1
ESCHEAT
GR L-45460 Feb. 25, 1938 THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF
SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, ET AL., applicants-appellants, vs.
COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE, INC., ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
This is an appeal from the order of CFI of Laguna of
Oct. 29, 1936, which denied the applicants motion
questioning the appearance and intervention in the
case of the oppositors Colegio de San Jose and Carlos
Young, and from the resolution of the 30th of the same
month which denied the petition for escheat filed by
the said Pets., with the costs against the latter.
This case was commenced in the said by a
petition filed by the Pets. in behalf of the
municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna,
wherein they claim the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasa by the right of escheat. The Colegio de San
Jose, Inc., appeared specially and assailed the
petition upon the grounds that the court has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance and decide the
case and that the petition does not allege
sufficient facts to entitle the applicants to the
remedy prayed for; and asked that the petition be
finally dismissed. Carlos Young intervened and
filed a motion asking for the dismissal or the
petition upon the ground that the Code of Civil
Procedure, under which the same was filed, is not
applicable because it was not yet in force when
the original owner of the hacienda died, which
was in Apr., 1596, and that the petition was
irregularly docketed as the applicants had paid at
the docket fees which the clerk of court should
collect. Subsequently the attorneys for both
parties filed another motions of minor
importance, almost all of which contains the
arguments advanced in support of their
contentions. On Oct. 29, 1936, the court
overruled the objection to the appearance and
intervention in the case by the Colegio de San
Jose and Carlos Young, entering the order which
is one of those appealed from. And on the 30th of
the same moth the court entered the resolution,
also appealed from, dismissing the petition for
escheat, with the costs to the Pets..
The Pets. attribute to the court the following
errors: "(1) In overruling the objection of the
appellant of Sept. 2, 1936, and in not excluding
the appellees Carlos Young and Colegio de San
Jose, Inc., from these proceedings. (2) In
sustaining definitely the appellees' petitions to
dismiss, without previous hearing and in
derogation of the right to amend in any case. (3)
In improperly and unseasonably taking judicial
notice of certain facts in other judicial records to
reinforce the appealed resolutions, and in
erroneously distorting those facts judicially taken
notice of. (4) In holding that the municipality of
San Jose has neither right standing to file a
petition for escheat; that the petition does not
state facts sufficient a cause of action and that the
same does not lie, and that CFI of Laguna is
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of and
decide said petition. (5) In finally dismissing the
petition upon the dilatory exceptions thereto, and
the ordering the payment of costs when no
hearing has yet taken place."
1. The sworn petition which gave rise to the
proceeding is based upon the provisions of Sec.
750 and 751 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
English text of which reads:
SEC. 750. Procedure when person dies
intestate without heirs. — When a person
dies intestate, seized of real or personal
property in the Philippines Islands, leaving
no heir or person by law entitled to the same,
the president and municipal council of the
municipality where the deceased last
resided, if he was an inhabitant of these
Islands, or of the municipality in which he
had estate, if he resided out of the Islands,
may, on behalf of the municipality, the file a
petition with CFI of the province for an
inquisition in the premises; the court shall
there upon appoint a time and place of
hearing, and deciding on such petition, and
cause a notice thereof to be published in
some newspaper of general circulation in the
province of which the deceased was last an
inhabitant, if within the Philippines Island,
and if not, some newspaper of general
circulation in the province in which he had
estate. The notice shall recite the substance
of the facts and request set forth in the
petition, the time and place at which persons
claiming the estate may appear and be heard
before the court, and shall be published at
least six weeks successively, the last of which
publication shall be at least six weeks before
the time appointed by the court to make
inquisition.
SEC. 751. Decree of the court in such case. —
If, at the time appointed for the that purpose,
the court that the person died intestate,
seized of real or personal property in the
Islands, leaving no heirs or person entitled to
the same and no sufficient cause is shown to

the contrary, the court shall order and decree
that the estate of the deceased in these
Islands, after the payment of just debts and
charges, shall escheat; and shall assign the
personal estate to the municipality where he
was last an inhabitant in the Islands, and the
real estate to the municipality in which the
same is situated. If he never was a inhabitant
of the Islands, the whole estate may be
assigned to the several municipalities where
the same is located. Such estate shall be for
the use of schools in the municipalities,
respectively, and shall be managed and
disposed or by the municipal council like
other property appropriated to the use of
schools.
Accordingly to the first of the said Sec.s, the
essential facts which should be alleged in the
petition, which are jurisdiction because they
confer jurisdiction upon CFI, are: That a person
has died intestate or without leaving any will;
that he has left real or personal property; that he
was the owner thereof; that he has not left any
heir or person who is by law entitled to the
property; and that the one who applies for the
escheat is the municipality where deceased had
his last residence, or in case should have no
residence in the country, the municipality where
the property is situated.
The following Sec. provides that after the
publications and trial, if the court finds that the
deceased is in fact the owner of real and personal
property situated in the country and has not left
any heirs or other person entitled thereto, it may
order, after the payments of debts and other legal
expenses, the escheat, and in such case it shall
adjudicate the personal property to the
municipality where the deceased had his last
place of residence and the real property to the
municipality or municipalities where they are
situated.
Escheat, under Sec.s 750 and 751, is a proceeding
whereby the real and personal property of a
deceased person become the property of the
State upon his death without leaving any will or
legal heirs. It is not an ordinary action
contemplated by Sec. 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, but a special proceeding in
accordance with the said Sec. and Chapter XXXIX,
Part II, of the same Code. The proceeding, as
provided by Sec. 750, should be commenced by
petition and not by complaint.
2
In a special proceeding for escheat under Sec. 750
and 751 the Pet. is not the sole and exclusive
interested party. Any person alleging to have a
direct right or interest in the property sought to
be escheated is likewise and interest and
necessary party and may appear and oppose the
petition for escheat. In the present case the
Colegio de San Jose, Inc., and Carlos Young
appeared alleging to have a material interest in
the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasa; and the
former because it claims to be the exclusive
owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he
claim to be the lessee thereof under a contract
legality entered with the former. In view of these
allegations it is erroneous to hold that the said
parties are without right either to appear in case
or to substantiate their respective alleged right.
This unfavorably resolves the Pets.' first
assignment of error. . ….
For the foregoing reasons, the appealed order and
resolution are affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the Pets. and appellants. So ordered.
ADOPTION
GR 85044 June 3, 1992 MACARIO TAMARGO,
CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA TAMARGO, Pets., vs.
CA, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC Judge, Br. 20,
Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and CLARA
BUNDOC, Rsps..
On 20 Oct. 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor
of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her
death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages
was filed with RTC, Br. 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by Pet. Macario
Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and Pet.
spouses Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's
natural parents against Rsp. spouses Victor and
Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with
whom he was living at the time of the tragic
incident. In addition to this case for damages, a
criminal information or Homicide through
Reckless Imprudence was filed [CrimCase No.
1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto,
however, was acquitted and exempted from
criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted
without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 Dec. 1981, the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had filed a
petition to adopt the minor Adelberto Bundoc in
SpecPro No. 0373-T before the then Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption

was grunted on, 18 Nov. 1982, that is, after
Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, Rsp. spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's
natural parents, reciting the result of the
foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not
they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment the successful petition for
adoption was filed.
Pets. in their Reply contended that since
Adelberto Bundoc was then actually living with
his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing
and granting of a petition for adoption.
TC on 3 Dec. 1987 dismissed Pets.' complaint,
ruling that Rsp. natural parents of Adelberto
indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action.
Pets. received a copy of TC's Decision on 7 Dec.
1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or
on 14 Dec. 1987, Pets. filed a MR followed by a
supplemental MR on 15 Jan. 1988. It appearing,
however, that the motions failed to comply with
Sec.s 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised RoC —
that notice of the motion shall be given to all
parties concerned at least 3 days before the
hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall
state the time and place of hearing — both
motions were denied by TC in an Order dated 18
Apr. 1988. On 28 Apr. 1988, Pets. filed a notice of
appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, TC
dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling
that the notice had been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period ending 22 Dec. 1987.
Pets. went to CA on a petition for mandamus and
certiorari questioning TC's Decision dated 3 Dec.
1987 and the Orders dated 18 Apr. 1988 and 6
June 1988, CA dismissed the petition, ruling that
Pets. had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, Pets. once
again contend that Rsp. spouses Bundoc are the
indispensable parties to the action for damages
caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto
Bundoc. Resolution of this Petition hinges on the
following issues: (1) W/N Pets., notwithstanding
loss of their right to appeal, may still file the
instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court
3
may still take cognizance of the case even through
Pets.' appeal had been filed out of time; and (2)
W/N the effects of adoption, insofar as parental
authority is concerned may be given retroactive
effect so as to make the adopting parents the
indispensable parties in a damage case filed
against their adopted child, for acts committed by
the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged
with the biological parents.
1. ….
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's
voluntary act of shooting Jennifer Tamargo with
an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-
delict against him. As Art. 2176 of the CC
provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil
liability upon the father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
may be caused by a minor child who lives with
them. Art. 2180 of the CC reads:
The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for
the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
The responsibility treated of in this Art. shall
cease when the person herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.
(Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of
what is frequently designated as vicarious
liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence"
under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is
not only liable for torts committed by himself, but
also for torts committed by others with whom he
has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a

natural or logical consequence of the duties and
responsibilities of parents — their parental
authority — which includes the instructing,
controlling and disciplining of the child. ….
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by
Adelberto with an air rifle occured when parental
authority was still lodged in Rsp. Bundoc spouses,
the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It
would thus follow that the natural parents who
had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto,
are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however,
stoutly maintain that because a decree of
adoption was issued by the adoption court in
favor of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority
was vested in the latter as adopting parents as of
the time of the filing of the petition for adoption
that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which
an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses contend that
they were therefore free of any parental
responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious
conduct.
Rsp. Bundoc spouses rely on Art. 36 of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after
considering the report of the Department of
Social Welfare or duly licensed child
placement agency and the evidence
submitted before it, the court is satisfied that
the Pet. is qualified to maintain, care for, and
educate the child, that the trial custody
period has been completed, and that the best
interests of the child will be promoted by the
adoption, a decree of adoption shall be
entered, which shall be effective he date the
original petition was filed. The decree shall
state the name by which the child is
thenceforth to be known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above
Art. 36 should be read in relation to Art. 39 of the
same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption
shall:
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the
natural parents, except where the adopter is
the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
(Emphasis supplied)
4
and urge that their Parental authority must be
deemed to have been dissolved as of the time the
Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted,
under the CC, the basis of parental liability for the
torts of a minor child is the relationship existing
between the parents and the minor child living
with them and over whom, the law presumes, the
parents exercise supervision and control. Art. 58
of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted
this rule:
Art. 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the
child under their parental authority in
accordance with the CC. (Emphasis supplied)
Art. 221 of the FC of the Philippines 9 has
similarly insisted upon the requisite that the
child, doer of the tortious act, shall have beer in
the actual custody of the parents sought to be
held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons
exercising parental authority shall be civilly
liable for the injuries and damages caused
by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their
company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is
properly regarded as having been retroactively
transferred to and vested in the adopting parents,
the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle
shooting happened. We do not consider that
retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the
adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect
may perhaps be given to the granting of the
petition for adoption where such is essential to
permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage
in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case,
however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as
to burden them with liability for a tortious act
that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the
time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair
and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover,

would be inconsistent with the philosophical and
policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious
liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of
parental dereliction on the part of the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen
since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their
control at the time the tort was committed.
Art. 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code
fortifies the conclusion reached above.
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for
adoption shall be finally granted unless and
until the adopting parents are given by the
courts a supervised trial custody period of at
least six months to assess their adjustment
and emotional readiness for the legal union.
During the period of trial custody, parental
authority shall be vested in the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Art. 35, parental authority is
provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the
issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child during such trial period. In the
instant case, the trial custody period either had
not yet begun or bad already been completed at
the time of the air rifle shooting; in any case,
actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that Rsp. Bundoc
spouses, Adelberto's natural parents, were
indispensable parties to the suit for damages
brought by Pets., and that the dismissal by TC of
Pets.' complaint, the indispensable parties being
already before the court, constituted grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the
Decision of CA dated 6 Sept. 1988, in C.A.-GR SP-
15016 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Pets.'
complaint filed before TC is hereby REINSTATED and
this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs
against Rsp. Bundoc spouses. This Decision is
immediately executory.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009 IN RE: PETITION
FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM,
Pet..
5
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P.
LIM, MONINA P. LIM, Pet..
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
Monina P. Lim (Pet.) seeking to set aside the Decision 1
dated 15 Sept. 2004 of RTC, General Santos City, Br. 22,
in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which
dismissed without prejudice the consolidated
petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael
Jude P. Lim.
Pet. is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June
1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were
unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a
child of their own, Pet. and Lim registered the
children to make it appear that they were the
children’s parents. The children2 were named
Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim
(Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old
when brought to the clinic of Pet.. She was born
on 15 Mar. 1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when
Ayuban brought him to Pet.’s clinic. His date of
birth is 1 Aug. 1983.4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as
if they were their own. They sent the children to
exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim"
in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 Nov. 1998, Lim died. On 27
Dec. 2000, Pet. married Angel Olario (Olario), an
American citizen.
Thereafter, Pet. decided to adopt the children by
availing of the amnesty5 given under RA 85526 to
those individuals who simulated the birth of a
child. Thus, on 24 Apr. 2002, Pet. filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael
before TC docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258
and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of
the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years
old and already married, while Michael was 18
years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to
the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent.7 Michael also gave his consent to his
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. 8
Pet.’s husband Olario likewise executed an
Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle
and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the DSWD, Michelle
was considered as an abandoned child and the
whereabouts of her natural parents were

unknown. 10
The DSWD issued a similar
Certification for Michael.11
The Ruling of TC
On 15 Sept. 2004, TC rendered judgment
dismissing the petitions. TC ruled that since Pet.
had remarried, Pet. should have filed the petition
jointly with her new husband. TC ruled that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Sec. 7(c), Art. III of RA 8552 and
Art. 185 of the FC.
Pet. filed a MR of the decision but the motion was
denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In
denying the motion, TC ruled that Pet. did not fall
under any of the exceptions under Sec. 7(c), Art.
III of RA 8552. Pet.’s argument that mere consent
of her husband would suffice was untenable
because, under the law, there are additional
requirements, such as residency and certification
of his qualification, which the husband, who was
not even made a party in this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already
emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the
joint exercise of parental authority, TC ruled that
joint adoption is not only for the purpose of
exercising parental authority because an
emancipated child acquires certain rights from
his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.
Issue: Pet. appealed directly to this Court raising
the sole issue of W/N Pet., who has remarried,
can singly adopt.
The Court’s Ruling
Pet. contends that the rule on joint adoption must
be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and
the State to protect the paramount interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted. Pet. argues
that the legal maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not
applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint
parental authority is not necessary in this case
since, at the time the petitions were filed,
Michelle was 25 years old and already married,
while Michael was already 18 years of age.
Parental authority is not anymore necessary
since they have been emancipated having
attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
6
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, Pet. had already remarried.
She filed the petitions by herself, without being
joined by her husband Olario. We have no other
recourse but to affirm TC’s decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is
explicit. Sec. 7, Art. III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may
adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in
possession of full civil capacity and legal
rights, of good moral character, has not
been convicted of any crime involving
moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for
children, at least 16 years older than the
adoptee, and who is in a position to support
and care for his/her children in keeping
with the means of the family. The
requirement of 16 year difference between
the age of the adopter and adoptee may be
waived when the adopter is the biological
parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of
the adoptee’s parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same
qualifications as above stated for Filipino
nationals: Provided, That his/her country
has diplomatic relations with the
REPUBLIC, that he/she has been living in
the Philippines for at least 3 continuous
years prior to the filing of the application
for adoption and maintains such residence
until the adoption decree is entered, that
he/she has been certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any
appropriate government agency that
he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in
his/her country, and that his/her
government allows the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her adopted
son/daughter: Provided, further, That the
requirements on residency and certification
of the alien’s qualification to adopt in
his/her country may be waived for the
following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks
to adopt a relative within the 4th
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of his/her
Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino
citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the
4th degree of consanguinity or
affinity of the Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward
after the termination of the guardianship
and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt,
except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her
own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated
from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one
spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted
provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to
the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity.
Pet., having remarried at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since
the petitions for adoption were filed only by Pet.
herself, without joining her husband, Olario, TC
was correct in denying the petitions for adoption
on this ground.
Neither does Pet. fall under any of the three
exceptions enumerated in Sec. 7. First, the
children to be adopted are not the legitimate
7
children of Pet. or of her husband Olario. Second,
the children are not the illegitimate children of
Pet.. And third, Pet. and Olario are not legally
separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain requirements
that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth
in Sec. 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove
that his country has diplomatic relations with the
REPUBLIC; (2) he must have been living in the
Philippines for at least three continuous years
prior to the filing of the application for adoption;
(3) he must maintain such residency until the
adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the
adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country
as the latter’s adopted child. None of these
qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial.
These requirements on residency and
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt
cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec. 7. The
children or adoptees are not relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of Pet.
or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the
legitimate children of Pet..
Effects of Adoption
Pet. contends that joint parental authority is not
anymore necessary since the children have been
emancipated having reached the age of majority.
This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing
the children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.13 The father
and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common
children.14 Even the remarriage of the surviving
parent shall not affect the parental authority over
the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or
property of the children.15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of
emancipation — that is, when he attains the age
of majority or 18 years of age16 — emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person
and property of the child, who shall then be

qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.
17
However, parental authority is merely just one of
the effects of legal adoption. Art. V of RA 8552
enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ART. V - EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases
where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and
the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be
considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as
such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters
born to them without discrimination of any kind.
To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love,
guidance, and support in keeping with the means
of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate
succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall
have reciprocal rights of succession without
distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if
the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had
left a will, the law on testamentary succession
shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1)
sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2)
deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including but not
limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose
the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the
right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and
compulsory heirs of each other.18 Therefore, even
if emancipation terminates parental authority,
the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child
of the adopter with all the rights 19 of a legitimate
child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the
father and the mother; (2) to receive support
from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the
legitime and other successional rights.
Conversely, the adoptive parents shall, with
respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits
to which biological parents are entitled 20 such as
support21 and successional rights.22
8
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes,
being humane and salutary, hold the interests and
welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give
them the protection of society and family, as well
as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law. ….
Pet., in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent
events would show that joint adoption could no
longer be possible because Olario has filed a case
for dissolution of his marriage to Pet. in the Los
Angeles Superior Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of
the marriage between Pet. and Olario is of no
moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is
a judicial decree for the dissolution of the
marriage between Pet. and Olario, the marriage
still subsists. That being the case, joint adoption
by the husband and the wife is required. We
reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, Pet. was
married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the
Decision dated 15 Sept. 2004 of RTC, General Santos
City, Br. 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259.
Costs against Pet..
GR 164948 June 27, 2006 DIWATA RAMOS
LANDINGIN Pet., vs. REPUBLIC, Rsp..
On Feb. 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a
citizen of the USA, of Filipino parentage and a
resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition 3 for the
adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was
born on Aug. 31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who
was born on Sept. 7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon
Ramos who was born on Aug. 5, 1989. 6 The
minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos,
Pet.’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as Pet., alleged in her petition that
when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, 7 the children
were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria
Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia,

went to Italy, re-married there and now has two
children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children by Manuel
Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left
up to the institution of the adoption; the minors
are being financially supported by the Pet. and
her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria
passed away on Nov. 23, 2000, Pet. desires to
adopt the children; the minors have given their
written consent8 to the adoption; she is qualified
to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-
year-old widow, has children of her own who are
already married, gainfully employed and have
their respective families; she lives alone in her
own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired
citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She
came back to the Philippines to spend time with
the minors; her children gave their written
consent9 to the adoption of the minors. Pet.’s
brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial
income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in Pet.’s
custody.
Pet. prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered in her favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to
this Honorable Court that after publication and
hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the
adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon
Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon
Ramos by the Pet., and ordering that the minor
children’s name follow the family name of Pet..
Pet. prays for such other reliefs, just and
equitable under the premises.10
On Mar. 5, 2002, the court ordered the DSWD to
conduct a case study as mandated by Art. 34 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to
submit a report thereon not later than Apr. 4,
2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the
petition. The OSG entered its appearance 12 but
deputized the City Prosec. of Tarlac to appear in
its behalf. Since her petition was unopposed, Pet.
was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.
The Pet. testified in her behalf. She also presented
Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to
testify on the written consent executed by her
and her siblings.15 The Pet. marked in evidence
the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by
her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel
Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized
9
by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said
consent.16
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social
Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III,
Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the
following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds
minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed
Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the
following reasons:
1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has
voluntarily consented to their adoption by the
paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view
of her inability to provide the parental care,
guidance and support they need. An Affidavit
of Consent was executed by the mother which
is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption have
also expressed their willingness to be adopted
and joins the Pets. in Guam, USA in the future.
A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached.
The minors developed close attachment to the
Pets. and they regarded her as second parent.
3. The minors are present under the care of a
temporary guardian who has also family to
look after. As young adolescents they really
need parental love, care, guidance and support
to ensure their protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma
D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by
their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial
custody is hereby further recommended to be
dispensed with considering that they are close
relatives and that close attachments was already
developed between the Pet. and the 3 minors.17
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her
interview, as follows:
The mother of minors came home together with
her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks
vacation. This is to enable her appear for the
personal interview concerning the adoption of
her children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their
paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived
after the death of their paternal grandmother and

guardian. The paternal relatives including the Pet.
who attended the wake of their mother were very
much concerned about the well-being of the three
minors. While preparing for their adoption, they
have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with
minors and act as their temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about the
adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of
adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented. She realized that her children need
parental love, guidance and support which she
could not provide as she already has a second
family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the
Pets. & her children have been supporting her
children up to the present and truly care for
them, she believes her children will be in good
hands. She also finds Pets. in a better position to
provide a secured and bright future to her
children.18
However, Pet. failed to present Pagbilao as
witness and offer in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; Pet.,
likewise, failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the
adoption.
On Nov. 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the
petition for adoption, rendered a decision
granting said petition. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that
henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma
Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from
all legal obligations obedience and maintenance
from their natural parents and that they be
declared for all legal intents and purposes the
children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial
custody is dispensed with considering that
parent-children relationship has long been
established between the children and the
adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the
children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to
"Ramos-Landingin."
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local
Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect
the corresponding changes/amendment in the
birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.
SO ORDERED.19
On Apr. 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22
reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that Pet.
10
failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary
consent of Amelia Ramos, the children’s natural
mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the
Pet.’s children could not also be admitted in
evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA
and was not authenticated or acknowledged
before a Philippine consular office, and although
Pet. has a job, she was not stable enough to
support the children. The dispositive portion of
the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed
decision dated Nov. 25, 2002 of RTC, Br. 63, Tarlac
City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.23
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings
are the following: (a) whether the Pet. is entitled
to adopt the minors without the written consent
of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b)
W/N the affidavit of consent purportedly
executed by the Pet.-adopter’s children
sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) W/N
Pet. is financially capable of supporting the
adoptees.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to
the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v.
Agrava,28 that adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration and are
designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society
and family in the person of the adopter as well as
to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should thus be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.29
However, in Cang v. CA,30 the Court also ruled that
the liberality with which this Court treats matters
leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the
beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the
rights and privileges of the adopted child arising
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount
consideration is the overall benefit and interest of
the adopted child, should be understood in its

proper context and perspective. The Court’s
position should not be misconstrued or
misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond
the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
Thus, the discretion to approve adoption
proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best
interests of the child but likewise, with due
regard to the natural rights of the parents over
the child.31
Sec. 9 of RA 8552, otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the
Adoption. - After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold
his/her approval of the adoption, the written
consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:
(a) The adoptee, if 10 years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if
known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal
custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted
sons/daughters, 10 years of age or over, of
the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, 10 years
of age or over, of the adopter, if living with
said adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting
or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to
the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted
interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the
child in the manner of the proposed adoption.32
Clearly, the written consent of the biological
parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a
parent to his child requires that his consent must
be obtained before his parental rights and duties
may be terminated and re-established in adoptive
parents. In this case, Pet. failed to submit the
written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
11
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that
she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who
arrived in the Philippines with her son, John
Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in
the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to
interview her, it is incredible that the latter would
not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written
Consent to the adoption of her minor children.
Neither did the Pet. bother to present Amelia
Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
Pet., nonetheless, argues that the written consent
of the biological mother is no longer necessary
because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990,
she left for Italy and never came back. The
children were then left to the guidance and care
of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal
relatives, including Pet., who provided for the
children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the
biological mother, had effectively abandoned the
children. Pet. further contends that it was by
twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition
for adoption was pending with the RTC that
Amelia and her child by her second marriage
were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the
DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and
during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the
social worker that she conformed to the adoption
of her three children by the Pet..
Pet.’s contention must be rejected. When she filed
her petition with TC, Rep. Act No. 8552 was
already in effect. Sec. 9 thereof provides that if
the written consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained, the written consent of the
legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as
claimed by Pet., that the biological mother of the
minors had indeed abandoned them, she should,
thus have adduced the written consent of their
legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify
the adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to
forego all parental duties.33 The term means
neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. If a parent
withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to
display filial affection, and neglects to lend
support and maintenance, the parent, in effect,
abandons the child.34
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment.35 To dispense with the

requirement of consent, the abandonment must
be shown to have existed at the time of
adoption.36
In this case, Pet. relied solely on her testimony
and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that
Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Pet.’s
testimony on that matter follows:
Q Where is the mother of these three children now?
A She left for Italy on Nov. 20, 1990, sir.
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was
there an instance where she communicated with the
family?
A None, sir.
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir.
Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already married
with another man.
Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Q Did you come to know whether she has children by
her second marriage?
A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37
Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:
Q Where is your mother now?
A In Italy, sir.
Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in
1990?
A Two years old, sir.
Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your
mother communicate with you?
A No, sir.38
However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD
Social Worker also stated the following:
IV. Background of the Case:
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had
been under the care and custody of their
maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov.
2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased
father now serves as their guardian. The Pet.,
together with her children and other relatives
abroad have been supporting the minor children
financially, even during the time that they were
still living with their natural parents. Their
mother also sends financial support but very
minimal.39
12
V. Background Information about the Minors
Being Sought for Adoption:
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model
to her younger siblings. She helps them in their
lessons, works and has fun with them. She also
encourages openness on their problems and
concerns and provides petty counseling. In
serious problems she already consult her mother
and Pet.-aunt.40
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3
children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they
had a happy and comfortable life. After the death
of her husband, her in-laws which include the Pet.
had continued providing support for them.
However being ashamed of just depending on the
support of her husband’s relatives, she decided to
work abroad. Her parents are also in need of
financial help as they are undergoing
maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged
their farm land which she used in going to Italy
and worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in Nov. 1990, she entrusted
her 3 children to the care & custody of her
mother-in-law who returned home for good,
however she died on Nov. 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a
married man from Tarlac. They became live-in
partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario
who is now 2 years old. The three of them are
considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that
Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his
marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is
providing his legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging from
P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents
who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a
month to his children. The Pet. and other
paternal relatives are continuously providing
support for most of the needs & education of
minors up to present.41
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not
intended to abandon her children, or to
permanently sever their mother-child
relationship. She was merely impelled to leave
the country by financial constraints. Yet, even
while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish
entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the
children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for,
as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her

mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems.
Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial
support to the children, though in minimal
amounts as compared to what her affluent in-
laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the
adoption of the minors herein will have the effect
of severing all legal ties between the biological
mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the
same shall then be vested on the adopter.42 It
would thus be against the spirit of the law if
financial consideration were to be the paramount
consideration in deciding whether to deprive a
person of parental authority over his/her
children. More proof has to be adduced that
Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children,
and that the latter will not miss her guidance and
counsel if they are given to an adopting parent. 43
Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.
Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the RoC provides that the
Court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of
evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the
Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment
only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in
evidence for the purpose or purposes for which
such document is offered, the same is merely a
scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere
identification of documents and the markings
thereof as Exh.s do not confer any evidentiary
weight on documents unless formally offered.44
Pet. failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report
and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly
executed by her children; the authenticity of
which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint
written consent of Pet.’s children45 was notarized
on Jan. 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated
by the RoC in the same way as a document
notarized in this country it needs to comply with
Sec. 2 of Act No. 2103,46 which states:
Sec. 2. An instrument or document acknowledged
and authenticated in a foreign country shall be
considered authentic if the acknowledgment and
authentication are made in accordance with the
following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before
(1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of
13
legation, chargeé d affaires, consul, vice-consul,
or consular agent of the REPUBLIC, acting
within the country or place to which he is
accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer
duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or
documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment
shall certify that the person acknowledging
the instrument or document is known to him,
and that he is the same person who executed
it, and acknowledged that the same is his free
act and deed. The certificate shall be under his
official seal, if he is by law required to keep a
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In
case the acknowledgment is made before a
notary public or an officer mentioned in
subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph,
the certificate of the notary public or the
officer taking the acknowledgment shall be
authenticated by an ambassador, minister,
secretary of legation, chargeé de affaires,
consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the
REPUBLIC, acting within the country or place
to which he is accredited. The officer making
the authentication shall certify under his
official seal that the person who took the
acknowledgment was at the time duly
authorized to act as notary public or that he
was duly exercising the functions of the office
by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that
as such he had authority under the law to take
acknowledgment of instruments or documents
in the place where the acknowledgment was
taken, and that his signature and seal, if any,
are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of Pet.’s legitimate
children did not comply with the afore-cited law,
the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a
private document whose authenticity must be
proved either by anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or by evidence of the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the makers.47
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was
introduced by Pet. to authenticate the written
consent of her legitimate children, the same is
inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled
that Pet. was not stable enough to support the
children and is only relying on the financial

backing, support and commitment of her children
and her siblings.48 Pet. contradicts this by
claiming that she is financially capable as she has
worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a
house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with
tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her
children and siblings have likewise committed
themselves to provide financial backing should
the need arise. OSG, again in its comment, banks
on the statement in the Home Study Report that
"Pet. has limited income." Accordingly, it appears
that she will rely on the financial backing of her
children and siblings in order to support the
minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is
the adopter who should be in a position to
provide support in keeping with the means of the
family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is
the best interest of the child, it follows that the
financial capacity of prospective parents should
also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly,
the adopter should be in a position to support the
would-be adopted child or children, in keeping
with the means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study Report 49
forwarded by the Department of Public Health &
Social Services of the Government of Guam to the
DSWD, Pet. is no longer supporting her legitimate
children, as the latter are already adults, have
individual lives and families. At the time of the
filing of the petition, Pet. was 57 years old,
employed on a part-time basis as a waitress,
earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000
a month. Pet.’s main intention in adopting the
children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She
has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo,
Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Pet.
likewise knows that the limited income might be
a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful
whether Pet. will be able to sufficiently handle
the financial aspect of rearing the three children
in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is
rather of age. While Pet. claims that she has the
financial support and backing of her children and
siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the
ability to support the adoptees is personal to the
adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation
between the former and the latter. Moreover, the
records do not prove nor support Pet.’s allegation
that her siblings and her children are financially
14
able and that they are willing to support the
minors herein. The Court, therefore, again
sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that Pet. has only the
best of intentions for her nieces and nephew,
there are legal infirmities that militate against
reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, Pet. is
not prevented from filing a new petition for
adoption of the herein minors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED.
RULE 103, 108, RA 9048
GR L-33131 May 30, 1983 REPUBLIC, Pet.,
vs. HON. DAVID P. AVILA, Judge of CFI of Cotabato
and TAN CHENG BENG, TAN AY KIM, TAN CHENG
KENG, TAN AY GHO and LIM LIONG HO Rsps..
This is an appeal by the State from an Order of the
Rsp. Court authorizing the change of names applied
for by the private Rsps. pursuant to Rule 103 of RoC.
In their petition filed in the Rsp. Court, private
Rsps., who are brothers and sisters, prayed that
their names be changed as follows: Tan Cheng
Beng to Johnny Yap Tan; Tan Ay Kim to Jeanette
Yap Tan; Tan Cheng Keng to Jimmy Yap Tan; and
Tan Ay Gho to Jennifer Yap Tan. The petition was
published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the City and Province of Cotabato where the
private Rsps. reside. At the hearing, at which a
representative of the SolGen appeared as counsel
for the herein Pet., the private Rsps. presented
their documentary and testimonial evidence. No
evidence was presented on behalf of the State.
It appears that the private Rsps. are the
legitimate children of the spouses Lim Leong Ho
and Yap Kun both Chinese citizens. Their mother,
Yap Kun was already dead when this petition for
change of name was filed. They were all born in
Dulawan (now Datu Piang) Cotabato, on Sept. 11,
1943, Dec. 8, 1948, Jan. 21, 1950 and June 3,
1955, respectively. The present names of the
private Rsps. are what appear in their certificates
of birth, in the records of the Bureau of
Immigration, their certificates of registration, and
in their school records.
The reasons adduced by the private Rsps. for
wanting the change of their names are as follows:

1. Having been born in the Philippines and having
learned to love and adopt the traits and traditions
of the Filipino people, they desire to change their
Chinese names into Christian or Filipino names;
2. To avoid embarrassment and confusion in their
social and business dealings, they having been
known by their friends and acquaintances by the
names they wish to adopt;
3. In the case of private Rsp. Tan Ay Gho to avoid
ridicule, inasmuch as such name in Muslim
dialect means "running nose."
We find merit in the appeal taken by the herein
Pet. to seek a reversal of the questioned Order of
the Rsp. Court.
A change of name is a mere privilege and not a
matter of right. It should not be abused, nor
allowed for trivial and flimsy reasons. To justify a
change of name, there must exist a proper and
reasonable cause or compelling reason. In
Tanada, supra, it was held that the following may
be considered proper and reasonable causes that
may warrant the grant of a petition for change of
name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted
with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a
consequence of a change of status, such as when a
natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and
(3) when the change is necessary to avoid
confusion.
The reasons given by the private Rsps. do not
impress Us as sufficient and valid justification for
the desired change of their names. We also find
certain aspects in this proceeding that need
clarification to erase possible suspicion as to the
motivation behind the same:
1. We see nothing embarrassing in hearing a
Chinese name, especially by one who is
admittedly a Chinese. It would be a greater
source of ridicule for a Chinese to adopt
American or Filipino names, which in itself
connotes a desire to hide one's ancestry, as if he
were ashamed of the same.
2. Granting the change of the names of the private
Rsps., as prayed for by them, would not eliminate
confusion, but would possibly enhance the same.
Instead of having only two names (their names in
the birth registry, and the names they are
supposedly known to their friends) which fact is
15
already confusing by itself the private Rsps. will
have three, the third being the names they are
praying for in this proceeding. It will be noted
that private Rsps. do not only want to legalize
their use of American names, by which they claim
they are usually known, but also a new family
name (Yap Tan) which includes that of their
mother but which they never used before. It
becomes confusion worse compounded if it is
considered that the private Rsps. are not using
the family name of their father (Lim), but that of
the first husband of their mother who was
surnamed Tan.
3. The supposed ugly meaning of the name of
private Rsp. Tan Ay Gho which allegedly means
"running nose" in the Muslim dialect may not be
considered reason enough to change the same.
Her parents who, at the time of her birth, were
long-time residents of Cotabato, are presumed to
know the signification of the name they gave to
their daughter in the local dialect, and they would
not have picked on that name ff it would invite
ridicule or shame on her part. The alleged
offensive-sounding name (Ay Gho) being a given
name, was chosen for her, and not one imposed
by law as is in the case of a family name.
4. We searched the record in vain for a plausible
or credible explanation why the private Rsps.
would want to legalize "Yap Tan" as their family
name. "Yap Tan" is a combination of the family
names of the private Rsps.' mother, who was
already deceased at the time this proceeding was
commenced, and of their mother's first husband.
They are totally discarding the use of the family
name of their father, Lim Liong Ho which is
specifically ordained by law. (Art. 264, par. 1, CC.)
Lim Liong Ho could merely explain what the Rsp.
Court called a "legal anomaly" by declaring that it
was the mother of the private Rsps. who gave
them the family name "Tan", and he simply
acquiesced in the same.
While there appears no showing that the use by
the private Rsps. of the family name of the
deceased first husband of their mother, and not
that of their own father, was intended for some
ulterior or sinister purposes, the fact remains
that such circumstance is a source of
bewilderment by itself, if not of some unsavory
implication as to their legitimacy. This situation is
not helped any, and in fact aggravated, by the
proposal to use their mother's surname as part of
their own. We cannot give judicial sanction to

legalize the use of the names applied for by the
private Rsps..
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for change of
names shall be deemed DENIED. No costs.
GR 140305 Dec. 9, 2005 PLATON AND LIBRADA
CERUILA, Pets., vs. ROSILYN DELANTAR,
represented by her guardian, DSWD, Rsp..
Pets.-spouses Platon Ceruila and Librada D.
Ceruila (Ceruilas) filed an action with RTC of
Manila, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-818932,
for the annulment and cancellation of the birth
certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar
(Rosilyn), the child-victim in the rape case
involving Romeo Jaloslos.1 The RTC granted the
Ceruilas’ petition in its decision dated Apr. 11,
19972 which was nullified, however, by CA on
June 10, 1999.3 The CA denied Pets.’ MR.4 Hence
the present petition.
Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn complained against
her father, Simplicio Delantar (Simplicio) for child
abuse, particularly prostitution. Simplicio was
incarcerated at the Pasay City Jail starting Aug.
22, 1996 which prompted the filing of a petition
for involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor of
the DSWD, as the whereabouts of the mother,
Librada Ceruila, was unknown. The petition was
granted by the RTC of Pasay City, Br. 119 on Nov.
9, 1996 and Simplicio’s motion to vacate said
judgment was denied by said court on Jan. 20,
1997.5
On Feb. 3, 1997, the Ceruilas filed a petition
before the RTC of Manila, entitled "IN THE
MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT
OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN
TELIN DELANTAR," praying that the birth
certificate of Rosilyn be canceled and declared
null and void for the reasons that said birth
certificate was made an instrument of the crime
of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and
spurious, and it falsified all material entries
therein, as follows:
a. The name of her mother which should not be
Pet. Librada A. Telin;
b. The signature of informant referring to
‘Librada T. Delantar’ being a forgery;
c. The name of Simplicio Delantar as the
biological father, considering that, as already
16
mentioned, he is merely the foster father and co-
guardian in fact of Maria Rosilyn and the name of
the natural father in unknown;
d. The date of marriage of the supposed parents,
since the parents reflected in said certificate were
actually full blood brother and sister and
therefore marriage between the two is virtually
impossible;
e. The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child
as the same is actually not legitimate;
f. The date of actual birth of Marial Rosilyn, since
the known father merely made it appear that she
was born at the time the informations for the
birth certificate were supplied by him to the civil
registrar or proper recording;
g. The name of the physician who allegedly
attended at the time of birth of Maria Rosilyn,
being a fictitious ‘Dr. Santos’.6
On Feb. 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting
the case for hearing on Mar. 19, 1997 and
directed the publication of said order once a
week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation. The Order also stated that
any person who is interested in the petition may
interpose his/her comment or opposition thereto
on or before the scheduled hearing.7
Summons was sent to the Civil Register of
Manila.8 However, no representative appeared
during the scheduled hearing.9
On Apr. 11, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision
granting the petition of the Ceruilas as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING the certificate of live birth of the Minor
Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar as registered under the
Local Civil Registry No. 85-27325 of the office of the
City Civil Registrar of Manila as null and void ab initio:
and
2. ORDERING the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the
National Statistics Office, Manila, to expunge from
their respective marriage registers the entry of the
birth of said minor and such other documents
pertaining thereto, if any.
Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Office of
the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the National
Statistics Office for record purposes.SO ORDERED.10

The RTC explained in its Decision thus:
During the initial trial, the petition was read
aloud in open court to find out if there is any
opposition thereto. There being none, the Pet.’s
counsel, Atty. Goering G.C. Paderanga, then
established the jurisdictional requirements
(Exh.s "A" to "E").11 Thereafter, Pet. husband
Platon Ceruila was placed on the stand as the
lone witness for the Pet. and after he completed
his testimony, Atty. Paderanga formally offered
his evidence and rested his case.
The evidence on record reveals the following:
On May 11, 1985, a child was born at the Dr. Jose
Fabella Memorial Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
The name of the child was entered in her birth
certificate as Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Exh.
"I"). In the said birth certificate the name of the
child’s mother appear as Librada A. Telin (Entry
No. 6) while that of her father as Simplicio R.
Delantar (Entry No. 9). The birth certificate
likewise shows that the parents of the child,
Simplicio R. Delantar and Librada A. Telin, were
married on Feb. 14, 1977 in Manila (Entry No.
12). Likewise, in Entry No. 21 of the same
document, it is made to appear that the mother of
the child was 27 years old when the child was
born and that she was attended in her delivery
thereof by Dr. Santos (Entry No. 13). The birth
certificate was signed by one Librada T. delos
Santos as the informant and mother of the child
with her given address as 2165 P. Burgos St.,
Pasay City (Entry No. 14). This is the very
certificate of live birth that is being seriously
impugned by the herein Pets..
In support of their petition, the Pets. submitted
the baptismal certificates of Simplicio Delantar
(Exh. "J") and Librada Delantar (Exh. "K") to
prove that they are full blood brother and sister
and could not have been possible for them to
have sired Rosilyn . In the said baptismal
certificates, the names of the parents of Simplicio
and Librada are similarly entered as Juan
Delantar and Carila Telen (Exh. "J-1" and "K-1").
The Court is inclined to concur with the
observation of the Pet. that it is highly unlikely
that the alleged parents of Rosilyn would commit
an incestuous act and proclaim to the whole
world that they are the parents of the herein
minor. The court has also observed that in the
baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar, it is
entered therein that she was born on Jan. 8, 1940
17
in Tubod, Manglanilla, Cebu (Exh. "K-2"). Such
being the case, then Librada must have been 45
years of age at the time of the birth of Rosilyn in
stark contrast to her age appearing in Entry No.
27 of the birth certificate of the latter which
shows that Librada was 27 years old at the time
of her delivery. The presentation of the baptismal
certificate of Librada Delantar as secondary
evidence of her birth certificate was resorted to
after the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Minglanilla, Cebu gave a certification to the effect
that the records of birth on file with the office for
the period Jan., 1940 to Apr., 1945 were all
destroyed by WORLD WAR II (Exh. "L"). And
going for the jugular, so to speak, the signature of
the person named Librada T. delos Santos in the
birth certificate (Exh. "I") purporting to be that of
the Pet. wife and the signature of the latter
appearing in the verification of the Pet. (Exh. "A-
6") are so strikingly dissimilar that they could not
have but proceeded from two different hands. For
it does not require the trained eye of an expert
calligrapher to discern such discrepancy in the
writing style.
In fine, there being an abundance of evidence to
support the Pet.’s claim that the birth certificate is
indeed a falsified document, the Court is left with
no other alternative but to grant the relief prayed
for in the petition. To let the birth certificate
reamin as it is would adversely affect the rights
and interests of the herein Pets..12
On July 15, 1997, Rosilyn, represented by her
legal guardian, the DSWD, filed, with the CA, a
petition for the annulment of judgment in the
petition for cancellation of entry of her birth
certificate.13 She claimed that she and her
guardian were not notified of the petition and the
subsequent judgment and learned about the
same only from the news on May 16, 1997.14 She
argued that the RTC decision was issued without
jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due
process; that the Judge did not have authority to
declare her to be illegitimate; and that mere
correction of entries, not cancellation of the
entire certificate, is the appropriate remedy.15
Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without
admitting that Librada is not her mother, still it
was erroneous to cancel or annul her entire birth
certificate; Librada is not an interested party
concerning the issue of whether Simplicio is the
father, the date of actual birth, and the name of
the physician who attended to the birth;16

Librada’s allegations are also contradicted by (a)
the "Records Based on Cord Dressing Room Book
… dated Apr. 13-May 29, 1985," issued by Emelita
H. Avinante, Head of the Medical Records Sec. and
Admitting Unit of the Fabella Hospital, which is
attached to the petition for annulment as Annex
"E" and which states that Maria Rosilyn Delantar
was born on May 11, 1985 at the Fabella Hospital
and that her parents are Librada Telin and
Simplicio Delantar;17 and (b) the admission of
Simplicio in his Motion to Vacate Judgment18 in
Sp. Proc. No. 96-41919 regarding the custody of
Rosilyn, which is attached to the petition to annul
as Annex "F," where he stated that he, as the
rightful parent of Rosilyn, should not be deprived
of his parental authority.20
On June 10, 1999, the CA rendered the herein
assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is GRANTED.
Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING NULL
and VOID the decision of the Rsp. RTC dated Apr.
11, 1997 in SpecPro No. 97-81893.With costs
against private Rsps.. SO ORDERED.21
The CA reasoned that:
As shown in the caption of the petition in SpecPro
No. 97-81893 entitled "In the Matter of
Cancellation and Annulment of the Birth
Certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar",
herein Pet. Rosilyn Delantar represented by her
legal guardian, DSWD, was not made a party-Rsp.
therein,…contrary to the mandatory provision of
Sec. 3 of Rule 108 of the RoC …
In the said Special Proceeding No. 97-81893, Pets.
therein, Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila,
sought not only a cancellation or correction of an
entry in the birth certificate of Rosilyn Telin
Delantar but in effect sought to annul, cancel or
expunge from the Civil Register the subject birth
certificate. With more reasons, therefore, that all
parties, particularly Rosilyn Telin Delantar, or
thru her legal guardian, the DSWD, whose birth
certificate was sought to be annulled or cancelled
from the Civil Register must not only be notified
but must be made a party in the said petition.
Pet. and her guardian are undoubtedly persons
who have interest which would be affected by the
18
petition for the obvious reason that it is the entry
of her birth which is being sought to be annulled
and cancelled.
In a similar case, the Supreme Court ruled that
corrections of substantial entries in the certificate
other than mere clerical errors, should be passed
upon in an appropriate adversary proceedings
with all the persons interested are made parties
therein… Republic vs. Valencia (141 SCRA 462;
468-469; 470-474).
The proceedings undertaken in said SpecPro No.
97-81893 is indeed wanting of the required
notice to all the parties having claim or interest
which would be affected thereby, and of the
adversarial proceedings, as disclosed in the
decision dated Apr. 11, 1997…
With the foregoing disquisitions, We find that the
decision dated Apr. 11, 1997 null and void for
want of jurisdiction over the person of herein Pet.
Rosilyn Delantar and the DSWD as her legal
guardian and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the said
decision. Also, the said decision dated Apr. 11,
1997 is considered null and void for lack of due
process there being no adversarial proceedings
(was) conducted by the public Rsp. RTC.
And, even if the same judgment had already
become final and executory, and had in fact been
executed, as in the instant case, still the execution
thereof produces no legal effects. 22
The CA denied the MR of Pets..23 Hence, the
present petition raising the following issues:
I. W/N CA ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE
DECISION RENDERED BY RTC OF MANILA BR. 38
DATED APR. 11, 1997 IN SPEC. PROCEEDING NO. 97-
81893 ENTITLED: IN THE MATTER OF
CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH
CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR
II. W/N THE HONORABLE CA SHOULD HAVE
EXERCISED ITS PEREMPTORY POWER TO DECLARE
THE SUBJECT BIRTH CERTIFICATE NULL AND VOID
AB INITIO.24
As to the first issue, Pets. argue that: since the
falsification of the entries in the birth certificate
of Rosilyn renders the same void ab initio, the
case should be liberally construed as an ordinary

civil action for declaration of nullity of falsified
documents based on Art. 5 of the CC25 and Sec.
15, Rule 6 of the RoC26 and not as a special
proceeding; Pets. were only constrained to utilize
the provisions of Rule 108 of the RoC on the
Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry since Art. 5 of the CC provides no
procedure for the nullification of void documents
which happens to be a birth certificate in this
case; since the present case involves an ordinary
civil action, the cases relied upon by the CA which
are applicable only to SpecPro should not be
applied herein; the civil registrar, which is an
indispensable party, was duly served summons
by mail; Rsp., meanwhile, is not an indispensable
party and granting that she is, she was deemed
duly impleaded as her name was clearly stated in
the caption of the case; Rsp.’s location could not
be determined as she was reported to have ran
away from the custody of Simplicio, thus the
publication of the petition and the order of the
RTC setting the case for hearing once a week for
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation should be considered
substantial notice and the requirements of due
process deemed substantially complied with;
there was no adversarial proceeding in court
because the parties were declared in general
default thus, just like an ordinary civil case, the
court should receive evidence ex parte.27
As to the second issue, Pets. claim that: the CA
should have exercised its peremptory power to
declare the birth certificate of Rosilyn as null and
void ab initio following the doctrine that where
an instrument is void ab initio for being contrary
to law, no amount of technicalities could correct
its inherent nullity; otherwise, there will be
multiplicity of actions as the parties will have to
file cases anew to annul Rsp.’s birth certificate.28
They then pray that the CA decision dated June
10, 1999 be reversed and that the RTC judgment
dated Apr. 11, 1997 be reinstated.29
Anent the first issue, the SolGen, for the Rsp.,
contends that: since the Pets. chose to file a
petition under Rule 108 they cannot in the
present action turn around and claim that their
case is not a special proceeding; in any case, due
process was not complied with rendering the
proceedings a quo annullable; Pets. sought to
establish Librada Ceruila’s status, i.e., W/N she is
the mother of Rsp., thus, the action falls within
the ambit of Sec. 3(c), Rule 1 of the RoC;30 Pets.
19
did not allege that they are bringing the suit to
enforce or protect their right or to prevent or
redress a wrong, for their case to be categorized
as an ordinary civil action; Art. 5 of the CC which
is being invoked by Pets. is a general provision,
while entries of record of birth in the civil
register are governed by RA 3753 (Civil Registry
Law) as amended, and Presidential Decree No.
651; since the law provides for a remedy when an
entry in a record found in the civil registry is
erroneous or falsified, Pets. cannot, by their mere
allegation, transport their case from the realm of
the rules on SpecPro for the correction of entry to
that of an ordinary civil case for annulment of a
falsified document; in Republic vs. Valencia,31 it
was held that the parties who must be made
parties to a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register are the civil registrar and all persons who
have or who are claiming interests who would be
affected thereby; Rsp., being a person whose
interests would be adversely affected by the
petition, is an indispensable party to the case;
publication cannot be substituted for notice; Rsp.
cannot be declared in default since she was not
properly notified.32
Anent the second issue, Rsp. contends that the CA
has no authority to rule on the merits of the case
since in a petition for annulment of judgment on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, its authority is
limited to ruling on W/N the Pet. was denied due
process of law; that if the CA were to rule on the
merits of the case, it would have deprived Rsp. of
due process; and that in any case, Rsp.’s record of
birth is not void as Librada was only able to prove
that she is not the mother of Rsp..33
Is the petition for annulment and cancellation of
the birth certificate of Rosilyn an ordinary civil
action or a special proceeding? Considering that
the petition, based on its allegations, does not
question the fact of birth of Rosilyn, all matters
assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth
certificate properly, including the date of birth,
fall under Rule 108 of the RoC which governs
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry. Thus, the petition filed by the Ceruilas,
alleging material entries in the certificate as
having been falsified, is properly considered as a
special proceeding pursuant to Sec. 3(c), Rule 1
and Rule 108 of the RoC.
Did the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of
Rule 108? We answer in the negative.

Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the RoC, expressly states that:
SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all
persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register must be made parties thereto.35 As
enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito,36 unless
all possible indispensable parties were duly
notified of the proceedings, the same shall be
considered as falling much too short of the
requirements of the rules.37
Here, it is clear that no party could be more
interested in the cancellation of Rosilyn’s birth
certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation,
legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake.
Pets. claim that even though Rosilyn was never
made a party to the proceeding, it is enough that
her name was included in the caption of the
petition. Such reasoning is without merit.
As we pronounced in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic38
where the mother sought changes in the entries
of her two children’s birth certificates:
…since only the Office of the SolGen was notified
through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal,
representing the REPUBLIC as the only Rsp., the
proceedings taken, which is summary in nature,
is short of what is required in cases where
substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the
Office of the SolGen, all other indispensable
parties should have been made Rsps.. They
include not only the declared father of the child
but the child as well, together with the paternal
grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights
would be adversely affected thereby. All other
persons who may be affected by the change
should be notified or represented . . ..39 (Emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of
Manila was served summons, who, however, did
not participate in the proceedings. This alone is
clearly not sufficient to comply with the
requirements laid down by the rules.
20
Pets. further claim that the lack of summons on
Rosilyn was cured by the publication of the order
of TC setting the case for hearing for three
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation.
We do not agree. Summons must still be served,
not for the purpose of vesting the courts with
jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements
of fair play and due process.40 This is but proper,
to afford the person concerned the opportunity to
protect her interest if she so chooses.
Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that
even though an interested party was not
impleaded in the petition, such defect was cured
by compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 108 on
publication. In said cases, however, earnest
efforts were made by the Pets. in bringing to
court all possible interested parties.41
Such is not the case at bar. Rosilyn was never
made a party at all to the proceedings seeking the
cancellation of her birth certificate. Neither did
Pets. make any effort to summon the SolGen.
It does not take much to deduce the real motive
of Pets. in seeking the cancellation of Rosilyn’s
birth certificate and in not making her, her
guardian, the DSWD, and the REPUBLIC, through
the SolGen, parties to the petition. Rosilyn was
involved in the rape case against Romeo Jalosjos,
where her father, as appearing in the birth
certificate, was said to have pimped her into
prostitution. In the CrimCase, the defense
contended that the birth certificate of Rosilyn
should not have been considered by TC to prove
Rosilyn’s age and thus find basis for statutory
rape, as said birth certificate has been cancelled
by the RTC of Manila, Br. 38, in the special
proceeding antecedent to this petition. Their
efforts in this regard, however, were thwarted
when the CA overturned Br. 38’s decision, and the
Court, in G.R. Nos. 132875-7642 considered other
evidence as proof of Rosilyn’s age at the time of
the commission of the crime.
…. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit.
GR L-32181 Mar. 5, 1986 REPUBLIC, Pet., vs.
LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural mother and
guardian of her minor children, BERNARDO GO
and JESSICA GO; and HON. AGAPITO HONTANOSAS,
Judge of CFI OF CEBU, Br. XI.

This is a petition to review the decision of Rsp. Judge
Agapito Hontanosas of CFI of Cebu, Br. XI who ordered
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu to make the necessary
cancellation and/or correction in the entries of birth
of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of
the City of Cebu.
Rsp. Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her
minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed
with CFI of Cebu a petition for the cancellation
and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo
Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City
of Cebu. The case was docketed as SpecPro No.
3043-R.
The SolGen filed an opposition to the petition
alleging that the petition for correction of entry in
the Civil Registry pursuant to Art. 412 of the NCC
of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the
Revised RoC, contemplates a summary
proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors,
those harmless and innocuous changes such as
the correction of a name that is merely mispelled,
occupation of parents, etc., and not changes or
corrections involving civil status, nationality, or
citizenship which are substantial and
controversial.
Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, TC issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and the date of hearing
thereof in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of
general circulation in the city and province of
Cebu, once a week for 3 consecutive weeks, and
notice thereof, duly served on the SolGen, the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.
Rsp. Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the
opposition wherein she admitted that the present
petition seeks substantial changes involving the
civil status and nationality or citizenship of Rsps.,
but alleged that substantial changes in the civil
registry records involving the civil status of
parents, their nationality or citizenship may be
allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2)
evidence is submitted, either to support the
allegations of the petition or to disprove the
same; that Rsps. have complied with these
requirements by filing the present special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108
of the Revised RoC and that they have caused
reasonable notice to be given to the persons
named in the petition and have also caused the
order for the hearings of their petition to be
21
published for 3 consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu
City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
since the petition seeks to change the nationality
or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from
"Chinese" to "Filipino" and their status from
"Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also
the status of the mother from "married" to
"single" the corrections sought are not merely
clerical but substantial, involving as they do the
citizenship and status of the petitioning minors
and the status of their mother.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.
After trial on the merits during which the parties
were given all the opportunity to present their
evidence and refute the evidence and arguments
of the other side, the lower court rendered a
decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered
granting the instant petition and ordering the
Local Civil Registrar of the City of Cebu to
make the necessary cancellation and/or
correction on the following entries:
A. In the Record of Birth of BERNARDO GO, to
register said Bernardo Go as 'FILIPINO'
instead of 'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE
instead of LEGITIMATE', and his father's (GO
ENG) and mother's (LEONOR VALENCIA)
civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED';
B. In the Record of Birth of JESSICA GO to
register said Jessica Go as 'FILIPINO' instead
of 'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE' instead of
'LEGITIMATE' and father's (GO ENG) and
mother's (LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as
'SINGLE instead of MARRIED': and
C. In both Records of Birth of Bernardo Go
and Jessica Go to change the entry on Pet.'s
Citizenship from 'CHINESE to FILIPINO'.
Pursuant to Sec. 6, Rule 103 of the RoC, the
Clerk of Court is hereby directed to furnish a
copy of this decision to the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Cebu City, who shall
forthwith enter the cancellation and/'or
correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go
and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry as
adverted to above.

From the foregoing decision, oppositor-appellant
REPUBLIC appealed to us by way of this petition
for review on certiorari.
The Pet. REPUBLIC raises a lone error for the
grant of this petition, stating that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
CORRECTION OF THE PET.'S CITIZENSHIP AND
CIVIL STATUS AND THE CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL
STATUS OF HER MINOR CHILDREN BERNARDO
GO AND JESSICA GO.
The Pet. premises its case on precedents from the
1954 case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic to the 1981
case of Republic v. Caparosso, that entries which
can be corrected under Art. 412 of the NCC as
implemented by Rule 108 of the Revised RoC
refer to those mistakes that are clerical in nature
or changes that are harmless and innocuous
(Wong v. Republic, 115 SCRA 496). In Republic v.
Medina (119 SCRA 270) citing the case of Chua
Wee, et al, v. Republic (38 SCRA 409), there was
this dicta:
From the time the NCC took effect on Aug.
30, 1950 until the promulgation of the
Revised RoC on Jan. 1, 1964, there was no
law nor rule of court prescribing the
procedure to secure judicial authorization
to effect the desired innocuous
rectifications or alterations in the civil
register pursuant to Art. 412 of the NCC.
Rule 108 of the Revise RoC now provides
for such a procedure which should be
limited solely to the implementation of Art.
412, the substantive law on the matter of
correcting entries in the civil register. Rule
108, lie all the other provisions of the RoC,
was promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to its rule- making authority
under Sec. 13 of Art. VIII of the
Constitution, which directs that such RoC
'shall not diminish or increase or modify
substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be
extended beyond innocuous or harmless
changes or corrections of errors which are
visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy or
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby
become unconstitutional for it would be
increasing or modifying substantive rights,
22
which changes are not authorized under
Art. 412 of the NCC.
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of
a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but
one involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted,
affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is
also true that a right in law may be enforced and
a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres
to the principle that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. As a matter of fact, the
opposition of the SolGen dated Feb. 20, 1970
while questioning the use of Art. 412 of the CC in
relation to Rule 108 of the Revised RoC admits
that "the entries sought to be corrected should be
threshed out in an appropriate proceeding.
What is meant by "appropriate adversary
proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary defines
"adversary proceeding as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application,
one of which the party seeking relief has
given legal warning to the other party, and
afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it. Excludes an adoption proceeding." …
The pertinent Sec.s of Rule 108 provide:
SEC. 3. Parties — When cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.— Upon the
filing of the petition, the court shall, by an
orde, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once in a week for 3
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.

SEC, 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and
any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within 15 days
from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his
opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a
proceeding concerning the cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register are-(1)
the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected
thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes
the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing
the time and place for the hearing of the petition,
and (2) cause the order for hearing to be
published once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
province. The following are likewise entitled to
oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2)
any person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is
sought.
If all these procedural requirements have been
followed, a petition for correction and/or
cancellation of entries in the record of birth even
if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the
Revised RoC can no longer be described as
"summary". There can be no doubt that when an
opposition to the petition is filed either by the
Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming
any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled
and/or corrected and the opposition is actively
prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become
adversary proceedings.
In the instant case, a petition for cancellation
and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo
Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City
of Cebu was filed by Rsp. Leonor Valencia on Jan.
27, 1970, and pursuant to the order of TC dated
Feb. 4, 1970, the said petition was published once
a week for 3 consecutive weeks in the, Cebu
Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in
the City of Cebu. Notice thereof was duly served
on the SolGen. the Local Civil Registrar and Go
Eng. The order likewise set the case for hearing
and directed the local civil registrar and the other
Rsps. or any person claiming any interest under
the entries whose corrections were sought, to file
their opposition to the said petition. An
opposition to the petition was consequently filed
by the Republic on Feb. 26, 1970. Thereafter a full
23
blown trial followed with Rsp. Leonor Valencia
testifying and presenting her documentary
evidence in support of her petition. The Republic
on the other hand cross-examined Rsp. Leonor
Valencia.
We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the
Rsp. in the lower court by way of a special
proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in the civil register with the requisite
notice and publication and the recorded
proceedings that actually took place thereafter
could very well be regarded as that proper suit or
appropriate action. ….
To follow the Pet.'s argument that Rule 108 is not
an appropriate proceeding without in any way
intimating what is the correct proceeding or if
such a proceeding exists at all, would result in
manifest injustice.
Apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, there are
four (4) other sisters and one (1) other brother
born of the same father and mother. Not only are
all five registered as Filipino citizens but they
have pursued careers which require Philippine
citizenship as a mandatory pre-requisite. To
emphasize the strict policy of the government
regarding professional examinations, it was the
law until recently that to take the board exams for
pharmacist, the applicant should possess natural
born citizenship. (See. 18, RA 5921 and Sec. 1, P.D.
1350)
The sisters and brother are:
1. Sally Go, born on Apr. 29, 1934 was licensed as
a Pharmacist after passing the government board
examinations in 1956.
2. Fanny Go, born on July 12, 1936 is a Registered
Nurse who passed the government board
examinations in 1960.
3. Corazon Go, born on June 20, 1939, during the
trial of this case in 1970 was a fourth year
medical student, qualified to take the government
board examinations after successfully completing
the requirements for a career in medicine, and
presumably is a licensed physician now.
4. Antonio Go, born Feb. 14, 1942 was an
engineering student during the 1970 trial of the
case and qualified by citizenship to take
government board examinations.

5. Remedios Go, born Oct. 4, 1945 was a licensed
Optometrist after passing the government board
examinations in 1967.
The above facts were developed and proved
during trial. Pet. failed to refute the citizenship of
the minors Bernardo and Jessica Go.
In this petition, it limits itself to a procedural
reason to overcome substantive findings by
arguing that the proper procedure was not
followed.
There are other facts on the record. Leonor
Valencia is a registered voter and had always
exercised her right of suffrage from the time she
reached voting age until the national elections
immediately preceding the filing of her petition.
The five other sisters and brother are also
registered voters and likewise exercised the right
of suffrage.
An uncle of the mother's side had held positions
in the government having been elected twice as
councilor and twice as vice-mayor of Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Rsp. Leonor Valencia has
purchased and registered two (2) parcels of land
as per TCT No. T-46104 and TCT No. T-37275.
These allegations are well documented and were
never contradicted by the Republic. As correctly
observed by the lower court.
The right of suffrage is one of the important
rights of a citizen. This is also true with
respect to the acquisition of a real property.
The evidence further shows that her
children had been allowed to take the
Board Examinations given by the
Government for Filipino citizens only.
It would be a denial of substantive justice if two
children proved by the facts to be Philippine
citizens, and whose five sisters and brother born
of the same mother and father enjoy all the rights
of citizens, are denied the same rights on the
simple argument that the "correct procedure" not
specified or even intimated has not been
followed.
We are, therefore, constrained to deny the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
The decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.
GR 170340 June 29, 2007 REPUBLIC, Pet., vs.
CARLITO I. KHO, MICHAEL KHO, MERCY NONA
24
KHO-FORTUN, HEDDY MOIRA KHO-SERRANO,
KEVIN DOGMOC KHO (Minor), and KELLY DOGMOC
KHO (Minor), Rsps..
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari is the
Oct. 27, 2005 Decision1 of CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 78124
which affirmed the Sept. 4, 2002 Decision 2 of RTC of
Butuan City, Br. 5 granting the prayer of Rsps. Carlito I.
Kho (Carlito), Michael Kho, Mercy Nona Kho-Fortun,
and Heddy Moira Kho-Serrano for the correction of
entries in their birth certificates as well as those of
Carlito’s minor children Kevin and Kelly Dogmoc Kho.
On Feb. 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael,
Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the
RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for
correction of entries in the civil registry of
Butuan City to effect changes in their respective
birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in
behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to
order the correction of some entries in their birth
certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction
in his birth certificate of the citizenship of his
mother to "Filipino" instead of "Chinese," as well
as the deletion of the word "married" opposite
the phrase "Date of marriage of parents" because
his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco
(Epifania), were allegedly not legally married.
The same request to delete the "married" status
of their parents from their respective birth
certificates was made by Carlito’s siblings
Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito’s
children, he prayed that the date of his and his
wife’s marriage be corrected from Apr. 27, 1989
to Jan. 21, 2000, the date appearing in their
marriage certificate.
The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was
impleaded as Rsp..
On Apr. 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended
Petition3 in which it was additionally prayed that
Carlito’s second name of "John" be deleted from
his record of birth; and that the name and
citizenship of Carlito’s father in his (Carlito’s)
marriage certificate be corrected from "John Kho"
to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese,"
respectively.
As required, the petition was published for three
consecutive weeks4 in Mindanao Daily Patrol-

CARAGA, a newspaper of general circulation,
after which it was set for hearing on Aug. 9, 2001.
In a letter of June 18, 2001 addressed to TC, the
city civil registrar5 stated her observations and
suggestions to the proposed corrections in the
birth records of Carlito and his siblings but
interposed no objections to the other
amendments.
On the scheduled hearing of the petition on Aug.
9, 2001, only the counsel for Rsps. appeared as
the OSG had yet to enter its appearance for the
city civil registrar. TC thus reset the hearing to
Oct. 9, 2001.6 On Sept. 14, 2001,7 the OSG entered
its appearance with an authorization to the city
Prosec. of Butuan City to appear in the case and
render assistance to it (the OSG).
On Jan. 31, 2002, Rsps. presented documentary
evidence showing compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements of the petition. They
also presented testimonial evidence consisting of
the testimonies of Carlito and his mother,
Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional
correction in the birth certificates of Carlito’s
children was requested to the effect that the first
name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel"
to "Marivel."
By Decision8 of Sept. 4, 2002, TC directed the
local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the
entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as follows:
(1) change the citizenship of his mother from
"Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John" from his
name; and (3) delete the word "married"
opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The
last correction was ordered to be effected
likewise in the birth certificates of Rsps. Michael,
Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira.
Additionally, TC ordered the correction of the
birth certificates of the minor children of Carlito
to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito and
Marivel Dogmoc (Marivel) as Jan. 21, 2000,
instead of Apr. 27, 1989, and the name "Maribel"
as "Marivel."
With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito
and Marivel, the corrections ordered pertained to
the alteration of the name of Carlito’s father from
"John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and the latter’s
citizenship from "Filipino" to "Chinese."
25
Pet., REPUBLIC, appealed the RTC Decision to the
CA, faulting TC in granting the petition for
correction of entries in the subject documents
despite the failure of Rsps. to implead the minors’
mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to
offer sufficient evidence to warrant the
corrections with regard to the questioned
"married" status of Carlito and his siblings’
parents, and the latter’s citizenship.
Pet. also faulted TC for ordering the change of the
name "Carlito John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for non-
compliance with jurisdictional requirements for a
change of name under Rule 103 of the RoC.
By the assailed Decision of Oct. 27, 2005, CA
affirmed the decision of TC.
The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised RoC,
which outlines the proper procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, was observed in the case.
Regarding Carlito’s minor children Kevin and
Kelly, the appellate court held that the correction
of their mother’s first name from "Maribel" to
"Marivel" was made to rectify an innocuous error.
As for the change in the date of the marriage of
Carlito and Marivel, albeit the CA conceded that it
is a substantial alteration, it held that the date
would not affect the minors’ filiation from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate" considering that at
the time of their respective births in 1991 and
1993, their father Carlito’s first marriage was still
subsisting as it had been annulled only in 1999.
In light of Carlito’s legal impediment to marry
Marivel at the time they were born, their children
Kevin and Kelly were illegitimate. It followed, the
CA went on to state, that Marivel was not an
indispensable party to the case, the minors
having been represented by their father as
required under Sec. 5 of Rule 39 of the Revised
RoC.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed
to observe the requirements of Rule 103 of the
RoC, he had complied nonetheless with the
jurisdictional requirements for correction of
entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
RoC. The petition for correction of entry in
Carlito’s birth record, it noted, falls under letter
"o" of the enumeration under Sec. 2 of Rule 108.

In the present petition, Pet. contends that since
the changes sought by Rsps. were substantial in
nature, they could only be granted through an
adversarial proceeding in which indispensable
parties, such as Marivel and Rsps.’ parents, should
have been notified or impleaded.
Pet. further contends that the jurisdictional
requirements to change Carlito’s name under Sec.
2 of Rule 103 of the RoC were not satisfied
because the Amended Petition failed to allege
Carlito’s prior three-year bona fide residence in
Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did
not state Carlito’s aliases and his true name as
"Carlito John I. Kho." Pet. concludes that the same
jurisdictional defects attached to the change of
name of Carlito’s father.
The petition fails.
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as
it sought to change the citizenship of Carlito’s
mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and
delete the "married" status of Carlito’s parents in
his and his siblings’ respective birth certificates,
as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito
and Marivel involves the correction of not just
clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous
nature.10 Rather, the changes entail substantial
and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of
Carlito’s mother as reflected in his birth
certificate is a grave and important matter that
has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and
nationality not only of the parents, but also of the
offspring.11
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito’s
and his siblings’ parents were "married" alters
their filiation from "legitimate" to "illegitimate,"
with significant implications on their
successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in
an adversary proceeding. Labayo-Rowe v.
Republic12 explains the raison d etre:
x x x. The philosophy behind this requirement lies
in the fact that the books making up the civil
register and all documents relating thereto shall
be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained. If the entries in the civil register could
be corrected or changed through mere summary
proceedings and not through appropriate action
26
wherein all parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented, the door to
fraud or other mischief would be set open, the
consequence of which might be detrimental and
far reaching. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
In Republic v. Valencia, 13 however, this Court
ruled, and has since repeatedly ruled, that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule
108.14
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of
a petition is not for the correction of clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature, but
one involving nationality or citizenship, which is
indisputably substantial as well as controverted,
affirmative relief cannot be granted in a
proceeding summary in nature. However, it is
also true that a right in law may be enforced and
a wrong may be remedied as long as the
appropriate remedy is used. This Court adheres
to the principle that even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the
error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. x x x x
What is meant by "appropriate adversary
proceeding?" Black’s Law Dictionary defines
"adversary proceeding["] as follows:
One having opposing parties; contested, as
distinguished from an ex parte application, one of
which the party seeking relief has given legal
warning to the other party, and afforded the latter
an opportunity to contest it. x x x 15 (Emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)
The enactment in Mar. 2001 of RA 9048,
otherwise known as "An Act Authorizing the City
or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General
to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an
Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname
in the Civil Register Without Need of Judicial
Order," has been considered to lend legislative
affirmation to the judicial precedence that
substantial corrections to the civil status of
persons recorded in the civil registry may be
effected through the filing of a petition under
Rule 108.16
Thus, this Court in Republic v. Benemerito17
observed that the obvious effect of RA 9048 is to
make possible the administrative correction of

clerical or typographical errors or change of first
name or nickname in entries in the civil register,
leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial
changes in the civil registry in appropriate
adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule
108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary
proceeding necessary to effect substantial
corrections to the entries of the civil register is
satisfied.18 The pertinent provisions of Rule 108
of the RoC read:
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil registrar is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. — Upon the filing
of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once in a
week for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within 15 days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
There is no dispute that TC’s Order 19 setting the
petition for hearing and directing any person or
entity having interest in the petition to oppose it
was posted20 as well as published for the required
period; that notices of hearings were duly served
on the SolGen, the city Prosec. of Butuan and the
local civil registrar; and that trial was conducted
on Jan. 31, 2002 during which the public Prosec.,
acting in behalf of the OSG, actively participated
by cross-examining Carlito and Epifania.
What surfaces as an issue is whether the failure
to implead Marivel and Carlito’s parents rendered
the trial short of the required adversary
proceeding and TC’s judgment void.
A similar issue was earlier raised in Barco v. CA. 21
That case stemmed from a petition for correction
of entries in the birth certificate of a minor, June
27
Salvacion Maravilla, to reflect the name of her
real father (Armando Gustilo) and to
correspondingly change her surname. The
petition was granted by TC.
Barco, whose minor daughter was allegedly
fathered also by Gustilo, however, sought to annul
TC’s decision, claiming that she should have been
made a party to the petition for correction.
Failure to implead her deprived the RTC of
jurisdiction, she contended.
In dismissing Barco’s petition, this Court held
that the publication of the order of hearing under
Sec. 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an
indispensable party.
The essential requisite for allowing substantial
corrections of entries in the civil registry is that
the true facts be established in an appropriate
adversarial proceeding. This is embodied in Sec.
3, Rule 108 of the RoC, which states:
Sec. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred
to in Sec. 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected
by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of
Armando would affect her ward’s share in the
estate of her father. x x x.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the
petition, CA correctly pointed out that the defect
was cured by compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 108,
which requires notice by publication x x x.
The purpose precisely of Sec. 4, Rule 108 is to
bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
decision would cover even parties who should
have been impleaded under Sec. 3, Rule 108, but
were inadvertently left out. x x x
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in
rem, an action against a thing and not against a
person. The decision on the petition binds not
only the parties thereto but the whole world. An
in rem proceeding is validated essentially
through publication. Publication is notice to the
whole world that the proceeding has for its object

to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to
make an objection of any sort against the right
sought to be established. It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a
party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.22
Given the above ruling, it becomes unnecessary to
rule on whether Marivel or Rsps.’ parents should
have been impleaded as parties to the
proceeding. It may not be amiss to mention,
however, that during the hearing on Jan. 31, 2002,
the city Prosec. who was acting as representative
of the OSG did not raise any objection to the non-
inclusion of Marivel and Carlito’s parents as
parties to the proceeding.
Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that
Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to
correct the entries in her children’s birth
certificates, especially since the notices, orders
and decision of TC eHe were all sent to the
residence23 she shared with Carlito and the
children.
It is also well to remember that the role of the
court in hearing a petition to correct certain
entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the
truth about the facts recorded therein.24
With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito
and Marivel, their certificate of marriage25 shows
that indeed they were married on Jan. 21, 2000,
not on Apr. 27, 1989. Explaining the error, Carlito
declared that the date "Apr. 27, 1989" was
supplied by his helper, adding that he was not
married to Marivel at the time his sons were born
because his previous marriage was annulled only
in 1999.26 Given the evidence presented by Rsps.,
the CA observed that the minors were illegitimate
at birth, hence, the correction would bring about
no change at all in the nature of their filiation.
With respect to Carlito’s mother, it bears noting
that she declared at the witness stand that she
was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. 27
Again, that testimony was not challenged by the
city Prosec..
The documentary evidence supporting the
deletion from Carlito’s and his siblings’ birth
certificates of the entry "Married" opposite the
date of marriage of their parents, moreover,
consisted of a certification issued on Nov. 24,
1973 by St. Joseph (Butuan City) Parish priest
28
Eugene van Vught stating that Juan Kho and
Epifania had been living together as common law
couple since 1935 but have never contracted
marriage legally.28
A certification from the office of the city registrar,
which was appended to Rsps.’ Amended Petition,
likewise stated that it has no record of marriage
between Juan Kho and Epifania.29 Under the
circumstances, the deletion of the word
"Married" opposite the "date of marriage of
parents" is warranted.
With respect to the correction in Carlito’s birth
certificate of his name from "Carlito John" to
"Carlito," the same was properly granted under
Rule 108 of the RoC. As correctly pointed out by
the CA, the cancellation or correction of entries
involving changes of name falls under letter "o" of
the following provision of Sec. 2 of Rule 108:30
Sec. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages;
(c) deaths; (d) legal separation; (e) judgments of
annulment of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, while the jurisdictional requirements of
Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of
name) were not complied with, observance of the
provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the
correction sought for.
More importantly, Carlito’s official transcript of
record from the Urious College in Butuan City, 31
certificate of eligibility from the Civil Service
Commission,32 and voter registration record33
satisfactorily show that he has been known by his
first name only. No prejudice is thus likely to arise
from the dropping of the second name.
The correction of the mother’s citizenship from
Chinese to Filipino as appearing in Carlito’s birth
record was also proper. Of note is the fact that
during the cross examination by the city Prosec.
of Epifania, he did not deem fit to question her

citizenship. Such failure to oppose the correction
prayed for, which certainly was not Rsps.’ fault,
does not in any way change the adversarial
nature of the proceedings.
Also significant to note is that the birth
certificates of Carlito’s siblings uniformly stated
the citizenship of Epifania as "Filipino." To
disallow the correction in Carlito’s birth record of
his mother’s citizenship would perpetuate an
inconsistency in the natal circumstances of the
siblings who are unquestionably born of the same
mother and father.
Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of
course, is the correction of the name of Carlito’s
wife from "Maribel" to "Marivel." The mistake is
clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only
visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the
understanding34 considering that the name
reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and
his wife is "Marivel."
Apropos is Yu v. Republic35 which held that
changing the appellant’s Christian name of
"Sincio" to "Sencio" amounts merely to the
righting of a clerical error. The change of name
from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to
Emperatriz Labayo was also held to be a mere
innocuous alteration, which can be granted
through a summary proceeding.36 The same
ruling holds true with respect to the correction in
Carlito’s marriage certificate of his father’s name
from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho." Except in said
marriage certificate, the name "Juan Kho" was
uniformly entered in the birth certificates of
Carlito and of his siblings.37
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of
CA is AFFIRMED.
GR 186027 Dec. 8, 2010 REPUBLIC, Pet., vs.
MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-
Fact, EVELYN M. OGA, Rsp..
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Dec.
9, 2008 Decision1 of CA, in CA G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN,
which affirmed the Sept. 28, 2005 Order of RTC of
Dipolog City, Br. 8 (RTC), in a petition for correction of
entries, docketed as SpecPro No. R-3427 (SP No. R-
3427), filed by Rsp. Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera)
under Rule 108 of the RoC.
On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera),
represented by her sister and duly constituted
Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the
29
correction of her given name as it appeared in her
Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L.
Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City
pursuant to RA 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).2
Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is
now authorized to effect the change of first name
or nickname and the correction of clerical or
typographical errors in civil registry entries.
"Under said law, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with
administrative officers. The law now excludes the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 until and unless an administrative petition
for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied"3 and removes "correction or changing of
clerical errors in entries of the civil register from
the ambit of Rule 108." Hence, what is left for the
scope of operation of the rules are substantial
changes and corrections in entries of the civil
register.4
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog
City, however, refused to effect the correction
unless a court order was obtained "because the
Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a
permanent appointment before he can validly act
on petitions for corrections filed before their
office as mandated by RA 9048."5
Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition
For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the
Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before
RTC of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition was
docketed as SpecPro No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427).
Sec. 2 of Rule 108 reads:
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages;
(c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name. [Underscoring supplied]

Upon receipt of the petition for correction of
entry, the RTC issued an order, dated June 10,
2005, which reads:
Finding the petition sufficient in form and
substance, notice is hereby given that the hearing
of said petition is set on JULY 26, 2005 at 8:30
o’clock in the morning, at the Session Hall of Br. 8,
this Court, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Dipolog City,
on which date, time and place, anyone appearing
to contest the petition shall state in writing his
grounds there[for], serving a copy thereof to the
Pet. and likewise file copies with this Court on or
before the said date of hearing.
Let this order be published at the expense of Pet.
once a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a
newspaper edited and published in Dipolog City
and of general circulation therein, the City of
Dapitan and the province of Zamboanga del
Norte, and copies hereof be furnished to the
Office of the SolGen of 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi
Village, Makati, Metro Manila, the City Civil
Registrar of Dipolog, and posted on the bulletin
boards of the City Hall of Dipolog, the Provincial
Capitol Building, and of this Court. IT IS SO
ORDERED.
The OSG entered its appearance for the
REPUBLIC and deputized the Office of the City
Prosec. to assist in the case only on the very day
of the hearing. This prompted the court to reset
the hearing on Sept. 5, 2005. On said day, there
being no opposition, counsel for Mercadera
moved for leave of court to present evidence ex
parte. Without any objection from the City
Prosec., TC designated the Br. clerk of court to
receive evidence for Mercadera.
On Sept. 15, 2005, the testimony of Oga and
several photocopies of documents were formally
offered and marked as evidence to prove that
Mercadera never used the name "Marilyn" in any
of her public or private transactions. On Sept. 26,
2005, the RTC issued an order6 admitting Exh.s
"A" to "I"7 and their submarkings, as relevant to
the resolution of the case.
The following facts were gathered from
documentary evidence and the oral testimony of
Oga, as reported by the lower court:
Pet. Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on Aug. 19,
1970 at Dipolog City. She is the daughter of
spouses Tirso U. Mercadera and Norma C.
30
Lacquiao. The fact of her birth was reported to
the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog
City on Sept. 8, 1970. It was recorded on page 68,
book no. 9, in the Registry of Births of said civil
registry. In the certification of birth dated May 9,
2005 issued by the same registry, her given name
appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn (Exh. "C").
On Sept. 29, 1979, Pet. was baptized according to
the rites and ceremonies of the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines. As reflected in her
certificate of baptism issued by said church, she
was baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera
(Exh. "D").
In her elementary diploma issued by the
Paaralang Sentral ng Estaka, Dipolog City; her
high school diploma issued by the Zamboanga del
Norte School of Arts and Trades, Dipolog City;
and college diploma issued by the Silliman
University, Dumaguete City, where she earned the
degree of Bachelor of Secondary Education,
uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera
(Exh.s "E", "F", and "G").
Presently, she is working in U.P. Mindanao,
Buhangin, Davao City. Her certificate of
membership issued by the Government Service
Insurance System also bears his [sic] complete
name as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera (Exh. "H").
When she secured an authenticated copy of her
certificate of live birth from the National
Statistics Office, she discovered that her given
name as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn;
hence, this petition.
In its Sept. 28, 2005 Decision, 8 the RTC granted
Mercadera’s petition and directed the Office of
the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct
her name appearing in her certificate of live birth,
Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN
Lacquiao Mercadera. Specifically, the dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Office of the City Civil Registrar
of Dipolog City is hereby directed to correct the
given name of Pet. appearing in her certificate of
live birth, from Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera to
MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera.
In a four-page decision, the RTC ruled that the
documentary evidence presented by Mercadera
sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged

in her petition. Considering that she had used
"Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until
she discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate
of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that the
correction was justified.
The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for
the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision.
It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of
Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under
Rule 108. In its Brief9 filed with the CA, the OSG
argued that the lower court erred (1) in granting
the prayer for change of name in a petition for
correction of entries; and (2) in admitting the
photocopies of documentary evidence and
hearsay testimony of Oga.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of
Mercadera’s given name might seem innocuous
enough to grant but "it is in truth a material
correction as it would modify or increase
substantive rights."10 What the lower court
actually allowed was a change of Mercadera’s
given name, which would have been proper had
she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved
any of the grounds therefor. The lower court,
"may not substitute one for the other for
purposes of expediency."11 Further, because
Mercadera failed to invoke a specific ground
recognized by the Rules, the lower court’s order
in effect allowed the change of one’s name in the
civil registry without basis.
CA was not persuaded. In its Dec. 9, 2008
Decision, 12 the appellate court affirmed the
questioned RTC Order in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-
MIN. …..
On Mar. 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present
petition. On behalf of Mercadera, the PAO filed its
Comment14 on July 3, 2009. The OSG declined to
file a reply claiming that its petition already
contained an exhaustive discussion on the
following assigned errors:15
I. CA ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING
THE CHANGE IN RSP.’S NAME UNDER RULE 103.
II. CA ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN
CONSIDERING SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions
for change of given name or surname, or both,
pursuant to Art. 376 of the CC. 16 This rule
provides the procedure for an independent
31
special proceeding in court to establish the status
of a person involving his relations with others,
that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the
rest of the community.17 In petitions for change of
name, a person avails of a remedy to alter the
"designation by which he is known and called in
the community in which he lives and is best
known."18 When granted, a person’s identity and
interactions are affected as he bears a new "label
or appellation for the convenience of the world at
large in addressing him, or in speaking of, or
dealing with him."19 Judicial permission for a
change of name aims to prevent fraud and to
ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court
decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action
in rem which requires publication of the order
issued by the court to afford the State and all
other interested parties to oppose the petition.
When complied with, the decision binds not only
the parties impleaded but the whole world. As
notice to all, publication serves to indefinitely bar
all who might make an objection. "It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the
whole world as a party in the case and vests the
court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it."20
Essentially, a change of name does not define or
effect a change of one’s existing family relations
or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It
does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. 21
However, "there could be instances where the
change applied for may be open to objection by
parties who already bear the surname desired by
the applicant, not because he would thereby
acquire certain family ties with them but because
the existence of such ties might be erroneously
impressed on the public mind."22 Hence, in
requests for a change of name, "what is involved
is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the
sufficiency and propriety of the justifications
advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results
in the event of its grant x x x."23
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial
proceedings for the correction or cancellation of
entries in the civil registry pursuant to Art. 412 of
the CC.24 Entries in the civil register refer to "acts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons,"25 also as enumerated in Art.
408 of the same law.26 Before, only mistakes or
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature in the
entries in the civil registry may be corrected

under Rule 108 and substantial errors affecting
the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party are beyond the ambit of the rule. In the
abandoned case of Chua Wee v. Republic,27 this
Court declared that,
x x x if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to
the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108
would thereby become unconstitutional for it
would be increasing or modifying substantive
rights, which changes are not authorized under
Art. 412 of the NCC."
In the latter case of Wong v. Republic,28 however,
Justice Vicente Abad Santos, in a separate
concurrence, opined that Art. 412, which Rule
108 implements, contemplates all kinds of issues
and all types of procedures because "the
provision does not say that it applies only to non-
controversial issues and that the procedure to be
used is summary in nature." In Republic v. Judge
De la Cruz,29 the dissenting opinion penned by
Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the same view:
It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be
rendered unconstitutional if it would allow the
correction of more than mere harmless clerical
error, as it would thereby increase or modify
substantive rights which the Constitution
expressly forbids because Art. 412 of the CC, the
substantive law sought to be implemented by
Rule 108, allows only the correction of innocuous
clerical errors not those affecting the status of
persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the
aforesaid Wong Case, Art. 412 does not limit in its
express terms nor by mere implication, the
correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical
errors. x x x it would be reasonable and justified
to rule that Art. 412 contemplates of correction of
erroneous entry of whatever nature, procedural
safeguards having only to be provided for, as was
the manifest purpose of Rule 108.
x x x proceedings for the correction of erroneous
entry should not be considered as establishing
one's status in a legal manner conclusively
beyond dispute or controversion, x x x the books
making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence
of the facts therein contained. Hence, the status
32
as corrected would not have a superior quality
for evidentiary purpose. Moreover, the correction
should not imply a change of status but a mere
rectification of error to make the matter
corrected speak for the truth. x x x
Finally in Republic v. Valencia, 30 the above stated
views were adopted by this Court insofar as even
substantial errors or matters in a civil registry
may be corrected and the true facts established,
provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves
of the appropriate adversary proceeding. "If the
purpose of the petition is merely to correct the
clerical errors which are visible to the eye or
obvious to the understanding, the court may,
under a summary procedure, issue an order for
the correction of a mistake. However, as
repeatedly construed, changes which may affect
the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as
well as sex, are substantial and controversial
alterations which can only be allowed after
appropriate adversary proceedings depending
upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes
which affect the civil status or citizenship of a
party are substantial in character and should be
threshed out in a proper action depending upon
the nature of the issues in controversy, and
wherein all the parties who may be affected by
the entries are notified or represented and
evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of
the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted
x x x."31 "Where such a change is ordered, the
Court will not be establishing a substantive right
but only correcting or rectifying an erroneous
entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In
short, Rule 108 of the RoC provides only the
procedure or mechanism for the proper
enforcement of the substantive law embodied in
Art. 412 of the CC and so does not violate the
Constitution."32
In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the
conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a
correction of an innocuous error but a material
correction tantamount to a change of name which
entails a modification or increase in substantive
rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that
requires compliance with the procedure under
Rule 103, and not Rule 108.
It appears from these arguments that there is, to
some extent, confusion over the scope and
application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. Where a
"change of name" will necessarily be reflected by
the corresponding correction in an entry, as in

this case, the functions of both rules are often
muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to
categorize petitions under either rule, this Court
is of the opinion that a resort to the basic
distinctions between the two rules with respect
to alterations in a person’s registered name can
effectively clear the seeming perplexity of the
issue. Further, a careful evaluation of
circumstances alleged in the petition itself will
serve as a constructive guide to determine the
propriety of the relief prayed for.
The "change of name" contemplated under Art.
376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Art.
412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under
Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds
provided by law. In order to justify a request for
change of name, there must be a proper and
compelling reason for the change and proof that
the person requesting will be prejudiced by the
use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency
of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be
adversarial proceedings.33
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the
civil registry may be raised. Considering that the
enumeration in Sec. 2, Rule 10834 also includes
"changes of name," the correction of a patently
misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it
to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name
are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for
clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in "names," however, does not operate
to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of
clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a
summary proceeding. As explained above,
Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing
substantial errors in other entries like
citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be
corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an
adversary proceeding. "After all, the role of the
Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths
about the facts recorded therein."35
A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a
glaring lack of support to the OSG’s assumption
that Mercadera intended to change her name
under Rule 103. All that the petition propounded
are swift arguments on the alleged procedural
flaws of Mercadera’s petition before the RTC. In
the same vein, no concrete contention was
brought up to convince this Court that the
dangers sought to be prevented by the
33
adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 103
are attendant in this case. Instead, the RTC found
the documents presented by Mercadera to have
satisfactorily shown that she had been known as
MERLYN ever since, discounting the possibility
that confusion, or a modification of substantive
rights might arise. Truth be told, not a single
oppositor appeared to contest the petition
despite full compliance with the publication
requirement.
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the
RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply
sought a correction of a misspelled given name.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from." To change
means "to replace something with something else
of the same kind or with something that serves as
a substitute."36 From the allegations in her
petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower
court "to remove the faults or error" from her
registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make
or set aright" the same to conform to the one she
grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not take a complex
assessment of said petition to learn of its
intention to simply correct the clerical error in
spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the
remedy allowed by R.A. No. 9048 but she
unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency
which the law provides and was constrained to
take court action to obtain relief. Thus, the
petition was clear in stating:
7. That as such, there is a need to correct
her given name as appearing in her
Certificate of Live Birth from MARILYN to
MERLYN to conform to her true and
correct given name that she had been
using and had been known within the
community x x x.
8. That herein Pet. went to the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City
and requested them to effect such
correction in her Certificate of Live Birth,
however, the Local Civil Registrar of
Dipolog City will not effect such
correction unless an order is obtained by
herein Pet. from this Honorable Court
because the Local Civil Registrar therein is
not yet equipped with permanent
appointment before he can validly act on
petitions for corrections filed before their
office as mandated by RA 9048, hence the
filing of this petition. [Emphases supplied]

Indeed, there are decided cases involving
mistakes similar to Mercadera’s case which
recognize the same a harmless error. In Yu v.
Republic37 it was held that "to change ‘Sincio’ to
‘Sencio’ which merely involves the substitution of
the first vowel ‘i’ in the first name into the vowel
‘e’ amounts merely to the righting of a clerical
error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,38 it was held
that the change of Pet.’s name from "Beatriz
Labayo/Beatriz Labayu" to "Emperatriz Labayo"
was a mere innocuous alteration wherein a
summary proceeding was appropriate. In
Republic v. CA, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P.
Caranto, the correction involved the substitution
of the letters "ch" for the letter "d," so that what
appears as "Midael" as given name would read
"Michael." In the latter case, this Court, with the
agreement of the SolGen, ruled that the error was
plainly clerical, such that, "changing the name of
the child from ‘Midael C. Mazon’ to ‘Michael C.
Mazon’ cannot possibly cause any confusion,
because both names can be read and pronounced
with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono,
tunog, himig)."39
In this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter
"e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what
appears as "Marilyn" would read as "Merlyn" is
patently a rectification of a name that is clearly
misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and
"Merlyn" may well be the object of a mix- up that
blemished Mercadera’s Certificate of Live Birth
until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct
the same.
The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her
name. What it did allow was the correction of her
misspelled given name which she had been using
ever since she could remember.
It is worthy to note that the OSG’s reliance on
Republic vs. Hernandez40 is flawed. In that case,
this Court said that "a change in a given name is a
substantial matter" and that it "cannot be granted
by means of any other proceeding that would in
effect render it a mere incident or an offshoot of
another special proceeding." While this Court
stands true to the ruling in Hernandez, the said
pronouncement therein was stated in a different
tenor and, thus, inapplicable to this case.
Hernandez was decided against an entirely
different factual milieu. There was a petition for
adoption that must not have led to a
corresponding change in the adoptee’s given
name because "it would be procedurally
34
erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to
effect a change of name in the absence of a
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law."
In the present case, the issue is the applicability
of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 and the relief
sought by Mercadera can in fact be granted under
the latter. This Court finds no attempt on the part
of Mercadera to render the requirements under
Rule 103 illusory as in Hernandez.
Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this
case and that compliance with the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what
is mandated, it still cannot be denied that
Mercadera complied with the requirement for an
adversarial proceeding before the lower court.
The publication and posting of the notice of
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and
the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil
Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse
proceeding. The fact that no one opposed the
petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the
court of its jurisdiction to hear the same and did
not make the proceeding less adversarial in
nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose
the petition and the motion to present its
evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to
do so, it cannot now complain that the
proceedings in the lower court were procedurally
defective. Indeed, it has become unnecessary to
further discuss the reasons why the CA correctly
affirmed the findings of the lower court especially
in admitting and according probative value to the
evidence presented by Mercadera.
WHEREFORE, the Dec. 9, 2008 Decision of CA in CA-
G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN is AFFIRMED.
REPUBLIC, Pet., vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Rsp..
Born in Makati on Sept. 9, 1972, Julian Edward
Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (Rsp.) is the son of
Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique
Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as Rsp.’s certificate
of live birth1 shows, contracted marriage on Mar.
26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never
legally married, Rsp. filed on July 22, 2008 at RTC
of QC a Petition to change his name to Julian
Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The
petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was
entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME

OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG
MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."
In support of his petition, Rsp. submitted a
certification from the National Statistics Office
stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does
not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage." 2
Rsp. also submitted his academic records from
elementary up to college3 showing that he carried
the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate
of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his
surname.4 In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections,
Rsp. ran and was elected as Councilor of QC’s 3rd
District using the name "JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG."5
On order of Br. 77 of the QC RTC, 6 Rsp. amended
his petition by alleging therein compliance with
the 3-year residency requirement under Sec. 2,
Rule 103] of the RoC.7
The notice setting the petition for hearing on Nov.
20, 2008 was published in the newspaper
Broadside in its issues of Oct. 31-Nov. 6, 2008,
Nov. 7-13, 2008, and Nov. 14-20, 2008.8 And a
copy of the notice was furnished the OSG.
No opposition to the petition having been filed,
an order of general default was entered by TC
which then allowed Rsp. to present evidence ex
parte.9
By Decision of Jan. 8, 2009, 10 TC granted Rsp.’s
petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati
City to:
1. Delete the entry "Mar. 26, 1972" in Item 24
for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF
PARTIES" [in herein Rsp.’s Certificate of live
Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space
for the Last Name of the [Rsp.] to
"COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space
for Middle Name of the [Rsp.]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo,
Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [Rsp.]…
(emphasis and underscoring supplied;
capitalization in the original)
35
The REPUBLIC (Republic) filed a MR but it was
denied by TC by Order of July 2, 2009, 11 hence, it,
thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for
review to the Court on pure question of law.
The Republic assails the decision in this wise:
I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME…
INVOLVES THE CHANGE OF [RSP.’S] CIVIL
STATUS FROM LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE
AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE MADE
THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL
PROCEEDINGS…
II. TC EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DIRECTED THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF
RSP.’S FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH
CERTIFICATE.12 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The Republic contends that the deletion of the
entry on the date and place of marriage of Rsp.’s
parents from his birth certificate has the effect of
changing his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a
person must be effected through an appropriate
adversary proceeding.13
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion
of Rsp.’s parents’ date of marriage and the name
of Rsp.’s father from the entries in Rsp.’s birth
certificate,14 TC exceeded its jurisdiction, such
order not being in accord with Rsp.’s prayer
reading:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most
respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court
issue an order allowing the change of name of
Pet. from JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG
MAGPAYO to JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the
Honorable Court order the Local Civil Registrar
and all other relevant government agencies to
reflect the said change of name in their records.
Pet. prays for other reliefs deemed proper under
the premises.15 (underscoring supplied)
Rsp. counters that the proceeding before TC was
adversarial in nature. He cites the serving of
copies of the petition and its annexes upon the
Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar
General, and the OSG; the posting of copies of the
notice of hearing in at least four public places at
least ten days before the hearing; the delegation

to the OSG by the City Prosec. of QC to appear on
behalf of the Republic; the publication of the
notice of hearing in a newspaper of general
circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the
fact that no oppositors appeared on the
scheduled hearing.16
The petition is impressed with merit.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule
103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and
meritorious grounds including (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence such as
legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for
a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.17 Rsp.’s reason
for changing his name cannot be considered as
one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds,
however.
The present petition must be differentiated from
Alfon v. REPUBLIC.18 In Alfon, the Court allowed
the therein Pet., Estrella Alfon, to use the name
that she had been known since childhood in
order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her
legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the
surname of her mother which she had been using
since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court
held that she was lawfully entitled to use her
mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of
confusion was justification enough to allow her to
do so. In the present case, however, Rsp. denies
his legitimacy.
The change being sought in Rsp.’s petition goes so
far as to affect his legal status in relation to his
parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that
of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to
grant Rsp.’s supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that
"changes which may affect the civil status from
legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be
36
allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings . . ."
Since Rsp.’s desired change affects his civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies.
It reads:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition.—Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction
of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of
the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction
of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of
the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week
for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. (emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which
concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the
civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the
present case, and "all persons who have or claim
any interest which would be affected thereby"
should be made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of Rsp.
was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate
was registered but in QC. And as the above-
mentioned title of the petition filed by Rsp. before
the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of
Makati nor his father and mother were made
parties thereto.
Republic v. Belmonte,21 illuminates:
The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding
change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry are separate and distinct. They may not
be substituted one for the other for the sole

purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would
render nugatory the provisions of the RoC
allowing the change of one’s name or the
correction of entries in the civil registry only
upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis,
capitalization and underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that Rsp. had
simultaneously availed of these two statutory
remedies, Rsp. cannot be said to have sufficiently
complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above,
aside from improper venue, he failed to implead
the civil registrar of Makati and all affected
parties as Rsps. in the case.
Republic v. Labrador22 mandates that "a petition
for a substantial correction or change of entries
in the civil registry should have as Rsps. the civil
registrar, as well as all other persons who have or
claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby." It cannot be gainsaid that change of
status of a child in relation to his parents is a
substantial correction or change of entry in the
civil registry.
Labayo-Rowe23 highlights the necessity of
impleading indispensable parties in a petition
which involves substantial and controversial
alterations. In that case, the therein Pet.
Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a
petition for the correction of entries in the birth
certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and
Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San
Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her
name appearing in the birth certificates is
Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name
is Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in
the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as
"married" on "1953 Bulan" are erroneous
because she was not married to Vicente Miclat
who was the one who furnished the data in said
birth certificate.
TC found merit in Emperatriz’s petition and
accordingly directed the local civil registrar to
change her name appearing in her children’s
birth certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and
to correct her civil status in Victoria’s birth
certificate from "married" to "single" and the date
and place of marriage to "no marriage."
On petition before this Court after CA found that
the order of TC involved a question of law, the
Court nullified TC’s order directing the change of
Emperatriz’ civil status and the filiation of her
37
child Victoria in light of the following
observations:
x x x x Aside from the Office of the SolGen, all
other indispensable parties should have been
made Rsps.. They include not only the declared
father of the child but the child as well, together
with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected
thereby. All other persons who may be affected by
the change should be notified or represented. The
truth is best ascertained under an adversary
system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her
parents would be substantially impaired if her
status would be changed from "legitimate" to
"illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from
the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will
bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing
of the petition was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served
upon the State will not change the nature of the
proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other
provisions of the RoC, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making
authority under Sec. 13, Art. VIII of the 1973
Constitution, which directs that such rules "shall
not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of
errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to
the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations
concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without
observing the proper proceedings as earlier
mentioned, said rule would thereby become an
unconstitutional exercise which would tend to
increase or modify substantive rights. This
situation is not contemplated under Art. 412 of
the CC.24 (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)
As for the requirement of notice and publication,
Rule 108 provides:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the filing
of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week

for 3 consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within 15 days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A reading of these related provisions readily
shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of
notices to different "potential oppositors." The
first notice is that given to the "persons named in
the petition" and the second (which is through
publication) is that given to other persons who
are not named in the petition but nonetheless
may be considered interested or affected parties,
such as creditors. That two sets of notices are
mandated under the above-quoted Sec. 4 is
validated by the subsequent Sec. 5, also above-
quoted, which provides for two periods (for the
two types of "potential oppositors") within which
to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from
the last date of publication).
This is the overriding principle laid down in
Barco v. CA.25 In that case, Nadina Maravilla
(Nadina) filed a petition for correction of entries
in the birth certificate of her daughter June from
June Salvacion Maravilla to June Salvacion
"Gustilo," Armando Gustilo being, according to
Nadina, her daughter’s real father. Gustilo in fact
filed before TC a "CONSTANCIA" wherein he
acknowledged June as his daughter. TC granted
the petition.
After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo
filed with CA a petition for annulment of the
Order of TC granting the change of June’s family
name to Gustilo.
Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her
minor daughter Mary Joy Ann Gustilo, filed before
the appellate court a motion for intervention,
alleging that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the
annulment of TC’s Order as Mary Joy was, by
Barco’s claim, also fathered by Gustilo.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for
annulment and complaint-in-intervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she
should have been impleaded in Nadina’s petition
38
for correction of entries of the birth certificate of
Mary Joy. But since a Pet., like Nadina, is not
expected to exhaustively identify all the affected
parties, the subsequent publication of the notice
cured the omission of Barco as a party to the case.
Thus the Court explained:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred
to in Sec. 3 of Rule 108.Her interest was affected
by the petition for correction, as any judicial
determination that June was the daughter of
Armando would affect her ward’s share in the
estate of her father. It cannot be established
whether Nadina knew of Mary Joy’s existence at
the time she filed the petition for correction.
Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a
Pet. under Rule 108 would know of all the parties
whose interests may be affected by the granting
of a petition. For example, a Pet. cannot be
presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or
illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or
paramour. x x x x.
The purpose precisely of Sec. 4, Rule 108 is to
bind the whole world to the subsequent
judgment on the petition. The sweep of the
decision would cover even parties who should
have been impleaded under Sec. 3, Rule 108 but
were inadvertently left out. x x x x.26 (emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)
What is clear then in cases of Barco and Kho is
the mandatory directive under Sec. 3 of Rule 108
to implead the civil registrar and the parties who
would naturally and legally be affected by the
grant of a petition for correction or cancellation
of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-
Rsp. of one who is inadvertently left out or is not
established to be known by the Pet. to be affected
by the grant of the petition or actually
participates in the proceeding is notified through
publication.
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a
strict compliance with the requirements of Rule
108 of the RoC is mandated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
discussions, GRANTED. The Jan. 8, 2009 Decision of Br.
77 of RTC of QC in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is
NULLIFIED.

GR L-51201 May 29, 1980 IN THE MATTER OF THE
PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF MARIA
ESTRELLA VERONICA PRIMITIVA DUTERTE,
ESTRELLA S. ALFON, Pet., vs. REPUBLIC, Rsp..
This is a petition filed pursuant to RA 5440 to review
an Order of CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII, dated Dec. 29, 1978,
which partially denied Pet.'s prayer for a change of
name. Only a question of law is involved and there
is no controversy over the facts which are well-
stated in the questioned Order as follows:
This is verified petition filed on Apr. 28, 1978
by Pet. Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte through her counsel, Atty. Rosauro
Alvarez, praying that her name be changed
from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte
to Estrella S. Alfon.
The notice setting the petition for hearing on
Dec. 14, 1978 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning
was published in the Times Journal in its
issues of July 28, Aug. 5 and 11, 1978 and a
copy thereof together with a copy of the
petition was furnished the Office of the SolGen
(Exh.s C, C-1, C-2 and C-3).
At the hearing of the petition on Dec. 14, 1978,
Atty. Rosauro Alvarez appeared for the Pet.
and Fiscal Donato Sor. Suyat, Jr. represented
the office of the SolGen, Upon motion of
counsel for the Pet., without objection on the
part of Fiscal Suyat, the Deputy Clerk of Court
was appointed commissioner to receive the
evidence and to submit the same for
resolution of the Court.
From the testimonial and document evidence
presented, it appears that Pet. Maria Estrella
Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May
15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital (Exh. A). She
was registered at the local Civil Registrar's
Office as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte On June 15, 1952, she was baptized as
Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at
the St. Anthony de Padua Church Singalong,
Manila (Exh. B). Her parents are Filomeno
Duterte and Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte has been taken cared of by Mr. and
Mrs. Hector Alfon. Pet. and her uncle, Hector
Alfon, have been residing at 728 J.R. Yulo
Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila for twenty-three (23) years. When Pet.
started schooling, she used the name Estrella
S. Alfon. She attended her first grade up to
39
fourth year high school at Stella Maris College
using the name Estrella S. Alfon (Exh.s E, E-1,
E-2 and E-3). After graduating from high
school she enrolled at the Arellano University
and finished Bachelor of Science in Nursing
(Exh. E-4). Her scholastic records from
elementary to college show that she was
registered by the name of Estrella S. Alfon. Pet.
has exercised her right of suffrage under the
same name (Exh. D). She has not committed
any felony or misdemeanor (Exh.s G, G-1, G-2,
G-3 and G-4).
Pet. has advanced the following reasons for
filing the petition:
1. She has been using the name Estrella Alfon
since her childhood;
2. She has been enrolled in the grade school
and in college using the same name;
3. She has continuously used the name Estrella
S. Alfon since her infancy and all her friends
and acquaintances know her by this name;
4. She has exercised her right of suffrage under
the same name.
Sec. 5, Rule 103 of the RoC provides:
Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the
date fixed in the order that such order has
been published as directed and that the
allegations of the petition are true, the court
shall if proper and reasonable cause appears
for changing the name of the Pet. adjudge that
such name be changed in accordance with the
prayer of the petition.
The evidence submitted shows that the change
of name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte to Estrella Alfon is not
proper and reasonable with respect to the
surname. The fact that Pet. has been using a
different surname and has become known
with such surname does not constitute proper
and reasonable cause to legally authorize and
change her surname to Alfon. The birth
certificate clearly shows that the father of Pet.
is Filomeno Duterte. Pet. likewise admitted
this fact in her testimony. To allow Pet. to
change her surname from Duterte to Alfon is
equivalent to allowing her to use her mother's
surname. Art. 364 of the CC provides:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father.
If another purpose of the Pet. is to carry the
surname of Alfon because her uncle who
reared her since childhood has the surname
"Alfon" then the remedy is not a petition for
change of name.
WHEREFORE, the petition insofar as the first
name is granted but denied with respect to the
surname. Pet. is authorized to change her
name from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva
Duterte to Estrella Alfon Duterte.
Let copy of this order be furnished the Local
Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant
to Sec. 3, Rule 103 of the RoC.
The lower court should have fully granted the
petition.
The only reason why the lower court denied the
Pet.'s prayer to change her surname is that as
legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella
Alfon she should principally use the surname of
her father invoking Art. 364 of the CC. But the
word "principally" as used in the codal provision
is not equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is
no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated
child should choose to use the surname of its
mother to which it is equally entitled. Moreover,
this Court in Haw Liong vs. Republic, said:
The following may be considered, among
others, as proper or reasonable causes that
may warrant the grant of a Pet. for change of
name; (1) when the name is ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor, or is extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the
request for change is a consequence of a
change of' status, such as when a natural
child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3)
when the change is necessary to avoid
confusion Tolentino, CC of the Philippines,
1953 ed., Vol. 1, p. 660).
In the case at bar, it has been shown that Pet. has,
since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon
although her birth records and baptismal
certificate show otherwise; she was enrolled in
the schools from the grades up to college under
the name Estrella S. Alfon; all her friends call her
by this name; she finished her course in Nursing
in college and was graduated and given a diploma
40
under this name; and she exercised the right of
suffrage likewise under this name. There is
therefore ample justification to grant fully her
petition which is not whimsical but on the
contrary is based on a solid and reasonable
ground, i.e. to avoid confusion.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby
modified in that, the Pet. is allowed to change not only
her first name but also her surname so as to be known
as ESTRELLA S. ALFON. No costs.
GR 103695 Mar. 15, 1996 REPUBLIC, Pet.,
vs. CA, JAIME B. CARANTO, and ZENAIDA P.
CARANTO, Rsps..
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision1 of CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 24453 which
affirmed in toto the decision of Br. XVI of RTC of Cavite
City, granting private Rsps.' petition for the adoption of
Midael C. Mazon with prayer for the correction of the
minor's first name "Midael" to "Michael."
The petition below was filed on Sept. 21 1988 by
private Rsps. spouses Jaime B. Caranto and
Zenaida P. Caranto for the adoption of Midael C.
Mazon, then fifteen years old, who had been
living with private Rsp. Jaime B. Caranto since he
was seven years old. When private Rsps. were
married on Jan. 19, 1986, the minor Midael C.
Mazon stayed with them under their care and
custody. Private Rsps. prayed that judgment be
rendered:
a) Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the
child of Pets. for all intents and purposes;
b.) Dissolving the authority vested in the
natural parents of the child; and
c) That the surname of the child be legally
changed to that of the Pets. and that the first
name which was mistakenly registered as
"MIDAEL" be corrected to "MICHAEL."
The RTC set the case for hearing on Sept. 21,
1988, giving notice thereof by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Province
of Cavite and by service of the order upon the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
and the Office of the SolGen.
The SolGen opposed the petition insofar as it
sought the correction of the name of the child
from "Midael" to "Michael." He argued that
although the correction sought concerned only a

clerical and innocuous error, it could not be
granted because the petition was basically for
adoption, not the correction of an entry in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the RoC.
Thereafter the case was heard during which
private Rsp. Zenaida Caranto, Florentina Mazon
(natural mother of the child), and the minor
testified. Also presented was Carlina Perez, social
worker of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, who endorsed the adoption of the
minor, being of the opinion that the same was in
the best interest of the child.
On May 30, 1989, the RTC rendered its decision.
The RTC dismissed the opposition of the SolGen
on the ground that Rule 108 of the RoC
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil
Registry) applies only to the correction of entries
concerning the civil status of persons. It cited
Rule 108, §1, which provides that any person
interested in an act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction
of any entry relating thereto." It held that the
correction of names in the civil registry is not one
of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, §2 as
"entries subject to cancellation or correction."
According to TC, the error could be corrected in
the same proceeding for adoption to prevent
multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the
Pets..
The dispositive portion of RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
granting the herein petition and declaring
that:
1. Michael C. Mazon is, for all legal intents
and purposes, the son by and option of Pets.
Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto;
2. Henceforth, the minor's name shall be
Michael Caranto, in lieu of his original name
of Michael Mazon, or Midael Mazon, as
appearing in his record of birth;
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Cavite City, the
birthplace of said minor, is hereby directed to
accordingly amend (and) correct the birth
certificate of said minor; and
41
4. This judgment shall retroact to Sept. 2,
1988, the date of filing of the herein petition.
The SolGen appealed to CA reiterating his
contention that the correction of names cannot
be effected in the same proceeding for adoption.
As additional ground for his appeal, he argued
that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case for adoption because in the notice published
in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael,"
instead of "Midael," which is the name of the
minor given in his Certificate of Live Birth.
On Jan. 23, 1992, CA affirmed in toto the decision
of the RTC. CA ruled that the case of Cruz v.
Republic, 2 invoked by the Pet. in support of its
plea that TC did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case, was inapplicable because that case involved
a substantial error. Like TC, it held that to require
the Pets. to file a separate petition for correction
of name would entail "additional time and
expenses for them as well as for the Government
and the Courts."
Hence this petition for review. Private
The first issue is whether on the facts stated, the
RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private Rsps.'
petition for adoption. Pet.'s contention is that TC
did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for
adoption because the notice by publication did
not state the true name of the minor child. Pet.
invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic.3
The present case is different. It involves an
obvious clerical error in the name of the child
sought to be adopted. In this case the correction
involves merely the substitution of the letters
"ch" for the letter "d," so that what appears as
"Midael" as given name would read "Michael."
Even the SolGen admits that the error is a plainly
clerical one. Changing the name of the child from
"Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot
possibly cause any confusion, because both
names "can be read and pronounced with the
same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog,
himig)." The purpose of the publication
requirement is to give notice so that those who
have any objection to the adoption can make their
objection known. That purpose has been served
by publication of notice in this case.
For this reason we hold that the RTC correctly
granted the petition for adoption of the minor

Midael C. Mazon and CA, in affirming the decision
of TC, correctly did so.
With regard to the second assignment of error in
the petition, we hold that both CA and TC erred in
granting private Rsps.' prayer for the correction
of the name of the child in the civil registry.
Contrary to what TC thought, Rule 108 of the RoC
applies to this case and because its provision was
not complied with, the decision of TC, insofar as it
ordered the correction of the name of the minor,
is void and without force or effect.
TC was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be
applicable only to the correction of errors
concerning the civil status of persons. Rule 108,
§2 plainly states:
§2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
— Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths;
(d) legal separation; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning;
(g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.
This case falls under letter "(o)," referring to
"changes of name." Indeed, it has been the
uniform ruling of this Court that Art. 412 of the
CC — to implement which Rule 108 was inserted
in the RoC in 1964 covers "those harmless and
innocuous changes, such as correction of a name
that is clearly misspelled."4 Thus, in Yu v.
Republic5 it was held that "to change "Sincio" to
"Sencio" which merely involves the substitution
of the first vowel "i" in the first name into the
vowel "e" amounts merely to the righting of a
clerical error." In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic6 it was
held that "the change of Pet.'s name from Beatriz
Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo is a
mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary
proceeding is appropriate."
Rule 108 thus applies to the present proceeding.
Now §3 of this Rule provides:
42
§3 Parties. — When cancellation or
correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding.
The local civil registrar is thus required to be
made a party to the proceeding. He is an
indispensable party, without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.7 As he was
not impleaded in this case much less given notice
of the proceeding, the decision of TC, insofar as it
granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is
void. The absence of an indispensable party in a
case renders ineffectual all the proceedings
subsequent to the filing of the complaint
including the judgment.8
Nor was notice of the petition for correction of
entry published as required by Rule 108, §4
which reads:
§4. Notice and publication. — Upon filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons named in the petition. The court
shall also cause the order to be published once
a week for 3 consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
province.
While there was notice given by publication in
this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption
made in compliance with Rule 99, §4. In that
notice only the prayer for adoption of the minor
was stated. Nothing was mentioned that in
addition the correction of his name in the civil
registry was also being sought. The local civil
registrar was thus deprived of notice and,
consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
The necessary consequence of the failure to
implead the civil registrar as an indispensable
party and to give notice by publication of the
petition for correction of entry was to render the
proceeding of TC, so far as the correction of entry
was concerned, null and void for lack of
jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject
matter.9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
decision of CA is MODIFIED by deleting from the
decision of RTC the order to the local civil

registrar to change the name "MIDAEL" to
"MICHAEL" in the birth certificate of the child. In
other respects relating to the adoption of Midael
C. Mazon, the decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED.
HABEAS CORPUS, AMPARO, DATA
GR 182497 June 29, 2010 NURHIDA JUHURI
AMPATUAN, Pet., vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG,
RTC, MANILA, BR. 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL
AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS,
PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and P/CHIEF INSP.
AGAPITO QUIMSON, Rsps..
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
651 of the RoC assailing the Order dated 25 Apr. 2008
of RTC of Manila, Br. 37, in Special Proceeding No. 08-
119132 which denied the petition for Habeas Corpus
filed by herein Pet. Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan in behalf
of her husband Police Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan 2
(PO1 Ampatuan).
Pet. alleged in her petition that her husband PO1
Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat
Municipal Police Station. On 14 Apr. 2008, he was
asked by his Chief of Police to report to the
Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan,
Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The
latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent
Piang Adam, Provincial Director of the PNP
Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to
stay at the Police Provincial Office of
Maguindanao without being informed of the
cause of his restraint. The next day, 15 Apr. 2008,
PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos
City Airport and was made to board a Philippine
Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at
the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was
turned over to policemen of Manila and brought
to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director
Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A
press briefing was then conducted where it was
announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for
the killing of two COMELEC Officials. He was then
detained at the Police Jail in United Nations
Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was
brought to inquest Prosec. Renato Gonzaga of the
Office of the City Prosec. of Manila due to the
alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of
the Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 Apr.
2008, PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the
Regional Headquarters Support Group in Camp
Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.3
43
Pet. continues that on 21 Apr. 2008, Chief Inquest
Prosec. Nelson Salva ordered the release for
further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. 4 The
Order was approved by the City Prosec. of Manila.
But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr.,
and P/Chief Insp. Agapito Quimson refused to
release PO1 Ampatuan.
This prompted Pet. to file the petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the RTC of Manila, Br. 37.5
Private Rsps. had another version of the
antecedent facts. They narrated that at around
7:08 o’clock in the evening of 10 Nov. 2007, a
sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal
Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del
Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila.
Investigation conducted by the Manila Police
District (MPD) Homicide Sec. yielded the identity
of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan.
Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to
the MPD District Director for proper disposition.
Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by
the Manila Prosec.’s Office.
On 18 Apr. 2008, Police Senior Superintendent
Atty. Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge
Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding
probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with
Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending
that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to
summary hearing.
On even date, a charge sheet for Grave
Misconduct was executed against PO1 Ampatuan,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
CHARGE SHEET
THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT
hereby charges above-named Rsp. of the
administrative offense of Grave Misconduct
(murder) pursuant to Sec. 52 of R.A. 8551 6 in
relation to NAPOLCOM Memorandum Circular
93-024, committed as follows:
That on or about 7:08 in the evening of Nov. 10,
2007, in M.H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil St., Ermita,
Manila, above-named Rsp. while being an active
member of the PNP and within the jurisdiction of
this office, armed with a cal .45 pistol, with intent
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, shot Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Jr.,
COMELEC official on the different parts of his

body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
gunshot wounds which directly cause his death.
Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws rules and
Regulations.7
Also, through a Memorandum dated 18 Apr. 2008,
Police Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr.
directed the Regional Director of the National
Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place
PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody, thus:
1. Reference: Memo from that Office dated
Apr. 15, 2008 re Arrest of PO1 Busser
Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty.
Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both
COMELEC Legal Officers.
2. This pertains to the power of the Chief,
PNP embodied in Sec. 52 of RA 8551, to place
police personnel under restrictive custody
during the pendency of a grave
administrative case filed against him or even
after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave
in nature, against such police personnel.
3. In this connection, you are hereby directed
to place PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in
the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty.
Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers,
under your restrictive custody.
4. For strict compliance.8
On 19 Apr. 2008, through a Memorandum
Request dated 18 Apr. 2008, Rsp. Police Director
Geary L. Barias requested for the creation of the
Summary Hearing Board to hear the case of PO1
Ampatuan.9
On 20 Apr. 2008, Special Order No. 921 was
issued by Police Director Edgardo E. Acunñ a,
placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody
of the Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 Apr.
2008. Said Special Order No. 921, reads:
Restrictive Custody
PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under
restrictive custody of the Regional Director,
NCRPO effective Apr. 19, 2008. (Reference:
Memorandum from CPNP dated 18 Apr. 2008).
BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL
RAZON:10
Meanwhile, on 21 Apr. 2008, the City Prosec. of
Manila recommended that the case against PO1
44
Ampatuan be set for further investigation and
that the latter be released from custody unless he
is being held for other charges/legal grounds.11
Armed with the 21 Apr. 2008 recommendation of
the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, Pet., who is
the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the
RTC of Manila on 22 Apr. 2008. The petition was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 08-119132
and was raffled to Br. 37.
On 24 Apr. 2008, finding the petition to be
sufficient in form and substance, Rsp. Judge
Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus commanding therein Rsps. to
produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing
said Rsps. to show cause why they are
withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1
Ampatuan.12
On 25 Apr. 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition in
its Order which reads:
Essentially, counsels for Pet. insists that PO1
Basser Ampatuan is being illegally detained by
the Rsps. despite the order of release of Chief
Inquest Prosec. Nelson Salva dated Apr. 21, 2008.
They further claim that as of Apr. 23, 2008, no
administrative case was filed against PO1
Ampatuan.
Rsps., while admitting that to date no CrimCase
was filed against PO1 Ampatuan, assert that the
latter is under restrictive custody since he is
facing an administrative case for grave
misconduct. They submitted to this Court the Pre-
charge Evaluation Report and Charge Sheet.
Further, in support of their position, Rsps. cited
the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon. Calderon,
GR 178920 claiming that habeas corpus will not
lie for a PNP personnel under restrictive custody.
They claim that this is authorized under Sec. 52,
Par. 4 of R.A. 8551 authorizing the Chief of PNP to
place the PNP personnel under restrictive
custody during the pendency of administrative
case for grave misconduct.
Pet. countered that the administrative case filed
against PO1 Ampatuan was ante-dated to make it
appear that there was such a case filed before
Apr. 23, 2008.
The function of habeas corpus is to determine the
legality of one’s detention, meaning, if there is

sufficient cause for deprivation or confinement
and if there is none to discharge him at once. For
habeas corpus to issue, the restraint of liberty
must be in the nature of illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom which must be actual and
effective, not nominal or moral.
Granting arguendo that the administrative case
was ante-dated, the Court cannot simply ignore
the filing of an administrative case filed against
PO1 Ampatuan. It cannot be denied that the PNP
has its own administrative disciplinary
mechanism and as clearly pointed out by the
Rsps., the Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1
Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to
Sec. 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551.
The filing of the administrative case against PO1
Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this
Court has no authority to order the release of the
subject police officer.
Lastly, anent the contention of the Pet. that the
letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered
the administrative case moot and academic, the
same could not be accepted by this Court. It must
be stressed that the resignation has not been
acted by the appropriate police officials of the
PNP, and that the administrative case was filed
while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of
the PNP.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.13
Distressed, Pet. is now before this Court via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the RoC to
question the validity of the RTC Order dated 25
Apr. 2008. The issues are:
I. THE RSP. COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT
THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B.
AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT
AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL;
II. THE RSP. COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY
OF RSP. AVELINO RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52, PAR. 4,
R.A. 8551 TO PLACE AMPATUAN UNDER
RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS;
III. THE RSP. COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT SHIRKED FROM ITS
JUDICIAL DUTY TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF PO1
45
AMPATUAN FROM THE CUSTODY OF RSPS.
MAMANG PULIS.14
Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty.15
Rule 102 of the 1997 RoC sets forth the
procedure to be followed in the issuance of the
writ. The Rule provides:
RULE 102 - HABEAS CORPUS
SEC. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except
as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ
of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.
SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. – The writ of
habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme
Court, or any member thereof, on any day and at
any time, or by CA or any member thereof in the
instances authorized by law, and if so granted it
shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines,
and may be made returnable before the court or
any member thereof, or before a Court of First
Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and
decision on the merits. It may also be granted by
a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on
any day and at any time, and returnable before
himself, enforceable only within his judicial
district.
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. – If it appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect
in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
The objective of the writ is to determine whether
the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If

it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of a person's
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even
if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may,
by reason of some supervening events, such as
the instances mentioned in Sec. 4 of Rule 102, be
no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application.16
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief
for those who have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ,
however, should not be issued when the custody
over the person is by virtue of a judicial process
or a valid judgment.17
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the
writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such
relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or placed under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained
via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus
is unavailing.18 Fundamentally, in order to justify
the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an
illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action.19
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to determine W/N a particular person is
legally held. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is
an actual and effective, and not merely nominal
or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of
habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime
specification of an application for a writ of habeas
corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object
and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any
restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient.20
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a
court or judge must first inquire into whether the
Pet. is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not,
the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of
detention will proceed only where such restraint
exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to
be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and
46
the Pet. discharged. Needless to state, if
otherwise, again the writ will be refused.21
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not
issue as a matter of course or as a mere
perfunctory operation on the filing of the
petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its
issuance and it must be clear to the judge to
whom the petition is presented that, prima facie,
the Pet. is entitled to the writ. It is only if the
court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully
restrained of his liberty will the petition for
habeas corpus be granted. If the Rsps. are not
detaining or restraining the applicant or the
person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.22
Pet. contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was
placed under the custody of Rsps. on 20 Apr.
2008, there was yet no administrative case filed
against him. When the release order of Chief
Inquest Prosec. Nelson Salva was served upon
Rsps. on 21 Apr. 2008, there was still no
administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan.
She also argues that the arrest on 14 Apr. 2008 of
PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal
because there was no warrant of arrest issued by
any judicial authority against him.
On the other hand, Rsps., in their Comment23 filed
by the Office of the SolGen, argue that TC
correctly denied the subject petition. Rsps.
maintain that while the Office of the City Prosec.
of Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan
be released from custody, said recommendation
was made only insofar as the criminal action for
murder that was filed with the prosecution office
is concerned and is without prejudice to other
legal grounds for which he may be held under
custody. In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is also
facing administrative charges for Grave
Misconduct. They cited the case of Manalo v.
Calderon,24 where this Court held that a petition
for habeas corpus will be given due course only if
it shows that Pet. is being detained or restrained
of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody
and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of
police officers under investigation by their
superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty.25
The SolGen is correct.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed
under Restrictive Custody. RA 6975 (also known

as the Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990), as amended by RA
8551 (also known as the Philippine National
Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998),
clearly provides that members of the police force
are subject to the administrative disciplinary
machinery of the PNP. Sec. 41(b) of the said law
enumerates the disciplinary actions, including
restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly
designated supervisors and equivalent officers of
the PNP as a matter of internal discipline. The
pertinent provision of RA 8551 reads:
Sec. 52 – x x x.
4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to
impose the disciplinary punishment of dismissal
from the service; suspension or forfeiture of
salary; or any combination thereof for a period
not exceeding 180 days. Provided, further, That
the Chief of the PNP shall have the authority to
place police personnel under restrictive custody
during the pendency of a grave administrative
case filed against him or even after the filing of a
criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such
police personnel. [Emphasis ours].
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under
restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid
argument for his continued detention. This Court
has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring
of movements or whereabouts of police officers
under investigation by their superiors is not a
form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.26
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint
which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is
neither actual nor effective restraint that would
call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a
permissible precautionary measure to assure the
PNP authorities that the police officers concerned
are always accounted for.27
Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s restrictive
custody is the administrative case filed against
him, his remedy is within such administrative
process.
We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been
under restrictive custody since 19 Apr. 2008. To
date, the administrative case against him should
have already been resolved and the issue of his
restrictive custody should have been rendered
moot and academic, in accordance with Sec. 55 of
RA 8551, which provides:
47
SEC. 55. Sec. 47 of RA 6975 is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending CrimCase.
– Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a
member of the PNP for grave felonies where the
penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one
(1) day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office for a period not
exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment:
Provided, however, That if it can be shown by
evidence that the accused is harassing the
complainant and/or witnesses, the court may
order the preventive suspension of the accused
PNP member even if the charge is punishable by a
penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day:
Provided, further, That the preventive suspension
shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if
the delay in the disposition of the case is due to
the fault, negligence or petitions of the Rsp.:
Provided, finally, That such preventive
suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in
the exigency of the service upon recommendation
of the Chief, PNP. Such case shall be subject to
continuous trial and shall be terminated within
ninety (90) days from arraignment of the
accused. (Emphasis supplied.)
Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of TC, we have to dismiss
the petition.
In sum, Pet. is unable to discharge the burden of
showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the
writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1
Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face
that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty
guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
GR 151876 June 21, 2005 SUSAN GO and the
PEOPLE, Pets., vs. FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, Rsp..
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of
the RoC, assailing the Oct. 10, 2001 2 and the Oct. 11,
20013 Orders of RTC (Br. 5), Baguio City. 4 The Oct. 10,
2001 Order released Rsp. Fernando L. Dimagiba from
confinement and required him to pay a fine of
₱100,000 in lieu of imprisonment.
There being no further appeal to CA, the RTC
issued on Feb. 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality of
the Decision.12

Thus, on Feb. 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order
directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of
his sentence as a result of his conviction. TC also
issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil
liability.13
On Feb. 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a MR of the
MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of the Order
of Arrest and the modification of the final
Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only,
instead of imprisonment also, should have been
imposed on him.14 The arguments raised in that
Motion were reiterated in a Motion for the Partial
Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed on Feb. 28,
2001.15
In an Order dated Aug. 22, 2001, the MTCC
denied the MR and directed the issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba.16 On Sept.
28, 2001, he was arrested and imprisoned for the
service of his sentence.
On Oct. 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio
City a Petition17 for a writ of habeas corpus. The
case was raffled to Br. 5, which scheduled the
hearing for Oct. 10, 2001. Copies of the Order
were served on Rsp.’s counsels and the city
warden.18
Ruling of RTC
Right after hearing the case on Oct. 10, 2001, the
RTC issued an Order directing the immediate
release of Dimagiba from confinement and
requiring him to pay a fine of ₱100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment. However, the civil aspect of the
July 16, 1999 MTCC Decision was not touched
upon.19 A subsequent Order, explaining in greater
detail the basis of the grant of the writ of habeas
corpus, was issued on Oct. 11, 2001.20
In justifying its modification of the MTCC
Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. CA21 and
Supreme Court Administrative Circular (SC-AC)
No. 12-2000,22 which allegedly required the
imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment
also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a
recidivist or a habitual delinquent. The RTC held
that this rule should be retroactively applied in
favor of Dimagiba.23 It further noted that (1) he
was a first-time offender and an employer of at
least 200 workers who would be displaced as a
result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil
liability had already been satisfied through the
levy of his properties.24
48
On Oct. 22, 2001, Pet. Go filed a MR of the RTC
Orders dated Oct. 10 and 11, 2001.25 That Motion
was denied on Jan. 18, 2002.26
Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court
on pure questions of law.27
The Issues: In the main, the case revolves around
the question of whether the Petition for habeas
corpus was validly granted. Hence, the Court will
discuss the four issues as they intertwine with
this main question.29
The Court’s Ruling: The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention in which
individuals are deprived of liberty. 30 It was
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more
specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those
who may have been illegally confined or
imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus
deliver them from unlawful custody.31 It is
therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the
circumstances under which a person is
detained.32
The writ may not be availed of when the person
in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue
of a valid judgment.33 However, as a post-
conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the
following exceptional circumstances is attendant:
(1) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a
person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty
has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to
such excess.34
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in
Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly
prescribed the imposition of a fine, not
imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Rsp.
sought the retroactive effect of those rulings,
thereby effectively challenging the penalty
imposed on him for being excessive. From his
allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in
form to support the issuance of the writ.

However, it appears that Rsp. has previously
sought the modification of his sentence in a MR 35
of the MTCC’s Execution Order and in a Motion
for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution. 36
Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground
that it had no power or authority to amend a
judgment issued by the RTC.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, Rsp. raised the
same arguments that he had invoked in the said
Motions. We believe that his resort to this
extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity.
The remedy should have been an appeal of the
MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he
should have prayed that the execution of the
judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused
the action he had chosen, obviously with the
intent of finding a favorable court. His Petition for
a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to
reopen a case that had already become final and
executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to
forum shopping. Rsp. should have resorted to the
proper, available remedy instead of instituting a
different action in another forum.
The Court also finds his arguments for his release
insubstantial to support the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus.
Preference in the Application of Penalties for
Violation of BP 22
The following alternative penalties are imposable
under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than
30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of
not less or more than double the amount of the
check, a fine that shall in no case exceed
₱200,000; or (3) both such fine and
imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.37
SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-
2001,38 established a rule of preference in
imposing the above penalties.39 When the
circumstances of the case clearly indicate good
faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be
considered as the preferred penalty. 40 The
determination of the circumstances that warrant
the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial judge
only.41 Should the judge deem that imprisonment
is appropriate, such penalty may be imposed.42
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative
penalty of imprisonment. The competence to
49
amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to
this Court.43
Inapplicability of SC-AC No. 12-2000
Pets. argue that Rsp. is not entitled to the
benevolent policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-
2000, because he is not a "first time offender." 44
This circumstance is, however, not the sole factor
in determining whether he deserves the
preferred penalty of fine alone. The penalty to be
imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances
of each case.45 It is TC’s discretion to impose any
penalty within the confines of the law. SC-AC No.
13-2001 explains thus:
"x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
establishes a rule of preference in the application
of the penal provisions of BP 22 such that where
the circumstances of both the offense and the
offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the
imposition of a fine alone should be considered
as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say,
the determination of whether the circumstances
warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely
upon the Judge. x x x.
It is, therefore, understood that:
"2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of
sound discretion, and taking into consideration
the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone
would best serve the interests of justice, or
whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense,
work violence on the social order, or otherwise be
contrary to the imperatives of justice;"
The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of
habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged
retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000, which
supposedly favored BP 22 offenders.46 On this
point, Dimagiba contended that his
imprisonment was violative of his right to equal
protection of the laws, since only a fine would be
imposed on others similarly situated.47
The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws
may be applied retroactively if favorable to the
accused. This principle, embodied in the Revised
Penal Code,48 has been expanded in certain
instances to cover special laws.49
 50
…. ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S.
IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA, LT. GEN.
Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA
preference, it serves only as a guideline for TCs. CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT.
RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS
Thus, it is addressed to the judges, who are
WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE,
directed to consider the factual circumstances of Rsps..
each case prior to imposing the appropriate
penalty. In other words, the Administrative At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari 1
Circular does not confer any new right in favor of assailing the Decision2 dated 26 Aug. 2009 of CA in CA-
the accused, much less those convicted by final G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a petition that was
judgment. commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of
Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas
The competence to determine the proper penalty Data Rule). In its decision, CA extended to the Pet.,
belongs to the court rendering the decision Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo
against the accused.52 That decision is subject and habeas data but denied the latter’s prayers for an
inspection order, production order and return of
only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law,
specified personal belongings.
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Another TC may not
Pet. is an American citizen of Filipino descent. 4
encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC No.
While in the United States, Pet. enrolled in an
12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all
exposure program to the Philippines with the
factual circumstances of each case. Such a review
group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United
can no longer be done if the judgment has
States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a
become final and executory.
member.5 During the course of her immersion,
Pet. toured various provinces and towns of
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had
Central Luzon and, in Apr. of 2009, she
full knowledge of all relevant circumstances from
volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in
which Rsp.’s conviction and sentence were based.
conducting an initial health survey in La Paz,
The penalty imposed was well within the
Tarlac for a future medical mission.7
confines of the law. Upon appeal, the conviction
was sustained by RTC-Br. 4 of Baguio City.
In pursuit of her volunteer work, Pet. brought her
Eventually, the Decision attained finality. Hence,
passport, wallet with ₱15k in cash, journal, digital
RTC-Br. 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify
camera with memory card, laptop computer,
the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a
external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch,
writ of habeas corpus.
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.
The doctrine of equal protection of laws53 does
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, Pet.
not apply for the same reasons as those on
and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo)
retroactivity. Foremost of these reasons is that
and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest
the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty
in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo) in
of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely
Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz,
a rule of preference as to which penalty should be
Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon,
imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a
however, Pet., her companions and Mr. Paolo
case. At any rate, this matter deserves scant
were startled by the loud sounds of someone
consideration, because Rsp. failed to raise any
banging at the front door and a voice demanding
substantial argument to support his contention.54
that they open up.11
…. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the
Suddenly, 15 heavily armed men forcibly opened
assailed Orders NULLIFIED. Rsp.’s Petition for habeas
corpus is hereby DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED the door, barged inside and ordered Pet. and her
to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of Rsp. and companions to lie on the ground face down.12 The
the completion of his sentence. armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with
the exception of their leader, were also wearing
GR 189155 Sept. 7, 2010 IN THE MATTER OF THE bonnets to conceal their faces.13
PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND
HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS,
MELISSA C. ROXAS, Pet., vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-

Pet. tried to protest the intrusion, but 5 of the
armed men ganged up on her and tied her
hands.14 At this juncture, Pet. saw the other
armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already
blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a
nearby blue van. Pet. started to shout her name. 15
Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men
dragged Pet. towards the van—bruising her arms,
legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before
she can be blindfolded, Pet. was able to see the
face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. 17
The van then sped away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van
stopped.18 Pet., Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered
to alight.19 After she was informed that she is
being detained for being a member of the (CPP-
NPA), Pet. was separated from her companions
and was escorted to a room that she believed was
a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors. 20
From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire,
the noise of planes taking off and landing and
some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she
was taken to the military camp of Fort Magsaysay
in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22
What followed was 5 straight days of
interrogation coupled with torture.23 The thrust
of the interrogations was to convince Pet. to
abandon her communist beliefs in favor of
returning to "the fold."24 The torture, on the other
hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and
suffocating the Pet..25
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, Pet. was
made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep. 26
Pet. was only relieved of her blindfolds when she
was allowed to take a bath, during which she
became acquainted with a woman named "Rose"
who bathed her.27 There were also a few times
when she cheated her blindfold and was able to
peek at her surroundings.28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, Pet. was
still able to learn the names of three of her
interrogators who introduced themselves to her
as "Dex," "James" and "RC."29 "RC" even told Pet.
that those who tortured her came from the
"Special Operations Group," and that she was
abducted because her name is included in the
"Order of Battle."30
On 25 May 2009, Pet. was finally released and
returned to her uncle’s house in QC. 31 Before
being released, however, the abductors gave Pet. a
51
cellular phone with a SIM card, a slip of paper
32
containing an e-mail address with password, 33 a
plastic bag containing biscuits and books, 34 the
handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of
shoes. Pet. was also sternly warned not to report
the incident to the group Karapatan or something
untoward will happen to her and her family.36
Sometime after her release, Pet. continued to
receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given
to her.37 Out of apprehension that she was being
monitored and also fearing for the safety of her
family, Pet. threw away the cellular phone with a
SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future
harm as well as the suppression of any existing
government files or records linking her to the
communist movement, Pet. filed a Petition for the
Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this
Court on 1 June 2009.38 Pet. impleaded public
officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the
military and police hierarchy as Rsps., on the
belief that it was government agents who were
behind her abduction and torture. Pet. likewise
included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that:
(1) Rsps. be enjoined from harming or even
approaching Pet. and her family; (2) an order be
issued allowing the inspection of detention areas
in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur,
Nueva Ecija; (3) Rsps. be ordered to produce
documents relating to any report on the case of
Pet. including, but not limited to, intelligence
report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry
Division, the Special Operations Group of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its
subsidiaries or Br./es prior to, during and
subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) Rsps. be ordered
to expunge from the records of the Rsps. any
document pertinent or connected to Melissa C.
Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name which sounds
the same; and (5) Rsps. be ordered to return to
Pet. her journal, digital camera with memory
card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,
wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope,
medicines and her ₱15k cash.40
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court
issued the desired writs and referred the case to
CA for hearing, reception of evidence and
appropriate action.41 The Resolution also directed
the Rsps. to file their verified written return.42

On 18 June 2009, the OSG, filed a Return of the
Writs43 on behalf of the public officials impleaded
as Rsps..
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the
public Rsps..
The public Rsps. label Pet.’s alleged abduction
and torture as "stage managed."44 In support of
their accusation, the public Rsps. principally rely
on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the
Special Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In
the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior
to the purported abduction, Pet. and her
companions instructed him and his two sons to
avoid leaving the house.46 From this statement,
the public Rsps. drew the distinct possibility that,
except for those already inside Mr. Paolo’s house,
nobody else has any way of knowing where Pet.
and her companions were at the time they were
supposedly abducted.47 This can only mean, the
public Rsps. concluded, that if ever there was any
"abduction" it must necessarily have been
planned by, or done with the consent of, the Pet.
and her companions themselves.48
Public Rsps. also cited the Medical Certificate 49 of
the Pet., as actually belying her claims that she
was subjected to serious torture for 5 days. The
public Rsps. noted that while the Pet. alleges that
she was choked and boxed by her abductors—
inflictions that could have easily produced
remarkable bruises—her Medical Certificate only
shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.50
For the public Rsps., the above anomalies put in
question the very authenticity of Pet.’s alleged
abduction and torture, more so any military or
police involvement therein. Hence, public Rsps.
conclude that the claims of abduction and torture
was no more than a charade fabricated by the Pet.
to put the government in bad light, and at the
same time, bring great media mileage to her and
the group that she represents.51
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and
torture to be genuine, the public Rsps. insist on
the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data
petition based on the following grounds: (a) as
against Rsp. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
in particular, because of her immunity from suit, 52
and (b) as against all of the public Rsps., in
general, in view of the absence of any specific
allegation in the petition that they had
52
participated in, or at least authorized, the
commission of such atrocities.53
Finally, the public Rsps. posit that they had not
been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth
behind the allegations of the Pet.. 54 In both the
police and military arms of the government
machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following
manner:
Police Action
Police authorities first learned of the purported
abduction around 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of
19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M.
Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police
Station to report the presence of heavily armed
men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55
Acting on the report, the police station launched
an initial investigation.56
The initial investigation revolved around the
statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the
investigators of an abduction incident involving 3
persons—later identified as Pet. Melissa Roxas,
Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandoc—who
were all staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed
that the abduction occurred around 1:30 o’clock
in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about
eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their
way inside his house.58 Other witnesses to the
abduction also confirmed that the armed men
used a dark blue van with an unknown plate
number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles
with no plate numbers.59
At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009,
the investigators sent a Flash Message to the
different police stations surrounding La Paz,
Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and
motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the
effort yielded negative results.60
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial
investigation were included in a Special Report 61
that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police
Provincial Office, headed by public Rsp. P/S Supt.
Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public Rsp. Supt.
Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police
Office of Region 3 about the abduction. 62 Follow-
up investigations were, at the same time,
pursued.63
On 26 May 2009, public Rsp. PC/Supt. Leon Nilo
Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police

Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special
Investigation Task Group—CAROJAN (Task Group
CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation
on the abduction of the Pet., Carabeo and
Jandoc.64
Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by
making a series of background examinations on
the victims of the purported abduction, in order
to reveal the motive behind the abduction and,
ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators. 65 Task
Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with
Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of
People’s Rights—organizations trusted by Pet.—
in the hopes of obtaining the latter’s participation
in the ongoing investigations. 66 Unfortunately, the
letters sent by the investigators requesting for
the availability of the Pet. for inquiries were left
unheeded.67
The progress of the investigations conducted by
Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the
reports68 that it submitted to public Rsp. General
Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine
National Police. However, as of their latest report
dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still
unable to make a definitive finding as to the true
identity and affiliation of the abductors—a fact
that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal
of the Pet., or any of her fellow victims, to
cooperate in their investigative efforts.69
Military Action
Public Rsp. Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of
National Defense, first came to know about the
alleged abduction and torture of the Pet. upon
receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing
him and the other Rsps. to file their return.70
Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum
Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the
AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct
an inquiry to determine the validity of the
accusation of military involvement in the
abduction.72
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive,
public Rsp. General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief
of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message 73 addressed
to public Rsp. Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit
(Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the
Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation
on the abduction of the Pet..74
53
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations
in the amparo petition, public Rsp. Lt. Gen. Bangit
instructed public Rsp. Major General Ralph A.
Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the
Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion
an investigation regarding the possible
involvement of any personnel assigned at the
camp in the purported abduction of the Pet.. 75 In
turn, public Rsp. Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the
Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th
Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation. 76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry
Division released an Investigation Report77
detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance,
the report described Pet.’s allegations as
"opinionated" and thereby cleared the military
from any involvement in her alleged abduction
and torture.78
The Decision of CA
In its Decision,79 CA gave due weight and
consideration to the Pet.’s version that she was
indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for
5 straight days. The appellate court noted the
sincerity and resolve by which the Pet. affirmed
the contents of her affidavits in open court, and
was thereby convinced that the latter was telling
the truth.80
On the other hand, CA disregarded the argument
of the public Rsps. that the abduction of the Pet.
was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an
unfounded speculation that only the latter and
her companions knew where they were staying at
the time they were forcibly taken.81 CA further
stressed that the Medical Certificate of the Pet.
can only affirm the existence of a true abduction,
as its findings are reflective of the very injuries
the latter claims to have sustained during her
harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was
handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors
onto their van.82
CA also recognized the existence of an ongoing
threat against the security of the Pet., as
manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and
monitor her, even after she was released.83 This
threat, according to CA, is all the more
compounded by the failure of the police
authorities to identify the material perpetrators
who are still at large.84 Thus, the appellate court
extended to the Pet. the privilege of the writ of

amparo by directing the public Rsps. to afford
protection to the former, as well as continuing,
under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their
existing investigations involving the abduction. 85
CA likewise observed a transgression of the right
to informational privacy of the Pet., noting the
existence of "records of investigations" that
concerns the Pet. as a suspected member of the
CPP-NPA.86 The appellate court derived the
existence of such records from a photograph and
video file presented in a press conference by
party-list representatives Jovito Palparan
(Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which
allegedly show the Pet. participating in rebel
exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed
that the photograph and video came from a
female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the
organization. According to CA, the proliferation of
the photograph and video, as well as any form of
media, insinuating that Pet. is part of the CPP-
NPA does not only constitute a violation of the
right to privacy of the Pet. but also puts further
strain on her already volatile security. 87 To this
end, the appellate court granted the privilege of
the writ of habeas data mandating the public
Rsps. to refrain from distributing to the public
any records, in whatever form, relative to Pet.’s
alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently
related to her abduction and torture.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, CA was
not convinced that the military or any other
person acting under the acquiescence of the
government, were responsible for the abduction
and torture of the Pet..89 The appellate court
stressed that, judging by her own statements, the
Pet. merely "believed" that the military was
behind her abduction.90 Thus, CA absolved the
public Rsps. from any complicity in the abduction
and torture of Pet..91 The petition was likewise
dismissed as against public Rsp. President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from
suit.92
Accordingly, the Pet.’s prayers for the return of
her personal belongings were denied.93 Pet.’s
prayers for an inspection order and production
order also met the same fate.94
Hence, this appeal by the Pet..
AMPARO
54
A. Pet. first contends that CA erred in absolving
the public Rsps. from any responsibility in her
abduction and torture.95 Corollary to this, Pet.
also finds fault on the part of CA in denying her
prayer for the return of her personal
belongings.96
Pet. insists that the manner by which her
abduction and torture was carried out, as well as
the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes
that she heard while in detention, as these were
detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her
in open court, are already sufficient evidence to
prove government involvement.97
Proceeding from such assumption, Pet. invokes
the doctrine of command responsibility to
implicate the high-ranking civilian and military
authorities she impleaded as Rsps. in her amparo
petition.98 Thus, Pet. seeks from this Court a
pronouncement holding the Rsps. as complicit in
her abduction and torture, as well as liable for the
return of her belongings.99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the
Pet. of the doctrine of command responsibility as
the justification in impleading the public Rsps. in
her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not
incorrect. The doctrine of command
responsibility is a rule of substantive law that
establishes liability and, by this account, cannot
be a proper legal basis to implead a party-Rsp. in
an amparo petition.100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, 101 which was the
first to examine command responsibility in the
context of an amparo proceeding, observed that
the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico
notes that:102
The evolution of the command responsibility
doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr.
Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest
terms, means the "responsibility of commanders
for crimes committed by subordinate members of
the armed forces or other persons subject to their
control in international wars or domestic
conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility
is properly a form of criminal complicity. The
Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine
of command responsibility,104 foreshadowing the
present-day precept of holding a superior

accountable for the atrocities committed by his
subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of
control over them. As then formulated, command
responsibility is "an omission mode of
individual criminal liability," whereby the
superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to
prevent or punish the perpetrators105 (as opposed to
crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring
supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility
presupposes an imputation of individual liability,
it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal
or administrative case rather than in a summary
amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in
the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed
at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives
that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation
of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security.106 While the principal objective of its
proceedings is the initial determination of
whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal
killing or threats thereof had transpired—the
writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such
disappearance, killing or threats, whether that
may be criminal, civil or administrative under the
applicable substantive law.107 The rationale
underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo
writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the
landmark case of The Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo:108
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as
it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the Pet.; it is not
an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the
inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not,
by any measure, preclude impleading military or
police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed
with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In
55
which case, commanders may be impleaded—not
actually on the basis of command responsibility
—but rather on the ground of their responsibility,
or at least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis, 110
the distinct, but interrelated concepts of
responsibility and accountability were given
special and unique significations in relation to an
amparo proceeding, to wit:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the
actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by
action or omission, in an enforced disappearance,
as a measure of the remedies this Court shall
craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the
responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to
those who Exh.ed involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined
above; or who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who
carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Rsps.
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case
that the intent of the Pet. in impleading the public
Rsps. is to ascribe some form of responsibility on
their part, based on her assumption that they, in
one way or the other, had condoned her
abduction and torture.111
To establish such assumption, Pet. attempted to
show that it was government agents who were
behind her ordeal. Thus, the Pet. calls attention to
the circumstances surrounding her abduction
and torture—i.e., the forcible taking in broad
daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates;
utilization of blindfolds; conducting
interrogations to elicit communist inclinations;
and the infliction of physical abuse—which,
according to her, is consistent with the way
enforced disappearances are being practiced by
the military or other state forces.112
Moreover, Pet. also claims that she was held
inside the military camp Fort Magsaysay—a
conclusion that she was able to infer from the
travel time required to reach the place where she

was actually detained, and also from the sounds
of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard
while thereat.113
We are not impressed. The totality of the
evidence presented by the Pet. does not inspire
reasonable conclusion that her abductors were
military or police personnel and that she was
detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances
attending a particular case of abduction with
those surrounding previous instances of enforced
disappearances does not, necessarily, carry
sufficient weight to prove that the government
orchestrated such abduction. We opine that
insofar as the present case is concerned, the
perceived similarity cannot stand as substantial
evidence of the involvement of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be
accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of
military involvement depends largely on the
availability or non-availability of other pieces of
evidence that has the potential of directly proving
the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable,
must be preferred over mere circumstantial
evidence based on patterns and similarity,
because the former indubitably offers greater
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of
the perpetrators. An amparo court cannot simply
leave to remote and hazy inference what it could
otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, Pet. was, in fact, able to
include in her Offer of Exh.s,114 the cartographic
sketches115 of several of her abductors whose
faces she managed to see. To the mind of this
Court, these cartographic sketches have the
undeniable potential of giving the greatest
certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of
Pet.’s abductors. Unfortunately for the Pet., this
potential has not been realized in view of the fact
that the faces described in such sketches remain
unidentified, much less have been shown to be
that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly
stated, the abductors were not proven to be part
of either the military or the police chain of
command.
Second. The claim of the Pet. that she was taken
to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established
by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach
the place where she was detained and by the
56
sounds that she heard while thereat. Like CA, We
are not inclined to take the estimate and
observations of the Pet. as accurate on its face—
not only because they were made mostly while
she was in blindfolds, but also in view of the fact
that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines,
whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the
travel time required to reach it is in itself
doubtful.116 With nothing else but obscure
observations to support it, Pet.’s claim that she
was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere
speculation.
In sum, the Pet. was not able to establish to a
concrete point that her abductors were actually
affiliated, whether formally or informally, with
the military or the police organizations. Neither
does the evidence at hand prove that Pet. was
indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay
to the exclusion of other places. These
evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually
impossible to determine whether the abduction
and torture of the Pet. was in fact committed with
the acquiescence of the public Rsps.. On account
of this insufficiency in evidence, a
pronouncement of responsibility on the part of
the public Rsps., therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the Pet. for the
return of her personal belongings.
In its decision, CA denied the above prayer of the
Pet. by reason of the failure of the latter to prove
that the public Rsps. were involved in her
abduction and torture.117 We agree with the
conclusion of CA, but not entirely with the reason
used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the
prayer of the Pet. for the return of her belongings
is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is
sufficient evidence to hold public Rsps.
responsible for the abduction of the Pet..
In the first place, an order directing the public
Rsps. to return the personal belongings of the Pet.
is already equivalent to a conclusive
pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a
substantial relief that can only be granted once
the liability of the public Rsps. has been fixed in a
full and exhaustive proceeding. As already
discussed above, matters of liability are not
determinable in a mere summary amparo
proceeding.118

But perhaps the more fundamental reason in
denying the prayer of the Pet., lies with the fact
that a person’s right to be restituted of his
property is already subsumed under the general
rubric of property rights—which are no longer
protected by the writ of amparo.119 Sec. 1 of the
Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and
extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection
of property rights.
B. The next error raised by the Pet. is the denial
by CA of her prayer for an inspection of the
detention areas of Fort Magsaysay. 121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely
pointing to any military involvement in Pet.’s
ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of CA
in denying an inspection of the military camp at
Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate
court that a contrary stance would be equivalent
to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was
never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing
for the interim relief of inspection order. 122
Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused by
the Pet., the Amparo Rule does not allow a
"fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed
to give support or strengthen the claim of a Pet. in
an amparo petition, in order to aid the court
before making a decision.124 A basic requirement
before an amparo court may grant an inspection
order is that the place to be inspected is
reasonably determinable from the allegations of
the party seeking the order. While the Amparo
Rule does not require that the place to be
inspected be identified with clarity and precision,
it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of
an inspection order that the supporting
allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as
to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown
above, Pet. failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the
Pet. are not strong enough to make out a prima
facie case that she was detained in Fort
Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp
cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot
issue on the basis of allegations that are, in
themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, CA granted to the Pet. the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, by enjoining
57
the public Rsps. from "distributing or causing the
distribution to the public any records in whatever
form, reports, documents or similar papers"
relative to the Pet.’s "alleged ties with the CPP-
NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and
torture." Though not raised as an issue in this
appeal, this Court is constrained to pass upon and
review this particular ruling of CA in order to
rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the
grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used
by CA in granting the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant
portion125 of its decision:
Under these premises, Pet. prayed that all the
records, intelligence reports and reports on the
investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or
Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually
expunged from the records. Pet. claimed to be
included in the Government’s Order of Battle
under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed political
opponents against whom false criminal charges
were filed based on made up and perjured
information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Pet.
could testify before Us, Ex-army general Jovito
Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover
of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
party-list held a press conference where they
revealed that they received an information from a
female NPA rebel who wanted out of the
organization, that Pet. was a communist rebel.
Alcover claimed that said information reached
them thru a letter with photo of Pet. holding
firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD
of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Pet.’s denial that she
was the person in said video, there were records
of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or
Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy.
Without a doubt, reports of such nature have
reasonable connections, one way or another, to
Pet.’s abduction where she claimed she had been
subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts
which nearly caused her life precisely due to
allegation of her alleged membership in the CPP-
NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to
be continuously made available to the public,
Pet.’s security and privacy will certainly be in
danger of being violated or transgressed by
persons who have strong sentiments or aversion

against members of this group. The unregulated
dissemination of said unverified video CD or
reports of Pet.’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA
indiscriminately made available for public
consumption without evidence of its authenticity
or veracity certainly violates Pet.’s right to
privacy which must be protected by this Court.
We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Pet. the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis
supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a
judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy,
most especially the right to informational privacy
of individuals.126 The writ operates to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding
himself, particularly in the instances where such
information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement
before the privilege of the writ may be extended
is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of
an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. 127
This, in the case at bench, the Pet. failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of CA is that
there is actually no evidence on record that
shows that any of the public Rsps. had violated or
threatened the right to privacy of the Pet.. The act
ascribed by CA to the public Rsps. that would
have violated or threatened the right to privacy of
the Pet., i.e., keeping records of investigations and
other reports about the Pet.’s ties with the CPP-
NPA, was not adequately proven—considering
that the origin of such records were virtually
unexplained and its existence, clearly, only
inferred by the appellate court from the video
and photograph released by Representatives
Palparan and Alcover in their press conference.
No evidence on record even shows that any of the
public Rsps. had access to such video or
photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive
by CA enjoining the public Rsps. from
"distributing or causing the distribution to the
public any records in whatever form, reports,
documents or similar papers" relative to the Pet.’s
"alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be
devoid of any legal basis. The public Rsps. cannot
be ordered to refrain from distributing something
that, in the first place, it was not proven to have.
58
Verily, until such time that any of the public Rsps.
were found to be actually responsible for the
abduction and torture of the Pet., any inference
regarding the existence of reports being kept in
violation of the Pet.’s right to privacy becomes
farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the
meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege
of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the Pet., while
telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any
form of responsibility on the part of the public
Rsps., revealed two important things that can
guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One,
that further investigation with the use of
extraordinary diligence must be made in order to
identify the perpetrators behind the abduction
and torture of the Pet.; and two, that the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to
its Constitutional mandate to "investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights and to provide appropriate
legal measures for the protection of human
rights,"128 must be tapped in order to fill certain
investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the
reason why the Pet. was not able to adduce
substantial evidence proving her allegations of
government complicity in her abduction and
torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and
one-sided investigations conducted by the
government itself. This "awkward" situation,
wherein the very persons alleged to be involved
in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing
are, at the same time, the very ones tasked by law
to investigate the matter, is a unique
characteristic of these proceedings and is the
main source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced
by any Pet. in any amparo case.129
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo
Rule placed a potent safeguard—requiring the
"Rsp. who is a public official or employee" to
prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence
as required by applicable laws, rules and
regulations was observed in the performance of
duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public
Rsps. is able to show to the satisfaction of the

amparo court that extraordinary diligence has
been observed in their investigations, they cannot
shed the allegations of responsibility despite the
prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary
diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was
not fully observed in the conduct of the police
and military investigations in the case at bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted
by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on
the part of the police investigators to identify the
perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said
reports are replete with background checks on
the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same
time, comparatively silent as to other concrete
steps the investigators have been taking to
ascertain the authors of the crime. Although
conducting a background investigation on the
victims is a logical first step in exposing the
motive behind the abduction—its necessity is
clearly outweighed by the need to identify the
perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the
Pet., who was no longer in captivity, already came
up with allegations about the motive of her
captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of
their investigations solely on the cooperation or
non-cooperation of the Pet.—who, they claim,
was less than enthusiastic in participating in their
investigative efforts.131 While it may be conceded
that the participation of the Pet. would have
facilitated the progress of Task Group CAROJAN’s
investigation, this Court believes that the former’s
reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for
Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means
or avenues from which they could obtain relevant
leads.132 Indeed, while the allegations of
government complicity by the Pet. cannot, by
themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before
a court of law—they are, nonetheless, a vital
source of valuable investigative leads that must
be pursued and verified, if only to comply with
the high standard of diligence required by the
Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the Pet., Task
Group CAROJAN’s reports still failed to explain
why it never considered seeking the assistance of
Mr. Jesus Paolo—who, along with the victims, is a
central witness to the abduction. The reports of
Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to
obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of
59
the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who,
by Pet.’s account, was not wearing any mask.
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as
a comparative material to the sketches included
in Pet.’s offer of Exh.s that, it may be pointed out,
were prepared under the direction of, and first
submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latter’s
independent investigation on the abduction and
torture of the Pet..133 But as mentioned earlier, the
CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this
date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with CA
that further investigation under the norm of
extraordinary diligence should be undertaken.
This Court simply cannot write finis to this case,
on the basis of an incomplete investigation
conducted by the police and the military. In a very
real sense, the right to security of the Pet. is
continuously put in jeopardy because of the
deficient investigation that directly contributes to
the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before
the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive,
however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift
the primary task of conducting further
investigations on the abduction and torture of the
Pet. upon the CHR.134 We note that the CHR,
unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy
the trust and confidence of the Pet.—as
evidenced by her attendance and participation in
the hearings already conducted by the
commission.135 Certainly, it would be reasonable
to assume from such cooperation that the
investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the
very least, bears the most promise of advancing
farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of
the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final
resolution of this petition. From this perspective,
We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate
the task of affording interim protection to the
Pet., also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the
Appeals for further investigation, as follows—
1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency
tasked with conducting further investigation
regarding the abduction and torture of the
Pet.. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the
norm of extraordinary diligence, take or
continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to
identify the persons described in the

cartographic sketches submitted by the Pet.,
as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to
pursue any other leads relevant to Pet.’s
abduction and torture.
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP,
or his successor, and the incumbent Chief of
Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend
assistance to the ongoing investigation of the
CHR, including but not limited to furnishing
the latter a copy of its personnel records
circa the time of the Pet.’s abduction and
torture, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing
laws.
3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of
the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this
Court, CA, and the Pet. or her representative,
a copy of the reports of its investigations and
their recommendations, other than those
that are already part of the records of this
case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this decision.
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to
CA within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this decision, a copy of the reports on its
investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or
continue to provide protection to the Pet.
during her stay or visit to the Philippines,
until such time as may hereinafter be
determined by this Court.
Accordingly, this case must be referred back to
CA, for the purposes of monitoring compliance
with the above directives and determining
whether, in light of any recent reports or
recommendations, there would already be
sufficient evidence to hold any of the public Rsps.
responsible or, at least, accountable. After making
such determination, CA shall submit its own
report with recommendation to this Court for
final action. CA will continue to have jurisdiction
over this case in order to accomplish its tasks
under this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY
MERITORIOUS.
Accordingly, the public Rsps. shall remain
personally impleaded in this petition to answer
for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities
60
they may have incurred during their
incumbencies.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE v.
MANALO
This is an appeal via Petition for Review on the
Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside
on both questions of fact and law.
-originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction,
and TRO filed by Rsps. to stop Pets. aand/or their
officers and agents from depriving them of their
right to liberty and other basic rights. Rsps.
sought therein all legal and equitable reliefs
under Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution and
Rule 135, Sec.6 of the RoC.
-in the Court’s resolution, it ordered the Sec. of
the Department of National Defense and the Chief
of Staff of the AFP, their agents, representatives,
or persons acting in their stead, including but not
limited to the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU), enjoined them from
causing the arrest of therein Pets., or otherwise
restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving
them of their right to life, liberty, and other basic
rights as guaranteed under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the
1987 Constitution.
-While the Petition was pending, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo took effect (Oct. 24, 2007). Herein
Rsps. prayed that: (1) the petition be considered
a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 26 of
the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ
commanding herein Pets. to make a verified
return within the period provided by law and
containing the specific matter required by law;
(3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by
the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for
in the petition but not covered by the Amparo
Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render
judgment as required in Sec. 18 of the Amparo
Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.
- the Court issued the WRIT OF AMPARO and
remanded the petition to the CA for summary
hearing on the petition.
-CA ruled in favor of herein Rsps. and granted the
privilege of the writ. Pets. Sec. of Defense and AFP
chief of Staff were ordered, among others, to
confirm in writing the present places of official
assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo
and Donald Caigas, and to cause to be produced
to the court all medical reports, records and
charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any,
to the Pets., to include a list of medical and
personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them.

-Rsp. Raymond Manalo narrated that about one
or two weeks before, several uniformed and
armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU
summoned to a meeting all the residents of their
barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Rsps. were
not able to attend as they were not informed of
the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the
soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.
-weeks after, while sleeping in his house, at pas
noon, several armed soldiers wearing entered
Raymond’s house and roused him. They asked
him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester
Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre.
The armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks
and nudged him in the stomach. He was then
handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house, and
forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on
the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light,
then forcibly brought near the road.
-Among the men who came to take him, Raymond
recognized brothers de la Cruz, who all acted as
lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU. He
also recognized brothers Mendoza, also members
of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken,
he also saw outside of his house two barangay
councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa,
with some soldiers and armed men.
-The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van.
Once inside, he was blindfolded. In his 18 months
of captivity, he learned their names. The one who
drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie
Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years
of age or older. The leader of the team who
entered his house and abducted him was
"Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit
old. Another one of his abductors was "George"
who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30
years old.
-The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person
was brought inside the van and made to sit beside
Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the
road, he recognized the voice of the person
beside him as his brother. The van stopped
several times until they finally arrived at a house.
-the brothers were each brought to a different
room. Raymond saw several soldiers
continuously hitting his brother on the head and
other parts of his body with the butt of their guns
for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was
brought to Raymond's room and it was the
latter’s turn to be beaten up. The soldiers asked
him if he was a member of the NPA. Each time he
said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their
guns. He was questioned where his comrades
61
were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how
many NPA members he had helped. Each time he
answered none, they hit him.
-In the next days, Raymond's interrogators
appeared to be high officials. He was in blindfolds
when interrogated by the high officials, but he
saw their faces when they arrived and before the
blindfold was put on. One of those officials was
tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and leather
shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in
Tagalog and knew much about his parents and
family, and a habeas corpus case filed in
connection with the Rsps.' abduction. While these
officials interrogated him, Raymond was not
manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier
guards beat him up.
-On the 3rd week of Rsps.' detention, 2 men
arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat
him up. They subjected Reynaldo to the same
ordeal in another room. Before their torturers
left, they warned Raymond that they would come
back the next day and kill him.
-The following night, Raymond attempted and
managed to escape. He reached the highway, but
some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run
away. The soldiers chased him and caught up
with him. They brought him to another place near
the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay.
He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with
chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline
on him. A so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly
called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond
before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the
torture and he was returned inside Fort
Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.
-For some weeks, the Rsps. had a break from all
the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the
wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed.
-For 3 ½, Rsps. were detained, kept in a small
house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room
was made into the bartolina. The house was near
the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At
dawn, soldiers Mar.ed by their house. They were
also sometimes detained in what he only knew as
the "DTU."
-At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine Rsps..
Medicines were sent through the "master" of the
DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti.
They were kept in the DTU for about two weeks.
While there, he met a soldier named Efren who
said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor
and take care of them.
-One day, Rizal Hilario fetched Rsps... Rsps. were
detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey

house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While
there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilario's men.
-Hilario and Efren brought Rsps. to Sapang, San
Miguel, Bulacan and were detained in a big
unfinished house inside the compound of
"Kapitan" for about three months. When they
arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them.
He began by asking if Rsps. felt well already, to
which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He
asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied
that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he
would be scared if he were made to face Gen.
Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not
be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan
was an evil man.
-Rsps. agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as
they felt they could not do otherwise.
-Hilario, Efren and his men brought them to their
parents' house. Raymond was shown to his
parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo
because he still could not walk. In the presence of
Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to
his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they
were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario
threatened Raymond's parents that if they
continued to join human rights rallies, they would
never see their children again. The Rsps. were
then brought back to Sapang.
-When Rsps. arrived back in Sapang, Gen.
Palparan was about to leave. When Gen. Palparan
saw Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big
white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle
as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his
strength and be healthy and to take the medicine
he left for him and Reynaldo. He also said that
they should prove that they are on the side of the
military and warned that they would not be given
another chance.
-One of the soldiers named Arman made
Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan.
The medicine, named "Alive," was green and
yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a
box of this medicine and instructed to take one
capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting
their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them
sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy
upon waking up.
-After a few days, Hilario arrived again, took
Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman
instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he
should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military
trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in
Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of
the men who abducted him from his house, and
62
got acquainted with other military men and
civilians.
-After 3months in Sapang, Raymond was brought
to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion.
He was fetched by 3 unidentified men in a big
white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond
was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his
blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him
and he was kept in the barracks.
-The next day, Raymond's chains were removed
and he was ordered to clean the barracks. It was
then he learned that he was in a detachment of
the Rangers. In one of the rooms therein, he met
Sherlyn from Laguna. She told him that she was a
student of UP and was abducted in Hagonoy,
Bulacan. She confided that she had been
subjected to severe torture and raped.
-After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to
Camp Tecson. 2days from his arrival, 2 other
captives arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in
the room with "Allan" whose name they later
came to know as Donald, called "master" or
"commander" by his men in the 24 th Infantry
Battalion.
-Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the
adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo
were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In
the daytime, their chains were removed, but were
put back on at night. They were threatened that if
they escaped, their families would all be killed.
-Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the
detainees that they should be thankful they were
still alive.
-Before the hearing, Rsps. were brought to their
parents to instruct them not to attend the
hearing. However, their parents had already left
for Manila. Rsps. were brought back to Camp
Tecson. They stayed in that camp for 3months,
and Raymond was instructed to continue using
the name "Oscar" and holding himself out as a
military trainee.
-Rsps., along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel,
were transferred to a camp of the 24 th Infantry
Battalion in Limay, Bataan. While there, battalion
soldiers whom Raymond knew as "Mar" and
"Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach
with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered
enormous torture in the camp. They were all
made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.
-Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog"
was launched, Donald and some other soldiers
brought him and Manuel with them to take and
kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They witnessed
the killing.

-Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel
were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near
the sea. The 5 detainees were made to do errands
and chores.
-Donald brought them back to the camp in Limay.
Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to
bring food to detainees brought to the camp.
Manuel was taken out and burned by some
soldiers.
-Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to
Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for
Donald, in exchange for which, he would take care
of the food of their family. They were instructed
to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod
(for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as
cousins from Rizal, Laguna.
-Rsps. started to plan their escape. When they
had saved Php1,000.00 each for helping in the
farm, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could
get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange
text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A
phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and
did not use it. They earned some more until they
had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
-There were 4houses in the compound. Raymond
and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while
their guards lived in the other three. Donald
entrusted Rsps. to Nonong, the head of the
guards.
-Rsps. managed to escaped.
-Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the
contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they
related to matters they witnessed together. They
were detained for 18months.
-Dr. Molino(specialized in forensic medicine)
corroborated the accounts of Rsps. Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo.
-Pets. dispute Rsps.' account of their alleged
abduction and torture. They filed a Return of the
Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but
denying any involvement therein. Attached to the
Return of the Writ was the affidavit of herein Pet.
Secretary of National Defense, which attested that
he assumed office only on Aug. 8, 2007 and was
thus unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged
abduction. He also claimed that: The Secretary of
National Defense does not engage in actual
military directional operations, neither does he
undertake command directions of the AFP units
in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP
operations. The principal responsibility of the
Secretary of National Defense is focused in
providing strategic policy direction to the
Department (bureaus and agencies) including the
AFP; In connection with the Writ of Amparo, he
63
said he had directed the AFP Chief of Staff to
institute immediate action in compliance with
Sec. 9(d) of the Amparo Rule and to submit report
of such compliance:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to
the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the
prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements
from them concerning the death or
disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and
time of death or disappearance as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about
the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or
persons involved in the death or disappearance;
and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a
competent court.49
-AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ,
attesting that he received the above directive of
Secretary of National Defense and that acted on
this directive.
-Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the
affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA
involving the 3 other detainees.
-It was explained in the Return of the Writ that
for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj.
Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario
aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated
could not be secured in time and would be
subsequently submitted.
-Herein Pets. presented a lone witness in the
summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez,
Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine
Army, based in Fort Magsaysay.
-Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by Maj. Gen.Palaran
to investigate the alleged abduction of the Rsps..
He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of
the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
by the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries;
and (2) the administrative liability of said
auxiliaries, if any. Jimenez testified that this
investigation was initiated because Gen.Palparan
saw news about the abduction of the Manalo
brothers on the television, and he was concerned
about what was happening within his territorial
jurisdiction.
-Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for
the purpose of having them execute sworn
statements and conducting an investigation. The

six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was
in fact his first time to meet them.
-Jimenez gave his report to the Office of the Chief
of Personnel.
-Pets. largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation
Report that the 6 implicated persons vehemently
denied any participation or involvement on the
abduction of said victims, and claimed that the
brothers, being their neighbours, are active
members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA, thus
there is no evidence to substantiate their being
implicated.
-In this appeal, Pets. question the appellate
court's assessment of the foregoing evidence and
assail.
ISSUE: whether the writ of Amparo was validly
issued? Whether there is a violation or
threatened violation of right to life, liberty and
security?
whether CA erred in believing and giving full faith
and credit to the incredible, uncorroborated,
contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed
and self-serving affidavit/testimony of herein
Rsp. Raymond Manalo? Whether CA erred in
requiring Pets. to: (a) furnish to the Manalo
brother(s) and to CA all official and unofficial
reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already
in file with the court; (b) confirm in writing the
present places of official assignment of m/sgt.
hilario aka rollie castillo and donald caigas; and
(c) cause to be produced to CA all medical
reports, records and charts, and reports of any
treatment given or recommended and medicines
prescribed, if any, to the manalo brothers, to
include a list of medical personnel (military and
civilian) who attended to them?
HELD: On Oct. 24, 2007, the Court promulgated
the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of
extralegal killing and enforced disappearances." It
was an exercise for the first time of the Court's
expanded power to promulgate rules to protect
our people's constitutional rights. ["Extralegal
killings" -"killings committed without due process
of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings."; "enforced disappearances" -
"attended by: an arrest, detention or abduction of
a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal
64
to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which
places such persons outside the protection of law."]
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico.
"Amparo" literally means "protection". If, after
hearing, the judge determines that a
constitutional right of the Pet. is being violated,
he orders the official, or the official's superiors, to
cease the violation and to take the necessary
measures to restore the Pet. to the full enjoyment
of the right in question. Amparo combines the
principles of judicial review with the limitations
on judicial power characteristic of the civil law
tradition.It enables courts to enforce the
constitution by protecting individual rights in
particular cases, but prevents them from using
this power to make law for the entire nation.
What began as a protection against acts or
omissions of public authorities in violation of
constitutional rights later evolved for several
purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection
of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas
corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the
judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes;
(3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the
constitutionality and legality of a judicial
decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and (5)
Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants'
rights derived from the agrarian reform process.
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution
does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo,
several of the above Amparo protections are
guaranteed by our charter. Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2)
[Grave Abuse Clause] provides for the judicial
power "to determine W/N there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any Br. or
instrumentality of the Government." The Clause
accords a similar general protection to human
rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes,
Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo.
Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of
habeas corpus found in several provisions of the
1987 Constitution.
While constitutional rights can be protected
under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies
of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the
RoC and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule
102, these remedies may not be adequate to
address the pestering problem of extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of

Amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it
partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the
appropriate reliefs available to the Pet.; it is not
an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and
exhaustive proceedings. It serves both preventive
and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of
impunity in the commission of these offenses; it
is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent
punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably
yield leads to subsequent investigation and
action. In the long run, the goal of both the
preventive and curative roles is to deter the
further commission of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
In the case at bar, Rsps. initially filed an action for
"Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary
Restraining Order" to stop Pets. and/or their
officers and agents from depriving the Rsps. of
their right to liberty and other basic rights, prior
to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. When
the Amparo Rule came into effect, they moved to
have their petition treated as an Amparo petition
as it would be more effective and suitable to the
circumstances of the Manalo brothers' enforced
disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
CA giving full credit to the testimony of Raymond
-Sec. 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides
that it is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity. It shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof.
-Sec.s 17 and 18 provide for the degree of proof
required -- substantial evidence to grant the
privilege of the writ.
*Substantial evidence--relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
SC affirms the finding of CA that Rsps. were
abducted from their houses and were
continuously detained until they escaped. The
abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the
Rsps. were narrated by Rsp. Raymond Manalo in
65
a clear and convincing manner. His account is
dotted with countless candid details.
SC is convinced that the reason for the abduction
was the suspicion that the detainees were either
members or sympathizers of the NPA,
considering that the abductors were looking for
Ka Bestre, who turned out to be Rolando, the
brother of Pets.. The efforts exerted by the
Military Command to look into the abduction
were merely superficial (one-sided).
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction
was also established. He was aware of the
captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned
to his command. In fact, he or any other officer
tendered no controversion to the firm claim of
Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in
person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them
what he wanted them and their parents to do or
not to be doing.
The participation of Hilario and the other military
personnel in the abduction and forced
disappearance of the herein Rsps. was
established.
We reject the claim of Pets. that Rsp. Raymond
Manalo's statements were not corroborated by
other independent and credible pieces of
evidence. Raymond's affidavit and testimony
were corroborated by the affidavit of Rsp.
Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical
reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr.
Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the
physical injuries inflicted on Rsps., also
corroborate Rsps.' accounts of the torture they
endured while in detention. Rsp. Raymond
Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort
Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his
testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be
the "Division Training Unit," firms up Rsps.' story
that they were detained for some time in said
military facility.
With the secret nature of an enforced
disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the
victim during detention, it logically holds that
much of the information and evidence of the
ordeal will come from the victims themselves,
and the veracity of their account will depend on
their credibility and candidness in their written
and/or oral statements. Their statements can be
corroborated by other evidence such as physical
evidence left by the torture they suffered or

landmarks they can identify in the places where
they were detained.
Right of Rsps. to the privilege of the writ
While Rsps. admit that they are no longer in
detention and are physically free, they assert that
they are not "free in every sense of the word" as
their "movements continue to be restricted for
fear that people they have named in their Judicial
Affidavits and testified against are still at large
and have not been held accountable in any way.
These people are directly connected to the AFP
and are, thus, in a position to threaten Rsps.'
rights to life, liberty and security." Rsps. claim
that they are under threat of being once again
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which
constitute a direct violation of their right to
security of person.
a. right to security
Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution --right of
the people to be secure in their persons—
inviolable. At the core of this guarantee is the
immunity of one's person, including the
extensions of his/her person - houses, papers,
and effects - against government intrusion. Sec. 2
also protects the privacy and sanctity of the
person himself.[nothing is closer to a man's
soul than the serenity of his privacy and the
assurance of his personal security.]
While the right to life under Art. III, Sec. 1
guarantees essentially the right to be alive, the
right to security of person is a guarantee of the
secure quality of this life -- a life lived with the
assurance that the government he established
and consented to, will protect the security of his
person and property.” It includes the right to
exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while
existing, and it is invaded not only by a
deprivation of life but also of those things which
are necessary to the enjoyment of life according
to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of
the individual."
-right to security of person is "freedom from
fear." In its "whereas" clauses, UDHR enunciates
that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy
freedom of speech and belief and freedom from
fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people." Some scholars
postulate that "freedom from fear" is an
individual international human right. It is the
"right to security of person" as the word
"security" itself means "freedom from fear."
66
(Art.3, UDHR; Art. 9(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR
and the ICCPR.
In the context of Sec. 1 of the Amparo Rule,
"freedom from fear" is the right and any threat
to the rights to life, liberty or security is the
actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action.
In the Amparo context, it is more correct to say
that the "right to security" is actually the
"freedom from threat." Hence, the "threatened
with violation" Clause in the latter part of Sec. 1
of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the
right to security mentioned in the earlier part of
the provision.
-right to security of person is a guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity or security.
Art. III, Sec. II of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context
of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful
physical intrusion. As the degree of physical
injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates.
In criminal law, physical injuries constitute a
crime against persons because they are an affront
to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe
invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to
vitiate the free will such as to force the victim to
admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating
information, it constitutes an invasion of both
bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity
of the human person includes the exercise of free
will. Art. III, Sec. 12 of the 1987 Constitution
more specifically proscribes bodily and
psychological invasion. Parenthetically, under this
provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the
free will - although not involving invasion of
bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a
violation of the right to security in the sense of
"freedom from threat" as afore-discussed.
-right to security of person is a guarantee of
protection of one's rights by the government.
In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is
built into the guarantees of the right to life

and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution and the right to security of person
(as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily
and psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec. 2.
The right to security of person is a corollary of
the policy that the State "guarantees full respect
for human rights" under Art. II, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution. As the government is the chief
guarantor of order and security, the
Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life,
liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they
are under threat. Protection includes conducting
effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to
victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice.
First, the violation of the right to security as
freedom from threat to Rsps.' life, liberty and
security.
While Rsps. were detained, they were threatened
that if they escaped, their families, including
them, would be killed. In Raymond's narration, he
was tortured and poured with gasoline after he
was caught the first time he attempted to escape
from Fort Magsaysay. This time, Rsps. have finally
escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed
has come to pass. It should be stressed that they
are now free from captivity not because they
were released by virtue of a lawful order or
voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to
be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal,
Rsps.' captors even told them that they were still
deciding whether they should be executed. With
their escape, this continuing threat to their life is
apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced
and implicated specific officers in the military not
only in their own abduction and torture, but also
in those of other persons known to have
disappeared.
Understandably, since their escape, Rsps. have
been under concealment and protection by
private citizens because of the threat to their life,
liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free
will as they are forced to limit their movements
or activities. Precisely because Rsps. are being
shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction,
they cannot be expected to show evidence of
overt acts of threat such as face-to-face
intimidation or written threats to their life,
67
liberty and security. Nonetheless, the
circumstances of Rsps.' abduction, detention,
torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that
they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to
their liberty, security, and life, actionable through
a petition for a writ of Amparo.
the violation of the right to security as
protection by the government.
Apart from the failure of military elements to
provide protection to Rsps. by themselves
perpetrating the abduction, detention, and
torture, they also miserably failed in conducting
an effective investigation of Rsps.' abduction as
revealed by the testimony and investigation
report of Pets.' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben
Jimenez. The one-day investigation conducted by
Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-
sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements
of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and
civilians whom he met in the investigation for the
first time. Thus, there is substantial evidence to
warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
Rsps.' right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that Rsps.' right to security
as "freedom from threat" is violated by the
apparent threat to their life, liberty and security
of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of
protection by the government is likewise violated
by the ineffective investigation and protection on
the part of the military.
In re: reliefs granted by CA which Pets. question
First, that Pets. furnish Rsps. all official and
unofficial reports of the investigation
undertaken in connection with their case, except
those already in file with the court.
Second, that Pets. confirm in writing the
present places of official assignment of M/Sgt.
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.
Third, that Pets. cause to be produced to CA all
medical reports, records and charts, and
reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if
any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of
medical personnel (military and civilian) who
attended to them from Feb. 14, 2006 until Aug.
12, 2007.
With respect to the first and second reliefs,
Pets. argue that the production order sought by

Rsps. partakes of the characteristics of a search
warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for
the issuance of a search warrant must be
complied with prior to the grant of the
production order, namely: (1) the application
must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search
warrant must particularly describe the place to
be searched and the things to be seized; (3) there
exists probable cause with one specific offense;
and (4) the probable cause must be personally
determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. In the case at bar,
however, Pets. point out that other than the bare,
self-serving and vague allegations made by
Raymond in his unverified declaration and
affidavit, the documents Rsps. seek to be
produced are only mentioned generally by name,
with no other supporting details.
The production order under the Amparo Rule
should not be confused with a search warrant for
law enforcement under Art. III, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a
protection of the people from the unreasonable
intrusion of the government, not a protection of
the government from the demand of the people
such as Rsps.. The Amparo production order may
be likened to the production of documents or
things under Sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure: Motion for production or inspection
order. Upon motion of any party showing good
cause therefor, the court in which an action is
pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or
photographing, by or on behalf of the moving
party, of any designated documents, papers,
books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things, not privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control...
Moreover, in his affidavit, Pet. AFP Chief of Staff
himself undertook "to provide results of the
investigations conducted or to be conducted by
the concerned unit relative to the circumstances
of the alleged disappearance of the persons in
whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought
for as soon as the same has been furnished
Higher headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs,
Pets. assert that the disclosure of the present
places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
68
Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the
submission of a list of medical personnel, is
irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and
unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a
writ of Amparo; that it will unnecessarily
compromise and jeopardize the exercise of
official functions and duties of military officers
and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose
them to threat of personal injury or even death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present
places of assignment of the persons whom Rsps.
both directly implicated as perpetrators behind
their abduction and detention, is relevant in
ensuring the safety of Rsps. by avoiding their
areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure
would also help ensure that these military
officers can be served with notices and court
processes in relation to any investigation and
action for violation of the Rsps.' rights. The list of
medical personnel is also relevant in securing
information to create the medical history of Rsps.
and make appropriate medical interventions,
when applicable and necessary.
* The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to
preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret
walls.
GR 122338 Dec. 29, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES,
(LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo
Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R.
TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), Pets.,
vs. DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW
BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA, MM., Rsps..
In this original petition for habeas corpus, the
wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo
Sumulong Torres pray for his immediate release
from prison on the ground that the exercise of the
President's prerogative under Sec. 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code to determine the
occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a
pardon in violation of pardonee's right to due
process and the constitutional presumption of
innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by
CFI of Manila some time before 1979. These
convictions were affirmed by CA. The maximum
sentence would expire on Nov. 2, 2000. On Apr.
18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to

Torres by the President of the Philippines on
condition that Pet. would "not again violate any of
the penal laws of the Philippines. 5" Pet. accepted
the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.6
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and
Parole resolved to recommend to the President
the cancellation of the conditional pardon
granted to Torres because Torres had been
charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and
convicted of sedition by, RTC of QC. On Sept. 8,
1986, the President cancelled the conditional
pardon of Torres. On Oct. 10, 1986, then Minister
of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority
of the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment 7 against Pet.. The Pet. was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa
to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
Torres impugned the validity of the Order of
Arrest and Recommitment in the aforecited case
of Torres v. Gonzales 8. There we ruled that:
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict
who has been conditional pardoned and who
is alleged to have breached the conditions of
his pardon, the Executive Department has two
options: (i) to proceed against him under Sec.
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, or
(ii) to proceed against him under Art. 159 of
the Revised Penal Code . . . Here, the President
has chosen to proceed against the Pet. under
Sec. 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
That choice is an exercise of the President's
executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.9
Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and
children, seeks anew relief from this court.
Unfortunately, there is no adequate basis for us to
oblige him.
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract
between the sovereign power or the Chief
Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect
that the former will release the latter subject to
the condition that if he does not comply with the
terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to
prison to serve the unexpired portion of the
sentence or an additional one.10 By the
pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this
contract, the pardonee has thereby placed
himself under the supervision of the Chief
Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to
see to it that the pardonee complies with the
69
terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Sec.
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the
Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest
and re-incarceration of any such person who, in
his judgment, shall fail to comply with the
condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or
suspension of sentence." It is now a well-
entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this
exercise of presidential judgment is beyond
judicial scrutiny. The determination of the
violation of the conditional pardon rests
exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief
Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to
place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the
judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot
invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous
the findings may be upon which his
recommitment was ordered. 11
It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has
allegedly been acquitted in two of the three
CrimCases filed against him subsequent to his
conditional pardon, and that the third case
remains pending for 13 years in apparent
violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a
person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as
illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the
incarceration of Torres remains legal considering
that, were it not for the grant of conditional
pardon which had been revoked because of a
breach thereof, the determination of which is
beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served
his final sentence for his first conviction until Nov.
2, 2000.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive,
who in the first place was the exclusive author of
the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is
the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon
if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the
pardonee from the subsequent charges filed
against him, warrants the same. Courts have no
authority to interefer with the grant by the
President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It
has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial
pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is
not a requirement for the President to determine
W/N there has been a breach of the terms of a
conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis
for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a
conditional pardon revoked by the President in
the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and
absolutely lodged in his office.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
GR 182161 Dec. 3, 2009 Reverend Father
ROBERT P. REYES, Pet., vs. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in
his capacity as the secretary of CA, secretary
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Rsps..
Pet. was among those arrested in the Manila
Peninsula Hotel siege on Nov. 30, 2007. In the
morning of Nov. 30, 2007, Pet. together with (50)
others, were brought to Camp Crame to await
inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same
day, the DOJ Panel of Prosec.s, composed of
Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and
Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest
proceedings to ascertain W/N there was probable
cause to hold Pet. and the others for trial on
charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
On Dec. 1, 2007, upon the request of (DILG), Rsp.
DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold
Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering Rsp.
Commissioner of Immigration to include in the
Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) the name of Pet. and 49
others relative to the aforementioned case in the
interest of national security and public safety.
On Dec. 2, 2007, after finding probable cause
against Pet. and 36 others for the crime of
Rebellion under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosec.s filed an
Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045
before RTC, Br. 150 of Makati City.
On Dec. 7, 2007, Pet. filed a Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause and Release of
the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance
asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any
evidence indicating his specific participation in
the crime charged; and that under the
Constitution, the determination of probable cause
must be made personally by a judge.
On Dec. 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order
dismissing the charge for Rebellion against Pet.
and 17 others for lack of probable cause. TC
ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the
DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosec.s failed to show
that Pet. and the other accused-civilians
conspired and confederated with the accused-
70
soldiers in taking arms against the government;
that Pet. and other accused-civilians were
arrested because they ignored the call of the
police despite the deadline given to them to come
out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit
themselves to the police authorities; that mere
presence at the scene of the crime and expressing
one’s sentiments on electoral and political
reforms did not make them conspirators absent
concrete evidence that the accused-civilians
knew beforehand the intent of the accused-
soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the
cooperation which the law penalizes must be one
that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.
On Dec. 18, 2007, Pet.’s counsel Atty. Francisco L.
Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the
lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of
CrimCase No. 07-3126.
On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to Pet.’s
letter stating that the DOJ could not act on Pet.’s
request until Atty. Chavez’s right to represent Pet.
is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J.
V. Bautista representing himself as counsel of Pet.
had also written a letter to the DOJ.
On Jan. 3, 2008, Pet. filed the instant petition
claiming that despite the dismissal of the
rebellion case against Pet., HDO No. 45 still
subsists; that on Dec. 19, 2007, Pet. was held by
BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included
in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been
for the timely intervention of Pet.’s counsel, Pet.
would not have been able to take his scheduled
flight to Hong Kong; that on Dec. 26, 2007, Pet.
was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong
Kong but every time Pet. would present himself at
the NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be
detained and interrogated by BID officers
because of the continued inclusion of his name in
the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of
Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting
of HDO No. 45. Pet. further maintained that
immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the
availment of the writ is exigent as the continued
restraint on Pet.’s right to travel is illegal.
On Jan. 24, 2008, Rsps. represented by the OSG
filed the Return of the Writ raising the following
affirmative defenses: 1) that the Secretary of
Justice is authorized to issue Hold Departure
Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of
19982 and No. 18 Series of 20073 pursuant to his
mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987

as ahead of the principal law agency of the
government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated Dec. 1,
2007 was issued by the Sec. Gonzales in the
course of the preliminary investigation of the
case against herein Pet. upon the request of the
DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is
premature in view of public Rsp.’s pending MR
dated Jan. 3, 2008 filed by the Rsps. of the Order
dated Dec. 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing
CrimCase No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of
probable cause; 4) that Pet. failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift
HDO No. 45 before the DOJ; and 5) that the
constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can
not be attacked collaterally in an amparo
proceeding.
During the hearing on Jan. 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m.
at the Paras Hall of CA, counsels for both parties
appeared. Pet.’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez
manifested that Pet. is currently in Hong Kong;
that every time Pet. would leave and return to the
country, the immigration officers at the NAIA
detain and interrogate him for several minutes
because of the existing HDO; that the power of
the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis;
and that Pet. did not file a motion to lift the HDO
before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so
would be tantamount to recognizing the power of
the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.
For Rsps.’ part, OSG maintained that the Secretary
of the DOJ’s power to issue HDO springs from its
mandate under the Administrative Code to
investigate and prosecute offenders as the
principal law agency of the government; that in
its ten-year existence, the constitutionality of DOJ
Circular No. 17 has not been challenged except
now; and that on Jan. 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of
Investigating Prosec.s had filed a MR of the Order
of Dismissal of TC.
The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on
the ground that Rsps. violated Pet.’s
constitutional right to travel. Pet. argues that the
DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold
Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No.
45 has no legal basis since CrimCase No. 07-3126
has already been dismissed.
On Feb. 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed
Decision dismissing the petition and denying the
privilege of the writ of amparo.
present petition is based on the ff. grounds:
71
I. THE DOJ SECRETARY’S ARROGATION OF POWER
AND USURPATION OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD
DEPARTURE ORDER CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS SUPPOSEDLY
BEEN "REGULARLY EXERCISED IN THE PAST" OR HAS
"NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED (IN THE PAST).
II. THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN
HDO INDEPENDENT OF THAT OF RTCS, HENCE, PET.
CANNOT MERELY RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER
OF THE RTC MAKATI IN CRIMCASE NO. 07-3126 TO
ASSAIL SUCH CLAIMED POWER.
III. THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS
EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CONTINUING ACTUAL
RESTRAINT ON PET.’S RIGHT TO TRAVEL THROUGH
THE MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO LIST
AND DOES NOT SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF
W/N PET. WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL DESPITE SUCH A
RESTRAINT.
IV. DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO
STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE DOJ SECRETARY’S
CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO FOR IT IS NOT A
STATUTE. THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT TO
BE BASED ON ANY STATUTE, HENCE, IT DOES NOT
HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND NEED NOT BE
ATTACKED IN A DIRECT PROCEEDING.7
Pet. maintains that the writ of amparo does not
only exclusively apply to situations of
extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances but encompasses the whole
gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution.
Pet. argues that "[liberty] includes the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude and includes the
right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties
in all lawful ways." Part of the right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a
person to travel.
In their Comment,8 both Rsps. Secretary Gonzalez
and Commissioner Libanan argue that: 1) HDO
No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of
Justice in accordance with Department of Justice
Circular No. 17, Series of 1998,9 and Circular No.
18, Series of 2007,10 which were issued pursuant
to said Secretary’s mandate under the
Administrative Code of 1987, as head of the
principal law agency of the government, to
investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute
offenders, and provide immigration regulatory
services; and; 2) the issue of the constitutionality
of the DOJ Secretary’s authority to issue hold
departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and
18 is not within the ambit of a writ of amparo.

The case hinges on the issue as to W/N Pet.’s
right to liberty has been violated or threatened
with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO,
which would entitle him to the privilege of the
writ of amparo.
The petition must fail.
Sec. 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Sec. 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of
amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated
or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al.
v. Manalo et al.,11 made a categorical
pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its
present form is confined to these two instances of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," or to threats thereof, thus:
x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address
the intractable problem of "extralegal killings"
and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances
or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are
"killings committed without due process of law,
i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following
characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction
of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose
the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned
or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law."12
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,13 the Court laid down the
basic principle regarding the rule on the writ of
amparo as follows:
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo
was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and
enforced disappearances, and to the perceived
lack of available and effective remedies to
72
address these extraordinary concerns. It is
intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a
remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is
not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely
property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character
of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its
issuance demands – requires that every petition
for the issuance of the writ must be supported by
justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the Pet.;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of
the Rsp. responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or
uncertain, the Rsp. may be described by an
assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the
aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
Rsp., and how such threat or violation is
committed with the attendant circumstances
detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any,
specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct
of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the Pet.
to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person
responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for
other just and equitable reliefs."14
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily
satisfied with the prima facie existence of the
ultimate facts determinable from the supporting
affidavits that detail the circumstances of how
and to what extent a threat to or violation of the
rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party was or is being committed. (Emphasis
supplied)

Here, Pet. invokes this extraordinary remedy of
the writ of amparo for the protection of his right
to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the
protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual
restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus
called upon to rule W/N the right to travel is
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of
the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 1 of the Rules
thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2)
right to liberty; and (3) right to security.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et
al.,15 the Court explained the concept of right to
life in this wise:
While the right to life under Art. III, Sec. 1
guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon
which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is
a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz:
"The life to which each person has a right is not a
life lived in fear that his person and property may
be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler.
Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the
government he established and consented to, will
protect the security of his person and property.
The ideal of security in life and property…
pervades the whole history of man. It touches
every aspect of man’s existence." In a broad sense,
the right to security of person "emanates in a
person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of
his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the
right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is
invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also
of those things which are necessary to the
enjoyment of life according to the nature,
temperament, and lawful desires of the
individual."16
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was
defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio,
Jr.,17 in this manner:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was
defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be
dwarfed into mere freedom from physical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is
deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the
facilities with which he has been endowed by his
73
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are
necessary for the common welfare." x x x
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et
al.18 thoroughly expounded on the import of the
right to security, thus:
A closer look at the right to security of person
would yield various permutations of the exercise
of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom
from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
enunciates that "a world in which human beings
shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and
freedom from fear and want has been
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people." (emphasis supplied) Some
scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not
only an aspirational principle, but essentially an
individual international human right. It is the
"right to security of person" as the word
"security" itself means "freedom from fear." Art. 3
of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security
of person.
In the context of Sec. 1 of the Amparo Rule,
"freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to
the rights to life, liberty or security is the
actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a
reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action.
Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from
being baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one
person to another with the variation of the
prolificacy of their imagination, strength of
character or past experience with the stimulus.
Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to
say that the "right to security" is actually the
"freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the
"threatened with violation" Clause in the latter
part of Sec. 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of
violation of the right to security mentioned in the
earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security. Art. III, Sec. II of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search
warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context
of extralegal killings and enforced

disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful
physical intrusion. As the degree of physical
injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates.
Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries
constitute a crime against persons because they
are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of
a person.
Third, the right to security of person is a
guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo,
this right is built into the guarantees of the right
to life and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987
Constitution and the right to security of person
(as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily
and psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec. 2.
The right to security of person in this third sense
is a corollary of the policy that the State
"guarantees full respect for human rights" under
Art. II, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the
rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when
they are under threat. Protection includes
conducting effective investigations, organization
of the government apparatus to extend protection
to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of
justice. x x x (emphasis supplied) 19
The right to travel refers to the right to move
from one place to another. 20 As we have stated in
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,21 "xxx a person’s right
to travel is subject to the usual constraints
imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the
system of justice. In such cases, whether the
accused should be permitted to leave the
jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter
of the court’s sound discretion." 22
Here, the restriction on Pet.’s right to travel as a
consequence of the pendency of the CrimCase
filed against him was not unlawful. Pet. has also
failed to establish that his right to travel was
impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life,
liberty and security, for which there exists no
readily available legal recourse or remedy.
74
We find the direct recourse to this Court
inappropriate, considering the provision of Sec.
22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which
reads:
Sec. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. –
When a criminal action has been commenced, no
separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The
reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion
in the CrimCase.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the
disposition of the reliefs available under the writ
of amparo.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Sec. 22, Pet.
should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion
to lift HDO No. 45 in CrimCase No. 07-3126. Pet.,
however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion
to lift the DOJ’s HDO, as his co-accused did in the
same CrimCase. Pet. argues that it was not the
RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO,
and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy
to the lifting of the HDO but also to question
before this Court the constitutionality of the
power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO. 24 We
quote with approval the CA’s ruling on this
matter:
The said provision [Sec. 22] is an affirmation by
the Supreme Court of its pronouncement in
Crespo v. Mogul25 that once a complaint or
information is filed in court, any disposition of
the case such as its dismissal or its continuation
rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite
the denial of Rsp.’s MR of the dismissal of the case
against Pet., TC has not lost control over
CrimCase No. 07-3126 which is still pending
before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court
a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents
in the instant case to the exclusion of even this
Court. The relief Pet. seeks which is the lifting of
the HDO was and is available by motion in the
CrimCase. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo,
supra).26
Even in civil cases pending before TCs, the Court
has no authority to separately and directly
intervene through the writ of amparo, as
elucidated in Tapuz v. Del Rosario,27 thus:
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil
process dealing directly with the possessory
dispute and the reported acts of violence and
harassment, we see no point in separately and
 75
directly intervening through a writ of amparo in
the absence of any clear prima facie showing that
the right to life, liberty or securitythe personal
concern that the writ is intended to protectis
immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal
bar, however, to an application for the issuance of
the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending
case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by
analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the
writ with a separately filed CrimCase.

Additionally, Pet. is seeking the extraordinary

writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the
DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO. 28 Pet.’s
apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus,
he has failed to show any clear threat to his right
to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ
of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy
also renders it unnecessary for us on this
occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ
Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules
and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold
Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of
2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations
Governing the Issuance and Implementation of
Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The

assailed Decision of the CA dated Feb. 4, 2008 in
CA-GR 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.