Spouses Perena vs. Zarate Digest
The Court
G.R. No. 157917 : August 29, 2012
Facts: In June 1996, Nicolas and Teresita Zarate
contracted Teodoro and Nanette Pereña to
transport their (Zarate’s) son, Aaron Zarate, to
and from school. The Pereñas were owners of a
van being used for private school transport.
At about 6:45am of August 22, 1996, the driver
of the said private van, Clemente Alfaro, while
the children were on board including Aaron,
decided to take a short cut in order to avoid
traffic. The usual short cut was a railroad
crossing of the Philippine National Railway
(PNR).
Alfaro saw that the barandilla (the pole used to
block vehicles crossing the railway) was up which
means it was okay to cross. He then tried to
overtake a bus. However, there was in fact an
oncoming train but Alfaro no longer saw the
train as his view was already blocked by the bus
he was trying to overtake. The bus was able to
cross unscathed but the van’s rear end was hit.
During the collision, Aaron, was thrown off the
van. His body hit the railroad tracks and his head
was severed. He was only 15 years old.
It turns out that Alfaro was not able to hear the
train honking from 50 meters away before the
collision because the van’s stereo was playing
loudly.
The Zarates sued PNR and the Pereñas (Alfaro
became at-large). Their cause of action against
PNR was based on quasi-delict. Their cause of
action against the Pereñas was based on breach
of contract of common carriage.
In their defense, the Pereñas invoked that as
private carriers they were not negligent in
selecting Alfaro as their driver as they made sure
that he had a driver’s license and that he was not
involved in any accident prior to his being hired.
In short, they observed the diligence of a good
father in selecting their employee.
PNR also disclaimed liability as they insist that
the railroad crossing they placed there was not
meant for railroad crossing.
The RTC ruled in favor of the Zarates.
of Appeals affirmed the RTC. In the decision of
the RTC and the CA, they awarded damages in
favor of the Zarates for the loss of earning
capacity of their dead son.
The Pereñas appealed. They argued that the
award was improper as Aaron was merely a high
school student, hence, the award of such
damages was merely speculative. They cited the
case of People vs Teehankee where the Supreme
Court did not award damages for the loss of
earning capacity despite the fact that the victim
there was enrolled in a pilot school.
ISSUES: Whether or not the defense of due
diligence of a good father by the Pereñas is
untenable. Whether or not the award of
damages for loss of income is proper.
HELD: Yes, in both issues.
Defense of Due Diligence of a Good Father
This defense is not tenable in this case. The
Pereñas are common carriers. They are not
merely private carriers. (Prior to this case, the
status of private transport for school services or
school buses is not well settled as to whether or
not they are private or common carriers – but
they were generally regarded as private
carriers). Private transport for schools are
common carriers. The Pereñas, as the operators
of a school bus service were: (a) engaged in
transporting passengers generally as a business,
not just as a casual occupation; (b) undertaking
to carry passengers over established roads by
the method by which the business was
conducted; and (c) transporting students for a
fee. Despite catering to a limited clientèle, the
Pereñas operated as a common carrier because
they held themselves out as a ready
transportation indiscriminately to the students
of a particular school living within or near where
they operated the service and for a fee.
Being a common carrier, what is required of the
Pereñas is not mere diligence of a good father.
What is specifically required from them by law is
extraordinary diligence – a fact which they failed
to prove in court. Verily, their obligation as
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common carriers did not cease upon their
exercise of diligently choosing Alfaro as their
employee.
(It is recommended that you read the full text,
the Supreme Court made an elaborate and
extensive definition of common and private
carriers as well as their distinctions.)
Award of Damages for Aaron’s loss of earning
capacity despite he being a high school student
at the time of his death
The award is proper. Aaron was enrolled in a
reputable school (Don Bosco). He was of normal
health and was an able-bodied person. Further,
the basis of the computation of his earning
capacity was not on what he would have
become. It was based on the current minimum
wage. The minimum wage was validly used
because with his circumstances at the time of his
death, it is most certain that had he lived, he
would at least be a minimum wage earner by the
time he starts working. This is not being
speculative at all.
The Teehankee case was different because in
that case, the reason why no damages were
awarded for loss of earning capacity was
that the defendants there were already
assuming that the victim would indeed become
a pilot – hence, that made the assumption
speculative. But in the case of Aaron, there was
no speculation as to what he might be – but
whatever he’ll become, it is certain that he will
at the least be earning minimum wage.
De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals
GR L-47822, December 22, 1988
Facts: Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk
dealer. He buys scrap materials and brings
those that he gathered to Manila for resale
using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to
Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicle
with cargo which various merchants wanted
delivered, charging fee lower than the
commercial rates. Sometime in November 1970,
petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with
respondent for the delivery of 750 cartons of
Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970, respondent
loaded the cargo. Only 150 boxes were
delivered to petitioner because the truck
carrying the boxes was hijacked along the way.
Petitioner commenced an action claiming the
value of the lost merchandise. Petitioner argues
that respondent, being a common carrier, is
bound to exercise extraordinary diligence,
which it failed to do. Private respondent denied
that he was a common carrier, and so he could
not be held liable for force majeure. The trial
court ruled against the respondent, but such
was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is a
common carrier
(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the
loss of the goods
Held: (1) Article 1732 makes no distinction
between one whose principal business activity
is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity. Article 1732 also carefully avoids
making any distinction between a person or
enterprise offering transportation service on a
regular or scheduled basis and one offering
such service on an occasional, episodic or
unscheduled basis. Neither does Article 1732
distinguish between a carrier offering its
services to the "general public," i.e., the general
community or population, and one who offers
services or solicits business only from a narrow
segment of the general population. It appears
to the Court that private respondent is properly
characterized as a common carrier even though
he merely "back-hauled" goods for other
merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although
such backhauling was done on a periodic or
occasional rather than regular or scheduled
manner, and even though private respondent's
principal occupation was not the carriage of
goods for others. There is no dispute that
private respondent charged his customers a fee
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for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell
below commercial freight rates is not relevant
here. A certificate of public convenience is not a
requisite for the incurring of liability under the
Civil Code provisions governing common
carriers.
(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that
common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods which
they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other
natural disaster or calamity;
b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether
international or civil;
c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of
the goods;
d. The character of the goods or defects in the
packing or in the containers; and
e. Order or act of competent public authority."
The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall
within any of the five (5) categories of
exempting causes listed in Article 1734. Private
respondent as common carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently.
This presumption, however, may be overthrown
by proof of extraordinary diligence on the part
of private respondent. We believe and so hold
that the limits of the duty of extraordinary
diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried
are reached where the goods are lost as a result
of a robbery which is attended by "grave or
irresistible threat, violence or force." we hold
that the occurrence of the loss must reasonably
be regarded as quite beyond the control of the
common carrier and properly regarded as a
fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that
even common carriers are not made absolute
insurers against all risks of travel and of
transport of goods, and are not held liable for
acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are
inevitable, provided that they shall have
complied with the rigorous standard of
extraordinary diligence.
Trans-Asia Shipping vs. Court of Appeals
GR 118126, March 4, 1996
Facts: Plaintiff [herein private respondent Atty.
Renato Arroyo], a public attorney, bought a
ticket [from] defendant [herein petitioner], a
corporation engaged in . . . inter-island shipping,
for the voyage of M/V Asia Thailand vessel to
Cagayan de Oro City from Cebu City on
November 12, 1991.
At around 5:30 in the evening of November 12,
1991, plaintiff boarded the M/V Asia Thailand
vessel. At that instance, plaintiff noticed that
some repair works [sic] were being undertaken
on the engine of the vessel. The vessel departed
at around 11:00 in the evening with only one (1)
engine running.
After an hour of slow voyage, the vessel
stopped near Kawit Island and dropped its
anchor thereat. After half an hour of stillness,
some passengers demanded that they should
be allowed to return to Cebu City for they were
no longer willing to continue their voyage to,
Cagayan de Oro City. The captain acceeded [sic]
to their request and thus the vessel headed
back to Cebu City.
At Cebu City, plaintiff together with the other
passengers who requested to be brought back
to Cebu City, were allowed to disembark.
Thereafter, the vessel proceeded to Cagayan de
Oro City. Plaintiff, the next day, boarded the
M/V Asia Japan for its voyage to Cagayan de
Oro City, likewise a vessel of defendant.
On account of this failure of defendant to
transport him to the place of destination on
November 12, 1991, plaintiff filed before the
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trial court a complaint for damages against
defendant. NEGROS NAVIGATION CO., INC. vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS, RAMON MIRANDA, SPS. RICARDO
and VIRGINIA DE LA VICTORIA
G.R. No. 110398 November 7, 1997
Issue: Whether or not the failure of a common
carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its
Facts:
vessel involved in a contract of carriage a
Private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased
breach of its duty?
from the Negros Navigation Co., Inc. four
special cabin tickets. The tickets were for
Held: Undoubtedly, there was, between the
Voyage No. 457-A of the M/V Don Juan, leaving
petitioner and private respondent a contract
Manila and going to Bacolod.
of carriage. Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code,
the petitioner was bound to observed
Subsequently, the Don Juan collided off the
extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of
Tablas Strait in Mindoro, with the M/T Tacloban
the private respondent. That meant that the
City, an oil tanker owned by the Philippine
petitioner was pursuant to the Article 1755 off
National Oil Company (PNOC) and the PNOC
the said Code, bound to carry the private
Shipping and Transport Corporation
respondent safely as far as human care and
(PNOC/STC). As a result, the M/V Don Juan
foresight could provide, using the utmost
sank. Several of her passengers perished in the
diligence of very cautious persons, with due
sea tragedy. The bodies of some of the victims
regard for all the circumstances. In this case, the
were found and brought to shore, but the four
Supreme Court is in full accord with the Court of
members of private respondents’ families were
Appeals that the petitioner failed or discharged
never found.
this obligation.
Before commencing the contact of voyage, the
Private respondents filed a complaint against
petitioner undertook some repairs on the
the Negros Navigation, the Philippine National
cylinder head of one of the vessel’s engines.
Oil Company (PNOC), and the PNOC Shipping
But even before it could finish these repairs it
and Transport Corporation (PNOC/STC), seeking
allowed the vessel to leave the port of origin on
damages for the death. Petitioner, however,
only one functioning engine, instead of
denied that the four relatives of private
two. Moreover, even the lone functioning
respondents actually boarded the vessel as
engine was not in perfect condition at
shown by the fact that their bodies were never
sometime after it had run its course, in conked
recovered. Petitioner further averred that the
out. Which cause the vessel to stop and remain
Don Juan was seaworthy and manned by a full
adrift at sea, thus in order to prevent the ship
and competent crew, and that the collision was
from capsizing, it had to drop anchor. Plainly,
entirely due to the fault of the crew of the M/T
the vessel was unseaworthy even before the
Tacloban City.
voyage begun. For the vessel to be seaworthy, it
must be adequately equipped for the voyage
In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in
and manned with the sufficient number of
failing to exercise the extraordinary diligence
competent officers and crew. The Failure of the
required of it in the carriage of passengers, both
common carrier to maintain in seaworthy
the trial court and the appellate court relied on
condition its vessel involved in a contract of
the findings of this Court in Mecenas v.
carriage is a clear breach of its duty prescribed
Intermediate Appellate Court, which case was
in Article 1755 of the Civil Code
brought for the death of other passengers. In
Mecenas, SC found petitioner guilty of
negligence in (1) allowing or tolerating the ship

4
captain and crew members in playing mahjong
during the voyage, (2) in failing to maintain the
vessel seaworthy and (3) in allowing the ship to
carry more passengers than it was allowed to
carry. Petitioner is, therefore, clearly liable for
damages to the full extent.
Petitioner criticizes the lower court’s reliance on
the Mecenas case, arguing that, although this
case arose out of the same incident as that
involved in Mecenas, the parties are different
and trial was conducted separately. Petitioner
contends that the decision in this case should
be based on the allegations and defenses
pleaded and evidence adduced in it or, in short,
on the record of this case.
Issues:
1. Whether the ruling in Mecenas v. Court of
Appeals, finding the crew members of
petitioner to be grossly negligent in the
performance of their duties, is binding in this
case;
2. Whether the award for damages in Mecenas
v. Court of Appeals is applicable in this case.
Held:
1. No. The contention is without merit.
Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by
this Court’s policy of maintaining stability in
jurisprudence. Where, as in this case, the same
questions relating to the same event have been
put forward by parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a
bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
2. No, it is not applicable.
Petitioner contends that, assuming that the
Mecenas case applies, private respondents
should be allowed to claim only P43,857.14
each as moral damages because in the
Mecenascase, the amount of P307,500.00 was
awarded to the seven children of the Mecenas
couple. Here is where the principle of stare
decisis does not apply in view of differences in
the personal circumstances of the victims. For
that matter, differentiation would be justified
even if private respondents had joined the
private respondents in the Mecenas case.
The doctrine of stare decisis works as a bar only
against issues litigated in a previous case.
Where the issue involved was not raised nor
presented to the court and not passed upon by
the court in the previous case, the decision in
the previous case is not stare decisis of the
question presently presented.
The Mecenas case cannot be made the basis for
determining the award for attorney’s fees. The
award would naturally vary or differ in each
case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification and
petitioner is ORDERED to pay private
respondents damages
BASCOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO
A. CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 101089, April 7, 1993
FACTS: Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing
Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE for
short) entered into a hauling contract with
Jibfair Shipping Agency Corp whereby the
former bound itself to haul the latter’s 2,000
m/tons of soya bean meal to the warehouse in
Calamba, Laguna. To carry out its obligation,
CIPTRADE, through Cipriano, subcontracted
with Bascos to transport and to deliver 400
sacks of soya bean meal from the Manila Port
Area to Calamba, Laguna. Petitioner failed to
deliver the said cargo. As a consequence of that
failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair Shipping Agency the
amount of the lost goods in accordance with
their contract.
Cipriano demanded reimbursement from
petitioner but the latter refused to pay.
Eventually, Cipriano filed a complaint for a sum
of money and damages with writ of preliminary
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attachment for breach of a contract of carriage.
The trial court granted the writ of preliminary
attachment.
In her answer, petitioner interposed the
defense that there was no contract of carriage
since CIPTRADE leased her cargo truck to load
the cargo from Manila Port Area to Laguna and
that the truck carrying the cargo was hijacked
and being a force majeure, exculpated
petitioner from any liability
After trial, the trial court rendered a decision in
favor of Cipriano and against Bascos ordering
the latter to pay the former for actual damages
for attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
The “Urgent Motion To Dissolve/Lift preliminary
Attachment” Bascos is DENIED for being moot
and academic.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but
respondent Court affirmed the trial court’s
judgment.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
(1) WON petitioner a common carrier
(2) WON the hijacking referred to a force
majeure
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED and the
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.
1. YES
In disputing the conclusion of the trial and
appellate courts that petitioner was a common
carrier, she alleged in this petition that the
contract between her and Cipriano was lease of
the truck. She also stated that: she was not
catering to the general public. Thus, in her
answer to the amended complaint, she said that
she does business under the same style of A.M.
Bascos Trucking, offering her trucks for lease to
those who have cargo to move, not to the
general public but to a few customers only in
view of the fact that it is only a small business.
We agree with the respondent Court in its
finding that petitioner is a common carrier.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common
carrier as “(a) person, corporation or firm, or
association engaged in the business of carrying
or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water or air, for compensation, offering
their services to the public.” The test to
determine a common carrier is “whether the
given undertaking is a part of the business
engaged in by the carrier which he has held out
to the general public as his occupation rather
than the quantity or extent of the business
transacted.” 12 In this case, petitioner herself
has made the admission that she was in the
trucking business, offering her trucks to those
with cargo to move. Judicial admissions are
conclusive and no evidence is required to prove
the same. 13
But petitioner argues that there was only a
contract of lease because they offer their
services only to a select group of people.
Regarding the first contention, the holding of
the Court in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals 14
is instructive. In referring to Article 1732 of the
Civil Code, it held thus:
“The above article makes no distinction
between one whose principal business activity
is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and
one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local idiom, as a “sideline”). Article
1732 also carefully avoids making any
distinction between a person or enterprise
offering transportation service on a regular or
scheduled basis and one offering such service
on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis.
Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a
6
carrier offering its services to the “general
public,” i.e., the general community or
population, and one who offers services or
solicits business only from a narrow segment of
the general population. We think that Article
1732 deliberately refrained from making such
distinctions.”
2. NO
Likewise, We affirm the holding of the
respondent court that the loss of the goods was
not due to force majeure.
Common carriers are obliged to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods transported by them. Accordingly, they
are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently if the goods are lost,
destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few
instances when the presumption of negligence
does not attach and these instances are
enumerated in Article 1734. 19 In those cases
where the presumption is applied, the common
carrier must prove that it exercised
extraordinary diligence in order to overcome
the presumption.
In this case, petitioner alleged that hijacking
constituted force majeure which exculpated her
from liability for the loss of the cargo. In De
Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that hijacking, not being included in the
provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with
under the provisions of Article 1735 and thus,
the common carrier is presumed to have been
at fault or negligent. To exculpate the carrier
from liability arising from hijacking, he must
prove that the robbers or the hijackers acted
with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or
force. This is in accordance with Article 1745 of
the Civil Code which provides:
“Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar
stipulations shall be considered unreasonable,
unjust and contrary to public policy; xx
(6) That the common carrier’s liability for acts
committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not
act with grave or irresistible threat, violences or
force, is dispensed with or diminished;” xx
Phil American General Insurance Co Inc vs
MGG Marine Services Inc
GR: 135645 : March 8, 2002
Facts: On March 1, 1987, San Miguel
Corporation insured several beer bottle cases
with an aggregate value of P5,836,222.80 with
petitioner Philippine American General
Insurance Company.[2] The cargo were loaded
on board the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G to be
transported from Mandaue City to Bislig,
Surigao del Sur.
After having been cleared by the Coast Guard
Station in Cebu the previous day, the vessel left
the port of Mandaue City for Bislig, Surigao del
Sur on March 2, 1987. The weather was calm
when the vessel started its voyage.
The following day, March 3, 1987, M/V
Peatheray Patrick-G listed and subsequently
sunk off Cawit Point, Cortes, Surigao del Sur. As
a consequence thereof, the cargo belonging to
San Miguel Corporation was lost.
Subsequently, San Miguel Corporation claimed
the amount of its loss from petitioner.
Upon petitioners request, on March 18, 1987,
Mr. Eduardo Sayo, a surveyor from the Manila
Adjusters and Surveyors Co., went to
Taganauan Island, Cortes, Surigao del Sur where
the vessel was cast ashore, to investigate the
circumstances surrounding the loss of the
cargo. In his report, Mr. Sayo stated that the
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vessel was structurally sound and that he did belonging to San Miguel Corporation, private
not see any damage or crack thereon. He respondents cannot be held liable for the said
concluded that the proximate cause of the loss.
listing and subsequent sinking of the vessel was
the shifting of ballast water from starboard to
portside. The said shifting of ballast water
allegedly affected the stability of the M/V
Peatheray Patrick-G.

Thereafter, petitioner paid San Miguel

Corporation the full amount of P5,836,222.80
pursuant to the terms of their insurance
contract.

On November 3, 1987, petitioner as subrogee of

San Miguel Corporation filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City a case for
collection against private respondents to
recover the amount it paid to San Miguel
Corporation for the loss of the latters cargo.

Issue: Whether or not the sinking of the ship

was caused by a fortuitous event as its
proximate cause?

Ruling: Yes. In the case at bar, it was adequately

shown that before the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G
left the port of Mandaue City, the Captain
confirmed with the Coast Guard that the
weather condition would permit the safe travel
of the vessel to Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Thus, he
could not be expected to have foreseen the
unfavorable weather condition that awaited the
vessel in Cortes, Surigao del Sur. It was the
presence of the strong winds and enormous
waves which caused the vessel to list, keel over,
and consequently lose the cargo contained
therein. The appellate court likewise found that
there was no negligence on the part of the crew
of the M/V Peatheray Patrick-G, citing the
following portion of the decision of the Board of
Marine Inquiry

Since the presence of strong winds and

enormous waves at Cortes, Surigao del Sur on
March 3, 1987 was shown to be the proximate
and only cause of the sinking of the M/V
Peatheray Patrick-G and the loss of the cargo