Jarabini Del Rosario v Asuncion Ferrer

G.R. No. 187056

September 20, 2010

Facts:

Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a documented titled Donation Mortis Causa in
favor of their children Asuncion and Emiliano, and their granddaughter, Jarabini, who is the daughter
of their predeceased son, Zoilo. The donation covers a 126-square meter lot and the house on it, to be
divided in equal shares among the donees.

The deed of donation specifies that the donation shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the
surviving donor spouse. The deed had no attestation clause and was witnessed by only 2 persons. The
donees also signified their acceptance on the document.

A few months after the death of Guadalupe, Leopoldo assigned his rights and interest in the subject
property to Asuncion.

In 1998, Jarabini filed a petition for probate of the August 27, 1968 deed of donation mortis causa
before the RTC of Manila. Asuncion opposed the petition, contending that Leopoldo has assigned his
rights and interests in the property to her.

RTC held that the donation was in fact one made inter vivos due to the fact that the donors intended to
transfer title over the property to the donees during the donors’ lifetime, given its irrevocability. RTC
further held that Leopoldo’s subsequent assignment was void for her had nothing to assign.

CA reversed the RTC’s decision. It held that Jarabini cannot, through a petition for probate of the
deed of donation mortis causa, collaterally attack Leopoldo’s deed of assignment.

Issue:

Whether the donation executed by spouses Gonzales in favor of Asuncion, Emiliano, and Jarabini was
a donation mortis causa or donation inter vivos.

Ruling:

It was a donation inter vivos. The court held that if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character
is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa. Thus, the caption on the document is not
controlling.

The court held in Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals that irrevocability is a quality absolutely
incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa, where revocability is precisely the essence of
the act. Furthermore, the court provided the following characteristics for donation mortis causa:

1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee

Otherwise stated, express irrevocability of the donation is the distinctive standard that identifies the
document as a donation inter vivos. The intent to make the donation irrevocable is evident in the
proviso indicating that the surviving donor shall respect the irrevocability of the donation.

While donors reserve the right, ownership, possession, and administration of the property and make
the donation operative upon their death, the court has consistently held that such reservation in the
context of an irrevocable donation means that only beneficial ownership of the donated property is
retained by the donor while they are alive, but the donors already part with the naked title of the
property.

The fact that the deed has an acceptance clause indicates that the donation is inter vivos, since
acceptance is required only in such donations. Since a donation mortis causa is essentially a will in
form, it need not be accepted by the done during the donor’s lifetime.

Finally in Puig v. Peaflorida, the court held that in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed a
donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the
property subject of the deed.

The donation being one made inter vivos and therefore immediately operative and final, Leopoldo’s
subsequent assignment of rights and interests in the property in favor of Asuncion is void for her no
more rights and interests to assign.
Mario Siochi v Alfredo Gozon, Winifred Gozon, Inter-Dimensional Realty, Inc., Gil Tabije
G.R. No. 169900
March 18, 2010

Facts:

This case involves a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 5357 situated in Malabon, Manila and
registered in the name of Alfredo Gozon, married to Elvira Gozon.

On December 23, 1991, Elvira filed with the Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against
Alfredo. She then filed a notice of lis pendens, which was then annotated on TCT No. 5357.

During the pendency of the legal separation case, Alfredo and petitioner Mario Siochi entered into an
agreement to buy and sell the subject property for P18 Million. Alfredo failed to comply with the
stipulations of the agreement despite repeated demands from Mario. Thus, after paying the P5 Million
earnest money as partial payment, Mario took possession of the property. The agreement was also
annotated on TCT No. 5357.

Cavite RTC decreed the legal separation between Alfredo and Elvira. The subject property was also
deemed party of their conjugal property.

On August 22, 1994, Alfredo executed a deed of donation over the property in favor of their daughter,
Winifred. TCT No. 5357 was then cancelled and TCT No. M-10508 was issued in Winifred’s name.
The agreement and notice of lis pendens was not annotated on the new certificate of title.

By virtue of a special power of attorney executed by Winifred, Alfredo sold the property to Inter-
Dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for P18 Million. TCT No. M-10508 was cancelled and TCT No. M-
10976 was issued to IDRI.

In its decision, Malabon RTC enjoined defendants from continuing any act of further alienating or
disposing of the subject property.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision but with modifications, holding that the sale between Alfredo
and Mario is null and void as it was done without the consent of Elvira.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the sale entered into by Alfredo and Mario is void.

Yes, it is void. Pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code, in the event that one spouse is
incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal property, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. In this case, Alfredo was the sole
administrator because as Elvira was separated in fact from Alfredo, she was unable to participate in
the administration of the property. However, even as sole administrator, Alfredo still cannot sell the
property without the written consent of Elvira or the court. The absence of the consent of one of the
spouse renders the entire sale void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
spouse who contracted the sale.

Regarding Mario’s contention that the agreement should be considered as a continuing offer which
may be perfected by Elvira’s acceptance before it is withdrawn, the same is untenable since the fact
that Alfredo donated the property to Winifred and subsequently sold it to IDRI already indicates that
the offer has been withdrawn.

2. Whether one-half of Alfredo’s undivided share has already been forfeited in favor of
Winifred.
No. When legal separation is decreed, the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the
net profits earned by the conjugal partnership. It is only Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is
forfeited in favor of Winifred.

3. Whether or not IDRI is a buyer in good faith.

No. As found by RTC Malabon, IDRI had actual knowledge of facts and circumstances which should
impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiries about the vendor’s title to the property
being sold.

Conjugal property cannot be donated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. The
donation was done without Elvira’s consent. IDRI was aware of the existence of the lis pendens on
TCT No. 5357 as well as the legal separation case. Clearly, he was not a buyer in good faith.
Kapatiran Ng Mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Bienvenido Tan
GR No. 81311
June 30, 1988

Facts:

The case involves a petition seeking to nullify Executive Order No. 273, issued by the President of the
Philippines on July 25, 1987, which amended certain sections of the NIRC and adopted the Value-
Added Tax. Petitioners allege that it is unconstitutional for having been enacted outside the powers of
the President; that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violates the due process and
equal protection clauses and other provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not EO 273 is unconstitutional on the ground that the President had no authority
to issue it.

Contention is without merit. Under Article XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the incumbent
President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened. The first
Congress, created and elected under the 1987 Constitution, was convened on 27 July 1987. Hence, the
enactment of EO 273 on 25 July 1987, two (2) days before Congress convened on 27 July 1987, was
within the President's constitutional power and authority to legislate.

Moreover, the court found no merit in the petitioners’ claim that EO 273 was issued by the President
President in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. “Grave abuse of
discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility. Petitioners failed to show that EO 273 was issued in such manner.

2. Whether or not EO 273 is oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive, in violation of the
provisions of Art. VI, sec. 28(1) of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the rule of
taxation shall be uniform and equitable.

The petitioners failed to support their assertions with facts and circumstances that would warrant their
conclusions. They have failed to adequately show that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory or
unjust. They merely relied on newspaper articles which are merely hearsay. To justify the nullification
of a law. there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative implication.

The court held that EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax as it is uniform. In the case of
City of Baguio vs. De Leon, the court stated: “A tax is considered uniform when it operates with the
same force and effect in every place where the subject may be found.”

Moreover, in Eastern Theatrical Co. v. Alfonso, the court held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation
means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation.”

The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public,
which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%. It is also equitable as it is imposed only on
sales of goods or services by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales
exceeding P200,000.00.

3. Whether or not EO 273 discriminates against customs brokers.

No. The phrase “except custom brokers” is not meant to discriminate against custom brokers but to
avoid a potential conflict between Sections 102 and 103 of the Tax Code, as amended. The distinction
of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are subject to occupation tax under the Local
Tax Code is based on material differences, in that the activities of customs partake more of a business,
rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the percentage tax under Section 174 of the Tax
Code prior to its amendment by EO 273.
Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. v CIR

Facts:

Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. received a formal Letter of Demand from the CIR dated July 9,
2004, containing an assessment for deficiency value-added tax and excise tax in the amounts
P102,535,520.00 and P 4,334,715.00, respectively, inclusive of penalties and interests.

AIA claimed that it filed a protest letter dated August 29, 2004 through registered mail on August 30,
2004. Additional supporting documents were also filed on September 24 and November 22 of the
same year. CIR failed to act on the protest, so AIA filed a petition for review before the CTA.

CIR filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to AIA’s failure to file a
timely protest, thereby rendering the assessment final and executor. CIR denied receiving the August
29, 2004 protest letter, claiming it only received the September 24 protest letter on September 30,
which is three days past the 30-day period for filing a protest.

The CTA f