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ANNOTATION

INJUNCTION
By *
ALICIA GONZALEZ DECANO

__________________

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of

the Court of Appeals. The petitioner, dissatisfied with the
trial courtÊs denial of its application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and writ of preliminary injunction. The appellate court
dismissed the petition for certiorari with the ruling that
even assuming that the trial courtÊs denial of petitionerÊs
application for a writ of preliminary injunction was
erroneous, it constituted only an error of judgment which is
not correctible by certiorari, unlike error of jurisdiction,
hence this Petition for Review.
Before an incisive analysis of what an injunction is, a
definition of injunction is a must.
INJUNCTION DEFINED: It is a judicial writ, process or
proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or to refrain
from doing a particular act. It may be an action in itself,
brought specifically to restrain or commend the
performance of an act (see Sec. 26, Civil Code; Section 4,
Rule 39), or it may be just a provisional remedy for and as
an incident in the main action which may be for other
relief. (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 1984,
p. 336)

_______________
 * Law Professor, University of Pangasinan, Professorial Lecturer,
Consultant, UST Graduate School, Law and Political Science Cluster.

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General Principles

Injunction was, under the Code of Civil Procedure, a

„special remedy‰ adopted in that code from American
practice, and originally borrowed from English legal
procedure, which was there issued by the authority and
under the seal of a court of equity, and limited, as in other
cases, where there was no plain, adequate and complete
remedy at law.
Under the Rules of Court, the nomenclature given
thereto is „provisional remedy‰ to which litigants may
resort for the preservation or protection of their rights or
interests, and for no other purpose, during the pendency of
the principal action. If an action, by its nature, does not
require such protection or preservation, the remedy is
unavailing and cannot be granted. It has been said that the
writ „is the strong arm of equity that never ought to be
extended unless to cases of great injury, where courts of
law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in
damages.‰
Except in cases wherein the statute gives an absolute
right to an injunction, this remedy, whether temporary or
permanent, cannot, as a general rule, be sought as a matter
of right, but its granting or refusal rest in the sound
discretion of the court under the circumstances and the
facts of the particular case. (Moran, Comments on the Rules
of Court, Vol. III, 1980, pp. 66-67)

Purpose of Injunction

The primary purpose of injunction is to preserve the status

quo by restraining action or interference or by furnishing
preventive relief. The status quo is the last peaceable,
uncontested status which precedes the pending
controversy. (Ro-dulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225, cited by
Regalado, Vol. I, supra)
Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the
protection of oneÊs substantive right or interest. (Batangas-

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Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. vs. Bitanga, 362 SCRA

636 (2001)

Kinds of Injunction

Injunction may be preliminary or final. Preliminary

injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action
prior to the final judgment therein. A final injunction is one
issued in the judgment of the case permanently restraining
the defendant or making the preliminary injunction
permanent.
Injunction may also be preventive (or prohibitive) or
mandatory. A preventive injunction requires a person to
refrain from a particular act, while a mandatory injunction
requires the performance of a particular act.
A mandatory injunction is an extreme remedy and will
be granted only on a showing that: (a) the invasion of the
right is material and substantial, (b) the right of the
complainant is clear and unmistakable, and (c) there is an
urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damages. (Bautista, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., 53
O.G. 4464, cited by Regalado, Vol. 1, supra)

Injunction Distinguished from Prohibition and Man-

damus

A line of distinction should be drawn between the

provisional remedy of injunction on the one hand, and the
special civil action of mandamus and prohibition on the
other. Injunction is directed only to the parties litigants,
requiring them to refrain from act which is in violation of
substantive rights; while prohibition is directed generally
to a court, commending it to cease from the exercise of a
jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. Mandamus is a
remedial writ; an injunction, essentially a preventive
remedy. Mandamus is usually employed to redress past
grievances; injunction prevents future injury. The functions
of an injunction are to restrain motion and to enforce
inaction; those of mandamus, to set in motion

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and to compel action. In this sense, an injunction may be

regarded as a conservative remedy; mandamus as an active
one. Injunction preserves matters in status quo until the
merits can be heard, and by status quo is meant „the last,
actual peaceful, uncontested status which preceded the
pending controversy,‰ mandamus seeks to change the
status of affairs and to substitute action for inactivity. The
one is a positive or remedial process; the other, a negative
or preventive one (Moran, supra).

Preventive and Mandatory Injunction Distinguished

A preventive injunction commands a party to refrain from

doing an act. Injunctions of this nature operate upon
unperformed and unexecuted acts, and prevent a
threatened but non-existent injury. A mandatory injunction
commands the performance of some positive act and its
purpose is not to correct a wrong of the past, in the sense of
redress for injury already sustained, but to prevent further
injury. (Moran, supra)

Grounds for the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction

Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides: „a

preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief

demanded, and the whole or part of which relief
consists in restraining the commission or
continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either
for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-
 performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the
applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring
or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
viola

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tion of the rights of the applicant respecting the

subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.‰

Requisites for the Grant of Preliminary Injunction

In the case of Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

119118, February 19, 2001, 352 SCRA 72, the Supreme
Court held:

„x x x on the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, there are

three requisites for the grant of the same:

The invasion of the right is material and substantial; 2)

The right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; 3)
There is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage. x x x.‰
In the case of Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs.
Vianzon, G.R. No. 131020, July 20, 2000, 336 SCRA 309,
the Supreme Court through Justice Minerva Gonzaga-
Reyes held:

„x x x The foregoing requites are present in this case. (Note: „the

foregoing requisites‰ are those enumerated above).

The Petitioner does not contest the validity of the

contractual right of SAFFIROU SEACRAFTS, INC., or SSI
in brief, as lessee but claims that said right was
extinguished pursuant to Board Resolution No. 97-023
which cancelled and terminated SSIÊs right on the ground
that SSI violated certain provisions in the registration
agreement and supplemental agreement. It is also
undisputed SSI has possession over the subject property
and in fact filed the action to prevent implementation of
the demand made by the PESA to vacate the leased
premises since SSI claims that the PESAÊs cancellation was
unauthorized and is illegal. Verily, SSI has a clear and
unmistakable right to protect its contractual right to lease
the property lest it suffers business losses from its
investments within the processing zone. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that there was sufficient ground for the
issuance of an injunction. The Court of appeals held:

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„x x x under the Registration agreement and supplemental

agreement it entered into with the petitioner in praying for a writ of
preliminary injunction, private respondent has the right to lease
the premises in question from 1992-2007 or for a period of fifteen
years. When petitioners demanded of private respondent to vacate
the leased premises in 1997, the latter had still ten (10) years to go
under the said arguments. Thus, in filing the instant case for
injunction, private respondent was just protecting its right as a
lessee under the said agreements with the petitioner. x x x‰

To illustrate the second requisite which is „the right of the

complainant is clear and unmistakable,‰ the Court of
Appeals ruling as affirmed by the Supreme Court, states:

„x x x Private respondentÊs right as a lessee of the premises in

question is clear and unmistakable as evidenced by the Retainer
(sic) agreement and supplemental agreement with the petitioner,
granting private respondent fifteen years to lease the said premises.
At the time of petitioners demand for private respondent to vacate
the leased premises, the latter had still ten (10) years of the
agreement subsisting as adverted to earlier x x x.‰

The third requisite is „There is an urgent and permanent

necessity for the issuance of the writ of injunction to
prevent serious damage.‰ This appears to be so in the above
entitled case. Private respondent allegedly had already
infused a capital of fifty-five million (P55,000,000.00) Pesos
in establishing its business in the leased premises, and
considering that it has not even recouped said investment
under the agreements with petitioner, not to mention its
already paid rentals, the loss of employment for its workers
as well as its business goodwill, private respondentÊ stands
to lose so much if it will just be unceremoniously evicted
from its place of business. x x x.‰
The three requisites enumerated and discussed earlier
were also reiterated in the case of Crystal, et al. vs. Cebu
International School, G.R. No. 135433, April 4, 2001 356
SCRA 296 where the Supreme Court ruled:

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„x x x a writ of preliminary injunction is issued only upon the proof

of the following: (1) a clear legal right of the complainant; (2) a
violation of that right, and (3) a permanent and urgent necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damages.‰

Unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction which is a

preservative remedy, a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction requires the performance of a particular act that
tends to go beyond maintaining the status quo and is thus
more cautiously regarded. Hence, the applicant must prove
the existence of a right that is clear and unmistakable.
(SBMA vs. Universal International Group of Taiwan, 340
SCRA 359 2000 cited by Justice Panganiban in Crystal vs.
Cebu International School, supra).
In the present case, Petitioners have failed to show that
they have a clear and unmistakable right that has been
violated neither have they shown permanent and urgent
necessity for the issuance of the writ.
„Petitioners in this case have no right or standing to
pray for the issuance of an injunctive writ, because they
failed to pay the required school fees on time. x x x.
Moreover, the past credit history of petitioners did not
help them in this instance. Not only had their personal
checks bounced several times in the past, but these had
been postdated as well; sometimes they were not even
encashed upon petitionersÊ advice, x x x. When they filed
the case, they were no longer students in good standing.
Even assuming that petitioners have a clear and
unmistakable legal right, they are still not entitled to a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. They have not
shown any urgent and permanent necessity for it,
considering that Monica Claire and Francis Lorraine are
already enrolled at the Colegio de Immaculada Concepcion.
In other words, there is no more need for the issuance of a
writ of mandatory injunction to compel the school to admit
them. x x x‰

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Instances When Injunction Will Not Lie

In the case of Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 128102, March 7, 2000, 327 SCRA 59, the
Supreme Court held:

„x x x In the instant case private respondentsÊ petition for review

with prayer for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) or preliminary injunction was mailed on August 2,
1994 but was received by the Court of Appeals only on August 30,
1994. Meanwhile, on August 3, 1994, the writ of demolition was
implemented, resulting in the demolition of respondentsÊ houses.
Hence, any relevant issue arising from the issuance or enforcement
of the writ had been rendered moot and academic. Injunction would
not lie anymore, as the acts sought to have been enjoined had
already become a fait accompli or an accomplished or consummated
act. x x x‰

The same ruling finds application in the case of Zabat, et

al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 12209, August 23,
2000, 338 SCRA 551, where the Supreme Court ruled:

„x x x It should be stressed that the remedy of injunction could no

longer be availed of where the act to be presented had long been
consummated. In their complaint before the trial court and in the
present petition, petitioners pray that the NHA be enjoined from
evicting them and from demolishing their structure. What they
truly and ultimately desire, however, is to overturn the award of the
lot solely to the Mauris, This, in our view, is not legally, feasible.
The award of the lot has already been accomplished. x x x‰
This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Ticson, et al. vs.
Video Post Manila, Inc., G.R. No. 136342, June 15, 2000
333 SCRA 472, where the Supreme Court again held:

„x x x When the act sought to be enjoined has become fait accompli,

only the prayer for provisional remedy should be denied and the
trial court should still proceed with the determination of the
principal action so that an adjudication of the rights of the parties
can be had. x x x‰

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Injunction is not granted to take property out of the

possession or control of one party to be placed into that of
another whose title has not been clearly established by law.
(Zabat, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., supra)
The Supreme Court in the case of Ong Ching Kian
Chuan vs. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 145 (2001) ruled:

„x x x The grant of preliminary injunction in copyright cases

depends chiefly on the extent of doubt in the validity of the
copyright, existence of infringement, and the damages sustained by
such infringement. In our view, the copies of the certificates of
copyright registered in the name of Ceroilfood Shandong sufficiently
raise reasonable doubt. With such a doubt, the preliminary
injunction is unavailing x x x‰

In Medina vs. City Sheriff of Manila, 276 SCRA 133 (1977),

the Supreme Court held:

„x x x where the complainantÊs right or title is doubtful or disputed,

injunction is not proper. (Arcega vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
122206, July 7, 1997 citing Vinzons-Chato v. Natividad, 244 SCRA
787 (1995) and China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 121158, December 5, 1996)

The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an

actual existing right is not a ground for injunction (Ulang
vs. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 642 (1993).

CONCLUSION

Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the

 protection of oneÊs substantive right or interest. It is not a
cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an
adjunct to a main suit. (Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co.,
Inc. vs. Bitanga, 362 SCRA 635 [2001])
To be entitled to the injunctive writ, parties must show
that there exists a right to be protected which is directly
threatened by an act sought to be enjoined (SEARTH Com-

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modities Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 628,

1992; Saulog vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119769,
September 18, 1996 cited in the case of Medina vs. City
Sheriff, Manila, supra). Furthermore, there must be a
showing that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial and that there is an urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
(Syndicated Media Access Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 219
SCRA 797 (1993) cited in the case of Molina vs. City
Sheriff, supra).
ComplainantÊs right must be clear and unmistakable. In
the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the writ
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. (Medina vs. City
Sheriff, supra).

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