The PRESIDENTIAL RECORDINGS JOHN F. KENNEDY

The
P R E SIDE NT I AL
R E CO R DING S
J OHN F . K ENNEDY
The
P RESIDEN T I A L
R ECORDI N G S
J O H N F. K E N N E DY
THE GREAT CRISES, VOLUME TWO
SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 21, 1962
Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow

Editors, Volume Two
David Coleman
George Eliades
Francis Gavin
Jill Colley Kastner
Erin Mahan
Ernest May
Jonathan Rosenberg
David Shreve
Associate Editors, Volume Two
Patricia Dunn
Assistant Editor
Philip Zelikow and Ernest May

General Editors
B
W. W. NORTON & COMPANY • NEW YORK • LONDON
Copyright © 2001 by The Miller Center of Public Affairs
Portions of this three-volume set were previously published by Harvard University Press in The
Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis
by Philip D. Zelikow and Ernest R. May.
Copyright © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America
First Edition
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
John F. Kennedy : the great crises.

p. cm. (The presidential recordings)
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Contents: v. 1. July 30–August 1962 / Timothy Naftali, editor—v. 2. September 4–October 20,
1962 / Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow, editors—v. 3. October 22–28, 1962 / Philip Zelikow
and Ernest May, editors.
ISBN 0-393-04954-X
1. United States—Politics and government—1961–1963—Sources. 2. United States—
Foreign relations—1961–1963—Sources. 3. Crisis management—United States—History—
20th century—Sources. 4. Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917–1963—Archives. I. Naftali,
Timothy J. II. Zelikow, Philip, 1954– III. May, Ernest R. IV. Series.
E841.J58 2001
973.922—dc21 2001030053
W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110
www.wwnorton.com
W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., Castle House, 75/76 Wells Street, London W1T 3QT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0
MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
The Presidential Recordings Project
Philip Zelikow
Director of the Center
Timothy Naftali
Director of the Project
Editorial Advisory Board

Michael Beschloss
Taylor Branch
Robert Dallek
Walter Isaacson
Allen Matusow
Richard Neustadt
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Robert Schulzinger
Contents

By Philip Zelikow and Ernest May xi
Preface to John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Volumes 1–3

By Philip Zelikow and Ernest May xvii
Editors’ Acknowledgments xxv
Areas of Specialization for Research Scholars xxvii
A Note on Sources xxix
Meeting Participants and Other

Frequently Mentioned Persons xxxi
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1962 3

11:30–11:50 A.M. Meeting on U-2 Incident 4
12:35–1:00 P.M. Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba 19
4:00–4:50 P.M. Drafting Meeting on the
Cuba Press Statement 33
5:00–5:55 P.M. Meeting with Congressional Leadership
on Cuba 52
5:55–6:10 P.M. Meeting on the Congressional Resolution
about Cuba 73
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1962 81

5:00–6:15 P.M. Meeting on the DOMINIC
Nuclear Test Series 82
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1962 110

TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation with Douglas Dillon 112
12:35–12:40 P.M. Meeting with Billy Graham and
Dwight Eisenhower 115
vii
viii CONTENTS
12:40–1:02 P.M. Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower 118

6:45–7:15 P.M. Meeting on Berlin 135
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1962 149

4:55 P.M. Conversation with John McCormack,
Thomas Morgan, and Carl Vinson 150
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1962 154

5:00–5:56 P.M. Meeting with Maxwell Taylor on
His Far Eastern Trip 156
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1962 178

11:30 A.M.–12:03 P.M. Meeting on Laos 178
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1962 181

11:00 A.M.–12:27 P.M. Meeting on the Soviet Union 182
1:18–1:30 P.M. Meeting on the Crisis at the
University of Mississippi 222
APPROXIMATELY 1:30–1:35 P.M. Meeting with
Robert Kennedy on the Drummond Spy Case 230
2:00 P.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett 233
2:25 P.M. Conversation with Theodore Sorensen 237
2:30 P.M. Conversation with LeMoyne Billings 238
2:50 P.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett 239
7:36 P.M. Conversation with Torbert MacDonald 247
SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 30–MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962 250

APPROXIMATELY 10:40 P.M.–1:00 A.M. Meeting on Civil Rights 251
12:14 A.M. Conversation with Ross Barnett 288
Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued 290
APPROXIMATELY 12:40 A.M. Conversation from the
Oval Office between Robert Kennedy and Cyrus Vance 299
Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued 299
1:50 A.M. Continuation of Conversation with
Ross Barnett 308
2:00 A.M. Conversation between Robert Kennedy and
Creighton Abrams 310
4:20 A.M. Conversation with Creighton Abrams 312
CONTENTS ix
MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962 314

9:31 A.M. Conversation with Archibald Cox 316
11:12 A.M. Conversation with Cyrus Vance and
Robert McNamara 317
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1962 319

4:20–5:20 P.M. Meeting on the Budget and
Tax Cut Proposal 321
5:25 P.M. Conversation with Kenneth O’Donnell and
Cyrus Vance 352
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1962 355

9:20 A.M. Conversation with Cyrus Vance 356
10:05 A.M. Conversation with John McCormack 357
SOMETIME THAT MORNING. Conversation with
Lawrence F. O’Brien 359
MONDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1962 361

10:30 A.M. Conversation with Mike Mansfield 362
12:00 P.M. Conversation with Albert Gore 365
4:48–5:10 P.M. Meeting on the Budget 369

9:54 A.M. Conversation with Mike Mansfield and
Mike Kirwan 379
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1962 381

TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation with George Smathers 382
TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation with Eugene Keogh 388
TIME UNKNOWN. Conversation about James Meredith 389

11:50 A.M.–1:00 P.M. Meeting on the
Cuban Missile Crisis 397
6:30–8:00 P.M. Meeting on the
Cuban Missile Crisis 427
x T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T
WEDNESDAY, October 17, 1962 468

10:00–11:30 A.M. Meeting with West German
Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 469
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1962 499

10:00–10:38 A.M. Cabinet Meeting on
the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 499
11:10 A.M.–1:15 P.M. Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 512
NEAR MIDNIGHT. Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meeting
on the Cuban Missile Crisis 572
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1962 578

9:45–10:30 A.M. Meeting with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 578
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1962 599

2:30–5:10 P.M. National Security Council Meeting
on the Cuban Missile Crisis 601
Index 615
BY PHILIP ZELIKOW AND ERNEST MAY
B
etween 1940 and 1973, presidents of the United States secretly
recorded hundreds of their meetings and conversations in the
White House. Though some recorded a lot and others just a little,
they created a unique and irreplaceable source for understanding not
only their presidencies and times but the presidency as an institution
and, indeed, the essential process of high-level decision making.
These recordings of course do not displace more traditional sources
such as official documents, private diaries and letters, memoirs, and con-
temporaneous journalism. They augment these sources much as photo-
graphs, films, and recordings augment printed records of presidents’
public appearances. But they do much more than that.
Because the recordings capture an entire meeting or conversation,
not just highlights caught by a minute-taker or recalled afterward in a
memorandum or memoir, they have or can have two distinctive qualities.
In the first place, they can catch the whole complex of considerations
that weigh on a president’s action choice. Most of those present at a
meeting with a president know chiefly the subject of that meeting. Even
key staff advisers have compartmented responsibilities. Tapes or tran-
scripts of successive meetings or conversations can reveal interlocked
concerns of which only the president was aware. They can provide hard
evidence, not just bases for inference, about presidential motivations.
Desk diaries, public and private papers of presidents, and memoirs
and oral histories by aides, family, and friends all show how varied and
difficult were the presidents’ responsibilities and how little time they had
for meeting those responsibilities. But only the tapes provide a clear pic-
ture of how these responsibilities constantly converged—how a presi-
dent could be simultaneously, not consecutively, a commander in chief
worrying about war, a policymaker conscious that his missteps in eco-
nomic policy could bring on a market collapse, a chief mediator among
interest groups, a chief administrator for a myriad of public programs, a
spokesperson for the interests and aspirations of the nation, a head of a
sprawling political party, and more.
The tapes reveal not only what presidents said but what they heard.
For everyone, there is some difference between learning by ear and by
xi
xii T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T
eye. Action-focused individuals ordinarily take in more of what is said to

them than of what they read, especially when they can directly question
a speaker. A document read aloud to a president had a much better
chance of registering than the same document simply placed in the in-
box. Though hearing and reading can both be selective, tapes probably
show, better than any other records, the information and advice guiding
presidential choices.
Perhaps most usefully, the secret tapes record, as do no other sources,
the processes that produce decisions. Presidential advisers can be heard
debating with one another. They adapt to the arguments of the others.
They sometimes change their minds. The common positions at the end
of a meeting are not necessarily those taken by any person at the outset.
The president’s own views have often been reshaped. Sometimes there
has been a basic shift in definition of an issue or of the stakes involved.
Hardly anyone ever has a clear memory of such changes. Yet, with the
tape, a listener now can hear those changes taking place—can follow, as
nowhere else, the logic of high-stakes decision making.
Casting about for analogies, we have thought often of Pompeii. As the
ruins uncovered there have given students of Greco-Roman civilization
knowledge not to be found anywhere else, in any form, so the presidential
recordings give students of the presidency, of U.S. and world history, and
of decision making knowledge simply without parallel or counterpart.
They are a kind of time machine, allowing us to go back and be in the
room as history was being made. And, unlike even the finest archaeologi-
cal site, what we uncover are the words and deliberations of the people
themselves in the moment of action, not just the accounts, summary
notes, or after-the-fact reconstructions they left behind.
Of the six presidents who used secret recording devices, three did so
extensively. Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower
recorded to a limited extent. John Kennedy, however, after installing an
elaborate taping system in July 1962, used it frequently during the 16
months before his murder in November 1963. Using a different system,
Lyndon Johnson made recordings throughout his presidency, especially in
1968, his last, tumultuous year in office. Richard Nixon, after two years
without using any recording devices, installed a system which, because
voice activated, captured every conversation in a room with a microphone.
The existence of Nixon’s system came to light in July 1973 during
congressional hearings on administration involvement in the 1972
Watergate burglary. Segments of tape obtained by Congress provided a
major basis for the impeachment proceedings that led to Nixon’s later
resignation.
T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T xiii
The Watergate hearings brought an end to secret taping. Afterward,

it became unlawful to record conversations without knowledge and con-
sent. As the ruins of Pompeii reveal details of Greco-Roman life only up
to August of 79 A.D., when lava from Vesuvius buried the city, so secret
recordings reveal the inner workings of the U.S. presidency only from
1940—and especially 1962—down to mid-1973.
On the premise that these recordings will remain important histori-
cal sources for centuries to come, the University of Virginia’s Miller
Center of Public Affairs plans to produce transcripts and aids for using
all accessible recordings for all six presidencies. We started with the
methods and style we used in 1996–97 to produce a then-unprecedented
volume of its kind, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
Though that volume improved on the then-available transcripts of a few
Kennedy administration meetings, we kept trying to find ways to make
the transcripts still better. This was a process of trial and error.
Our initial hope was that professional transcribers, like court reporters,
could do much of the primary transcription. That did not work out well.
For those untrained in the history of the period, transcribing presiden-
tial tapes can be a bit like assembling a jigsaw puzzle without being able
to see the picture on the puzzle box, and this is especially true when the
audio quality is bad. Tapes of telephone conversations tend to be much
easier, both because the speakers are using a machine that was linked to
the original recording system (usually a Dictaphone in this case) and
because there are generally only two participants in the telephone con-
versation. Recordings of meetings are much harder to transcribe. Most
Kennedy recordings are of meetings; most Johnson recordings (and all
those publicly released so far) are of telephone conversations.
Originally short of funds and audio expertise, we initially worked
almost entirely with ordinary cassette copies of the tapes. We later began
relying on more expensive Digital Audio Tape (DAT) technology. We tried
out other technical fixes, starting in 1996 with a standard noise reduction
technique (called NONOISE in the trade). The results were disappointing.
We have since tried out other, much more sophisticated techniques sug-
gested by some sound studios. Though we have learned these techniques
can sometimes be vital for especially murky material suffering from unusual
interference, there is an offsetting risk of additional distortion and loss of
data, including the subtle changes in tone that can affect accurate speaker
identification. Two of our scholars, Timothy Naftali and George Eliades,
were especially critical experimenters in this learning process.
The same two scholars helped the growing team stumble on a more
xiv T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T
useful bit of hardware. Looking for a way for two scholars to listen
simultaneously to the same DAT copies, Eliades suggested use of a mul-
tiple outlet headphone amplifier (Rane’s Mojo amplifier). Eliades and
Naftali also discovered that this hardware dramatically improved our
ability to boost the audio signal from the tapes. We are continuing to tin-
ker with the hardware, including more use of CD-ROM technology. We
welcome suggestions for further improvement.
The most fundamental improvements in transcription so far, though,
have not come from machines. They came from people. Introduction of a
team method for reviewing transcripts, an innovation developed and
managed mainly by Naftali, has helped reduce the most intractable source
of error—the cognitive expectations and limitations of an individual lis-
tener. For instance, when you expect to hear a word in an ambiguous bit
of sound, you often hear it. Even without particular expectations, differ-
ent listeners hear different things. So we have utilized a special kind of
“peer review” in this new realm of basic historical research.
The talents required from our scholars are demanding. They must be
excellent historians, knowledgeable about the events and people of the
period. They must also have a particular temperament. Anthropologists
and archaeologists used to taking infinite pains at a dig, teaspoon or
toothbrush in hand, might call this a talent for “field work.” So we are
especially grateful to the historians, listed on the title page of the vol-
umes, who have displayed the knowledge, the patience, and the discipline
this work requires, rewarded by a constant sense of discovery.
In consultation with our editorial advisory board and our scholars,
we developed a number of methodological principles for the Miller
Center’s work. Among the most important are:
First, the work is done by trained professional historians who have
done deep research on the period covered by the tapes and on some of
the central themes of the meetings and conversations. They are listed on
the title page as associate and volume editors. The historians not only
delve into documentary sources but sometimes interview living partici-
pants who can help us comprehend the taped discussions. Our voice
identifications are based on sample clips we have compiled and on our
research. On occasion our list of participants in a meeting differs from
the log of President Kennedy’s secretary, Evelyn Lincoln. We list only
the names of participants whose voices we can identify. Our research has
also turned up a few minor cataloguing errors made at the time or later.
Second, each volume uses the team method. Since few people always
speak in complete grammatical sentences, the transcriber has to infer
and create paragraphs, commas, semicolons, periods, and such. Usually
T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T xv
one or two scholars painstakingly produce a primary draft, including the

introductory scene setters and explanatory annotations. Two or more
scholars then carefully go over that transcript, individually or sometimes
two listening at the same time, with their suggestions usually going
back to the primary transcriber. In the case of often-difficult meeting
tapes, like the Kennedy recordings, every transcript has benefited from at
least four listeners. The volume editors remain accountable for checking
the quality and accuracy of all the work in their volume, knitting
together the whole. All of this work is then reviewed by the general edi-
tors, with the regular advice of members of the project’s editorial advi-
sory board.
Third, we use the best technology that the project can afford. As of
2001, we work from DAT copies of the recordings (not the less expensive
analog cassettes ordinarily sold to the public by presidential libraries).
Our transcribers are now moving toward transferring this digital data
onto CD-ROMs. Each transcriber at least uses a professional quality
DAT machine and AKG K240 headphones with the signal boosted by a
headphone amplifier. Each listens to a DAT copy of the library master,
checking with a DAT from which sound engineers have attempted to
remove extraneous background noise.
Fourth, we aim at completeness. Over time, others using the tran-
scripts and listening to the tapes may be able to fill in passages marked
[unclear]. Although the Miller Center volumes are intended to be author-
itative reference works, they will always be subject to minor amendments.
Editors of these volumes will endeavor to issue periodic updates. We use
ellipses in our transcripts in order to indicate that the speaker paused or
trailed off, not to indicate that material has been omitted.
Fifth, we strive to make the transcripts accessible to and readable by
anyone interested in history, including students. As the U.S. govern-
ment’s National Archives has pointed out, the actual records are the
tapes themselves and all transcripts are subjective interpretations. For
instance, our team omits verbal debris such as the “uh”s that dot almost
anyone’s speech. Listeners unconsciously filter out such debris as they
understand what someone is saying. Judgments must be made. Someone
says, for example, “sixteen . . . uh, sixty. . . . ” The transcriber has to
decide whether the slip was significant or not. But the judgment calls are
usually no more difficult than those involved in deciding where to insert
punctuation or paragraphing. In the effort to be exhaustive, sometimes
there is a temptation to overtranscribe, catching every fragmentary
utterance, however unclear or peripheral. But the result on the page can
add too much intrusive static, making the substance less understandable
xvi T H E P R E S I D E N T I A L R E C O R D I N G S P RO J E C T
now than it was to listeners at the time. Obviously, what to include and
omit, balancing coherence and comprehension against the completeness
of the record, also requires subjective judgment. The object is to give the
reader or user the truest possible sense of the actual dialogue as the par-
ticipants themselves could have understood it (had they been paying
attention).
Sixth, we go one step further by including in each volume explana-
tions and annotations intended to enable readers or users to understand
the background and circumstances of a particular conversation or meet-
ing. With rare exceptions, we do not add information that participants
would not have known. Nor do we comment often on the significance of
items of information, except as it might have been recognized by the par-
ticipants. As with other great historical sources, interpretations will
have to accumulate over future decades and centuries.
Preface to John F. Kennedy:
The Great Crises, Volumes 1–3
BY PHILIP ZELIKOW AND ERNEST MAY
T
hese three volumes in the Miller Center Presidential Recordings
series cover the three months after Kennedy first began to tape-
record meetings.
Before and after becoming president, Kennedy had made use of a
recording device called a Dictaphone, mostly for dictating letters or notes.
In the summer of 1962 he asked Secret Service Agent Robert Bouck to
conceal recording devices in the Cabinet Room, the Oval Office, and a
study/library in the Mansion. Without explaining why, Bouck obtained
Tandberg reel-to-reel tape recorders, high-quality machines for the
period, from the U.S. Army Signal Corps. He placed two of these machines
in the basement of the West Wing of the White House in a room
reserved for storing private presidential files. He placed another in the
basement of the Executive Mansion.
The West Wing machines were connected by wire to two micro-
phones in the Cabinet Room and two in the Oval Office. Those in the
Cabinet Room were on the outside wall, placed in two spots covered by
drapes where once there had been wall fixtures. They were activated by
a switch at the President’s place at the Cabinet table, easily mistaken for
a buzzer press. Of the microphones in the Oval Office, one was in the
kneehole of the President’s desk, the other concealed in a coffee table
across the room. Each could be turned on or off with a single push on an
inconspicuous button.
We do not know where the microphone in the study of the Mansion
was located. In any case, Bouck, who had chief responsibility for the sys-
tem, said in 1976, in an oral history interview, that President Kennedy
“did almost no recording in the Mansion.” Of the machine in the base-
ment of the Mansion, he said: “Except for one or two short recordings, I
don’t think it was ever used.” So far, except possibly for one short
recording included in these volumes, no tape from the Mansion machine
has turned up.
President Kennedy also had a Dictaphone hooked up to a telephone
in the Oval Office and possibly also to a telephone in his bedroom. He
xvii
xviii P R E FA C E
could activate it, and so could his private secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, who
knew of the secret microphones, often made sure that they were turned
off if the President had forgotten to do so, and took charge of finished
reels of tape when they were brought to her by Bouck or Bouck’s assis-
tant, Agent Chester Miller.
Though Kennedy’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and
Robert Kennedy’s secretary, Angie Novello, certainly knew of the tapes and
dictabelts by some point in 1963, it is not clear that they had this knowl-
edge earlier. Anecdotes suggest that the President’s close aide and sched-
uler, Kenneth O’Donnell, might have known about the system and might
have told another aide, Dave Powers, but the anecdotes are unsupported.
Most White House insiders, including counsel Theodore Sorensen, who
had been Kennedy’s closest aide in the Senate, were astonished when they
learned later that their words had been secretly captured on tape.
After Kennedy’s assassination, Evelyn Lincoln was quickly displaced
by President Johnson’s secretaries. She arranged, however, for the Secret
Service agents to pull out all the microphones, wires, and recorders and
took the tapes and dictabelts to her newly assigned offices in the
Executive Office Building, adjacent to the White House. Though Robert
Kennedy had charge of these and all other records from the Kennedy
White House, Lincoln retained physical custody.
During Kennedy’s presidency, only a small number of conversations
were transcribed. Though Lincoln attempted to make some other tran-
scripts, she never had much time for doing so. George Dalton, a former
Navy Petty Officer and general chore man for the Kennedy family, took
on the job. “Dalton transcripts” have not been released, but everyone
who has seen them uses terms like fragmentary, terrible to unreliable, awful,
or garbage.
The tapes and dictabelts migrated with President Kennedy’s papers.
First they moved to the main National Archives building in downtown
Washington, D.C. Herman Kahn (an archivist, not the strategic analyst)
was responsible for them within the National Archives system; Robert
Kennedy was the custodian for materials belonging to the family, includ-
ing all the tapes. Robert Kennedy disclosed the existence of the tapes in
1965 to Burke Marshall, a legal scholar and former Justice Department
colleague. Lincoln and Dalton were looking after the materials, and
Dalton was attempting some transcripts. The papers and the tapes then
were moved to a federal records depository in Waltham, Massachusetts.
In the summer and fall of 1967, when Robert Kennedy drafted his
famous memoir of the Cuban missile crisis, Thirteen Days, he used what-
P R E FA C E xix
ever transcripts existed and almost certainly listened to tapes. Passages

in the book which refer to “diaries” seem nearly all to be based on the
secret recordings.1
After Robert Kennedy was assassinated in 1968, custody of President
Kennedy’s private papers became the primary responsibility of Senator
Edward Kennedy (Burke Marshall represented Jacqueline Kennedy’s
interests). Dalton was employed by Senator Kennedy, and either some
tapes or some of Dalton’s transcripts or both may have been moved into
Senator Kennedy’s own files. Despite occasional rumors, none of the cus-
todians publicly acknowledged that the tapes existed.
When Nixon’s taping system was revealed in 1973 and Congress was
seeking access to those tapes, Senator Kennedy was a member of the
inquiring Judiciary Committee. With rumors by then rife, he and the fam-
ily quickly confirmed that President Kennedy had, indeed, also secretly
taped meetings and conversations in the White House. They publicly
promised to turn the tapes over to the National Archives. During the next
two years they negotiated a deed of gift that put in the hands of archivists
at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in Boston, Massachusetts, all
tapes except those dealing with private family affairs.
According to Richard Burke, a longtime member of Senator Kennedy’s
staff, Dalton was instructed by the late Steven Smith, Senator Kennedy’s
brother-in-law, to remove sensitive documents from the Kennedy papers
and to cull the tapes in order to protect the family’s reputation. Burke
also claims that he read transcripts by Dalton from Oval Office dictabelts
of conversations with Marilyn Monroe and Judith Exner and that
Dalton had erased potentially embarrassing passages.2 But Burke is an
undependable source. A book he wrote about his years with the senator
is full not only of errors but of outright inventions. Yet there are others,
including at least one Kennedy Library archivist who received the
tapes, who suspected that between 1973 and 1975, Dalton — possibly
assisted by Kennedy aide Dave Powers and retired archivist and
Kennedy family employee Frank Harrington —looked at the tapes to see
what should be removed without leaving any record or documentation
1. See Timothy Naftali, “The Origins of ‘Thirteen Days,’”Miller Center Report 15, no. 2 (sum-
mer 1999): 23–24.
2. Philip Bennett, “Mystery Surrounds Role of JFK Tapes Transcriber,” Boston Globe, 31
March 1993, p. 1; Seymour M. Hersh, The Dark Side of Camelot (Boston: Little, Brown, 1997),
pp. 454–55.
xx P R E FA C E
of their work. Dalton has refused to discuss what he did. Senator

Kennedy’s then–chief of staff, when interviewed in 1993 by the Boston
Globe reporter Philip Bennett, denied that Dalton had worked on the
tapes at the direction of Senator Kennedy, but Burke Marshall told
Philip Zelikow in February 2000 that he thought Dalton had been
working on the tapes for the Senator, at least in general.
In 1975, tapes recording about 248 hours of meetings and 12 hours
of telephone conversations became part of the President’s Office Files at
the library. While a treasure trove for history, this handover did not
include all the recordings that President Kennedy had made, nor were all
the recordings complete.
Fortunately perhaps, the Secret Service agents had originally num-
bered and catalogued the reels of meeting tapes in a simple way, so
removals and anomalies are easily noticed. There are a few. Three tapes
were received by the library with reels containing “separate tape seg-
ments.” It is possible that they had been cut and spliced, for two of these
tapes, including the one made on August 22, 1962, concerned intelli-
gence issues and may have involved discussion of covert efforts to assas-
sinate Castro. The Kennedy Library archivist Alan Goodrich says,
however, that the “separate tape segments” may exist simply because the
Secret Service agents were winding some partial reels of tape together
to fill out the reels of blank tape being fed into the machine.
Another tape from August 1962 is simply blank. Several more num-
bered tape boxes, for tapes made in June 1963, had no tapes inside,
though the library has “Dalton transcripts” for at least four of these
missing tapes. The fact that still other tapes received by the library had
been miswound suggests at least that they had been clumsily handled.
Since the library has not yet issued its own forensic reports about the
“separate tape fragments” or blank tape or made the original tape reels
available for outside examination or released the existing “Dalton tran-
scripts” for missing tapes, we cannot draw conclusive judgments about
just what happened.
The dictabelt recordings never had any order. Lincoln seems to have
filed them randomly. Some seem to have been partially overwritten. The
Kennedy Library’s numbers merely distinguish one item from another.
They provide no guidance to chronological sequence or content. As with
the meeting tapes, the Kennedy Library has attempted to date and iden-
tify the tapes, and the editors of these volumes have confirmed and, in
various cases, amended this information as a result of further research. A
number of dictabelts were taken by Lincoln without authorization for a
private collection of Kennedy memorabilia. Some of these went to the
P R E FA C E xxi
Kennedy Library after her death in 1995; others turned up in the hands
of a collector who had befriended her. In 1998 the Kennedy Library was
able to recover these dictabelts too, but there is no way of knowing
whether there were others and, if so, what their fate was.
Once in the jurisdiction of the Archivist of the United States, the
recordings were handled with thoroughgoing professionalism. The library
remastered the tapes on a Magnecord 1022 for preservation. The dicta-
belts were copied onto new masters. All copies of the tapes, including
those used for these books, derive from these new preservation masters.
Some minor anomalies were introduced as a result of the remastering.
Listeners will occasionally hear a tape stop and the recording start up,
replaying a sentence or two. That is an artifact of the remastering process,
not the original White House taping. The original tapes were also recorded
at relatively high density (1 78 inches per second). The remastered tapes
necessarily have different running speeds that produce subtle audio distor-
tion. The new masters, for example, seem to have people talking slightly
faster than they did at the time.
The library was initially at a loss as to how to make tapes available to
the public. Many contain material still covered by security classification.
Because of the poor sound quality of most of the tapes, it was not easy to
identify sensitive passages. The library initially attempted to prepare its
own transcripts and submit these for classification review. But the task
was hard, the library staff was small, and funds were meager. Moreover,
some archivists believed as a matter of principle that the library should
not give official standing to transcripts that might contain transcribers’
errors. In the view of the National Archives and Records Administration,
only the tapes themselves are archival records. All transcripts are works of
subjective interpretation. The effort at transcription came to an end in
1983, and almost all the tapes remained under lock and key.
In 1993 the library acquired new equipment and began putting the
recordings onto Digital Audio Tape (DAT). These could be reviewed in
Washington and digitally marked without transcripts. Changes in proce-
dures, along with determined efforts by two archivists, Stephanie
Fawcett and Mary Kennefick, accelerated the pace of declassification.
Between 1996 and 2000 about half of the recordings in the Kennedy
Library became available for public release; the rest await declassifica-
tion review.
While the Kennedy Library has been careful to make no deletions or
erasures from tapes and dictabelts in its possession, the copies publicly
released, and used for these volumes, do have carefully annotated exci-
sions of passages still security classified. These passages were excised
xxii P R E FA C E
digitally, not literally, and remain intact on the library’s preservation

masters. It is to be hoped that future, more tolerant declassification
reviews may someday release some of the material that currently is
excised. But even for the sanitized tapes, the library issues no transcripts.
Our work on these tapes commenced in 1995. We obtained analog
cassettes of tapes relating to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis as soon as they
were released. Painstakingly, we listened to and transcribed those tapes.
Each of us spent many hours listening to each hour of tape. Even so, our
transcripts contained large numbers of notations for words or passages
that were unclear or speakers that could not be identified. The resultant
transcripts were published by Harvard University Press in 1997 as The
Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Because of support from the Governing Council of the University of
Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs, and W. W. Norton, the tran-
scripts of meetings on the missile crisis in volumes 2 and 3 of this series
are more complete and accurate than were our original products. We
were able to decipher in those tapes large numbers of words and pas-
sages previously incomprehensible and to identify speakers with greater
certainty. We were also able to draw on the assistance of other historians
employed in the Miller Center’s Presidential Recordings Project,
employing and benefiting from the team method we describe in our gen-
eral preface on the project.
Some questions nevertheless linger because of uncertainties, already
described, concerning the completeness and integrity of the tapes now
available. Why were they made? Did Kennedy use the on/off switch with a
view to controlling, even distorting the historical record? Did others, after
his murder, tamper with the tapes in order artificially to shape the record
of events? In view of the possibility that a small fraction of the meeting
tapes were removed or mangled after the fact, can they really be regarded
as better sources than self-serving memoirs or oral histories? To the
extent that they are valid, undoctored records of conversations and meet-
ings, do they tell us much that could not be learned from other sources?
Our judgment is that any tampering with the tapes was so crude and
ham handed that it extended only to removals. The extent of such
removals may have been constrained by the original Secret Service cata-
loguing system. Since missing tapes would be noticed, too many missing
tapes might cause an outcry and lead to unwelcome inquiries. So the
removals of meeting tapes, if that is the explanation for the anomalies,
were relatively limited. The situation of the dictabelts is different. Since
they were not catalogued at the time they were made, we cannot know
how many—if any—are missing.
P R E FA C E xxiii
The most plausible explanation for Kennedy’s making secret tape

recordings is that he wanted material to be used later in writing a mem-
oir. Since he seems neither to have had transcripts made (with two minor
exceptions in 1963) nor to have listened to any of the tapes, it is unlikely
that he wanted them for current business. He had himself written histo-
ries and was by most accounts prone to asking historians’ questions:
How did this situation develop? What had previous administrations
done? He knew how hard it was to answer such questions from surviv-
ing documentary records. And he faced the apparent likelihood that,
even if reelected in 1964, he would be an out-of-work ex-president when
not quite 51 years old.
Did Kennedy tape just to have material putting himself in a favorable
light? On some occasions, he must have refrained from pushing an “on”
button because he wanted no record of a meeting or conversation.
Especially on early tapes, there are pauses at moments when the President
was speaking of tactics for dealing with legislative leaders. Almost cer-
tainly, he made recordings only when he thought the occasions important.
As a result, the tapes record relatively little humdrum White House busi-
ness such as meetings with citizen delegations or conferences with con-
gressmen and others about patronage.
Those who have spent much time with the tapes and those who have
compared the tapes to their own experience working with Kennedy find
no evidence that he taped only self-flattering moments. He often made
statements or discussed ideas that would have greatly damaged him had
they become public. Early in the missile crisis, for example, he mused
about his own possible responsibility for having brought it on. “Last
month I said we weren’t going to [allow it],” he said. “Last month I
should have said that we don’t care.” He never seemed to make speeches
during a meeting for the benefit of future listeners. His occasional taped
monologues were private dictation about something that had happened
or what he was thinking, obviously for his own later reference.
Two other points apply. First, he had no reason to suppose that the
tapes would ever be heard by anyone other than himself unless he chose
to make them available. They were completely secret. Second, he could
hardly have known just what statements or positions would look good to
posterity, for neither he nor his colleagues could know how the stories
would turn out.
The tapes of missile crisis debates establish far more clearly than any
other records the reasons why Kennedy thought Soviet missiles in Cuba
so dangerous and important. They make abundantly clear that his preoc-
cupation was not with Cuba or the immediate threat to the United
xxiv P R E FA C E
States. He feared that, if he did not insist on removal of the missiles,

Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev would be emboldened to try to take
over West Berlin, in which case he—Kennedy—would have only two
choices. He would either have to abandon the two and a half million
West Berliners theretofore protected by the United States, or he would
have to use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union, for there was no
imaginable way of defending West Berlin with conventional military
forces. The Soviet missiles in Cuba would then be a “knife in our guts”
constraining the U.S. nuclear threats to save Berlin.
The tapes also explain as do no other sources Kennedy’s approach to
the Mississippi civil rights crisis. They show him worrying about inter-
national economics, specifically the drain on U.S. gold reserves, to such
an extent that he questions whether the United States can or should
continue to keep troops in Europe. The tapes in some instances disclose
facts still hidden by walls of security classification, as, for example, that
the Kennedy administration had plans to create an illegal CIA unit to
investigate U.S. journalists and officials.
But the greatest value of these recordings does not reside in specific
revelations. It comes, as is said in the general preface to the project, from
giving a listener or reader unique insight into the presidency and presi-
dential decision making. We are proud to be able to put this extraordi-
nary source into the hands of students of history and politics.
Editors’ Acknowledgments
These initial volumes of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Recordings

Series represent the work of a team of dedicated people. Besides the
scholars listed on the title page, the editors are grateful to Lorraine
Settimo, the executive assistant of the Miller Center’s Presidential
Recordings Project, and to Andrew P. N. Erdmann, the scholar who
assisted with the Eisenhower conversations. At the John F. Kennedy
Library, Jim Cedrone, Alan Goodrich, William Johnson, and Mary
Kennefick were especially helpful. And at the National Archives, Nancy
Keegan Smith was of special assistance. Lastly, we are deeply grateful to
our editors at Norton, Drake McFeely and Sarah Stewart, who exhibit
such a rare combination of qualities: attention to detail, patience, and
vision.
Areas of Specialization for Research Scholars
RESEARCH SCHOLARS
David Coleman
Cuba, Nuclear Test Ban
George Eliades
Vietnam, Laos, Nuclear Test Ban
Francis Gavin
Berlin Crisis, International Monetary Policy
Max Holland
Domestic Politics
Jill Colley Kastner

U. S.-German Relations
Erin Mahan
Berlin Crisis, U.S.-European Relations, Congo, Middle East,
United Nations, China
Timothy Naftali
U.S.-Soviet Relations, Cuba, General Latin America,
Intelligence Policy, Nuclear Test Ban
Paul Pitman
U.S.-European Relations
Jonathan Rosenberg
Civil Rights
David Shreve
Congressional Relations, Tax and Budgetary Policy,
International Monetary Policy
CD-ROM DEVELOPER AND MULTIMEDIA COORDINATOR
Kristin Gavin
RESEARCH ASSISTANTS
Brett Avery Bush

W. Taylor Fain
Laura Moranchek
A Note on Sources
In addition to the various memoirs and other writings cited as sources in

our footnotes, we have relied upon the relevant archival holdings for the
White House and the various agencies of the U.S. government, held
mainly in the John F. Kennedy Library in Boston and the National
Archives, Washington, D.C. We have also relied on the less formal hold-
ings of that useful private institute, the National Security Archive,
Washington, D.C.
Each footnote appearing for the first time in a chapter is fully cited
on first reference. The one exception made was for the many footnotes
citing the U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States
1961–63 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office). Footnotes
that include references to Foreign Relations of the United States are abbre-
viated as FRUS and include the volume number and page numbers. For
FRUS references other than those from 1961 to 1963, the appropriate
years are included.
Meeting Participants and Other
Frequently Mentioned Persons
T
he following is a concise guide to individuals who participated in
taped conversations. We have supplemented these brief descrip-
tions, when possible, with the thumbnail sketches made by for-
mer presidential special consultant Richard E. Neustadt in his book
Report to JFK: the Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1999). Neustadt met the people he has written about.
We feel that his vivid brush strokes add some additional color that we, at
this distant remove, do not feel qualified to provide. We also include fig-
ures mentioned frequently in the conversations, such as foreign heads of
government, who were not present at the meetings.
Abrams, Creighton W., Colonel, U.S. Army; Assistant Deputy Chief of

Staff and Director of Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, 1962–1963
Ackley, H. Gardner, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1962–1968
(Chairman, 1964–1968)
Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany,
1949–1963
Alexander, Henry, Chairman, Morgan Guaranty Trust in 1962
Allen, Ward P., Director, Office of Inter-American Regional Political
Affairs, Department of State
Anderson, George W., Admiral, U.S. Navy; U.S. Chief of Naval Operations,
1961–1963
Ausland, John C., State Department Representative to the Berlin Task
Force, 1961–1964
Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State, 1961–1966
A Washington lawyer with an international practice, wartime associate of
Jean Monnet (the advocate of European Union), adviser to Adlai Stevenson
in 1952, ’56 and ’60, Ball had come into the Kennedy Administration as
xxxi
xxxii M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs; his focused energy, intelligence, and
application already had won him a promotion.
Barbour, Walworth, U.S. Ambassador to Israel, 1961–1973
Barnett, Ross R., Democratic Governor of Mississippi, 1960–1964
Bell, David E., Director of the Budget, 1961–1962; Director, U.S.
Agency for International Development after December 1962
An economist, former Secretary of Harvard’s Graduate School of Public
Administration, as it then was, and before that Administrative Assistant to
President Truman, Bell was personable, thoughtful, analytic, and experienced.
Billings, LeMoyne, Personal friend of President Kennedy; a roommate of
the young JFK at Choate and, briefly, Princeton
Blough, Roger, Chairman, U.S. Steel Corporation, 1955–1969
Boeschenstein, Harold, Senior Executive, Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corporation in 1962
Boggs, Thomas Hale, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Louisiana,
1941–1943, 1947–1972; House Majority Whip, 1961–1971
Bohlen, Charles E., Special Adviser to the President, 1961–1962; U.S.
Ambassador to France, October 1962–1968
One of the two top Russian specialists in the State Department, recently
appointed Ambassador to France. More a thoroughly skilled operator than a
deep analyst, Bohlen was bored in Paris, feeling out of things.
Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, 1961–1966
Formerly Dean of Arts and Sciences at Harvard at a young age, co-author of
Henry Stimson’s memoirs, “Mac” was bright, quick, confident, determined,
striving to be the perfect staff man, juggling many balls at once.
Bundy, William P., Deputy Assistant of Defense for International
Carter, Marshall S., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army; Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence, 1962–1965
Castro Ruz, Fidel, Premier of Cuba, 1959–
Celebrezze, Anthony J., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare,
1962–1965
Charyk, Joseph V., Under Secretary of the Air Force, 1960–1963
Clark, Ramsey, Assistant Attorney General of the United States,
1961–1965
Clay, Lucius D., President’s Special Representative in Berlin, 1961–1962;
Special Consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962–1963
Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International
Organization Affairs, 1961–1965
Clifford, Clark, Personal Attorney to the President; Member, President’s
M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S xxxiii
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 (Chairman from May

1963)
Cline, Ray S., Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, 1962–1966
Cox, Archibald, Solicitor General of the United States, 1961–1965
Day, J. Edward, Postmaster General of the United States, 1961–1963
Dean, Arthur H., Chairman, U.S. delegation, Conference on the Discon-
tinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, Geneva, 1961–1962; Chairman, U.S.
delegation, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, Geneva, 1962
de Gaulle, Charles, President of France, 1958–1969
Dennison, Robert S., Admiral, U.S. Navy; Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
Atlantic Fleet and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, 1960–1963
Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury, 1961–1965
Dillon was engagingly direct, practical, experienced, disinclined to reach beyond
his own (broad) departmental boundaries, except on Kennedy’s invitation.
Dirksen, Everett M., U.S. Senator, Republican, from Illinois, 1950–1969;
Senate Minority Leader, 1959–1969
Dobrynin, Anatoly, Soviet Ambassador to the United States, 1962–1985
Dowling, Walter C., U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of
Germany, 1959–1963
Duncan, John P., Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, 1961–1963
Duvalier, François, President of Haiti, 1957–1971
Eastland, James O., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Mississippi, 1943–1978
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 34th President of the United States, 1953–1961
Feldman, Myer, Deputy Special Counsel to the President, 1961–1964
Fisher, Adrian, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1961–1969
FitzGerald, Desmond, Chief, Far Eastern Division, Deputy Directorate
for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, 1958–1963
Forrestal, Michael V., Senior Staff Member, National Security Council,
1962–1965
Foster, William, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
1961–1969
Fowler, Henry H., Under Secretary of the Treasury, 1961–1964
Fowler, James R., Deputy Administrator, Far East, U.S. Agency for
International Development
Freeman, Orville L., Secretary of Agriculture, 1961–1969
Fulbright, J. William, U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Arkansas, 1945–1974;
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1959–1974
Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1961–1964
Wall Street lawyer, skilled, sophisticated, broad-gauged, loyal to McNamara.
xxxiv M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
Goldberg, Arthur J., Secretary of Labor, 1961–1962; Associate Justice,

U.S. Supreme Court, 1962–1965
Goodwin, Richard N., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, 1961–1963
Gordon, A. Lincoln, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, 1961–1966
Gordon, Kermit, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1962;
Director, Bureau of the Budget after December 1962
Gore, Albert, Sr., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Tennessee, 1959–1971
Goulart, João, President of Brazil,1961–1964
Graham, William Franklin (Billy), Baptist minister and evangelist
Graybeal, Sydney N., Division Chief, Foreign Missile and Space
Activities, Central Intelligence Agency, 1950–1964
Greenewalt, Crawford H., Chairman, E. I. DuPont de Nemours and
Company, 1962–1967
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister, 1957–1985
Halaby, Najeeb E., Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration,
1961–1965
Halleck, Charles A., U.S. Representative, Republican, from Indiana,
1935–1969; House Minority Leader, 1959–1965
Harriman, W. Averell, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern and
Pacific Affairs, 1961–1963
Hart, Philip A., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Michigan, 1959–1976
Haworth, Leland, Member, Atomic Energy Commission from 1961
Heller, Walter W., Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1964
Helms, Richard M., Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence
Agency, 1962–1965
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., U.S. Senator, Republican, from Iowa,
1945–1969; Chairman, Republican Policy Committee, 1961–1969
Hillenbrand, Martin J., Director, Berlin Task Force and the Office of
German Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State,
1961–1963
Hilsman, Roger, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and
Research, 1961–1963
Hodges, Luther H., Secretary of Commerce, 1961–1965
Hoover, Herbert H., 31st President of the United States, 1929–1933
Humphrey, Hubert H., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Minnesota,
1948–1964; Senate Majority Whip, 1961–1964
Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President of the United States, 1961–1963
Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, 1961–1964
M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S xxxv
A senior career Foreign Service officer, most recently Ambassador to Thailand;

successful in the Service in all senses of the phrase.
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Deputy Attorney General of the United
States, 1962–1966
Kaysen, Carl, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National
A professor of economics on leave from Harvard, Kaysen worked up expert-
ise in defense policy and weaponry, among other things; brilliant, subtle,
confident, analytic but also a looker-around-corners.
Keeny, Spurgeon, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for Science
and Technology
A physicist with training in international relations, associated from the
start with the President’s Science Adviser’s Office, Keeny was personable,
sophisticated, discreet, and a great gatherer of bureaucratic intelligence.
Kennedy, John F., 35th President of the United States, 1961–1963
Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General of the United States, 1961–1964
Keogh, Eugene J., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from New York,
1937–1967
Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Soviet Communist Party and Soviet Premier, 1953–1964
Killian, James R., Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology, 1957–1959
King, J. C., Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Plans,
Central Intelligence Agency
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr., Executive Director, Central Intelligence
Agency, 1962–1965
Kirwan, Michael, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Ohio, 1937–1970;
Chairman, Subcommittee on Interior and Related Agencies, House
Appropriations Committee in 1962; Chairman, Democratic Congres-
sional Campaign Committee
Kohler, Foy, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian
Affairs, 1959–September 1962; U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union,
September 1962–1966
Kreer, Robert G., Director of the Diplomatic Communication Services,
Department of State
Kuchel, Thomas H., U.S. Senator, Republican, from California,
1953–1969; Senate Minority Whip, 1959–1969
Land, Edwin, physicist and inventor; member, President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board in 1962
Leddy, John M., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State until
xxxvi M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
April 1961; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, April 1961–June

1962; U.S. Representative to the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development after October 1962
LeMay, Curtis E., General, U.S. Air Force; U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff,
1961–1965
Lemnitzer, Lyman, General, U.S. Army; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 1960–1962; Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command,
1962–1969
Lincoln, Evelyn, Personal Secretary to President Kennedy, 1952–1963
Loeb, James, U.S. Ambassador to Peru, 1961–1962
Long, Franklin, Assistant Director for Science and Technology, U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1962–1963
Lovett, Robert A., Special Counselor to the President, 1961–1963; member,
Executive Committee of the National Security Council, October 1962
Lundahl, Arthur C., Assistant Director of Photographic Interpretation,
Central Intelligence Agency, from 1953
MacArthur, Douglas, General of the Army, 1944–1964
McDonald, David, President, United Steel Workers of America,
1952–1965
MacDonald, Torbert, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Massachusetts,
1955–1976
Macmillan, M. Harold, Prime Minister of Great Britain, 1957–1963
A one-nation Tory in Parliament from the 1930s, close to Eisenhower since
North Africa in the ’40s, complex, shrewd, detached and tough behind a
bland, Edwardian exterior. Macmillan’s private humor and wry outlook on
life endeared him to Kennedy, despite their age difference.
Mansfield, Michael J., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Montana; Senate
Majority Leader, 1961–1977
Marshall, Burke, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, 1961–1965
Martin, Edwin M., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs, 1962–1964
Martin, William McChesney, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 1951–1970
McCloy, John J., Special Adviser to the President on Disarmament
Matters, 1961–1963
McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence, 1961–1965
McCormack, John, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Massachusetts,
1928–1971; Speaker of the House of Representatives, 1961–1971
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense, 1961–1968
Recruited from the presidency of the Ford Motor Company, a driving, man-
M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S xxxvii
aging, no-nonsense—and also no-pomposity—rationalist; his adherence to

reason and duty was so passionate as to hint at emotion hidden beneath.
Meany, George, President of the AFL-CIO, 1955–1979
Meredith, James H., First African American student admitted to the
University of Mississippi, 1962–1963
Mills, Wilbur D., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Arkansas,
1939–1976; Chairman, House Ways and Means Committee, 1957–1976
Morgan, Thomas E., U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Pennsylvania,
1945–1977; Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee in 1962;
member, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1962
Moscoso, Teodoro, Assistant Administrator, U.S. Agency for International
Development; U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress
Murrow, Edward R., Director, U.S. Information Agency, 1961–1964
Nasser, Gamal Abdul, Prime Minister of Egypt, 1954–1956; President of
Egypt, 1956–1958; President of the United Arab Republic, 1958–1970
Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, 1961–1963
Experienced in defense and diplomacy since 1940, sophisticated, competent,
cool, public cold warrior and private philanthropist, Nitze had all the skills
and some of the limitations of the driving young banker he had once been.
Norstad, Lauris, General, U.S. Air Force; NATO Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe, 1956–1963
O’Brien, Lawrence F., Special Assistant to the President for
Congressional Affairs, 1961–1963
O’Donnell, Kenneth, Special Assistant to the President, 1961–1963
Okun, Arthur, Staff Economist, Council of Economic Advisers,
1961–1964
Ormsby-Gore, Sir David, British Ambassador to the United States,
1961–1965
Former Tory MP, intelligent, sensitive, quick on the uptake and well con-
nected: related both to Macmillan’s wife and to Kennedy’s late lamented
brother-in-law, the Marquis of Hartington, killed in World War II.
Pérez Godoy, General Ricardo Pío, leader of Peruvian military coup of
July 1962; leader of the military junta, 1962–1963
Pittman, Steuart, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense,
1961–1964
Prado y Ugarteche, Manuel, President of Peru, 1956–1962
Reuther, Walter, President of the United Auto Workers,1946–1970
Roosa, Robert V., Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary
Affairs, 1961–1964
xxxviii M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
Rosenthal, Jacob, Executive Assistant to the U.S. Under Secretary of

State, 1961–1966
Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman
of the Policy Planning Council, 1961–1966
MIT economist, a driving enthusiast and conceptualizer with a tendency to
listen to himself.
Rusk, Dean, U.S. Secretary of State, 1961–1969
Experienced, thoughtful, conventional, perhaps essentially shy, temperamen-
tally at odds with his presumed model and undoubted mentor, General
Marshall, Rusk may never have felt at ease with JFK, to say nothing of
articulate aides like Kaysen.
Russell, Richard B., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Georgia, 1933–1971;
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
Salinger, Pierre E. G., White House Press Secretary 1961–1964
Saltonstall, Leverett, U.S. Senator, Republican, from Massachusetts,
1945–1967; ranking minority member, Senate Armed Services
Committee, in 1962
Samuelson, Paul A., Economist; member, Council of Economic Advisers,
1960–1968
Schaetzel, J. Robert, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs, February 1961–March 1962; Special Assistant to
the Under Secretary of State, March 1962–September 1962; Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs after September 1962
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., Special Assistant to the President, 1961–1964
Schroeder, Gerhard, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of
Germany, 1961–1966
Schultze, Charles L., Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget, 1961–1965
Seaborg, Glenn T., Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961–1971
Shoup, David M., General, U.S. Marine Corps; Commandant of the U.S.
Marine Corps, 1960–1963
Sloan, Frank K., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs in 1962
Smathers, George A., U.S. Senator, Democrat, from Florida, 1951–1969
Solow, Robert M., Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1962–1968
Sorensen, Theodore C., Special Assistant to the President, 1961–1964
Sproul, Alan, President of the New York Reserve Bank, 1941–1956;
Chairman, Task Force on the International Balance of Payments,
November 1960–January 1961
Staats, Elmer B., Deputy Director, U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 1958–1966
Stevenson, Adlai E., U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, 1961–1964
M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S xxxix
Strong, Robert C., Director, Office of Near East Affairs, Department of

State, 1961–1963
Sullivan, William H., U.N. Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State until April 1963
Sweeney, Walter C., General, U.S. Air Force; Commanding General,
Tactical Air Command, 1961–1965
Taber, John, U.S. Representative, Republican, from New York, 1923–1963;
ranking minority member, House Appropriations Committee in 1962
Talbot, Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, 1961–1965
Taylor, Maxwell D., General, U.S. Army; Military Representative of the
President, 1961–1962, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
1962–1964
[H]e had come out of retirement after a distinguished career to support JFK
in 1960: one person at the Pentagon the President knew well enough to trust.
Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 1961–1971
Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., Ambassador-at-Large, U.S. Department of
State, 1962–1966
Tobin, James, Member, Council of Economic Advisers, 1961–1962
Tretick, Stanley, Staff photographer for Look magazine in Washington,
1961–1971
Troutman, Robert, Member, President’s Committee on Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity, 1961–1962
Tshombe, Moise Kapenda, Leader of the secessionist Katanga Province,
the Congo, 1960–1963
Turner, Robert C., Assistant Director, U.S. Bureau of the Budget,
1961–1962
Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs,
September 1962–1965
Vance, Cyrus R., U.S. Secretary of the Army, 1962–1963
Vinson, Carl, U.S. Representative, Democrat, from Georgia, 1914–1966;
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, in 1962
Wagner, Aubrey, Chairman, Tennessee Valley Authority, 1962–1978
Webb, James E., Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, 1961–1968
Wehrley, Roy, Director, U.S. Agency for International Development
mission in Vientiane, Laos
Wheeler, Earle G., General, U.S. Army; Army Chief of Staff, 1962–1964
White, Lincoln, Spokesman, U. S. Department of State, 1961–1963
Wiesner, Jerome B., Special Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology, 1961–1964
xl M E E T I N G PA RT I C I PA N T S
Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,

1961–1966
Wilson, Donald M., Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency, 1961–1965
Wirtz, W. Willard, Secretary of Labor, 1962–1969
Zorin, Valerian A., Soviet Representative to the Eighteen-Nation
Disarmament Committee, Geneva, 1962–1964
Zuckert, Eugene M., Secretary of the Air Force, 1961–1965
The
P R E SIDE NT I AL
R E CO R DING S
J OHN F . K ENNEDY
T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962 3
Tuesday, September 4, 1962
The President’s Labor Day holiday in Newport, Rhode Island, ended

abruptly. A U.S. spy plane had just accidentally strayed over Soviet terri-
tory in violation of international law and the President’s 1961 pledge to
maintain a moratorium on reconnaissance flights in Soviet airspace.
Briefed first thing that morning in Newport, Kennedy sent instructions
for his chief Kremlin-watchers to meet him at the White House once he
returned. The stray plane had spent only a few minutes in Soviet air-
space, and fortunately Moscow’s response was a note and not a salvo of
antiaircraft missiles. Nevertheless, with tensions high in U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions, President Kennedy wanted to minimize the effect of this incident.
He wished to waste no time in responding to the Soviet protest. In
Washington, the State Department was drafting that response for the
President’s approval.
Even before this news arrived from Russia, President Kennedy had
planned to devote considerable time on this Tuesday to discussing the
Cold War. The week before Labor Day, two Republican congressmen
had launched a searing attack on Kennedy’s Cuba policy, suggesting
that the Soviet military buildup in the Caribbean was designed to make
a missile base out of Fidel Castro’s island. Senators Kenneth Keating
and Bourke Hickenlooper were alleging that the Kennedy administra-
tion knew this and was hiding the truth about Soviet activities from the
American people. Indeed the administration did know a little bit more
about the situation in Cuba than it had announced publicly. On August
29, a CIA U-2 had flown over most of Cuba. The photographs from that
flight had revealed eight Soviet surface-to-air missile sites on the west-
ern half of the island. These were not the nuclear missiles alleged by
the Republican senators. Nonetheless, this was the first time Soviet mis-
siles of any kind had been seen in Cuba. Kennedy had to be concerned
that it was only a matter of time before this significant development
would be leaked to his opponents.
President Kennedy felt it was time to reassert control of the situa-
tion, to take the lead in informing the public of what his experts believed
was happening in Cuba. Over the weekend the head of policy planning at
the State Department, Walt Rostow, had chaired a team to draft a major
press statement for the President. Even before Kennedy’s plane arrived
at Andrews Air Force Base, word was already going out to the congres-
4 T U E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 4, 1962
sional leadership to be prepared for an afternoon White House briefing

on the Cuban situation.1
11:30 –11:50 A.M.
[W]e don’t owe him the whole truth . . .
Meeting on U-2 Incident2

Since the May 1960 shoot-down of a CIA U-2 spy plane piloted by
Francis Gary Powers, use of the U-2 had become a problem for the
United States in international politics. In the words of the CIA, there
was “universal repugnance, or, at the very least, extreme uneasiness
regarding overflights.”3 Hope for a short-term solution of the Berlin
problem before Dwight D. Eisenhower left office crashed with Powers’s
plane. In the United States, candidate John F. Kennedy had joined the
chorus of disapproval of Eisenhower’s decision to send a U-2 over Soviet
territory so close to a planned summit. As a result of the failure of the
Powers mission, the White House would never again send a U-2 to fly
over the Soviet bloc.4
Two years later at a moment of even greater international tension,
President John Kennedy faced his own U-2 problem. A U.S. Air Force U-
2 had strayed into Soviet territory on Thursday, August 30, but Kennedy
apparently only heard about it when the Soviet protest arrived early on
September 4.5 In response, the President gathered his top aides from
State and Defense to consider how to mollify the Soviets and to guard
1. Date Diary, 4 September 1962, Richard Russell Papers, Richard B. Russell Library for
Political Research and Studies, University of Georgia, Athens.
2. Including President Kennedy, Charles Bohlen, McGeorge Bundy, Martin Hillenbrand,
Robert Kennedy, Foy Kohler, Robert McNamara, and Dean Rusk. Tape 18, John F. Kennedy
Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
3. “U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” 27 February 1963, in CIA
Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, ed. Mary McAuliffe (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992),
document 45.
4. Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974
(Washington, DC: CIA, 1998), p. 197.
5. After 1958, the U.S. Air Force assumed the responsibility for U-2 reconnaissance flights
along the Soviet periphery. This particular flight was under the control of the Strategic Air
Command. Like the CIA, the U.S. Air Force was not permitted to send U-2s over Soviet terri-
tory after May 1960. Although a resumption of U-2 overflights of Soviet territory was consid-
Meeting on U-2 Incident 5
against yet another U-2 incident. But the U.S. government still needed
the intelligence that U-2s could provide. Although satellite reconnais-
sance was still in its infancy, the successful launch of the SAMOS satel-
lite in the summer of 1961 had taken some but not all of the pressure off
the U-2 for information on Soviet military developments. Evidently, the
U-2 involved in the 30 August incident had meant to fly parallel to the
Soviet borders to pick up electronic intelligence but had lost its way.
Kennedy began taping as Dean Rusk gives his assessment of the
situation.
Dean Rusk: It’s very clear indeed that the Soviets have got us right
on the hip on this one.
President Kennedy: Right.
Rusk: Therefore the [unclear] and—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] which I [unclear]. I saw your wife the
other day at the airport.
Charles Bohlen: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: And I saw Avis’s sister, wasn’t that . . .?6 Avis’s
sister was there right at the airport to welcome me, along with a few
others.
Bohlen: Evidently.
President Kennedy: She said she was Avis’s sister and three boys,
and two boys.
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: She must . . . she couldn’t have too much to do
up there if she went to the airport [unclear]. [A chuckle.]
Rusk: [Unclear] have you been briefed on what actually happened on
this?
President Kennedy: Yeah. I wonder how the pilot made the mistake?
Rusk: Well . . . very heavy winds blowing to the west and they just
blew him off course. It was at night. Obviously, it could not have been—
there—a reconnaissance photographic plane of the sort that the U-2
over a Soviet—
President Kennedy: Oh, it was at night.
ered by the Kennedy administration during the 1961 Berlin crisis, no intentional overflights of
Soviet territory took place in the Kennedy years (ibid., pp. 189–97, 201).
6. Charles Bohlen had two daughters, Avis and Celestine. Here the President is referring to
Celestine Bohlen, who later became a foreign correspondent for the New York Times.
Rusk: It was at night.

Rusk: But I think the key element here is the basis of candor between
you and Mr. Khrushchev on a matter of this sort. Because if he develops
all sorts of wide-ranging suspicions of your own credibility then all sorts
of other tight things like Berlin, Cuba could be directly affected and, I
think, in a very adverse way. So, I would suggest for your consideration
that we send a note and make a short statement, consistent with it, say-
ing that it was investigated immediately upon receipt of the Soviet note.
The investigation revealed that an unintentional violation may, in fact,
have taken place.
“A weather reconnaissance and air-sampling aircraft operated by
United States Air Forces in the Northern Pacific was in the area east of
Sakhalin at about the time specified in the Soviet note.7 The pilot of the
aircraft has reported that he was flying a directed course well outside
Soviet territorial limits, but encountered severe winds during this night-
time flight and may therefore have unintentionally overflown the south-
ern tip of Sakhalin. My government has instructed me,” this will be the
note, “that the policy of the United States government with respect to
overflights of Soviet territory has in no way been altered and remains as
stated by the President on January 25, 1961. If the pilot of the aircraft in
question did, in fact, violate Soviet territory this act was entirely unin-
tentional and due solely to a navigational error under extremely difficult
flying conditions.”
Bohlen: May I make [unclear interjection] I think you ought to say,
“expresses the regret of the United States government.”
President Kennedy: The regret thing might bring it back . . . the
whole business of ’60, where I said that we should have regretted and
[former vice president Richard] Nixon always said I apologize[d].8 I’d
just as soon . . . I tried—I’d rather use a phrase here—
Rusk: Well, if you, see if the pil—
President Kennedy: —that suggested . . . which would not put us
back in the regretting business.
Rusk: If the pilot of the aircraft in question did, in fact, violate
7. Sakhalin Island was divided between Japan and Russia until 1945, when the Soviets occu-
pied the southern half of this long island.
8. Kennedy is referring to the politics surrounding the Soviet shoot-down of Gary Powers’s
U-2 in May 1960. The Eisenhower administration’s handling of the crisis became an issue in
that year’s presidential election.
[Soviet] territory . . . You see it’s, leave that open. He may have, you see.
But [if he] did in fact violate, this act was entirely unintentional and due
solely to a navigational error under extremely difficult flying conditions.
That’s enough of a regret, I should think, at this point.
Martin Hillenbrand: Sir, may I bring up one point that I think—
President Kennedy: Yeah.
Hillenbrand: —is important to your credibility problem?
Thirty-four seconds excised as classified information.
Robert Kennedy: Can I make that point also that it’s almost the
direct wording of the note that was issued after the U-2 . . . that first
paragraph—
Hillenbrand: My point is that I just wouldn’t specify what they’re
collecting—I would leave it unspecified, but the nighttime will make it
clear that it’s not a photographic one.
President Kennedy: Well, the other thing, I, you’d have to maybe
even explain that . . .
Hillenbrand: I think you could say, “a routine.”
Bohlen: Well, but the cause of the violation was the weather, the
wind . . .
Unidentified: Right.
Hillenbrand: No doubt—
President Kennedy: The purpose of the flight—
Bohlen: The purpose of the flight was not going to—
Rusk: “A weather reconnaissance and air-sampling aircraft” . . . It
undoubtedly did some air sampling, didn’t it? Don’t all of our flights do
some of this?
Unidentified: I’m, you know . . .
Robert McNamara: I don’t [unclear], the U-2 did.
Unidentified: No, I don’t think so.
Rusk: An aircraft on a routine mission—
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t know . . . it’s . . . I think the . . . we
owe him . . . we don’t owe him the whole truth [unclear]—
McGeorge Bundy: Why don’t you just say an aircraft in interna-
tional waters may have been blown over?
Hillenbrand: That’s right. All I’m suggesting is we not say while on
an air-sampling mission.
Rusk: Knock out that sentence.
Hillenbrand: I think that this would clearly affect the credibility of
[unclear].
Hillenbrand: It is very likely that he would know that it’s not.
President Kennedy: Well, would he?

Bundy: Is their charge as I understood it, the first take? [President
Kennedy can be indistinctly heard.] They have charged a rather higher
degree of violation than we believe to have occurred in this matter.
They’ve talked about—
Unidentified: Nine minutes.
Rusk: They’ve only talked about nine minutes. But that may—
President Kennedy: The point is there’s no photography. That’s the
key to this U-2. Now, if we just say “nighttime,” we leave everybody to
conclude that it’s not. Unless we want to at the time, to put out back-
ground that it wasn’t a U-2, it was obviously at night, so no photography
was involved. That seems to me—that gets away from the U-2 idea.
Bundy: It is a U-2.
President Kennedy: The plane is U-2 but it gets away from—
Bundy: The mission is not to spy in the sky.
Bundy: Spies, yeah.
President Kennedy: Does he charge it was photography?
Rusk: No, they didn’t, sir . . . they didn’t say that.
Kohler: Just say, “a U-2 reconnaissance, an American U-2 reconnais-
sance plane.”
President Kennedy: Well, there wasn’t reconnaissance in this.
Reconnaissance is photographic. How do we get that over?
Is that for you?
Rusk: Well, you get, then—“a weather reconnaissance aircraft oper-
ated by the United States Air Force.”
President Kennedy: Why don’t we call it “a weather reconnaissance
plane?”
Kohler: That would be perfectly all right. As long you just don’t say,
“[unclear] on a air-sampling mission,” I just . . .
Bundy: In international waters.
Rusk: In the Northern Pacific.
Kohler: Yes.
Rusk: It was in the vicinity, it was in the area east of Sakhalin at
about the time specified by the Soviet note. It was not on a photographic
mission, period. The pilot of the aircraft—
President Kennedy: It was at night. It was at night and not on a pho-
tographic mission. You want to say that. We want to just have that back-
grounded when we put it out, when we release this note.
Hillenbrand: You just say a weather plane—
President Kennedy: Are we planning to release this note . . . ?

Rusk: We’d convert that part of it into a short statement. Just the
part that I . . . the . . .
President Kennedy: But I think [unclear interjection] we could in a short
statement that we put out, say it wasn’t photographic, it took place at night.
Hillenbrand: If you just said “a weather reconnaissance airplane
operating at night.”
Bohlen: I think that takes . . .
Hillenbrand: That would take care of it.
President Kennedy: OK, but then I think we can—whoever puts
this, if State puts it out, the thing to say is it’s obviously not U-2 because
it was . . . at night. Weather . . .
Bohlen: The only real problem we have in regard to the public state-
ment is where this plane came from. It came from South Korea.
Hillenbrand: This is, this kind of gets us too involved—
Bohlen: And, this is one that we’ve decided . . . the best thing to do is
just say we don’t say where it came from—
Hillenbrand: You should deny it came from Japan.
Bohlen: Except [unclear] background [unclear] on background to
say that it’s been announced that there’s no U-2 operations from Japan.
You might have a little trouble with South Korea [unclear].
President Kennedy: Can we see, read that again to us now, Mr.
Secretary?
Rusk: “A weather reconnaissance aircraft operated by—”
President Kennedy: This should be to Khrushchev? Or who would
this be to ?
Rusk: This would be to—
Bohlen: No, this would be a reply to the note. This statement would
then [unclear] in an oral reply . . .
Rusk: [mumbling in the background] This [unclear] no question who
was [unclear] and who was—
President Kennedy: . . . does contain that the United States [unclear] . . .
[mumbles as he reads the draft note] the investigation will be a [unclear] to—
Rusk: Right.
President Kennedy: The investigation.
Rusk: [reading] “An investigation revealed that an unintentional vio-
lation may in fact have taken place. A weather reconnaissance aircraft
operated by the United States Air Force in the Northern Pacific, was in
the area east of Sakhalin at about the time specified in the Soviet note.”
The question [is] whether we specifically say no photography was
involved.
Hillenbrand: All right, well, if you put in that phrase there, “operat-
ing at night.”
President Kennedy: Well, then we’re going to background, aren’t
we? And say that . . . We’re going to say that here. We don’t say it to the
Soviets [unclear].
Rusk: [reading] “The pilot of the aircraft has reported that he was
flying a directed course well outside Soviet territorial limits but encoun-
tered severe winds during the nighttime flight and may therefore have
unintentionally overflown the southern tip of Sakhalin. My government
has instructed me to state that the policy of the United States govern-
ment with reference to overflights of Soviet territory has in no way been
altered and remains as stated by the President on January 25, 1961. [If ]
the pilot of the aircraft in question did in fact violate Soviet territory,
this act was entirely unintentional and due solely to a navigational error
under extremely difficult flying conditions.”
President Kennedy: Do we want to say “every precaution will be
taken to prevent a recurrence”?
Unidentified: Sounds good.
President Kennedy: See that gets in, the regret, then after that . . .
Bohlen: This implies as though you haven’t taken [them] before.
And, of course, the course of this plane was well outside the—
Bundy: I don’t understand how this damn thing happened, I must say.
President Kennedy: I see that every—We are just restating it that
every precaution be taken to prevent a recurrence.
Rusk: “Precautions are . . .”
President Kennedy: “Every step will be taken.”
Rusk: “Precautions are . . .”
Bohlen: “The existing precautions will be . . .”
Rusk: “Precautions are . . . earlier—”
President Kennedy: “Reexamined in [unclear] terms.”
Rusk: “—directed earlier—”
Unidentified: “Reconfirmed.”
Rusk: “Precautions directed earlier by the President to avoid such
incidents remain in full effect.”
President Kennedy: But, except, we’ve had the incident. So, I think
we ought to just say, if we are going to say anything, we ought to just
say that we’re taking every step to prevent a recurrence.
Bundy: Will be reviewed. You could say it will be reviewed. That
would suggest that you—
President Kennedy: Prevent a recurrence.
Well, then . . . and then what would we release?
Rusk: I think we might make a statement that in effect is this note,

even though we make the statement before the Soviets get the reply.
Bundy: Why do we . . . Why do we—?
Rusk: Make a statement entirely harmonious with—
Bundy: Isn’t it better to have the Soviet government get the answer
before we make it public that we think there may have been . . .
Bohlen: Well, that means a certain number of hours, almost till
tomorrow that we have to wait for the . . .
Bundy: Why are we in such a tremendous hurry?
Rusk: I think we ought to handle the press today.
Bundy: I think maybe we could stonewall today, saying that the mat-
ter . . . that the President’s instructions are in force and the question will
be, the case is being looked into.
President Kennedy: What would be—you know, we can say the mat-
ter is being looked into—but what would be the matter of our making
this as a public statement now before the Soviets have gotten it?
Bundy: No. I was thinking that the same argument that the Secretary
and Chip were making is . . . the critical issue here for the long haul is
that we should do nothing that makes Khrushchev think he can’t trust
you.9 It seems to me that the more seriously you respond [unclear] the
response is more seriously from the U.S. government to the Soviet gov-
ernment if they get it first on a private line.
President Kennedy: Did they release theirs before we got it?
Bundy: They [unclear].
Bohlen: Yes, they gave Reuters [unclear] what we got this morning.
Bundy: Well, they gave it to our man before they gave it, before they
released it. But we didn’t get it until after they had . . . is that right?
Bohlen: [Unclear] afternoon but [unclear].
Bundy: Thompson, presum—, had this, you see, as of yesterday. No,
as of one P.M. today.
President Kennedy: Well, then we’ve got two alternatives: one is to
put it out now and then put it out an hour after we—
Rusk: Well, you can give it to [Anatoly] Dobrynin and then put it out.10
Bundy: Hmm, hmm. That’s true, [unclear]. Right.
Rusk: You can just send it over to him, send it to him, and then put it
out. If it is in their hands at the time we put it out, it’s all right.
President Kennedy: Then what would we put out?
9. Chip is Charles Bohlen.

10. Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States since mid-March 1962.
Rusk: We would put out the text of the note.

Bohlen: Do you want to do it in an oral statement or do you want to
make it a formal note?
Bundy: [to Robert Kennedy] Well, the question is whether we want to
add anything that says, when you see him, you’re seeing him . . .
Rusk: Make an oral statement but make the, but make the . . .
Bundy: Bobby happens to be speaking to him at 2:15, is that right? 11
Rusk: I think we ought to get this to him before you see him, so that
you can underline it, reaffirm it in whatever way is necessary.
President Kennedy: OK. We ought to . . . It seems to me that we
ought to . . . When Bobby is seeing him . . . we ought to give Bobby some
instructions as to what his attitude ought to be on various matters.
Dobrynin called you what day?
Robert Kennedy: Saturday.
President Kennedy: And he wanted to see you, he’d like to see you?
Bohlen: You’ve had a response from [unclear]?
Robert Kennedy: No, he wants to see me at 2:15. He said anytime
and anyplace. He wants to talk just . . . I don’t know what it’s about.
Bohlen: Berlin?
President Kennedy: What is it that we ought to have—What is it,
Bobby ought to, does anybody have any suggestions about what line he
should take?
Rusk: Well, I think that the principal positive thing is this question
of the nontransfer of nuclear weapons and I’d [unclear] a few minutes
with you about that.12 They have come back to it, so we’re moving to
kind of pull this together with our allies so that we can go ahead on the
nontransfer of nuclear weapons agreement with them. We’ve said that
Mr. [Andrei] Gromyko’s reply to mine was constructive and open.13 I
think you ought to take up the nuclear testing with him and point out
that—
President Kennedy: We ought to get this atmospheric . . .
11. Robert Kennedy’s 2:15 P.M. meeting with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin is con-
firmed by a note in the Attorney General’s appointments diary, John F. Kennedy Library.
12. At the Geneva foreign ministers’ meeting in July, the United States had proposed an
agreement on the nondiffusion of nuclear weapons from nuclear states to nonnuclear states as
a way to assuage Soviet concerns that the United States would permit the Federal Republic of
Germany to acquire nuclear weapons. The Soviets did not find the U.S. proposal satisfactory
because it left the door open to West Germany receiving nuclear weapons as part of a multi-
lateral NATO nuclear sharing agreement.
13. Andrei Gromyko was Soviet foreign minister since 1957.
Rusk: We really ought to get going on this and that we just really
can’t understand why they make such a [unclear] deal about on-site
inspections, which can’t possibly involve espionage. That this must be
something else in their minds. But if he has any idea . . . he could give
you more about what is really in their minds about this, do they really
want to continue the testing? [Unclear]—
President Kennedy: Well, yeah, that. And then the other thing is:
what he ought [to] say about Berlin, what he ought to say about Cuba?
He ought to indicate what [unclear] are not in Cuba.
Rusk: Well, we have that proposed statement coming in on Cuba.
President Kennedy: [to Robert Kennedy]You come into that meeting
on Cuba and Berlin.
Rusk: And then Berlin, I should think that, again, we hammer the
business of the necessity of avoiding incidents, that the movement of the
traffic from Friedrichstrasse to Brandenburg Gate or to the Brandenburg
Bridge is intended to avoid incidents. And we hope their people will coop-
erate on that and that this is a matter that ought not to be allowed to
[unclear] because [unclear]. But you’ve been fully briefed on that earlier
report on this.
President Kennedy: Yes. Well, why don’t we see whether we get—
McNamara: [Unclear] the Attorney General add to this note also, to
repeat again that it’s the President’s personal instruction to the
Secretary of Defense that there will be no U-2 overflights . . . wish he
could.
Hillenbrand: Right. And also about photography.
McNamara: Yes, and also about the photography.
Hillenbrand: Yeah. I think coming from him—
McNamara: I believe it is extremely important that [unclear].
President Kennedy: And before you . . . Chip will have gotten this
over to them? As soon as it’s . . .
Bohlen: Yeah, we can get—
President Kennedy: But you go right now. You won’t be at this,
involved in this Cuba thing, so you can go ahead with it.
Bohlen: Well, [unclear].
President Kennedy: Then, there, when the press goes out, Manning
ought to be told that he can reiterate to the press but—14
Bohlen: OK.
14. Robert J. Manning was the State Department’s press officer.

Bundy: Manning is right here and—

President Kennedy: Can he get this message [unclear]?
Bundy: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Well, we just reiterate that it was a U-2 flight.
[Bohlen can be heard indistinctly in the background.]
Rusk: Do we put that in the actual statement?
President Kennedy: No, but the press, because—
Bundy: It was obviously not engaged in photography by the Soviets’
own times? Did they give times?
Unidentified: Yes.
Bundy: 19:21 hours Moscow time.
President Kennedy: That’ll just be a part of the story.
Robert Kennedy: What if he says to me [unclear]?
Bundy: You can say it again that you don’t know but you have the
impression that flights, the planes of both sides have flown near each
others’ borders. This has happened.
Hillenbrand: I would suggest that when you say to this one . . . this
flight, you know that we have to do air sampling, we have all sorts of
routine missions with these aircraft, just as yours do.
Unidentified: And the ships, too.
Hillenbrand: We have just—
Rusk: We have all sorts of aircraft flying from Alaska down
towards—
Unidentified: Excuse me.
President Kennedy: The whole problem, you see, is I don’t know
what that particular mission was, the plane was on.
Robert Kennedy: I know. We talked about it with [Director of
Central Intelligence John] McCone.
President Kennedy: Well, it wasn’t intended to be over your coast.
Rusk: And since it was at night, it obviously wasn’t photographic or—
Robert Kennedy: Yeah.
Rusk: I think—
President Kennedy: Chip, can you—
Unidentified: The Attorney General—
President Kennedy: Chip, you’ve covered the [unclear]?
Bohlen: Do you want me to . . .
Hillenbrand: Chip, do you want [unclear] to a State Department—?
Bundy: Yes, and the instruction will—
Rusk: Now what about—
Bundy: Will you tell Manning and Pierre [Salinger] that we say
nothing [unclear].
Rusk: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: Well [unclear] it will automatically get to [unclear].
Rusk: Well, that’s right. We don’t send anything over tomorrow.
Bundy: Let’s not [unclear] Pierre’s article.
Bohlen: Do you want me to call and see him?
President Kennedy: Why doesn’t Chip take—what?
Rusk: I wouldn’t go over to see him.
President Kennedy: Why not?
Rusk: Why doesn’t he come to see me?
President Kennedy: He doesn’t have to—what time?—Chip, just
talk to him on the phone briefing him [on] the message [unclear]—
Rusk: Or I could send him the thing. . . . I wouldn’t talk to him on the
phone. Just a phone call telling him to . . .
Bohlen: Well, then I think we’d better do this. We’d better give this
to him and then have it repeated in Moscow by McSweeney to the
Russian [unclear].15
President Kennedy: Fine. That’s the best way.
Rusk: Give him a copy of the statement we make here and then send
this to Moscow.
Bohlen: Yeah, well, we won’t get it . . . How do I get it to him? Send
it to him?
President Kennedy: Have Chip call him up and read to him and say,
“This is the message we’re sending to McSween[ey], I’ll send you over a
copy of it but I wanted you to have it ’cause we’re going to put out a
statement—”
Rusk: Yeah. We’re making a statement on it [unclear].
Meeting breaks up.
President Kennedy: McSween[ey] ought to be told, it seems to me,
in the note that we send to him that you . . . this is what’s been given to
Dobrynin at whatever time it was and also about the public statement
put out. So—
Rusk: Yeah. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: As long as [unclear] have this by the time
McSween[ey] gets this. McSween[ey] ought to know [unclear] will
have it. Because, you know [unclear].
Bohlen: Yeah, we’ll put this right on the wires . . .
Rusk: That’s right. Let McSweeney know that it has been made public.
Bohlen: You have to make it public.
15. John M. McSweeney was the U.S. minister-counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.
Rusk: [Unclear.] [Pause.]

Unidentified: You took my estimate? [Door closes.]
The incident over Sakhalin introduced a new note of caution in U.S.

intelligence gathering. At the next meeting of the Special Group, which
oversaw covert action by the U.S. government, the Air Force successfully
pushed through a policy of standing down for the time being all U-2
flights manned by the Air Force.16 The CIA, which was the only other
agency with a U-2 fleet, continued in the business. However, the loss of a
U-2 leased to the Taiwanese government only a few days later would
also put operational use of U-2s by the CIA under severe scrutiny.17 By
September 10, Kennedy officials, especially McGeorge Bundy and Dean
Rusk, were asking the CIA to shape its plans for U-2 surveillance of
Cuba so as to minimize the risk of an international incident. This would
have an effect on the timeliness of warnings to President Kennedy of the
Soviet buildup on the island.
Those events were still days away. In the meantime, after a little dis-
jointed conversation, Kennedy’s advisers walked out of the Oval Office.
The President accompanied them and left the recorder running. Twelve
minutes of hall chatter follow amidst general sounds of secretarial work.
The President’s secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, is heard answering two tele-
phone calls.
At approximately noon, members of an Arkansas delegation led by
Senator William Fulbright entered the West Wing of the White House.
The group included the University of Arkansas’s Schola Cantorum
choir, which had just won first prize at a choir competition in Italy, and
the ambassador of Italy, Sergio Fenoaltea. Two White House guards are
overheard discussing the group.
White House Guard #1: Did you bring over the Italian guy
[Ambassador Sergio Fenoaltea]?
White House Guard #2: Yeah. I got him.
A few minutes later the group approaches the empty Oval Office.
16. From Marshall Carter to John McCone, 8 September 1962, in CIA Documents, McAuliffe,
pp. 55–56.
17. “U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” 27 February 1963, ibid.,
pp. 127–37.
White House Greeter: Mr. Ambassador, how do you do?

Ambassador Fenoaltea: Very well.
Ten minutes after the Arkansas group had entered the private secretarial
and staff office adjacent to the Oval Office to await the President, Kennedy
reentered the Oval Office. He clearly had little idea who these people were
or why they had been allowed to wait for him in an office usually closed to
public visitors. No White House staffer had informed him that Senator
William Fulbright and the Italian ambassador were waiting outside his
office. Apparently preoccupied with the two difficult foreign policy matters
of the day, Kennedy had forgotten that at his August 29 press conference
he had hailed this Arkansan choir and promised the press corps that the
choir would be visiting him at the White House within the new few days.
Staffer: It’s all set up, Mr. President.

President Kennedy: Are you going to inform me now on what I
ought to say?
Staffer: Angie’s probably got it.18
President Kennedy: Well, ask Angie—
Staffer: Pierre [Salinger] set this thing up.19
Staffer: Schola Cantorum at the University of Arkansas.
President Kennedy: Are they?
Staffer: Who’ll get Pierre?
Staffer: Pierre.
Staffer: [Unclear] to Pierre.
Staffer: Pierre!
Staffer: Are they there?
Unclear exchange. Angie Duke enters the Oval Office to clarify the situ-
ation for the President.
President Kennedy: You getting in on this Angie?
Angie Duke: Pierre’s got it now.
President Kennedy: Where’s Pierre?
Duke: He’s down in his office—
President Kennedy: Listen, from now on, Mrs. Lincoln, whenever
we’ve got a group, I want all the information right here.
18. Angie Biddle Duke was the White House chief of protocol.
19. Pierre Salinger was the President’s press secretary.
Amidst a babble of voices, the President asks McGeorge Bundy, who

may have been with the President in the Oval Office throughout this
momentary confusion, to find his secretary, Evelyn Lincoln.
President Kennedy: Whose [unclear] is this?
Bundy (?): [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Tell her to come in here.
Bundy: Evelyn! [The telephone rings.]
President Kennedy: Who are those people standing there?
Evelyn Lincoln: I have no idea.
President Kennedy: Well, now don’t let people come into your office
to be listening to everything that goes on. Who are these people?
Lincoln: Who brought them in? Who brought them?
Staffer: They [unclear] take a picture. Mr. [unclear].
President Kennedy: Just keep them out until I’m ready for
Christssake.
Lincoln: Who brought them here? [Unclear.]
Staffer: Ralph Tucker?
Lincoln: Ralph Tucker?
President Kennedy: Keep them out, Mrs. Lincoln.
Lincoln: I can’t [unclear].
President Kennedy: I don’t want people standing around.
The President and Bundy are intent on having a conversation about
something that has just come to their attention. Amidst the babble in his
office, Kennedy grabs a sheet of paper.
President Kennedy: This isn’t coming in right. The United States
government would like to give you a reminder [of its present course].
Bundy: Just an argument on how they couldn’t [unclear] helpful to
the effort. Particularly about the United States. How in the world . . . the
fact of the matter is, three . . . background. Our people produced the req-
uisition, everything.
President Kennedy: Yeah. I think we’d better have this thing organ-
ized. This is a shitty organization.
I never know what the hell I’m supposed to say . . . [what I could
use] is any suggestions.
Bundy: [Unclear] but I think not.
The choir members were successfully ushered out to the Rose Garden.
The President then joined them and the choir began to sing. The per-
formance lasted nearly five minutes, after which the President spoke to
the audience. Laughter can be heard faintly in the Oval Office in reaction
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba 19
to the President’s remarks outside, as well as some indistinct play-by-play

from White House staffers chatting as the performance took place. At
about 12:25 P.M., the President reentered the Oval Office. In a better
mood, he asked that the Arkansans be given a White House tour.
President Kennedy: Let’s see, can you get somebody to take them
through the White House?
Can you [unclear] people remind everybody that whenever I have a
group, give me a little history with suggested points and [unclear]?
Unidentified Staffer: Right. I will, sir.
Staffer: [Unclear.]
Staffer: But announce that you [unclear] out on the other side. We’ve
worked that out. The sergeant’s going to take them through.
Staffer: Yes.
Staffer: The sergeant . . .
The door opens. Someone says, “Gee, are you going to perform me
that Boogie?” Someone answers, “Oh, yes, [this] afternoon.” The
group passes through the corridor. There is a little chitchat.
Unidentified: Oh, isn’t that gorgeous.
The group from Arkansas has left and a few staffers were chatting.
Telephones continued to ring, and Evelyn Lincoln’s voice can be heard in
the background. Forgotten, the machine in the Oval Office kept running.
12:35–1:00 P.M.
I think it’s a question about Cuba in the future.
Meeting on Soviet Arms Shipments to Cuba20

The public event effectively broke Kennedy’s meeting with his national
security experts in two. While Chip Bohlen left to draft a response to the
20. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, Robert Kennedy, Robert
McNamara, Dean Rusk, and Theodore Sorensen. Tape 18, John F. Kennedy Library,
President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Soviet note on the U-2 incident, the rest of them moved to the Cabinet
Room to discuss Soviet activities in Cuba. At issue was what form of pub-
lic statement was required to reassure the American people that Kennedy
had matters under control. Congressmen, especially Senator Kenneth
Keating of New York, had begun to question the White House’s handling
of the obvious buildup of Soviet weapons on the island. There were
rumors of the installation of Russian missiles, certainly conventionally
armed surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), but possibly even surface-to-surface
nuclear rockets. Indeed, photography from a secret U-2 flight flown over
the island on August 29 had just confirmed for Kennedy the existence of
eight SAM sites.
Although there was as yet no firm evidence of nuclear missiles, some
in Kennedy’s inner circle think that it is only a matter of time before
Khrushchev decides to install that kind of force in Cuba. This group, led
by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, viewed the impending public
statement as a golden opportunity to send a clear warning to Khrushchev
that the United States would never countenance a Soviet nuclear base in
Castro’s Cuba. In any case, the President wanted a public statement on
this new Soviet defensive missile system found in Cuba. On August 31, he
had told General Marshall Carter, who was running the CIA in John
McCone’s absence, to put the readout from the August 29 flight “in the
box and nail it shut.”21 A freeze on sharing this information with anyone
but the top foreign policymakers and analysts remained in effect.
However, it was not going to last forever with interest so high on Capitol
Hill and in the media.
President Kennedy remembered to turn the machine on as the
Secretary of State, a skeptic about the possiblility of any Soviet nuclear
adventure in Cuba, read aloud from a draft statement prepared by the
State Department.
Tape machines were now running connected to microphones in both
the empty Oval Office, where distant secretarial sounds could still be
heard, and in the Cabinet Room, where the President’s Cuba team had
assembled.
21. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director, “Action Generated by DCI Cables
Concerning Cuban Low-Level Photography and Offensive Weapons,” CIA Documents,
McAuliffe, document 12.
Dean Rusk: [reading from State draft press statement 22] “. . . in Latin
America. Whatever armed strength the Cuban regime may develop will be
restricted by whatever means—”
McGeorge Bundy: Agreed.
Rusk: “—may be necessary to that island. The U.S. will join with
other hemisphere countries to insure that Cuba’s increased military
strength will amount to nothing more than an increased burden on the
people of Cuba themselves.”
Robert McNamara: I think that’s excellent.
Bundy: I think that general sentiment—I wouldn’t call it “increased
military expen—increased expenditure on military gadgets.” I really think
we don’t want to get into the position of being frightened by this group.
Rusk: But this sense that Bob McNamara has about any placing by
the Soviets of a significant offensive capability in the hands of this self-
announced aggressive regime in Cuba would be a direct and major chal-
lenge to this hemisphere and would warrant immediate and appropriate
action.
McNamara: I worry about that because they already have 16 MiGs
which—23
Rusk: Do you feel that the MiGs are [a] significantly aggressive
[addition]?
McNamara: I do. And I further feel that they’ll be adding to what
could be interpreted as offensive strength in the months ahead.
President Kennedy: The missiles really are what are significant?
Bundy: Surface-to-surface missiles are the turning point.
Unidentified: SAMs.
Bundy: Unless they were to put jerry-built nuclear weapons on MiGs
which is—
McNamara: Yeah.
Bundy: —not a likely configuration.
22. The President’s copy of this draft is in the “Cuba, Security, 1962” folder, President’s Office
Files, Box 115, John F. Kennedy Library. The document bears Kennedy’s notations and under-
lining.
23. The MiGs are Soviet fighter and ground attack aircraft. By the summer of 1962, the
Soviets were to have delivered at least 41 jets and reconnaissance aircraft (MiG-19s and MiG-
15s) to the Cubans. See the 4 May 1961 report by Soviet defense minister Rodion Malinovsky
as quoted in “One Hell of a Gamble”: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964, by Aleksandr
Fursenko and Timothy Naftali (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 99. The U.S. government had
detected these older model aircraft. It had not yet, however, detected the ongoing delivery of
the most-advanced Soviet fighter/ground attack aircraft, the MiG-21.
President Kennedy: No.

McNamara: They can, they may well put surface-to-surface missiles
or missile launchers, artillery or missile launchers in there. They have
that equipment in their own force. In the first place, it will be a question:
Do they have it or don’t they have it? We won’t be sure. Is it equipped
with a nuclear warhead or isn’t it equipped with a nuclear warhead? Is it
substantial or isn’t it substantial? I just worry about the President hav-
ing made a statement which can be used as a lever by elements of the
Congress and of the public, unless we know exactly what we’re going to
do under those circumstances. If we have a plan, we know what it is and
we’re are all agreed on it, then I think a firm statement is excellent. But
unless we have . . . it seems to me we could cause great [unclear].
Bundy: Our preliminary analysis of the consequences for us, Bob, of
the establishment of a surface-to-surface nuclear capability gives me at
least the feeling that we wouldn’t have to act.
Rusk: I think we’d have to act, Bob, exactly how and by what stages
we’d . . . for example, I would suppose that if you’re going to take on a
bloodbath in Cuba, you’d precede it by a systematic blockade to weaken
Cuba before you actually go to put anybody ashore.
McNamara: See I wonder why we . . . if we do it then, why wouldn’t
we do it today? This is one of the actions that we can consider today as a
matter of fact. There’s no question the Soviets are shipping arms to
Cuba; that’s clear. They’ve said so. Now, we can—
President Kennedy: The reason we don’t is that, is because we figure
that they may try to blockade Berlin and we would then try to blockade
Cuba. But I think that the reason we don’t today is the [unclear] is that it
wouldn’t do them that much harm for quite a while—
Rusk: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: —and then Berlin would be the obvious
response—
Rusk: [Unclear.] The configuration in Cuba still is defensive. Now
we’ve gone to great effort to try to find serious, significant Cuban pene-
tration into the other countries around the Caribbean. The defense min-
ister of Venezuela said they had captured only one Czech Bren gun.
They just haven’t found anything. And, we’ve been having great diffi-
culty in finding . . . except through money, Mexico [unclear] excuse.
Bundy: The Jordan report on this subject would be very clear and
that’s the principal argument . . .
Rusk: But we’ve, but we really have . . . If we have to go to the U.N.
to prove Cuban indirect aggression against the other members of the
hemisphere, we’d have a heck of a job proving it.
Bundy: What we find is a lot of energetic students being taught

“truth,” which is unfortunately not actionable.
Rusk: You see, at Punta del Este, we told Venezuela to capture a big
arms cache from Cuba and [unclear] helicopter pad [unclear].24 Well, there
was nothing there according to the Venezuelan minister of defense.
I am just saying, Mr. President, that we, that there is very little evi-
dence, hard evidence, that the Cubans are really directly engaged in sub-
versive activities in other countries around the Caribbean and Latin
America. We haven’t even been catching arms. We haven’t been able to
pin down hard evidence of the kinds of actions that would lay the basis
for any direct action in Cuba. The principal posture of Cuba at the pres-
ent time is defensive as far as the policy is concerned.
President Kennedy: I think we ought to get two things. First, what
statement I put out; and second, whether we ought to get the leadership
down here, the Republican, key gasbags and others. This is . . . it’s sort of
[unclear] which they have, [then] they can put it out in a way that looks
like we’re not putting anything out, probably give them everything we
do have. At least, it’s on the, it’s on the record.
As I say, one of the problems is that a lot of stuff has been out, but it
seeps out in a way that [will] convince these fellows . . . to look like
they’re putting stuff out that we won’t put out. So, I think, that maybe,
particularly this surface-to-air missile thing we ought to give them.
Does everybody agree to that? We’re going to have to put that out any-
way because that’s going to leak out—
Bundy: I think so.
President Kennedy: —in two or three days.
Bundy: I think [unclear] it would be better.
Rusk: Bob McNamara and [unclear] I are now scheduled to go before
the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee of the Senate
tomorrow morning for a briefing on the Soviet situation that’s bound to
get into this. 25 And I think we’d better have the leadership down here
and—
President Kennedy: Today.
Rusk: —and cancel that meeting.
Bundy: You have the leadership, I think, at breakfast tomorrow, Mr.
President.
24. The Organization of American States foreign ministers’ meeting was at Punta del Este,
Uruguay, 22 to 31 January 1962.
25. On Wednesday, 5 September 1962.
President Kennedy: No, I have the leader—I meant the Republicans

and Democrats.
Bundy: Oh, the regular, bipartisan body.
McNamara: There is a related point: You have asked, Mr. President,
on two or three occasions whether we believe it would be wise to ask for
authority from Congress to call up reserve and guard forces while
they’re out of session, if international events make that desirable. I per-
sonally believe it would be wise to ask for that authority, assuming that
we could achieve it without controversy. It relates to Cuba, in one
respect, that the forces that we would require could be required for
Berlin, Southeast Asia, or Cuba.
Rusk: Mr. President, I think I would agree with the Secretary of
Defense on that. I think we . . . it would be very helpful for us to have it
but I think it would more effective if we could do it quickly and quietly.
The Soviets would get the message.
McNamara: Yes. Yes—
Rusk: But, if we’re going to have a great turmoil—
McNamara: Yes.
Rusk: —and hullaballoo about it, then it would be better to have that
in connection with a specific action taken—
McNamara: Exactly—
Rusk: —[unclear] call the Congress back in special session.
McNamara: Exactly; but I mention it now because if the leadership
wants to act in relation to Cuba, one of the best actions I can think of is
exactly this.
President Kennedy: Well, now—if we, let’s say we get them down
here at five this afternoon, on an off-the-record basis we give them more
or less what we know about these things and tell them when this infor-
mation is to become available and the number of people that are there . . .
and any other question they want. In the meanwhile we’re going to go
over this statement. At least we’re going to have something to say about
this. It’s going to get out . . . so that I can say to Pierre to put it out at
six. Whatever he’s going to put out, he’s going to put out the informa-
tion about these sites and any other statement we’ve got [unclear]
worked out.
Bundy: I would suggest that we be very careful, Mr. President, about
going with that full statement today simply because the issues involved
are very grave and—
President Kennedy: That’s right but I think what we’ve got to do is . . .
we can’t permit somebody to break this story before we do.
Bundy: The SAM site business can be broken promptly. That doesn’t—
Bundy and the President start talking over each other.

President Kennedy: But everyone’s going to want to know what
we’re going to do about it.
Bundy: We don’t have to put all these statements out at once. They
don’t—
Robert Kennedy: Can I raise a—
Robert Kennedy: I think that [unclear] that while you were out that I
don’t think that this is just a question about what we are going to do
about this. I think it’s a question about Cuba in the future. And then I
think that it’s the judgment of everybody around this table that this is
only one step—we’ve seen it being built up for the last six months or
eight months, whatever it might be—that this is going [to] continue.
There’s going to be . . . three months from now, there’s going to be
something else going on, six months from now . . . That eventually it’s
very likely that they’ll establish a naval base there for submarines per-
haps, or that they’ll put surface-to-surface missiles in.
And what steps, we—what position will we be in at that time, if we
consider that surface-to-surface missiles, and I think maybe we should
reach a determination on that, that surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba
would be so harmful that we would have to undertake an invasion of
Cuba, or a blockade which eventually would lead to an invasion and the
Marines going in, and the airborne, et cetera. Then, whether . . . Or even
a naval base or some of these other things. That in this kind of a state-
ment, that you traced the history of Cuba and even mention the Monroe
Doctrine and say, point out that this was captured in a different way and
the Monroe Doctrine doesn’t apply as it did in the past; but we still have
our responsibilities to national security, that, making some of these
points that were made in Secretary Rusk’s statement, and then also say
that there’re certain things that would violate our national security. And
we would then have to take appropriate action and such things would be
the establishment of surface-to-surface missiles or the putting of, of, of a
nuclear weapons base.
Now, my point is, I think that it’s much more difficult for them to
take steps like that after you’ve made that statement. That if they put
them in and then you take offensive action, then I think that the Soviet
Union is almost committed to support them. Number two, we’re going
to be in a much tougher position in the future if the Soviet Union does
sign a treaty with Cuba because then if you invade Cuba, or do . . . take
any steps like that, you know that you’re going to have a world war. At
the present time, [if] you invaded Cuba, you’re not, you’re not, certain of
that. In fact, I should think that they probably wouldn’t support . . . a lot
of screams around the world.
But I think that this statement . . . this gives us a reason to put out a
statement as to what really is going to be our policy, not just on the sur-
face-to-air missiles, but what is our . . . going to be our policy as far as
Cuba in the future is concerned. I think that’s—
Rusk: The great problem, the great difficulty, of course, as we all
know [unclear] . . . I think that, looking at Cuba, I think that it would be
fairly easy to come to answers to the questions that are posed at the
present time. But the United States has such a worldwide confrontation
with the Soviet Union that when the time comes to act, the President
will have to take into account how that action relates to the worldwide
confrontation and what the situation is everywhere else at the same time
because his problems are total and comprehensive. I mean, if we were
relatively isolated in the world, which we were before World War II, we
could concentrate on Cuba and say, “If this in Cuba, then that follows.”
But we’ve got a million men overseas in confrontation with the Soviet
bloc and this is a part of that confrontation. This is the thing that makes
it so agonizingly difficult.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I understand that. So, therefore, I think that you
really have to reach a determination of whether putting surface-to-surface
missiles in Cuba would be where you’d really have to face up to it, and fig-
ure that you are going to have to take your chances on something like that.
Everything you do, whether you do it in Southeast Asia, or Berlin or Cuba
or wherever is going to have some effect on the Soviet Union elsewhere.
And whether there are certain things that they do that—
President Kennedy: But isn’t this what we’re saying? As I under-
stood, that statement was that when they’ve got a—
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but [unclear] saying—
President Kennedy: —upset the general balance in—
Robert Kennedy: The point of that, the Secretary makes, Secretary
McNamara says they’ve got that at the present time.
President Kennedy: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: Under that definition of a “substantial offensive
capability,” quote unquote, that at the present time that the Cubans and
the Russians have that in Cuba and that the . . .
Bundy: Would our [unclear], air-defense posture against those MiGs
be [unclear], Bob?
Robert Kennedy: Some congressman or senator can come in and say,
“Prove that they haven’t at the present time 16 MiGs,” and, then you’d
be in trouble. . . . “Why aren’t you doing something [unidentified mum-

bling] right at this moment?” Now maybe that—
Bundy: Respond how?
Robert Kennedy: Maybe you don’t have to say surface-to-surface
missiles but I think that this is an opportunity where we really face up to
what’s going to happen a year from today. Because they are going to get
tougher [unclear]. [Bundy is whispering to the President.]
Rusk: [Unclear.] I wouldn’t suppose, and of course this is . . . Bob to . . .
[the President is heard whispering, “has to study now.”]. But I would not
suppose that the mere fact that a, for example, that a motor-torpedo boat
can come roar up along the Florida coast and throw a few shots ashore
would mean that that was an offensive capability. I’m not sure that MiGs
unarmed with nuclear weapons would provide any offensive capability of
the significance that we’re talking about here.
McNamara: No, I don’t mean to overemphasize the offensive capabil-
ity of them. But they’re going to continue to increase whatever offensive
capability they have—
Bundy: I think that really is a question, Bob. It seems to me that every-
thing they have put in so far, really is, insofar as you can make these distinc-
tions, a defensive weapon. Fighters are defensive aircraft for use against
bombers and photographic reconnaissance. The SAMs are the same thing,
surface-to-air missiles don’t go . . . are a stupid way of reaching Florida.
Robert Kennedy: Well, Mac, that’s what you do, I mean, at the pres-
ent juncture, if you were them—
Bundy: No, I’m only saying that the other step seems to me a much
larger step than the development of the kind of thing we’ve seen over the
last year and a half which is fully consistent with their behavior in a lot
of other countries.
Robert Kennedy: I just . . . I think we can all assume that they are
going to take those steps eventually.
Rusk: No, I think, Bob, even there that if we were imposing a block-
ade, for example, we could make it very clear that any firing on the
American mainland by MiGs or anything else would lead immediately to
the destruction of Cuba.
Bundy: That’s right.
McNamara: Oh I think that’s completely clear. What they’re going
to try to do is build up a deterrent power. The first, and most obvious
steps, are air defense. But those are not likely to be enough because
really their air defense isn’t worth a damn. We can—
Bundy: If it were a war, I agree with you.
McNamara: All right. And therefore—

President Kennedy: If we were attacking the Soviet Union, it would-
n’t be worth much?
McNamara: No. Against . . . in Cuba it isn’t worth—
McNamara: —much and even in the Soviet Union, it isn’t worth
very much, Mr. President, because we can go underneath it. So that isn’t
going to be sufficient for the Cubans. They are going to say, “Well, that
really didn’t help us much. We have to have more of a deterrent power.”
And this, this—
President Kennedy: The only real deterrent against a country our
size is two things: First, the fact the Soviet[s] can act against us.
McNamara: Yes.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] in Iran, Turkey or anyplace else. And
secondly, if that they can get a ground-to-ground—
McNamara: Yes.
President Kennedy: —with a nuclear weapon. That’s the real deterrent.
McNamara: Yes.
President Kennedy: Otherwise we can always move against Cuba. It
just takes two more divisions than it took . . .
McNamara: Exactly, exactly or a few more suppressive aircraft.
Rusk: Mr. President, I think there is one thing that we can be—
Unidentified: Yes.
Rusk: —as certain about is . . . it can be a given that they have no . . .
the Soviet Union would never in the world permit a nuclear weapon to
be used against us from Cuba, except as part of a general nuclear war.
President Kennedy: That’s why I agree. I don’t think . . . why they give
the, and why do they give the . . . Then why don’t we give them the . . . ?
Rusk: Now, they could—If they should announce some morning that
they were placing nuclear weapons in Cuba—
President Kennedy: Under Soviet control.
Rusk: Whether they did or not; they just announced it, that could
cause some real problems.
President Kennedy: What is it you suggest that we announce today,
aside from this statement, which is rather long? What is it, in short, you
think we ought to announce as far as what our future action should be
towards Cuba? Aside from consultations, or aside from Guantánamo?26
26. The U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. The Cuban government granted the United
States a lease for the base in 1903 and extended it in an agreement signed in 1934.
What Bobby, I guess, is saying is that we should announce today that

if they put in ground-to-ground missiles, we will—
Robert Kennedy: They take certain [unclear]—I think, no I think
some study should go on—
Rusk: Well, if we designated ground-to-ground missiles or we speci-
fied the nuclear weapon, I think we would create a kind of panic that the
facts themselves don’t now justify.
Bundy: That’s correct.
Rusk: And that this could heat the matter up much faster than if we
could get some general language, then, take account of the point that
Bob McNamara made. . . . It would be better to get a warning to the
Soviets in more general terms so that we do not create for them a major
prestige problem in not moving down that trail and then make it very
clear to our friends in the hemisphere—
President Kennedy: This is . . . the key sentence is, “Any placing by
the Soviets of a significant offensive capability in the hands of this self-
announced . . . would be a direct and major challenge . . . would warrant
immediate—”
Rusk: “appropriate action.”
Robert Kennedy: Of course they’ve challenged us, though, repeat-
edly. We’ve got the Monroe Doctrine and they’ve spit in our eye on it. 27
The idea we’re going to challenge again or then. . . .
McNamara: The next sentence is excellent.28 Very strong.
Bundy: Yeah. It’s a very important sentence.
McNamara: I agree. I think it can stand without the preceding sen-
tence.29
Rusk: I think we ought to be careful, too, about supposing that the
Monroe Doctrine has somehow disappeared or receded into the back-
ground. What has happened to the Monroe Doctrine is that it, in the
27. The Monroe Doctrine, proclaimed by President James Monroe in 1823, constituted a
warning to European powers not to intervene in the Western Hemisphere. In the twentieth
century, it provided a rationale for U.S. intervention in the Caribbean region. President
Theodore Roosevelt declared as a “corollary” to the doctrine that the United States should
maintain stable conditions and not give outside powers any cause to intervene in the region.
28. The next in the draft, with underlining as found on the President’s own copy, reads,
“Further I say to our friends in Latin America that whatever armed strength the Cuban
regime may develop will be restricted by whatever means may be necessary to that island.”
29. The previous sentence was “Any placing by the Soviets of a significant offensive capability
in the hands of this self-announced aggressive regime in Cuba would be a direct and major
challenge to all this hemisphere stands for and would warrant immediate and appropriate
(forceful) action.” In Kennedy’s copy, forceful is underscored.
first instance, is a hemisphere problem. The Rio Pact.30 Implementation

of the Monroe Doctrine would be attempted primarily through hemi-
sphere action. But it still remains there as an element of American policy
and our own national self-defense. If we ever needed to move and we’d
move on the basis of the historic, special regime in this hemisphere. I
think your press conference—
President Kennedy: Of course, the point is that the hemisphere—
they are being invited in, not forcing their way in. And the Monroe
Doctrine was for another situation, which was that the country came and
invaded Latin America. This is where they are not invading it; they are
being asked in by the government, which is its de facto government.
Rusk: We also [unclear] Mr. President. We never did, so far as I can
recall at the moment, we never used the Monroe Doctrine as a flash-pan
reaction to a particular situation. It was a basis for diplomatic action, for
gnawing at it, for insisting to other governments that they respect it and
take it. And it took a lot of time in most instances to apply the Monroe
Doctrine.
Door opens and closes. There is a short pause.
I think, Mr. President, it would be a little difficult to talk about this
additional information, or to say anything sort of—we have here on the
fourth page—without some general reference and some background.
I’m not sure that this would be too sharp to say [unclear] look at it and
see that we should say [unclear] now.
President Kennedy: I don’t know about number “D. Informal consul-
tation.” 31
Rusk: Of course that is not a—
President Kennedy: Why don’t we just say . . . take . . . consult with
foreign ministers, other members—let’s just put it that way.
Rusk: Why we can combine C and D.32 Yeah. Sure.
30. The Rio Treaty of 1947 (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), better known
as the Rio Pact, was a collective security agreement. Under its provisions, an attack against
one American state would be considered an attack against all.
31. The draft ends with a list of six measures to be initiated by the President, lettered A
through G. Letter D reads, “I have asked the Secretary of State to take full advantage of the
forthcoming meeting of the U.N. General Assembly to arrange for informal consultations
with the Foreign Ministers of the other members of the Organization of American States on
recent developments in Cuba as they may affect the security of the hemisphere; this is in
accord with suggestions which have come from several of our Latin American friends.”
32. C reads, “I have asked the Secretary of State to consult with our friends in the Caribbean
area about ways in which they can assist in the above programs further to insure their protec-
tion against the threat of Cuban military strength.”
President Kennedy: Good. Now, this . . . what about G?33 This is say-
ing we are going to recognize the government-in-exile, is it?
Rusk: No, this does not go quite that far. It’s a move in that direction.
But our great problem there is that the refugees are in complete disorder
so far as leadership.
Bundy: I would question whether we want to—if we do this—then
the one that is formed will look like our puppet. It will be the Cuban
government-in-exile formed by the President on his instructions. There
is some disadvantage in that.
Rusk: I think we might be able to shorten this in various respects.
President Kennedy: Well, I think, that we can shorten this thing, boil
it down. The key thing you need right now are these missiles, also put
them into proportion: We are in much more danger from the Soviet
Union than we are from Cuba.
McNamara: Sure.
President Kennedy: So that this thing again, the fixation on Cuba as
opposed to someplace else, is really, if they’re to recognize that the mis-
siles have changed . . . There are dangers in them. But other than that . . .
we don’t want them to fall into that . . . we want to kind of make it clear
to the country that [unclear as Bundy begins to speak] get our information
as quickly as possible.
Bundy: In that context—It seems to me, Mr. President, I would sug-
gest that we get the information out of the White House because the
information, the question has been raised as to whether you had all the
dope, were getting the thing straight. And that needs to be got straight.
Then I, I at least would suggest at least that the major points might bet-
ter be made by the Secretary of State precisely because we are not doing
anything very enormous at the moment there.
President Kennedy: Now, the only key thing would be this, all of this . . .
Bundy: You could reinforce it at a press conference.
President Kennedy: Would be . . . whatever armed strength they
develop . . . I mean, they seem to put a lot into this thing about . . . why
they . . . so, this is going to be used against other Caribbean, so that sen-
tence is rather important.
Bundy: Very important. I agree.
33. G reads, “I feel sure as more and more Russians arrive in Cuba, more and more Cubans will be
thinking and saying: ‘Cuba sí, Russia no.’ To take full advantage of this fact I hereby invite and urge
Cuban exiles everywhere to unite within a single organization in which opportunities are left for
eventual major participation at top levels by those resisting Communist domination within Cuba.”
Rusk: I think that’s the kind of statement that has to be made by the
President. The declaration of a security, in effect, a security guarantee to
all—
Bundy: To the Caribbean states
Rusk: —all of Cuba’s neighbors [unclear].
President Kennedy: I think what we ought to do is . . . why don’t you
get . . . working.
Bundy: Yes, we can shorten it up.
President Kennedy: With Ted [Sorensen], to shorten it up, tighten
it up. Then let’s have a—Bobby’s going to see this fellow at 2:15—then
let’s have a meeting at, let’s get the leadership down here at five; all
we’re going to do really is to tell them about these surface—
Bundy: Bring them up—That will be essentially for briefing by
General [Marshall] Carter then?
President Kennedy: That’s right. Now, how much do we tell them
[about] how we got it?
Marshall Carter: We can give them a briefing, sir, that would give
them all without telling them exactly how we got it.
President Kennedy: I think you’ve got to say, you would say that—
when we did get it—because, you see, at the press conference I said that
we had no evidence.
Bundy: No confirmation. Fully confirmed conclusions were possible
only when, Thursday—
President Kennedy: Friday.
Bundy: —or Friday.
Robert Kennedy: Not till Saturday.
Bundy: It was Thursday night and Friday morning, wasn’t it?
Unidentified: That’s right. It was Thursday night.
President Kennedy: OK. Now you can work on this. So that part’s all
right. I don’t—there’s nothing particularly . . . I think you can just say you
got it and describe what it is to them. By then we will have this statement
in order and then I think at that time the Secretary can say we want to keep
some proportion. We’ve got Berlin and the big danger’s it would—They
don’t have offensive capability against us and they also, they don’t have an
ability to, in the final analysis, to prevent us from doing what we think
needs to be done. But the big problem is the fact of these other obligations.
So, if we lock them in, that takes care of really the big [unclear] physically.
Bundy: I think you can, do you have a judgment, is today the time to
reach that other larger question of whether we want to indicate that
some such phrase “the significant offensive capability or further develop-
ment which might create a direct hazard” or something of this sort?
Whether you want to make that [unclear]?
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement 33
President Kennedy: Well, Bobby are you suggesting that we say a

specific thing rather than [unclear] “significant offensive”—?
Robert Kennedy: Well I might be—could I work on it—
President Kennedy: OK.
Robert Kennedy: —for a little while?
President Kennedy: We’ll need it in—
Robert Kennedy: That’s my feeling. I think that we should take this
opportunity.
President Kennedy: Well, now, do we want to meet at four here and
[put an] end to this thing, in a new . . . form, with everybody having
given it some thought—?
Bundy: Right.
President Kennedy: And then we’ll have the leadership at five.
Bundy: You . . . And your current thought is that we, you would then
issue a statement through Pierre at the end of the afternoon?
President Kennedy: That is correct. Even if it’s confined—
Bundy: To a very limited—
President Kennedy: —to a statement of what the facts are plus this
key sentence from page 4. [to someone else] That’s all right [unclear]. But
even if—
The meeting ended and Kennedy left to shake hands in the Oval Office
with a congressional candidate from Missouri. After that, he went to the
Mansion for lunch and a swim.
4:00 –4:50 P.M.
The difficulty here is that the intervention is being invited.

That’s what’s causing all our difficulties . . .
Drafting Meeting on the Cuba Press Statement34

In the three hours since this group last met, Robert Kennedy has been
very busy. Besides drafting a new version of the statement on Cuba for
the President, the Attorney General met with Soviet ambassador
34. President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, Ray S. Cline, C. Douglas Dillon,
Carl Kaysen, Robert Kennedy, Curtis LeMay, Edwin Martin, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze,
Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy. The Russians requested this

meeting to hand over a private letter from Khrushchev in response to
the new Anglo-American proposals on the test ban matter. Kennedy
came back from that meeting with little that was positive. Khrushchev
was unwilling to countenance a partial test ban without some form of
restraint on future nuclear tests underground. The Attorney General
had made use of the meeting to mention Cuba, but the Soviet ambassa-
dor said nothing to deter Kennedy from his belief that it was only a mat-
ter of time before Moscow put nuclear missiles on the island.35
The group was larger for this second Cuban meeting of the day.
Among the new participants were the Treasury secretary, Douglas
Dillon; the assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, Edwin
Martin; and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay.
Kennedy was widening the circle to confirm the instincts of his key
advisers and to tighten the statement before it went out. Discussion now
centered on the new Robert Kennedy draft. In the struggle over whether
to use the evening’s statement to send a warning to the Soviets, Robert
Kennedy had scored a victory.
The President started recording as he and his key advisers were con-
sidering how much of the intelligence data at hand on the Soviet buildup
should be revealed in this statement.
Dean Rusk : [Unclear] ships [unclear] instead of actions, suggesting

he wants [unclear].
President Kennedy: I think in this one, we ought to say . . . and to
avoid having the exact number of days ago—
McGeorge Bundy: I think so.
President Kennedy: Because otherwise it looks like it’s only been the
last minute.
Bundy: Well, I would say if it’s going to go, “It has become clear that
the suspected landing craft [unclear].
Rusk: I would not put [unclear] in terms . . . They would say yes.
And we can’t be sure of that fact.
Theodore Sorensen, and Maxwell Taylor. Others attending the meeting but not identified as
having spoken include Charles Bohlen and Martin Hillenbrand. Tape 19, John F. Kennedy
35. What Robert Kennedy did not know was that indeed his suspicions were correct and
Soviet missiles were on their way to Cuba, though they had not arrived there. However,
Ambassador Dobrynin was as much in the dark about these missile deployments as the U.S.
government.
Bundy: Here is the foreign intelligence [unclear] because this

[unclear] clear if we can get the substantive [unclear] on the side of
[unclear]. [Pages are flipped.]
President Kennedy: I think probably, in here somewhere, we proba-
bly ought to say is how many [unclear] technicians there are, military
technicians there are [unclear]. [Ongoing unintelligible background conver-
sation.]
Bundy: What level of force can be stated, numbers of technicians? On
the order of 5,000, or don’t you know?
Marshall Carter: Three thousand would be closer.36
Unidentified: Three thousand.
Unidentified: We’re talking about military personnel.
President Kennedy: Technicians?
Carter: Technicians, yes sir. Military technicians.
Unidentified: Military technicians.
Carter: This is within the last month, sir.
Rusk: Military training and tactical personnel [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, I think . . . let’s put that sentence here:
“That consistent with . . . there are . . .”
Unidentified: There appear to be about 3,000 in there, we have
[unclear].
President Kennedy: That’s about right.
Bundy: About 3,000.
Unidentified: Three thousand.
President Kennedy: What’s this statement for?
Bundy: This is to get the facts. The factual paragraph will go before
this. This is a slightly shortened version of the paragraph on page 1. [A
page is flipped.]
President Kennedy: What about saying, “There are approximately
3,000 technicians this side [unclear] there are . . . however . . .”
Carter: You could add this up. [Unclear] presence. That might work.
Unidentified: You just take that one [unclear] should probably have
another one.
Carter: Now on a substantive issue, Mr. President—
President Kennedy: Why don’t I just [say], “As I have said before,”
Bobby, “As we have said before.” [Unclear] just so it doesn’t look like this
is a new fact coming out, this one on the technicians.
36. Ultimately, the White House would put out that there were approximately 3,500 Soviet
military personnel in Cuba. The Attorney General’s draft statement has not been found.
Ray Cline: Sir, you asked me a question this morning about our first
evidence, we traced it back to mid-1960, to at least by July 1960 there
were some military technical advisers—
Cline: —sent to Cuba from the [Soviet] bloc.
Bundy: Was that more than three years ago?
Cline: No, [unclear].
Carter: We were carrying 500 up until this most recent influx, and
there were 1,700 actually in, and 1,300 more within the last four or five
days, so that it’s about 3,500 military technicians, but we’ve been carry-
ing approximately 2,000 agricultural and economic assistants, Soviet
types, since they first started coming in in mid-’60.
Rusk: So that number has increased since they . . . [Rusk keeps talking
under Kennedy—unintelligible.]
President Kennedy: OK, well we have to rewrite that section, I think.
I’d rather see, “As we have said before.”
Bundy: Yeah. Right.
Carter: We carry about 5,000, altogether: agricultural, economic, and
military at this time. [Pause.]
Bundy: What this statement in this form admits . . . This paragraph
here, that’s the one on which we were having a discussion this morning.
Rusk: The Attorney General redrafted it, as we said this morning . . .
Robert Kennedy (?): We’ll look at that.
Rusk: There is a paragraph here that I believe might . . . we might
just want to make two or three small changes. I think [unclear]. [Lot of
paper rustling. Short, unclear exchanges.]
Robert Kennedy: The Secretary thinks that you should . . .
Rusk: It’s page 4, I believe [unclear].
Unidentified: Have you seen this piece of paper?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]
Carter: [Unclear] I was more concerned about the first page with the
facts [unclear]. That one there that you [unclear].
Unidentified: Coordination.
Rusk: This last paragraph on page 4.
President Kennedy: Why don’t we just start at the top of page 4:
“Clearly the recent acceleration of Soviet military aid to Cuba is coming
dangerously close to a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.” I think that’s a
. . . it’s an ambivalent, ambiguous position. What [unclear] would be the
subject of endless conversation about what does constitute a violation
and what does not. [Bundy can be heard indistinctly in the background.]
Edwin Martin: Well Mr. President, the “however” clause which

immediately followed that sort of impliedly says—
President Kennedy: —But what is the “violation?”
Martin: What is the “vio—”? They have not yet done the following
things and the implication is that that would be—
President Kennedy: I think we ought to leave this out, this
Monroe—
Douglas Dillon: We could get into a terrible fight about the Monroe
Doctrine, because—
President Kennedy: It’s so vague.
Dillon: —others would say it has already been clearly violated.
President Kennedy: I think we ought to leave the Monroe Doctrine
out of that paragraph. I don’t think it’s necessary anyway.37
Bundy: I think if we do leave it out, if we leave out of any statement
we make, there is no point in calling attention to it in the statement at all
because it has the difficulty Douglas [Dillon] described.
Rusk: The . . . Then what about calling attention to the inter-
American security arrangement [unclear] connection?
President Kennedy: Well, I think we can just leave out the words
“since the Monroe [Doctrine] was first announced.” Just say “for over a
century and a half ” or something. Or it would just say, “For many years
the United—the American states,” that would be the bottom of page 2.
“For many years, the American states have consistently maintained their
right to prevent the use of their ter—”
Is this the principle of our agreements to prevent the use of the
territory by nonmilitary [nonhemispheric] powers or is it to prevent
the seizure of territory, or—What exactly is the Rio Treaty? What
does it provide? Is that the key document, the Rio Treaty that will
overturn it?
Bundy: The collective security arrangement.
Rusk: Well, I think it’s a general collective security phrase to ensure
the safety and territorial integrity of the defense of the Western
Hemisphere [unclear.] [Two other voices—unclear.]
Cline: How about the Declaration on Solidarity for the Preservation
of the Political Integrity of the American States, 1954, says—under the
37. The final statement did not contain any reference to the Monroe Doctrine. The U.S. posi-
tion was that it had a right to react to anything that posed a threat to U.S. security or to the
security of other members of the inter-American system.
Rio Treaty—said it [reading] “declares that the domination or control of

political institutions of any American State by the international commu-
nist movement, extending to this Hemisphere the political system of an
extra-continental power, would constitute a threat to the sovereignty
and political independence of the American States, endangering the
peace of America—”38 I think—
Rusk: There were sweeping reservations that were read into that at
the time that [unclear].
Cline: That’s right. This is the most clear statement that we have
under the Rio Treaty on Communist intervention. It was called, “Against
International Communist Intervention at Caracas, Venezuela.”
Martin: That figured an inaccurate use of force [unclear] it all
together.
Rusk: Yes, I think the wording at the bottom of page 2 will have to
be revised to bring in the actual language of the Rio Pact.
Robert Kennedy: Can you get me—What is the language here of the
Rio Treaty?39
President Kennedy: The key point is that the Monroe Doctrine—
and all these things—is talking about the forcible seizure of the terri-
tory of one country, of a country in the Western Hemisphere, by a
foreign power. The difficulty here is that the intervention is being
invited. That’s what’s causing all our difficulties, but we therefore have
to . . .
Robert Kennedy: The Article 5 of the Rio Treaty says that “the terri-
tory or sovereignty or political independence of any American State is
affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack.”40
Rusk: That’s right.
38. “Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of the American
States Against International Communist Intervention,” accepted on 13 March 1954 at the
conclusion of the Tenth Inter-American Conference, held at Caracas, Venezuela. For the full
text of the declaration, see Department of State Bulletin 30, no. 769 (22 March 1954): 420. The
passage continues: “. . . and would call for a meeting of consultation to consider the adoption
of measures in accordance with existing treaties.”
39. The Attorney General is trying to rework his draft to incorporate these new ideas.
Ultimately his draft would be completely revised and cut.
40. He is presumably referring to Article 6, which reads: “If the inviolability or the integrity of
the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be
affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-conti-
nental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the
Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be
taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures
Robert Kennedy: “Or by any other type of situation that might

endanger the peace.”
President Kennedy: The whole name “aggression” is the point.
These people are being invited in, that’s why—
Robert Kennedy: It’s just whether the Soviet Union establishing
bases here or putting missiles here, whether that is in fact an aggression
which doesn’t constitute an armed attack [unclear].
Dillon: It depends a lot on the—
President Kennedy: Well, we don’t have to settle that question today,
though. I mean, this is really leading up to our main points. So that I don’t
think we have to . . . I think the first sentence, [reading] “Considering U.S.
policy is necessary [unclear], the special relationship among the countries
of the Western Hemisphere, a relationship which has existed for many
years and which has been the subject of many hemispheric treaties.”
Rusk: Inter-American treaties.
President Kennedy: Inter-American treaties. [reading] “This special
relationship has been acknowledged throughout the world, and is recog-
nized by Article 52 which provides for regional security arrange-
ments.”41 Then we go on to January of this year . . .
[Pause.]
Robert Kennedy: You better get that changed.
Unidentified: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: All right. Then I would say at the top of [page]
4, I’d leave that paragraph out.
Rusk: Then first, [page] 4. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: First, take it out and say, “There is . . .” Yeah.
Rusk: At the bottom of page—
Robert Kennedy: Now what does that—
President Kennedy: [testily] You have to understand, we’re going to
have to redo this.
President Kennedy: I just want to get the key . . . you have to lead up
to explaining that.
which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security
of the Continent.” For the full text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1947,
see Department of State Bulletin 17, no. 429 (21 September 1947): 565–67.
41. Of the Charter of the United Nations.
Rusk: [Unclear.] “Soviet assistance” at the bottom of page 4, “limited

to weapons normally associated with defense.”
Rusk: And knock out the next sentence, and then say, “[Unclear] say
to our friends in Latin America [unclear].”
Unidentified: Well, you really want to say that there is nothing in the
Soviet announcement which foreshadows such an eventuality; there is noth-
ing there which precludes it either. And you just wanted [unclear] our way.
Carl Kaysen: The reason for that sentence was really to put them . . .
to read our interpretation into it, and to force them into [unclear].
Bundy: That puts us in a position of depending on their words.
President Kennedy: Well, maybe it wouldn’t be if you keep in that sen-
tence, “It will continue to be so confined.” I would say, that if it was going
to happen, then we would take action against it. So I would think that . . .
Rusk: I think rather than say “it will continue to be so confined,” “it
must be so confined.”
President Kennedy: We say “bloc assistance” [unclear].
Dillon: If you say, “It must be so confined,” does that mean you’re
going to confine it?
Rusk: Well, that’s what “it will continue to be so confined” means, in
this context. Not negotiable.
Dillon: [Unclear] statement . . .
Unidentified: What’s this about [unclear]? [Pause. Mumbling.]
Rusk: “Should it be otherwise, the greatest questions would arise . . .
but otherwise the greatest questions would arise for our friends in Latin
America.”
Unidentified: With all this information, it’s a little less red flaggish.
Carter: [Unclear.]
Dillon: The only thing I think you want to be careful of is . . . making
a threat to do something if they get some particular weapon in Cuba. If
you make your threat that you’ll never let it come out of Cuba, which is
still the key; but the other thing means that you’re—
President Kennedy: Well, I would say ground-to-ground missiles,
you’d—42
42. Presumably, Robert Kennedy’s draft only ruled out the placement of offensive weapon sys-
tems on Cuba. Here the President is making clear what he thinks would be unacceptable:
ground-to-ground missiles.
Dillon: Well, that’s . . . if you want to put it on that maybe—

Dillon: —that’s a strong enough one to put it on, but just saying
“offensive weapons,” I don’t know what an offensive weapon is. They’d
argue. Might say tanks are but I don’t know.
Bundy: That’s a substantive question. I mean how far—it’s clear that
we want to make a statement that makes it plain that they will be confined
and not make a . . . head for the rest of the hemisphere with this stuff.43
Rusk: Well, what about this then? “To date, bloc assistance has been
limited to weapons normally associated with defense. Were it to be oth-
erwise the greatest questions would arise.”44 [Unclear] “Our friends in
Latin America and throughout the world [unclear] Cuban regime
[unclear] restricted by whatever means make it necessary to that island.”
Nothing more . . .
Dillon: That’s right, but you don’t say you’re going to go in there . . .
Bundy: I think that “to that island” is technically not a . . . Ed [Martin]
and I have figured out [Martin makes an unclear interjection] that you can’t
keep them out of international waters with their patrol boats. So we’re
going to have to say, “kept away from any part of the hemisphere.”
Rusk: “By whatever means necessary to Cuba.”
Martin: We have [had] an alternative plan.
Bundy: [Unclear] take that “free passage of the high seas” unless
you’re going to make a special order.
President Kennedy: Let’s see which way that we are in the draft.
Now, this first—
Bundy: I think the factual part can be done very well from that first
paragraph with the corrections you’ve made. It doesn’t need to be long.
Then the question is really whether you want an extensive development,
or any development of the Rio Treaty obligations or whether you want
to go straight to some form of pledge, either as stated in the Justice draft
or anywhere else.
President Kennedy: There’s no difference between them.
Robert Kennedy: Do you have another copy of that first factual?
Bundy: No I don’t; it’s just the one.
Rusk: I think there is some mistake [unclear] in the Attorney
43. Bundy consistently doubts the Soviets would ever use Cuba as a military base from which
to threaten the United States.
44. Rusk has hit on a new formulation of the warning to the Soviets. This phrasing would
prevail.
General’s draft in the middle of page 4 indicating what there is not evi-
dence of . . .
Martin: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: I think we ought to have that and then we ought
to—
Bundy: That could follow on—
Rusk: And then the statement on—that reassures our Latin
American allies at the end.
Dillon: Well, I think the way you’ve redrafted it [unclear] objection.
President Kennedy: What we are doing is, first we’re going to give
the details of what assistance they’ve sent to Cuba.
Bundy: That’s right . . . what they have not.
President Kennedy: Secondly, we have . . . And what they have not.
Then secondly we are going to give a unilateral guarantee against the
use of any of these forces against anyone in the hemisphere.
Bundy: Against anybody else.
President Kennedy: Third, we’re going to say that the [unclear] indi-
rect methods of taking steps against them [unclear] direct. Then I think
we ought to say something about, at the end, that we have to keep in mind
for those who are . . . This is a dangerous world and we have to keep in
mind . . . don’t want to use the word totality again, but all of the dangers we
live with. The fact of the matter is the major danger is the Soviet Union
with missiles and nuclear warheads, not Cuba. We don’t want to get
everybody so fixed on Cuba that they regard . . . So in some way or other
we want to suggest that at the end. This is a matter of [unclear] danger, as
is Berlin as is Southeast Asia as are a great many areas which are—
Bundy: I think there is a question, Mr. President, whether you want
to do that in this statement or whether that’s something we make clear
as we go along.
President Kennedy: Well, I know, I think we’ve got to say something
about that otherwise you don’t want everybody to blow on this, you get
everybody so mesmerized here that all these other places which are
also—
Rusk: I think, perhaps [unclear]—
President Kennedy: This is not an aggressive danger to us except
indirectly.
Bundy: As it now stands.
President Kennedy: Compared with these other places. Now some-
where we’ve got to get that in, it seems to me, right from the beginning.
Give some guidance.
Dillon: How far do these surface-to-air missiles shoot if they want to

use them to hit the ground?
Bundy: Thirty miles.
Dillon: [Unclear.]
Pause. Some flipping of pages.
Bundy: Would you like us to go and work on it?
President Kennedy: Haven’t similar missiles been given to Iraq and
what, the U.A.R. [United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria]?
Bundy: Similar missiles are on order for Iraq and the U.A.R. and
[unclear]—
President Kennedy: Indonesia?
Paul Nitze: Indonesia has them, yes sir.
Cline: [Unclear] the equipment has been delivered to Indonesia and
they are proceeding at a very leisurely pace there and this is the only
place that they’ve set up such a program.
President Kennedy: Do you think it might—
Bundy: This is a quick, smart, secret operation.
Unidentified: That’s right.
Bundy: They were put in fast here in Cuba. It is in that sense quite
different from their ordinary military assistance. [Voices of agreement.]
Rusk: The problem with stating these points you mentioned at the
very end, Mr. President is to put [it] in terms of general tensions and
the need for making progress on all fronts, to not put it in such a way
that it appears that we are timorous about Cuba, because we are scared
to death of [unclear]—
President Kennedy: No, but what I just want to get everybody to
keep in mind, what is really—
Rusk: Right.
President Kennedy: —dangerous, and what’s really annoying—
Nitze: At some stage wouldn’t it be wise, Mr. President, to lay the
background as to why this isn’t symmetrical, why that it’s the Russians
who are really threatening people all over the world? Our measures are
defensive mainly. We feel differently. Whereas the Russians have come in
with a real aggressive phase. [Unclear.] Because otherwise you get on
this tit-for-tat kind of a thing, justification where you have to understand
time lines.
Bundy: Have you got [unclear] language Mr. Secretary as to what we
figure will be the consequences? Because that’s— [Unclear response.]
President Kennedy: Yeah, well I think we ought to . . . do we charac-
terize this as an announcement [unclear] aggressive regime?
Papers rustling. Dillon is speaking to someone in the background.

President Kennedy: All right. Now let’s see. We’ve got this first page
[unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Bundy: The first paragraph, it’s on—there it is, Bobby.
President Kennedy: Now, the question, I don’t [unclear]—
Bundy: Then we would add the paragraph from page 4—
Rusk: [Unclear.]
Bundy: Of Bobby’s draft, the middle paragraph, “no evidence of,”
except I would suggest that we omit the last sentence. That seems to
me—
President Kennedy: I’ve taken that out.
Bundy: —entirely a question of their faith.
President Kennedy: All right, now what do we say after this?
Bundy: And after that we would move toward . . .
Rusk: I would say what comes below, we’re going to have to revise.
The use of [unclear].
Bundy: “I say to our friends in Latin America and throughout the
world.”
President Kennedy: [Unclear] grandiloquent thing, that’s an oratori-
cal phrase?
Rusk: Well, “Our friends in—”
Bundy: “I can assure our friends in Latin America”?
President Kennedy: Let’s just say, “The armed strength [unclear] in
Latin America.”
Bundy: Or “whatever armed strength.” All right. And say not “to that
island,” I would think . . .
President Kennedy: Well, I think that gets over the idea we have
[unclear].
Martin: [Unclear] precious distinction.
Kennedy and Unidentified: What?
Martin: The high seas is a precious distinction in [unclear] state-
ment.
Bundy: Well, it’s an important one because the question will come up
when they begin using the high seas with MTBs [motor-torpedo boats]
as to whether the President has committed himself to prevent that. I
would be sorry to see him in that bind.
Brief, unclear exchange. President Kennedy at one point says, “What?”
Inaudible.
President Kennedy: Bobby, you rewrite that sentence.
Bundy: I would say . . .

Rusk: Maybe you rewrite that sentence and let’s take the last sen-
tence that [unclear]—
Bundy: Well, I think it’s important to say. Look, we put in another
draft—I admit that it’s not as eloquent language—“will be prevented by
whatever means might be necessary from threatening any part of the
hemisphere.”45
Martin: Seems to me that gets the point across.
President Kennedy: All right. “Threatening militarily . . .” They’re
threatening every part of the hemisphere now in the indirect sense, so
that we’re talking now about the military—
Bundy: “Prevented from action against any part of the hemisphere.”
Unidentified: “Any action against—”
President Kennedy and several others: “Military action.”
Unidentified: “Military action against.”
Rusk: And in the final sentence where . . . here we will have to write a
sentence to relate this to other problems [unclear].
Bundy: You have one other sentence though about grave damage,
which danger, which we need a decision either for or against.
Rusk: Start the paragraph: “To date, bloc assistance has been limited to
weapons normally associated with defense. Were it to be otherwise, the
greatest questions would arise. The armed strength which the Cuban
regime may develop will be restricted by whatever means.” For sure.
President Kennedy: See, the reason we’ve got to put in something at
the end, otherwise you’re going to get a suggestion of blockade right now
and blockade these shipments and . . . so that I think we better just—46
Bundy: Well, we could say simply, “Against the real dangers which
confront the world, the current threat of, the current hazards in Cuba
are not—”
Unidentified: “Kept in pers—”
Bundy: “Must be kept in perspective.”
45. This less than eloquent phrase makes its way into the final version of the statement.
46. The President is seeking more policy flexibility than would have been allowed by a stri-
dent statement. The sentence about restricting or confining Cuban power never makes it into
the final version. Instead the Cuban problem is set within the complex of concerns defining
the worldwide struggle against Communism.
Unidentified: “Perspective.”
President Kennedy: “The dangers which confront the world in . . .”
Bundy: Well, I would . . . I don’t know that I’d localize it, at all.
“Which Soviet—”
President Kennedy: “Communist.” “Communist.”
Bundy: “With which Communist aggression threatens the wor—
Communist aggressiveness,” I would say, “threatens the world.”
President Kennedy: “And the peace.”
Long pause, with the sounds of writing and page turning. Several
unclear, whispered exchanges. Someone says “statement of the general
threat.”
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] Read that [unclear].
Rusk: [reading] “The Cuban ques—”[unclear] “The Cuban question
must be considered as part of a worldwide challenge posed by Communist
threats to the peace and must be dealt with as a part of that larger issue in
which all free men have a prominent stake.” It gets the idea without—47
Bundy: Without [unclear] either way. It’s very clear.
Robert Kennedy: We might put that at the beginning, I think, of the
first paragraph, rather than at the end where we say [unclear] happen
[unclear]. Might be well to have this right under . . . when we get into a
discussion of this whole problem.
Unidentified: After the factual statement.
Bundy: That’s probably going to be the second paragraph.
Unidentified: After the factual statement.
Bundy: But before we . . . the defense [unclear] . . .
Unidentified: [Unclear.] All right, [unclear].
Bundy: But before we say there is no defensive [unclear] I would
think . . . Let’s put this together in detachable fragments [unclear].
[Unclear exchange. Someone says, “Time is running out.”]
President Kennedy: Five, yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Can we head up there before that? [Unclear] take it
up now?
Bundy: Well, we’ll do our best.
President Kennedy: Here’s . . I don’t know what—You’ve got
Bobby’s haven’t you?
47. Here Rusk was expressing President Kennedy’s point that Cuba must be kept in perspective,
since the real concern was the Soviet Union and the most acute dangers were in other parts of the
world. This language would also be part of the final version.
Bundy: Yeah.
President Kennedy: What about this business of Guantánamo?
[Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: Here at the end.
Bundy: I swiped it out.48
Unidentified: Yeah. I think that . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah, we ought to have a sentence in there “as
any further . . . as further information is received and verified—”
Bundy: “It will be promptly made available.”
President Kennedy: “In accordance with the President’s statement a
week ago.”49
Robert Kennedy: That’s almost covered in that first page.
Bundy: It’s in one of the papers. I think we did get this.
Robert Kennedy: Mac, you might look at the first page.
Bundy: Well . . . the [Central Intelligence] agency has a brief of what
they plan to do, Mr. President, which you may want to review before the . . .
Rusk: “As further information is developed and confirmed.”50
Carter: Would you prefer to look at it or . . .
President Kennedy: What’s this on?
Carter: This is substantially what we gained in this morning, Mr.
President, except—
President Kennedy: Oh about the . . . I’d like to ask General [Curtis]
LeMay a little about what these SAM sites could mean if we were going to
carry out an attack on Cuba. What hazard would this present to you?51
Curtis LeMay: Well, it would mean you’d have to get, of course, your
force in there to knock them out so that the rest of the attacking forces
would be free to take on the other targets. That’d be the first thing we’d
do. We’d have to go in low level and get them.
48. Guantánamo would be mentioned in the final text.

49. Presumably referring to his news conference on 29 August 1962 where he addressed the issue.
50. This becomes the language of the final draft; but just before Salinger reads the statement,
the President has this rewritten so that it is clear that he has consistently promised to provide
information as “it is obtained and properly verified.” Understandably, the President is con-
cerned about his personal credibility. Compare the news conference version to the “last draft,”
4 September 1962, “Cuba” folder, National Security Files, Box 36, John F. Kennedy Library.
Besides this change, Salinger provided additional information at the press conference on the
range of the SAMs. Otherwise, the statement as read and this so-called last draft found in
McGeorge Bundy’s Cuba file are identical.
51. On 7 September, Kennedy would order military planning for assaults on SAM sites.

LeMay: These missiles have no low-level capability so you go in low
and take them out.
President Kennedy: You’d have to go hit the radar?
LeMay: And the missiles, too.
President Kennedy: Would that be a difficult operation?
LeMay: No, sir.
Rusk: They would probably have low-level, smaller antiaircraft guns.
LeMay: Lose our tactical fighters going in low, uh, huh.
Rusk: Yeah.
President Kennedy: You mean they would use antiaircraft [guns]?
Rusk: They would use 20 mm [unclear]—
LeMay: Well, they would probably not see us until we got within a
few miles of the coastline.
Rusk: Yeah.
LeMay: And you’d put part of your force on those missiles to knock
them out.
Rusk: Right.
LeMay: Of course, you’ve got to get the airfields very quick too.
Rusk: Sure.
LeMay: But this complicates any assault plans you might have. It’s
another target you’ve got to worry about.
President Kennedy: Yeah. How about . . . let’s see . . . how are we now
. . . are we going to continue our observation of the island?
Carter: We have not yet faced that problem, sir. We have a bird ready
to go tomorrow morning and we would like to send it to cover that por-
tion which was obstructed by clouds on the [August] 29th mission. We
could go in across the Isle of Pines—hit the two—[pointing to a map]
hit right there on the first of the green sites and then cover the island
down and back, avoiding the present area. We don’t need any more cov-
erage of that area now.52
President Kennedy: This would be about 75,000 feet, would it,
depending?
LeMay: Sixty-five [thousand], 70,000 feet, yes sir.
52. A U-2 photographed the central and eastern portions of Cuba on September 5. The mis-
sion detected three additional SAM sites in the central portion of the island. Heavy cloud
cover prevented the U-2 from seeing much along the eastern side of the island. “U-2
Carter: I think that’s a safe operation. But I think also it’s safe for the
entire island now, but next week it may not be and it might not be now.
President Kennedy: He has to go over land doesn’t he, to get this
thing, these [unclear]?
Carter: Yes sir, these are verticals.53
LeMay: Well, once these things become operational they have the
capability of shooting a U-2 down, of course. We can go to the low alti-
tude 101s, but [unclear].54
President Kennedy: You can’t get much, can you?
LeMay: You can’t hide them very well.
President Kennedy: You don’t get much I suppose either, do you?
LeMay: Well, you’d get the definite targets you’re looking for. You’d
have to cover a big wide area. You need more sorties to do that. The spe-
cific areas you’re interested in, you could [unclear].
President Kennedy: So the question really is the hazards to this
flight tomorrow.
LeMay: Yes, sir.
Carter: I think the hazard would be very, very slight and we would
like to go ahead with it, sir.
President Kennedy: It’s fine with me. Do you have any?
Robert McNamara: I think we definitely should go ahead, Mr.
President.
Bundy: I would agree.
President Kennedy: Fine.
Now, that would be about—after that it would probably get more dif-
ficult. So what are we going to do then? We ought to go, at least—I
know it’d seem abrupt so let’s be thinking about what [unclear]. There’s
no way we can do this . . .
Thirty-three seconds excised as classified information.
Cline: This flight tomorrow, ought to give us complete coverage of the
island and I think we would assess that and perhaps suggest we do an open
flight or a . . . that it is safe for another major flight based on [unclear].
Carter: Of course, you’ll get noise from the 101s [if President
Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October 1962,” 27 February 1963, in CIA

Documents, McAuliffe, pp. 127–37.
53. Vertical photography was taken from directly overhead, rather than at an angle, pointed
inland from a flight along Cuba’s periphery.
54. The McDonnell RF-101 Voodoo was the world’s first supersonic photoreconnaissance air-
craft. Originally built as a fighter-interceptor, it was a highly maneuverable, low-altitude
reconnaissance plane.
Kennedy adds low-level surveillance flights] but you’re going to get

noise no matter what happens anywhere.
President Kennedy: OK, why don’t we stand down for a meeting at
five. Now, on this meeting at five certainly one of the questions that is
going to come up is this question of our ability or inability to get our
NATO allies to do anything about their ships carrying this stuff. That
would be addressed to you, Mr. Secretary [unclear].
Rusk: Yes, and I will comment briefly on that, that it’s not very
promising at this point. We’ve taken it up with them again. But . . . to
explain some of the difficulties, but that’s not very helpful.
Carter: Does the opening sentence adequately take care of your
injunction [unclear] Mr. President?
President Kennedy: This is what you might read?
Carter: Yes, sir, this is what we’ll give them.
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s fine. I think that’s right. I think the . . .
just what the facts are which is just that . . . [Loud paper rustling.]
President Kennedy: At the meeting then, I think I’ll ask that you,
General [Carter], to just brief on . . . go over that part of the material
which has been made available previously and then this recent material . . .
if you want to comment . . . and then [turn to] the Secretary of Defense
and General LeMay will then be asked about the military significance of
this. Also they’ll talk about Guantánamo. Now, if they want to talk about
this question of Guantánamo, you should respond—
McNamara: Yes, I talked to Admiral [George W.] Anderson this
afternoon, Mr. President, and he recommended that we maintain the
present forces at the present levels, unless we observe, by various means,
reinforcements of Cuban military personnel in the area.55
President Kennedy: Now, this statement of Bundy’s is—I wonder if
at this meeting the personnel we’ll want here will be Secretary of . . .
the CIA, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, General LeMay, and
Mr. Nitze. I wonder if the other gentlemen could perhaps go into my
office and take a look at this statement [unclear] as soon as Bundy has
it ready and then see if you fellows could come to a conclusion on it
and then if we get it all straightened out, then I will have the
Secretary of State and Defense take a look at it and we’ll put it out
right about six.
President Kennedy: Why don’t we all wait in . . .
The meeting breaks up. Only fragments of conversation can be made out.
55. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., was Chief of Naval Operations.

Bundy: Mr. President walk into [unclear]. [Bundy keeps mumbling.]

[Papers shuffling.]
McNamara: [Unclear.] I don’t have [unclear]. Yes, I think so. It
seems to me [unclear]. I’m not sure we [unclear].
Bundy: How much do we want?56
McNamara: All right.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] How much do we want?
McNamara: I would recommend . . . Last time you had 250,000 for
11 months. I’d recommend 150,000 for say 5 months, up to the first of
March, end of February. [Unclear.] Worked out fine [unclear] in effect
while they’re out of session. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: And I think we did a good job [unclear].
Nitze: I appreciate your help. [He laughs.]
Unclear exchanges. Meeting has broken up.
McNamara: Could I just ask, Mr. President, whether you want to
raise [unclear] question with the [congressional] leadership [unclear]. I
agree with [unclear], the surface-to-air missiles should not represent the
stage at which our traditional strength [unclear] putting nuclear weapons
there as a deterrent actually makes Cuba more [unclear] recognizable
deterrent.
Unidentified: They could put some more strength there [unclear]
concentration of artillery [unclear].
Unidentified: We’ve got [unclear].
Nitze: You have an appointment to see Foy Kohler at five? 57
McNamara: Yeah, would you call him? Thank you very much. It may
be too late but at least. But she may have already done it.
Dean Rusk had a barely audible conversation with someone before the
congressmen arrive. The Secretary of State then, it seems, left the room,
but Robert McNamara stayed behind to greet the congressmen.
56. The discussion has shifted to the call-up of reserves that Kennedy believes is necessary to
prepare the U.S. armed forces for any contingency in the rough patch ahead.
57. Foy D. Kohler would replace Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., as U.S. ambassador to the Soviet
Union on 27 September 1962.
5:00 –5:55 P.M.
. . . I think Berlin is coming to some kind of a climax this fall,

one way or another, before Christmas. And I think that today I
would think it would be a mistake for us to talk about military
action or a blockade [against Cuba].
Meeting with Congressional Leadership on Cuba58

The Attorney General and McGeorge Bundy moved to the Oval Office
to complete work on the President’s Cuba statement, as the congres-
sional leadership filed into the Cabinet Room. Earlier in the day, the
White House invited 20 people to attend, including Speaker of the
House John McCormack of Massachusetts, Senate Majority Leader Mike
Mansfield of Montana, and Vice President Lyndon Johnson.59
Robert McNamara was in the Cabinet Room as the congressmen
arrived. At the tail end of the drafting meeting he had mentioned to the
President that a call-up of reserves might be needed during the forth-
coming congressional recess. As the congressmen took their seats
around the Cabinet table, McNamara isolated a key congressional player
to put in a word about the administration’s pressing military need.
Robert McNamara: [quietly as an aside to an unidentified congressman,

perhaps Senator Russell] Well, I think the President wants to tell you
what he knew of it. While you’re standing here, may I mention that
[unclear] possibility of obtaining authority [to] call up reserve [unclear]
personnel while Congress is out of session.60 He can’t do it. The old
58. Including President Kennedy, Senators Everett Dirksen, J. W. Fulbright, Bourke

Hickenlooper, Mike Mansfield, Richard B. Russell, and Alexander Wiley; Congressmen Charles
A. Halleck, John McCormack, and Carl Vinson; Marshall Carter, Curtis LeMay, Robert
McNamara, and Dean Rusk, all identified in the discussion. Senators Thomas H. Kuchel and John
Sparkman and Congressmen Carl Albert, Leslie C. Arends, Robert B. Chiperfield, and Armistead
Selden are listed on the President’s appointments diary but not identified as speakers. Tape 19,
John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
59. Sometime later, Senator John Sparkman of Alabama was added to the list of invitees.
According to a note to the President’s appointments secretary Kenneth O’Donnell, Vice
President Lyndon Johnson, Senators Hubert Humphrey, George Smathers, and Leverett
Saltonstall and Congressmen Hale Boggs and Thomas Morgan could not attend.
60. The 87th Congress adjourned on 14 October 1962 and the 88th Congress convened on 10
January 1963.
Meeting with Cong ressional Leadership on Cuba 53
[unclear] expired on the first of August [unclear] the resolution . . . or

rather on May—yeah, the first of August the resolution was passed. In
theory . . . that authority . . . again, unless he declares a national emer-
gency which is [unclear] impossible to ask Congress. Now this, however,
is likely to cause controversy because of this [unclear]. It certainly would
be the wrong thing to ask for. We are united as a nation at this time.
[Unclear] I don’t think so [unclear]. Well, it’s Cuba, Berlin, and
Southeast Asia, all the [unclear]. No. No sir, I do not. [Unclear.] I wouldn’t
anticipate [unclear] requirement. [Unclear.] The authority shows, our
purpose and firmness of will. You know, we’ve asked for it only for a
period while Congress is out of session until the end of February, from
the 1st of October to the end of February. We could have it [unclear].
This bill was passed [unclear].
While McNamara has this private conversation, the number of con-
gressmen and the voice level in the Cabinet Room rises significantly.
John McCormack: [Unclear] resolution on the holidays. Is that
right, Ev?
Everett Dirksen: Yeah.
McCormack: Constitution Day.
Dirksen: How many more of these [unclear] are going to come?
[Unclear exchanges and greetings.]
Unidentified: They’re not all here, Mr President. They’re not all
here yet. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: General, why don’t you come in and sit over
there. [Whispered exchanges.]
Dirksen: Oh, we are having fun—
President Kennedy: I know you’re having fun, but—
Dirksen: I invited you to come up to the battleground if you run out
of [unclear]. [Laughter.]
Richard Russell: It’s at the country’s expense Mr. President. I can
assure you of that.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.]
Dirksen: The last thing was [Senator Paul] Douglas trying to knock
the lobbying sections out of the bill. John Cooper came along and got it
all bitched up, then they had 15 parliamentary inquiries and as of this
moment, nobody knows what he voted on.61 But he voted on something.
Alexander Wiley: Mike, you come over here. Come on. [Whispered
exchanges.]
61. John Sherman Cooper was a Republican senator from Kentucky.

Unidentified: All the big shots should be at the table, not the little
shots today. [Unclear exchanges.]
Unidentified: Pull up a chair.
Unidentified: You sit back there thinking that you’ll have people think-
ing that pipe as far away from everybody as possible. [Unclear exchanges.]
President Kennedy: Just wait just a minute. Alex. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] California.
Unidentified: He’s in California.
Unidentified: Oh, he’s in California?
Unidentified: Back tonight. I saw Fulbright was in town.
President Kennedy: That singing group from Arkansas here this
morning was fantastic . . . [unclear] group from the University of
Arkansas [unclear] won that prize with forty other countries at singing
medieval church music.
Charles Halleck: Is that the group that all the singing experts said
was no good? [Several voices agree. Laughter.] [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [That] shows you you can’t believe everything
[unclear].
Unidentified: It just proves . . .
Russell: In my opinion I thought the . . .
Unidentified: Huh?
Russell: In my opinion the Italians loved it. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: I think we’re . . . I think we’re starting anyway.
This meeting is to give the leadership the latest information we have
on Cuba. Perhaps General Carter, who is executive director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, who is representing the intelligence com-
munity today in Mr. McCone’s absence, will lead off with first what we
had up till Friday, then the information we got this weekend.62
Marshall Carter: Up until Friday of last week we’ve had considerable
indications—in fact, firm indications—of Soviet shipping up to as many
as forty ships having come into Cuba since mid-July. Spasmodic reports,
many from refugees and from some defectors indicating the type of
equipment, but nothing on which we could really pin a confirmation.
New sources, highly reliable, new information that has just come in
over this last weekend now gives us clear confirmation of exactly what
62. McCone was on his honeymoon at Cap Ferrat, on the French Riviera.
the Soviets have been putting in, in recent weeks. We have surface-to-air
missiles, some artillery, and some motor torpedo boats with missile
launchers.
I’d like to go into the details of exactly what this equipment is that we
have been able to confirm. They are now building, on the island of Cuba,
eight surface-to-air missile sites, one probable assembly area just south of
Havana and two additional sites, one on the far eastern side of Cuba.
I’d like to show you these on the map here. There has been very little
permanent construction at these sites, indicating that they are going in
on a crash basis and yet they could be operational, some of them, within
a week. It takes a minimum of 125 technically trained personnel to oper-
ate one of these sites and to the best of our knowledge, no Cubans have
been receiving this technical training. This excludes the security person-
nel and administrative personnel required to operate a site. The sites on
the western slope of Cuba, eight of them, cover the entire third of the
island. Just below Havana is what appears to be an assembly area from
the information we are getting, and in the far right, we have here an
indication of an additional site. Each of these sites has a central radar
and normally six launchers, each normally having a missile. They are
exactly the type of equipment that the Soviets utilize in Russia and is
known as their [NATO designation] SA-2. It has characteristics some-
what better than the Nike Ajax, not as good as the Nike Hercules. Its
horizontal range is 25 to 30 miles, its altitude capability 60[,000] to
80,000 feet with one system, 80,000 to 100,000 feet with an improved
system. We have not received information as to which of the systems
they are putting in. Low altitude capability is about 2,500 feet and the
maximum operational area for these missiles; the best capabilities are
between 10,000 and 60,000 feet. It appears that there will be additional
surface-to-air missile sites put in subsequently.
Now further defector and clandestine reports from the central
province indicate that at least two sites will be located there—I’ve put
them in in green—but we have not received any confirming information
on those. The pattern now is emerging that would indicate approxi-
mately 24 sites in total would cover the entire island of Cuba.
In addition to the surface-to-air missile sites that are being put in, we
have confirmed reports on eight Komar-type missile-launching motor
torpedo boats. These have an operational radius of about 300 miles at a
speed of 45 knots. Each of the boats has two missile launchers, but these
launchers are not reloadable, so that they must go back to shore or to a
mother ship to get new loads. They are radar-guided missiles and they
have an effective range of between 15 and 17 miles. It carries a 2,000-

pound high-explosive warhead. This is a conventional type of missile-
launching motor-torpedo boat such as the Soviets utilize in their waters.
Some Cuban naval personnel have received training in the Soviet Union
but we do not know whether or not they were trained on the Komar-
type boat. These are in addition to the 13 motor-torpedo boats and the
six submarine chasers that we had reported earlier this year.
These same highly reliable sources indicate that current shipments also
include some additional army-type armaments such as tanks and armored
personnel carriers, possibly also some combat aircraft. We now credit the
Cubans with having 60 MiG fighters operational including at least a dozen
MiG 19s. There is no report on any MiG 21s or of any bombers.
Soviet shipments of military equipment continue to show no signs of
letting up. There are about 16 Soviet dry cargo ships now en route to
Cuba and we estimate at least ten of them are probably carrying military
equipment. Total numbers of military and military-related shipments to
Cuba since mid-July approximate 65 vessels. The routine shipments of
Soviet goods continue mainly in Western bottoms.63 At least 1,700
Soviet military technicians have arrived in Cuba in late July and early
August. Bloc military personnel, as you know, first began arriving in
Cuba in mid-1960 and up until this most recent influx, we have been car-
rying about 500 military-type technicians, several thousand agricultural
and economic type. Thirteen hundred military-type technicians have just
recently arrived and we estimate now from 3,000 to 3,500 military tech-
nicians on the island of Cuba. We would anticipate that additional Soviet
technicians, both military and economic, would be coming in these sub-
sequent shipments.
That concludes the present situation as we were able to confirm it
just this past weekend from, what I say, are very reliable sources, Mr.
President.
President Kennedy: Questions, gentlemen?
Russell: How many of these missile torpedo boats did you say they
had?
Carter: There are eight of them there, sir, now.
Hickenlooper: Are they water to water, water to air?
Carter: Water to water, short range, highly accurate, however, or rea-
sonably accurate. The . . .
Hickenlooper: Not subject to water to air?
63. Ships registered in non-Communist countries.

Carter: No sir. We give them an estimated probable error [in accu-

racy] of about 100 feet.
President Kennedy: At how many miles? At 15 miles?
Carter: At 15 miles, yes, sir.
President Kennedy: We would hope to have the rest of the informa-
tion in a very short while about other sites on the rest of this island
[unclear].
Carter: Yes sir, we are seeking out information from the eastern por-
tion of the island. And as it comes in through various sources we will
collate it and I would hope by next week or within the next ten days we
would have any new developments in that area.
Halleck: Mr. President, I wonder if I could ask something?
President Kennedy: Yeah, shoot.
Halleck: Do you consider this a defensive operation or force, or an
offensive [operation]?
Carter: Well, there are no indications of any offensive weapons right
now, sir. These weapons are defensive.
At least, the surface-to-air missiles are. The interpretation as to
tanks or armored personnel carriers—since they are on the island . . . I
think we’d better revert to the Department of Defense to make that
analysis. The motor-torpedo boats, well they are . . . I think I’m not com-
petent to comment on that, sir. General LeMay [would be] better. I
would say they are either defensive or offensive depending upon how
they are used.
Curtis LeMay: I don’t think these torpedo boats have offensive capa-
bility. I think [unclear] defensive buildup.
President Kennedy: [whispering] Did he just say “defensive”?
Russell: Doesn’t matter what you say, Mr. General, if they would
decide to kick us out of Guantánamo, every bit of this stuff could be
offensive. They could bring their artillery and then put them in those
hills back of Guantánamo and run us out. Then we do what?
Unidentified: I would think they’d be [used] mainly against other
Latin American countries.
Russell: Oh, against it, yes.
Hickenlooper: Mr. President, is there any buildup or threat against
Guantánamo at the moment? I mean indication of movement or concen-
tration?
Carter: No sir. Normal harassment that takes place all the time, sir,
but nothing . . . no real indication.
President Kennedy: Might just say something about Guantánamo.
Dean Rusk: Well, they seem to be staying very much at arm’s length
from Guantánamo, with any significant forces, [unclear] moving some
forces.
President Kennedy: The Secretary of Defense wants to say some-
thing about Guantánamo, what we got there?
McNamara: Yes, Mr. President. We have relatively light forces there
at the present time, approximately 1,500 men including about 400 sailors
who have been trained for ground combat.
An attack on Guantánamo would have to be met with forces from the
United States, forces which are available, which are on alert, fighter air-
craft and airborne troops. [Unclear background conversation.]
Hickenlooper: Mr. President, may I ask if—is there any stepped-up
activity on the part of Soviet submarines in the Caribbean waters, the
Gulf [of Mexico], around that area, the shipping lanes?
Carter: No, sir. At least we have no indication of it, sir.
Hickenlooper: Well, I said stepped-up activity. There probably is
some activity around in there.
Carter: Very, very slight, in that area, sir. And very spasmodic.
Hickenlooper: Thank you.
Rusk: There’s been a surprisingly small amount of submarine activ-
ity in the Atlantic area by the Soviets.
Russell: Mr. Secretary, you remember how many dollars they get
each year out of Guantánamo, their employees there?
Rusk: They have 3,200 Cuban employees, of whom 1,000 live on the
base. So that means about 2,200 go back and forth every day.
McNamara: They might get something on the order of seven million
dollars a year perhaps. There are roughly 3,500 employees involved.
Russell: They’re requiring these people to turn in their dollars too,
aren’t they?
McNamara: Yes.
Rusk: So far as we know, there’s been no systematic attempt to
harass the workers on the base, nor has there been any interference with
the water supply there. They run a regular check on the water supply.
Halleck: Are the Cuban workers permitted to buy at the PX on the
base at Guantánamo and then go off base with their purchases, back into
Cuba, such as medicines, luxuries, this that and the other thing?
McNamara: I don’t believe so, but I can’t answer for certain. [Pause.]
Russell: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [to Rusk] Do you want to say anything?
Rusk: Mr. President, I might just comment on two points on the
political side. One, the attitude of the other American states and the effect
of this on them. We do believe that this will give much further impetus to
the motion that started in the hemisphere about a year ago. We detect a
deeper concern in what’s happening in Cuba. You will recall that at the
last Punta del Este Conference in January, this hemisphere showed con-
siderable movement in rejecting Castro as a solution to the hemispheric
problems and unanimously condemned this regime in Cuba as a Marxist-
Leninist government and—with not in all of the cases unanimity—took a
number of actions that moved toward hemispheric solidarity.
Since that time, the Argentine government was in fact overthrown
over this issue, the Frondizi government, and this attitude toward Castro
is one of the key sources of present tensions in Brazil where the reaction
to Castro has been getting stronger.64
In the case of Mexico, if I can make this very much on an off-the-
record basis, we do get more help from Mexico, privately, underneath the
scenes, than they are willing to confess publicly or make any noise about.
They’ve got a political problem there.
But I think we can count on growing, rather than diminishing soli-
darity in the hemisphere, in response or in the face of this continued
buildup of arms in Cuba.
Now, on the other side of that, it seems that it’s necessary for us—we
have done this in a number of ways privately and the President has
thought about the public aspect of it—we’ve got to make it very clear to
all of our friends in the hemisphere that these Cuban armed forces aren’t
going anywhere. They’re not a threat by force of arms to the other coun-
tries of the hemisphere.
Now, you’ll be interested that we’ve—actually the special security
measures established at the Punta del Este Conference as an instrument
of the OAS . . .65 We’ve gone to extraordinary effort to try to catch the
Cubans actually smuggling arms or putting in bands in countries around
the Caribbean, and thus far we haven’t been able to turn up very much.
The principal effort that the Communists are making in Latin America
seems now to be money, and the training of young people as potential
agents, training these Cubans. But we haven’t been able to catch any of
this illicit traffic in arms that we were hoping to intercept [unclear] the
Punta del Este Conference. They seem to be playing a cautious game on
things of that sort.
Now, in the NATO framework, we have been trying to get our
64. The Argentine government under Arturo Frondizi was overthrown on 29 March 1962.
65. Organization of American States.
NATO allies to take a harder look at this Cuban problem than they have
thus far been willing to do. We’ve made some progress, but not nearly
enough in our estimate.
In the case of Canada, their trade with Cuba in 1961, [was] on the
order of 35 or 40 million dollars. This year it will be on the order of six
or seven million dollars. Part of that is because Canada is forbidding any
reexport of anything from the United States to Cuba. They are applying
the COCOM list to Cuba and it cuts off quite a number of things and
also, our own embargo on Cuba has deprived Cuba of dollars that they
might use to buy large quantities of foodstuffs and things of that sort
from Canada. So it’s partly action by Canada, partly because the Cubans
haven’t got any dollars.
We are very much concerned about the use of free world shipping in
the Cuba trade.66 But this is a very, very difficult problem to deal with,
because there is such a vast supply of shipping and a surplus of shipping
for normal trade these days, that the customary arrangements with the
Soviet bloc [are] bare-bones charters, without specifically identifying
them for the Cuba trade. A very small percentage of the tonnage avail-
able in fact goes into the Cuba trade, something like 1 percent, 2 percent,
in that order of magnitude. A number of the NATO countries claim that
they do not have the legal authority to move without having parliamen-
tary action similar to our Trading with the Enemy Act. But, in any
event, since their problem would be to break trading relations with the
Soviet bloc as a whole, as far as shipping is concerned . . . Countries like
Norway, U.K., Greece, that have a heavy reliance upon their shipping
services for foreign exchange for their own necessities, would find it
very difficult to do that in specific relation to Cuba. Nevertheless, we are
talking about this development with our NATO allies and hope very
much that they can find some way to put pressures on those shippers
who are in fact taking an active part in the Cuba trade. But it is a difficult
one because of the vast surpluses of shipping and the nature of the char-
ters that are normally used in the trade that get diverted or turned away
into the actual Cuban part of it.
Dirksen: What flag is predominant would you say?
Rusk: It varies: U.K., Norway, Greece.
Unidentified: Portugal.
Rusk: Portugal slightly, Italy slightly. And—
66. Referring to recent press reports that the demand for shipping between the Soviet Union
and Cuba was so high that vessels registered in NATO member countries were being used.
President Kennedy: West Germany.

Rusk: Yugoslavia and West Germany, all of them are involved with it.
Russell: Mr. Secretary, you . . . speaking of the Mexican cooperation,
I was very much concerned last year when I was down there talking to
some of our people, particularly [three seconds excised as classified informa-
tion] telling me about these dummy corporations that were shipping
parts and replacements to the Cubans to keep their industry going. I
understood that practically all of them were American in origin. They
were transshipping, the dummy corporations in Mexico to Cuba. And
the Canadians are pretty bad about that too. They bought a great deal of
parts and replacements [unclear] few get rich, the big boys over there.
Has that matter been [unclear]?
Rusk: We’ve seen some reduction of that, again partly because of
Cuban foreign exchange, which—
Twenty-four seconds excised as classified information.
Russell: The Russians would never let that happen you see. It’s got
too much nuisance value to . . . They’ve kept them going.
Rusk: There’s practically no trade as such now between Cuba and
Latin America, very limited now. The foreign minister of Chile, for exam-
ple, told me the only thing they sell to Cuba is garlic. And we thought
that was probably something we wouldn’t worry too much about. [Some
chuckling.]
Alexander Wiley: Mr. President, may I ask a question? How do you
define the question of missile sites? I understood you to say that they
were defensive instead of offensive, is that right?
Carter: Yes, sir. These are designed for shooting down aircraft and
that’s all.
Wiley: Well, now then, the next question is, what is our policy in
relation to Cuba? I’m just back from the hinterland and everybody is
inquiring about it and I said I’ll have to talk to the executive who spear-
heads foreign policy or the Secretary of State. What is to be our policy?
Just to sit still and let Cuba carry on?
President Kennedy: [Unclear statement.] On this matter we are going
to make an announcement in regard to the existence of these sites today.
We’re also going to state that the United States would prevent the use
of any of these military weapons, any of this force against any neighboring
country, but that this . . . which I have never thought a very likely prospect
but at least it has been discussed. Any concern that this buildup, military
buildup would be used against another country, another neighbor would
be . . . We will indicate that if that were done, the United States would
intervene under its Rio Treaty and the Monroe Doctrine and all the rest.
As to whether the United States would intervene in Cuba in order to

. . . at this point, I would think it would be a mistake. We’re talking
about—we have to keep some proportion—we’re talking about 60
MiGs, we’re talking about some ground-to-air missiles which from the
island, which do not threaten the United States. We are not talking
about nuclear warheads. We’ve got a very difficult situation in Berlin.
We’ve got a difficult situation in Southeast Asia and a lot of other places.
So that if I were asked, I would say that I could not see, under present
conditions, the United States intervening. It would be a major military
operation. General LeMay can describe it in more detail. It would be a
major military operation.
Wiley: Blockading [unclear].67
President Kennedy: Well, a blockade is a major military operation, too.
It’s an act of war. We could blockade . . . there’s no evidence that that
would bring down Castro for many, many months. You’d have a food situa-
tion in which you’d have people starving and all the rest. In addition,
Berlin obviously would be blockaded also. And if Berlin were blockaded
one of our reprisals obviously could be the actions of various kinds against
Cuba. But I would say today . . . listen I think Berlin is coming to some
kind of a climax this fall, one way or another, before Christmas. And I
think that today I would think it would be a mistake for us to talk about
military action or a blockade [against Cuba]. Blockades are very difficult.
It’s a big island and you have to stop ships of the Soviet Union and other
ships. And it would be regarded as a belligerent act; and it would be
regarded as a warlike act. I would think we would have to assume that
there would be actions taken against countries. . . . I think that we there-
fore should not do that. I don’t see that the Soviet . . .
This is annoying and it’s a danger. I think the dangers to this hemi-
sphere [unclear] by Cuba is by subversion and example. There’s obviously
no military threat, as yet, to the United States. The military threat quite
obviously is still the Soviet Union which has missiles and hydrogen bombs.
So that, in answer to your question, I would . . . even though I know a
lot of people want to invade Cuba, I would be opposed to it today. So I think
we ought to keep very close surveillance on Cuba which we are doing and
keep well informed and make it very clear that the placing in Cuba of mis-
siles which could reach the United States would change the nature of the
. . . buildup and therefore would change the nature of our response.
Rusk: Mr. President, I think it might be worth commenting that the
67. Over previous weeks, Wiley had called publicly for a blockade of Cuba.
Soviets have been reluctant to make a flat all-out commitment to Cuba.

There is a good deal of information that Castro’s famous statement last
December that he was an all-out Marxist-Leninist was a statement
which seriously annoyed the people in Moscow for two reasons: one was
that it exposed him to other people in Latin America. Senator [Bourke]
Hickenlooper and Congressman [Armistead] Selden will remember
how much of an impression that made at the Punta del Este Conference,
for example, and therefore it made him less effective in Latin America.
But secondly, the impression is that he made that statement in order
to try to force the hand of the Soviet[s] to make commitments to Cuba
that the Soviets weren’t ready to make. They have stayed—it’s not sure
now they’re making a flat all-out security commitment to Cuba in this
situation and . . . either publicly or privately.
President Kennedy: After all, the United States put missiles in
Turkey, which are ground to ground with nuclear warheads. We have to
keep some . . . it seems to me we have to weigh our dangers. I would say
the biggest danger right now is for Berlin.
Perhaps you want to comment on what happened in Berlin today and . . .
Rusk: Yes, I’d say—
Wiley: May I say, Mr. President, that I think that the majority of the
people agree with the conclusions that you’ve made, that the world is a
hot spot and we’d better not make it hotter by any of our own acts.
I got your statement to mean that we’ll be ready and willing and able
to carry on but we will not, to the slightest degree precipitate, well, a
third world war. [Pause.]
Hickenlooper: Mr. President.
Hickenlooper: I can see how the present extent of the buildup as
reported here poses no military threat of any great significance at this par-
ticular moment, physically to the United States. But, the thing that both-
ers me is the psychological impact on the Latin American countries.
Whether or not the continued, reported and established buildups in Cuba
of bloc country arms, technicians, people, with inaction here, I’m not sug-
gesting action one way or the other, that isn’t part of my discussion. The
effect that it has on the Latins, and the argument that we’re a paper tiger
and the fomenting groups in Latin America say, “See look what’s happen-
ing 100 miles from the United States. They do nothing about it. The
United States is . . . we have nothing to fear, we can spit in their face, we
can do this, that, and the other thing.” That is, the dissident groups in
Latin America which are not diminishing in strength so far as I can find.
And it’s the psychological impact that bothers me, at least as much if not
more than some of the physical threats, or potential threats that might be
involved at the moment. I think it’s quite a serious psychological situation
in Latin America. Every time it’s announced that more Russian troops,
people, more Russian technicians, whether they are troops in civilian
clothes or whether they are agricultural technicians or whatnot, predomi-
nantly it comes out that the more of those that come in . . . more missiles,
more weapons, and so on, I’m afraid it gives stimulus to those dissident
groups down there which pose an increasing difficulty for us in those
countries. I may be wrong but . . .
President Kennedy: I will say that the Soviet Union exercises some
restraint in some areas. They haven’t after all talked about a peace treaty
since 1958 and they haven’t raised it.68 We did as I say put missiles in
Turkey with nuclear warheads and they didn’t take action. We have
engaged in assistance of various kinds to Iran, Pakistan, and other areas.
So that I think that we both proceed with some caution because we both
[Hickenlooper tries to interrupt] realize where the real danger to the coun-
tries lies finally, but I quite agree that Cuba is . . .
On the other hand, Senator, I’m not so sure looking at it over the last
12 months whether you’d say that what’s happened in Cuba has particu-
larly helped the Communist cause. I would say that there’s a lot of things
that helped the Communist cause but I think they are more internal in
each country and not what’s happened to Cuba. I would say that every
survey I’ve seen in the last 12 months shows the sharpest drop in the
support of Castro, which was, perhaps since ’59.
Hickenlooper: Mr. President, I have noticed in whatever meager and
perhaps inaccurate information I get, I think I have noticed a sharp drop
over the last year, year and a quarter, in Castro, the popularity of Castro,
or the respect for Castro as an individual, or as a leader. But Castroism is
a thing that I believe they separate from Castro in their thinking. That
is, the idea that you can take from the big fellow, that you can go take and
do it with immunity. That you can confiscate, that you can have this, that,
and the other thing, which they ally with Castro’s movement in Cuba.
They know Castro is a Commie, they know he’s under Communist domi-
nation, but I don’t know whether the Spanish say Castroísimo or, what is
68. President Kennedy is playing down his Khrushchev problem. Khrushchev’s 1958 threat to
sign a peace treaty with the East German government triggered the 1958 to 1962 Berlin cri-
sis. Although Khrushchev had backed down from following through on this threat in 1959, he
had not stopped talking about his readiness to sign a peace treaty. Khrushchev reiterated this
threat at the Vienna Summit of June 1961 and again, most recently, in July 1962.
it? Whatever. Anyway, the Castroism in Spanish is a thing that they dif-
ferentiate as compared to Castro as the individual. I may be wrong about
that but that is the impression I get.
Rusk: Mr. President, I think there is no question that the extreme left
down there will tend to make some noise about this kind of buildup. I think
there is a compensating factor on the other side, Senator. I think that more
and more people of the responsible sort are becoming much more sober
about Cuba than a year ago. A year ago at Punta del Este, as you know, cer-
tain of these countries down there didn’t really think about Cuba; they were
thinking about their own internal problems and those at a distance from
Cuba—Argentina, Brazil, Chile—weren’t very helpful at Punta del Este.
Now, there are growing concerns about it. I think there is a more
sober approach. And I would have to report [unclear] that some of the
reactions have been not what ought to be done about Cuba, but to use
the Cuban situation as a pretext for saying to us: “Well, now that means,
of course, the opportunity presents itself to have more destroyers and
more cruisers and things of that sort.” And that’s as a matter for their
own military establishments. It is not really called for at this point
[unclear] in relation to Cuba. But, I think on balance the development
down there has been wholesome, in response to this. [Unclear.]
The President asked me to comment for just a moment on what hap-
pened in Berlin today. Over the weekend the three allies insisted to the
Soviet Union that their guard coming in from Friedrichstrasse to the
War Memorial would have to be moved to gates down near the War
Memorial to avoid incidents, traffic hazards, provocations that were
resulting from their use of the Friedrichstrasse Gate for their armored
personnel carriers, carriers that they adopted after the stoning incidents
ten days ago. We gave them until this morning to reply because they had
to turn around with Moscow.69
Hickenlooper: That’s the War Memorial at Brandenburg Gate?
69. An imposing Soviet War Memorial in Berlin had been erected just inside West Berlin, near
the Brandenburg Gate. Each day, Soviet soldiers charged with guarding the memorial would
travel down Unter den Linden, through the Brandenburg Gate, from East Berlin to West
Berlin. Disturbances and instances of harassment from West Berliners, particularly students,
had intensified with the recent one-year anniversary of the sealing of West Berlin (13 August)
and the killing of an East German, Peter Fechter, as he was trying to cross the Wall and
escape to West Berlin. This led the Soviets to transport their soldiers in Armored Personnel
Carriers (APCs), creating a difficult issue for the Western powers striving to keep to a mini-
mum the Soviet military presence in West Berlin. By changing the crossing point from the
Brandenburg Gate to the Sandkrug Bridge, the Western powers shortened the distance that
the Soviet APCs would have to travel through West Berlin.
Rusk: That’s correct. So we’ve just had information from Berlin that
the Soviets did accept the Sandkrug Bridge which is just beyond the
Brandenburg Gate and is very near the War Memorial. And we were
interested and pleased that they responded in that way because they
were beginning to build up a position there and we cut that back to the
original [unclear].
Russell: That’s good news.
Short unclear exchange between Rusk and President Kennedy.
Russell: That’s good, but one question, Mr. Secretary. You hear all
kind of rumors that Castro is becoming more and more of a figurehead,
that two of the old-time Communists are running Cuba and he’s more or
less a front. Is there anything to that?
Rusk: My own reading of our information on that, Senator Russell, is
that this is not the case, that it would have, it might have been true per-
haps four or five months ago but that Castro, whatever his faults, has been
more or less accepted by the Soviet Union as the person who has to be
backed even though there is friction between himself and the hard-core,
old-time Communist apparatus.70 Now, I think you do get reports about
his heavy drinking and his administrative hopelessness and things of that
sort. But we’re inclined to believe that the Soviets have agreed to tolerate
his “un-Communist” kinds of weaknesses, if you like, because they need
his hold on the Cuban people. I suspect, myself, that they’d have much
greater difficulty with the Cuban people if Castro were removed and you
had the old-line apparatus trying to take over completely.
Dirksen: General Carter, assuming that those sites you pointed out
are essentially for defensive purposes, how long would it take to convert
them to an offensive facility?
Carter: They’re not convertible, sir. You’d have an entirely new
installation. The only thing you could use would be the administrative
facilities, the buildings and roadways.
Dirksen: What else would they require?
Carter: You’d require launching pads, and an entirely new missile
delivery system and missile guidance system, if you are going into a
static operation. Now, of course, we do have mobile surface-to-surface
missiles in our own inventory and in the Soviet inventory. We have seen
no sign of those at all in Cuba.
70. In March 1962, Castro removed the powerful longtime Cuban Communist leader, Anibal
Escalante. On the shake-up in the Cuban leadership see Fursenko and Naftali, “One Hell of a
Gamble,” pp. 163–65.
Russell: Is it contemplated that there’d be any change in the flight

instructions to any of our planes as a result of the construction of these
bases?
Carter: No, sir. This is—
Russell: Or would you know about that? General LeMay, do you
know about that? [A voice is heard indistinctly in the background.]
Carter: It should not be required.
Russell: Well, we’ve been getting such information by flying along
the shores and all of Cuba and not just by [unclear]. I didn’t know
whether we were going to continue to get that information or whether
it’d prevent us from knowing if they did put in an intermediate-range
missile base.71
Carter: Well, these—
President Kennedy: General, let me just say, this is going to present
us with some difficulties of securing information of the type you
describe. So that we are now considering what should be the action we
would take in order to keep informed about what additional . . .
Russell: [Unclear.]
Rusk: I think there is one point the Senator mentioned—
President Kennedy: But there is no doubt that we can’t fly low.
Rusk: As far as international waters are concerned, I’ve already
announced this week that we would insist upon our right to use interna-
tional waters or international airspace for at least the planes.
President Kennedy: What are the—
Russell: Well, we won’t go into that.72
Carl Vinson: Mr. President, is there any possibility of any more dras-
tic action through the OAS as a result of this arms buildup?
Rusk: I will be talking with the foreign ministers of the OAS and the
U.N. assembly in the next—in about ten days’ time.73 We have talked
with several of them separately on this general subject. We would like to
step up, if we can, the activities of that special security committee.
But thus far, I must say, we’ve had very little luck in getting hard infor-
mation about action directed against the other countries in the hemi-
sphere. They tend to think those are the kind of ordinary Communist
71. The chairman of the Armed Services Committee is asking about the possible consequences
of the SAM deployments on U-2 flights over the island.
72. Senator Russell was a member of the smaller group of congressmen who were regularly
informed about CIA operations.
73. Rusk met with the Latin American ambassadors the following afternoon, where he pro-
posed an informal meeting of foreign ministers.
techniques of money and training [unclear] and things of that sort. Arms,
we think they haven’t been able to buy. We’d love to catch them.
Russell: The President referred to our responsibilities there to these
other countries. Just what would we do if they had an upheaval say in
[the] Dominican Republic and the Communists took over there? A
handful of Castroites there, perhaps not many. But are we under any
more responsibility there to restore some democratic form of govern-
ment than we are in Cuba?
President Kennedy: Well, I’d say that that is our problem, quite obvi-
ously not the military problem, but Haiti is now a [unclear] and I would
think that the United States should intervene if it appeared that there
were going to be a revolt or a coup d’etat in the Dominican Republic that
would put Communists in control, then I would think the United States
would intervene at that point.
Russell: We moved up, I know, when it looked as if the fallen dicta-
tor’s family might—
President Kennedy: That’s right.
Russell: —move back in. I didn’t know whether that . . . of course
you’ve got about as much of a dictator on the other end of the island as
there was in Santo Domingo. Duvalier, I think, is [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear, but someone mentions Castro.]
President Kennedy: Yes, I think that obviously Duvalier . . . and we
don’t know where he’s going, but we have to . . . but I would think that if
we ever had any others that Castro is taking over, then the United States
would with as many other countries as we could, would try to intervene.
We have, in the case of [the] Dominican Republic, we had Colombia and
Venezuela with us. And I think that we ought to attempt to strengthen
our inner OAS arrangements in the Caribbean so that if there is a situa-
tion, we can intervene with the support of at least one or two other
Caribbean countries at the critical moment.
Hickenlooper: Well, Mr. President, isn’t there some evidence that
almost all of the Caribbean countries are willing to join in whatever
intervention the United States should determine—
President Kennedy: I’m sure with the exception perhaps of Haiti, I’m
sure they would.
Hickenlooper: Well, with the exception of Haiti, yes, yes, yes.
President Kennedy: And Mexico, I’m sure they would if they see—
Hickenlooper: Indeed.
President Kennedy: Whether they would join in Guatemala would
depend really on the conditions in Guatemala. But I would think if the . . .
There might be a difference of opinion as to the personnel. And we

might say someone is Communist which the Venezuelans or someone
else might not say. But, I think, if the provocation were clear, I don’t
think there is a doubt—I don’t see anyone who would not support us at
this time with the exception of Haiti.
Unidentified: And Mexico.
President Kennedy: I think the problem always is, as it was with
Castro, is they come into power as something else, and our information
is not complete and therefore we assume that they may be all right. I
think that would be our problem with Guatemala. But I—
William Fulbright: Do you—
The President and Senator Fulbright try to speak at the same time.
President Kennedy: No, you go ahead; I’m finished.
Fulbright: Do you feel that this might be a sort of a testing out of
our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, in part?
Rusk: May I comment on that very briefly, Mr. Chairman—Mr.
President? I’m inclined to believe that the Cuban development came as a
surprise to the Soviets two years ago. They saw in this an opportunity to
cause us some difficulty in this hemisphere. They had not planned it
quite this way all the way through and that they came aboard with large
assistance when it became necessary to support the Castro regime. I
don’t believe it started out as a probing of the Monroe Doctrine, but I do
believe that the attitude we take about the effect of Cuba in the hemi-
sphere is very important in terms of the Monroe Doctrine, in terms of,
more importantly at this point, the inter-American defense treaties. To
be sure that the Soviets realize that there is suspicion beyond Cuba, that
they are in for trouble here . . . and then the Cuban situation has to be
looked at in this total context as a threat and so in a given circumstance
to see what has to be done at the time.
Russell: Mr. President, this statement to which you refer, you not
only refer to these missile sites, but you give all the facts as to the techni-
cians, and . . .
President Kennedy: Yes, but the technician information has been—
Russell: The whole story is being released . . . I think that’s a very
wise—
President Kennedy: The technician material has been put out before—
Russell: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: —but the missile sites we did not get until
Friday and that is being put out to . . . so it’s the missile sites— [Unclear
background whispering.]
Carter: Not in the same degree, Mr. President, as it appears.

Russell: No, it’s much later. As I understand from what General
Carter says, it’s larger than we thought it was when we made this other
statement.
President Kennedy: Well, I think we’ve known for at least two weeks.
In the State Department briefing, it seems to me the figure of 3,500 was
used, wasn’t it?
Rusk: Yes, sir.
Unidentified: [Unclear]—
Carter: Three to five thousand, I think.
Carter: It’s a pretty good fix now at about 5,000 total.
Unidentified: That includes [unclear].
Carter: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: That’s correct. That’s right. But, of the 5,000,
how many are military?
Carter: At the most, 3,500.
President Kennedy: So there’s 3,500, and the others are other kinds
of technicians.
Carter: Yes, sir.
Russell: I think it’s an [unclear] just to give the whole thing out.
Let’s say MiGs, and armored torpedo boats and old kit and bother noth-
ing. Just throw it out and let the people have it . . . hearsay . . . You have
so many rumors, if you don’t do it this way . . .
The tape quality deteriorates intermittently over the next few exchanges.
Russell: . . . it’s worse than it actually is . . .
President Kennedy: Right. Well, I think we’re setting a number—I
don’t know if we got the torpedo boats in this one. Have we put out the
torpedo boats before?
Carter: No, sir.
[Pause.]
President Kennedy: Perhaps General LeMay, before we conclude,
might just want to say what the military problem is of these sites in case
there is ever a military action against Cuba. What it would take—
LeMay: This complicates the military circumstances [unclear].
These missiles are not good at altitude [unclear] go in underneath their
effective altitude and knock them out.
LeMay: I would [unclear] use our strategic force [unclear].
Unidentified: No.
LeMay: I see no complications regarding the general operation

[unclear].
Rusk: [Unclear.]
McNamara: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] General, go see if the statement we’re
going to put out is ready. I might read it to . . .
Background conversation while Rusk is talking is unintelligible.
Rusk: Mr. President, although the forces actually in Guantánamo
may appear to be rather light, the capability of these forces on the one
side is very heavy. And further, the other side, the Cubans have gone to
considerable lengths to make it clear that they don’t have intentions of
attacking Guantánamo. One of the current jokes around the United
Nations is the Cubans [say] “Don’t the Americans hope we would attack
Guantánamo?” That kind of thing. So, I think, the lightness of the forces
in Guantánamo is not necessarily a measure of the situation.
Mansfield: Well, Mr. President, I’d hate for you to lie down, but I
think it ought it to be understood that when you issue a statement, and
give these facts and figures, that the reaction may well be a call for
action of some kind or another. I would hope that this would not be
used for the purpose of creating a situation which would tend to under-
mine your authority and your responsibility. I would hope that we
would move with caution and we will not be carried away by these fig-
ures and facts that you have given us this afternoon. I think we would
have to expect that there will be a certain reaction which may not be
very satisfactory.
President Kennedy: Oh, I expect that, but as I say, [short, unclear aside
to someone else]. All right, as I say we’re talking about 58 MiGs, we’re
talking about some ground-to-air missiles. That really isn’t comparable
to the threats we face all around. So that I think that’s just the perspec-
tive we have to keep it in, even though no one would desire more to see
Castro thrown out of there; but throwing Castro out of there is a major
military operation. It’s just a question of when we decide that that’s the
proper action for us to take. It is an operation which has to be mounted
over a period of time and we could anticipate that there would be reac-
tions in other parts of the world, by the Communist bloc against other
vulnerable areas as we carve out Cuba. So I think we just have to try to
keep all that in perspective.
Mansfield: Well, that’s the point—
President Kennedy: There’s no easy aspect to throwing Castro out.
If we had it, we’d do it. Except an outright military action which
involves a great many divisions—a number of divisions—and a great
deal of our military power and I think we’ve got Berlin, we’ve got
Turkey and Iran . . . We’ve got southeast Asia, so I—
Unidentified: Formosa also.
Fulbright: Do you think?
President Kennedy: And Formosa.
Fulbright: Do you think, Mr. President, if we did decide to take some
firm action about Cuba, that this would turn the pancake over, that this
would start Russia off here, there, somewhere else?
Rusk: I think this will lead to a very very severe crisis indeed. I
couldn’t predict exactly what the Soviets would do but I would think
that they would almost certainly make a major move on Berlin of some
sort. You remember, the unfortunate combination of Hungary and Suez
in 1955 and ’6. Now, if on the other side, as the President indicated, the
Soviets made a move on Berlin, this opens up some possibilities with
Cuba with world support, that we would not have if we at the moment
took initiative against Cuba because of circumstances.
Fulbright: This is the other side of the pancake.
Rusk: See, that’s the other side of the pancake. Because this is a part
of the worldwide confrontation of the free world and the Soviet Union.
We have a million men outside the United States as part of this con-
frontation. All right, this has to be thought of in relation to the whole
because you can’t deal with these simply as little isolated [unclear]
instances but the total situation.
Russell: That’s undoubtedly true, but Senator Mansfield is right about
. . . it may cause a great deal of reaction because this Cuban thing—
Russell: —is in the nature of an offense to the national pride, [chuck-
ling] and there’s something personal about it too. It’s so close down
there that . . . a man wouldn’t get ruffled about something that happened
in Berlin, much less Hungary or some other part of the world, but he
would get upset about Cuba.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Short pause.]
President Kennedy: Well, this statement will be out and it won’t
have any reference to our meeting here but it will be a statement of fact
and you’ve heard the facts as they come along, we’ll make available to
you. And I would think that if we ever get any information about
ground-to-ground missiles then the situation would then be quite
changed and we would have to [unclear].
Unidentified: Well, thank you, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Meanwhile we will . . .
Unidentified: Thank you [unclear] Senator Russell.
Meeting on the Cong ressional Resolution about Cuba 73
Meeting breaks up.

Unidentified: Mr. Secretary.
Unidentified: Hello, Alex. [Unclear.]
Wiley: [Unclear.]
McNamara: Yes, I wanted to speak to Senator Russell also [unclear].
Unidentified: My greatest friend.
The tape spools out.
At the end of the meeting with the congressional leadership, Robert

McNamara, it seems, gathered a few of the congressmen for a short sep-
arate meeting with the President to discuss the need for a special grant
of standby authority to permit the administration to call-up 150,000
reservists. Kennedy had been considering a call up in August as a
response to the increasingly tense situation in West Berlin. His advisers
had discouraged him. Now, it seemed that recent events in Cuba could
provide another argument for the reserve call-up that Kennedy wanted.
5:55–6:10 P.M.
. . . [D]efinitely say “in view of the developments in Cuba” . . .

people understand that . . .
Meeting on the Congressional Resolution about Cuba74

For the second time in twenty months, President Kennedy intended to
seek congressional authority for special reserve mobilization powers. In
mid-1961, following the dramatic Kennedy-Khrushchev summit in
Vienna, where the mercurial Soviet leader had vowed to solve once and
for all the Berlin problem, Congress approved a call-up as part of a pro-
gram of expanding defense spending. Now it was the specter of twin
crises, in and around Cuba and Berlin, combined with the fact that
Congress was about to recess for the midterm elections, that prompted
the administration’s request.
74. Including President Kennedy, Everett Dirksen, Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara,
Paul Nitze, Dean Rusk, Richard Russell, and Carl Vinson. Tape 20, John F. Kennedy Library,
Getting authorization in 1962 was going to be more difficult. In ret-

rospect, the 1961 call-up seemed to have been a mistake. National news-
papers and congressional offices received complaints from some of the
150,000 men who had been pulled away from civilian jobs and their fam-
ilies in 1961. Yet despite the unpopularity of the 1961 call-up, the
Pentagon had since late July been kicking around drafts of a new con-
gressional reserve authorization. The immediate cause was a new cam-
paign of threats from Moscow, which Khrushchev had launched in the
summer by insisting on some kind of resolution of the Berlin tangle
after the U.S. midterm elections. For over a month, these drafts had not
become policy. Although he shared his advisers’ concerns about the
implications of Khrushchev’s threats to Berlin, President Kennedy was
not prepared to push for this authorization until the political climate had
improved.
Now, with the Soviets’ hurriedly and mysteriously building up Cuban
defenses, Kennedy sensed Congress might be prepared to call up
reserves to meet an anticipated superpower conflict. A threat from Cuba
resonated more than one from Berlin with the American people. With
the administration about to make public its statement on the discovery of
Soviet defensive surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in Cuba, it was time to
see whether public concerns over Cuba could translate into congres-
sional support for authorization to call up 150,000 reservists in 1962.
As McNamara corralled key congressional leaders, he knew how
important it was that this request not meet any significant political oppo-
sition. Khrushchev was now in the habit of telling American visitors that
democracies would not fight. It was this notion that the administration
needed to dispel. For a message of unity and determination to be sent to
the Kremlin, any administration request for reserve authorization would
have to proceed smoothly and without controversy through Congress.
The time and place of this meeting remain unclear, though all inter-
nal evidence points to its having taken place on September 4 after the
larger congressional briefing on the Cuba statement. With this smaller
group convened, possibly in the Oval Office, the recording began with
McNamara’s reporting on the results of the 1961 U.S. military buildup
and the reasons why more was needed now.
Robert McNamara: The authority that was granted last summer has
expired. As you know it covered authority to call up 250,000 men during
a period of 11 months and that authority expired with the 1st of July.
Since that authority was granted, we have added about 300,000 men
to the regular forces: roughly 40[,000] to 50,000 men to the Navy, about
the same number to the Air Force, and 110[,000] to 120,000 men to the
Army. All of the forces are in substantially better shape today than they
were on June 30th of last year.
The Army has been expanded in terms of combat-ready divisions by
about 45 percent. There were then 11 combat-ready divisions. There are
today 16 combat-ready divisions.
The Air Force has had a very substantial expansion in its tactical air
strength. A portion of that tactical air strength that has been added,
however, is not yet combat ready and won’t be combat ready for six to
nine months.
The Navy has been expanded by the addition of a large number of
amphibious craft as well as logistical support ships.
So, we are much stronger today than we were 13 or 14 months ago
when we asked for authority to call up Reserve and Guard personnel.
On the other hand, there are both military and political and psycho-
logical reasons why it would be desirable, we believe, to have authority
to call up between 150[,000] and 250,000 personnel during the period
that Congress is out of session, say roughly from the 1st of October to
the end of February. We’ve been considering that. I just mentioned it
briefly, a moment ago, to Chairman [Carl] Vinson and Chairman
[Richard] Russell.75 They mentioned that the House would meet on
Friday—
Unidentified: On Thursday.
McNamara: Rather Thursday. We have a draft resolution, essentially
the same as the resolution passed a year ago. I think we’re all agreed, all
of us who have considered this problem, that if there is to be any contro-
versy, any debate, any argument over whether this is a wise move or not,
it would be undesirable to submit it to—[Tape cuts off briefly.]
President Kennedy: Then [unclear] the numbers revised [by]
General [Burgess]?
McNamara: Yes, sir. We would.
President Kennedy: But it seems to me quite possible that you would
have to call up some air units before the end of the year, if not earlier.
Because I think they would be the most likely units we’d call.
We don’t have any plans to call up any [National] Guard divisions?
McNamara: No, sir. They . . . If—
President Kennedy: That’s why I think the 150 is enough. When it
75. Respectively, chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
gets beyond that, then we’re [unclear] crisis more, and after that we
draft a [unclear].
McNamara: It seems almost certain that any units that were called
up during this intervening period between now and, let’s say, the end of
February could be composed of men who had not been called up within
the last year and a half.
President Kennedy: With the exception of the air.
McNamara: Well, even in the air, Mr. President. We have located
seven squadrons of fighter aircraft and personnel who were not called to
active duty and who would therefore be the squadrons we’d call to rein-
force either the U.S. reserve or to move to Western Europe.
And similarly in the Navy we think that, except under most unusual
circumstances, we could call the 8[,000] or 10,000 naval reservists that
might possibly be needed in the event of blockade and antisubmarine war-
fare from personnel who had not served within the past year and a half.
In the case of the Army, because of the very substantial increase in
armed strength, as I mentioned, a 45 percent increase in the number of
combat ready divisions, we see no real requirement for a call-up during
this period. But with the possibility that such might be necessary, we
would like to have authority to call up a total of at least 150,000 men.
Were it necessary to call Army personnel, again personnel could be
called who had not served within the past year and a half.
Dean Rusk: Mr. President, if I might just make a very brief comment
on the one aspect of this. If the Soviets have been cautious this past year
about Berlin in key times, a lot of it was due to the speed and the calm
with which the Congress moved last autumn in response to the
President’s request for additional strength in the military field. If this
could go through with relative quiet and speed, it would be a very useful
signal in Moscow, but if it were to create a grave controversy, then that
would be—create another problem.
Everett Dirksen: Mr. Secretary, how are we going to avoid acri-
monies today in view of the gripes that obtained in the last call-up of
reserves . . . ?
President Kennedy: Sir, that’s why we’re talking to you now.
Dirksen: Yeah, [unclear].
Now, I think there is probably one way to pour some sugar on that
department and achieve that tactic, if in any kind of a statement you
were going to particularly mention . . . definitely say “in view of the
developments in Cuba” . . . people understand that . . . and a few other
things, put ’em in . . . have no doubt in their minds as to why this is
needed. You [unclear]. Now, Mr. President, I was [unclear] yesterday, I
was the guest of the Winnebago Labor Day, on Labor Day.76 The only
thing they wanted to talk about, those that talked to me, wanted to talk
about Cuba . . . in Cuba. So this is very much in the average person’s
mind and you’ll have to lay it right on the line in any statement you
make; otherwise they’ll be hell-a-poppin for one and we won’t have any
good answers for them, unless you give us the answers.
McNamara: We can say that it will not be necessary. As a matter of
fact, we can insert into the resolution, a statement that personnel who
had served within the past year and a half would not be called back
involuntarily. And we could certainly say that in view of world condi-
tions, including Cuba, we believe it necessary to request this authority to
act during the period when Congress is out of session.
Richard Russell: Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, [unclear] go back and
get the qualified personnel without meeting again with the same group?
McNamara: Yes, we can.
Russell: The only other question you had is about the recommenda-
tion to reducing the National Guard reserve force. Is this [unclear] in
any way contemplated?
McNamara: No, definitely not.
Russell: Because that ought to be explained somewhere.
McNamara: Yes, that can be—that’s very very—
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: Who would we ask? [Unclear exchange. Then indistinct
discussion among the participants.]
Unidentified: Why don’t we lead on this?
Russell: I think that we may have some controversy about this now,
Mr. Secretary—
Unidentified: [whispers in the background] We will.
Russell: —because it’s a political year and you’re on the eve of an elec-
tion. And there have been some legitimate gripes on the part of some of
these fellows who have been called up . . . [unclear] griping, there’s been a
lot of questioning, and we can get the bill through all right. But I can’t
guarantee you that if we [unclear] controversy . . . that the President’s
[unclear] I’ll do it anyhow [unclear] if he wants to do [unclear] to assume
my part of the responsibility to get that through [unclear].
Dirksen: [Unclear.]
76. Senator Everett Dirksen spoke at the Winnebago County (Illinois) Labor Day picnic
(Rockville Register Star, 4 September 1962). We are grateful for the assistance of the Everett
Dirksen Center, University of Illinois, in tracking down this reference.
President Kennedy: Even when pointing out that it’s deeper than
[unclear] international [unclear].
Dirksen: Deeper [unclear] so damn vulnerable [unclear].
President Kennedy: Can we do this in this manner? The Secretary of
Defense can talk to the leadership again and to Senator Russell and to
Senator . . . to Chairman Vinson in the next two or three days in more
detail about the kind of language about how no one would be called up
with the exception of [unclear] of say a thousand people because it’s pos-
sible we might want to [unclear] Cuba. If we really had an emergency,
we could call up an important [unclear]—
Russell: I bet a good many would volunteer.
President Kennedy: —go over to talk to the leadership and unless he . . .
McNamara: Yes, Mr. President, we can do that. This doesn’t—
President Kennedy: You get [unclear] think about in the next day or so.
Carl Vinson: I’m working with [unclear] this week. If it does not
have to be done this week, it might be better. [Unclear.]
The President, McNamara, and the Congressman speak simultaneously.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] through just at the end, which you
suddenly lost the . . .
McNamara: Yes, I agree [unclear], Mr President. It’s pertinent to the
subject that we discuss it more. But we will draft a resolution and dis-
cuss it further.
The meeting seems to have ended and the President has apparently left.
The recorder picks up bits of conversation.
Lincoln: Can I come in?
McNamara: [Unclear] I don’t think it’s necessary to call any of those
that were called up before. Do you?
Lyman Lemnitzer: [Unclear exchange in the background as Lemnitzer
speaks.] I wouldn’t think so and [unclear] all right.
McNamara: Yeah and get this [unclear].
Lemnitzer: I would like to have the 300 people at that point, in
January for Cuba.
McNamara: Well, those could be . . . more of those could be extended
service of people you have.
Lemnitzer: No, not exactly because we don’t have any qualified F-84
people available to do that. They would have to come from the National
Guard, if you wanted for us to move, wanted to do the job properly.
Paul Nitze: Is this a question of manpower ceiling now for you or—
McNamara: It’s really the 300 specialists on that [unclear ]—
Lemnitzer: What we did, you see, is we formed some new regular
units. We didn’t have in the regular establishment any qualified F-84

people, or practically none.77 We had to start up a school and send these
people to school. Now we’ve had a plan for getting National Guard peo-
ple, by name, actually to fill these slots. They’ll all be out of school by
January so this list has been coming down all the time.
McNamara: What I’d like to avoid, Paul, is sending up a bill that has—
Nitze: One [Unclear.]
McNamara: Yeah, one for 300 people, because the criticism will be, or
a criticism against the bill, will be that we’re going to call up people that
had just recently served. I’d like to be able to put in a flat statement that
we won’t call back people who served recently.
Nitze: Of course, if you . . . You know, it might be that if you just have
a proviso covering a thousand men, this is so small that you take the heat
off of it.
McNamara: Yeah, but then it points the finger directly and you really
get a lot of gripes. I think we can—
Lemnitzer: Well, if we had a little more time, I’d imagine we could
get three hundred volunteers.
McNamara: Yeah, I think so, too.
Lemnitzer: [Unclear.] Whether it would be the exact people we
request or not [unclear].
McNamara: Well, yeah. I agree, too.
Lemnitzer: With a little time, I think we can try to find them
[unclear].
McNamara: I think so, too. And there isn’t much . . . we’re not talk-
ing about a long period here.
Lemnitzer: No.
McNamara: We are only talking about 120 days. I think we could
safely have—
Lemnitzer: [Unclear] until January it would be a great help if we
could use these men.
McNamara: Yeah.
Lemnitzer: Because by January you just get the bodies out of school.
McNamara: Yeah.
Lemnitzer: They would then start the unit training—
McNamara: Yeah.
77. Manufactured by Republic, the F-84 was a fighter-bomber introduced in 1948. The F-84
swept-wing version followed in 1951.
Lincoln: Do you want [unclear]?

Tape is shut off, perhaps by Evelyn Lincoln.
After these discussions, the President had a long one-on-one session

with Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee. Then he met with Sorensen and
Pierre Salinger. And finally, he closed the day with a five-minute chat
with McGeorge Bundy. None of these meetings was taped.
Meanwhile Pierre Salinger, the White House press secretary, read
the final text of the President’s statement to reporters:
All Americans, as well as all of our friends in this hemisphere, have

been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolster
the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba. Information has
reached this Government in the last four days from a variety of
sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets have provided
the Cuban Government with a number of antiaircraft defense missiles
with a slant range of 25 miles which are similar to early models of our
Nike. Along with these missiles, the Soviets are apparently providing
the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required
for their operation. We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-
made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles hav-
ing a range of 15 miles. The number of Soviet military technicians
now known to be in Cuba or en route—approximately 3,500—is con-
sistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equip-
ment. As I stated last week, we shall continue to make information
available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.
There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from
any Soviet bloc country, of military bases provided to Russia, of a
violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantánamo, of the presence
of offensive ground-to-ground missiles, or of other significant offen-
sive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and
guidance. Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.
The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide
challenge posed by Communist threats to the peace. It must be dealt
with as a part of that larger issue as well as in the context of the special
relationships which have long characterized the inter-American system.
It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro
regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force
or by the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may
be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western
W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962 81
Hemisphere. The United States, in conjunction with other hemisphere

countries, will make sure that while increased Cuban armaments will
be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba themselves, they will
be nothing more.
His official day at an end, the President went for his evening swim at
7:35 P.M.
Wednesday, September 5, 1962
The President reached the Oval Office after breakfast with the congres-
sional leadership. The international news that morning was not good.
The Soviets had decided to flex a little muscle in the air corridors linking
Berlin to the world. On Tuesday, Soviet MiGs had unexpectedly
“escorted” three commercial airplanes flying over East Germany on their
way to West Berlin. These actions stood in stark contrast to Moscow’s
apparent acceptance of a Western plan to regulate Soviet troop move-
ments to the Soviet War Memorial in West Berlin.
The news from Moscow would not get any better in the course of
the day. The Soviets would decide to reiterate their opposition to any
four-power meeting on Berlin, asserting instead that the best way to
eliminate tension in that divided city was to sign peace treaties with both
Germanies and remove all troops from West Berlin. And on this day, the
Kremlin would also dismiss the Kennedy administration’s explanation of
the U-2 accident in the Soviet Far East. “Unworthy of responsible politi-
cians,” said the authoritative newspaper, Izvestia.1
This morning Kennedy’s chief foreign policy advisers testified before
the Senate Armed Services Committee about the current crisis in U.S.-
Soviet relations. Neither Dean Rusk nor Robert McNamara mentioned
the administration’s intention to ask for standby authorization to call up
reserves. This was still closely held among the few congressional leaders
who had been briefed on Tuesday. But they did talk about Cuba, Berlin,
and the fact that the United States still had more nuclear weapons than
the Soviet Union.2
1. “Russians Scorn U-2 Note; Call the Flight Aggressive,” New York Times, 6 September 1962.
2. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Together with Joint Sessions
82 W E D N E S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 5, 1962
The President, on the other hand, had a largely ceremonial morning.

He signed into law a bill designating Frederick Douglass’s home as a
national historical site. Then, after a brief meeting with the U.S. ambas-
sador to Portugal, the President spent some time with participants in the
Experiment in International Living program.
Kennedy returned to the White House after lunch at 3:50 P.M. He
switched the tape recorder on and off rapidly, catching what appear to be the
words, “Ambassador Steven[son].” Then silence. The President went into a
13-minute meeting with the Democratic governor of Wisconsin, John
Reynolds, before turning to the next big issue on his agenda, nuclear testing.
5:00 –6:15 P.M.
I get the impression with all this material [that] this is a case of
go out and see what happens. Because you know, nobody knows.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series3

President Kennedy was uneasy about the remaining tests in the DOMINIC
series. Following the start of the Soviet test series that summer, Defense
and the AEC had pushed for an increase in the number of U.S. nuclear tests.
The Soviet tests seemed to have revealed a much greater antimissile capa-
bility than had been expected, and there was concern that the United States
needed more information for its own ABM development. The answer for
the United States seemed to be more high-altitude tests, which could simu-
late the effect of nuclear war on satellites and missile communications, to
keep in step with the Soviets. For some time, Kennedy had expressed con-
cern over high-altitude tests. There was a body of evidence that these tests
added radiation—electron particles—to the Earth’s magnetic field, a
potential hazard to satellites and, worse, to astronauts who happened to be
in Earth orbit. Over the objections of the British and some U.S. scientists,
Kennedy had approved high-altitude tests in the original DOMINIC plan.
with the Senate Armed Services Committee (Historical Series), 5 September 1962, Volume 14,
87th Cong., 2d Sess., 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986).
3. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Leland Haworth, Carl Kaysen, Robert
McNamara, Dean Rusk, Glenn Seaborg, Theodore Sorensen, Robert Seamans, Jerome
Wiesner, Adrian Fisher, and James Webb. Tape 20, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s
Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series 83
Now, however, just as he fielded requests for more of these tests, Kennedy
had additional reasons to doubt his original grant of approval. On
September 1, the Atomic Energy Commission had admitted that the high-
altitude STARFISH test, conducted on July 8, had unexpectedly added sig-
nificant amounts of radiation to the Earth’s magnetic field, causing damage
to the fuel cells on three satellites. Of great embarrassment to the U.S. gov-
ernment was the fact that one of the damaged satellites, which lost its abil-
ity to communicate with Earth, was British.
Kennedy could not abandon high-altitude tests easily. At Geneva, the
U.S. and British governments had proposed a draft of a partial test ban
that would have outlawed all atmospheric and high-altitude testing as of
January 1, 1963. Although the initial Soviet reaction to this proposal had
been negative, Kennedy wished to have all high-altitude testing out of the
way quickly just in case a change in Soviet disarmament policy made a
treaty possible before the new year. Canceling the remaining tests, how-
ever, would be a direct challenge to what his military experts were telling
him about the new Soviet antiballistic missile program. They wanted him
to swallow a few, last-minute, high-altitude tests as part of DOMINIC, so
that the U.S. missile defense program could keep up with what the
Russians were doing. And, if these contradictory pressures were not
enough to keep in mind, Kennedy knew that NASA had another Mercury
space mission scheduled for September. Kennedy did not want the astro-
naut, Walter M. Schirra, to be endangered by a high-altitude test.4 So, if
Kennedy approved more high-altitude tests in 1962, they would have to be
scheduled with Schirra’s mission in mind. The President did not want a
high-profile postponement of that Mercury mission to draw attention to
any decision to press on with a few last high-altitude shots.
Before the nuclear test meeting began, President Kennedy and a few
of his national security advisers discussed Cuban policy. Press speculation
following the President’s September 4 statement centered on the possibil-
ity of early military action against the island. The recording picked up an
elliptical discussion of the possibilities of imposing a blockade.
Dean Rusk: I think you were starting to say something about this.
Unidentified: I think—
President Kennedy: The blockade thing is really [dead].
4. Born 12 March 1923, in Hackensack, New Jersey, Captain Walter “Wally” M. Schirra flew
on Mercury 8, Gemini 6, and Apollo 7.
McGeorge Bundy: A newsman?
President Kennedy: You know what I think we ought to do, would be
to get a good analysis of what the problems are of blockade—of how
long it would take to have [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.] There are a few
steps we can have ready [unclear]—
Robert McNamara: Well, things we can do now: We could even check
the [unclear]. But I am very reticent that the blockade would be very effec-
tive on that.5 [Unclear interjection.] And it would certainly lead to retalia-
tion, then, almost certainly, I would assume, by the Soviets.6
Dean Rusk: It might in broad terms be very [unclear].
President Kennedy: Let’s deal with that unless [unclear]. My atti-
tude on [unclear interjection by McGeorge Bundy] off by the weather.
Bundy: [Unclear.] What we could do, what could we do . . .
Unidentified: Building up an independent—
McNamara: In addition to the deterrent we [unclear].
Unidentified: —[a] target zone. When we put it out. [Unclear dis-
cussion.]
Bundy: Third paragraph. I have all the latest substantial [unclear].
McNamara: The problem is that there is still substantial doubt
whether the [unclear] Soviets retaliate with their forces in Berlin or else-
where . . . but put that kind of a blockade in [Cuba] and it will be effec-
tive immediately with the quantities [unclear].
President Kennedy: That’s obvious.
McNamara: And we didn’t discuss [unclear].
Rusk: [Unclear.] [Unclear exchange.]
McNamara: He said it wouldn’t take any U.S. soldiers.
Unidentified: I didn’t know you said seven.
McNamara: I didn’t tell him how many. [Unclear] U.S. soldiers.
Unidentified: Sorry.
McNamara: I think—
Rusk: They believe they can hold on.
McNamara: Substantial casualties [unclear] in Cuba.
Unidentified: In any event, we got a call from your office [unclear].
Unidentified: Well, this isn’t going to be worse in the future.
[Laughter.]
5. The Soviet military buildup on Cuba.

6. In the 4 September drafting meeting the President had worried that the Soviets would
respond to any blockade of Cuba with a blockade of West Berlin.
President Kennedy: All right.

McGeorge Bundy calls the nuclear test meeting to order. The chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission, Glenn Seaborg, is to lead off with a
briefing on the latest Soviet test series. Announced on July 21, this test
series started on August 5 with a gigantic atmospheric test estimated at
30 megatons. In the days that followed, the Soviets tested many nuclear
devices with much smaller yields.
Bundy: Mr. President, this is a preliminary meeting for a meeting of
the NSC [National Security Council] tomorrow. [Tape cut off briefly.]
And then look at the draft letter which essentially states the direct and
appropriate amount of defense commission.
Glenn Seaborg: Well, very briefly there have been 18 airburst tests,
and then there was this one underground test, where we really just got a
picture of the crater of.7 Since the start there have . . . we only have a lit-
tle bit of the radiochemistry at the moment.
Twenty-nine seconds excised as classified information.
Seaborg: The other thing I think that’s interesting about the series is
there’s been a tremendous concentration on relatively small-yield tests;
we’ve gotten several in the less than 5 kt [kiloton] and some that were
probably less than 1 kt are the ones which we don’t really have a good yield
[unclear.]8 This is much more so than we’ve ever seen before when they’ve
tested.
Jerome Wiesner: That’s not surprising given the last series, which
concentrated on hard wood—
President Kennedy: But it indicates . . . what does that indicate?
Unidentified: Well, the thing it might indicate [is] that they’re aim-
ing at the small tactical—
President Kennedy: Tactical.
Unidentified: —type of devices; that would be my guess.
Twelve seconds excised as classified information.
Seaborg: These are still pretty tenuous but there are a number of con-
nections between Tyuratam and the other testing areas and also with
Novaya Zemlya. And there is a certain, at least, possibility that they will fire
7. An airburst is the explosion of a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere, but below 100,000 feet
and at such an altitude that the expanding fireball does not touch the Earth’s surface. Test
devices detonated above 100,000 feet are known as high-altitude tests.
8. Yield is the energy released in nuclear explosions, usually expressed in terms of the equiva-
lent tonnage of TNT required to produce the same energy release.
something from Novaya Zemlya, coming from Tyuratam up to Novaya

Zemlya or perhaps from some other inland site. But [unclear] likely to be
Tyuratam.9
Eleven seconds excised as classified information.
Seaborg: Which were similar to those tests which occurred off in the
Novaya Zemlya area, which gives us some thought that perhaps if they
are going to do a high-altitude test, they will do it up there.
President Kennedy: This gives [unclear], all right. What problems
might that present—similar to the problem of, that we—
Seaborg: We don’t—I gather you’d have to ask Jerry [Wiesner] on
this but my feeling is that this is less likely to cause trouble than at those
higher latitudes.10 But as of last week those scientists—[unclear interjec-
tion]. No, you’re thinking of the shot . . . no those radiation effects—but
we really don’t know enough about it to be sure one way or the other—
it probably would depend on what the yield is.
President Kennedy: How much? By what factor would you have to
increase the number of—11
Unidentified: Electrons.
Unidentified: Electrons.
President Kennedy: —to make a lunar journey prohibitive?
Wiesner: It would make it difficult if you wind up with [unclear] . . .
President Kennedy: A moral [unclear].
Wiesner: More advanced . . . Would you say a factor of 50 would
really push it . . . serious trouble?
Unidentified: Well, as of right now, we feel that we probably can get
through; however, it is already a matter of concern and it is an additive
effect. And so we would really be concerned if the electronic power
increased by a factor of say ten times. I think that would almost rule out
the flight.
9. The Tyuratam Missile Test Range was east of the Aral Sea in the Soviet republic of
Kazakhstan. Referred to as Baikonur in official Soviet press releases, it was the location of the
first Soviet launch of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile in August 1957.
10. Jerome B. Wiesner was the President’s special assistant for science and technology and
director of the White House Office of Science and Technology.
11. The President has in mind the controversy about the effects of high-altitude testing on the
upper atmosphere. On 11 August the Soviets had asked the United States not to conduct any
tests that endangered their cosmonaut Major Andrian Nikolayev. Here Kennedy wonders
whether the more recent Soviet high-altitude tests had added additional charged particles—
electrons—to the upper atmosphere, which could interfere with radio communications or even
pose a threat to the lives of astronauts who orbited through this space.
Unidentified: There are actually two things that—there are a num-

ber of things you could do, I might point out. First of all, you could
launch. You see your present difficulties occur at one hot spot in the
Atlantic. If you could carry out your launchings in a way that avoided
that—handicapping your launching time. You could get it back to a very
substantial reduction by doing that. Secondly—
President Kennedy: I’d have to move the whole space program up to
New England then. [Laughter.]
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: What did we move it for then [unclear]?
Unidentified:12 [Unclear] I think you could fire from any of our bases
and avoid that. It just depends on the nature of your launch as a matter
of fact and the nature of your mission mostly.
Secondly—whereas I think NASA is justifiably worried about the
present 8R estimates of dosage, a human being could take 10 [to] 20
times that dosage of electrons, and medical people tell us, and still sur-
vive and not be sick, not be hurt. I think the [unclear]—
President Kennedy: In any case, I was thinking just because of this . . .
We haven’t gotten any response from the Soviets—
Unidentified: I think a factor of 50 would really get you in serious
trouble. I think Bob is right that at a factor of 10 you’d begin to worry—
I think you could manage, if you found yourself in this embarrassment,
but I don’t—
President Kennedy: OK, right, in any case.
Unidentified: It also causes heaps of trouble, if you start—
James Webb: Well, I think we can shield, but it might cause us some
trouble. 13
Rusk: Would any [unclear]? Has anything happened in the recent
Soviet series that is any surprise at all?
Unidentified: No.
Seaborg: I think the only thing surprising is that they haven’t really
been—so far at this stage in the analysis—nothing surprising has showed
up. But [unclear]. I think it was a little bit of a surprise that this first one
was clean; I think one rather expected it not to be.14
12. Probably Robert Seamans of NASA.

13. Shield the astronaut from this radiation.
14. A weapon that produces less residual radiation relative to other weapons of the same
energy yield is said to be cleaner.
President Kennedy: What about our tests? How would you summa-
rize our tests, as far as . . . so, how would they? If they were talking
about our tests would they dismiss them quite as you dismiss theirs?
Seaborg: I think that they would not be able to understand the
sophistication of some of the biggest advances we have. Well, one other
point I might mention: we have electromagnetic timing measurements
on the . . . pulse measurements on a number of these high-yield shots
and so far all of them have been two-stage as far—
Unidentified: Well, we’ve missed the 25 megaton, we’ve—
Seaborg: No.
Seaborg: No, no. We got it but not with the airplane; we got it.15
[Unclear.]
Unidentified: That’s a two-stage one, too?
Seaborg: And that’s two-stage . . . Now this data—I think, at this
stage one must always remember one is still relatively looking . . . taking
a first look at the data.
Unidentified: I think—
Seaborg: Last year things changed several times in the process . . .
Unidentified: I think one observation that might be made here. And
I don’t want to put a lot of weight on it; but that is: this 25-megaton shot
being clean can be inter[preted] . . . I mean, it has significance in various
ways. But our most advanced ideas, namely the ripple concept, leads to
an inherently clean system and maximum efficiency.16
Unidentified: You don’t know whether it is a clean weapon or
another weapon that is—
Unidentified: Right. Or [unclear interjection] whether it’s clean to be
clean or whether it’s clean [unclear interjection].
Seaborg: I’m sorry, I believe it has lead in it. And I think that’s quite
a different process. I’ll check, and I don’t have it here, but that’s my
understanding [unclear and unclear interjection] in lead so that it’s not an
amazing development.
Webb: Well, perhaps it isn’t—
Seaborg: It wouldn’t show up in lead.
Webb: With reference to your earlier question, Mr. President, I think
15. The U.S. Air Force and the CIA cooperated in using reconnaissance planes to collect elec-
tronic signals from Soviet test ranges. The U-2 that strayed over Soviet territory in late
August was likely on one of these missions (see “Meeting on U-2 Incident,” 4 September 1962).
16. A ripple device permits the firing or releasing of two or more munitions, in this context
nuclear weapons, in close succession.
probably the single most-advanced thing they wouldn’t be able to make

much sense out of, namely the ripple, which is of course a very reduced
yield and a very complicated device. So, I doubt that they could really
make any sense of it.
Unidentified: So, they would have the same troubles we have with
their efficient weapon last time. [Chuckles.]
Webb: Yes, I think so.
Unidentified: Not being able to decipher what it was.
Seaborg: I don’t think also that they have anything like the sophisti-
cated system that we have for [unclear].
Twenty-two seconds excised as classified information.
Kaysen: . . . I think, leads to the very low weight, high-yield weapons.
Are the two most—
Unidentified: Why in other words, yes—
Unidentified: The two most important.
Kaysen: Yes. And with some real [unclear] advances in the primary,
the primary—
Unidentified: Well, those came from underground.
Bundy: [Unclear] and did them underground. That’s correct.
Kaysen: I was speaking of—
President Kennedy: All right, well, let’s . . . Can you?
Bundy: That’s essentially all—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] now? [flipping through chart] Where
do you want us to look?
Bundy: Well, at their yield. At the back of graph 3, Mr. President,
that you will see the series of tests which [unclear]—
Unidentified: We brought a chart that indicates that . . .
Bundy: The next to last page, page 17, following the schedule, what
it amounts to is a series of values, you get 6 of one, 5 of the other.17
Unidentified: That’s right. A total of 11.
Bundy: Of high-altitude tests primarily for determining these effects,
which we still so imperfectly understand from 50 kilometers on up, 25
kilometers on up.18
And a series of five new atmospheric tests primarily designed to
17. In reaction to the new Soviet test series, President Kennedy had indicated in August that
he would authorize an additional 11 tests in the DOMINIC series, some of which would be
high-altitude tests.
18. For details on the scope, character, and purposes of the DOMINIC test series, see Chuck
Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (New York: Orion Books, 1988), pp. 81–89.
explore further the problem of very high yield weapons with probably
low weights. The most important being the Ripple II and Ripple III
experiments, I believe.
President Kennedy: Where are those?
Bundy: On the right-hand side.
Bundy: It may be worth just a moment to explain what that is. I
should think Lee [Haworth] or Glenn [Seaborg] . . .19 Because that is
probably the most important technical development in our own Dominic
series.
Kaysen: That’s the sort of breakthrough of the Livermore laboratory.
One minute, 29 seconds excised as classified information.
During the portion of this conversation excised for reasons of national
security, the President evidently asked Glenn Seaborg a question that led
to the following discussion of the role of underground testing in the U.S.
program of nuclear trials.
Rusk: . . . you might Glenn Seaborg, before you get to the President’s
question, looking ahead at your own program underground, do you see,
[unclear] strictly from your own point of view, a period of six months
say in which you would not yourself expect to conduct underground
tests for reasons of your own? Do you . . . Are there going to be any
recesses?
Seaborg: You mean if there were . . . If the possibility existed of car-
rying on tests in the future on a—
Rusk: Yes.
Seaborg: Optimum time schedule?
Rusk: If there were no, if you like, interference from the outside. Are
there periods of time in which you would not be doing anything any-
how—if you were just running your own . . .
Seaborg: I think our present view is that from the standpoint of the
best rate of advance by testing, that the Atomic Energy Commission
would prefer the—
Rusk: Steady course.
Seaborg: The steady course at an optimum rate, where the tests
would be [unclear]—
President Kennedy: Let’s see—how many underground tests have
we carried on now, since last September?
Seaborg: About 15.
19. Leland J. Haworth was a commissioner of the AEC.

President Kennedy: We had 15 underground tests and 15 atmos-

pheric tests.
Seaborg: No about 25 are—
President Kennedy: So, we’ve had 25 atmospheric.
Seaborg: About, yes.
President Kennedy: Twenty-five atmospheric tests. We’ve had 75
tests in the last 11, 10 months now.20 I can’t see what there is above . . .
ahead of us in the next nine months or a year that make it so necessary
for us to continue to test beyond what you have talked about here. So, I
mean, we are starting to talk about what, 75 times or 60, aren’t we? I
mean that’s what we’re—
Unidentified: Mr. President could I make a comment on that?
Unidentified: There is something that is in the underground pro-
gram that’s of great interest to us. And that’s about mainly our clean
weapons in the low-yield range.21
Fifty-one seconds excised as classified information.
Bundy: Broadly speaking, the underground testing program can now
provide for continuous and rapid weapons development and effects tests
when we get calibration for everything up to 50 or even 100 kt.22
And I think if we were to put it this way, Mr. President, so that you
could see the choices: I don’t believe that there will be any significant,
really heavy pressure from the laboratories for continued atmospheric
tests for a period of a year to 18 months after this series is completed in
the higher yields. And I think if we were to continue without atmos-
pheric testing in 1963, you would have high morale with a high rate of
progress.
Underground testing, simply because it is the outlet, has a kind of
psychological impact on the vitality and the energy of the laboratories
and there is, therefore, a certain cost of cutting that off. On the other
hand, the fact that we have had these 50 tests makes it perfectly plain
20. The President was only off by one test. Since the Soviets broke the moratorium in
September 1961 and by the time of this meeting, the United States had tested 27 times in the
atmosphere as part of the DOMINIC series, 44 times underground as part of the NOUGAT
series, and 5 times underground or on the surface as part of Operation STORAX—a total of
76 tests. (Gallery of U.S. Nuclear Tests, Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org).
21. These were for tactical use.
22. The first U.S. underground test (RAINIER) occurred in 1957. By 1962, most U.S. nuclear
testing was done underground at the National Testing Site in Nevada. In fact, two-thirds of
all U.S. tests since the resumption of testing in September 1961 took place underground.
that in the underground area we are, not only more experienced, but bet-
ter informed and better prepared than any other country.
Kaysen: Of course, somebody has [unclear]—but we are also learning
how to test higher and higher yields underground. This probably could
now be used to test weapons up to about 100 kilotons and possibly could
go up as high as a megaton. The point that Mr. Bundy makes about the
general effect on the laboratories and the state of readiness that it keeps
the laboratories in and the state of higher morale that it provides for the
laboratories is, of course, a point [that] we have made many times.23
Seaborg: I think it is just about happenstance perhaps; there has to
be a time at which the things that one, the advances one would hope to
make—the most significant advances that are down in the ground are
ones which require a series of experiments rather than a —you build up
to a point and have a sudden go/no-go test. The all-fusion weapon, is
one example.
Wiesner: But the all-fusion weapon, Mr. President, shouldn’t weigh
very heavily in your mind, in my opinion. [Seaborg is mumbling in the
background.] Because, the fact of the matter is today the all-fusion
weapon, as the result of some of the tests, looks more dismal than it did a
year ago. Keep in mind that people [unclear] make it. And it’s got to be
regarded as a long-term development program. I don’t think it should be
a major factor in seeing whatever your thinking is . . .
President Kennedy: Well, let’s go to work on these other matters
[unclear]—were you going to say something about that?
Seaborg: No, that’s all right but—
Wiesner: Wouldn’t you agree with the—
Seaborg: Well yeah, the high cleanliness . . . whether it’s all-fusion or
the other is the same general— [Unclear exchange.]
Wiesner: Which is the one that people hold out as a very cheap, and
therefore very attractive weapon. It’s still a gleam. And it is probably a
dimmer gleam now than it was a year ago.
Unidentified: Well, this is of course part of the go/no-go [unclear].
Wiesner: Yes.
Unidentified: It doesn’t make it, for us, in a year, either.
Unidentified: From a military standpoint, some of these small,
cleaner systems can be very useful. [Some agreement in the background.]
23. See Leland Haworth’s and Glenn Seaborg’s comments at the test ban meeting of 1 August
1962.
Unidentified: Yeah, I’m sure that’s right.

President Kennedy: Let’s take a look down this—how many tests are
we talking about?
Unidentified: Eleven until [unclear].
President Kennedy: And they would be run from what date to what
date?
Bundy: I would say from the third week in September to the first week
in November. But this illustrated schedule which is on page 17 probably
should be slipped and this is as good point as any to indicate the really
grave complexity of this, which is the reason we’ve asked Mr. Webb and Dr.
Seamans to be here . . . is that we have a Mercury shot scheduled now for
the 25th of September. While we do not believe that test Fluvio or test
Nike/Hercules currently scheduled for the 17th to the 22nd will do more
than very temporary damage to this orbiting area, we don’t know that.24
And it would certainly be necessary to measure the atmosphere before
sending up Mr. [Walter] Schirra.25 And our preliminary thought in a staff
discussion of this yesterday, was that we might do better, assuming that this
in principle, in the main, were it acceptable to you, Mr. President, to slip the
whole thing a couple of weeks.26 And to put this initial shot safely behind—
the Mercury shot—rather than to have any question of this kind arise.
The way the diplomatic situation has developed there is a kind of an
informal image of a January 1 point at which there may be pressure not
to do atmospheric testing in light of what you and the Russians have said
to each other; I don’t know whether Butch would agree on this.27
Adrian Fisher: Yes I would. I think January 1 is sort of a point—
President Kennedy: What? About atmospheric testing or all of
them?
Fisher: Well, January 1 is the date which we said we would—
President Kennedy: Stop the testing.
Fisher: —would like to have an effective treaty. If you put it in terms
of an effective treaty . . . But still if saying that, if you start up on January
1 with a series of large bangs, I think that gives you a little bit of a trum-
pet blowing an uncertain note.
President Kennedy: Of course, this Schirra may be a week or two
weeks delayed . . . might be so?
24. These high-altitude tests were subsequently postponed, scaled back, and renamed.
25. Astronaut Schirra was originally scheduled to blast off aboard Mercury 8 on September 23.
26. The remainder of the DOMINIC test series.
27. Butch was Adrian Fisher, deputy director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Webb: It could be. But we are certainly making every effort to go off
by the 25th.
Bundy: The alternative would be if, let’s say for the moment—that
we were to say that we gave NASA ten days or two weeks from the 25th
to try to get him up. If that, for various technical reasons, did not hap-
pen, it might be well to put the Mercury shot over to December, where
there’s another one scheduled. Then get the series out of the way, and go
forward.
McNamara: Could we not carry on some of the airdrop tests?28
Bundy: We could do that. The airdrop tests are really not a problem.
[McNamara is mumbling in the background.] But they are very easy any-
way, Bob. They can be done at any point.
McNamara: I agree. I am just suggesting that instead of pushing the
whole schedule forward two weeks—
Bundy: The tight part of the schedule is the high-altitude testing
part. That’s where there are uncertainties.
McNamara: I think there is some merit in starting the testing . . .
Bundy and McNamara speak at the same time.
Bundy: I agree, [unclear] with the current tests. I would only [unclear]
started, if the Soviets stop.
McNamara: However, in that case we could start airdrops.
Wiesner: Well, there is a problem though, that the ripple weapons
have to be fabricated.
Wiesner: So that you can’t drop them tomorrow. They are still in the
laboratory, in development.
Unidentified: These were actually the earliest dates at which they
could be made ready.
President Kennedy: You mean and each weapon, in other words—
Unidentified: They are being run through the laboratory right now.
President Kennedy: This is a schedule which is based on when these
weapons will be ready?
Unidentified: Yes. I’d speak [unclear] now. [Unclear.]
Bundy: [Unclear] two ranges, Mr. President. In the high-altitude test
28. Most of the tests in the DOMINIC series (25 April 1962 to 4 November 1962)—29 out
of the 36 tests— were airdrop tests. They involved dropping the nuclear device from an
aircraft, detonating it in the air, and measuring its yield. Unlike high-altitude tests, which
were designed primarily to measure weapons effects, airdrop tests were used for weapons
development.
cases, it is based on pad availability, essentially the BLUEGILL test,29

the URRACA test,30 and the KINGFISH test31 [unclear].
President Kennedy: [Unclear]?
Seaborg: Wouldn’t this help you some, Jerry, with respect to this air-
plane question?
Wiesner: In what?
Seaborg: The BLUEGILL. . . . Isn’t there a problem of outfitting an
aircraft by September 17th anyway?
Unidentified: Well, there is. There is the question of whether it’s a
critical . . . a critical air [unclear] or not. [Unidentified person agreeing in
the background.] We could be ready to fire sometime in that period, but
there might be some degradation of the experiment. Of course this is
something that can happen any time in the course of an operation. But I
think at this stage it would help. However, what about HAYMAKER
prime risk two, you would [unclear] perhaps?32
Unidentified: Well, I don’t believe Ripple II, I am quite sure Ripple
II cannot. I believe that the HAYMAKER can; but I have to check it—
Unidentified: That’s right, HAYMAKER [unclear].
McNamara: In any case, HAYMAKER doesn’t have to be postponed.
That’s the point I’m trying to make here.
Unidentified: Yes.
Bundy: [Unclear] That problem doesn’t arise yet, so I think we can
start—
Unidentified: On the 23rd—
Bundy: —the third week of September . . . [Unidentified person says,
“That’s right.”]
Rusk: Does the BLUEGILL shot get into the space problem at all? 33
29. The BLUEGILL test was aborted on 3 June 1962 when the Johnston Island missile track-
ing system failed. The BLUEGILL Prime [the second BLUEGILL test] was the test that
blew up the launch pad and contaminated the launch site at Johnston Island on 25 July 1962.
The Thor missile engine failed after ignition, and the missile control officer hit the destruct
button while the missile was still on the ground. BLUEGILL was a high-altitude test to eval-
uate a W-50 warhead in a Mk 4 reentry vehicle. (Hansen, U.S. Nuclear Weapons, pp. 86–87.)
30. The highest nuclear test (1,300 kilometers) ever planned by the United States, URRACA
was controversial from the moment DOD official Harold Brown announced the schedule for
high-altitude testing 29 April 1962. It was considered the most likely test to add additional
radiation to the Earth’s magnetic field, and it was subsequently canceled.
31. The KINGFISH test was a test similar to BLUEGILL in intention and design.
32. A HAYMAKER underground test, in the NOUGAT series, took place 27 June 1962.
33. BLUEGILL Double Prime was intended to be the lowest of the high-altitude tests. Like
the earlier BLUEGILLs, it too failed.
Kaysen: They are predicted not to.

Bundy: We think not but we would have to make a check, Mr.
Secretary, before we set up an announcement—
Rusk: It would be better for the BLUEGILL shots, if the altitude
permits it in honesty . . . to consider those ordinary atmospheric tests
rather than high-altitude outer space tests.
Unidentified: [Snickering.]
Unidentified: If you don’t, well let’s try. [Unclear interjection.] There
is some concern about the possibility of BLUEGILL getting something
up to levels that will have some effect on the man in space . . . [unclear]
far up that—
Unidentified: We don’t believe this—but we believe it enough that
we’d have to make measurements after the shot to be sure.
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t think we want it around that we
blew off something a week before that made us postpone the thing for
three months.34 I think we shouldn’t take that chance. I would rather
take it on the other end. [Unclear] telling me [unclear] had some slip-
page [unclear] by November 1st, well, let’s say that as we . . . then let’s
not have it then. Let them go ahead and let’s . . . then go till November
20th, [unclear] not [unclear].
Bundy: What we would actually do Mr. President, I think, is to move
the BLUEGILL-URRACA-KINGFISH series back two weeks. There’s a
particular problem about KINGFISH which is worth attention, too. And
that’s the one now scheduled next to last on the 14th of October.
President Kennedy: Well, let’s just set it as our policy that we will
not put off any tests that raises any reasonable prospect of interfering
until Schirra goes. And then let’s try to decide which of these tests we
can throw out. We don’t want to do them all, if we can help it.
Seaborg: You mean which of these we’d terminate?
Seaborg: Well, our candidate among the developmental tests would
be the fourth, THUMBELINA.35
President Kennedy: What about URRACA?
President Kennedy had been uneasy about this planned test since the British
34. Schirra’s Mercury mission.

35. Thumbelina was the name of a nuclear device. Although there was no test called THUM-
BELINA in the DOMINIC series, a Thumbelina device was ultimately tested in an airdrop test
called CHAMA on 18 October 1962. The Thumbelina nuclear device was lightweight with a
small diameter.
raised an objection to it in May. Kennedy created a special panel, including

scientists Wolfgang Panofsky and James A. Van Allen, to study the radiation
effect of URRACA on the natural radiation belt—the so-called Van Allen
radiation belt—in the Earth’s magnetic field. Although this distinguished
panel assured the President that URRACA would not contribute signifi-
cantly to the number of electrons, the President was biased against the test.
For months his AEC chief Seaborg and McNamara had been fighting a
rearguard action to save it. With evidence that the July STARFISH test
had added so much radiation to the magnetic field that one British and two
U.S. satellites had been severely damaged, the President was even more
determined not to take any chances with URRACA.
Seaborg: No, that’s [laughter].
Unidentified: That’s our only [unclear].
Unidentified: That’s our only [unclear].
President Kennedy: What?
Seaborg: That’s the AEC’s only high-altitude shot.
President Kennedy: I know. But we . . . I know, it’s one of the saddest
things I’ve ever . . . I mean, it needs 1,500 kilometers. [Laughter.]
Seaborg: Oh, well, no, we should have made the point that that has
been reduced, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: To what?
Seaborg: From 165 kilotons to 10 kilotons to make the contribution
to the artificial radiation belt negligible.
President Kennedy: All right. So, now it is down to 10 kt?
Seaborg: It is down to 10 kt.
President Kennedy: At 1,500 kilometers?
Seaborg: It is—
Bundy: Mr. President, if you wanted to look at the problem of the
contribution to the electrons, the test to concentrate on is KINGFISH.
Seaborg: Yes, and we should get to that, I think, because that’s—
Bundy: That’s the—
Rusk: [Unclear] the URRACA. I would like to ask an irreverent
question, if I can [unclear]?
Seaborg: Yes.
Rusk: I get the impression with all this material [that] this is a case
of go out and see what happens. Because you know, nobody knows.36 Is
that [unclear]—
36. Rusk is raising a sore subject. Only days earlier the AEC had to admit that the STARFISH
test at 400 kilometers had unexpectedly added large amounts of radiation to the Earth’s mag-
Seaborg: Well that’s [unclear].

Wiesner: If it’s worse than that, you know. [Laughter.]
Seaborg: No, I don’t agree with that and I wouldn’t describe it that
way.
Rusk: [Unclear] saying the knowledge of the existence of unpre-
dicted phenomena could be very important.
Seaborg: Yes, and we’ve found unpredicted things, for example, in
KINGFISH—
Unidentified: We sure did.
Wiesner: This is the place where Glenn’s loyalty to his organization,
I think—37
President Kennedy: Now tell me why it is that this is the AEC’s only
test?
Seaborg: Well, because they are effects shots and the other—38
President Kennedy: But, I mean, Livermore—Los Alamos. This is a
Los Alamos [Scientific Laboratory] test?
Seaborg: Yes.
Unidentified: This is their only high-altitude—
Seaborg: The only high-altitude test.
Unidentified: The rest are Defense Department tests.
Seaborg: That was primarily AEC’s; of course they are all at
Livermore [unclear].39 [Unclear] sort of joint.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but I don’t know . . . And that really is.
What are you going to try to find from this test?
Seaborg: How to . . . ourselves . . . test if it becomes desirable in
space. And to make the diagnosis from those tests that would be neces-
sary for weapons development and how to ascertain whether the other
fellow is testing [unclear]—
netic field, causing damage to the fuel cells on three satellites. According to Seaborg’s later
memoir, Dean Rusk would rib him for years about AEC’s erroneous prediction about the
effects of this high-altitude test [Glenn Seaborg, with the assistance of Benjamin S. Loeb,
Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban (Berkeley; University of California Press 1981), p.156].
37. Seaborg is probably referring to the ill-fated STARFISH test. In his memoir, Seaborg
admits that the AEC had tried to hide the fact that it had been so wrong on STARFISH. In
its first assessment of the test results on 20 August, the AEC wrote that the increase in radi-
ation had been “generally anticipated.” Yes, it had been anticipated, but for the higher-alti-
tude URACCA test not for STARFISH; and the AEC believed these changes would be
insignificant for the Van Allen belt, in any case (see Seaborg, Kennedy, p. 157).
38. Effects shots are tests designed to test the effect of a nuclear blast on communications,
electromagnetic pulses, and so on, in outer space.
39. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, initially the University of California Radiation
Laboratory.
President Kennedy: Well, I think what we ought to do is go around

the room and everybody throw in what test they would give up, if they
had to. And then we can . . . I say we’re going to cut this list down. What
do we want now?
Seaborg: All right. Well, I have given you the Thumbelina [device
test], yes, sir.
President Kennedy: All right. Now, Jerry [Wiesner]. What one
would you give?
Wiesner: Oh, dear.
President Kennedy: Let’s get . . . the problem is which is the least
useful scientifically?
Wiesner: I would rather go the other way and say which ones I think
are most valuable.
President Kennedy: Let’s do it my way. Let’s just . . .
Wiesner: All right, your way, well . . . [chuckling].
President Kennedy: Which one would you throw off the list?
Wiesner: My list will be longer this way. I’d agree with THUMBE-
LINA. I would say that HAYMAKER Prime is probably useful, but not
necessary. I would—
President Kennedy: What’s the least useful?
Wiesner: Least useful: probably THUMBELINA or URRACA.
President Kennedy: URRACA. We’ve already got THUMBELINA;
so we get URRACA.
Wiesner: URRACA.
Wiesner: I think Ripple III could be dispensed with, wouldn’t you
agree, [unclear]?
Kaysen: I’d give up Ripple III, before I’d give up URRACA, yes.
Unidentified: Yes.
Wiesner: Now, not all of the 10-kiloton tests in the high-altitude
series are necessary. You’ll get interesting and useful information—
President Kennedy: Yes, but, OK. Who are we going . . .
Wiesner: But, you could drop all three if you wanted to.
President Kennedy: Do you . . . one? What one do you [unclear]?
[Laughter.]
Unidentified: Well, if I were . . . I think of the high-altitude things, I
think that I would throw out first number 6. I’d just have 33c.
President Kennedy: That’s called? [Bundy whispers.]
Unidentified: Then I would throw out, I think, next the low-yield
BLUEGILL. The 25 kilometer 10 kt.
President Kennedy: Number 1?
Unidentified: Four.
Unidentified: Four. No, 4. See, 4 is a two-stage package actually—
Unidentified: It’s 165 kilotons at 50 kilometers as a backup for
BLUEGILL. And if BLUEGILL is successful, then it’s 10 kilotons at 25
kilometers.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] questions. Do you have any, Mac?
Bundy: I am sure that I would agree on throwing out THUMBE-
LINA and I think the test that you need to pay most attention to, Mr.
President, is KINGFISH number 2, in the high-altitude series.
President Kennedy: That’s right. [Four seconds excised as classified
information.] What about Nike/Hercules?40
Seventeen seconds excised as classified information.
Seaborg: I think that’s the test you’ve read, Mr. President.
Wiesner: No, no. It’s number 5.
Seaborg: Oh.
McNamara: The Nike/Hercules tests bear on KINGFISH—
McNamara: And I think today we should simply agree that we don’t
know whether KINGFISH can be carried out.41
Bundy: Right.
Five seconds excised as classified information.
McNamara: Information can be gained from the, particularly the first
Nike/Hercules, possibly from the second Nike/Hercules also, that will
bear on the potential effects of KINGFISH, and we should certainly not
carry out KINGFISH or decide to carry it out until one or both of those
Nike/Hercules tests have been carried out, Mr. President.
Unidentified: Mr. President—
Wiesner: Ah, excuse me . . . The trouble with that Bob is that the best
estimates that we have now is you drop KINGFISH much below 40 or 50
kilotons, you won’t get any of the blackout effects we are trying to study.42
McNamara: I agree fully.
40. The President is asking about tests using a Nike/Hercules missile to launch the test device
to a somewhat lower altitude, about 25 kilometers, which might accomplish the goals of some
of the high-altitude tests, like KINGFISH.
41. The Secretary of Defense is referring to the new uncertainty concerning the radiation
effects of this particular high-altitude nuclear test.
42. KINGFISH is also designed to test the effect of a very high altitude (circa 95 kilometers)
nuclear blast on command and control systems. Bringing the test lower or reducing its yield
to avoid the harmful effects on the Van Allen belt would make it less useful for this purpose.
Wiesner: [Unclear.]
McNamara: As I say, I think that the Nike/Hercules tests will how-
ever bear on whether you should carry it out at all.
Unidentified: Uh, huh. But, Mr. President, I think—
McNamara: I don’t think we can decide today, for sure—
Unidentified: No.
McNamara: —whether we should carry it out.
Carl Kaysen: I think there is a new dimension or element of the prob-
lem, which perhaps we didn’t have to worry about so much before.
Before, we looked at total yield and we looked at what’s important and
what’s not. We now have a number of 10-kt shots at different altitudes,
which hasn’t you know—Bob McNamara has just said the purpose of
finding out what we know about certain phenomena.
I think if we look at the political side of the business of putting elec-
trons up into space, it’s not only how many electrons we actually put up,
but the total number of high-altitude shots that has some . . . That is a
problem, that is something we ought to look at, so that—
President Kennedy: Well, now, let me ask you, point out these shots
which present the electron possibility.
Forty-six seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: There’s not much use our going to the Russians
and telling them about the problem of electrons and then going ahead
and doing it ourselves and adding more electrons.
Unidentified: Well, I was thinking in estimating, however, if the
Russians do put one up, in the 30- or 40-megaton amount [unclear],
which is not likely . . . But if they shot a very high yield one up to the, at
the most vulnerable altitude and increased by a factor of five or ten the
radiation that’s already up there, then we’re beginning to get into the
range where [unclear] it’s becoming not, maybe not impossible but
[unclear] which is complicated and difficult. I don’t regard it as likely
that the Russians [unclear] . . . additional.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] too; but we haven’t heard unless I ask
[unclear] that we try again with [unclear] the Russian ambassador [unclear]
not much available, not much to draw on over there.
Wiesner: I think that Carl’s point is very important in that the total
number is [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, let’s . . . on this matter of KINGFISH, it
seems to me the Defense Department ought to come forward with addi-
tional reasons for [unclear] tests [unclear] and they can propose, so that
we maybe can cut down the electrons and can give us . . . which we
regard as . . . based on this information. What happened before [unclear]
whether they suggest that we ought to do it or not or whether we can

strip it down to . . . enough to make [unclear] useful but not hazardous.
We can’t very well make any less [unclear] that the Russians as far as . . .
[unclear] ourselves.
Eight seconds excised as classified information.
McNamara: But we are not certain that even with that reduction by a
factor of ten that we have a safe test. We don’t know of any way to find
out other than to carry out the Nike/Hercules tests.
Wiesner: On the other hand we [unclear] number of what will hap-
pen in [unclear].
President Kennedy: The upper limit we deem . . .
Wiesner: The worst possible thing that we think could happen is,
and this we think is unlikely, it could double what’s already up there.
Unidentified: If all the electrons are ours.
Unidentified: If all the electrons that their bomb would generate—
Unidentified: If they’re all going in the wrong place would [unclear]
increase 50 percent.
Wiesner: You see. Right now we think we’ve got 25 percent of the
electrons.[Unclear.] If you got them all, you’d get 50 [unclear].
Unidentified: Of course that could be a different distribution.
Rusk: We know that some of these shots are creating a problem for
us in space [unclear]. I would suppose that our criteria have not changed
from what is necessary for national security into it would be good to do
or good to know. There is a rigorous test: What is required by national
security? [Unclear.]
Bundy: Mr. President, you asked the question what tests do we take
now. I do not find that it’s an unacceptably long list in the context of the
various ideas and possibilities and knowledge probably that we have. I
agree with the Secretary [of State] that that’s the proper test. I think
this may be our last clear chance to do this, and I think that there’s a
great deal to be said for getting in a posture in which we have clearly
found out the things we need to find out. Because we may have a year or
a year and a half when it’s not easy to find out.43
President Kennedy: You think—
Rusk: In fact, a major change in the weight-yield ratio, for example,
is very important from a security point of view that [unclear].
Wiesner: I think you have to be careful about that because it is my
understanding that this test, the Ripple II, will not put you in that posi-
43. When the pace of diplomatic negotiation would make testing politically infeasible.
tion. This will put you in a position to design a weapon, which will
require further testing, so that—
Unidentified: No, it will put you in pretty good position.
Wiesner: Except you’ll have this one. You’ll have this one, which will
not be the 30 to 40 megaton.
Unidentified: No, that’s right.
Unidentified: It might be 15.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Wiesner: I understand that. So that I think that should be clear.
Unidentified: But it will be a big gain.
Wiesner: On the other hand, Mr. President, you want to recall the
KINGFISH-type experiment was one of the basic reasons that we felt
we had to resume testing.44 Which was to get [these] effects [unclear].
Because of the bad luck we’ve had in the Pacific we’ve not carried out
this test. Many of the others, I think, would be cut if you took seriously
the criteria we started applying initially, which the Secretary has talked
about.
McNamara: I would speak to that point, Jerry. I think Ripple III
should not be cut.
Forty-four seconds excised as classified information.
McNamara: We may have to burst higher than we previously antici-
pated to avoid anti-ballistic missile systems. Therefore I think Ripple III
is an important test as I think Ripple II is an important test. So, I would-
n’t cut out either Ripple II or Ripple III. There are others that might be
cut; but not those two.
President Kennedy: Where are we with BLUEGILL?
Well, in any case we are agreed that we will not start these tests
until after this . . . Schirra has gone ahead, we’ll give the order, then.
McNamara: Except, Mr. President, for some air-drop tests.
President Kennedy: Air-drop tests?
McNamara: Yes.
President Kennedy: If we can. If we can do that.
Bundy: How long would you like that, figure that period would be,
Mr. President? Do you want to make it indefinite?
President Kennedy: [to the NASA representatives] Well, we ought to
be able to know within two weeks if you are ever going—we hope you
are going to go within two weeks of the time you’ve said.
44. Soviet high-altitude tests in 1961 had been at higher altitudes than had been anticipated by
U.S. analysts.
Webb: I would certainly say that. Of course, worldwide weather is

the problem here. [President Kennedy agrees.] [Unclear] recovered. But I
think it is feasible to set the [unclear]. If we don’t get off within two
weeks of the time, we do have another [Mercury] flight scheduled in
December. We’d simply cancel that and go on with December at which
time we can have a chance to make it [unclear].
President Kennedy: It seems to me we probably won’t want to do
that. With all the . . . you don’t want to build up the Schirra flight, then
you cancel it till December. That will look like a setback. So, I would
think we’d probably have to go with this flight, if you are ready to go
September 25th . . . want to . . . waiting on the weather then, I think, we
ought to wait until you go and just do whatever else we can do which will
not affect this.
Webb: We’ll do everything we can to go at the earliest possible—
President Kennedy: Then the other problem is that these tests will
be taking place probably after the Soviets have announced that they have
desisted their tests. 45 We assume—
Unidentified: They have closed the area until the 15th of October—46
President Kennedy: So we have to assume—
Unidentified: But that doesn’t mean that they won’t continue with
any [unclear].
Rusk: No, they told us that they are going to be finished by Novem-
ber 1st.
President Kennedy: So we ought to be shooting for November 1st
ourselves. We don’t to want to sort of string them out at the last
moment if we can help it, obviously. That may mean therefore if we have
to . . . if we are not able to put a couple of these airdrops into that period
from September 25th that’s going to put our schedule up till November
12th and 15th, won’t it?
Bundy: The tightness in the schedule, Mr. President, is much more
likely to come not in the airdrop tests but in the high-altitude tests. The
three that are interlocked because of the launch pad problem—
Unidentified: And the airdrop won’t present much of a problem.
Bundy: —are BLUEGILL, URRACA, and KINGFISH.
President Kennedy: URRACA, KINGFISH, and what?
Bundy: And BLUEGILL on 17 September, URRACA 29 September,
and KINGFISH on 14 November.
45. The President means ended.

46. The area is the Soviet testing zone.
President Kennedy: Well, we’re all agreed that we’ve got to go with
BLUEGILL and we have to go with KINGFISH though we’re going to
have another discussion on KINGFISH, aren’t we? [Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: Mr. President, I’d like to make one consideration that
you should have in mind, and that’ll get to the background to the test
ban negotiations, background to the discussions of outer space generally.
And there is under consideration before you the idea of heading off this
military use of space, which is the Soviet concept to get our reconnais-
sance satellite, with our counter position, which is no weapons of mass
destruction in outer space. Now, there’s not a general resolution on that
yet; but that’s the way the thinking tends . . . is shaping up. Now
[unclear] is [unclear] to many ones in outer space, at the same time you
make your proposal. And that’s [unclear] URRACA, and . . . [unclear
interjection] which you hold your position on KINGFISH is—
President Kennedy: Well, URRACA is in trouble . . . anyway. But the
other . . . KINGFISH is the—
Unidentified: It’s our most important test.
President Kennedy: . . . most important test. Unless we have a great
October, I [unclear].
Bundy: [Unclear] is the most important test.
Bundy: [Unclear] ranks after BLUEGILL, STARFISH, and URRACA,
in the earlier recommendations, I think
Unidentified: That is right.
Unidentified: One part of the reason for that I believe was DOD
wasn’t ready to go ahead with it. I think they always felt it was an
important test.
Seaborg: KINGFISH was always in the forefront of these. We didn’t
think we could do it this year.
Wiesner: Mr. President, one other thing is that [unclear] responsi-
bility for the fallout [unclear] getting rid of Thumbelina [unclear]—
Wiesner: Because that’ll [unclear].
President Kennedy: I see.
Bundy: I might mention, Mr. President, although it is not a part of
this specific presentation that there is also a possibility, that there is a
recommendation on it, there is a request for authority to make a fourth
lattice shot. And this would also create fall-out and those problems and
the Defense Department yesterday was apparently pulling very hard
[unclear] all this attention [unclear] the [boron?].
Seaborg: [Unclear] to trigger a shot to see about X rays up and
down. And you [unclear] experiment. You look like you get the data, but
we certainly are not interested in pushing that problem.
Wiesner: It’s a test that’s not unlike, it’s a test not unlike the one we
had [unclear] trouble [unclear] accidentally.
Seaborg: It’s about the same magnitude. There are in effect two
shots: There’s one at one-and-a-half or 1.7 megaton, kilotons each but
right on the surface.
McNamara: Mr. President, in view of the problem of the Russians
completing their tests on November 1st and ours which slipped, as we dis-
cussed it, and extending substantially beyond that point, I’d like to suggest
we take this schedule, and at least as far as the Nike/Hercules and the
KINGFISH shots are concerned, reschedule this to be completed by the
1st of November. I don’t know exactly how we’ll do that; but if you could
give us that objective, I think we can work it out. But I don’t think we
ought to have a schedule extending beyond November 1st.
Unidentified: This poses a problem with regard to Mercury.
McNamara: It does, well, but I am going to assume for the minute
that we will accept a delay in Mercury and reschedule in such a way as to
complete it by the 1st of November.
President Kennedy: How long do you think you’ll need? It’s possible
to give you five weeks; but it might only give you three.
McNamara: It might only give us three weeks; but we have con-
structed another pad, fortunately.
Unidentified: It doesn’t come in till the 15th—
McNamara: I know it doesn’t come in until the 15th of October; but
it is available for two weeks. And for two weeks, we will have two pads.
For the period before that, we will only have one pad.
I think we ought to simply take it as our objective to finish this off by
the 1st of November, at least on schedule.
Bundy: Mr. Secretary, I think we ought to be awfully careful about
this high-altitude test, just out of the experience we have had in trying
to cram it into a tight schedule. I would hate to see us come down to a
period in which we were missing certain things in October [unclear] for
the one that I would myself think in the light of the whole pattern of our
relations with the Soviet Union, it is essential for us to [unclear]
[McNamara begins to interject]. Pressure for [unclear].
McNamara: I don’t think it’s essential, Mac. But I think we can gain
a lot by preparing to complete it by the 1st of November. As a matter of
fact, we will begin to anticipate problems and find solutions to them.
Mac, my concern about what may happen, if we have to defer our tests
until after Mercury starts [is] Mercury may not take off until the end of
November, or the end of October. We’ve got to have some action here to
try to compress our schedule. The best way to get it is simply say,
assume you don’t start until the third . . . or three weeks after the 15th of
September and finish the 1st of November.
Rusk: But on the political side, if we were quite clear that we had
given them [unclear] their two shots go off after they had stopped, we
didn’t say that.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] finish.
Rusk: [Unclear.] Well, we wouldn’t want to do that, then the
[unclear] got to be larger [unclear].
President Kennedy: What about BLUEGILL? Now, what is
BLUEGILL doing in the way of electrons?
Wiesner: Very little. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: Can you get it at 95 [unclear]? Is that the dif-
ference?
Unidentified: Yes, the pressure goes up very greatly.
President Kennedy: You can’t [unclear] . . . dropping KINGFISH?
Unidentified: Well, the trouble is dropping KINGFISH—
President Kennedy: Now what is KINGFISH going to tell us that
BLUEGILL doesn’t?
Fifty-one seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: . . . Let’s do this.
Wiesner: [Unclear] you call URRACA because we don’t know about
that very high altitude—
President Kennedy: Let’s take to . . . we’re going to be back here tomor-
row. I think overnight let’s be thinking—I think we ought to . . . I think 11
[tests] is too many given our time problem. So we’ve got to try to drop—
take it down to 8. And we just have to see where we, and then let’s see what
our—given the problem of—let’s do two schedules: One in which they go
off on time—give them two days; and the other is two weeks. When . . .
And how would we organize it in order to get it done as close to the
November 1st date as Bob McNamara has suggested in recognition that
that’s not a final decision right now?
Then let’s . . . What other matter do we have to consider in regard
[to this]? There’s nothing more we can do about KINGFISH. You got
that down about as fine as you can.
Unidentified: Have to learn more, sir. It is conceivable that we will
have to wait for the yields [unclear] times and the exact height of the
[unclear]?
Unidentified: Learn as much as we can up until . . . for the time that

you need, the advance time that you need, learn as much as you can from
it [unclear].
President Kennedy: Now is there anything . . . you got three, as I
understand it, there are three Nike/Hercules?
Seaborg: Three, yes. Well, one is a scout.
Unidentified: Two are Nike/Hercules and one is a scout, XM 33c.
President Kennedy: They’re all . . .
Unidentified: The BLUEGILL one.
President Kennedy: XM 33c was put in somebody’s list. Which one
is that? What do you call it?
Unidentified: That’s six, seven, and eight [unclear].
President Kennedy: The fact of the matter is, if the Soviet Union
ever really gets this space ship which presented us with a real military
matter, couldn’t you stop it?
Unidentified: If there are people . . . Yes, if they—
President Kennedy: Have people on it.
Wiesner: Well, if it were up above 500 kilometers or so.
Unidentified: [two people talking at the same time] Even at a low altitude,
you could do it for quite a while because quite high levels for a day—
Wiesner: For a few days this stuff could be made very intense.
Unidentified: Oh, yes we could stop it, yes.
President Kennedy: If it were manned?
Unidentified: If it were manned and we wanted to.
Wiesner: You could probably even stop electronic equipment, if you
wanted to—
Wiesner: But it would take the [unclear].
McNamara: Well, the probability is we could shoot it down with
Nike/Zeus from Kwajalein.47
Wiesner: You could probably even stop solar cells from there.
McNamara: We will have by next May, Mr. President, [unidentified
interjection] the capacity at Kwajalein to shoot down satellites in the
order of 150- to 200-mile altitude and we can probably increase that to
800 miles of altitude, say 1,300 kilometers, within a year or two.
47. The U.S. Army’s first antiballistic missile [ABM] system was designed in the mid-1950s,
and then redesigned as the Nike-X.
President Kennedy: We assume they will have the ABM?

McNamara: And we assume they will have the same, yes.
Wiesner: You see we’re doing it with the Nike/Zeus.
McNamara: Yes.
Wiesner: And they have a comparable system.
McNamara: Yes.
Wiesner: In fact, we could do it with our regular missiles, if we
wanted to.
McNamara: There is a great probability that Leningrad system will
have some capability of this kind.48
Wiesner: See, if we really wanted to attack a satellite now, we think
we can do it relatively quickly with a Minuteman, or even with a smaller
missile.
President Kennedy: Well, in any case, we are going to be back again
tomorrow morning and we are going to see if we can get this thing down to
eight and then what the schedule ought to be in view of priorities [unclear].
Seaborg: Mr. President, there is one thing: Cutting the weapons
development tests won’t help much on the schedule.
Unidentified: No.
Seaborg: We have to do it on the left-hand column.
President Kennedy: Now, we are also concerned, which we haven’t
talked about much, about radiation.
Wiesner: Well, this is why I feel strongly about THUMBELINA.
Unidentified: That’s where THUMBELINA helps.
Wiesner: THUMBELINA helps a great deal; but the Ripple II and
III [tests of ripple nuclear devices] will also make a substantial differ-
ence. I understand the Secretary’s—
President Kennedy shuts off the machine.
The National Security Council, at its meeting on Friday, decided to reduce

the 11 remaining tests to 8, dropping the AEC’s HAYMAKER Prime,
URRACA, and a DOD high-altitude test. The President saved THUM-
BELINA because it had been designed by Los Alamos and would provide
an important development base for that laboratory. There were two
alternative sets of dates for these eight tests, depending on the date of
48. The Soviets were thought to be building an ABM system around Leningrad.
110 M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962
Walter Schirra’s Mercury mission. Under no circumstances would the

high-altitude BLUEGILL shot go up until after Schirra had come down.49
Kennedy had one more meeting before the end of Thursday with
Arthur Goldberg and Walter Reuther, the head of the United Auto
Workers [UAW]. This was apparently the meeting Reuther had requested
the previous week to talk about the recent problems between the UAW
and the AFL-CIO. This was not taped.
The President left the Oval Office at 7:40 P.M.
Monday, September 10, 1962
The twin pots of Cuba and Berlin continued to simmer. Cuban policy
seemed to be increasingly a difficult domestic matter for Kennedy. The
administration had managed to keep the congressional resolution for the
reserve call-up under wraps until Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield
introduced it on September 7. Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen
had kept the secret, but just as soon as Mansfield made his statement, the
Republican leadership began a campaign in favor of much tougher action
against Cuba. At the same time, an incident half a world away was also
complicating Kennedy’s Cuba policy. On September 8 a U-2 reconnais-
sance aircraft on a joint U.S.-Taiwanese mission had disappeared over the
People’s Republic of China and was presumed shot down. Given the
administration’s existing concerns about the consequences of a U-2 inci-
dent over Cuba, the event in Asia reopened the debate over what risks
were acceptable to maintain surveillance over the island.
The most disturbing news to reach Kennedy was about Khrushchev
and Berlin. In his second meeting that year with a high-level U.S. visitor
(the first in May, with Salinger and Sorenson), Khrushchev had brought
Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall to his Black Sea resort at
49. Diary of Glenn Seaborg, Entry, 6 September 1962, John F. Kennedy Library. In the end,
there would be nine remaining tests in the DOMINIC series. Five of the nine were airdrop tests,
of which ANDROSCOGGIN (2 October 1962) and HOUSATONIC (30 October 1962) tested
the Ripple II device, and CHAMA (18 October) the Thumbellina device. The ANDROSCOG-
GIN failed, which may be the reason why there was an extra test in this last group. The four
high-altitude tests were CHECKMATE (20 October 1962), BLUEGILL Triple Prime (26
October 1962), KINGFISH (1 November 1962), and TIGHTROPE (4 November 1962). All of
the high-altitude tests took place after Walter Schirra’s nine-hour Mercury mission on 3
October 1962.
M O N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 10, 1962 111
Pitsunda. The Soviet press was about to announce that Berlin negotia-
tions were deadlocked and there would be a pause. Khrushchev now told
Udall, who told Kennedy, just what would happen after that pause. He
said, “We will give [President Kennedy] a choice—go to war, or sign a
peace treaty [ending occupation rights in Berlin]. We will not allow your
troops to be in Berlin.” Khrushchev added, “if any lunatics in your coun-
try want war, Western Europe will hold them back.” If that were not
enough, “It’s been a long time since you could spank us like a little boy—
now we can swat your ass. So let’s not talk about force. We’re equally
strong,” Khrushchev blustered. “You want Berlin. Access to it goes through
East Germany. We have the advantage. If you want to do anything, you
have to start a war.” But Khrushchev promised a lull before he brought
the crisis to a conclusion. “Out of resepct for your President we won’t do
anything until November [after the midterm elections].” None of this
was public. What was public was bad enough. Khrushchev had also met
with visiting U.S. poet Robert Frost, who then recounted to reporters (in
a cleaned up version of what Khrushchev actually said) how Khrushchev
had told him that “we were too liberal to fight.”1
In Congress, when the talk wasn’t on Cuba, there was discussion of a
plan to allow the self-employed to build retirement accounts of their own,
what would become the Self-Employed Pension–Individual Retirement
Account (SEP-IRA), and the President’s foreign aid bill.
The President had spent the weekend at Hammersmith Farm in
Newport, Rhode Island, catching some of the excitement of the upcom-
ing America’s Cup Challenge. Ahead of him this Monday were a series of
important meetings, only half of which he would choose to tape.
A sense of history and, of course, politics apparently influenced the
President’s choice of what to tape this day. Former president Dwight D.
Eisenhower remained a special challenge for Kennedy. Enormously
respected throughout the world, Eisenhower retained the affection of
millions of Americans. Journalist and sometime Kennedy adviser Joseph
Alsop once described the difference in the hold that the younger
President and Eisenhower had on the American people. Kennedy com-
manded their minds, but only Eisenhower had been given a place in
American hearts. The former president had just returned from a lengthy
1. Memorandum of Conversation between Khrushchev and Udall, 6 September 1962, in FRUS,

15: 309. Kennedy apparently read this document, since he alluded to its contents at least once, on
tape, later in the day. On Frost, see Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 351.
European tour, which had included a long conversation with the prickly
German chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Kennedy needed Eisenhower’s
blessing, or at least a political nonaggression pact, to keep control of the
domestic debate on measures appropriate to the current tensions in
Europe. Later in the day, Kennedy would meet with his Berlin team to
discuss the latest developments and to hammer out the responses that
the Western alliance would make if Khrushchev seized West Berlin.
Possibly just before turning to Eisenhower and these foreign mat-
ters, Kennedy called his Secretary of the Treasury to discuss whether to
veto the Self-employed Pension Bill.
Time Unknown
Now, what I’ve got to indicate, therefore, is that I’ll veto it if

it’s hung on this bill and that they’ve got a better chance to
override my veto if it’s separate than they have with this bill.
Conversation with Douglas Dillon2

Despite overwhelming congressional support for H.R. 10, the Self-
employed Pension Bill, President Kennedy felt compelled to oppose the
measure. A similar bill had passed the House on three previous occasions
but had always been rejected by the Senate. Three days before this conver-
sation, on September 7, the measure gained the approval of the Senate for
the first time, and though it emerged in a much diluted form compared to
the original House proposal, it appeared headed for only a modest rework-
ing in the House-Senate conference committee. The precursor of the many
tax deductible private pension plans of later years, Keogh-Smathers—as it
was often called—provided for the partial deductibility of contributions to
private pension plans made by owner managers and the self-employed.3
2. Dictabelt 3A.6, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. C. Douglas Dillon, secretary of the treasury. See also transcripts for
the President’s conversations on H.R. 10 with Albert Gore on 8 October 1962, and with
George Smathers on 10 October 1962.
3. The principal sponsors of the original bill were Eugene J. Keogh, Democratic U.S. represen-
tative from New York, 1937 to 1967, and George A. Smathers, Democratic U.S. senator from
Florida, 1951 to 1969. Under its final provisions, eligible self-employed individuals could
deduct 50 percent of their contributions up to an annual maximum of $2,500 or 10 percent of
Conversation with Douglas Dillon 113
Having received estimates that it would produce a revenue loss of

$100 to $125 million, Kennedy expressed a private desire, soon made
public, that he would prefer to veto the legislation.4 The Treasury had
also weighed in against the bill and had recommended a veto on the basis
of the expected revenue drain and on the realization that the lion’s share
of benefits under the measure would go to wealthy physicians and attor-
neys. Only the likelihood of near unanimous congressional support and a
potential veto override gave the President any reason to consider sign-
ing H.R. 10.5 And though Kennedy believed that the bill was, indeed,
based on a principle of taxpayer equity (since it provided some private
pension plans with tax benefits comparable to those enjoyed by public
pension plans) and that it might be worthy of consideration in a larger
package of tax reform, the estimated revenue loss and the status of its
expected beneficiaries convinced him to issue a veto threat.
While it eventually would be passed as a separate bill, some of its
champions in the Senate launched a preemptive, and ultimately abortive,
search for the appropriate “veto-proof ” legislation on which to add, by
amendment, the provisions of H.R. 10. In the following conversation
with Treasury secretary Douglas Dillon, Kennedy ponders a strategy by
which the administration could convince supporters of the bill not to
hang it on other more favored legislation.
Douglas Dillon: [Unclear] allow me to say that . . . even if he’s retir-

ing in due course—6
Dillon: [Unclear] will be chosen shortly—
Dillon: [Unclear] wait until after Congress has gone home.
President Kennedy: Right. OK . . . fine. Good.
their annual income, whichever was less. In addition, the tax benefits would not be granted to
an employer if he did not offer the same partially deductible retirement contributions to all
employees. The original House version allowed for 100 percent deductibility up to the
$2,500/10 percent limits. A Senate floor amendment by Senators Russell Long (D-Louisiana)
and Eugene J. McCarthy (D-Minnesota) changed this to 50 percent.
4. The estimated revenue loss in the original House version was $365 million.
5. It passed the House unanimously and garnered only four no votes in the Senate: Paul Douglas
(D-Illinois), Albert Gore (D-Tennessee), Pat McNamara (D-Michigan), and Wayne Morse (D-
Oregon). The final version of the bill that emerged out of the Senate-House conference commit-
tee also passed unanimously in the House and received only eight no votes in the Senate.
6. “He” is unidentified.
Douglas Dillon: You don’t have to worry about that.

President Kennedy: OK, good. Now, let’s see . . . this problem of
H.R. 10. They . . . see, [Everett] Dirksen and everything, they’re argu-
ing that unless they hang it on this bill, that I’ll veto it.7 Now, what I’ve
got to indicate, therefore, is that I’ll veto it if it’s hung on this bill and
that they’ve got a better chance to override my veto if it’s separate than
they have with this bill. It’s rather . . . it may not be right, but that’s the
only way. Because, otherwise, they’re going to hang it on this bill.
Dillon: Yeah, although . . . you think they . . . you don’t think they
have the votes?
President Kennedy: Well, I . . . they won’t unless they think I’m
going to veto it.
Dillon: I see.
President Kennedy: So, I’m giving the impression that we’re going to
veto it, and I thought the Treasury people ought to at least have that line—
Dillon: Yeah, fine.
President Kennedy: —that this would be too much of a revenue loss,
it doesn’t belong in this bill, and we just have to veto it.
Dillon: Yeah, the same sort of thing we said about the Cannon
amendment.
President Kennedy: Yeah, right.
Dillon: That [unclear].
President Kennedy: OK, good.
Dillon: OK.
President Kennedy: All right. Thank you.
At 12:30 P.M. the former President arrived at the White House through a
side door. Minutes after Eisenhower’s arrival, the Reverend Billy Graham
paid a call on both Presidents in the Oval Office. Graham was just return-
ing from a visit to Latin America and had some news to bring the
President about the strength of Fidel Castro’s supporters in South
America. President Kennedy tapes the meeting through the receiver of
his telephone. He rarely used this method of taping.8
7. Everett M. Dirksen was a Republican senator from Illinois, 1951 to 1969, and Senate Minority
Leader, 1959 to 1969.
8. It is possible that the conversation on Dictabelt 3A.7, which has not been found, was the
object of President Kennedy’s effort to tape. Ending that conversation, the President might
have forgotten to switch off the dictabelt machine and thus this room conversation was picked
up by either an open receiver or the telephone speaker.
Meeting with Bill y Graham and Dwight Eisenhow er 115
12:35–12:40 P.M.
And the anti-Communist forces are getting hysterical because

they feel that we’re not defending them like we ought to, right
or wrong.
Meeting with Billy Graham and Dwight Eisenhower9

The Reverend William Franklin Graham, Jr.—more popularly known as
Billy Graham—paid a brief courtesy call on the President before depart-
ing for the second half of his 1962 Latin America tour. Relations between
President Kennedy and Graham, the most popular Protestant evangelist
of the era, had never been close, in part because of the minister’s friendly
relations with both Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. Eisenhower’s
arrival for his luncheon with President Kennedy allowed the brief exchange
of greetings. Graham took the opportunity to reiterate the importance of
Latin America’s problems. Although Latin America was an overwhelm-
ingly Catholic region, Graham was deeply concerned that Communist
inroads posed a general threat to religious freedom in the area. This short
conversation begins with Graham discussing his experiences during the
first portion of his Latin American tour in early 1962, when his proselytiz-
ing campaign encountered resistance by local authorities and violent
demonstrations. It was recorded on the Dictaphone connected to the
President’s telephone and, therefore, is of poor quality.10
Billy Graham: There are these guerrillas up in the mountains in

Colombia. I was there. They killed 32 in the town I was in the night I
9. Including President Kennedy, Dwight Eisenhower, Billy Graham, and Evelyn Lincoln.
Dictabelt 3A.8, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection.
10. In January and February 1962, Graham toured Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and
Chile. Then beginning in São Paulo, Brazil, on 25 September 1962, he toured Brazil, Paraguay,
Argentina, and Uruguay. “Billy in Catholic Country: He Collides with Clergy,” Time, 23
February 1962, pp. 77–78; Current Biography Yearbook, 1973 (New York: H. W. Wilson, 1974),
pp. 151–54; Marshall Frady, Billy Graham: A Parable of American Righteousness (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1979), pp. 441–46; Billy Graham, Just As I Am: The Autobiography of Billy Graham (San
Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1997), pp. 188–92, 199–206, 356–57, 360–68, 389–402;
Carroll Kilpatrick, “President Confers With Ike 2 Hours,” Washington Post, 11 September
1962, pp. A1, A6; New York Times, 24 January 1962, p. 3; Wallace Terry, “Billy Graham
Condemns Sterilization,” Washington Post, 11 September 1962, p. A6.
was there.11 And they swooped down. They’ve killed over 300,000 in the
last 14 years.12 And they claim now that Castro is in control of these
guerrillas.
Unidentified: In what? In Colombia?
Graham: In Colombia.
And he says the way to the United States is through the Colombian
Andes. And hoped [unclear] get organized and give weapons to [unclear].
And so, the infiltration is tremendous. And the anti-Communist forces are
getting hysterical because they feel that we’re not defending them like we
ought to, right or wrong. And I know it’s a very delicate problem.
Dwight D. Eisenhower: But it isn’t easy. [Unclear.] But these ones, the
20[,000], the 25,000 . . . but a . . . but, the main thing . . . that they charge
. . . American policy is that [we support] an oppressive regime . . . the
supporters, that is . . . [we’re] keeping them down, and . . . And, there-
fore, America is wrong. “America ought to give us the weapons and not to
our bosses.” And [unclear] . . .
Graham: And how to get it to them—
Eisenhower: And [unclear]. . . . [Unclear] we were discussing, how-
ever, on the telephone today [unclear] pushing, pushing for them and I’d
like to take them on the ears: What do you mean by it?
President Kennedy: As matter of fact from Bogotá [unclear]. The, a,
there’s no a . . . the a . . . Colombia actually has, you know, [Alberto]
Lleras Camargo, he’s a first-class [unclear] government—13
Eisenhower: Oh, yes. Oh, yes. They [unclear]. The tape skips.
Unidentified: —The [unclear] president [unclear] the same thing.
The person was asked if he had been asked to help finance the [unclear]
to help them to get out of the [unclear].
Graham: Right. [Unclear exchange.] If you can do the same thing
somehow in Brazil.
Unidentified: We’ve diversified the problems down in there [unclear].
11. Graham refers to his visit to Cali, Colombia, during his Latin American tour earlier in
1962. In his autobiography published in 1997, Graham records the incident slightly differ-
ently, reporting that the guerillas killed “fourteen people not far from where we were staying”
in Cali (Graham, Just As I Am, pp. 364–65).
12. From 1948 to 1962, Colombia endured La Violencia, a period of intense violence between
Liberal and Conservative political factions that left over 200,000 Colombians dead.
13. Alberto Lleras Camargo, who had just stepped down after his second term as president of
Colombia (1945–46, 7 August 1958 to 7 August 1962), was a strong supporter of Kennedy’s
Alliance for Progress.
Meeting with Bill y Graham and Dwight Eisenhow er 117
Graham: Well, I was sure delighted to see you. Please give my

regards to the Mister Vice President.
Graham starts to leave, causing a number of people to speak at the same
time. Someone says “Nice to see you.”
Graham: Thank you very much. Nice to see you. [Multiple voices
continue.]
Unidentified: . . . in Georgia.
Graham: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Oh, I see.
Graham: He’s playing golf—
Unidentified: Oh. Oh.
Graham: —in North Carolina right now. Good-bye. Thank you.
Unidentified: All right, Mister Graham. All right.
Graham: Fine. Thank you.
Evelyn Lincoln: Have a good evening.
Graham: Thank you. I’m so glad to see you.
Again the sounds of a number of people saying good-bye to Graham.
Someone says “Thank you very much,” and another says to Graham
“Well, we’ll wish you [unclear] Vice President.”
Graham: Yes. [Unclear.] [Laughter.] Bye. Thank you. Bye.
Unidentified: May I, Mrs. Lincoln?
Evelyn Lincoln: Sure, sure.
Unidentified: The Attorney General won’t be here until about one. And
he’ll stand by and then he’ll [unclear] unless of course the [Attorney
General] judge. He’ll go over the canal about 20 minutes to seven. Then
we’re bringing him back for a short tour [unclear] Billy Graham later
that [unclear].
Unidentified: . . . and for his pictures [unclear].
President Kennedy: Are you gentlemen all set? [Two voices agree
simultaneously.]
Unidentified: Thank you, General Schulz from the rest of us.14 [Pause.]
Unidentified: We’ll need a ride. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: No. Leave that right there. [Unclear.]
After Billy Graham left the White House, Kennedy and Eisenhower
met in the Oval Office to discuss Eisenhower’s trip to West Germany.
14. Brigadier General Robert L. Schulz, retired, longtime aide to General Eisenhower.
12:40 –1:02 P.M.
You can’t go up the autobahn waving an atom bomb. . . .

[T]he first time . . . a bridge is blown out in front of you, you
can’t begin a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union over
getting to Berlin.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower15

In late July, President Kennedy’s predecessor, Dwight David Eisenhower,
made a six-week trip to Western Europe. On his return, President
Kennedy wrote him and requested a meeting. The two Presidents were
not only from different generations but also from different political par-
ties. President Kennedy felt that Eisenhower found him young and inex-
perienced even though Kennedy himself thought the older man woefully
uninformed. In explaining why his brother often conferred with
Eisenhower, Attorney General Robert Kennedy recalled that “feeling
Eisenhower was important and his election was so close—he always went
out of his way to make sure that Eisenhower was brought in on all mat-
ters and that Eisenhower couldn’t hurt the administration by going off
and attacking.”16
On September 10, the two Presidents met at the White House.
Eisenhower brought Kennedy a copy of a memorandum about his conver-
sation with West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer on August 2.17 In
the discussions before lunch, the two U.S. Presidents dealt with the topics
from that memorandum, which covered primarily NATO issues. Kennedy
was interested to discover whether Eisenhower might cause him political
trouble by criticizing his European defense policies. He need not have
been worried. There was a large degree of continuity between the two
administrations’ West European policies.
The heavy financial load that the United States carried for the mili-
15. Tape 21, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
16. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy in His Own Words: The
Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 55.
17. “Conversation with Chancellor Adenauer,” 2 August 1962, Dwight Eisenhower papers,
post-presidential series, Box 27, folder: Principal file, 1962, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential
Library.
Meeting with Dwight Eisenhow er 119
tary defense of Western Europe, which had so vexed Kennedy during

August, remained on his mind. Kennedy was interested in hearing
Eisenhower’s thoughts on pressing for greater allied contribution to a
conventional ground force buildup in Europe.
For President Kennedy, the ongoing Berlin crisis necessitated a
NATO strategy based on graduated military responses in order to limit a
war before it escalated to nuclear conflagration. President Eisenhower
had also grappled with the crisis over Berlin.
West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer questioned President
Kennedy’s commitment to Berlin and resisted the U.S. insistence on a
conventional force buildup in Central Europe. Adenauer feared that a
NATO strategy that stressed conventional defense below the nuclear
threshold might make war more likely and thus expose West Germany
as the probable chief theater of war.
President Kennedy and Eisenhower believed that French president
Charles de Gaulle was capitalizing on Adenauer’s anxiety and disen-
chantment with the United States. The two American Presidents feared
that de Gaulle’s vision of Europe was anti–Anglo-Saxon in outlook and
threatened the integrity of NATO. They speculated about the various
implications of the Franco-German rapprochement, ceremoniously sig-
naled on September 14, 1958, at Colombey-des-Deux-Églises, where the
two European statesmen met. Periodic meetings between the West
German chancellor and the French president had continued. Most
recently, in July 1962, Adenauer had spent three days in France. Then in
September, de Gaulle had visited Bonn.
Another problem that had carried over from the President’s August
meetings on Berlin and Europe was a change in the U.S. military com-
mand. Adenauer worried that it signaled a shift in U.S. nuclear strategy
toward greater reliance on conventional weapons. In late July, the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), General Lauris Norstad, had
announced his resignation, effective November 1, 1962.18 His intended
replacement was the present Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Lyman Lemnitzer. Kennedy had nominated General Maxwell D. Taylor as
General Lemnitzer’s successor. Norstad had enjoyed a special relationship
with the Europeans because he had conceived SACEUR’s role as increas-
ingly independent of Washington and had envisioned NATO as a fourth
18. Norstad’s resignation was eventually postponed to 1 January 1963 because of the Cuban
missile crisis.
nuclear power. His departure, amidst a controversy over the deployment

of a land-based medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) force under
SACEUR’s direct command, fueled West German and French resentment
of U.S. hegemony.
The tape recording begins as Eisenhower commiserates with Kennedy
about the European allies.
Dwight D. Eisenhower: For now, as I mentioned in my note, I think

that events have sort of overtaken—
President Kennedy: Well, I wrote him a letter, and he wrote back a
very nice letter. I talked to Globke here the other day, and evidently he
[Adenauer] goes into these fits of depression.19 Whether it’s their sort
of overdependence upon us, which makes them particularly sensitive to
what we do, but . . . I find that—I’m sure you did—somewhat harassing
because here we do these things . . . we keep our forces there. The
French have only a division and a half in West Germany instead of
four.20 The Germans just cut their defense budget from 17 billion down
to 15.8, which means they aren’t going to reach the figures that they
originally said they would.21
Eisenhower: I know. They told me they wouldn’t.
President Kennedy: Yeah, well, they just cut it within a two- or
three-week period. I think, since your visit there. The finance minister
[Ludwig Erhard] made [West German minister of defense Franz Josef]
Strauss cut it so that this has dropped—so now we’re going to appeal to
them. Well, with all that, and the fact that the British, the Army of the
Rhine is not to NATO standards—
Eisenhower: Yes, yes.
President Kennedy: I feel that sometimes that they place more bur-
dens on us than they’re entitled to do.
Eisenhower: That’s correct and, I’m going to tell you, Mr. President,
when I went through in 1951—January—I went around to all these,
every one of these places. I said, “Now as far as I understand the policy of
my government”—that was Truman’s plan. I said, “This is an emergency
effort to get you people a chance to get on your feet. You’ve got 225 mil-
19. Dr. Hans Globke was state secretary in the office of Chancellor Adenauer.
20. As set forth by NATO Policy Directive MC 26/4 in the summer of 1961.
21. The West German Ministry of Defense had requested 18.2 billion deutsche marks. The
West German Bundestag approved a defense budget of 14.97 billion deutsche marks.
lion people. We know you’ve got a collective labor force about twice the
size, in skilled labor, twice the size of ours. There’s no reason why you
people can’t keep the ground forces. Now in the meantime, the United
States has got to keep the deterrent—all the big bombs and all the rest of
it. We’ve got to keep the big thing and an enormous air force. Your
expenditures in those things don’t need to be very heavy, but you’ve got
to begin to produce these conventional and land forces.”
“Well,” which they said, “Well, you want us just to be the ol’ land
man and you come in and be the . . . you know, the glamour boys.”
I said, “To the hell with that, we’re trying to find the . . . how can we
put together our assets to have the best defense.” Now I tried to sell—I
sold this idea. I mean, they said they accepted it.
But as time has gone on, and for eight years, I desperately tried
behind the scenes to get these people to admit we ought to begin to get
out; they wouldn’t do it. And I’m afraid that just through custom they
have thought of the—begin to think of the thing as their right, that this
is just their . . . And if you say, “Well, you now ought to do a little more,
that you ought to pay for this or that [or anything].” Oh, they get very
emotional.
But Mr. Adenauer started off to tell me about relations between
France and Germany. These he said were improving markedly and rap-
idly, and that both he and General de Gaulle were committed to a com-
plete rapprochement, and that his own trip through—about six or seven
days through France—had been almost a triumphal tour. He was very
pleased.22 And he said he thought that this was going on to . . . so that
very soon, they would be allowing all people to go back and forth over
their borders without even, without cards, like we demand up in . . .
cards you carry between Mexico and so on. He says it’s all just free cir-
culation.
I said, “Well, if you start the intermarrying, then you’ll have union,
and be all right.”
He is very keen on this and, really, I think, is now looking upon
French-German friendship, and a sort of an entente, as a new type of,
almost an axis of influence in that area. This was what he said was the
encouraging part about the European thing and he thought this also of
the Common Market.23
22. Adenauer made a state visit to France in early July 1962.

23. Signed in 1957, the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community (EEC),
also referred to as the Common Market, and the European Atomic Energy Commission
And I— we —had a long talk about the Common Market, which

seemed to have no —nothing—no application to defense.
Then he came . . . the next thing that bothered him though very very
much was the relief of Norstad.24 And he told the long story of the—
about this being a surprise and everything else. And he was very
unhappy—first, that he was leaving. He said, “Norstad has gotten to be
an influence that we think is almost necessary—backup.” I told him then
of my friendship with Lemnitzer, and I said, “I don’t see how you can get
a better man. Now, he hasn’t had quite as much experience in this kind of
thing [as] Norstad.”25
But he was. . . . I sent Lemnitzer over to [British field marshal Sir
Harold] Alexander as his operation officer in a big army group, and, I
said, “He does know something about allied work together.”26
Now, he said, then, but he [Adenauer] said, “By and large, we see
this as two things. You’re putting in . . . you’re sending Lemnitzer out
and Norstad out because they apparently have not understood the poli-
cies, or not have followed the policies that America is now adopting. And
you’re putting in General [Maxwell] Taylor.”27 Then he reached over
and got a book, and this book was [laughs] General Taylor’s book.28
And he said, “Now I must tell you, General,” he said, “I tell you as
your friend, if this book—if the philosophy of this book—is going to be
adopted in Europe,” he said, “I am afraid there will be disastrous conse-
quences in Western Europe.”
And I said, “Well, you better go ahead, Mr. Chancellor.”
“Well,” he said, “well, the philosophy of this book is that we should
(EURATOM). The original six signatories were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
24. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), 20 November
1956 to 1 January 1963.
25. General Lyman Lemnitzer was Norstad’s successor as SACEUR, 1 January 1963 to 1 July
1969.
26. Then Brigadier General Lemnitzer was Alexander’s U.S. deputy, his deputy chief of staff,
for the 15th Army Group during World War I.
27. Reference to General Maxwell Taylor, Lemnitzer’s successor as Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Taylor served as U.S. Army chief of staff under President Eisenhower from
1955 to 1959 and emerged as a leading critic of the Eisenhower administration’s policies.
28. Reference to Taylor’s The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper, 1959), a landmark study of
U.S. military security needs, which indicted Eisenhower’s national security policy, generated
considerable controversy around the 1960 election, and popularized the term flexible response to
describe the need for limited military options short of nuclear war. See “Meeting about Berlin,”
6 August 1962, for a discussion of West German anxiety.
not depend on atomic bombs.” And he said, “we’re going to—we should-
n’t fight and strive to fight our wars by conventional weapons.” He said,
“If we do this, and if we adopt this kind of philosophy, this means that
America is again ready to see Europe overrun. Then we will start—
starting way back to where we were in 1942—to go back and plan [to
retake a Soviet-occupied Europe] and after all of this destruction and
occupation.” And he said, “This time it won’t be as easy as it was under
Hitler.” And this should, by and large, he said, he saw this as a very
strong evidence of an enormous and revolutionary change in American
policy, defense policy in Western Europe.
And I said, “Well, now, I’m not going, I can’t quarrel about that. I
mean I can’t argue the case because I am not privy to exactly to the
inner circles of portions of what you’re saying. But I do know this.
They’ve [the Kennedy administration] said they’re spending a good
many billions to keep our deterrent in a very top shape, and the missile
work as far as I can see is not only going ahead but, from all that my G-2
friends tell me from time to time, our strength is growing up even more
rapidly than what we thought, first calculated, and to greater value.29
Therefore, I can’t see that any of our, any government—any American
government—is discounting the effect of the deterrent or its need to use
it in the face of overwhelming strength.
Now, shortly after that, that was the gist of his talk, although he
brought in all sorts of details and, you might say, auxiliary sort of rea-
sons to support this. But then I got a word. It came out from one of his
friends, one of his people, that reached me, oh, a week later. Said that
General Taylor had given some testimony that greatly reassured
him.30 Now, I didn’t read this testimony; I didn’t want to . . . But appar-
ently . . . The German said, that spoke to me said, that apparently
General Taylor no longer believes exactly what he said in his book
because he had changed his mind. So, the big, real thing, was when I
saw this in the paper and then this German came to see me and told me
this. I said, “Well, I think maybe there’s no need for telling you because
29. The abbreviation G-2 is used in the Army to refer to staff intelligence personnel.
30. On 9 August, while Eisenhower was touring Europe, the U.S. Senate by unanimous vote
confirmed Taylor’s nomination as Chairman of the JCS. The action followed a hearing by the
Senate Armed Services Committee. At one point, Taylor assured the committee that “I am not
returning, if you gentlemen confirm me, as a crusader for change but rather one to make the
present system as effective as possible” (see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 24 August
1962, p. 1421).
it’s probably something you’d write about a friend with and knew about
the change.”
President Kennedy: Well, I think that . . . Of course, I think they mis-
stated Taylor’s position. As you know, Taylor’s been very strong on tac-
tical atomic weapons.
Eisenhower: Yes. Oh, yes . . . Oh, yes . . .
President Kennedy: And I, so I . . . there’s in fact . . . Norstad . . . I
think it’s a great loss—Norstad. For example, last spring . . . As you
know, [General Lucius] Clay and Norstad had a rather difficult time.31
Eisenhower: Oh did they? No, I didn’t know that.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, there was a good deal of tension
there.
Eisenhower: Hmm.
President Kennedy: For example, last spring, General Clay wanted to
have the civilian—at the time buzzing was taking place take place in the
corridor—he wanted a fighter escort at that time.32 General Norstad dis-
agreed. And we went with General Norstad. And I think it was the right
thing, as [a] matter of fact. They, as you know, they called the buzzing off.
But there was a good deal of . . . I don’t know whether it’s wanting to go
back to other times—but there was a good deal of friction.
Eisenhower: I didn’t know that.
President Kennedy: But I think that Norstad is first class, but when
he came back last winter, he said . . . I guess he’s had what—two heart
attacks—or one?
Eisenhower: Yes, that’s right.
President Kennedy: So he said he wanted to resign at the end of this
year. So, then when General Lemnitzer’s time ended [as JCS Chairman],
I was either faced with having him reappointed again or putting him
back, so this seemed to be the best arrangement.
But it was unfortunate that General [James] Gavin left in September,
who had been identified with support for the French nuclear effort.33 And
General Norstad left. General Lemnitzer went in. And these things are
regarded, I think, as quite significant. And the chancellor is 86. But as I
say, I find—I think that the criticisms, which are traditionally leveled at
31. General Lucius D. Clay was the President’s special representative in Berlin until May
1962, thereafter special consultant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Clay was chosen for his sym-
bolic role as the hero of the 1948 Berlin airlift while he was the U.S. military governor for
occupied Germany.
32. Reference to Soviet harassment of Western aircraft.
33. General James Gavin was the U.S. ambassador to France until mid-September 1962.
the United States, when you think that the amount of ground divisions
we have there, the amount of effort we’re putting in various places.
Again the French—a division and a half in West Germany. I talked
to Ambassador [Hervé] Alphand this morning, and I said, “I don’t
understand.”34 I said, “This French-German rapprochement is wonder-
ful, but here the Germans, who have been quite critical of us this sum-
mer, as I say, have cut their defense budget in the last month even though
they’ve got a very strong economy. And the French have a division and a
half even though your minimum goal is four under NATO, and you really
should have six.”35
He said, “Well, we’ve got them for the defense of France.”
But I said, “Well, look, you can’t have two divisions here [in Western
Europe] and two others . . .” The British are—
Eisenhower: That’s right.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] on us. So I think that the press, partic-
ularly some feed this, these European criticisms of our efforts—I think
that considering the load we carry compared to the load they carry . . .
Eisenhower: That’s right.
President Kennedy: It’s incredible.
Eisenhower: I would agree, and, a matter of fact, I would . . . I tried
my best, although every time I did the diplomats always said, “Now you
do it, you’re going to lose Europe now; that’s all there is to it because
their temper and this and that and the other thing and the psychological
reaction.”
But I tried every possible way. I said, “Well, now let’s make these
smaller divisions. Let’s begin to show them that we are concerned about
this big spending.” After all, we built almost unaided that great infra-
structure that starts right at the ports and goes all the way through the
place. We’ve got airfields. We’ve got everything and, of course, de
Gaulle did not . . . De Gaulle didn’t talk to me substantively at all. He
just proved very nice, very hospitable, and all that, very kind, but we
didn’t talk about it. And he wouldn’t, you know. He’s a very very
[unclear] man.
But, on the other hand, the German gave me the understanding that
not only were they going to go right up to their target. But I said, “Of
course, your target is too small. You are a people of still only 60 million.
34. Hervé Alphand was French ambassador to the United States. President Kennedy and he
met between 11:05 and 11:34 A.M.
35. Four divisions were specified under NATO Policy Directive MC 26/4.
You’re right there on the firing line. Our country, which is, I say, three
times the size, is doing much more than three times what you’re doing,
and you people ought to be waking up to this.” But I’m astonished that
they cut their—
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, Bob McNamara is coming over to
give you the figures on it.36
Eisenhower: Well, I think when I write to Adenauer I’m going to tell
him that I’m astonished.
President Kennedy: That would be very helpful. I think we’ll get
Secretary McNamara to give you the figures. I think that . . . Your talk
was very helpful, too. Of course, he has great regard for you and John
Foster Dulles—37
Eisenhower: We’ve always been very friendly.
President Kennedy: Yeah. So I think the fact that you . . . That helped
reassure him very much, especially when you spoke about Lemnitzer and
Taylor.
Eisenhower: Oh yes. Oh, oh, Lemnitzer . . . to hell with it.
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s right.
Eisenhower: And I said, “I just can’t believe that you’ll have anything
but satisfaction.” Now, he did bring out that . . . before he gave me all the
circumstantial evidence that showed that what’s his name, Norstad,
knew nothing about his immediate relief. Because he . . . Norstad, only
by happenstance had been there about five days earlier. And was talking
with him, the plans that they were going to do together, and so I said
well maybe he was under a . . .
President Kennedy: Well. . . . No . . . That’s right. We gave him . . . It
was only five days before his relief because he came back here about a
month in July. He came back in July, and we talked about this. He had ear-
lier said that he would like to resign between August and September and
the next January—he gave a four- or five- month period. Well, we picked
October—the first of November because of the Lemnitzer, Joint Chiefs . . .
So when he came back here in July, we talked about whether we ought
to go to January, and he said no. And he also said he’d like to come out
right away because otherwise it would be rumored and his influence would
36. McNamara joined Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk for lunch and
then met in the Cabinet Room with General Marshall Carter, deputy director of the CIA, and
the two presidents.
37. Dulles was secretary of state under Dwight Eisenhower until his death from cancer in
1959.
be nonexistent. So that we moved it, at Norstad’s own suggestion, with a

good deal of speed. Now they may have felt that that indicated that we
were . . . Quite the reverse, I’d give anything to have Norstad there
because I think we’re going to have a terribly difficult time with Berlin and
I think Norstad has so much experience and they have so much confidence
in him. It’s a very tough job for Lemnitzer to go in after him.
Eisenhower: That’s right. And not only that, but, at this stage, I’ll
say this: Norstad is a very tough fellow, when he [makes a] commit-
ment. He’s a very great supporter of his own convictions, and normally, I
must say, I think [unclear]. Well, now, I can disabuse you of Laurie
[Norstad] . . . Of his mind on that particular thing because he thinks
that we were—that is our country—was trying to put them in sort of a
secondary position—take it and like it. See we started . . . It happened
when Mr. Truman called me and asked me to go over there. He . . . The
great argument, he was . . . “unanimously these 12 countries,” Mr.
President, “12 countries have asked for you.”
And I said, “Well as long as they’ve asked for me in person, Mr.
President, I mean duty is you will have to send me over.” But God, how
I’d hate to leave home. [Laughs.] I did.
So then we . . . when I was leaving. I was going out . . . and I finally
agreed to come over here and stand for this Republican nomination. And
I said to him I would be . . . “It must be done unanimously; it must be
done correctly.”
So I gave plenty of warning, and they worked and they so . . . and, I
wanted, what’s his name—
President Kennedy: [General Alfred] Gruenther.38
Eisenhower: Gruenther.
They decided to take Ridgway because Ridgway was coming out of
Korea, and I think they wanted to send him over.39 I don’t think that
Ridgway was the temperament for that kind of a job. But anyway, he
didn’t . . . He came back and became the chief of staff about a year later.
But both saw . . . all we did was done unanimously [unclear] by request-
ing the President to do this. He knew all this past history, and that both-
ered him because he said it looked like their opinions weren’t very
38. General Alfred Gruenther was a close personal friend of Eisenhower and served as his
chief of staff while Eisenhower was SACEUR, 1951 to 1952. Gruenther was then SACEUR
himself, 11 July 1953 to 20 November 1956.
39. General Matthew Ridgway was commander of the U.N. Command in the Far East, 11
April 1951 to 30 May 1952. He was SACEUR, 30 May 1952 to 11 July 1953, and served as
U.S. Army chief of staff, 1953 to 1955.
important. But I told him that just had to be something that was mechan-
ical . . . No one would do that deliberately. He seemed to take that—
President Kennedy: Well, Norstad wanted us to move because he
thought there would be rumors about . . . As I say, Norstad asked—told
me—that he couldn’t, that this was what his desire was when he was
over in the winter.
Then when he came in July, and he talked to me about what our tim-
ing was, he said he’d like it to come as quickly as possible. So what we did
was announce Norstad and then say that if we were asked to submit
somebody, we would submit the name of General Lemnitzer and put it
up to the North Atlantic Treaty Council.
Well, of course, the French are attempting always to justify the need
for their own atomic [force], independent of us.40 So, I think, they raised
some difficulty about it but . . . I don’t know what—where these—when
you think, as I say, what the United States has done for 17 years in
Germany, I think that—
Eisenhower: There’s one point that I do think we’ve got to remem-
ber. These people have . . . They were in an awful shape; then the
Marshall Plan of course got them back, and they recognize that. I’ll tell
you the nation that speaks more publicly and openly about the help of
America, American help, is Germany. You never hear of this brought up
in France or Britain—sometimes in Britain. But up in Germany, it’s
almost a religion. Everybody that comes to you says, “Well, now, of
course, we realize what we owe to America.”
But the effort to get these people to doing their own part—I just
don’t know beyond this very argument. If it were the six divisions
there—with the little bit that, the 12 that Germany will have, the one
that France, so on. You’re bound to be back to the Rhine before you can
collect yourself.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah . . . yeah . . .
Eisenhower: You see. Unless you go into this atomic business. And if
that’s going to be true, you’ve got to have greater strength that can be
deployed rapidly. Well, if they’re going to cut down . . . There’s just . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah.
Eisenhower: There’s something wrong here. I don’t know just what
it is. I hadn’t heard this. I was hopeful . . . I knew that when de Gaulle
brought back his Algerian army, he was going to put most of his
40. Since assuming power in 1958, de Gaulle had declared unequivocally and repeatedly that
France would achieve independent national nuclear capability.
Algerian army in France. But I never dreamed that he wouldn’t go and

fulfill his commitments—41
President Kennedy: Well, I agree. That’s what I said. I said to
[French ambassador Hervé] Alphand, “This great Franco-German . . .
We are always subject to very sharp criticism by the Germans for not
doing one thing or another.” I said, “But we are doing everything we
committed to under NATO and in addition carrying SAC, and in addi-
tion the navy, and in addition Southeast Asia.” I said, “Now, France isn’t
even fulfilling its NATO commitment.”
But, of course, the reason is that they know that they don’t depend
on the French and they depend on us. So, therefore, they’re always con-
cerned about our intentions because they realize that without the United
States, they would be exposed. The fact is that he would be perfectly
right about in talking about our immediate use of nuclear weapons, it
seems to me, if we didn’t have the Berlin problem, because then obvi-
ously any Soviet intrusion across the line would be a deliberate one and
would be a signal for war.
When we have this problem of maintaining our position in Berlin,
where you may be using sort of gradually escalating force to maintain
yourself in Berlin, you can’t suddenly begin to drop nuclear weapons the
first time you have a difficulty. That would really be the only—and it’s a
very valid reason for our emphasizing the necessity of their building up
conventional forces. When I saw Clay, he said, “You can’t go up the auto-
bahn waving an atom bomb. And say, the first time you put a . . . a bridge
is blown out in front of you, you can’t begin a nuclear exchange with the
Soviet Union over getting to Berlin.”
Eisenhower: Well of course, on that one, Mr. President, I’ve personally,
I’ve always long thought this from the beginning. If they believe there is
no amount of strength you can put in Berlin, they can say that. I would
think that you could . . . What’s his name—Khrushchev—said to me at
Camp David.42 He was talking about [The United States’s] needing some
41. In 1958, de Gaulle returned to power to end the French-Algerian war. Peace talks began
in March 1961, but bloodshed continued until Algeria gained independence on 1 July 1962. In
September 1961, de Gaulle had begun withdrawing French forces from Algeria. Under NATO
policy directives MC 70 and 26/4, France was committed to contribute four divisions but had
produced only two and one-third divisions to that point.
42. Rural retreat of U.S. presidents in northern Maryland, 70 miles northwest of Washington,
D.C. Established in 1942 as “Shangri-La” by Franklin Roosevelt, Eisenhower renamed it for
his grandson in 1953. When Khrushchev visited the United States in September 1959, he and
Eisenhower had several discussions at Camp David.
more troops [in West Germany]—there was somewhat at that time in the
public about more, a couple more divisions, and so . . . He [Krushchev]
says, “What are they talking about?” He says, “For every division they can
put in Germany, I can put ten, without any trouble whatsoever.”
And I said, “We know that.” And I said, “But we’re not worrying
about that.” And I said, “I’ll tell you. I don’t propose to fight a conven-
tional war. If you declare . . . if you bring out war, bring on war of global
character . . . There are going to be no conventional, nothing conven-
tional about it.” And I told him flatly.
And he said, “Well.” He said, “That’s a relief. Neither one of us can
afford it.” “Yes,” I said that, and I said, “OK, so I agree to that, too.”
[Laughing.]
President Kennedy: Right. Right.
Eisenhower: But, you see, what these people are afraid of . . . I mean
the essence of his argument was, if you try to fight this thing convention-
ally from the beginning, when do you start to go nuclear? And this will
never be until you yourselves in other words become in danger and he
said, “That means all of Europe is again gone.” And that—
President Kennedy: But, of course, we’ve got all these nuclear weapons,
as you know, stored in West Berlin. All we are . . . What they are really con-
cerned about is that the Russians will seize Hamburg, which is only a few
miles from the border, and some other towns, and then they’ll say, “We’ll
negotiate.” So then Norstad has come up with this whole strategy. I think
the only difficulty is that no one will . . . That if we did not have the prob-
lem, I say, of Berlin and maintaining access through that autobahn author-
ity, then you would say that any attempt to seize any part of West
Germany, we would go to nuclear weapons. But, of course, they never will!
But it’s this difficulty of maintaining a position 120 miles behind
their lines—
Eisenhower: Mr. President, I’ll tell you . . . Here’s something, I can’t
document everything . . . but Clay was there. Poor, poor old Smith is
gone.43 We begged our governments not to go into Berlin.
We . . . I asked that they build a cantonment capital, a cantonment cap-
ital at the junction of the British, American, and Russian zones. I said, “We
just don’t, we can’t do this. . . . ” Well, it had been a political thing that had
been done first in the Advisory Council, European Advisory Council, in
London. And later confirmed and . . . But Mr. Roosevelt said to me this
43. Eisenhower was probably referring to Joseph Smith, who as an Army brigadier general,
had been headquarters commander for the Berlin airlift of 1948–49.
twice—I’m talking about my concern. And he said, “Ike”—and he was

always very, you know, informal—he said, “Ike,” he said, “quit worrying
about Uncle Joe. I’ll take care of Uncle Joe.”
That’s exactly what he told [me]. Once in Tunis and once when I
came over here about the first or second or third of January of ’44.
That’s the last time I ever saw him. Now he just wouldn’t believe that
these guys were these tough and really ruthless so-and-sos they were.44
There’s one other thing that Adenauer brought in that you might
have interest—more than I would—under the security standpoint. He
was talking about the French problem and about bringing the British
into the Common Market.45 And he got into, you might say, into the
same nest. Now he said, “You know, just a few years, when you were
here, General, France wanted Britain in this whole—you might call it
‘association’—in order to balance off Germany.46 Now what they’re
frightened of, is that Britain comes in and Britain will have greater influ-
ence in the association than will France.”
Now he said, “This is a . . .” He cited plenty of evidence there. But he
said, “One of the reasons they’re making it so difficult for you to come
into the Common Market . . .” And he said, more or less, as a suspicion of
his, that they were going to be able to prevent [British entry into the
44. Eisenhower did travel with Franklin Roosevelt in Tunis on 21 November 1943. He also
met privately with Roosevelt at the White House on 5 and 12 January 1944. There are no
records of those conversations.
In March and April 1945 Eisenhower had refused to divert his forces to a race to capture
Berlin before the Russians, partly because he knew the postwar occupation zones had already
been decided. Later criticized for this judgment, he tended to be defensive about it [see
Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 1 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), pp. 391–404]. In
now recalling how those zones, and Berlin’s place in them, were originally determined,
Eisenhower mixes memories of general conversations with Franklin Roosevelt about future
relations with Russia in November 1943 and January 1944, when there was probably little or
no specific discussion of Berlin, with the memory of his own subsequent early-1944 proposal
for a “cantonment capital.” Eisenhower made that proposal at a time when Roosevelt still
toyed with the idea of connecting Berlin to the edge of a sketchily imagined U.S. occupation
zone. Under pressure from the British, the Soviets, and his diplomats, Roosevelt gave way
later in 1944 to the scheme which neither he nor Eisenhower had originally supported but
which was finally adopted [see Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 360-65; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: The
White House Years, 1956–1961 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), p. 335 and note 5].
45. On 31 July 1961, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan announced Great Britain’s bid for
accession for the EEC. De Gaulle rarely disguised his reluctance to accept Britain’s entrance.
46. During the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome, which established the EEC in 1957, de
Gaulle supported Britain’s entrance. The United Kingdom, however, decided against joining
the Common Market and formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with Austria,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Common Market] because they would make it impossible really for

Britain to come in, except at the price of complete desertion of the
Commonwealth.
“And you know,” he said, very . . . very wisely, he said, “You know
today, if I were prime minister of Britain, I would not know what is the
answer here.” He says, “For immediate, economic advantage, they should
come into the Common Market. But when you think of all the tradition
and all of the connections they would have to sever and the bad will that
would be engendered throughout the [unclear],” he said, “Oh, this is a
tough problem for them.”
President Kennedy: He doesn’t really want them in? He thinks
because it will weaken the [unclear] the British and just us.
Eisenhower: No, I think . . . I think he would like them in. But he
doesn’t think France wants them in. Because the French . . . He said
France is finally getting into a position they’ve been wanting . . . to get
some kind of a lever on all of Western Europe—where they’re really
bigger . . . big shots.
President Kennedy: And once the British come in they’ll have a—
Eisenhower: That’s right. They become sort of a [unclear].
An unidentified speaker interrupts the conversation to tell Kennedy that
his lunch companions have arrived.
Unidentified: Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara are over at
the House.
President Kennedy: OK. We’ll walk over.
Unidentified: And General Carter had to come from CIA, as you
know . . . and he . . . Mac Bundy said that he could—
President Kennedy: I’ll tell you what we’ll do—we’ll get right after
lunch.
[speaking to Eisenhower] I just had General Carter . . .47 I just wanted
him to show you the Cuban SAM sites. . . .48
Eisenhower: I’d like to see them.
President Kennedy: [speaking to an aide] So right after lunch if he
could just . . . We’ll meet him in this office.
Unidentified: You’ll meet him here?
President Kennedy: Right. In this office. Yeah. [Conversation begins to
fade as they depart.] Why doesn’t he come because I’d like to have
47. Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter was deputy director of the CIA.
48. Surface-to-air missiles.
Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara . . . We’ll all meet here right
after lunch.
Unidentified: Fine.
President Kennedy: It’ll be about 2:15.49
Unidentified: Fine. [Door shuts.]
Tape recording continues for several minutes until someone enters the
room and turns off the switch. Following lunch in the Mansion, Kennedy,
Eisenhower, Rusk, and McNamara joined Marshall Carter in the Cabinet
Room. Kennedy did not tape that meeting.
On September 12, 1962, Eisenhower drafted a letter to Chancellor
Adenauer about the points discussed between the two U.S. presidents.
Eisenhower ended his letter with a passage meant to calm the aging
chancellor’s anxiety about the U.S. commitment to the defense of West
Germany: “Please do not bother to reply to this document. As a friend of
yours and your countrymen and as a loyal citizen of my own I have tried
only to act as a messenger of thoughts expressed to me personally (by
each of our two nations’ respective leaders) on subjects to which I have
adverted.”50 On September 14, Kennedy and Rusk approved this letter
before it was sent to Adenauer.
After Dwight Eisenhower left the White House, at about 3:00 P.M.,
Kennedy returned to the family quarters for a hour. He had a series of
meetings before him that afternoon, none of which he taped. For an hour
he spoke with the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Harry F.
Byrd of Virginia, a staunch opponent of anything that smacked of deficit
spending. Next there came a group led by the outgoing secretary of
labor, Arthur Goldberg; the secretary of the Navy, Fred Korth; the secre-
tary of commerce, Luther Hodges; the solicitor general, Archibald Cox;
and the attorney general, Robert Kennedy. Hodges stayed on after this
meeting and was joined by Senator Robert Kerr, Theodore Sorensen, and
the White House domestic team. At 6:00, Kennedy huddled with Clark
Clifford, the Washington lawyer and intelligence community wise man,
49. Kennedy is referring to the time of the intelligence briefing set up for President
Eisenhower in the Cabinet Room after lunch.
50. Personal letter, Eisenhower to Adenauer, 12 September 1962, Dwight Eisenhower papers,
post-presidential series, Box 27, folder: Principal file, 1962, Dwight D. Eisenhower
Presidential Library.
who in early August had pushed for the establishment of a CIA unit to
help investigate press leaks.
Finally, from 6:28 to 6:45, the President met with Rusk, McGeorge
Bundy, and Robert Kennedy. Although no memorandum of conversation
exists for this meeting, its subject was almost certainly sending U-2s
over Cuba. A week earlier the Soviets had protested the straying of a U-
2 over Sakhalin Island, and just the day before a U-2 piloted by the
Nationalist Chinese under arrangement with the U.S. government had
been shot down over Communist China. Nevertheless the CIA was
requesting two extended flights over portions of the island not covered
by the flights of August 29 or September 5. Fearing another U-2 diplo-
matic incident, Secretary Rusk had concerns about flying over a country
that now had Soviet surface-to-air missile batteries. There was reason to
believe that the recently discovered SAM sites, which were in the eastern
and central portions of Cuba, might be operational. Bundy had called for
a 5:45 meeting of CIA representatives with Rusk; Lansdale; James Reber,
the head of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR); and
the Attorney General in his office to discuss the Secretary’s concerns.
Rusk, Bundy, and Robert Kennedy came directly from that meeting to
see the President.
The President agreed with Rusk. The White House apparently
ordered a worldwide stand-down for all U-2 flights until September 16.
When U-2 flights resumed over Cuba, they were to be quick missions,
termed in-and-out flights, that photographed small parts of the island of
particular interest to the agency without coming near known SAM sites.
Due to unexpectedly bad weather the in-and-out flights would be further
delayed until September 26 and 29. As for the central and eastern parts
of Cuba, the areas with known SAM sites, there was, as yet, no agree-
ment to take the risk to photograph them.51
A gathering of the administration’s Berlin team followed. Kennedy
51. The story of Bundy’s 10 September meeting was reconstructed after the fact by two CIA
officers during congressional investigations in 1963 into the intelligence background to the
Cuban missile crisis [see Ernest deM. Berkaw, Jr., to the Executive Director, CIA, 28
February 1963, FRUS, 10: 1054–55 (The FRUS version indicates this memorandum was pre-
pared in 1963 but carries the date of 10 September 1962, giving the impression this document
was backdated for the CIA’s records.); Lyman Kirkpatrick, Memorandum for the Director,
“White House Meeting on 10 September 1962 on Cuban Overflights,” 1 March 1963, in CIA
Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, Mary McAuliffe, ed. (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992),
document 21]. The results of the later Oval Office meeting can be inferred from Gregory W.
Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, eds., The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1974
(Washington, DC: CIA, 1998), pp. 199–211.
Meeting on Berlin 135
decided to tape his advisers explaining this particular national security

headache.
6:45–7:15 P.M.
[T]he planning that goes into this preferred sequence will be

extremely valuable to governments when we have to make the
decisions nearer to the time.
Meeting on Berlin52
Since President Kennedy’s meetings about Berlin in August, the adminis-
tration’s contingency planning had progressed. His chief advisers now
encouraged him to approve a proposal on “Preferred Sequence of Military
Actions in the Berlin Conflict,” which largely drew on the Berlin and mar-
itime contingency (BERCON/MARCON) plans discussed in August.53
Now President Kennedy needed to approve the sequence of military actions
before the Washington Ambassadorial Group and the NATO Council con-
vened later in the month.
Earlier that day, McGeorge Bundy had sent Kennedy a draft of the
paper and a cover memorandum that explained disagreements about the
use of nuclear weapons and the wisdom of specifying in advance a
sequence of actions.54
The President began recording as his advisers outlined the differing
views among the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
Dean Rusk: [voice fades in] . . . as simply a part of a catalog of plans. A

year ago the North Atlantic Council asked me and [SACEUR General
Lauris] Norstad to undertake such planning with regard to Berlin, and
52. Including President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy, Mike Forrestal, Martin Hillenbrand,
Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, Paul Nitze, and Dean Rusk. Tape 22, John F. Kennedy
53. Draft not found. For the revised military subgroup proposal for the Washington
Ambassadorial Group on the preferred sequence of military actions in a Berlin conflict, see
FRUS, 15: 315–20.
54. FRUS, 15: 313–15.
these BERCON/MARCON plans on which you agreed—long ago—are

a result of that.55 Norstad feels that he needs a general planning type of
approval from the North Atlantic Council, and [the] Council ought to
know what’s going on. I do think that it is important for the North
Atlantic Council to . . . members of NATO to . . . know what may in fact
lie ahead if this Berlin matter gets, you know, more difficult because they
may be living in a kind of a dream world, and some of them may not be
facing up to the fact that this could get very tough indeed if the situation
develops further.
Now, on the interallied discussions there are two points on which
there may be some disagreement among the four principal powers. The
first would be the timing in the application of maritime sanctions. The
British are inclined to hold that off longer than we think we ought to.
We, the Germans, and the French have pretty well agreed to move on
those fairly early. But the British will want to delay for long-standing
attitudes toward maritime matters.
Secondly, there is some, there may be some difference in the stage at
which some type of nuclear weapon would be involved. I think Mr.
[Paul] Nitze could indicate the views of the different national delega-
tions on that. Otherwise, I think the general approach is agreed among
the Four, and it would be a very sobering thing for the North Atlantic
Council to get into. The actual BERCON/MARCON plans themselves
have been already discussed with the North Atlantic Council, I believe.
Isn’t that correct?
Paul Nitze: The views of the standing group . . . the standing group
has sent its comments to the North Atlantic Council.
Rusk: Oh. Well, the governments though . . . have had means of
becoming familiar with that, with the nature—
Nitze: That’s right.
Rusk: I think it ought to be pointed out to you, Mr. President, that
Norstad is concerned about the North Atlantic Council seeming to . . .
putting too much emphasis on what we refer to as the preferred
sequence of those reactions. He does not feel that the circumstances of
the time, or the action of the enemy, would make it clear enough that this
is the way the scenario’s going to unfold. Now, we think it must be
underlined to the North Atlantic Council that we can’t guarantee our
preferred sequence, but that the planning that goes into this preferred
55. For the BERCON/MARCON contingency planning discussions, see “Meeting on Berlin,”
3 August 1962 and 9 August 1962.
sequence will be extremely valuable to governments when we have to

make the decisions nearer to the time. Of course, all these matters are
subject to later decisions by government in light of the circumstances.
President Kennedy: What is the obligation of the other NATO pow-
ers in case any of these . . . What are we asking of them? They’ve got a
Berlin commitment too, haven’t they?
Rusk: Well there’s, there’s for example, there would be . . . For exam-
ple in Phase I, there would be mobilization, alert and mobilization activi-
ties which would . . .
President Kennedy: By all of the NATO powers?
Nitze: Phase II.
Rusk: I’m sorry, I thought that was certain mobilization mentioned
in Phase I, Paul, is that not right?
Nitze: [Unclear.]
Rusk: I beg your pardon . . .
Nitze: [That] supposes it to have already taken place as a result of
our [unclear].
McGeorge Bundy: We’re in Phase I.
Nitze: Yes.
Rusk: Yes, I’m sorry. It’s Phase II, isn’t it . . . [flips through pages].
Paragraph 2 at the bottom of page 3 . . .
President Kennedy: Under [unclear] and then to instruct. Now, do
we know what it is we want each one of these countries to do? For exam-
ple, Belgium, what kind of mobilization, a gradual military buildup of
naval measures and air measures including repressive measures? Do we
know sort of what we’d want each of the . . . program to be?
Nitze: Long term is we want them to meet their force goals, we know
what divisions we want them to call up, and what we want them to do, in
broad terms, but in specific terms we have not . . .
President Kennedy: Let me say force goals—
Lyman Lemnitzer: Within NATO there are specific measures, what
he calls an alert, steps which they should take to move forces, to call up
[unclear] character.
Nitze: But, for instance in Phase II we would expect the British to
call up their territorials, and then to move over the top the forces that
are necessary to bring them up to the three divisions to which they are
committed by the NATO MC 26/4 force goals.
President Kennedy: Of course, isn’t that a peacetime goal? Or is that
the alert goal?
Lemnitzer: No, it is a peacetime goal, but they are not up to it.
Nitze: They are not up to it.
President Kennedy: What country in NATO is up to its goals, except

for the United States?
Nitze: Canada.
President Kennedy: Canada?
Lemnitzer: Canada and the United States.
Unidentified: Well, Belgium is pretty well up to its commitment. So,
there are varying degrees . . .
Rusk: And the Netherlands are not too far away . . .
Robert McNamara: Well, none of them are up to it in terms of proper
logistical support. None of them are ready to fight, Mr. President, and
each of them would have to call men to active duty in Phase II in order to
prepare for the action in Phase III, and as a matter of fact, it would be the
calling of reserves to duty in Phase II that we would hope would deter
Phase III. But I think it’s fair to say none of the NATO forces are properly
equipped with combat support and logistical support forces.
President Kennedy: All of ours? Ours are?
McNamara: [Unclear] ours.
Nitze: And we would contract; perhaps reinforcing the forces we’ve
got there now. We’ve got the two division sets of equipment and we
might want to fly over . . .
McNamara: Yes, and almost certainly in Phase II we would call up
additional air squadrons.
Rusk: We nonetheless suddenly we have . . . We have column one and
column two. Column one was the Third Division force.
McNamara: Yes.
Rusk: And column two showed the additions we would hope that the
different countries would make to that. Presumably we would press
pretty early for the column two.
McNamara: Yes, but we would first press to move to column one,
which they have not moved to as yet.
President Kennedy: Well, the only thing is, do we want to say this,
on page 4, where it said, “Should the risk of loss be too great, extended
flights would be suspended.” Do we want that on any record?
Nitze: Well, there’s an important point involved here. . . . If the
Soviet Union were to use their ground-to-air missiles in the corridor, we
couldn’t continue flights in the corridor without going after those
ground installations. And, if you go after the ground installations, you
also go after the airfields from which the Soviet planes come up, would
be an expansion of the activity beyond what we contemplated in Phase I
and would really involve very serious risks of the conflict becoming a big
one. And the thought was that you’d better take these mobilization
measures which are contemplated in Phase II before you go that far.
President Kennedy: This Phase II, though, we’re talking now really
about Phase II, aren’t we?
Lemnitzer: Yes.
Nitze: Yes, during Phase II, you would continue the flights as long as
you could, but if they started using these ground-to-air missiles, or put
in a—
President Kennedy: It seems to me we ought to maybe consider
rewording that sentence because I think it sounds like maybe they will
try and then they’ll knock us down and then we’ll stop and then it will
be up to NATO when we start again. Don’t you think we ought to put it
a little more . . . we will cease and mobilize and then—
Bundy: And [many] steps will be taken.
President Kennedy: Prepare to commence again rather than sort of
leaving it more questionable.
Nitze: I think that the British are going to come in with some sug-
gested amended language for that particular sentence. And I think their
government has approved the whole document except for that sentence
and I think they’re going to come in into our next meeting with a slight
change in it. I think they’ll make the same point that you have in mind,
Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Could you keep that in mind . . . the NATO deci-
sion? Couldn’t we say NATO would have to face the necessity, in light of
stated military preparedness for air action, beyond the scope of Live Oak
operations, in order to reestablish air access after suitable concentration of
forces has taken place?56 This other thing, they get it all, in the end.
Garbled exchange between Bundy and an unidentified speaker. Sound of
pages being turned.
President Kennedy: Now, when we say the three powers would, if
necessary . . . what are we . . . What do we want to call in the . . . Have
you got that? When do we call on NATO to make its forces, air forces
available?
Nitze: The concept is that as long as the effort is purely on the air
corridors along the autobahn, that this is a tripartite responsibility. The
56. Live Oak was the planning group created by SACEUR Lauris Norstad to deal with the
military aspects of the Berlin problem. Headed by a British major general, it also included U.S.
and French officers and a West German observer.
moment it spreads beyond the air corridors or autobahn, then it becomes

a NATO responsibility.
President Kennedy: I wonder if there’s something we could impress
upon the other NATO [countries] about what their obligations will
begin to become; or do you think they’ll be impressed enough with the
prospect that it might escalate into nuclear, to be willing to participate
fully in any support they can give us short of nuclear action? In other
words, this doesn’t seem to ask very much of NATO except for this,
really, almost information sheet. Isn’t it for them, for the other members
of NATO aside from the British and the French and Germans?
Nitze: They would have to participate fully in the buildup to Phase
II. All the actions in Phase III and in Phase IV would be NATO action.
Rusk: I think we might knock out that four, the last line on page 3,
for example naval measures, national, tripartite and NATO, because
naval measures would be themselves outside of the corridor—
Nitze: Well, we’d wanted really to have some degree of flexibility so
that the three powers could do naval harassment and even some forms of
encroaching blockade without the possibility of being vetoed by NATO.
But I think you should still . . . could take out the or without. [Unclear] I
think.
Rusk: I don’t think the . . . that the veto . . . that unanimity is going
to deal with these in places in time and it’s necessary [unclear].
McNamara: The paragraph requiring the action by the other members
of NATO, Mr. President, is the second paragraph on page 4. . . . Perhaps it
is sufficiently self explanatory, and can certainly be enlarged—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] mean “to mobilize and deploy jointly
additional military forces”?
McNamara: It means . . .
President Kennedy: [reading] “Achieving the force levels and state of
readiness necessary to the defense of NATO and the launching of
BERCON/MARCON operations.” It doesn’t say what—
McNamara: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Of all M-day forces.57
Bundy: Theoretically, the M-day forces go well above the 30 division
levels or any current levels.
Nitze: Yeah.
President Kennedy: We wouldn’t want to state what those additional
military forces would be?
57. The abbreviation M-day forces stands for Reserve Forces.

Bundy: Well, they know what they are, Mr. President. Under the
existing NATO planning, they would total, if they all were produced,
something like 47 divisions, if I remember the figure correctly. General
Lemnitzer will have it in mind.
Lemnitzer: I am not sure of the total. We will check it.
Bundy: But it implies a NATO-wide mobilization, and they will all
know that that is what is implied under existing contingency plans on a
NATO-wide basis. This document, it is important to say, relates to an
existing NATO strategy. This is simply the Berlin strategy within exist-
ing NATO strategy.
Martin Hillenbrand: We have another paper which will be consid-
ered by the NAC [North Atlantic Council] at the same time, and that
relates to the specific question of tripartite-NATO relationship, and what
parts of these operations will be under necessarily under tripartite con-
trol, and where the obligation is for NATO as a whole.58
McNamara: Which we could declare by saying a major element of
military action will be for each of the Western European members of
NATO to mobilize and deploy. . . . Make it more specific.
Bundy: Under NATO M-day plans.
McNamara: Yes.
Bundy: Yeah.
McNamara: [whispering] We also hope each of the NATO nations
contemplate through the use of [unclear].
President Kennedy: Do the words on page 5, “the initiation of some
form of nuclear action” . . . has the word initiation got anything to do
[with] [unclear] [sounds of flipping pages] at the bottom? If our continued
impression would be observed, it would be the realization of the imminence
of nuclear war?59 Or is initiation satisfactory? [Unclear exchange.]
Nitze: The point we were trying to get across here was that the
other NAC members would have to realize that we might be faced with a
situation where we would have to initiate. If we could take out the words
58. The tripartite powers were the three Western powers with treaty rights and obligations in
West Germany—Great Britain, France, and the United States. The defense of the Western
position in Berlin would start as a tripartite responsibility and then expand to involve all of
NATO. The involvement of the entire NATO alliance would occur if the Soviet challenge
exceeded a certain threshold.
59. Kennedy is hinting at the possibility that the Western powers might have to be the first to
use nuclear weapons in a conflict with the Warsaw Pact over Berlin. They would preempt the
Soviet use of nuclear weapons because of the “realization of the imminence” of total war.
initiation of, and it would still be implied when you say “will be some
form of nuclear action.”
Bundy: I think that’s better.
Nitze: “Resort to.”
Nitze: We can just take out the initiation.
Bundy: I think “resort to” is pretty good.
Nitze: “Resort to.”60
President Kennedy seems to take a phone call, not related to the discus-
sion at hand.
President Kennedy: Right, OK, . . . Huntsville [Alabama]? Yeah, which
day can you do it? Next week? Why don’t you check that out and . . . Let
me see, I’ll be in Huntsville Tuesday, this week. Because it looks like I’ll be
down there this Sunday. What about the [unclear] burning of those things
[unclear]? Yeah . . . have you announced how many FBI you’ve got; or are
they putting in helicopters. Yeah, OK, fine. Right. OK. Good. Bye.61 [Hangs
up phone.]
President Kennedy: You are going [to] change that to make it . . .
Bundy: We’re going to say “resort to,” simply—
President Kennedy: “Resort to.”
Nitze: It would be “to resort to.”
President Kennedy flips his copy of the document, searching for the
offending phrase.
President Kennedy: All right, then.
Rusk: Mr. President, it’s the very last paragraph, on page 6, [unclear]
language [unclear] because it would be too much of a row to NATO, the
North Atlantic Council. Paul, I don’t see any particular point, from our
point of view, in hanging on to it. We might as well drop it.
Nitze: Apparently, the Germans have also said they wanted to drop
it. I’m not quite sure why they want to drop it.
60. The critical sentence in this planning document thus read: “If the course chosen [by
NATO] were conventional action and this fails to make the Soviet Union back down and has
not precipitated general war, the last remaining pressure to be exerted will be to resort to
some form of nuclear action” (FRUS, 15:320).
61. On 11 September 1962, President Kennedy planned to visit defense facilities at Redstone
Laboratories in Huntsville, Alabama. He would be accompanied by British defense minister
Peter Thorneycroft, who was visiting the United States 9 to 17 September. On Sunday, 16
September, Kennedy was expected to be in Newport, Rhode Island, with Thorneycroft as his
and Mrs. Kennedy’s guest.
Rusk: Well, apparently, there is [unclear] some of these big power

decisions here, this in effect, the Council is going to have to arrive at
rapid decisions at the time of execution. I think that’s really what . . .
Bundy: In realistic terms, it’s not accurate, that paragraph.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bundy: You ought to know, Mr. President, that General Norstad
himself is worried about the restrictiveness of this paper in terms of the
use of nuclear weapons. The reason this is important is that he will be
making a presentation on his views, at a certain stage. I don’t know just
when this will, how this will work. But the Council has asked for his
views on the general issue of the future of nuclear weapons in NATO,
and this connects closely to this general question of when they will be
used in the minds of Europeans who are hesitant about what they per-
ceive to be changes in our policy.
President Kennedy: Well, you know that President Eisenhower’s
conversation with Adenauer [unclear] some confusion, and all the rest.
Bundy: Yeah.
President Kennedy: He’s going to give . . . is General Norstad going
to give the . . . policy?
Bundy: The presentation of his paper will be handled, as I under-
stand it, by Paul Nitze, isn’t that right?
Nitze: No, Tom Finletter.62
Bundy: Tom Finletter.
Nitze: [I’ll] bring Tom up to date on the . . .
Bundy: What will Norstad’s relation to this paper be?
Nitze: I don’t think he will have a relationship to it. He’s already
expressed his views to the Joint Chiefs on the paper. His views have been
taken account of by the Joint Chiefs [of Staff].
Lemnitzer: Yes, he’s also . . . That’s right, and we’ve recommended,
concerned with most of them and a good many of his views have been
incorporated into this paper. Not all of them, but . . .
Nitze: I think the most important one is the . . . is the second sen-
tence, in the second paragraph on page 1.
Lemnitzer: The Joint Chiefs are most concerned [unclear] get the
idea that we were going through step by step by step.
President Kennedy: Have you tried ever [unclear] avoid the subject?
Is that the one?
62. Thomas Finletter was the permanent representative to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.
Bundy: Yeah. [Unclear.]

President Kennedy: [reading] “Nations may render [unclear] of
nuclear weapons. . . .”
Rusk: Point out the standard [unclear].
Nitze: This we thought met his major point. . . .
President Kennedy: Will he at some time talk about the failure of the
NATO people to come up with their, let’s say, with General Eisenhower
[unclear] . . . Adenauer complaining about us?63 Well, I think it would be
well to have these other points made.64 Did somebody make these? Or
will General Lemnitzer do that?
Lemnitzer: Well, he makes them continually, to most of the nations
particularly the British. He’s been after them for several years.
President Kennedy: What’s your impression of them?
Nitze: At the moment the French have won the most in their conver-
sations [unclear].
Lemnitzer: [Unclear.] I think he’s already given up on the French for
the time being, for more divisions, but as they come back from Algeria, I
think that we would have to continue to press the French.
President Kennedy: Is he going to talk about medium-range ballistic
missiles?65
Bundy: At a certain point, he’s under obligation, really, to talk to
NATO. He put that off earlier on so as not to have any confusion about
his views and his retirement. But this is a separate issue. The only reason
I mentioned it is slightly cognate in the minds of many of the Europeans,
because our instinct of holding off this decision till the latest possible
moment is related in their minds to what they take to be our lack of
enthusiasm to General Norstad’s modernization program.66 He will
defend his point of view on modernization in medium-range ballistic
missiles at some point before the council. I don’t know the date of that.
63. “He” is General Norstad.

64. Kennedy is referring to the inability of NATO allies to meet the conventional force goals
set in the fall of 1957 by MC 70 and again in the summer of 1961 by MC 26/4.
65. For Norstad’s views on the deployment of MRBMs in Europe, see the “Meeting with
Dwight Eisenhower,” 10 September 1962.
66. Bundy is referring to the Kennedy administration’s foot-dragging in establishing a European
land-based MRBM nuclear force. Many administration officials, especially in the Department of
State, opposed a land-based force because the allies would demand control over the missiles in
their territory. State preferred a sea-based multilateral force (MLF), which would avoid the issue
of national control entirely by employing mixed NATO crews. Kennedy held a dim view of the
MLF. Although the President shared State’s concerns about allied pressures for their own
national nuclear forces, he doubted the MLF was a viable alternative.
President Kennedy: I think it would be helpful if he put in the, why

he regards conventional forces, and their buildup, to be completely con-
sistent with his view on . . . because he knows I want to make an exclu-
sive . . . I’d like to have it, so that their . . . Also it affects—
Rusk: They’re going to jump on his bandwagon as an excuse for not
going ahead with a conventional buildup.
Bundy: Yeah. Well, they do this in their own minds . . .
President Kennedy: Well, I think if he says that, he’s regarded as
very pure on the subject, we’re not, if he would say it, and explain it.
Could we suggest that he make that part of his presentation?
McNamara: I hope to avoid that presentation as long as possible,
Mr. President, and to the best of my knowledge it isn’t scheduled at the
present time.
Lemnitzer: Well, there’s one on the 25th of September; that was sort
of a tentative date. I don’t know whether it’s been firmed up. I don’t
[know] what the status of that one is, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: OK, [unclear] now we’ve got to go to . . . [to
McNamara] You’re coming tomorrow?
McNamara: Yes, I think so. I’m worried about [British defense min-
ister Peter] Thorneycroft . . .
President Kennedy: Is he not—
Bundy: Isn’t Mike coming, too?
McNamara: Yes I believe so, Mac, but we have a problem that Dave
Ormsby-Gore is having a dinner for him tomorrow night.67 I don’t know
if that gets us back there in time for—
President Kennedy: You’ve got to get back in time for that.
McNamara: Yes, I’m taking him out for dinner tonight in lieu of—
President Kennedy: We’ll just send you to Huntsville—
McNamara: We could have limited [unclear]—
President Kennedy: —dinner Wednesday or is that Albert?
Bundy: Don’t know myself how high—
McNamara: The surgeon general sent me [unclear]. [Laughter.] I
don’t know.
Bundy: I think they would relax to just have this dinner without
Thorneycroft or even give up the dinner; that would be great!
Mixed exchange amidst continued laughter. Someone says, “Thorneycroft
can come late.”
67. David Ormsby-Gore was the British ambassador to the United States.
McNamara: I said we would talk to him tonight. Just say we can be

back here by nine tomorrow night, and leave with you [unclear] an hour . . .
President Kennedy: An hour isn’t . . . it seems to me you can cut it an
hour short, we’ve been through that so much.
McNamara: I haven’t—
President Kennedy: But he—
McNamara: And he hasn’t either.
President Kennedy: So it would be . . .
McNamara: It’s probably desirable to do it. I’ll talk to him and see
what his preferences are . . .
Bundy: I do think the dinner is a trivial matter.
President Kennedy: Who did you get, some congressmen and senators?
Bundy: No, just Thorneycroft and his party.
President Kennedy: Is his party all coming with us?
McNamara: No, only two or three.
President Kennedy: These are—Is [unclear] coming with us?
Bundy: I don’t know, Mr. President. You’ve got a lot of problems.
[chuckling] I wouldn’t try to manage that dinner. Nobody else can.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] give my speech . . . Is Chip [Charles]
Bohlen [unclear] is much more familiar with our whole scene than Tom
Finletter would be but perhaps Tom would—68
McNamara: Finletter, . . . I think it is a forum where he’d do it and he
has asked if Paul can come over to acquaint him with it so that he had
[unclear]. [Garbled exchange.]
Nitze: Well, we’ve considered it to be the natural thing that the U.S.
would put this forward.
President Kennedy: I mean, aren’t the British and the French
[unclear]?
Hillenbrand: We’ll put it forward as our view, and then the British,
French, and Germans would all support that.
President Kennedy: [shuffles papers while talking] . . . after the presen-
tation of the four-power military set group proposal.
Nitze: NATO cost us a little jealousy in the Four Power, in the
Ambassadorial Group. [Laughter.]
McNamara: Mr. President, Lem[nitzer] and I met with the Senate
committee this morning and this afternoon. I don’t believe we’ll have any
68. In October Bohlen is expected to leave for Europe to replace General James Gavin as U.S.
ambassador to France.
problem in putting a resolution through the Senate. Senator [Richard]

Russell has planned to do that very promptly. His [unclear], as a matter of
fact, was talking this afternoon and I believe it was unanimous.69
Rusk: I’ll [unclear].
McNamara: We’re scheduled to go before the House . . .
President Kennedy: So would they get that, including particularly
Khrushchev’s conversation with [Secretary of the Interior Stewart]
Udall about America [unclear] divided.70
McNamara: I think it’d be extremely helpful. We’d go before the House
on Thursday; we’ll have more trouble there. The process is becoming a real
controversy.
Lemnitzer: The more individual opinions in the House, with 37
members, everyone has got some particular angle to follow. . . .
President Kennedy: They can all vote for it.
McNamara: I’m sure they will. I’m sure they will.
Nitze: I think so.
President Kennedy: I would like to get, you know, this statement
[unclear] passed to them about the backlog in foreign aid; I’d like to get
what they at the Defense Department . . . if you did the comparable statis-
tics, you know . . . he’s got this thing where he just would [unclear].
McNamara: Yes there is roughly 2 billion dollars of other than fiscal
’63 [unclear]. Now he adds fiscal ’63, whatever he’s thinking of a billion-
two, perhaps, to the two billion, so he probably comes up with three bil-
lion two or three billion four.
President Kennedy: But, I mean, if you took your total, I’m talking
about the total Defense Department . . . what is your budget?
McNamara: Oh, I can’t tell you that . . .
President Kennedy: Seventy or 80 billion?
McNamara: Oh, I can’t answer the question, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Mac, [unclear]?
Bundy: Can I [unclear] the problem?
69. President Kennedy had asked Congress for standby authority to call up 150,000 reservists
for one year and to extend active duty tours without declaring a state of emergency. On 24
September, the House of Representatives granted him that power.
70. On 29 August, Secretary Udall arrived in the Soviet Union for an 11-day visit to see
hydroelectric projects. On 6 September, Udall met for two hours with Khrushchev. During
their conversation, Khrushchev raised the subject of Berlin and informed Udall bluntly that
the Soviets would not allow Western troops to remain in Berlin and that the United States
and its allies would not dare to go to war over this. At one point, Khrushchev told Udall that
Kennedy was not in a position to reach an agreement over Berlin because he lacked support in
Congress (see FRUS, 15: 308–10).
President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah. But in other words . . . [Garbled

exchange.]
McNamara: . . . in the Defense Department. We have it for so many
years back [unclear].
Bundy: We might get Charlie Hitch to do something.71
McNamara: Oh, yes, it’s all available, and we’ll get out a quarterly
report on it.
Meeting breaks up. Voices, milling around, slamming doors, laughter.
Multiple conversations taking place. The following statements can be heard.
Bundy: Lifetime obligation to [unclear].
Lemnitzer: [Unclear] back here, but I’d like to set it up under you.
President Kennedy: Would you set it up and send me a cable?
Lemnitzer: [Unclear] all I can get, I will. I’ll get it to you on
[unclear] 11th.
President Kennedy: That’s fine.
Lemnitzer: Right.
Unidentified: [Unclear] unless he’s coming back here. The President . . .
Nitze: Are you going back to the building or not?
Lemnitzer: Yes, I am, Paul.
Nitze: Could you take my . . . this with you?
Lemnitzer: Well, I don’t want to lose it.
Nitze: Well, look, I see [unclear]. I’ll . . . let me take it home and put
it in my safe.
Unidentified: So you’re going right to your office [unclear].
Nitze: Yeah, but probably not to the Pentagon.
Lemnitzer: I’ve decided to be there [unclear].
Nitze: I can just put it in my safe.
Lemnitzer: OK. All right. [Unclear.] See you later.
Nitze: Yeah.
Bundy: Mr. President, have you got a minute?
The President goes out, leaving the machine on.
On 13 September, the Ambassadorial Group met to discuss the paper

further. The group made only minor revisions, as Rusk persuaded the
71. Charles Hitch was assistant secretary of defense for budgetary affairs. McNamara admired
Hitch, the former head of the economics division at RAND, for his efficiency and innovation. Hitch
devised the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), which centralized planning in the
Office of the Secretary of Defense and reduced the independence of the service secretaries.
T H U R S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 13, 1962 149
allies that NATO acceptance of the preferred sequence would demon-

strate to the Soviets that any threatening move in Berlin would meet
with unified Western resistance.
Following the Berlin meeting, the President went for his evening
swim. Then it was time to return to the Executive Mansion.
Thursday, September 13, 1962
The President arrived in the Oval Office at 9:40 A.M., after breakfast with
the Democratic legislative leadership. It was his first full day in the
White House since Monday, September 10. Early Tuesday Kennedy had
flown to Huntsville, Alabama, for an intensive two-day tour of the heart-
land of the U.S. space program, where he received a series of briefings on
the status of his goal to put a man on the moon. By the time of his return
on Wednesday night, he had visited the Marshall Space Flight Center in
Huntsville; Cape Canaveral in Florida; the NASA facility in Houston,
Texas; and the McDonnell Douglas plant in St. Louis, which had built the
Mercury capsules and was now working on the Gemini program.
Kennedy had a press conference scheduled for Thursday evening, and
most of the morning was spent preparing. After signing a bill extending
federal protection to the Point Reyes seashore in northern California,
Kennedy met for a few minutes alone with Secretary of State Dean Rusk
before heading into a longer meeting with Rusk and a group of key
advisers to review what might be discussed at the press conference.
While Kennedy was on tour, the Soviets had issued a strong response to
the President’s September 4 statement on Cuba and the administration’s
announced intention to call up 150,000 Reserves. The Soviet Union
raised the alert status of its forces and warned that it would protect
Cuban sovereignty. President Kennedy had every reason to expect ques-
tions about this in the evening.
Walter Heller then came into the Oval Office for about half an hour,
presumably to help with any domestic economic questions. Finally, before
going to a luncheon in honor of U Thant, the acting secretary-general of
the United Nations, the President welcomed the members of the U.S. del-
egation to the 17th U.N. General Assembly. Senator Albert Gore of
Tennessee, who had been named to the delegation, brought along his
daughter, Nancy, and his son Al, a future vice president.
After lunch, just before dropping in on a group of Jewish leaders meet-
150 T H U R S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 13, 1962
ing in the Fish Room, the President called Speaker McCormack, whom he
had seen at the leadership breakfast, to discuss the congressional resolu-
tion on standby authority for calling up the Reserves. In McCormack’s
office were Congressmen Carl Vinson of Georgia and Thomas Morgan of
Pennsylvania.
4:55 P.M.
[T]he quicker we dispose of it, probably the better.
Conversation with John McCormack, Thomas Morgan,

and Carl Vinson1
The President talked with Carl Vinson, a Democratic representative from
Georgia and chairman of the Armed Services Committee; John McCormack,
a Democratic representative from Massachusetts and the Speaker of the
House; and Thomas “Doc” Morgan, a Democratic representative from
Pennsylvania and the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
The four discussed strategies for winning support of a House resolution
to grant the President special limited power to call up to 150,000 reservists
for one year and to extend active duty tours without declaring a state of
emergency. The House passed the resolution on September 24, 1962.
President Kennedy: Mr. Speaker.

John McCormack: Hello, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Hi.
McCormack: I have Carl Vinson with me and Tom Morgan was here
a little while ago and coming back.
McCormack: On this resolution on Cuba.
McCormack: Tom Morgan’s going to introduce it today and Carl
Vinson’s going to introduce, both of them are going to introduce, the
same resolution.
1. Dictabelt 3B.1, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Conversation with McCormack, Morgan, and Vinson 151
President Kennedy: Right, fine.

McCormack: Now you have seen it?
President Kennedy: Yes, that’s correct.
McCormack: That starts our, “Where, whereas President James
Monroe,” and so forth.
McCormack: That right? Then down there, “Now therefore be it
resolved.”
McCormack: We’re trying to see if we can get it up to suspension on
Monday. How would that hit you?
President Kennedy: That’s fine. I think the quicker we dispose of it,
probably the better.
McCormack: Yes, because the Senate isn’t going to . . . they’re going
to refer to the Joint Committee on Armed Services and Foreign
Relations and report back next Thursday.
President Kennedy: Right, right.
McCormack: Now if we can work it out. Ah, that is . . .
[off the phone to someone else] Will you get Chairman Morgan, will you?
[back to President Kennedy] Oh, here’s Chairman Morgan. I’ll have
you talk with Tom Morgan, if I may, and also Carl Vinson.
President Kennedy: Right, right.
McCormack: [to Morgan] I’ve got the President, Tom, and the
President said if we can get it up to suspension Monday that would be fine.
[back to President Kennedy] Now here’s Tom Morgan, Mr. President.
Thomas Morgan: Yes, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Yes, Doc, why I think the quicker, the better and
I think the closer we get to that language the better off we are. It’s the
only way to head off their giving us something much worse.
Morgan: Do you think this language is OK then?
President Kennedy: Yes, that’s the language that . . . we sent up, I
think, to the Senate—
Morgan: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Isn’t that the same language that Mike had?
Morgan: It’s the same language that Chairman Vinson had.
President Kennedy: Is that 1958? It mentions 1958?2
Morgan: Pardon?
2. President Kennedy wants to be sure this resolution mentions the congressional resolution
that helped a Republican president, Dwight Eisenhower, deal with foreign crises in 1958.
152 T H U R S DAY, S E P T E M B E R 13, 1962
President Kennedy: Does it mention the year 1958?

Morgan: Just a minute, Mr. President.
[to someone in the room with him] Is it here? 1958?
[back to the President] Yes.
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s the one. Right. Good. That’s fine.
Well, that’s good because that puts it back on them.
Morgan: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Good, Doc.
Morgan: OK.
President Kennedy: Thank you.
Morgan: Wait a minute, Mr. President. Mr. Vinson wants to talk to
you.
Carl Vinson: Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Yes, sir, Mr.—
Vinson: This is the resolution that was just sent me up from your
office down there—
President Kennedy: That’s correct.
Vinson: That I used when the Secretary of Defense was before the
committee to tell the committee that this was what we would consider,
and we do not have jurisdiction and so Mr. Morgan’s committee has
jurisdiction.
Vinson: But I am going to get the sense of my committee, “do they
endorse it.” And then I’ll bring out the . . . authorization for 150,000
reservists under suspension, past that Monday—
President Kennedy: Oh, terrific.
Vinson: And then, Mr. Morgan will call up . . . on the recommenda-
tion by the Speaker for suspension of the rule and bring up the concur-
rent resolution.
President Kennedy: Very good.
Vinson: Now it’s all right to introduce them?
President Kennedy: That’s fine, Mr. Chairman. Yes, because I think
that’s the only way to head off their introducing a much more objection-
able amendment—3
3. The New York Times that morning reported attempts by three Republican senators to add
inflammatory language to the administration’s reserve mobilization bill. One of them, Senator
Prescott Bush of Connecticut, proposed that it “put the Soviet Union on notice that the
Monroe Doctrine was not dead.” However, by the end of the day the Senate had passed the
resolution unanimously, without any amendments. The failed Republican amendments were
Conversation with McCormack, Morgan, and Vinson 153
Vinson: Uh-huh.
President Kennedy: —language.
Vinson: That’s right, because I’ve got to keep down some very objec-
tionable amendments—
President Kennedy: That’s correct.
Vinson: . . . in my committee and this is the only way I can do it.
President Kennedy: That’s fine, Mr. Chairman.
Vinson: Thank you, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Thanks a lot. Right.
At the President’s 6:00 P.M. press conference, Kennedy reiterated a desire

for calm regarding Soviet activities in the Caribbean. He stressed that he
believed that “these new shipments do not constitute a serious threat to
any other part of this hemisphere.” And he called for a stop to “loose
talk” about invading Cuba for it gave “a thin color of legitimacy to the
Communist pretense that such a threat exists.” Kennedy, however, did
not deny his administration’s concerns about what the future might
hold. On September 11, the Soviets had responded to his September 4
statement with a stiff public pledge of their own to defend Cuba. But the
Soviets had added that they had no intention of sending any nuclear mis-
siles to Cuba. Thus both provoked and encouraged, Kennedy reinforced
his earlier warning to the Soviets. If Cuba, he said, “should become an
offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then
this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security
and that of its allies.”4
Returning to the White House at 6:34 P.M., the President had another
warning to present. On the advice of Clark Clifford and the other mem-
bers of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), the
President had invited Orvil Dryfoos, the publisher of the New York Times,
to a meeting to discuss Hanson Baldwin and the problem of leaks of clas-
sified information.5
Kennedy and Dryfoos met for nearly an hour. To dramatize the value
of the information Baldwin had described in the Times, Kennedy handed
referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for possible incorporation in another res-
olution (New York Times, 13 and 14 September 1962).
4. The President’s News Conference of 13 September 1962, in The Kennedy Presidential Press
Conferences (New York: Coleman, 1978).
5. On the Baldwin case, see Volume 1, “Meeting with PFIAB,” 1 August 1962; Introduction to
16 August 1962; and “Meeting on Intelligence Matters,” 22 August 1962.
Dryfoos a top secret report, codeword Keyhole, that identified Soviet

missile launch sites on the basis of satellite information. Then he briefly
left the Oval Office while Dryfoos read.
Having returned to his office, President Kennedy explained to Dryfoos
that he intended to implement a new system to guard against harmful
leaks once the director of Central Intelligence, John McCone, returned
from his honeymoon. He wanted to work out a system with McCone
and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara so that the CIA would
receive reports on any conversations that Pentagon officials had with
journalists.
Dryfoos was impressed by the Keyhole document and said that
Hanson Baldwin would not have submitted his story had he understood
the sensitivity of his information. Nevertheless he argued strongly against
the President’s idea of using the CIA as a watchdog, citing the First
Amendment and the importance of an informed electorate in a democracy.
President Kennedy, however, kept coming back to the importance of his
CIA plan. Finally, Dryfoos asked whether the President planned to
announce this plan publicly. When Kennedy said no, Dryfoos cautioned
him that this was the type of plan that Hanson Baldwin would be the first
to find out about and it would make great front-page material.6
Following this meeting, the President went to the pool.
Tuesday, September 25, 1962
President Kennedy took some time off in mid-September 1962 despite the
crush of events in the Caribbean and Central Europe and his active partici-
pation in the midterm elections. An avid sailor, Kennedy spent as much
time watching the America’s Cup Challenge off Newport, Rhode Island, as
possible. Leaving the Oval Office on Friday afternoon, September 14, the
Kennedys spent until Wednesday afternoon, September 19, in Newport.
President Kennedy invited his good friend British ambassador David
6. “Meeting of Orvil E. Dryfoos with John F. Kennedy, September 13, 1962,” 14 September
1962, Dryfoos Papers, New York Times Archives, New York, NY. Kennedy started the meeting
by saying that he was much less worried about Cuba than he was about the situation in Berlin.
He thought people exaggerated the threat posed by Cuba. He expected the situation to get
very bad in Berlin in December. The editors are grateful to the New York Times for the use of
its archives.
Ormsby-Gore and Mrs. Ormsby-Gore to join his family on board the

USS destroyer Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. to watch the races. The Australian
sloop Gretel was challenging the American sloop Weatherly.
President Kennedy returned to the White House for meetings on
Wednesday evening and Thursday. Thursday evening, September 20, he
left for a quick visit to a Democratic fund-raiser in Harrisburg, Penn-
sylvania, before flying back to Newport that night for the next round of
races. The Kennedys did not leave Newport again until Monday evening,
September 24. The President and Mrs. Kennedy hosted a lunch for
Mohammed Ayub Khan and his delegation at Hammersmith Farm in
Newport before leaving for Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, September 25, was President Kennedy’s first full day in the
Oval Office since Thursday, September 13, the date of the previous taped
conversation. Much of the President’s schedule this day involved Asia
and the Pacific. In the morning the President met with the coordinating
secretary of state for security of South Vietnam, Nguyen Dinh Thuan.
Then he was reunited with Benjamin Kevu, the man from the Solomon
Islands who had saved his life during World War II by delivering a
coconut with information about the location of Kennedy and the other
survivors of his destroyed PT boat. Next to enter the Oval Office was
the prime minister of Australia, Robert G. Menzies. A non-Asian event,
the swearing in of Willard Wirtz as secretary of labor, also happened
just before lunch. So, too, did a meeting with George Ball, George
McGhee, and Carl Kaysen, perhaps on the progress of negotiations with
the Europeans on a modified gold standstill agreement.1
Following his midday break, the President returned to his office for
two meetings with his brother. At the first meeting, the Attorney
General was joined by John McCone of the CIA and Carl Kaysen. In the
second meeting Robert Kennedy was alone with the President. None of
these meetings was taped.
The only meeting the President taped came at the end of the day and
involved a discussion of incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Maxwell Taylor’s fact-finding trip to East Asia.
1. For the development of this policy see Volume 1, “Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis,”
10 August 1962; “Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis,” 16 August 1962; and “Meeting on
Gold and Dollar Policy,” 20 August 1962.
5:00 –5:56 P.M.
I would think the more likely thing would be . . . is they would

move there [South Korea] having moved against Quemoy and
Matsu and our having trouble in Berlin; it would be part of a
worldwide expansion rather than just a single action there.
Meeting with Maxwell Taylor on His Far Eastern Trip2

President Kennedy announced on July 19, 1962, that General Maxwell
Taylor would replace Lyman Lemnitzer as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, effective October 1. Before assuming his post, Taylor decided he
needed a refresher trip to the Far East. He left the country amid disturb-
ing reports of Soviet military aid arriving in Cuba. Taylor departed on
August 31, stopping first in Japan and following an arc down to
Indonesia. The newly appointed Chairman focused on U.S. policy in the
region, especially as it concerned Communist China. He also examined
the status of U.S. military assistance programs in the Far East, looking
for ways to use U.S. aid more effectively, including substituting nuclear
for conventional forces.
The short period of time did not allow for much more than a whistle-
stop tour, but Taylor did meet with heads of state in many countries,
including Thanarat Sarit in Thailand, Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia,
and Achmed Sukarno in Indonesia.
Taylor’s visit to Indonesia came soon after the United States had helped
negotiate an end to a Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West Irian, also
2. Including President Kennedy, William Bundy, Mike Forrestal, Averell Harriman, U. Alexis
Johnson, Carl Kaysen, Robert Komer, Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, William
Sullivan, and Maxwell Taylor. President Kennedy’s daily appointment’s diary lists George
Ball and a Commander Bagley as also having attended the meeting, but they were not identi-
fied on the tape. Tape 23, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. Initially, the Kennedy Library dated this conversation as 28 September
1962; however, internal evidence and the existence of an Asian foreign policy meeting on
Tape 25, which could not have occurred any other day but 28 September, argues for this being
the Taylor briefing meeting of 25 September 1962.
This tape begins with a few minutes of a fragmented conversation. The quality of the
recording is so poor that only a few words can be heard. Civil rights and the President’s inten-
tion to initiate a housing bill for the District of Columbia are mentioned. A “Ken,” possibly
Kenneth O’Donnell, and a “Tom” greet each other. Given that Tape 22 contained a conversa-
tion on September 10 and the next conversation on Tape 23 occurred in the late afternoon of
25 September, it is impossible to provide an exact date for this fragment.
Meeting with Maxw ell Ta ylor on His Far Easter n Trip 157
known as West New Guinea. The Dutch, who had colonized Indonesia and
controlled it until 1948, refused to turn over West New Guinea to the
Indonesians in 1949. The colony comprised 150,000 square miles of the
most primitive territory left in the world.
The United States maintained a hands-off policy until 1960, when
the Eisenhower administration proposed to create a U.N. trusteeship for
the territory. The negotiations quickly failed. The Dutch sent an aircraft
carrier and troops to the region, to which Sukarno responded by infil-
trating troops, contracting for $500 million of Soviet military aid, and
issuing belligerent statements. The Kennedy administration pursued
Eisenhower’s policy, but little progress was made until mid-1962, when
Kennedy’s negotiator, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, worked to bring
the two sides together. He proposed a two-year transition plan, with
West Irian remaining a U.N. trustee for the transitional period.
President Kennedy had to intervene to save the negotiations, but he
did save them and a compromise agreement was reached in early August
1962. The Dutch agreed to turn over the region to a U.N. Temporary
Executive Authority, which could begin the transfer of authority to the
Indonesians as early as May 1963.
Taylor returned on September 21. At this meeting, Taylor provided
essentially a long briefing of his trip. Kennedy did not tape the entire
meeting. He turned on the tape recorder after Taylor began speaking.
Maxwell Taylor: . . . my first orientation, and also updating of my

knowledge of some of these countries. However, one can’t go through an
area like this even though it’s sometimes reasonably familiar without
being hit by certain things which seem worth reporting. I might say
that, in general, that one reflects in going to the Far East . . . seeing the
analogies and the lack of analogies between our military problem there
and the problem in Europe. There is an analogy in the sense that we
have the problem of deterrence of war out there just as we have a prob-
lem of deterrence in the NATO area. The enemy, however, is different.
It’s Red China in one form or another. And the assets of Red China and
the weaknesses of Red China are quite different from the assets and
weaknesses of the Soviet Union.
And in military terms, and I looked at this primarily in a military way,
and I realize the one-eyed aspect of that, but the military threat from Red
China of course is manpower on the ground. They have the largest army
in the world. But secondly, and perhaps more critically from our point of
view, they also have the fourth-largest air force, and a pretty good air
force. We don’t think they fly as well as our Chinat [Chinese Nationalist]
friends, but if you look at the inventory of aircraft that have been built up
in recent years, it ends up in [being] quite a formidable threat. So much
so that our air people in each one of the areas, say, in Korea, or in Taiwan,
or in Southeast Asia, can build a picture which is quite graphic and quite
realistic, I think, of a 1,000-plane attack say against every important tar-
get in South Korea in a very short period of time.
Now what we’ve done over the years is that we have built up in Korea
particularly and Taiwan very sizable ground forces, but we have lagged
in the air defense aspect. So that now we’re being hit almost at one time,
in a short period of time, at least, with the requirements for more-
advanced interceptors and also for a modernized air control and warn-
ing circuits. So we’re having this in South Korean, Taiwan, and also—
President Kennedy: OK. Now, do we have Hawk missiles in—
Taylor: —and in Korea.
President Kennedy: Do we have them on Formosa?
Taylor: We have them planned in Formosa.
Lyman Lemnitzer: None of them have Hawks yet but we have a
Nike-Hercules Battery there.
President Kennedy: Is that a pretty good missile?
Lemnitzer: Yes sir, it’s the best up to about 80,000 feet. It’s a very,
very accurate—
President Kennedy: As good as a SAM 2?
Taylor: It’s also a surface-to-air missile, Mr. President, something we
don’t give her credit for, a surface-to-surface missile. A credit we don’t
give to ourselves, but it has a very good accuracy up to about 90 miles.
Lemnitzer: It was moved in there at the time of the bombardment of
the offshore islands of 1958, and it’s the best missile in the world of its
kind.
President Kennedy: Can this pick up? This . . . it could be against an
ocean target. The Nike—
Taylor: If you could locate the target with binoculars—
President Kennedy: Radar? Do you have a firing? Do you have a
radar apparatus?
Lemnitzer: Indeed, that’s how it . . .
President Kennedy: We don’t have any Nike-Zeus on Quemoy and
Matsu, do we?
Lemnitzer: No missiles, no surface-to-air missiles on Matsu.
President Kennedy: Now, is our, [is] the number of our missiles on
Formosa inadequate?
Taylor: I would say it is inadequate. That is really the point, sir, that
the air defense aspect has lagged in terms of other kinds of forces. And
unfortunately, when you look at the MAP program, as I told the senators
this morning, that’s where the money is going.3 We’re planning now to
close this gap, but most of the money in the military aid programs are
simply for the maintenance of current forces plus this additional money
for the modernization of air defense. That’s not entirely true, but it’s
generally so. So that’s one of the unfortunate things about any serious
cut in the aid program at this time is that it does hold back an area in
which we are critically weak.4
Another very interesting and I think important point militarily, Mr.
President, as you go down each country. Take Korea, which is a big
money user in that area. I looked that program over, hoping as I have in
previous years to find some way, from a military point of view, to reduce,
to recommend a reduction. This is a burden which we don’t like. It’s
been looked at year after year. But I would have to report that as long as
we keep the present assumptions in Korea, I don’t think, from a military
point of view, we’re justified in reducing our forces. In fact, we should be
putting more money, as I’ve said, into air defense.
Now, one of the reasons however, for that is that the assumption
now . . . the objective given to our forces . . . the indigenous forces in
Korea . . . is to be able, with South Korean forces, to check and hold off a
massive attack mounted not only by the North Koreans but also by the
Red Chinese. In other words, we’re setting a very high level of effort as
the goal for our, for the indigenous forces. And we’re assuming that
atomic weapons would not be used.
Now, I’ve discussed this with the Secretary and the Joint Chiefs. I
think that we should really come to you and get with a study of . . . an
analyzing of pros and cons of the use of atomic weapons in the Far East.
Those pros and cons are quite different from the situation in Europe.
Sometimes the advantages are greater; sometimes perhaps less. But I
think that if we could assume that in case of [a] massive Chinese attack
at any point in Asia, whether in Korea or in Southeast Asia, we could
certainly recast then some of our military requirements, and I would
think reorient some of our programs. So I think that’s a capital point,
and we should bring you a recommendation.
3. The acronym MAP stands for the Military Assistance Program.

4. The Kennedy administration was in the midst of a struggle with Congress over the size of
the following year’s foreign aid budget.
President Kennedy: On whether we ought to agree to the use of tac-

tical nuclear weapons in case the Chinese should join the North
Koreans?
Taylor: That is correct, sir. Take in Korea: If they came across the
Yalu [River], we’d use them in North Korea at once. We would not, we’d
reserve judgment on whether we’d attack targets elsewhere. But if your
military people could have that assumption, I would think there’s a
pretty good chance of recasting some of our deployments.
William Bundy: May I just comment on that, if I may General? This
essentially . . . such a study was made on a political-military basis by a
group headed by General Cary of the Air Force, retired Air Force officer
under our auspices—5
Lemnitzer: That’s right.
Bundy: —with very close joint staff cooperation, and it came up with
exactly the same conclusion: that if you made this strategic assumption,
then you could safely reduce; but pointed out the pros and cons of mak-
ing that assumption. In other words if you decide to use nukes sooner, in
effect you’re moving your strategy in Asia in the opposite direction of
what you are in Europe, and so on. And we can see all the pros and cons
of that. I merely say I think the studies exist for this kind of examination
now. The Joint Chiefs went into it at the same time.
Lemnitzer: We went into it in great detail. If you are in fact lowering
the threshold to the Chinese crossing the river, you’re going to use
nuclear weapons. Now that’s quite inconsistent with a policy which we’ve
expressed on, certainly in the European area, and generally throughout
the world. [Five seconds excised as classified information] and apply the
same terms that you would apply in NATO, the strength that you have
there on the ground is going to determine the threshold at which you
employ nuclear weapons. Well, I think, [the] lower the forces, the sooner
you’re going to be required to use nuclear weapons.
Taylor: I think the only thing required now would be to tell us that
you would like to have a study, that . . . assuming that we’re allowed to
plan on the use of nuclear weapons whenever the Chinese come in force
into North Korea. Then what effect would it have on force structure,
then see what came out of it.
Robert McNamara: Mr. President, may I say that that kind of a
study has been made in connection with the fiscal ’64 budget. The Chiefs
5. General Cary is unidentified.

haven’t had a chance to review it. A General Cary, who’s a retired Air
Force General.
President Kennedy mumbles something, probably related to the fact that
Bill Bundy has already made the same point while McNamara was out
of the room.
McNamara: But this ought to be reviewed formally by the Chiefs and
reported to you, and I asked the Chiefs yesterday to—
President Kennedy: The point he was making, Mr. Secretary, while
you were absent, [was] that this would in a sense be a reverse of what
we were attempting to do in Europe.
McNamara: But I think the conditions are reversed. In Europe the
reason our strategy [is] as it is, [is] because we’re faced with a nuclear
force and a very strong one. In China we have no nuclear force opposing
us. And it seems to me this is enough of a difference to warrant at least
consideration of a different strategy. And I think—
President Kennedy: Whether you’d say that you would use nuclear
weapons . . . on crossing, coming into North Korea, which would not be
very overt, because they could be coming in and out of there in peacetime
conditions or whether you’d wait until they cross the cease-fire line?6
Taylor: Well the intent would be a massive invasion. If it’s not mas-
sive, it has no great military significance.
President Kennedy: I would think that if they came en masse, the
Chinese down, then of course it would be a . . . I would think the more
likely thing would be . . . is they would move there [South Korea] having
moved against Quemoy and Matsu and our having trouble in Berlin; it
would be part of a worldwide expansion rather than just a single action
there. That’s the least likely kind of military action for them to take.
Taylor: Well, I think that’s true, that there’s no great feeling that that
is a likely contingency now, but the whole situation in Red China can
change drastically. If, for example, the situation would break in Southeast
Asia, we ourselves might want to put pressure on that part of world.
McNamara: Well, we’re right in an untenable position, I think, at the
present time. We’re supplying forces which are more than enough to
support a strategy based on nuclear weapons, but less than enough to
counter a large-scale conventional onslaught. So we don’t have any—
Taylor: We’re not bound by that position.
McNamara: And this is why we started these studies, Mr. President.
6. President Kennedy is referring to a military offensive by the People’s Republic of China.

President Kennedy: I would think that the nuclear, you changed to

using nuclear, I don’t know whether it’s the Yalu River or whether you
say it’s once they cross the cease-fire line in any force. The reason that
we’re so slow about using nuclear weapons in Europe is, first, because
we’re against a nuclear force, and second, because of Berlin. Well, you
see, if you didn’t have the Berlin problem, you just had a clean line, you
would use nuclear weapons almost from the beginning if they came
across in force. That would be a signal [without] [unclear].
Well, we know it isn’t going to come that way; it’s going to come
with difficulty in Berlin, but we might have to take the first action. So I
would think that we could say that you would use nuclear weapons . . . I
don’t think you could say if they came across the Yalu River, but you
could say that we certainly [would] use it if they attack in force across
the [Korean] cease-fire line. That’s—
Taylor: I think that’s the point sir, that we would not be prepared to
hold them back by conventional methods if they came en masse. How
they got there wouldn’t particularly matter.
President Kennedy: What would that free? That might free, what
one or two [divisions] . . . we’ve got two divisions there?
Taylor: Well, we—[unclear].
Lemnitzer: I don’t think it would free very much because the divi-
sions we’ve got in Korea are not the new U.S. divisions. They are the
divisions General Taylor, when he was commander of the Eighth Army,
organized specifically for the requirements of Korea. They aren’t very
heavy in artillery and transportation, and they aren’t very heavy in
strength. They’re smaller than our divisions.
President Kennedy: But we have two divisions there? Do we?
Taylor: We have two forward . . . two divisions.
President Kennedy: The question is whether they really, is that the
place for them to be, is it?
Lemntizer: Well I think it’s the greatest deterrent to the resumption
of hostilities in Korea.
President Kennedy: Our two divisions?
Lemnitzer: That’s right, and I also think that that representation of
our image in the United Nations command also gives us control of that
situation, which might otherwise . . . it would pass to some other nation-
ality.
McNamara: I think it would free this, Mr. President: In the long run
it would free substantial Korean forces. I say [in] the long run because
in the short run they have such a serious unemployment problem; you
couldn’t reduce the military force in Korea today without adverse effects
in the civilian economy. But in the long run it would free substantial
forces, maybe a couple hundred thousand men. In the long run it would
greatly reduce our military assistance program because we’re supplying
air power to Korea and to Taiwan, and we will have to supply it to
Thailand if we continue the present policy, which wouldn’t be required if
we understood that we could use nuclear weapons, particularly nuclear
weapons delivered by U.S. aircraft. So I think both of those effects would
take place.
Taylor: That’s correct. The present strength of the armed forces of
South Korea [is] about 600,000 as opposed to about 380,000, I think, in
North Korea. So if you really were setting up your military structure in
South Korea simply to offset North Korea, manpower-wise, you would
certainly think [that] you could make a reduction. But it would have to
go with some arrangement that you wouldn’t fear a sudden rush from
the Chinese across the Yalu. And that would be the response by nuclear
weapons.
President Kennedy: The next place was Japan. As a result of your
wire, I sent a memorandum to the secretary of defense about our capital
expenditures in Japan, our dollar expenditures, which I seem to recall
are 350 million?
McNamara: Over 300 [million]; 330, something like that.
President Kennedy: Yeah. The limitations which are described . . .
you can’t use it, we certainly couldn’t even use Japan if you really wanted
to use it. . . . Doesn’t seem to me they’d probably let you use it, would
they?7
Taylor: I think it is a question, sir. I’m afraid [in] my cable . . . I
noticed in the State summary which I didn’t think quite did [unclear]
really to my thoughts. [It] is not that the bases aren’t useful—they’re
very useful. In fact the Navy and the Air Force would say they’re virtu-
ally indispensable, at this time, in time of peace. But if you get into time
of war, then it becomes more and more unfit. And when you look at the,
we have some 680 combat aircraft in the Far East to face the Chinese
2,800 [planes]. About two-thirds of those are on Japanese bases. Now if
we start to have war with Red China, it’s very likely, as we’ve indicated
here, it would be a nuclear war, and whether we could use those . . . the
concerns of the air forces being neutralized, so to speak, by the Japanese
limitations, I don’t know. But it’s certainly a possibility. But I wouldn’t
7. Kennedy is referring to the Japanese government’s prohibition on the storage of nuclear

weapons in Japan.
suggest for a moment that we should close up these bases. But they are
necessary now, but they are not so important that they should really be
the controlling factor in all our foreign policy toward Japan.
William Sullivan:8 Under the present rules, Japan is committed to
permit us the use of bases in Japan for the use of our forces against any
resumption of hostilities in Korea. This is a United Nations commitment
which the Japanese made. They have made efforts to evade that commit-
ment when they entered the United Nations, and we were going to move
our Far East command out of there, but when it was put up on the basis
that their first action would be to deny the U.N. the use of Japanese bases
as their first act upon joining the United Nations, it looked a little bit
off-key. They withdrew their proposal.
Now the principal objection, the principal handicap at the present
time is the question of nuclear weapons in Japan. Japan is emotionally,
well they’re fanatical about nuclear weapons for understandable reasons.
Forty-two seconds excised as classified information.
Taylor: One other broad question, Mr. President, is the proper mix or
the proper balance between indigenous forces and our own forces when
we consider them packages for military purposes. Years ago, when the
military aid program started in the Far East, the thought was that prima-
rily we’d be supporting ground forces. We were going to always have a
small army. We would need the training of oriental manpower to help us
hold the line in any given sensitive area. Meanwhile our Navy and our
Air Force would utilize their mobility and their striking power and their
sophisticated weapons to back up the ground forces, largely indigenous.
In the course of the years, that’s changed, rather surprisingly. At least I
was surprised at the extent now we are planning to give sophisticated
weapons, advanced interceptors, some naval craft of some sophistication
to these indigenous forces. And I think it’s very timely for us to reexam-
ine this whole question of what is the proper mix, what should be the
objective of these forces. Now really, it’s saying in Pentagon language, to
reexamine the MAP objectives which we have country by country.
In countries such as Korea and Taiwan, for example, we use such
broad language as to say these forces are to assist U.S. forces extensively
in the event of general war. Well, that is so broad it could mean almost
anything. And I personally have the feeling that we should really
sharpen our objectives so that they state more specifically what are the
8. A sample of William Sullivan’s voice was not available. This identification is based on an
analysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.
common-sense reasonable objectives at this time. That’s something for

DOD, for the JCS and State to work out.
In Southeast Asia, Mr. President, of course the threat is quite differ-
ent. You’re impressed always that the diversity of insurgency is really the
open enemy in the four countries that we’re most concerned with. I had a
very interesting stop in South Vietnam. It was only one of these short
ones, two and a half days, and I saw many people and did a certain
amount of traveling. One of my most interesting experiences was calling
in eight junior officers, who were attached to . . . American officers
attached to the South Vietnamese units, to try to get a grassroots feeling
of how these young officers felt about their job, how they were getting
along with the local officials, and so on. I’m sure you would get a great
deal of encouragement out of hearing these young officers. They’re keen
as they can be. They like what they’re doing. They realize the importance
of their mission, and none of them would say they [have] had any real
difficulties in their personal relationships with the South Vietnamese offi-
cers. I asked that question because the press, just shortly before my
arrival, carried some such statement, and I would say based upon my
observations and many discussions it just isn’t so.
How are we doing there? Of course I’ve read the reports as all of us
have over the last 10 or 11 months, but really you have to be on the ground
to sense a lift in the national morale. It was right on the ground last
October when I was there. The hamlet program is indicative I would think
of the greater public popular support. They have either fortified or [are] in
[the] course of fortification [of] some 5,000 hamlets out of the total
16,000. This is done very largely by voluntary work on the part of the local
people with very little government guidance. They’re getting some, but the
programmer, they ran away from the government plan. Also, it’s some-
thing to see, the over 100,000 mountaineers, the Montagnards, who’ve
come out of the mountains, left their fields, left the areas in which they
want to live in order to escape communism. [Seven seconds excised as classi-
fied information.] Cleaning up the villages, getting adequate defenses for
them, and also bringing in new and improved agricultural methods, so that
the whole life of the Montagnards for the first time is showing some signs
of promise.
President Kennedy: We saw the minister this morning.9 He dis-
9. A reference to Nguyen Dinh Thuan, the coordinating secretary of state for security of
South Vietnam. He met with President Kennedy that morning to discuss, among other mat-
ters, the crop destruction program.
cussed with us this question of using pesticides against their food, and I
told him we’d give them an answer one way or another by the end of the
week. They wanted to try some test runs up in areas which are clearly
Vietcong.
Taylor: They are very anxious to do that.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] All the pluses and minuses about it.
What’s our judgment about it? I thought we ought to answer him one
way or the other.
Taylor: Well, this has been talked back and forth between State and
Defense for some time. And most people are unanimous in saying that
this rather modest initial effort should be tried.
President Kennedy: What about [Lieutenant General Paul D.]
Harkins? What does he think?
Taylor: He’s all for it. Also, Diem is for it.
President Kennedy: Can they tell, do you think, which are which—
Robert Komer:10 This has been the problem in our mind, Mr. President,
as to whether or not you can identify the Vietcong–held fields from the
Montagnard fields. And—
President Kennedy: They say [unclear] rice is planted in a straighter
line. Is there any other way? They say that in the areas which they are
talking about, they say they can. I don’t know whether—
Taylor: Well they know areas that are denied to the government
forces [where] you have to fight your way in. And the assumption is that
any rice in there is going to be used by the enemy, regardless of what the
political coloration of the man who actually planted the rice.
Unidentified: Yes.
McNamara: Mr. President, I don’t think any of us here can say for
sure whether they can tell. But what we can say is that the ambassador is
wholeheartedly in support of it, our military planners are wholeheart-
edly in support of it, and I believe that the risk of a trial is low. And I
would strongly urge therefore we try it.
President Kennedy: What can we do about keeping it from becoming
an American enterprise which would be surfaced with poisoning food?11
McNamara: I think we’ll be charged with that.
Taylor: We can’t avoid it.
McNamara: We can do quite a bit to avoid it.
10. A tentative voice identification. A sample of Robert Komer’s voice was not available. This
identification is based on an analysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.
11. The President is using surfaced to mean “revealed to be involved.”
President Kennedy: Should we have Vietnamese—

Taylor: They will put it down.
McNamara: They will put it down. It would be done in their aircraft.
Komer: How about the season? Is it?
President Kennedy: Yes, [can we do it] now?
Unidentified: Is it the time in the season? [Unclear exchange.]
McNamara: There’s about eight weeks left.
Unidentified: There are.
Unidentified: Well, let’s try it then.
Taylor: There is some experience with this in Malaya, isn’t that
right? One of those two groups there.
Komer: I don’t know that they used—
President Kennedy: I think that’d be worth having if the British did
it. That would be pretty . . .
Lemnitzer: The British did do it in Malaya, Mr. President, yes.
Unidentified: They used . . .
Komer: Well, I think psychologically, Mr. President, there’s some-
thing different between a man going in with it and spraying it on the
ground and doing it from a plane or from a helicopter. I’m not arguing
against it on this ground but I do point out that there is this—
President Kennedy: The British did it on the ground?
Komer: No, they did it both, and of course we’re now doing it, we’re
now using napalm. The British used napalm. In many ways napalm is
much nastier than the—
Unidentified: Nastier . . .
President Kennedy: To burn up food, we’re doing that?
Komer: Yes. Yes, and napalm destroys the use of the soil also. Very
simple, whereas the insecticides, or these—what do you call them?—
herbicides do not.
Bundy: I think the British also did this at the very end of, towards the
end, at any rate, of their campaign in Malaya when they had the Chinese
Communists boxed in small jungle areas fairly well identified.
Unidentified: Well identified. There was no question—
Bundy: There was no question that there was any mixture of friendly
people in those areas.
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t we send out the word, and let’s
take a look at what the instructions are so they understand all the . . .
Averell Harriman: It’s too late. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: [Unclear.] No, they say—
McNamara: No, it’s definitely not too late. There are about eight
weeks left.
Harriman: No, I don’t know, our people think that basically the peas-
ant, whoever he is, is the one who eats the food. Two, 3 percent, or 5 per-
cent, or 6 percent or 8 percent of Vietcong get around and that food is
taken away from whoever the peasant may be. That’s the argument that
our people make very strongly. There’s no such thing as fields, that we
know of, fields that have been grown for Vietcong. They are grown for
the villagers themselves, and that’s the argument against it, and that this
would not be depriving the Vietcong of a grain of food.
President Kennedy: Well, couldn’t we have some . . . ? It seems to me
there would have to be some proposal made that food would be supplied
to these areas by the government. Then the government would be able
to distribute—
Taylor: Once they get in, sir. But at this time these are closed areas,
no one—
Komer: Part of the problem is, if you destroy the crops, the
Montagnards come out. . . . Then being prepared to take care of them
when they do come out.
Well, now this is fairly well along [unclear], as I understand it.
McNamara: This, we have a program to do.
Komer: Yes, that’s . . .
Harriman: Our people have been through it, in China and elsewhere.
The loss will far, the losses among the peasants will far outweigh such a
relatively small gain in taking away the food from the Vietcong. But
that’s the amount of judgment which our people [feel] very strong, for
[whatever it’s worth].
President Kennedy: Who’s that? Who would that be, Governor?
Harriman: Huh?
President Kennedy: Who are those people?
Harriman: Well, Rice, who has been through it in China and seen
what happened when you prejudice the peasants against you, and he
thinks the whole thing is going to be won on the basis of whether the
peasants are with you or not.12 Come in and destroy their crops. . . . Why
it builds up an antagonism which is very hard to break.
Bundy: I think that Roger Hilsman’s theory on this is somewhat sim-
ilar, for what it’s worth. It’s mainly that if you can identify the enemy
very precisely and be sure that you’re not getting possibly friendly peas-
ants hurt too, then . . . it’s good to do it if it can be done in a rather large
12. E. E. Rice was a Foreign Service officer assigned to the Policy Planning Staff.
scale because then you really want to get real military advantage com-
mensurate with the political risk. There’s some worry that doing it just
in a few very small areas, we might take an awful political whacking and
not really get—
President Kennedy: The job done.
Bundy: The big military job done.
Harriman: And then it makes the local population ready to join the
Vietcong and changes the whole atmosphere. [Unclear.]
Taylor: Well this is another form of bombing. I think it’s the same
problem. We have the . . .
Harriman: It’s a very strong political argument against it from those
people who have had experience in this.
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t we . . . without putting an impos-
sible burden on them, why don’t we say that we are now leaning, or inclin-
ing towards permitting this program, and that we would like to . . .
First, is there sufficient time to make it effective? Number two, can it
be done on a wide enough scale and yet with accuracy to make it worth-
while? And three, what is the technique they’re going to use to detect
what areas they are going to do and what is the system they are going to
use to determine what is Vietcong and what isn’t? And then what proce-
dure would they make to take care adequately of the people who are not
Vietcong, but who are damaged or find themselves short of food? And
then if we get an answer back, in 48 hours or so, then we can make a final
judgment on it. Try to tell them we’ll give them a final answer when we
get back. There may be some other questions we ought to ask them.
Komer: Those are the principal ones.
Taylor: Those are the principal ones, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Well, then, we ought to try to tell them we’ll
give them a final answer by the weekend. I’m sure they don’t want to
screw around any longer.
Taylor: One of the things, Mr. President, we need to look at with a
little more, greater attention, is the best method of reporting our
progress. In other words, how are we doing? We’re always asking our-
selves that. We have never had a very good way to answer except by feel.
I found that General Harkins has anticipated this to a certain degree,
and now puts out a questionnaire, a rather heavy questionnaire, to all the
military people in the field, so that once a month they report back indica-
tors such as ability to go in certain villages where they hadn’t been
before, and so on.
My comment to the ambassador was that I thought that this should
be a country team affair so that all the questions, the political questions,
[would] get injected into the same kind of questionnaire, and that once
a month we get a complete poll across the board in those areas that
we’re interested in.
Komer: As you know we suggested to the ambassador, and I think
he’s accepted this, that we send a group of Vietnamese-speaking foreign
service officers out. To station one in each of these important areas to
maintain contact with the [unclear] people to maintain contact with the
local officials and the people and try to be [the] eyes and ears of the
ambassador and the country team to help answer this question. This
would be supplementary to—
Taylor: All these things should be done. But now we have literally
hundreds of Americans all through Vietnam who are qualified observers
and they should be passing in—
Komer: That’s great. And it’s a problem of getting the information
from them really. They’re all busy people.
Unidentified: Three are being established outside of Saigon, and
they will serve as sort of vacuum cleaners to pick this stuff [out] . . .
Komer: Yes.
Taylor: Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Mr. President, I stopped in
Cambodia and had the first insight into the [Prince Norodom] Sihanouk
personality.13 [Laughter.]. He couldn’t have been nicer, and I told him I
don’t know why you have troubles with this man. [Laughter.] In both
Thailand and Cambodia we have a real problem of emotionalism on the
question of who to support.
President Kennedy: It’s like India and Pakistan.
Taylor: Sir?
President Kennedy: It’s like India and Pakistan.
Taylor: Yes, and perhaps even more so right now. Sihanouk is a wild
man, as you know, and he really believes that both of his neighbors on
the right and the left are his enemies, mortal enemies, historical
enemies.14 These invasions are just feeling him out, that someday they’d
like to come over and stay. He believes that. I don’t think there’s any-
thing phony about it.
Then you get over and talk to [Marshal Thanarat] Sarit, and he is of
course a wise old pro and a tough old cookie, but he gives us a pretty
good beating now.15 Oh, I think he really doesn’t mean it. He smiles when
13. Sihanouk was the Cambodian chief of state.

14. Sihanouk viewed both South Vietnam, on the right, and Thailand, to his left, as enemies.
15. Sarit was the Thai prime minister.
he calls us these names, but he has behind him his people worried about
Cambodia because of the very modest military aid. They are painting the
picture of attacks by Cambodia. I said I had more confidence in the Thai
armed forces than Sarit did, and he really thought that was a possibility.
President Kennedy: How much are we giving them in our aid pro-
gram? To Cambodia?
McNamara: Eleven million.
Taylor: Eleven million and change to Cambodia. Yeah.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] And what are we giving Thailand?
A group of voices says, “Eighty million,” then, “About eighty million.”
Taylor: The real issue now is not the basic Cambodia program, but a
little increment which represented the equipment for three infantry bat-
talions and one so-called frontier battalion which Sihanouk would
undertake to put in the northeast frontier to help stop the infiltration:
Something we’re all for. It makes all the sense in the world. And now
that we’ve had to pay this price in Thai relations, I would say we ought
to go ahead and do it. It’s about 1.7 million as I recall some [unclear].
Unidentified: That’s right
U. Alexis Johnson (?): Part of this problem, Mr. President, is also a
problem of diplomacy here, if you will. The problem of the Thais reading
this in the newspapers first—of course, anything that comes out in
Phnom Penh leaks, and it leaks to the Thais through the newspapers—
instead of our being able to tell them directly. To the degree that we can
tell the Thai about these things before they read them in the newspapers,
of course we can help. But then there’s the problem of the Thai then
talking and Sihanouk reading it. [Some laughter.]
Komer: Well, the Cambodians deliberately did this once so the Thais . . .
Johnson: They deliberately did this. The Cambodians deliberately
did this to—
Unidentified: Yes.
Johnson: We couldn’t stop it.
Unidentified: We couldn’t stop it.
Lemnitzer: This has an impact on the Vietnamese situation because
the only way that that border is going to be properly policed is for these
battalions or other Cambodian battalions to get up there and prevent the
Vietcong from circulating back and forth.
Taylor: Well they’re trying to get us also to have some of the U.N.
presence that’s been talked about, or some device like that. Perhaps a
joint military commission with the Vietnamese. Because these border
incidents are going to continue by the very nature of that frontier, and
they’re going to be a source of constant disturbance in our relations.

Johnson: The problem here is that it’s very difficult to establish a
U.N. presence between Cambodia and South Vietnam because [of]
South Vietnam not being a member of the U.N. You can establish a U.N.
presence, if both sides have agreed in principle, between Thailand and
Cambodia. Again here, Mr. President, the problem is one of diplomacy.
The lack of any effective real communication between the Cambodians
and the Thai. And if you can put a U.N. man in there to act as a go-
between and a communicator, then this will . . .
President Kennedy: What is the status of that?
Johnson: The status of that is now that U Thant is going to talk to
both the Thai and the Cambodians at New York; now is my under-
standing.
Harriman: Yes. And they were going to select, they hoped to select a
Burmese.
Johnson: I’m very . . . I question the selection of a Burmese, anyway.
Let them work that out.
Harriman: They want to do it, but they’ve both agreed to this.
Johnson: They have agreed to a Burmese?
Harriman: Yes.
Johnson: All right, fine.
Taylor: I would like to pick up the comment by Mr. Johnson with
regard to the partition nature of Southeast Asia. To us it’s one strategic
area. We have a common problem there, and we are succeeding reason-
ably well in unifying our efforts. It’s been a real step forward, I think, on
the military side to have General Harkins. That ties together the two
principal programs.
I must say we’re still partitioned, though, in other ways. Our coun-
tries are partitioned. I think our people stationed in these countries get
“localitis.” I found that the people over in South Vietnam were fighting
[President Ngo dinh] Diem’s battle versus the Cambodians. But in
Cambodia they are fighting Sihanouk’s battle versus Diem. Now, the
thought may not be worth much, but I would think that to have our
ambassadors and our heads of MAAG get together once a quarter, just
to break down these barriers and frontiers which have certain psycho-
logical disadvantages to our own operations, would be good.16 Whether
you’d ever get Sarit, and Sihanouk and some of those people in a summit,
southeast summit, I don’t know.
16. The acronym MAAG stands for Military Assistance Advisory Group.
Johnson: Now, that would blow up.

Taylor: Well it might.
Johnson: But I entirely agree, Max, on our ambassadors. I think it’s
very important. When I was out there, we used to meet once every four
to five months. Laos, our own people, we always used to get together in
Vientiane, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, and Saigon. And we’ve encouraged
that again. It’s a problem of finding the time for them to do it. That was
a most useful device. In the MAAG case, too, we used to get together.
Taylor: Well, they all have common problems now.
President Kennedy: Why don’t we get a report of when they last all
met, [can we] get the report when they last met?
Unidentified: They last all met in Baguio, I think.
Kennedy asks a question apparently about the date of that meeting and
an unclear exchange follows.
McNamara: Well the last three were there with us in Honolulu. We
had the MAAG chiefs and the three ambassadors there on July 24th.
Unidentified: Yes, we did in Honolulu, that’s right. [Unclear] stayed
over a day.
Taylor: But moving from capital to capital within the area I would
think would have some symbolic effect of stressing the neighborhood
quality of this whole problem.
Unidentified: Very much so.
Taylor: Just a couple of other questions, Mr. President . . . comments
rather. One is Thailand. I would say that Ambassador [Kenneth T.]
Young has a very tough problem there, a very complex problem, in
pulling together all the resources in the way that you’ve been stressing
across the board: military, economic, and so on.17 He’s had trouble in get-
ting his plans in because they are complex. I think he may be short of
people. I’m not sure. I know he personally feels he ought to have
[unclear] assist him, and I reported this to Johnson.
Taylor: But he’s got a real problem. Of all the ambassadors, I think he
has more of a problem perhaps even than [Frederick E.] Nolting, [Jr.]
does.18 Because Nolting’s job is pretty well laid out in front of him now.
My final stop was Indonesia where I had a very good—
President Kennedy: Did you make a suggestion in your cable about
some internal security system being appointed to Young?
17. Kenneth Young was U.S. ambassador to Thailand, 29 March 1961 to 19 August 1963.
18. Frederick Nolting was U.S. ambassador in South Vietnam, 10 May 1961 to 15 August 1963.
Taylor: Yes, sir, I did.

Bundy: We are going ahead with that here.
Taylor: In Indonesia I had an inconsequential meeting with Sukarno,19
but a very, very useful contact with the military, particularly with
[Lieutenant General Abdul] Nasution and the army chief of staff, Yani.20
Nasution, was very frank, indeed, with describing the internal problems. Of
course he knows the military forces are popular with us, and he obviously
wants to keep before us the fact they are the balance wheel or the stabiliz-
ing influence vis-à-vis the Communist element in the country.
He has started a civic action program in his armed forces very much
along the model which we had in Korea, one which I think should have
long-term benefits.
Of course the whole country is burdened and will be burdened for
[an] indefinite number of years in the future by the saddle of debt to the
Soviet Union. As you know they have received credits and actually
drawn down credits of almost a billion dollars in military equipment.
They have some 500 million in economic credits. How far they’ve been
drawn down, I don’t know. But you really can visualize a country mort-
gaged for the indefinite future to the Soviets.
Yet on the military side the military men now [are] regretting it,
saying, “Yes of course we thought we were going to war over West Irian.
Now we’d like to turn back; we would like to give back some of this
equipment and turn to the West.” But they can’t do it. My own feeling is
we should give some aid to Indonesia, a small amount. In the military
field they need very little, LSTs, things of that sort, plus some support
for this civic action program, which really, I think, holds real promise
largely in the political field.21
President Kennedy: Have we got any Indonesian officers training
here?
Taylor: Yes, sir, we’ve always had. That program has never stopped.
We ought to give them just as many spaces as they can use.
Sullivan: This was reviewed by, you were there Averell, I think, in New
York with the Secretary and [Indonesian foreign minister] Subandrio?
19. Taylor notes in his memoirs that Sukarno talked at length “on the charms of his favorite
stars of Hollywood.”
20. Lieutenant General Abdul Nasution was chief of staff of the Indonesian armed forces and
minister of defense.
21. The abbreviation LST stands for landing ship, tank.
Harriman: Yes, I met Subandrio for lunch, met three hours with him.
He made it very plain that they wanted to get out from under the
Russian influence. That’s going to be a tough thing to do, until they get
this loan paid off.
Taylor: Yes, it will be a long time.
Harriman: But I think we ought to continue. . . . I told him I thought
we ought to give him preliminary assistance and then study out their
program. But they’ll have to work something out with the IMF, and
they’re not very keen to do it, and I think we ought to hold back a
longer-range program until they develop a program which the IMF
approves. But in the meantime, given that industry is down 30 percent
some of it, give them little spare parts and raw materials which should
help them off base. Indicate that we are ready to help them when they
put their house in order.
President Kennedy: The main purpose of this buildup was West
Irian, was it?
Taylor: Yes, sir.
Unidentified: Have they delivered . . . ?
Unidentified: I think.
Taylor: Most of it’s either delivered or in the pipeline. Apparently
Sukarno and Khrushchev got together and agreed they’d put all the
steam into this thing they could. And they really, really have accom-
plished it. I asked couldn’t they cancel or turn back anything, and they
said most of the high-money-value articles have been delivered or are on
the way.
President Kennedy: Are they pleased there was a peaceful settlement
of West Irian or they’d rather . . . ?
Taylor: Sir?
President Kennedy: Are they pleased that there was a peaceful settle-
ment?
Taylor: Oh, yes. Very happy about it. Very happy about our activities
in [unclear] that . . .
President Kennedy: How much did the . . . Did we ever find out how
much the Dutch put in there as far as troops? Five thousand was it or
what? I noticed this story Marquis Childs had yesterday about all this . . .22
Unidentified: They were building up to 10,000 but I don’t think they
ever got there, sir. It was around 6[,000] or 7,000. [Unclear.]
22. Childs wrote a syndicated column that the President often read.
President Kennedy: That’s all they put into all of West Irian?
Unidentified: I don’t think they ever got higher than that.
Unidentified: It was very low.
President Kennedy: What do the Indonesians have under arms, do
we know?
Unidentified: Maybe 350,000 now under arms, but they got about
1,200 men on the island. That’s all they have.
Taylor: They infiltrated about 2,000 into West Irian.
Unidentified: I think we’ve got it at around 1,200.
Taylor: Well, those are the principal points, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: What about . . . we were going to talk about
whether we withdraw, what we do about the withdrawal of the MAAG
from Laos.23
Michael Forrestal:24 Sir, we’re having a meeting for you on that on
Friday if that would be all right with you.25 We haven’t quite gotten that,
the program . . .
President Kennedy: Governor, do you think?
Carl Kaysen: I think we were waiting on the [Central Intelligence]
agency—
President Kennedy: SNIE?26
Kaysen: —[to] get an estimate, round up all the intelligence material
so we had the latest agreed statement on what’s happening, and that’s
due as I understand it, Thursday. We have a meeting then.
President Kennedy: I talked to the minister, I guess you may . . . on
this question of, this morning, [unclear] this question of this. We’ll just
have to wait and see what they do on that.
Kaysen: South Vietnam.
Unidentified: South Vietnam’s representation [on Laos].
Unidentified: South Vietnam’s representation, yes.
Unidentified: They seem to be drawing back slightly on that, don’t
they?
Unidentified: Yes, there’s hope. There appears to be hope in the cable.
President Kennedy: OK. All right. Is that all?
23. The Geneva Declaration on Laos required U.S. military personnel to leave the country by
7 October.
24. A tentative voice identification. A sample of Michael Forrestal’s voice was not available.
This identification is based on an analysis of the statements made by this voice in the meeting.
25. See “Meeting on Laos,” 28 September 1962.
26. Special National Intelligence Estimate.
McNamara: Mr. President, I can report to you that we met with

President Ayub this morning for an hour and a quarter on the MAP pro-
gram.27 [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: He said he had a lot to take up with you. [More
laughter.]
McNamara: More with you than with me, I think. We said yes and no
in the appropriate places and gave firm answers. He said he’d rather have
no than maybe. So we gave no in the places where it seemed suitable, and
then we broke up on, I thought, very friendly terms.
McNamara: Yes, sir. And [Walter P.] McConaughy has since
reported to me Ayub was pleased with the results.28 We didn’t increase
the military assistance program above the amounts we had previously
decided upon. [Laughter.]
McNamara: I think it is fair to say we performed poorly last year. We
didn’t deliver nearly as much as we could have or should have. So we, in
effect, told him that, and that we have a plan for increasing our deliveries
for next year.
Unidentified: Is John McCone going to see him?
President Kennedy: Yes, Thursday.
McNamara: Thursday. I talked to McCone after I talked to Ayub this
morning.
Papers rustle; people get up and talk over each other. This indistinct
chatting continues for over five minutes; then there is silence until the
tape runs out.
This was the last formal meeting of the day. Kennedy’s movements
afterward are not clear from the official record. At 10:15 P.M. he departed
the White House for the National Theater to meet up with the First
Lady and his mother, Rose Kennedy, to catch the second act of Mr.
President. Afterward, the presidential party attended an after-theater
supper party at the British Embassy.
27. Ayub Khan was president of Pakistan.

28. Walter P. McConaughy was U.S. ambassador to Pakistan and formerly the assistant secre-
tary of state for Far Eastern affairs, 24 April to 3 December 1961.
178 F R I DAY, S E P T E M B E R 28, 1962
Friday, September 28, 1962
The President had ahead of him a busy morning of varied engagements.

He was due to meet with George Meany of the AFL-CIO and a young
staffer in the Department of Labor, Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Then he
would turn to an off-the-record discussion of New York State politics
with the two main Democratic nominees for governor and the U.S.
Senate repectively, Robert Morgenthau and James B. Donovan. Donovan
carried another hat around the U.S. government these days. In the midst
of campaigning for the Senate, he was the central figure in the adminis-
tration’s secret negotiations with Fidel Castro over the release of the
1,105 men captured during the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961. Finally,
after the presentation of the report of the President’s Committee to
Appraise Employment and Unemployment Statistics, Kennedy would
have a short talk with the prime minister of New Zealand before heading
into a high-level meeting on handling policy in Southeast Asia.
11:30 A.M.–12:03 P.M.
The Communists will almost certainly seek to retain as many

of their North Vietnamese forces and military advisers in
Laos as they can do with safety.
Meeting on Laos1
President Kennedy had few achievements to show for his efforts to
improve U.S.-Soviet relations. The one exception was an agreement to
neutralize tiny Laos. Lying athwart the Mekong River, it bridged
Thailand and Cambodia in the east and the two Vietnams in the west.
Signed in July 1962, the Geneva Accords provided for the withdrawal of
1. George Ball, William Bundy, Ray Cline, Roswell Gilpatric, Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman,
Lyman Lemnitzer, Robert McNamara, and Maxwell Taylor attended the meeting. Tape 25, John
F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting on Laos 179
all foreign advisers and troops from this strategic real estate.2 This repre-
sented a possible improvement of the situation from the U.S. perspective.
The military position of the Royal Lao government had so deteriorated in
the spring that in early June the Kennedy administration seriously consid-
ered sending some 40,000 U.S. troops to occupy the southern portion of
the country. Before a decision had to be made in Washington, the situation
stabilized. In mid-June, the Lao elite formed a national coalition govern-
ment and the Geneva agreement was reached. With only a week to go
before the first major test of the uneasy peace, Kennedy gathered his Laos
team to discuss the progress of the Communist compliance. As of October
7, all foreign military advisers were to have left the country. In materials
distributed before the meeting, Kennedy’s advisers made clear their
assumption that the Communists would violate the Geneva agreement.
The North Vietnamese, in particular, were expected to maintain a military
presence in the country, to backstop the Communist Pathet Lao forces.
Kennedy faced the decision of whether the United States would adhere to
the letter of the agreement and pull out all U.S. military assistance teams.
Unidentified: [starts in midsentence] . . . later Secretary Ball and

Governor Harriman will run through for you the . . . their planning and
then perhaps after that the Defense Department, Secretary McNamara,
[and] Generals [Maxwell] Taylor and [unclear] might wish to com-
ment on the military aspects of it.
Ray Cline:3 Sir, the United States Intelligence Board [USIB] approved
a paper on Laos on Wednesday.4 I have advance copies of it here, which I
will distribute to those who are interested.
With respect to the problems that we are primarily concerned with—
the implementation of the Geneva accords—some major conclusions
were reached which I’d just like to read.
Conclusion on the Communist intentions is as follows: [reading] “The
Communists will seek to expand their influence and power in Laos with
the ultimate aim of achieving effective control over all of the country. To
2. These were the “Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos” and a 20-article protocol. They are
printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents (Washington, DC: Department of State,
1962), pp. 1075–83.
3. Ray Cline was deputy director for intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency.
4. The USIB was a interagency organization, under the chairmanship of the CIA, that over-
saw the production of national intelligence estimates.
180 F R I DAY, S E P T E M B E R 28, 1962
this end they will nominally support the Souvanna-led government pro-
ceeding toward their goal mainly through political and subversive means.
“The Communists”—the next conclusion that is relevant to this is—
“The Communists will almost certainly seek to retain as many of their
North Vietnamese forces and military advisers in Laos as they can do
with safety. Souvanna [Phouma] will almost certainly be unable to pre-
vent Communist use of southern Laos as a corridor for assisting the
Vietcong effort into South Vietnam.”
I think the . . . those are the conclusions relevant to the Geneva
Accords. In addition, they reached a number of conclusions on the fragility
of the political coalition in Vientiane. Unless there are specific questions, I
[unclear] the facts . . . if you want to read them. They are available here.
We have no evidence of an intention to withdraw all of the Vietminh
troops before October the 7th. Our own working estimate is that proba-
bly about 7,500, 7,000 to 8,000, Vietminh troops and advisers are still in
Laos. And there is very solid evidence of their intention to conceal at
least a considerable part of those troops by disguising them as Pathet
Lao or Lao troops.
I think that’s the general picture. We have a great deal of data on
what is actually going on in different parts of the country.
President Kennedy: What do we think is their—Did Secretary Rusk
have any success with his conversation with Gromyko in regard to
Soviet resupply? [Cline begins to speak but Kennedy cuts him off.] Or are
they blaming him because, they say, we’re doing the Meo business, the
Soviet Union—5
Cline: Yes, sir. I would say that the conversation with Gromyko was
not very satisfactory. That he indicated it was all our fault and said that—
President Kennedy: For what reason? What have we done wrong?
Cline: He specifically spoke about the supply of the Meo. But Hanoi—
he also referred to propaganda statements which the Communists are
now making which say that we are not intending to withdraw our troops
at all, either, that we are disguising them in—
Kennedy turns off the machine. The meeting continued for another 25
minutes.
At this meeting Kennedy decided to proceed with strict adherence to the

terms of the Geneva Accords. However, the United States would make a
5. The Meo were anti-Communist mountain people who were U.S. allies.
S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962 181
substantial payment to the coalition government in Vientiane. Moreover,

in order to prepare for the expected Communist violations, Kennedy
instructed his team to develop the necessary intelligence sources so that
the world, especially the International Control Commission responsible
for supervising the accord, could be made aware of the violations in good
order. Finally, as insurance against any further deterioration of the U.S.
position in the region, Kennedy ordered the retention of U.S. troops in
neighboring Thailand.6
Ironically, the most likely use of U.S. forces in the near future was not
in far-off Asia but at home in the Deep South. Two of the men at the Laos
meeting had just come from a meeting at the Pentagon War Room with
Attorney General Robert Kennedy. The Governor of Mississippi was
resisting a court order to allow an African American James Meredith—to
register at the main campus of the University of Mississippi system. The
President had no meetings scheduled this day to discuss the progress of
negotiations between Mississippi governor Ross Barnett and the
Attorney General. But he was certainly kept informed of his brother’s
efforts to avoid a military showdown like that which had happened in
Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957.
Saturday, September 29, 1962
The President was supposed to be in Newport, Rhode Island, for the

weekend. However, he delayed his departure and went into the office at
9:55 A.M. His first visitors were the incoming Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, Maxwell Taylor, who stayed about half an hour, and Michael V.
Forrestal, son of legendary Secretary of Defense James Forrestal and a
key member of the President’s National Security Council staff, particu-
larly on issues dealing with Southeast Asia. Twenty minutes after
Forrestal’s departure, the President welcomed his two closest Kremlin
watchers for a seminar on Nikita Khrushchev.
6. See National Security Action Memorandum No. 189, 28 September 1962, FRUS, 24: 904.
182 S AT U R DAY, S E P T E M B E R 29, 1962
11:00 A.M.–12:27 P.M.
Generally speaking, I think, Khrushchev has felt, at least up

until recently, that things are going his way and he needn’t
take any risks, that he is playing for the big stakes and not the
small.
Meeting on the Soviet Union1

President Kennedy had just received a letter from Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev by way of their top secret back channel. One of the dangers
of the President’s back-channel diplomacy with the Russians through
Robert Kennedy was that a careless remark might lead to serious misun-
derstanding. It appeared from the letter that the Soviet leadership
understood Robert Kennedy to have said in a private meeting with
Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that Washington would accept a
long-term moratorium on underground testing following the signing of
an atmospheric test ban. It was a Soviet objective to halt testing under-
ground. Given U.S. insistence on a strict verification system to strengthen
any comprehensive test ban, it seemed most likely that the superpowers
would only manage to agree on a partial test ban. Nevertheless, the
Soviets hoped to make a moratorium on underground testing a precon-
dition to any partial test ban. Kennedy knew what his answer would be
to this Soviet misunderstanding.
Kennedy made sporadic use of the administration’s top Soviet
experts.2 Between them, Llewellyn Thompson and Charles Bohlen had
nine years’ experience as U.S. ambassador in the Soviet Union and had
witnessed Khrushchev’s rise to power.3 The President knew Bohlen much
better than Thompson but had not even consulted Bohlen before he sent
the Attorney General to see Dobrynin. On this Saturday, he called them
in to help shape his response to Khrushchev. The U.S. congressional elec-
tions were only five weeks away, after which, Kennedy assumed, the
1. Including President Kennedy, Charles Bohlen, Llewellyn Thompson, and later Jerome
Wiesner. President Kennedy also has a telephone conversation with Senator Henry Jackson
during the latter part of the meeting. Tape 25, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
2. Timothy Naftali Interview with McGeorge Bundy, 16 November 1995.
3. Charles “Chip” E. Bohlen was U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1957.
Thompson succeeded him and stayed until his return in August.
Meeting on the Soviet Union 183
Soviets would initiate a new, more dangerous challenge to the status quo
in West Berlin—a warning Khrushchev repeated in his letter.
Later the President’s science adviser, Jerome Wiesner, would join the
conversation. Wiesner would not be told that Khrushchev had written
directly to the President. Instead, in another demonstration of how infor-
mation could be compartmentalized even among the President’s closest
advisers, President Kennedy would ask Wiesner to suggest responses to
certain Soviet attacks on the U.S. negotiating position at the test ban
talks, never letting on where these allegations had come from.
Kennedy started taping as Bohlen was reminiscing about his experi-
ences with Khrushchev. Thompson can be heard deferring somewhat to
Bohlen, a better linguist and more-experienced, though not necessarily
better, Kremlinologist.
Charles Bohlen: [tape fades in] . . . other than that [unclear] he con-
tinues—his wife was the one that’s—but she’s crippled.
Llewellyn Thompson: Yeah.
Bohlen: And after the breakup of the Summit in Paris [in 1960], she
rushed down to the airport when Khrushchev was leaving and presented
him with a big bunch of roses.
Thompson: Yeah, that’s right.
President Kennedy: But [unclear] . . . that is assuming he wants to
talk to [unclear] but at least I would [unclear] that part of it. [Unclear.]
Thompson: And this letter, Chip says, is—
Bohlen: This letter is clearly an appeal [unclear] to a meeting, per-
haps. This letter . . . I don’t know if this . . . [unclear] is worse.
President Kennedy: Oh, it’s not worse. It’s just the transparency of it
is less [unclear] are the Russians. Well, I’d like to have him be a little less
. . . [reading aloud from the most recent letter from Soviet premier Nikita
Khrushchev] “I would like to note with satisfaction that you now seem to
agree in principle that along with the conclusion of the treaty with . . . a
moratorium.”4
Bohlen: We had never agreed to that, at all.
4. The exact line runs: “I would like to note with satisfaction that now you seem to agree in
principle that along with the conclusion of a treaty on the ban of nuclear weapons tests in the
atmosphere, in outer space and under water a moratorium with regard to underground
explosions be accepted” (Nikita S. Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy, 28 September 1962,
FRUS, 6: 152–61).
President Kennedy: That’s right. [continuing to read] “If this is so,

then it opens certain prospects.”
Bohlen: Do you think that’s anything that Bobby might have told
him?
President Kennedy: No, but Bobby would. . . . Well, I think Bobby
did—5
Bohlen: Did say something.
President Kennedy: Bobby did say maybe for a period of six
months—
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —but not an indefinite one. It seemed to me there
was nothing wrong with . . . just not quite in that form. In a legal thing . . .
that there should be no unlimited moratorium. . . . Yeah, I [unclear] to say
something. But we never put the question that way. We are not proposing
[unclear] unlimited, we [unclear] just for a certain period of time. Of
course I always knew they would do that the first time it’s needed for . . .
But then it seems to me we could follow that up quickly.
Bohlen: Yes, if it . . . what he’s saying is that after the period of mora-
torium, he proposes five years, which is nonsense, of course, but . . . He
says that if at the end of that time you haven’t reached an agreement on a
treaty for [the] underground thing, then you agree to reexamine the
whole thing. In other words, any treaty that you might sign for the
atmosphere or something like that, would be conditional.
President Kennedy: Well, I think Bobby used the six-months phrase;
obviously five years . . .
What is your judgment as to why they won’t take an atmospheric
test?6 Because they can’t underground . . . they can’t test underground
as well as we can? Is that the reason?
Bohlen: This might be the reason; but I also think there probably is
some element of principle in their, in the . . . Tommy, would you? . . .
They may fear that we’ve got some tricks or scientific gimmick that’s
going to increase our . . . He says it, in essence, he’s not going to make a
[unclear].
President Kennedy: [reading] “If, however, even during that term . . .
then the whole question of a ban will have to be reconsidered anew. And
if . . . insists . . . I want to say this already now and in plain terms—the
Soviet Union will consider itself free from . . . ”
5. Robert Kennedy met with Anatoly Dobrynin on 18 September 1962.

6. Atmospheric test ban.
Thompson: I think they’d agree to a three-year moratorium; but not

much . . . and I doubt if you could get anything less than a two and a half
period. [Unclear] The others that could support five, that’s a bargaining—
President Kennedy: But I don’t see much advantage to us. We propose
six months; they propose five years. I don’t see much advantage to us in
that proposition. It would be an unpoliced moratorium for three years.
Thompson: Well, if this included those automatic stations—?
Bohlen: Well, he mentioned these automatic stations in here. Tommy,
is this the first time he has ever come forward with—?
Thompson: As far as I’m—
Bohlen: Yeah. And I don’t know whether—
President Kennedy: He says it’s national. Isn’t this in line with his
traditional position? That if he—
Thompson: Well, if you had a radio readout out on those stations,
that you are constantly monitoring—if they ceased to work, then you’d
obviously have—the whole thing would be up in the air. I don’t know
how effective they’d be; but I—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] we look at this part of it? I was won-
dering what [unclear] at Pugwash—
Thompson: Seems to me this is up to you. But there would be added
assurance because we would get reports from other stations that know if
they weren’t—if this thing wasn’t working or wasn’t reporting.
Bohlen: Yeah, but the difference between this and the on-site inspec-
tion is that I gather that there is absolutely no way no matter what read-
ings you get where you can tell the difference between certain kinds of
natural explosion and a nuclear one. And then the idea was that when
you got readings of this kind, you would go to the spot to measure.
[Pause.]
Well, Mr. President, I think this letter gives you a vehicle to make a
response, speaking now of the Berlin section of it, which can I say, I feel
quite strongly is necessary in some form or other. Now, there are three
or four different ways that you can get this over that the regularity with
which he [Khrushchev] has been telling everybody that the United
States is too liberal, et cetera, et cetera, to fight.7 And I must say the
general feeling, I think is that, among the demonologists, is chances are
he believes this. And now the question is how can you convey—
President Kennedy: Why would he say it? What is the argument for
his saying it?
7. On Khrushchev’s statement, see the editors’ introduction, 10 September 1962.

Bohlen: Well, he believes—if you take it from his own military point
of view—that the local military situation [that] makes the correlation of
forces is all in their favor and he probably thinks that in view of public
opinion and [unclear] of the horrors of a nuclear war that the United
States would not . . . would back away from that point. Therefore he’s
got a situation with all the advantage on his side where he can proceed.
And there’ll be a great whooping and yelling around but that nothing
will happen. But the thing he’s interested in, which is the only thing you
worry about, is a nuclear war. And this is cockeyed, I think. Although, I
don’t know, if you read some of Joe’s articles, [unclear] old Alsop’s arti-
cles about de Gaulle’s view and all this other stuff.
President Kennedy: But de Gaulle . . . that’s why I think de Gaulle . . . I
think de Gaulle would like to start to get out of Berlin and [unclear] blame
the United States. Because, if they could only get Berlin eliminated, then
they could really have a . . . Europe which would be in pretty good shape.
Bohlen: Well, I’m not so sure. But I think that de Gaulle’s basic feel-
ing, and I’ve talked to Joe about this, and I’ve told him [that] whoever
his informant was, who I believe was [French foreign minister] Couve
de Murville.
President Kennedy: [Unclear question.] Well, he said it was [French
diplomat Jean] Laloy; he talked to Laloy.
Bohlen: Laloy?
President Kennedy: Yeah. Apparently de Gaulle asked about contin-
gency planning. Then de Gaulle said, “Why, my dear fellow, don’t
worry—the Americans aren’t going to fight anyway. [Unclear.] Don’t
worry about it.”
Bohlen: This is de Gaulle’s, sort of, method of presentation. But I
think de Gaulle’s thought runs differently. I don’t believe that he thinks
there’s going to be a real crisis over Berlin, or what Joe would call a
crunch, in other words.
President Kennedy: Hopefully.
Bohlen: And he thinks that the thing is going to—the French have
always thought that Berlin was going to die on the vine. Couve de
Murville told me that last June.
Bohlen: He just said . . .
President Kennedy: They don’t really care, do they?
Bohlen: “[Unclear] just stay away” and that they don’t give a damn.
No. Because if they don’t . . . they want Germany divided which is essen-
tially their whole policy.
And I think that de Gaulle’s chief mistake about the Russian thing is
that he attributes the present structure of Russian power to be identical

with the time of Stalin. And he never can forget that he stood up to
Stalin and said, “Nuts to you,” and Stalin came around. And he doesn’t
realize that this guy, and I think Tommy would—I’d like to know what
Tommy thinks about this—operates in a very different power circum-
stance from Stalin.8 Stalin could change anything like that himself,
whereas this guy has pressures and tendencies that he has to take cog-
nizance of, if he . . . and this limits his personal sphere of maneuver.
But the question is, Mr. President, and this obviously is a subject
we’re not supposed to ask you. [He laughs.] But . . . this is your business
and not ours. That it seems to me very important to halt this sort of
progress that the Russians are doing in Berlin, building up this enor-
mous record of saying that the West is not going to do it. You and
Macmillan and de Gaulle really agree with him that Adenauer gets the
big picture. And it’s very difficult to know why he’s doing it, unless it’s
in preparation for another dialogue which he talks about—
Thompson: That’s what I think is the—
Bohlen: But I think this is the likelihood; but on the other hand—
Thompson: The other thing it might be is that—
Bohlen: —what in God’s name—?
Thompson: The other reason why he might make these remarks is
that he wants to, he wants to—
Bohlen: To show those to some of the others.
Thompson: Yeah, to provoke us into a strong reply, which he can use to
ease [unclear] policy. In either case it would argue for going back at him.
President Kennedy: I mean for us to, for us to—do you want some
orange juice?
Thompson: No, thanks.
President Kennedy: For us to . . . for him to tell Americans and other
people that the Americans aren’t going to fight . . . that doesn’t seem to
me to . . . what would be the log[ic] . . . as you say unless he wants us to,
[unclear] first [unclear] to fight but I don’t ever—if that’s his opinion
you don’t really announce it, because that’s really rubbing our face in it.
Do you think therefore—it could be—He doesn’t have to have a reason
for everything. If he’s telling what he actually thinks—
Thompson: Yeah.
Bohlen: Agreed.
Thompson: He’s capable of doing it.
8. Referring to Khrushchev.
Bohlen: The trouble is, that this circulates, and it’s already circulating
around Western Europe and you’re getting a sense of panic [unclear]
European countries. De Gaulle doesn’t necessarily help it at all, you know.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] Are you saying this keeps downgrad-
ing our changes?
Bohlen: Yeah. Definitely.
Thompson: I don’t know, I think—
Bohlen: There are three or four different ways in which this particu-
lar aspect of the problem can be [unclear]. One, by you being direct. I
think you’ve seen that draft of the—
President Kennedy: Yeah, I saw yours and then Bundy did another one.
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Bundy’s was satisfactory . . . [unclear] be yours
or [unclear].
Bohlen: [speaks over the President] Well, it seems to me that this, in a
sense . . . part of this could be tacked on, if you’re proposing to answer
this letter of his. Some of this stuff in this draft could be a [unclear].
That would be one way of doing it, the other way would be by a pub-
lic statement, which I think everybody believes would not be either con-
vincing or very desirable at this time.
The third way would be to use a diplomatic channel, possibly you to
[Anatoly] Dobrynin or Foy [Kohler] right to Khrushchev.9 My feeling
about this is negotiating a substance as serious as this, I really think that
the direct communication thing would carry more conviction, if you did
it to Dobrynin, you had no certainty how he would—
President Kennedy: Yeah. I don’t see these . . . anybody . . . these fel-
lows having any more of these conversations for a while. I’ll try to—
Bohlen: And I think that also if you sent your ambassador in
Moscow to talk to Khrushchev along these lines, we’re still working on
the same thing.
President Kennedy: Maybe we should get just a . . . get awfully bel-
ligerent to Kohler.
Bohlen: And the third way, Mr. President, is one that I must say that
I’ve always been inclining to [unclear] is in the field of action. These fel-
lows have been buzzing our planes in the corridors—running these MiGs
within 2[00] or 300 yards of a passenger-loaded Pan Am plane, which
just contains all the ingredients of an accident. Because these things go so
fast, you know, 2[00] or 300 yards is just nothing. And that if you would
9. Anatoly Dobrynin was the Soviet ambassador to the United States.

consider with your allies the possibility of the next time they do this, of
putting in fighter escorts for these planes and running them until they
seem to be calling it off and then call it off and then be prepared to start
again. I have a feeling that the Russians in situations of this kind pay much
more attention to action than they do to words.
[to Thompson] So what would you think of that?
Thompson: Yeah. As I was saying earlier, I think this may . . .
buzzing may be related to their annoyance at our buzzing their ships.10
It’s the prestige factor [unclear].
Bohlen: But you have a decided difference in there, is that the
buzzing of the planes in the corridor could at any point produce a terri-
ble accident, whereas the buzzing of a ship has got very little chances to
bring about that.
President Kennedy: We . . . How much [of the] buzzing has there
been? Remember last year there was . . . [in the] spring there was a big
argument with [Lucius] Clay wanting us to put in fighters and [General
Lauris] Norstad against it. And I thought Norstad’s judgment was right.
Because fighting . . . well, it just struck me . . I would think you ought to
wait on fighters. That is one of the things we can do without [unclear]
shooting . . . put fighters in there. And I . . . It seems to me we ought to
wait until this thing gets a little higher before we do that?
Bohlen: Well—
President Kennedy: So they’re doing [unclear] we did say we’d knock
it down, then . . . at least then they’ve taken an action which is . . .
Bohlen: Yeah. But then you’ll have an accident which will create an
enormous amount of excitement in this country and you will have the
loss of life with the passengers on the plane. And I think this will force
your hand into action which will be a little beyond what should be pro-
posed to do now.
Now the other possibility of action, which perhaps might be put in this
letter as a, sort of, a warning, but one which, I think, many of us in the
Department of State have been thinking of for a long time. And that is the
question of making West Berlin a Land of the Federal Republic. This
would mean complete recognition that you were through with East Berlin.
Well, we are de facto. But you will have a hell of a time, I think, with the
French in getting any agreement and the British to include that, and it
10. In his 28 September letter, Khrushchev makes direct reference to a conversation he had
with Llewellyn Thompson where he had complained to the U.S. ambassador about the
buzzing of Soviet ships on the high seas.
would require that agreement. I don’t know what the West German atti-
tude would be.
Thompson: They’d be for it.
Bohlen: They’d be for it, I think. And the West Berliners would
surely be for it. It would have the advantage of—you’d have to have a
whole series of new agreements. That is to say, you’d have the West
German government requesting the presence of the Western troops
with the agreement of the Federal Republic. The only problem would be
how this would affect your right of access through their territory.
I just have a very strong feeling that the trend is being manipulated
by Khrushchev very much to our detriment.
Thompson: You’d certainly have to study that one carefully because
on your access . . . one of our main points now is [that] we hold the
Soviets responsible. I mean . . . they haven’t recorded that . . . but once
you make . . . do it just by agreement, the Soviets say, “Well, we have
nothing to do with this agreement; why talk to us?” You get a—
Bohlen: Well, you might even do it in a too [unclear] sort of way but
you would leave your occupation rights there completely, but that you’d
also just change the status of the . . . West Berlin as a Land of the Republic.
Thompson: Going back to the buzzing, it seems the one thing you
could do is to put in some rather vague language in the reply, just raising
this problem instead of [unclear] our planes. [Unclear] could be coming
at it rather than just doing it.
Bohlen: A great deal of the language he uses on Cuba could be
[unclear] directly to Berlin because he’s talking about disregarding the
normal conventions, [unclear]—assigning to ourselves the right to this,
that, and the other, and this is exactly what he’s trying to do in Berlin.
President Kennedy: [reading aloud from Khrushchev’s letter] “[Unclear]
this occupation is here to stay . . . [unclear] . . . put it to the U.N.”
Did you get a report on Grewe’s last conversation with me before he
left,11 about how he thinks the Hallstein Doctrine is dated and that
they’re going to [unclear]?12
11. Wilheim Grewe was West German ambassador to the United States until September 1962.
His resignation came about because the Kennedy administration lost confidence in his effec-
tiveness as a liaison after Rusk accused him of leaking to the press in April 1962 a Department
of State draft of an allied agreement on Berlin.
12. This doctrine, named for Adenauer’s foreign policy adviser, Walter Hallstein, held that
Bonn would refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with all countries, excluding the Soviet
Union, that recognized the German Democratic Republic.
Bohlen: We picked up some [unclear] when we were in Bonn this

June. . . . But, it hasn’t got . . . a lot of the private interests in Germany
are very keen to have the Hallstein Doctrine eliminated and some of the
people in the Foreign Office. But I think old Adenauer is clearly hooked
on it. He did something recently that . . . well, the reaffirmation of the
Hallstein Doctrine.
President Kennedy turns to the section in Khrushchev’s letter about U.S.
policy toward Cuba.
President Kennedy: [reading aloud] “We haven’t done anything to
give you a pretext for that.”[Kennedy jumps ahead in the text.] “I must tell
you straightforward [ly] . . . that your statement with threats against
Cuba is just an inconceivable step.” Straightforward? He doesn’t say
whether existing . . .
[Kennedy resumes reading aloud] “Your request for an authority . . . by
the way is a step . . . apt to get red hot . . . pour oil in the flame . . . to
extinguish that red-hot glow.”13 His metaphors are a little mixed in that.
Why would he blame someone who wants to pour oil on the flames to
extinguish that red-hot glow? [Laughter.]
Thompson: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: Who writes these damn things for him?
Thompson: Does Foy know about this thing?14
Bohlen: I don’t think so. This only came in yesterday, didn’t it?
Thompson: I assume Foy will be seeing . . . calling on Khrushchev
[unclear].
President Kennedy: [reading from Khrushchev’s letter, sometimes mum-
bling] “to qualify . . . to remind you of the norms . . . naturally . . . would
not say anything on West Berlin. . . . For example, what is going on, for
example, in the U.S. [Congress]?”15 [The President is quite amused.]
People in the Congress?
13. Kennedy is paraphrasing as he reads. The sentence goes: “Under present circumstances,
when there exist thermonuclear weapons, your request to the Congress for an authority to
call up 150,000 reservists is not only a step making the atmosphere red-hot, it is already a
dangerous sign that you want to pour oil in the flame, to extinguish that red-hot glow by
mobilizing new military contingents.”
14. Foy Kohler was the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union.
15. FRUS, 6: 159. The full quote reads:
That is what made us to come out with the TASS statement and later at the session
of the UN General Assembly to qualify your act, to remind of the norms of interna-
tional law and to say about West Berlin.
If there were no statement by you on Cuba, we, naturally, as Ambassador
Bohlen: These are all such—

Bohlen: —stilted translations from the Russian. If you can see what
the Russians said, this [unclear]—
President Kennedy: [reading aloud] “How can one, for example, fail
to notice the decision of the House [of Representatives] to stop giving
U.S. aid to anybody that trades with Cuba. . . . Isn’t that an act of imper-
missible arbitrariness against freedom of, freedom of [movement]?”
They have the resolution. [He continues reading.] “Very serious con-
sequences may have the resolution adopted by the U.S. Senate . . . ready
to assume responsibility for unleashing [thermo]nuclear war.”
What do you think is the reason that they are going ahead with
Cuba in this massive way? They must know that it . . . I thought one
reason why they [unclear] Berlin because we’d take a reprisal against
Cuba . . . they want to make it as difficult as possible. What other reason
can there be? Because they began this buildup in June. In late June there
was no indication of an invasion by the United States at this time, so
[unclear].
Thompson: Well, I would suspect that Castro is nervous about what
might be going on and the pressure has been pretty—
President Kennedy: Sorry?
Thompson: —within the bloc, the Communist bloc, this is a good
step for him; he’s helping this country defend itself against U.S. imperial-
ism and . . .
Bohlen: This is the satellite bond that you get. The Poles and stuff
like that . . .
Bohlen: They think that Castro was planning it. They sent a guy
over there, Che Guevara, you know, to try and persuade the Russians to
let them join the Warsaw Pact, to give them formal coverage and Soviet
protection.16 And the Russians refused to do this. And then this is what
Thompson and Mr. Udall were told, would not say anything on West Berlin. Your
statement forced us to do so.
We regret that this dangerous line is being continued in the United States now.
What is going on, for example, in the U.S. Congress?
16. One of Fidel Castro’s closest associates, Ernesto “Che” Guevara, visited moscow in August
to discuss the conclusion of a Soviet-Cuban defense agreement. Khrushchev, however, refused
to sign the proposed agreement.
they did. And also, as Tommy mentioned, he said from the point of view
of the Communist world, it is very important for him to be out in front,
showing that he is militant, pushing for the great cause.
President Kennedy: Why do you think they refused to put him in the
Warsaw Pact?
Bohlen: Oh, because this is too much for the Russians because then
they’re not sure what the United States might do—
Bohlen: —and they don’t want to be committed to go to war over
Cuba, [Kennedy mumbles assent] if there is an American attack. Oh, I think
this has been very clear all the way going back to ’60 when he first began
to rattle the rockets about Cuba, then he made a statement before anyone
would call him on that thing, he made a statement saying, “It’s just sym-
bolic.” And they haven’t gone beyond that and this latest one, which he
refers to here; the September 11th one seems to me to have been primarily
issued in order to tack on the rider about not doing anything about Berlin.
Thompson: I think, in general, he’s, he has very much in mind that
meeting you and that, I think, if he can settle Berlin, then—
Bohlen: Well this is what bothers me . . . the hell out of me. He’s
coming over here in the end of November and this letter is really pitched
to the . . . twice he refers to the resumption of the dialogue . . . and then
in the last paragraph he talks about the: “Of great importance for finding
the ways to solve both this problem . . . are personal contacts of states-
men on the highest level.” Well that means between you and him. But,
the question is: What in God’s name could be the best solution to the
Berlin thing if you did meet?
President Kennedy: [Unclear] I don’t—unless he wants to demon-
strate that he’s doing every possible—
Bohlen: Well, I mean, this still leaves the situation as it was. I think,
from your point of view, [unclear] don’t see that [there’s] anything very
much to negotiate about as long as he is insisting on the removal of cer-
tain troops.
Thompson: Well, I think, Chip [Bohlen], that if he, I think he’s, first
of all, that he is in a position where he has . . . he feels he has got to go
ahead and sign this treaty.
Bohlen: Yes, I think everybody—
Thompson: And I don’t think he wants to play Russian roulette with
that and just toss a coin and see whether there’s war or not. If he wants
to . . . he could get us to accept the East German . . . Solution C
approach, where we would accept East Germans deployed at the check-
point.17 Each of us maintain a [unclear] position [unclear] would be

acceptable [unclear] his treaty.
President Kennedy: What’s that again? That sounded [unclear].
Thompson: Well, each of us would say, we would say, we would still
hold the Russians responsible but in a practical way we will let the . . .
accept [the] East Germans on the checkpoints as long as they don’t
interfere with our access. And they would make the statement that they
were treated as was a sovereign country. But, in fact, they are not.
Then he could go ahead and sign his treaty, and you wouldn’t be then
gambling on whether there’s war or not. And, I think, that’s about the
most that you could hope to come out with. He would hope for more, and
try for more, but in the end might settle for something like that. As long
as he can sign his treaty and then maintain the position that East
Germany is sovereign. We say it’s not. They, in the meantime, practically
control the access but don’t interfere.
Bohlen: Wouldn’t that be buying an awful lot of future trouble with
that sort of a solution because of the East Germans’ not being bound by
any agreement, anything like that; wouldn’t they go in for the harass-
ment that the Russians are now, sort of, semidoing in a much more
intensive [unclear]?
Thompson: [Unclear] would be very dangerous, I think. But if the
Russians say then they’re out of it except that they are allies of East
Germany. The East Germans start doing something and we take some
forceful action. . . . Then, we’ve always got the sanctions against them, of
cutting off trade and all that sort of thing. So for the immediate period, a few
years, I should think that it probably would buckle them in pretty quietly.
In the meantime they would be pressuring others to recognize East
Germany and gradually, I think, time would solve the thing, which in a
way, it might. It might not be too bad. Certainly, it’s going to go along
the way it is for a long time. There could be no solution—
President Kennedy: Could he claim that he had solved this problem
by this means?
Thompson: I think so. I think he’s off the hook then. And once he’s
signed this treaty, that’s the main thing.
17. Solution C was a term thrown around during the Kennedy administration as it tried to
devise a negotiating position on the German and Berlin problems. Solution C was to seek
negotiations aimed toward an informal, interim agreement to preserve the status quo in Berlin
despite a G.D.R.-U.S.S.R. peace treaty. It appeared to offer the most likely chance of success
with the least fuss. It was a view favored by State’s old Berlin hands.
President Kennedy: Why don’t you think he signed it before? On

that basis he could have signed at any time in the last two years. Why
don’t you think he signed it?
Thompson: Well, we’ve never let him know that we’d accept [the] East
Germans on the checkpoints. That’s the thing that would make the issue.
Bohlen: Well, then that international authority just is tantamount to
saying that it would be international, whether the East Germans would
be in it. We’ve never presented them a formal draft of that thing. I think
that they could . . .
I think it’s a . . . He’s coming over here . . . [Someone sighs.]
President Kennedy: He said, didn’t he? I mean, he just writes that
he’s coming, doesn’t he? [Kennedy reads] “After the election, especially in
the second half of November, it would be necessary . . . to continue the
dialogue.”
Bohlen: Yeah. He says that twice in there; there’s another. [Unclear
interjection by Kennedy.] That and coupled with the last point makes it
perfectly clear that his idea of a dialogue is between you and him.
President Kennedy: Of course that’s not very advantageous to us, is
it? Just to have he [and I] . . . And then no matter what happens it looks
like . . . we become even more obvious as the chief defender of Berlin.
Which is just what de Gaulle wants to do to us. Because he doesn’t want
to fight a war; he wants to make it all [unclear].
Bohlen: A sellout.
Thompson: Yes.
Bohlen: And I don’t know what the British attitude would be on this
sort of thing. I think [that] this will cause a great deal of ruckus and furor.
President Kennedy: What . . . de Gaulle and [unclear]?
Bohlen: A meeting between you and Khrushchev. I mean, I think, the
British and the Germans . . .
President Kennedy: Why would the British care? They’ve mucked it
up—[unclear].
Bohlen: Well, the British wouldn’t mind, I mean if they thought that
. . . they could be worried that the thing would come to a deadlock and a
big impasse and that you would be nearer the danger of war than you
were before. And the West Germans, I think, they’d probably follow
more or less the line of the French and be ready to fill the air with
denunciations of duty.
President Kennedy: And the weakness of the . . .
Bohlen: Of course this question as to why the Russians are pushing
this thing so hard is one that I have [unclear] almost four years and I
don’t think that anybody [is] clear why. . . . And de Gaulle may not care
if the United States takes the blame for any sort of a sellout, or whatever
you want to call it, in Berlin.
But on the other hand most of the fellows in the French Foreign
Office particularly feel that Khrushchev is doing this because of the
whole effect on West Germany and on the alliance. In other words, he is
seeking larger aims than just Berlin.
I must say, I don’t think that. I think that Berlin is a . . . these are the
kind of repercussions and results [on] which he would naturally capital-
ize if they happened. But I don’t think he’s playing these moves on Berlin
with this in view. I don’t know what you feel about the alliance.
Thompson: Well, I think he’s hooked personally on . . . He’s always
boasted that this was his solution that he dreamed this whole thing up.
Bohlen: Yeah.
Thompson: He got way out and he’s gotten further out since.
Bohlen: Well, what I mean is that [unclear] Berlin as a thing in itself.
That if he settled this, would he then quiet down? And consider that
Europe is all tidied up? Or would it be just a move to disrupt the
Alliance, to stop progress—?
Thompson: I think it’s mainly the former. I think he—
Bohlen: I think so, too, myself; but on the other hand you can’t sepa-
rate the fact that these might be the consequences which he would then
immediately try and exploit.
Thompson: He can exploit any of the—
Bohlen: Well, the thing that mystifies me about this thing is that he
himself nearly has a success on his terms which would be an enormous
humiliation and defeat for us, which I don’t think is going to happen, but
assuming that it does, still if he knows anything about history, this is the
way of bringing war very much sooner—
[Someone agrees indistinctly.]
Bohlen: —because you don’t inflict what would be a very humiliating
defeat upon a power like the United States when you don’t affect his
power 1 inch by . . . .Berlin wouldn’t affect our power at all.
Bohlen: And almost all throughout history a Munich has sort of
been followed by—
President Kennedy: Yeah
Bohlen: —the war.
Bohlen: So, I can’t see that if he is thinking straight, and in historical
terms, that he could have very much happiness out of either result of this
thing.
President Kennedy: Well, why would they build up Cuba? Why

would . . . I mean he must . . . if he calculates correctly, he must realize
that what’s happened in Cuba this summer makes it much more difficult
for us to accept any, to engage ourselves now to have a deal over Berlin. I
mean, that’s just not been—
Bohlen: [Unclear.] This is one thing that I’m convinced of, is that the
Russian mind does not have the foggiest comprehension of the American
political process. They really believe that you are sort of the dictator of
the United States and can do any damn thing you want, and that . . .
This just comes through the doctrine. You see, they consider that the
capitalist system, that democracy in a capitalist system is just a part of
flimflam and [is] a disguise for the control by Wall Street and all this
other . . . Look at the way he keeps talking about Dean Rusk being a tool
of the Rockefellers because he was head of the thing.18 I think he gen-
uinely believes in it. So that all this stuff that you—
Thompson: The Pentagon and Wall Street. [Unclear.]
Bohlen: Yeah. It’s a very complicated sort of process. But I think the
conclusion that they reach is that public opinion doesn’t—
President Kennedy: Really count.
Bohlen: —really have any real effect and [unclear] enormous pres-
sure this can put on a presidency.
President Kennedy: And I suppose we don’t . . . we over . . . we
underestimate the pressures that go on him, not from public opinion but
from other [unclear].
Bohlen: Well, I think you can describe public opinion in the Soviet
Union the same way that a good general pays great attention to the
morale of his troops. In other words, he doesn’t let troop morale dictate
his course of action, because then he wouldn’t be worth a damn as a gen-
eral. He is very conscious of the fact that they rely on the morale. I mean
this just . . . but this doesn’t mean any—
President Kennedy: But you don’t think that he would calculate what
they’re doing in Cuba as a broad sort of traditional position and so on
would [unclear] really intensify the feeling here greatly, and make it
much more difficult to do anything about Berlin?
Bohlen: No, sir, I think this is probably something that’s just a com-
plete blank page in his mind. I think that—what Tommy said—I think
he did Berlin because here it was something they had engaged in about
this regime, and then the Cubans got very scared and panicky for fear
18. Dean Rusk was president of the Rockefeller Foundation.

there was going to be another, sort of, Bay of Pigs, something like this.
Which they would probably have lost.
President Kennedy: [Comments indistinctly.]
Bohlen: And went to the Russians and said, “My goodness, my good-
ness, you’ve got to help us.” Their first idea was to put them in a treaty,
and then the Russians put these arms in there; and then also the effect of
his standing in the Communist world because the Chinese have been
constantly attacking Khrushchev from the left, which is the first time in
Bolshevik history that this has ever happened. Heretofore they have
always been the extreme left—denouncing yellow Soviet so-and-so as
the opportunist and everything like it. The Chinese now come and say,
“You are scared of the thing.” Now there is one factor that underlies
[unclear] that I don’t know anything about. Tommy may have some
ideas about it.
Thompson: History [unclear] points their way [unclear] move is to
keep the Chinese from doing it—
Bohlen: This is what I mean.
Thompson: —[taking] the Chinese with it.
Bohlen: Well, the Chinese are not in much shape to give very much
help.
Thompson: [Unclear] I think it doesn’t.
Bohlen: Yeah, I think it is more in the psychological field, of his lead-
ership in there, [Thompson murmurs assent] the other factor may be in
there. But the one question that perhaps may underlie this is that we
know now that all this flap about the missile gap is just for the birds
because they didn’t put their main effort on ICBMs and our estimate
now of the correlation of military forces is heavily in our favor [someone
mumbles assent] and not in their[s]. Now, if you go back to the history of
the Sino-Soviet dispute, you will see the Chinese undoubtedly believe,
completely literally, the Soviet claims which they were making in ’57 and
’58 of having . . . the balance having shifted in their . . . point. And I just
wonder whether or not in the Soviet hierarchy how much real under-
standing there is of the actual correlation of military force or whether
they are not operating on their previous, sort of, at least, announced esti-
mate that they had sort of passed us. And their policy would be much
more intelligible if they believed that; because if they believed that they
had the nuclear, sort of, equality, or even superiority, then their lines of
action would be quite continuous, I mean, quite consistent. But it is not
consistent if it’s viewed in the light of what our estimate of the two
forces are.
President Kennedy: We are taking a look at a contingency plan for
sort of building up a staging area in Florida for . . . in case we ever have

to go into Cuba. This would be impossible, I suppose, to keep this com-
pletely—we’ll look at this next week—to keep it completely submerged.
But obviously there is no sense in having about a four months’ gap
between the time we’ve decided to do something about Cuba and have to
wait. So, we want to begin to build up down there. Now, I suppose that
will surface. . . . What effect does that have?
Bohlen: Well, they’ll pick it up with all of this stuff, [unclear] calling
up this . . . Getting the authorization to call up 150,000 reservists and
state this in Congress. They’ll make a big thing out of it. And I think
this inevitably will . . .
President Kennedy: Do you see any reason not to do it?
Bohlen: I don’t. Although the question is—I’ll tell you one thing,
Mr. President, that I do think is that if you ever come to do any action
against Cuba, it would almost have to be on the basis of a declaration of
war. I mean serious action, that is—
Bohlen: —U.S. forces and all. Because this will give you the legal
basis for a blockade and everything of this kind. If you try a blockade
without a declaration of war, then I think you get into a mess of compli-
cations with your friends and allies, as well as with the Russians. Now, if
the Cubans would make some move that would establish a reasonable
justification for a declaration of war, I think this is the only way you
could do it, if you are going to use United States forces. I don’t know
what’s being done in the sense of infiltration of people into Cuba—
President Kennedy: Well, we’ve warned them that we’ve been trying
to do that. . . . We’ve been doing that for nine months—
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —under General [Edward] Lansdale but he
hasn’t had much success. We’ve got these intelligence teams in there.
But, I saw the Washington Post suggested that we’d given up on internal
revolt. You [unclear] that editorial this morning?
Bohlen: I saw that. But that’s very curious [unclear]—
President Kennedy: It sounds like some guy got in there late at
night, and he wrote . . . [unclear] from the Pentagon staff.
Bohlen: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: That has not been the Washington Post’s general line—
President Kennedy: Oh, no.
Bohlen: —on the Cuban thing at all this year.
President Kennedy: Suddenly, a complete [unclear] operation.
Bohlen: Some guy must have gotten a bright idea and sold it to Phil
Graham.19
President Kennedy: Yes, you’re probably [right].
Bohlen: But the . . .
Thompson: I think . . . I had the impression, that at the start of the
Cuban thing, that the Russians thought it wasn’t going to last and they
were very reluctant to get too committed, to put too much in there.
President Kennedy: Of course, if we had gone in a year ago—and it
was much easier in April after the Bay of Pigs—and you had that
become the regular United States invasion . . . I have always thought
that they would—of course you can’t tell what they would do, a year
ago. Now . . . but it always seemed to me they would just grab West
Berlin, don’t you think?
Bohlen: Well, they might have, Mr. President, and this might have
led to general war. But I think the situation is getting to the point where
there are so many places, there are many instances where if we take cer-
tain kinds of forcible actions, the Russians can retaliate. I think we tend
[unclear] to let the Berlin situation dominate our whole action [unclear].
But this is what the Russians are clearly trying to do. [Unclear.]
Thompson: I would have thought a move against Iran would have
been more likely than for Berlin.
President Kennedy: Except they could grab Berlin in two hours.
Iran, they would have to really—
Bohlen: Yeah, but any one of these things [unclear]—
Thompson: Grabbing would have meant direct fighting with U.S.
troops—
President Kennedy: What? What?
Thompson: Grabbing Berlin. And that’s, I think, much more danger-
ous than a move in Iran.
Bohlen: Their play is . . . the Russian game has always traditionally
been this way with the non-Communist power . . . is to push, pull, to feel
around and then judge, make their next move based upon their estimate
of the reaction to what people do. There is a phrase of Lenin in which he
said there are certain situations which you control with bayonets: if you
run into mush, you go forward; if you run into steel, you withdraw. And
since anything that Lenin said is enshrined in letters—
Bohlen: —in gold and scarlet, I still think that Khrushchev’s attitude
19. Philip Graham was the publisher of the Washington Post.

on Berlin is in one sense to test us. Now, I don’t know; but Joe Alsop
wrote about this . . . saw him the other day and I think you saw him,
didn’t you?
President Kennedy: Yeah, I saw him.
Bohlen: Joe has a new theory about the [Berlin] Wall, did he tell you
that?
President Kennedy: This was to cover up the . . .
Bohlen: This was to . . . The Wall was not to stop the refugees but to
provide the necessary circumstances where they could make a major
buildup of East German forces. And I said, “Well, I think that these
issues are one of the consequences but not necessarily the cause”—but
you know Joe when he gets on an idea—
President Kennedy: Then he’s got the idea that the solution to the
strategy is that the United States [unclear] our contingency planning, he
knows that the allies won’t do anything and therefore—
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —it [unclear] the United States to indicate it’s
going ahead.
Bohlen: Well, I must say, Mr. President, it depends on how your
analysis of this whole situation is. But, I think, that if we are going to do
anything, we’re going to have to do it—
President Kennedy: Quickly.
Bohlen: —unilaterally.
President Kennedy: Yeah. I just yesterday, or the day before, sent a
memorandum over to the Pentagon to ask them how long it takes to
move in. You remember that time we sent up that battle group into West
Berlin; then it turned out it took 28 hours to reach the autobahn. Well,
so now I asked whether they’ve got. . . . They’re still a long way away
from the autobahn, so we’ve got a camp there that they can make into a
barracks. So I asked them to—
Bohlen: McNamara was very much impressed with the state of train-
ing and the morale of the forces that he saw—
Bohlen: —in Germany [in] the last two or three days. I don’t think
the strategy is worth a damn; but at least [he chuckles] the troops are in
good shape.
Bohlen: But . . . because you might have an awful lot of pulling and
hauling with your allies, you see. For instance, suppose Khrushchev
when he signs the treaty does the following things: that he just turns
over to the East Germans the access rights to the military on the road
and the [East] Germans say, “Well, we haven’t got any agreement with
you; they can’t go through,” leaving the air alone, because the air is a
place where we have much more freedom of maneuver. Then what’ll you
do? You will have consultations with your allies. The British, undoubt-
edly, will call for a conference, [Thompson or Kennedy laughs] and the
French will just sort of stay out of it totally. [Bohlen chuckles.] You know
them. And [unclear]. So you could lose an awful lot of time on this thing.
If they’re foolish enough to announce that the air corridors are
closed, then, I think, you have a very clearly indicated action which is to
send your fighters in. [President Kennedy speaks indistinctly.] But send
them in, in force. Anything you do on a subject like that, the danger is
that you send in too few forces and that this doesn’t create the impres-
sion. You ought to send in double the number of fighters that people
think would be adequate for the purpose.
And in the air, I think, this is the place where the thing is going to come
to a real . . . the crunch will happen there. Wouldn’t you think so, Tommy?
Thompson: Generally speaking, I think, Khrushchev has felt, at least
up until recently, that things are going his way and he needn’t take any
risks, that he is playing for the big stakes and not the small. In places like
Iran and others, where he could have done a lot of things, but if he did,
he’d [unclear] make it more difficult to spread further later on. And he’s
been . . . in Laos the same way and there are other complicating factors
there, but. . . . In general, I don’t think he wants to really run a real risk
of war at this time.
Bohlen: I wouldn’t think so.
Thompson: [Unclear.]
Bohlen: But then you come back to what is their estimate of the gen-
eral correlation of military forces?
Thompson: Well, it certainly isn’t something that can be deliberately
calculated in this period. A wise thing to do . . .
Bohlen: Whatever happened to this idea that at one point was being
kicked around [unclear] of showing Khrushchev some—
President Kennedy: Pictures?
Bohlen: Pictures. It was leaked, I mean, it was deliberately let out of
NATO. And I think that [unclear] the probability is that they’ve got it.
The only question is do they realize to what extent we cover their instal-
lations and therefore we know what ICBM rockets they have and what
we have, which is growing every month here, I think?
President Kennedy: I think he thinks they’ve got enough to cause
such damage to us, that we wouldn’t want to accept that damage unless
the provocation was extreme. But, of course, those are all calculations he
has to make about what we are going to do, and what the French will do
and what the British will do. And I suppose it just comes back to what
you . . . we were originally saying, that it’s just a question of how do we
convince him that the risk is there. And that raises whether we ought to
go with this letter or not. Or whether we just choose to ignore this and
just let this thing drop until he comes over here in November. So
McNamara had some statement this morning about the [unclear]—
Bohlen: Yes, I saw that. In fact, that got the headlines in all the
papers about the fact that we had nuclear weapons there and that in cer-
tain circumstances we were prepared to use them.
President Kennedy: Whether we ought to let it drop at that or
whether these words get to be, as you suggested . . . They begin to have
less and less effect. Because I don’t know whether [unclear].
Bohlen: And the one thing about this channel, Mr. President, so far,
thank God, is it [has been] kept completely confidential—
Bohlen: —thoroughly. One of the few things—
Bohlen: —in the United States government operations which there
is not the slightest leak on. And this fact, I think, would lend a little
more weight to the words which you send back on it. The danger of not
answering this and letting him come over here would be he’d come over
with some positions which had obviously been agreed to in the hierarchy
of the Soviet government and that they may be completely based on a
miscalculation, on a misjudgment of the whole situation. And then he
comes over here and you meet, and you have just a complete confronta-
tion with no formal agreement, or anything like this, and this sets off its
own chain of events. What would you think, Tommy?
Thompson: Oh, I think, if . . . if by chance, he is, he did say these
things in order to get a positive response from us that he could use with
his colleagues, or with the East Germans . . . then it would be too bad, if
we didn’t . . .
Bohlen: Well, let’s put it this way. What would you lose by having in
the Berlin part of this letter, something along this line, which you take to
be daring?20 I can’t see that you would lose anything. The only danger
that it might involve would be that it would bring it to a head; but I
20. Bohlen seems to be referring to a draft response from President Kennedy. The actual
response, as sent from Washington on 8 October 1962 did not include any reference to the
Berlin question (see Kennedy to Khrushchev, 8 October 1962, FRUS, 6: 163–64).
don’t think the way this is worded it would have very much of this, if it’s
sufficiently general. And if he doesn’t believe it, well, you’ve wasted some
time in writing a letter, but I don’t think the consequences would be any
worse than they are. I am very much afraid of his coming over here filled
with these impressions, that our silence in the face of his—there were
four occasions now, one to [Secretary of the Interior Stewart] Udall,
one to [poet Robert] Frost—did he say it to you, Tommy, too, that
we’re not fighting on the . . . ?21
Thompson: No.
Bohlen: No. And [to] the Belgian and the Finn. And he has repeated
the same damn thing to them. And he hasn’t had any reaction whatso-
ever. Now that—
President Kennedy: It’s another . . . I don’t know whether I ought to
do anything about Frost about supposedly this secret Frost [unclear],
Macmillan sent these up . . . a civilized remark. But . . . I was just won-
dering whether there’s . . . have you talked to Frost?
Thompson: No. And I haven’t been near the [State] department, so I
don’t know . . . for the last two months, so I [unclear] . . . uninformed
[unclear].
President Kennedy: I’ll call [unclear] on the phone so he can’t say he
wasn’t asked.
What about this? Would you go along with this thought about
responding to this letter and in it, including in it . . . ?
Thompson: I agree with Chip. I think, if the letter is to have a . . .
President Kennedy: Would you get that letter you [unclear]?
Unidentified: Yes.
Bohlen: I think it’s in your [unclear].
Unidentified: I think it’s [on] the chair.
Thompson: I think now . . . You cut it down a bit, Chip.
Bohlen: Yeah.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Rustling of paper, then silence.]
Bohlen: You’ve got to change the first [clears his throat]. [Silence
while they read.]
President Kennedy: I think when he says that people over here agree
with him, I think he may in that case be meaning just the division of
Western Germany, which everybody does agree with him on in Europe.
Not this question of our rights and troops in West Berlin, because he’s
21. The Udall and Frost discussions on 6 and 7 September are described in the editors’ intro-
duction, 10 September 1962.
been told that so many times. He knows we don’t agree with that. But I
think he knows that de Gaulle and Macmillan and, possibly, I don’t really
care about the unification of Germany.
Bohlen: Yeah, well, except that in one of these things, I think it was
to the Belgian, he was more explicit than that, in which he said that
President Kennedy and Macmillan and de Gaulle really agree with my
solution to the Berlin thing, and it’s only Adenauer who just wants trou-
ble, pulling the spokes from the wheel. I don’t know which is—
President Kennedy: Of course that may be just a way to [unclear] to
Germany and . . . but . . . I wish if the Germans were ever going to do
anything about the division of Germany or recognition of East Germany
. . . what kind of [unclear], they would go ahead and do it and not try to
do it when it becomes useless as a . . . when they can’t sell that position
for anything.
Actually that last conversation that Adenauer had with Norstad and
[NATO general secretary Dirk] Stikker, I don’t . . . he didn’t even men-
tion Berlin. [Unclear] George Ball, et cetera. But he doesn’t get around
to Berlin when he talks. I don’t think he wants to see Germany reunified.
Bohlen: Hell, no.
President Kennedy: So what are we all doing?
Thompson: Khrushchev—
Bohlen: [Unclear] with the Germans [unclear] nothing in the
German ethos because one of the things that you always run into is this
deeply felt thing, blah, blah, blah [unclear] take any action [unclear], is
put off, you’ll really disrupt Germany. I must say I never totally believed
it because Germany is a [unclear] country. And I think also—
President Kennedy: We don’t want any—
Bohlen: —that the French fear of the Germans turning East,
under the present circumstances, is very illusory because Khrushchev
cannot give them Eastern Germany. He told me this and I am sure he
said it to you, but he used to use one expression to me in the last two
months: “I was there but you must understand that we are not in a
position to make any agreement with you affecting East Germany.”
What he meant by that was that they were hooked with this Soviet
invasion of East Germany, and, therefore, the only bait that he could
offer to the West Germans would be the reunification of the country
in return for their neutrality. Well if you had that possibility, my God,
we would have had that out on the table informally years ago. Don’t
you think so, Tommy?
Thompson: Uh, huh. Since we’ve got the bigger half, the bigger part,
any unification even in neutrality would eventually be [unclear]—
Bohlen: Yes, I mean, that is why I think that this would have been if he
had not Sovietized, if the Russians had not Sovietized Eastern Germany,
they would have an enormous diplomatic card that they could play to
wreck NATO, wreck the German involvement in it. But since this is not
one that they could play, I don’t really see much real danger of the Germans
turning to the East, particularly as this process with France and the
Common Market is going [Kennedy can be heard indistinctly] very far now.
President Kennedy: Well, Chip, what do you think is the . . . how
pleased with . . . I suppose anything that the West Germans did about
East Germany now would be regarded as indicating that Khrushchev
was right, and we really don’t care about West Berlin. West Berlin seems
to have less and less importance once you, if you give up the idea of uni-
fication. And then . . . what are we doing then in West Berlin . . . except
for the people that are involved—
Bohlen: Well, you’ve got two and a half million people—
Thompson: The symbol and [unclear].
President Kennedy: What’s the symbol got—?
Thompson: They’ll never give up the idea that eventually reunion
will be the case. It’s one thing [unclear].
Bohlen: But, of course, one of the, I think, major arguments against
doing anything formally such as recognition of East Germany is that it’s
extremely doubtful as to whether that East Germany setup is a viable
thing. I think that Khrushchev’s attitude may be primarily motivated by
a desire to do something which will increase the viability of East
Germany. He may have thought that this Wall was going to do it and
this hasn’t done it. He may think that if you could get his arrangement
on Berlin this would fix Ulbricht up. For God’s sake, all of this seems to
be very much founded on wishful thinking.
Thompson: Yeah. Perhaps on the basis that the other solution would
be to go in with a lot of money and build up East Germany to where it
would be viable and as [first deputy Soviet foreign minister Vasiliy]
Kuznetsov once told somebody, he said, “We can’t do that because that
would mean that the Germans would live better than we do and—”
Bohlen: Yes, and this is a factor, but another thing is—
Thompson: —“and that would be immoral,” he said.
Bohlen: Being a divided country, and given the temperament of the
Germans while they haven’t been unified for so damn long historically,
they nevertheless, which is a great thing for them, and I just don’t think
that even building it up would necessarily make it into a satellite coun-
try comparable to say Poland or [unclear interjection by Thompson]
Czechoslovakia because it’s [unclear]. These other ones that are divided
such as North Korea and Vietnam are new countries which haven’t got
any tradition of unity.
President Kennedy: What do you think about this letter of Chip’s?
Thompson: I think that the line is sound. I think it could be . . . you
know, this would be a long thing anyway, given the testing, if this could
be maybe boiled down a little more, not quite so—
Bohlen: And you could add this part onto the thing. Of course you’ll
want to discuss this with the Secretary.
Thompson: When he is coming back?
President Kennedy: He’s coming back this Wednesday, isn’t he?
Coming back Tuesday [unclear]?
Bohlen: Mac gets back on Wednesday, doesn’t he?
President Kennedy: Yeah. So why don’t we see what, on this
[unclear] come Wednesday?
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: But I have. . . . Why don’t we get somebody
working on a draft response to this?
Bohlen: On the Cuban [part]?
President Kennedy: To the whole thing.
Bohlen: All right, sir. Now the only question is [that] there are very
few people in the Department who know about this correspondence at
all [Kennedy is mumbling in the background], and I don’t know if, for
example, that anybody who is knowledgeable on the Cuban thing would
be . . . is in on the general knowledge of—
President Kennedy: Actually what we say on Cuba, I think, almost
anybody would know more or less the general position on Cuba as to—
Bohlen: What would you want to say on that, then?
President Kennedy: Well, I think we ought to say that this decision
of the Soviet Union to so greatly increase the military power of the . . . of
Cuba constitutes, I don’t know, an unfriendly act or whatever the diplo-
matic term is and that had increased tensions and made . . . reaching an
accord on matters of Berlin far more difficult and that because of the
many treaties of the United States in this hemisphere and the special
position, the historic position of the relationship of the United States
with countries surrounding it, this represents a very serious assault on
our position—something like that. Without sort of saying that we would
[unclear]—
Thompson:[Unclear] get in something about the two things that
concern us about the buildup in Cuba is: one, our own vital interest; and
the other is the possible use of Cuba as a threat to other countries in this
hemisphere.
Bohlen: And you might point out, if you want to mark a difference
between let’s say our assistance to Iran, where we have no bases, of
course—we just concluded an arrangement—is that Cuba was a member
of the American defense establishment. It is just as though, it would be
more comparable if the United States had acted in the case of Hungary—
Bohlen: —to give military support to the Hungarian government
which declared its—to the Soviet Union—its neutrality from the Warsaw
Pact. We can do that and what about—
President Kennedy: What about saying [that] a Cuba friendly to the
hemisphere is as significant to [us] . . . that we believe, inasmuch as you
had believed that a Hungary friendly to the Soviet Union is in your vital
interest? So that he doesn’t get off on Turkey and Iran.
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Then on the testing, we’re pretty . . . We know—
Bohlen: And our position—
President Kennedy: —We just can’t buy . . . on the other hand, it
seems to me, we just ought to say, “Well, in this case there’s just no . . .” I
mean he’s offering us five years and then if there is not an agreement by
then, that’s just unpoliced.
I think we ought to, I’ll get Jerry Wiesner. I’ll have to give Jerry
Wiesner these two pages and tell him that this is . . . and see if there is
anything he can do about them. Let me tap Wiesner. I think this ought
to be just paraphrased. And I can give this . . . these two pages to
Wiesner and ask him for comments at least and [unclear] [Sir Edward]
Bullard and [Sir William] Penney, et cetera. What it is they did say that
is significant, whether he is accurately restating it.22
Bohlen: Of course a great deal depends on what [unclear].
Jerry Wiesner enters the Oval Office.
President Kennedy: Oh, hi Jerry.
Bohlen: Hello, Jerry.
Jerry Wiesner: Hi.
Bohlen: What the value of these—
22. In his letter of 28 September, Khrushchev alleged that Sir William Penney, the chairman
of the U.K. Atomic Energy Authority, and Sir Edward Bullard had argued at the tenth
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, held in London 3 to 7 September 1962,
that unmanned seismic stations would suffice to verify a comprehensive test ban.
President Kennedy: Could you just take this down? I’ll give you this
notation, if you have a piece of paper. “The Russian scientists have said
that according to the British scientists Bullard and Penney, at Pugwash
concerning the use of automatic seismic stations.” [Unclear.]
Wiesner: Actually I have the statement that they issued. I don’t
know whether you want to read it.
President Kennedy: What exactly did they say? Who are Bullard and
Penney? Are they very good?
Wiesner: Yeah, they are two top British scientists.
President Kennedy: What did they say?
Wiesner: Thursday’s statement . . . the group . . . this doesn’t quote
either Bullard or Penney. That’s the group that signed the document but
apparently Bullard and Penney and a number of other people worked on
it. What they’re proposing are some unmanned seismic stations in unde-
fined number, including—
Bohlen: Two or three, he said.
Wiesner: Oh, it has to be hundreds. It has to be large numbers.
President Kennedy: Would it? Have they [unclear]?
Wiesner: They don’t say that. They say “enough.” Actually I have
had a study going since I got this document to try to find out just what
the right number is without us shooting past—
Bohlen: He mentions two or three in this letter.
Wiesner: Oh, that won’t do any good.
Bohlen: Right.
President Kennedy: Other than that we ought to . . . I’ll tell you what
we ought to do: just take these points down then you could respond to
them like we’re going to write a letter to these scientists.
Wiesner: Oh. Who is this letter from?
President Kennedy: Oh, this is from one of their people that came to us.
Wiesner: Uh, huh [possibly skeptical].
President Kennedy: [reading from the secret letter from Khrushchev] “As
we understood the idea, the suggestion is that automatic seismic stations
help with their records to determine what is the cause of this or that
underground tremor—underground nuclear blasts or ordinary earth-
quakes. It would be sort of a mechanical control without men. After
thinking this suggestion over we came to the conclusion that it can be
accepted if this would make it easier to reach [an] agreement. In this
case, it could be provided in a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests
that automatic seismic stations be set up both near the borders of the
nuclear state and two to three such stations directly on the territory of
the states possessing nuclear weapons—in the areas most frequently
subjected to earthquaking. The Soviet government agrees to this . . .

agrees to this perhaps only because it seeks a mutually acceptable basis
for an agreement.”
Wiesner: Uh, huh.
President Kennedy: Well, I think that that sort of violates the agree-
ment, but we also want to . . . And then it says that [he resumes reading
from the text] “The American scientists who took part in the Pugwash
Conference . . . approved of the suggestion about the use of automatic
seismic stations for the purposes of control. Soviet scientists approved
the suggestion . . . so, it appears the scientists were already in agreement
and there’s a possibility to move ahead . . . ”
I think we ought to move [unclear].
Wiesner: What they say is in the document that I have given you, is
that in principle they think this should work and it should be considered
by the governments and—
President Kennedy: [reading] “They need to be sealed in such a way
that they cannot be tampered with; they may be self-contained. The
instruments would be installed by the host government and periodically
returned to the international commission for inspection, replacement
and repair, and such.”23 See . . .
Wiesner: My basic reaction is that I would like these things to have
regular communication. I’m not sure it’s necessary, and I don’t want to
insist on it until I can prove it because [unclear].
President Kennedy: [reading further] “All the records would be
turned over to the Commission for analysis.”
Could they bug these instruments?
Wiesner: It would be pretty hard because you have, see if you have
your external seismic stations, which we still would have, you can get
calibrations on this signal.
President Kennedy: How long do you [unclear]?
Wiesner: You could—
Bohlen: But Jerry, what would happen if you had an explosion that
was suspicious, you weren’t sure?
Wiesner: Well, here’s what you’re hoping for—
Bohlen: Are these things are so good that they can detect the differ-
ence between an earthquake and a nuclear explosion?
Wiesner: Well, the thing you want, Chip, is a large number of seis-
23. Once again President Kennedy appears to be reading from a text, although these sentences
do not appear in the 28 September letter from Khrushchev.
mic stations so that some of them are always close to the events. If
they’re close, you can usually tell the difference.
Bohlen: Hmmm.
Wiesner: I don’t believe that any such system would get us out of the
necessity for some mandatory inspection of the seismic areas. It would
reduce . . . Anything of this kind that you do reduces the number. But it’s
technically—
President Kennedy: I’ll tell you what you do. Would you then pre-
pare for the . . . by Tuesday or so a response to this argument that it
needs only two or three—
Wiesner: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —agreed upon at Pugwash by first going back
to what they really said at Pugwash and the subsequent . . .
Wiesner: OK.
President Kennedy: . . . and then say what the seismic—
Wiesner: Can I get your reaction to one other idea—
Wiesner: —that I have been playing with . . . that I have actually
been trying to understand this to prepare a memo? As you know, I have
been impressed for the last year with the fact that the earthquakes—now
I think I have talked to both of you about this—[muttered assent] in the
Soviet Union occur in a very few remote places.
Unidentified: Yes.
Wiesner: And here are some maps that I’ve had made [unclear].
[Wiesner flips maps. Kennedy leaves the room?]
Wiesner: This is 1957. They’re in there. They’re in here and they’re
down here, an occasional one out there. They’re in the same place down
here. In fact, I’ve drawn an area in which I can’t find any record of seis-
mic—
Bohlen: [Unclear.]
Wiesner: Maybe one a year in here. So, I’ve been wondering whether
if we went into this direction we would be willing to do another trick; and
that is to say, we’d accept [unclear], we would accept invitational inspec-
tions in a defined a seismic area [Bohlen mumbling in the background] and
mandatory in the seismic areas and this would probably be mandatory in
a quarter—
Bohlen: The only trouble is that these areas of where they are, they
have the big complexes.
Wiesner: I know [unclear] but one. But they’re not where your mis-
sile bases are. These are [unclear] complexes [unclear].
Bohlen: Yeah but your [unclear] bases are all in here.
Now where is this . . . Where is . . . this place, Semipalatinsk in all of

this?
Wiesner: Semipalatinsk is in here. It’s [unclear].
Bohlen: [Unclear] for all that testing area—
Wiesner: All their testing and all their missile bases, with the excep-
tion of their Kamchatka—
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: —Terminal. Now I’ve talked to a Russian about this in
Geneva and he said, “Well, the only trouble is that these are on the bor-
ders where our intelligence complexes are.” And I said—
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: —“Sure but who cares about that anyway.” You see. Hey, 60
percent of them are out here underwater on these damn Kuril Isles. So
when you finally find out about these things, I’m ready to concede that
they probably have some basis for their suspicions of what we are trying to
do, but two or three stations would make no difference. There was a very
thorough study that was made of this a couple of years ago: if they were
willing to put in 100 or 200 of them, or maybe 50 I am not sure what the
number is, it would make a very substantial difference because what would
happen—I think you’d then go in the following way, Chip: you’d first . . .
Your external system would say there was something in here that can’t be
resolved. The next thing you’d do is call for these unmanned stations.
Either that or look at your radio records. I would suspect in a large frac-
tion of the cases, the unmanned stations would then give you enough data
so you could resolve it and say, “This was probably an earthquake.” There
is no question that there would always be a residue—
Bohlen: Well, the only things you’re really interested in are precisely
the ones which would not be resolved by mechanical [unclear] . . . In
other words—
Wiesner: Yeah. But suppose you start with the assumption that they
are not going to cheat.
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: You just . . . and then what you are looking for in both cases
is a system of assurance. Because if they’re going to cheat, I think they
can always cheat. I could always cheat on one or two [unclear] explo-
sions and get away with it. I don’t think they could cheat on a large test
series. . . . In fact, at present, they’ve never gotten away with it now. We
know when they’re testing—
Bohlen: Listen Jerry, tell me one thing: how valuable are under-
ground explosions?
Wiesner: I don’t think they are terribly valuable. And I think this is
the boss’s impression.24 But the fact is that we’ve got a political problem
here at home—
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: —but I think the Russians have got one, too, now, because . . .
What I’d like to see is whether you could invent a system in which [Door
closes. Kennedy comes back in the room?] we made a compromise, in which we
accepted invitation in the aseismic area and mandatory inspection in the
seismic area.
Bohlen: Yeah.
Wiesner: Do you think we would get in trouble politically, Mr.
President, with a—
Wiesner: —proposal that said that we would accept invitational
inspection in that part of the Soviet Union where there normally aren’t
earthquakes if they would accept mandatory inspection in the seismic
area? Here’s a map, a series of maps that show what’s going on. This is
year by year and you see it. Most of—
Wiesner: —that great big bulk of the Soviet Union probably doesn’t
have an earthquake a year.
Thompson: [Unclear] that?
Wiesner: And [unclear] here [pointing to map] 60 percent are over
here in the Kuril Islands. So, we have been asking, you see, for the right
to—of course if they were smart, they would say, “Well, if there are no
earthquakes, you can’t go there, because there’s no record.” But they say,
“We’ll fake them.”
Wiesner: But they . . . when we say, “Well if there’s no earthquake, we
won’t go because we won’t have a basis for going.” They say, “Well, you
can fake the record.” So that they worry about the other side of . . . [points
out places on the map]. You see, all of their factories and missile bases, and
so on, are in this part of the country there. There is a little bit over here:
at Kamchatka the terminal guidance for their ballistic missile tests is
there. But I think—
President Kennedy: Well, I think if there was a chance that they
[unclear], we might try—
Wiesner: You see, I think they’ve got . . . Khrushchev’s got [unclear
24. President Kennedy.

interjection by Kennedy] the clear advantage of your political problem by

now. People are saying you don’t want it, if you [unclear] . . .
Bohlen: I think this is one of the things . . . that Khrushchev has the
most distorted picture of the way American democracy or any democracy
operates. I think this is one of the great inefficiencies in his whole complex.
President Kennedy: Do you think that Khrushchev says all this busi-
ness about him finding inexplicable congressional action and the de jure
power and all the rest because he really does . . . astonished at that or is
it because this is this . . . What?
Bohlen: He probably thinks in the bottom of his heart that you put
them up to it.
President Kennedy: Put the Congress . . . ? [Laughter.]
Bohlen: Well, I’m kidding—actually, I’ve always . . . Well, you see, up
to very recently, I don’t know whether it’s changed so much now, no
Soviet Embassy in this town even bothered to read the Constitution of the
United States. I’ve talked to some of them, and they said, “We don’t want
[unclear] to read that.” And they literally didn’t understand anything about
the operation of our own system and any democratic system because of the
main thesis that this is just a flimflam to delude the people.
Thompson: Or they’ll say a different thing. I’ve argued with a lot of
them and they’ll say, “Well, the President can’t help with these pressures
on him; they’ll force him to do things, even if he doesn’t want to.” So that
you get both these images [unclear]—
Bohlen: Yeah, I have simplified it a lot in there. [Thompson agrees.]
And it may be with a man like Dobrynin, that they are getting a little
more understanding of how the thing works because some of his . . .
except for . . . on the basis of the fundamental Bolshevik thought, some
of this stuff, you see, that he says in public speeches and all this sort of
stuff is just a lot of nonsense.
President Kennedy shifts the discussion to the issue of providing nuclear

aid to France. Bohlen has recently been named to replace General James
Gavin as ambassador to France. Gavin announced his resignation in early
August and left Paris the week of September 20, ostensibly for personal
financial reasons but actually amidst controversy over his ongoing propos-
als to provide nuclear aid to France. Gavin had encouraged the sale of mis-
sile technology, enriched uranium, and compressors for gaseous diffusion
plants that separated radioactive isotopes. President Kennedy’s opening
statement to Bohlen is a sarcastic reference to Gavin’s downfall.
Gavin had not been a lone voice in the wilderness. In March 1962,
Kennedy had opened debate within the administration over the question
by asking for a “new appraisal of our atomic policy in regard to France.”25
Broadly speaking, the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff
favored nuclear sharing while the Department of State adamantly
opposed it.
President Kennedy entertained the idea of providing some form of
nuclear assistance because of U.S. balance of payments worries and fear
of Franco-German nuclear collaboration. By selling missile technology
and other information up to the level of fission weapons, he hoped to off-
set U.S. military outlays. He also thought it would prevent de Gaulle
from pressuring West Germany to cooperate in a nuclear program.
Throughout the spring and summer, the Department of State had
gotten the upper hand, and the administration maintained its official
unequivocal opposition to nuclear sharing with France. Behind the
scenes, however, Department of Defense officials continued to discuss
the issue with French officials. On September 5, Deputy Secretary of
Defense Roswell Gilpatric left for Europe to discuss allied contributions
to help redress U.S. balance of payments deficits arising from military
expenditures on the continent. From September 7 to 9, he met with
French defense minister Pierre Messmer and used their talks to explore
U.S.-French cooperation in research and development, procurement and
production, and logistic support.
When this meeting of September 29 occurs, the administration is seek-
ing congressional authorization for the sale to the French government of
the Skipjack nuclear submarine, which was the Nautilus rather than the
Polaris missile-firing type. The McMahon Act of 1958, of course, prohib-
ited assistance relating to nuclear weapons. Advocates of nuclear sharing
within the administration argued, however, that the McMahon Act had
been extrapolated into other technical areas such as missile technology.
During the meeting, Kennedy takes an important call from Senator Henry
“Scoop” Jackson, head of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.
President Kennedy: How long do you think it will be before we get

our first cable from you suggesting we give atomic weapons to France?
[Laughter.]
25. C. V. Clifton, “Memorandum of Conference with the President,” 7 March 1962, “Conference
with President and JCS, 10/61–11/62” folder, Chester Clifton Files, National Security Files,
Box 345, John F. Kennedy Library.
Bohlen: Mr. President, I think it will probably take at least—

Thompson: Two weeks. [More laughter.]
Bohlen: Two years. Three years. [Unclear] two years.26
Thompson: That’s all it takes?
Bohlen: Now I have been through all that drill, and I think the argu-
ments are very solid on this. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: [Gilpatric] was told by [unclear] that this Brosio
has just bought the French position completely and that he’s followed—27
Bohlen: It seems to have a . . . Paris is a very seductive town—
President Kennedy: Is it?
Bohlen: —Mr. President. [Chuckles.]28
Wiesner: I often thought that we may be of a lot of help to them with
nuclear submarines because—
Bohlen: Well, my God. [Chuckles again.]29
Wiesner: But [unclear].
Bohlen: Listen, we could [unclear].
Unidentified: Come in [unclear] construction. As we—
Thompson: The only thing they’d settle for—our technology.
Wiesner: I understand that.
Bohlen: The technology.
Wiesner: After two years of being sore at us because we wouldn’t
help them build one. Now you’re going to sell them one! [Laughs.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear] sell you one, don’t you think?
Bohlen: Oh yeah. I think so. The French . . . to hell with the . . . the
French strategy with its . . . is not exactly the most generous [unclear].30
Thompson: Well, look, I don’t know how much this—
26. Bohlen is being flippant because he had received stern written and oral instructions from
the Secretary of State to pursue the official administration line of opposing nuclear sharing.
27. Manlio Brosio was the Italian ambassador to France. From 17 to 19 September, Gilpatric
met with Italian defense minister Giulio Andreotti in Rome to discuss defense cooperation and
Italian contributions for offsetting U.S. military expenditures. Brosio had apparently reported to
his government that de Gaulle sought greater Franco-Italian defense collaboration.
28. The Kennedy administration had adopted what former secretary-general of NATO Paul-
Henri Spaak said was a running joke among the West Europeans: “Italy is always looking for a
compromise. Italy’s position is to say yes to France, no to the U.K., and do what the U.S. tells
her to do.”
29. He is laughing at Wiesner’s heretical suggestion to provide some form of nuclear aid to
France. There had been acrimonious debate throughout the spring and summer over the issue.
30. Reference to their perception that both France’s force de frappe and conventional forces
were for the defense of France. De Gaulle had declared that a force de frappe would not be inte-
grated with NATO’s nuclear forces.
Bohlen: This nuclear submarine thing, I hope to God that this goes
through.31
President Kennedy: Where is it now?
Bohlen: Well, I don’t know. Gilpatric told me yesterday that he talked
to Scoop Jackson and he talked to [Admiral George W.] Anderson.
President Kennedy: And they bullied?
Bohlen: Thought that there would be a considerable amount of con-
cern at the Department of State. Gilpatric went over there and sort of
made a conditional offer and this has produced a great sort of feeling in
the French: “Oh, boy, here the logjam is broken and this is wonderful”
and they’ve all expressed great pleasure and delight. But the only thing
is, if there’s a hitch in the congressional thing and we have to call it off,
then . . . [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: Oh no, I thought Anderson had that?
Bohlen: Did you see that letter from Jim Gavin to the Secretary [of
State]?
President Kennedy: A letter, no.32
Bohlen: On this subject?
President Kennedy: No. Maybe you can send it over to me? But I
think that, as I recall Anderson was in favor, or maybe Jackson, I think,
was in favor of our doing something with the French.
Bohlen: I don’t think so.
President Kennedy: What? You know giving them some—
Bohlen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —nuclear assistance—some of them were . . .
Wiesner: I always thought we were making a mistake in not helping
them with things that weren’t bombs. Because this made them particu-
larly bitter. They’d say, well this is not nuclear explosives, and confront
us on . . .
President Kennedy: Well, I think it is possible that we’ll just have to
. . . The fact is the Soviet Union in all these things recognizes France as
a nuclear power, so that it wouldn’t be a question of diffusing any-
more.33
Bohlen: Now, this is one of the things in this diffusion angle that has
really bothered me.
31. Reference to its going through the Joint Atomic Energy Committee.
32. No record of this letter has been found.
33. This was a concern because of President Kennedy’s hope for a test ban treaty.
Wiesner: But at the bottom of this is the faster you . . . the more you
help the French, the more incentive you give other people to get to that
stage, too, you see. So, I think you have to be very careful on the bomb.
Bohlen: As I’ve always understood, Mr. President, your thought on
the things you told Malraux,34 was that this is surely, but in particular
when Adenauer leaves, is going to produce a comparable German effort
to get one.
President Kennedy: Uh, huh.
Bohlen: And I would say that this is one of the places where I think
de Gaulle shuts his mind and is focusing on his needs, ready to bring
Germany into the European Community. He doesn’t seem to be paying
very much attention to the old talk about the WEU treaties.35
And you recall what Adenauer said to Rusk when we were there in
June; he talked about the atomic [unclear]. He said, “Well, of course
[unclear] when we signed the WEU agreement because it is based on
the doctrine of rebus sic standibus.36
President Kennedy: Yeah. Yeah.
Bohlen: —which gives the impression which was [unclear] rebus sic
standibus is a hell of a lot and that the situation is quite different than it was
then. I think the main thing on this thing is whether or not the French—
de Gaulle—really believes that this independent nuclear capability . . .
President Kennedy: [to Evelyn Lincoln] Is he calling me? Jackson’s
calling?
[to gentlemen in room] Jackson’s calling me. So [unclear].
[to Evelyn Lincoln] Can I get Senator Jackson please?
[to gentlemen] Yeah, let’s put that away for a little . . . [unclear] and
then let’s come back to it.
Unidentified: Uh, huh.
President Kennedy: [to Wiesner] Well, would you see if you can get
me a response [to Khrushchev’s test ban letter]?
Wiesner: Well, who’s this to? Can’t you . . .
President Kennedy: I just want a paper.
Wiesner: You want a paper?
34. André Malraux, French minister of state for cultural affairs, visited the United States from
10 to 16 May 1962 at President Kennedy’s personal invitation.
35. Western European Union.
36. Rebus sic standibus is the legal doctrine that treaties can be terminated on the ground of a
change in circumstances that defeats the treaty’s purpose. Bohlen is telling the President that
Adenauer admits to relying on this document as a possible escape hatch from the WEU agree-
ment that bars West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons.
President Kennedy: —a paper with an explanation of it.

Wiesner: All right.
President Kennedy: I just want to know what the Pugwash scientists
did say and what, particularly about this question, of their being quoted—
Wiesner: Right.
President Kennedy: —as having only said two or three.
Hello. Can you get Senator Jackson?
Door closes. Kennedy speaks on the telephone to Senator Jackson.
President Kennedy: Hello, Scoop, how are you? Good.
Henry Jackson: I’ll see if I can’t find out about [unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah, fine, then why don’t you come and see—
why don’t you come down next week, Monday or Tuesday?
Jackson: All right.
President Kennedy: Can I . . . I’ll call your office Monday morning
and then—
Jackson: I’ll be in a meeting [unclear].
President Kennedy: Good. Did Ros Gilpatric talk to you about—
Yeah, what is the feeling up there?
Jackson: On the [unclear], I think [unclear] used to be [unclear]. In
the meantime, [unclear].
President Kennedy: Oh. It seems to me that he accepted.
Jackson: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . right. I think. Go on. Yeah but that; but
do they think there is some stuff there that the other people don’t have?
Oh, I see. Good. OK.
Jackson: [Unclear.]
Bohlen and Thompson begin to talk while President Kennedy is on the
telephone to Jackson.
Thompson: I would say, West Berlin. I’m not sure we’re done.
Bohlen: [Unclear] consider very carefully. This is the . . . sort of an
amendment to the original resolution [unclear] much more. But it is, as
you notice, he speaks of the continued exercise of their rights in Berlin
which means, in effect, West Berlin.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see, I see. I understand what you mean.
Well, I’ll talk to you about it next, the first part of the week. Have you
told all this to Gilpatric? Right, to Gilpatric. Look, I’ll see you Monday
or Tuesday.37
37. On Wednesday, 3 October, Senator Jackson met with the President at the White House
from 11:10 to 11:30 A.M.
Jackson: I’ll brief him.

Telephone conversation ends. President Kennedy turns to Bohlen.
President Kennedy: He says [unclear] the Soviets—evidently there’s
some material there, information there, [which] could be valuable to the
Soviets.38
Bohlen: This is Rickover’s position. 39
President Kennedy: That’s Rickover. And he says the suggestion,
therefore, is that the training program might be adjusted so that this
information could be available at the very end. By that time the informa-
tion would not be useful—evidently they assume the Russians will have
it by then.
Bohlen: The main thing I’ll be interested in, and Gavin in this letter
said to me, if this is called off after Gilpatric’s thing. He said this would
make it very difficult for Ambassador Bohlen. In other words, this is the
kind of thing the French would consider we did.
Bohlen: —double-crossed them.
President Kennedy: Oh, I think we can—we’ll just indicate that we’ll
stay at it. I think we might as well . . .
Bohlen: Again, I see no objection to the thing, this resort, to the ques-
tion of this leakage of secrecy that it be handled that way. That’s all right. I
think the feeling is that in the French scientific community there are some
people who are very doubtful as to their former connection to the Soviet
Union, apart from their actual connections. But I think that if this could do
it, then . . . But first, there’s one thing, you know this business of the
nuclear diffusion that the Secretary has been talking to [Soviet foreign
minister Andrei] Gromyko about, that . . . If you put France in the cate-
gory, as the agreement does, as a nuclear possessing power—
President Kennedy: I am very reluctant [unclear].
Bohlen: —then you really—
Bohlen: —just knock the ground out from under your feet about help-
ing them, except on the grounds of unfriendliness to France. Now, I’ve told
this to the Secretary, and I think he is well aware of it. And it’ll be worth it
38. Summarizing his telephone conversation with Jackson, Kennedy tells them that there is
fear of compromising U.S. nuclear reactor technology by allowing the possibility of secrets
passing to the Soviets by sharing the Skipjack submarine with the French.
39. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover.
if you really have a good tight nuclear diffusion agreement; but if you don’t
. . . That’s why I was worried about sending it on to the allies to consider
and you ought to have a lot more clarity with the Russians as to whether
they’d really need—[reference to conflict between a nuclear nonproliferation or
nondiffusion agreement and any U.S. nuclear assistance to France].
President Kennedy: That’s what I thought. We don’t want to go
through one of these terrible allied [unclear]—
Bohlen: —allied performances on a hypothetical situation.
Bohlen: And, Mr. President, one more thing, you know this resolu-
tion on Berlin?
Bohlen: —that Zablocki has sponsored.40
Bohlen: Well, I’m going up there on Monday at ten—
Bohlen: —to talk to him. And you’ve seen this draft?
President Kennedy: And I asked him to take out this question of
German . . . The government . . . the conclusion, the final. Secondly—
Bohlen: And that isn’t accurate either because the agreements don’t
provide for that.
Bohlen: I mean, the agreements are not based on until—
President Kennedy: I think that I see no particular disadvantage.
[reading text] I don’t see any advantage of it, I don’t see it’s a great dis-
advantage.
Bohlen: No, it’s just that we’ve been trying to get Zablocki to lay off
it, but he’s just hot on it. You know, he feels that since we’ve asked
[unclear] reservists, he asked that you mention Cuba and Berlin that . . .
President Kennedy: Yeah, but I think . . . I just think—
Bohlen: If you have one on Cuba, you ought to have one on Berlin.
He really wants to pick up some political capital for being the—
President Kennedy: With the Germans?
Bohlen: No, with his election cam—41
President Kennedy: What [unclear] is German?
Tape spools out.
40. Clement J. Zablocki (D-Wisconsin) was on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
41. Zablocki was up for reelection in November 1962.
The secretary of the army, Cyrus Vance; the U.S. Army chief of staff,
General Earl Wheeler; and the incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, entered the Oval Office next to discuss
the possible use of the Army in Mississippi. Kennedy may have wished to
tape this conversation; but he only successfully pulls the switch at the
end of the conversation, leaving the machine on to catch the strategy
session with Attorney General Robert Kennedy and Assistant Attorney
General Burke Marshall.
1:18–1:30 P.M.
The question still will remain . . . as to whether we call out the

guard today, federalize the guard today, put it on an alert . . .
Meeting on the Crisis at the University of Mississippi42

The struggle to integrate the University of Mississippi (“Ole Miss”) began
quietly in January 1961, just after the inauguration of John Kennedy.
Inspired by the words of Kennedy’s inaugural address, James H. Meredith,
a 28-year-old Air Force veteran, decided to apply to the leading institution
of higher learning in Mississippi. Requesting an application, Meredith
described himself as an “American-Mississippi-Negro citizen,” who had
been moved by all the changes “in our educational system taking place in
the country in this new age.” He noted that the application would probably
not come as a surprise to the university and hoped the matter would be
“handled in a manner that [would] be complimentary to the University
and to the State of Mississippi. Of course, I am the one that will, no doubt,
suffer the greatest consequences of this event.” Convinced that his goal of
ending segregation at the university was but one part of the great struggle
for racial justice, Meredith would later write of his “Divine Responsibility”
for ending “White Supremacy” in Mississippi, observing that desegregat-
ing Ole Miss was “only the start.”
Over the next two years, as Meredith’s case moved through the
courts and finally exploded on the grounds of the Mississippi campus, it
received national and even international attention, and Kennedy admin-
42. Including President Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, and Burke Marshall. Tape 24, John F.
Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
Meeting on the Crisis at the University of Mississippi 223
istration officials, including the President and the Attorney General,

devoted a great deal of time to managing the crisis. Before the episode
ended with the registration and matriculation of Meredith at Ole Miss in
the fall of 1962, tense standoffs, rioting, and death would come to the
university, and President Kennedy would order thousands of U.S. Army
troops to the campus in order to protect Meredith and enforce the rule
of law. Meredith’s determination to attend Ole Miss, Mississippi’s stead-
fast efforts to prevent him from doing so, and the conviction of the
President and his aides that it was essential to allow Meredith to enter
the university combined to make the episode one of the most celebrated
in the history of the civil rights movement.
Having decided to transfer from all-black Jackson State to all-white
Ole Miss, Meredith recognized that he would need legal assistance, which
led him to contact Medgar Evers, Mississippi field secretary of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).
Evers put him in touch with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, where his
case would be handled by Constance Baker Motley, one of the defense
fund’s talented young attorneys. With the nation’s leading civil rights
organization behind him, Meredith embarked on what would become a
tortuous legal battle to enter the segregated institution. After Ole Miss
had denied him admission on clearly specious grounds, the struggle
moved to the courts, and over the next several months, Meredith contin-
ued to seek admission to the university. In September 1962, the federal
courts established Meredith’s legal right to attend the institution. But the
struggle was far from over, as white Mississippians—politicians, Ole
Miss students, local journalists, and ordinary citizens—united to block
the young black man from entering their beloved university.
Spearheading the movement against the integration of the university
was Governor Ross Barnett, who combined the soft-spoken demeanor of the
southern planter with the overheated rhetoric of the southern populist.
Barnett’s performance during the crisis is not easy to characterize: in speak-
ing to the Kennedys, he was generally conciliatory, searching, or so it
seemed, for a way out of the legal and political morass. But the governor was
equally capable of appealing to the basest instincts of those who would stand
in Meredith’s path. In one of the most highly charged moments of the crisis,
Barnett declared to a crowd of 46,000 football fans attending an Ole Miss
game: “I love Mississippi. I love our people. I love our customs.” The throng
laughed, cried, and roared its approval; the moment, a spectator recalled,
resembled “a big Nazi rally.” In showdowns that saw Barnett and his col-
leagues confront U.S. marshals and Justice Department officials, many
Mississippians came to perceive the crisis as pitting the federal Goliath
against the southern David—or perhaps more aptly, as providing a second

chance to fight for the honor of the south against the northern invader.
The U.S. Department of Justice was interested in the case from the
start, with Burke Marshall, assistant attorney general for civil rights,
telling Meredith that the Civil Rights Division was following his efforts
and was prepared to do everything it could to assist him. In August
1962, one month before the federal courts had established Meredith’s
right to enter the University, the Justice Department had become offi-
cially involved in the case, filing an amicus curiae brief, which argued
that several delays issued by Judge Ben Cameron of the Fifth Circuit
were improper. On September 10 Justice Hugo Black of the U.S.
Supreme Court concurred, thus paving the way for the federal order that
Meredith be admitted to Ole Miss.
While by August 1962 the Justice Department had become an active
participant in the case, its role in the person of the Attorney General
and others would increase markedly in the days ahead. During the latter
part of September, Robert Kennedy would engage in some twenty con-
versations with Governor Barnett in an effort to work out a plan to reg-
ister Meredith at Ole Miss, an eventuality the Mississippi politician
seemed determined to prevent.
Meredith was scheduled to start classes at the university, after regis-
tering on September 25. But Governor Ross Barnett prevented Meredith
from registering, blocking his entry into the trustee’s room in a state office
building in Jackson, where the registration was scheduled to take place.
Accompanied by John Doar of the U.S. Justice Department and James
McShane, chief U.S. marshal, Meredith was forced to leave after Barnett
willfully refused a court order to admit him, declaring he did “hereby
finally deny you admission to the University of Mississippi.” The large
crowd roared its approval, an onlooker cried “Three cheers for the gover-
nor,” and Meredith departed, along with his federal escorts.
The following day, September 26, Meredith, again accompanied by
Doar and McShane, headed to the Ole Miss campus in Oxford to regis-
ter for classes. The car carrying the three men, escorted by the highway
patrol, was forced to stop a few blocks from the entrance to the campus.
Backed up by state troopers, county sheriffs, and a line of patrol cars,
Lieutenant Governor Paul Johnson approached Meredith, Doar, and
McShane. Filling in for Governor Barnett (low clouds had prevented
him from flying up from Jackson to Oxford), Johnson said, “I would like
to read this proclamation,” which stated that Mississippi was “interpos-
ing” its powers and would deny Meredith admission to the university.
After some gentle pushing between McShane and Johnson, it was appar-
ent the Mississippian would not yield. After they exchanged some
words, McShane turned in retreat, and Meredith, Doar, and a retinue of
federal marshals departed the scene, prevented once more from fulfilling
their court-ordered task.
On September 27, the group again tried to register Meredith. This time
an elaborate plan had been worked out in discussions between Attorney
General Robert Kennedy and Governor Barnett and his friend Tom
Watkins, by which the U.S. marshals would draw their guns on Barnett and
Paul Johnson in a “show of force.” Once this symbolic act had been com-
pleted, the Mississippi politicians would stand aside and allow Meredith to
pass (with his escorts) and register for classes. But the plan was thwarted, as
some 2,000 people, including students, farmers, and self-styled vigilantes,
converged that day on Oxford from all over Mississippi, determined to stop
Meredith from registering at the university. A worried Barnett telephoned
the Attorney General late in the day to report that he was uncertain if he
could maintain order and claimed he had been unable to disperse the crowd.
The Attorney General, never comfortable with the planned “show of force,”
ordered Meredith’s convoy, which was heading from Memphis to Oxford, to
turn back. Less than 50 miles from Oxford, the group turned around,
recrossed the Tennessee border, and returned to Memphis.
On Friday September 28, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found
Governor Barnett guilty of contempt. Barnett, who did not appear in
court, was found guilty in absentia and given until the following
Tuesday to clear himself by retracting his proclamation and allowing
Meredith to register. In the event he failed to do so, the Court declared
Barnett would face arrest and a fine of $10,000 a day for each day he
remained in Meredith’s path.
On September 29, President Kennedy would become more directly
involved in the crisis, having previously allowed the Attorney General to
assume primary responsibility in the affair. That morning Robert Kennedy
had been on the telephone with Ross Barnett and his chosen intermediary,
Thomas Watkins, an attorney from Jackson, Mississippi. The deal reached
the day before had fallen through. Now the Mississippians wanted an even
larger show of federal force before giving in and letting Meredith register
at Ole Miss.
The President had to decide whether the U.S. Army or a federalized
Mississippi National Guard would be needed to cope with the increas-
ingly tense situation.
Unidentified: . . . the witness is on the telephone, so you know that

he says, “I can’t do it any longer.” Second point of it is that even if you
have the problem of, on Sunday if you call the guard on Sunday, this is
the quietest time in those towns, and you will look like you’re calling the
guard when there’s nothing happening. Sunday is the psychologically
quiet time, unless they incite somebody to meet. And so it ought, even in
Little Rock, there’s no doubt we read about Sunday always looks like
everybody was going to church, and the Life magazine pictures will look
like the very devil. 43
On the other hand, it’s the easiest time to mobilize, when there’s
nobody around. And that’s an advantage. A third critical point, I guess, is,
what if the governor chooses, in effect, to call out the guard before you do
and again, if he says you’re challenging him on keeping law and order.
And he said, “All right, I’ll keep law and order.” For one thing, he’ll tell
you if you’d call off Meredith, why there won’t be any disturbance.
President Kennedy: But I can’t call off Meredith for that.
Unidentified: No. No. I agree with you.
President Kennedy: I don’t have the power to call off Meredith.
Unidentified: But he’ll put it in the conversation that you’re the one
inciting the trouble.
President Kennedy: I understand that.
Unidentified: But the other point is, do you want him to call the
guard? If he says, “Well I could keep law and order, I guess, if I call out
the guard,” you have to think of whether he might preempt you on that.
President Kennedy: Well, let him do it. Let him do it. I don’t mind
that. That’d be all right.
Unidentified: You can always federalize the guard [unclear] or even
get the chance to.
President Kennedy: So now the question really is . . . I think we ought
to go ahead [with] my contacts, and your conversation and telegram, with
Barnett, number one. Now the question therefore, we know what the
result of that’s going to be. The question still will remain with us today as
to whether we call out the guard today, federalize the guard today, put it
43. The reference is to the autumn 1957 Little Rock crisis in which the governor of Arkansas,
Orval Faubus, defied a federal court order to desegregate Little Rock’s Central High School.
Faubus used the National Guard, ostensibly to prevent violence but in reality to block nine
African American students from enrolling in the all-white high school. After scenes of hate-
filled mobs harassing the students appeared on national television, President Eisenhower
called in 1,000 federal troops and 10,000 federalized National Guardsmen in order to protect
the young African Americans.
on an alert, start an intermediate step in the guard, or do we wait till

Monday and do it? Or do we wait till Barnett sent me an answer? I think
I’ll . . . Well, in any case, I’ll wait for Barnett’s answer, I guess. Then I
would think unless he sends me such a vague . . . I don’t know what kind of
wire he’ll send me. What’ll he say to me, or send me?
Robert Kennedy: Maybe he’ll attack Meredith, I suppose.
President Kennedy: But he won’t say whether he can keep order,
will he?
Robert Kennedy: No, I think he’s . . .
President Kennedy: He’ll give me an answer saying, “If you will just
call off that thing, we can keep order.” So it won’t be a clean answer to
me. So we still have to . . .
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but you can of course, you can phrase the
telegram in such a way that’s going to make it look difficult.
President Kennedy: All right, let’s get this wire written. Let’s get
something, Burke [Marshall], as to what I’m supposed to ask him in two
or three questions.
Burke Marshall: All right.
President Kennedy: Now, what about the guard? In other words, if
we decide in the next hour or so, after I’ve talked to Barnett, et cetera,
getting them there, how would a proclamation be handled . . . [trails off
as the President walks away] . . . It will take . . . It will require a federal
proclamation to that effect.
President Kennedy: I don’t know whether this requires a television
speech or not [unclear].
Unidentified: That’s what I hoped [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] the purpose and then [unclear].
Unclear exchanges. The voices get distant. Kennedy is heard saying,
“The one tomorrow night to the country.”
President Kennedy: Evelyn? Burke, do you want to dictate a memo-
randum for this conversation, guidance, what is it I want to say to
Barnett?
Robert Kennedy: Well, why don’t we, just the three of us go and . . .
President Kennedy: And a telegram? To follow?
Unidentified: If we do that [unclear], yes.
President Kennedy: OK, then I’ll call . . . If we’ve got to go with the
guard, it seems to me we ought to call out [unclear] regiment should go.
Unidentified: What’s the word, sir? If you call [unclear].
Unidentified: . . . federalizing the guard . . .
Unidentified: . . . put them in the armories, just about, I’d say that’d
be [unclear] use, and I would say the first battle group of the [unclear]
the Cavalry Regiment under Colonel Martin. Now, I would suggest that
we go ahead and move General Billingslea of the Second Infantry
Division Headquarters in there and put him in command . . .44
Unidentified: Under Vance?45
Unidentified: Right, under Vance.
Unidentified: None of the others . . .
President Kennedy: To do what? To do what?
Unidentified: Well, Billingslea would be the Army officer in overall
charge. Put him into Memphis right now.
President Kennedy: Where is he now?
Unidentified: He’s down at Benning now. 46
Several unclear exchanges follow.
Unidentified: No, I agree. We were going to use, first, two M.P. bat-
talions . . .
President Kennedy: How many would there be in one?
Unidentified: Well, there would be 800 men, all told. And we’d also
bring in the battle group from the Second Infantry Division at Fort
Benning to give [unclear].
President Kennedy: How about the map of the town and so on? Is
there somebody around who knows which way and can direct the guard
to go . . . ?
Unidentified: Oh, yes. [Unclear] military [unclear] set of maps
[unclear].
President Kennedy: Will you have a regular Army fellow with them
or will it be Billingslea?
Unidentified: You have regular Army. [Several speakers at once.]
President Kennedy: Has Billingslea [unclear] made an analysis of
what he would do with the various forces?
Unidentified: People have been working on . . .
Unidentified: Right. And Creighton Abrams will be down . . .47
Unidentified: Maybe he should talk to [unclear].
44. Colonel Martin is not further identified. General Billingslea is Brigadier General Charles
Billingslea.
45. Cyrus R. Vance, secretary of the Army.
46. Fort Benning, Georgia.
47. Major General W. Creighton Abrams was assistant deputy Army chief of staff for military
operations.

Unidentified: I can talk to Senator Stennis, if you like, Mr. President,
on this thing, but I do think it would be wise to at least bring it up.48
President Kennedy: You or [unclear]?
Unidentified: I’d be very happy to do it . . .
President Kennedy: I could see him. He’s in Washington, is he?
Unidentified: Yes, he’s in Washington.
President Kennedy: Well, I’ll see him about five or six. He’s talked to
me personally about [unclear] our problem. So [unclear] by that time,
I’ll have had my conversation with Barnett, and we’ll send Barnett a
wire and hopefully, I’ll get a hold of him. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Maybe you’d better go through an ambassador, instead
of yourself. [Lengthy unclear discussion about Barnett follows.]
Leaving the machine running, the President walks over to the family
quarters at approximately 1:25 P.M.
Evelyn Lincoln: Did he go over to the Mansion?
Unidentified: He’s in the pool with [unclear].
Lincoln: Oh. [Then about five minutes of distant conversation during
which someone says, “Is he coming back?”]
President Kennedy apparently decides against a swim. Instead he returns
to the Oval Office with the Attorney General.
President Kennedy has still not decided whether he will stay in
Washington overnight. Slated to meet his friends Lem Billings and
Congressman Torbert MacDonald in Newport, Rhode Island, Kennedy is
still holding out the option of flying out after he speaks to Ross Barnett.
Robert Kennedy: Jack?
President Kennedy: I think I’m going to go up there after we give
[unclear] depending on when we . . . [Unclear] don’t want some Micks
in Newport, Rhode Island [unclear]. [Unclear] going to make a speech
tomorrow night.
What about getting Sorensen to work? 49 Does he say Arthur’s been
working on it?50
Can I talk . . . can I get Arthur? Do you want to get Arthur?
48. Senator John Stennis of Mississippi.

49. For the past week, White House counsel Sorensen had been hospitalized with an ulcer. On
Friday, Sorensen had sent a memorandum to the White House with his suggestions for han-
dling the crisis. Evidently the President hadn’t yet seen it. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy
(New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 484.
50. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., was a presidential special assistant.
Unclear discussion. The President walks over to Evelyn Lincoln’s office

and has an unclear discussion with her.
President Kennedy: Yes, you just have to get him. I just want to
speak to him at home. Where is he? At home?
Lincoln: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Mr. President?
A brief unclear discussion follows. Then the Attorney General

launches into a discussion of a new spy case.
Approximately 1:30 –1:35 P.M.
If you’re caught spying as a diplomat . . . [y]ou can’t try them?
Meeting with Robert Kennedy on the Drummond Spy Case51

On September 28, the FBI arrested Yeoman First Class Nelson Cornelius
Drummond of the U.S. Navy and charged him with conspiring to pass
defense secrets to the Soviet Union. Drummond was apprehended while
sitting in a car in Larchmont, New York, with two officials from the
Soviet delegation to the United Nations. The FBI agents found eight
classified naval documents on the car seat between Drummond and the
Soviet officials.
Drummond had been under surveillance for some time and had
apparently shown unusual signs of wealth for an enlisted man whose
monthly salary was $318. Given their diplomatic status, the Soviet offi-
cials were not liable to arrest, although they were detained briefly before
their identity was established. Shortly after the Russians were appre-
hended, the U.S. government demanded their expulsion.
Robert Kennedy: They called [unclear] give those guys as much time
as he can. Tell him, you can’t believe the Russians would do this. You
Collection.
Meeting with Robert Kennedy on the Drummond Spy Case 231
can’t, you must be . . . You know they brought out the card thing, the
Russians are diplomats . . .
Unidentified: The Russians would do that. Ughhhh!!!
Unidentified: [Unclear] that they’ve misunderstood. They . . .
Robert Kennedy: It’s all about getting those two men.
President Kennedy: What were they doing?
Robert Kennedy: We got the chief petty officer [unclear] who gave
them a lot of valuable information. [Unclear] since 1958.
President Kennedy: Why, was he stationed in Moscow, was he for
awhile?
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] And he’s been living way above his
means. [Unclear.] So they got on him.
President Kennedy: How did they catch him?
Robert Kennedy: They started following him. He spent a lot of
money and then he [unclear] couldn’t get any good stuff on the docu-
ments. So when he was short of money, they would watch him [unclear].
And they followed . . . thought he was going to go last week, so they fol-
lowed all the way out [unclear]. Sometimes he’d drive at [unclear] miles
an hour. But they had cars stationed all the way. And then they went
finally chasing him to Westchester. [Unclear] he was with the third sec-
retary of the delegation of the Soviet Union.
President Kennedy: At the U.N. or here?
Robert Kennedy: The U.N.
Robert Kennedy: They were sitting in the car, with the documents,
with the dough.
President Kennedy: They just arrested them?
Robert Kennedy: So, they called me at once because they thought that
[unclear] speak Russian [unclear]. They asked for diplomatic immunity.
Robert Kennedy: Said [unclear] could not believe that the Soviet Union
would be involved. You would think you must be personally [unclear] the
Russians. We can’t let you go. So they took him down. [Unclear] had to
wait until someone came down.
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] United Nations delegation about 4:30
this morning.
President Kennedy: Did what?
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] and then they just let them go.
President Kennedy: They let them go? Why?

Robert Kennedy: Because they got diplomatic immunity.
President Kennedy: If you’re caught spying as a diplomat, all you do
is expel them? You can’t try them?
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] cause the guy confessed.
President Kennedy: There isn’t anything you can do under law to a
guy at an embassy who is caught spying? Have any of our people been
imprisoned?
Robert Kennedy: No. They only get expelled. [Unclear] at the United
Nations. That’s the way we do it all [unclear] now. Being stationed here
in the United States. You know, those other two fellows have been com-
plaining. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: What about . . . what’s Kenny O’Donnell [say]
about this?
The President turned off the machine at about 1:35. He then called Mrs.
Kennedy, perhaps to discuss the prospects of his joining her in Newport,
Rhode Island, at the end of the day.
A few minutes later, Arthur Schlesinger reached the White House. He
was just in time to witness the President’s next telephone conversation
with the Governor of Mississippi. An air of unreal humor pervaded the
Oval Office. When he was told that Ross Barnett was on the phone
Kennedy affected the manner of a ring announcer: “And now—Governor
Ross Barnett.” “Go get him, Johnny Boy,” replied the Attorney General.52
52. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., recounted this scene in Robert Kennedy and His Times (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1978), p. 344. Soon afterward the U.S. government demanded the expul-
sion of the two Russians.
On July 19, 1963, Drummond was convicted of conspiring to commit espionage for the
Soviet Union, and on August 15, 1963, he was sentenced to life imprisonment. The judge, who
spoke of Drummond’s “heinous” crime, could have imposed the death penalty, but said he
decided on a life sentence out of compassion for the ex-sailor’s wife and parents.
Conversation with Ross Barnett 233
2:00 P.M.
[T]he problem is, Governor, that I got my responsibility, just

like you have yours . . .
Conversation with Ross Barnett53

President Kennedy: . . . Mississippi.
Unidentified: Yes, Mr. President.
Unidentified: Hello. Hello.
President Kennedy: . . . calling, if they want to know who’s calling.
Unidentified: All right. Fine, Mr. President. [Long pause.]
President Kennedy: Hello.
Unidentified: All right.
President Kennedy: Hello? Hello, Governor?
Ross Barnett: All right. Yes.
President Kennedy: How are you?
Barnett: Is this . . .
President Kennedy: This is the President, uh . . .
Barnett: Oh. Well, Mr. President [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, I’m glad to talk to you, Governor. I am
concerned about this situation down there, as I know . . .
Barnett: Oh, I should say I am concerned about it, Mr. President. It’s
a horrible situation.
President Kennedy: Well, now, here’s my problem, Governor.
Barnett: [Unclear.] Yes.
President Kennedy: Listen, I didn’t put him in the university, but on
the other hand, under the Constitution . . . I have to carry out the orders,
carry that order out, and I don’t, I don’t want to do it in any way that
causes difficulty to you or to anyone else. But I’ve go to do it. Now, I’d
like to get your help in doing that.
Barnett: Yes. Well, uh, have you talked with Attorney General this
morning?
President Kennedy: Yeah. I talked to him and in fact, I just met with
him for about an hour, and we went over the situation.
53. Dictabelt 4A1, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Barnett: Did he and Mr. Watkins have a talk this morning, Tom
Watkins, the lawyer from Jackson, or not?54
President Kennedy: Yes, he talked to Tom Watkins, he told me.
Barnett: Yes, sir. Well, I don’t know what . . . I haven’t had a chance
to talk with him . . .
President Kennedy: Now just wait . . . just one minute because I got
the Attorney General in the outer office, and I’ll just speak to him.
Barnett: All right. [Long pause.]
President Kennedy: Hello, Governor?
Barnett: Yes. Hold on.
President Kennedy: I just talked to the Attorney General. Now, he
said that he talked to Mr. Watkins . . .
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: . . . and the problem is as to whether we can get
some help in getting this fellow in this week.
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: Now, evidently we couldn’t, the Attorney General
didn’t feel that he and Mr. Watkins had reached any final agreement on that.
Barnett: Well, Mr. President, Mr. Watkins is going to fly up there
early tomorrow morning.
Barnett: And could you gentlemen talk with him tomorrow? You . . .
President Kennedy: Yes, I will have the Attorney General talk to
him and then . . .
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: . . . after they’ve finished talking I’ll talk to the
Attorney General . . .
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: . . . on the phone and then if he feels it’s useful
for me to meet with him . . .
Barnett: I thought . . .
President Kennedy: . . . I’ll do that.
Barnett: I thought they were making some progress. I didn’t know.
President Kennedy: Well, now . . .
Barnett: I couldn’t say, you know.
President Kennedy: . . . he and Mr. Watkins, they can meet tomor-
row. Now, the difficulty is, we got two or three problems. In the first
54. Thomas H. Watkins was the Mississippi lawyer and Barnett aide who served as an inter-
mediary in the crisis.
place, what can we do to . . . First place is the court’s order to you, which
I guess is, you’re given until Tuesday. What is your feeling on that?
Barnett: Well, I want . . .
President Kennedy: What’s your position on that?
Barnett: . . . to think it over, Mr. President.
Barnett: It’s a serious matter, now that I want to think it over a few
days. Until Tuesday, anyway.
President Kennedy: All right. Well, now let me say this . . .
Barnett: You know what I am up against, Mr. President. I took an
oath, you know, to abide by the laws of this state—
Barnett: —and our constitution here and the Constitution of the
United States. I’m, I’m on the spot here, you know.
President Kennedy: Well, now you’ve got . . .
Barnett: I, I’ve taken an oath to do that, and you know what our laws
are with reference to . . .
President Kennedy: Yes, I understand that. Well, now we’ve got the . . .
Barnett: . . . and we have a statute that was enacted a couple of weeks
ago stating positively that no one who had been convicted of a crime or,
uh, whether the criminal action pending against them would not be eli-
gible for any of the institutions of higher learning. And that’s our law,
and it seemed like the Court of Appeal didn’t pay any attention to that.55
President Kennedy: Right. Well, of course . . .
Barnett: And . . .
President Kennedy: . . . the problem is, Governor, that I got my
responsibility, just like you have yours . . .
Barnett: Well, that’s true. I . . .
President Kennedy: . . . and my responsibility, of course, is to the . . .
Barnett: . . . I realize that, and I appreciate that so much.
President Kennedy: Well, now here’s the thing, Governor. I will, the
Attorney General can talk to Mr. Watkins tomorrow. What I want,
would like to do is to try to work this out in an amicable way. We don’t
want a lot of people down there getting hurt . . .
55. On September 20, Meredith was found guilty in absentia of false voter registration and
was fined $100 and costs and sentenced to one year in the Hinds County jail. The conviction
on this clearly specious charge occurred the same day that Mississippi Senate Bill 1501 passed
the legislature. The bill barred persons guilty of a criminal offense from attending state insti-
tutions of higher learning. In addition, on 20 September, Governor Barnett was appointed
registrar of the university. Five days later, the Board of Trustees rescinded the appointment.
Barnett: Oh, that’s right . . .

President Kennedy: . . . and we don’t want to have a . . . You know it’s
very easy to . . .
Barnett: Mr. President, let me say this. They’re calling, calling me
and others from all over the state, wanting to bring a thousand, wanting
to bring 500, and 200, and all such as that, you know. We don’t want
such as that.
President Kennedy: I know. Well, we don’t want to have a, we don’t
want to have a lot of people getting hurt or killed down there.
Barnett: Why, that’s, that’s correct. Mr. President, let me say this.
Mr. Watkins is really an A-1 lawyer, an honorable man, has the respect
and the confidence of every lawyer in America who knows him. He’s of
the law firm of Watkins and Eager. They’ve had an “A” rating for many,
many years, and I believe this, that he can help solve this problem.
President Kennedy: Well, I will, the Attorney General will see Mr.
Watkins tomorrow, and then I, after the Attorney General and Mr.
Watkins are finished then, I will be back in touch with you.
Barnett: All right. All right. I’ll appreciate it so much, now, and there
. . . Watkins’ll leave here in the morning, and I’ll have him to get into
touch with the Attorney General as to when he can see him tomorrow.
President Kennedy: Yeah, he’ll see him and . . .
Barnett: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: . . . .we will, then you and I’ll be back and talk
again.
Barnett: All right.
Barnett: All right.
Barnett: I appreciate your interest in our poultry program and all
those things.
President Kennedy: Well, we’re . . . [laughs softly].
Barnett: Thank you so much.
President Kennedy: OK, Governor. Thank you.
Barnett: Yes, sir. All right now.
President Kennedy: Bye now.
Barnett: Thank you. Bye.
Conversation with Theodore Sorensen 237
2:25 P.M.
[G]ive me some thoughts . . . the speech, is that right?
Conversation with Theodore Sorensen56

Theodore Sorensen had been hospitalized with an ulcer earlier in the
week. Kennedy telephoned him at the hospital, requesting that he provide
some suggestions for a televised speech on the Mississippi crisis that
Kennedy thought he might have to deliver Sunday night. Sorensen noted
that Republicans were taking a segregationist line, which would help the
President avoid a partisan attack. (He would be criticized by both sides.)
With some irony, Kennedy himself remarked that this strict Republican
line was not one Eisenhower had followed in the Little Rock crisis (when
the Republican President intervened with federal troops). Sorensen clari-
fied his point, noting that he meant the Republicans in Alabama.
President Kennedy: . . . sort of a South Caro—

Theodore Sorensen: . . . [word unintelligible] campaign going on in
Alabama, and the Republicans are taking the straight Ross Barnett line
and so forth.
President Kennedy: Well, except Eisenhower, they . . . [laughs].
Eisenhower’s taking a little away from them.
Sorensen: No, I mean the Republicans in Alabama.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but I mean, well I, you, and Burke can talk,
because the legal . . . our legal obligations on Tuesday affect when we go
with this guard; that’s the point.57
Sorensen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: OK, and you’re thinking about, give me some
thoughts . . . the speech, is that right?
Sorensen: Right.
With the Mississippi situation very much unresolved, the President’s

hopes to salvage what was left of his Newport weekend were dimming.
56. Dictabelt 4A2, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
57. Burke Marshall was assistant attorney general for the Civil Rights Division.
LeMoyne Billings, Kennedy’s roommate at Choate and a Kennedy family

intimate since 1934, called during the afternoon Mississippi discussions
to learn that he probably wouldn’t be seeing his friend up in Newport.58
Billings was having his own difficulties getting there.
2:30 P.M.
I guess it’s not going too well . . . [f]or you because of the
Mississippi deal.
Conversation with LeMoyne Billings59

Unidentified: Mrs. Lincoln?
Lincoln: Um-hm.
Unidentified: Mr. Lem Billings.
Lincoln: Could you hold just one minute?
Unidentified: Sure. [Short pause.]
President Kennedy: Lem? Hello.
Unidentified: There you are.
President Kennedy: Lem?
LeMoyne Billings: Hello.
President Kennedy: Where are you?
Billings: Oh. Hi. I’m a . . . I’ve missed my damn plane, so I’m going to
have to shoot up to Boston and back to Providence.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see. Well, I’m still . . . doesn’t look like I
may be able to go there.
Billings: Oh, go at all?
Billings: Oh, I better not go until . . . until you know.
President Kennedy: OK. You’re in a . . . Just leave your message
where we can—
Billings: I’m at LaGuardia now. When do you think you’d know? Or
you don’t know?
58. Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and his Times, p. 13.

59. Dictabelt 4B1, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
President Kennedy: Well, it looks like it will be sometime . . . Why

don’t you go back into New York?
Billings: All right.
President Kennedy: And then I will be in touch with you.
Billings: OK. Good.
President Kennedy: Because I . . . because you can always come up
later.
Billings: OK. As I said, I guess it’s not going too well, huh?
President Kennedy: Where?
Billings: For you, because of the Mississippi deal.
Billings: OK. I’ll see you later.
President Kennedy: OK. Bye.
2:50 P.M.
Well . . . as I understand it, Governor, you would do every-

thing you can to maintain law and order.

The President and the Attorney General speak to Governor Barnett,
making clear that their primary objective is to maintain order and that
they expect the governor to work to that end. Barnett hopes his friend,
Tom Watkins, will be able to help hammer out a solution to the prob-
lem caused by Meredith’s determination to register. The Attorney
General tells Barnett that his conversations with Watkins (they had
spoken twice that day) have been unhelpful, noting Watkins’s sugges-
tion that Meredith register secretly at Jackson on Monday, instead of
at the Oxford campus. As Barnett had actually initiated the plan
through Watkins, he finds it attractive, noting an earlier ruling had
ordered it. In addition, the plan would permit him to demonstrate his
unyielding opposition to desegregation (he almost certainly planned a
60. President Kennedy and Governor Barnett were later joined by Robert Kennedy. Dictabelt
4C, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
public stand to prevent Meredith’s registration), and also because he

could claim the federal government had decided by stealth to enroll
Meredith anyway.

Ross Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: Governor.
Barnett: Mr. President. Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: Oh, will you talk to Mr. Watkins? The Attorney
General did.
Barnett: No, I haven’t talked with him now in a couple of hours . . .
President Kennedy: Oh. Well, now . . .
Barnett: . . . I talked with him though about two hours ago, Mr.
President, and he said he was going to talk with the Attorney General
and go see him tomorrow morning.
President Kennedy: Oh. Well, in the meanwhile, then, the Attorney
General talked to Mr. Watkins to see whether there was some . . . Wait
just a second. The Attorney General’s right here. He’ll tell you what he
talked to Watkins and Watkins was going to talk to you. Wait a minute.
Barnett: All right. All right.
President Kennedy: He’ll come right on the other phone.
Barnett: Yeah, sure.
President Kennedy: Wait just a [unclear].
Barnett: All right. All right.
Robert Kennedy: Hello?
Barnett: Yes, sir, General. How are you?
Robert Kennedy: Fine, Governor. How are you?
Barnett: Fine, fine.
Robert Kennedy: I talked to Mr. Watkins, you know, earlier this
morning.
Barnett: Oh, yes?
Robert Kennedy: And he really did not have much of a suggestion.
He had mentioned yesterday the possibility of our coming in tomorrow
Monday with marshals, and . . .
Barnett: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: . . . that under our understanding for Thursday
that the marshals would show up and that you and the others would
step aside and Mr. Meredith would come into the university. Well, he
felt that when he mentioned he talked to me today, he said that he
thought that would create some problems, which they could not over-
come. And he suggested at that time, some alternatives which were not
very satisfactory.
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: And then he mentioned the fact that he might come
up early tomorrow morning.
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: I called him back after I heard the President’s con-
versation with you . . .
Barnett: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: . . . and said that I thought I’d be glad to see him,
but I thought that unless we had some real basis for some understanding
and working out this very very difficult problem that really he was wast-
ing his time; and that one of the basic requirements, in my judgment,
was the maintenance of law and order, and that would require some very
strong and vocal action by you, yourself. . . .
Barnett: Well, I’m certainly going to try to maintain law and order,
Mr . . .
Barnett: . . . General, just the very best way that I can.
Robert Kennedy: But in the . . .
Barnett: I, I talked with the student body the other day and told
them to really, to have control of the physical and mental faculties. But it
didn’t do much good it seemed like.
Robert Kennedy: Well . . .
Barnett: They cheered and carried on, but then they just started rav-
ing and carrying on, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I think, Governor, that if we . . . as a very
minimum and as a start, an order by you and the state that people could
not congregate in Oxford now in groups of three or five, larger than
groups of three or five; the second, to get the school authorities to issue
instructions to the students that if they congregate in groups that they
are liable for expulsion. If that was done this afternoon, I think that
would be a big step forward. And that anybody carrying an arm or a,
arms or a club, or anything like that would be liable to punishment.
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: Those kind of steps by you . . .
Barnett: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: . . . would indicate an interest in maintaining law
and order.
Barnett: Well, General, I certainly, I’ll tell the chancellor to
announce to all the students to keep law and order and to keep cool
heads. But the trouble is not only the students, but it’s so many thou-
sands of outsiders will be there.
Robert Kennedy: Yes, but I think, if you said, Governor, not just to . . .
Barnett: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: . . . keep cool heads, but that they couldn’t congregate.
Barnett: How many do you figure on sending down?
Robert Kennedy: Well, that’s a . . . I think that the President had
some questions for you that he thought that maybe if we could get some
answers to them that . . .
Barnett: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: . . . that would be what [it would] depend [on].
[speaking to President Kennedy in the room] Mr. President . . .
Barnett: Mr. General, why don’t you . . . I believe that if you and Tom
Watkins could get together it would help a lot. He’s a very reasonable
man, and, and he’s, he knows, he knows the situation down here as well
as anybody living. If you all could get together tomorrow morning, I
really think that it would pay. I think it would help.
Robert Kennedy: Well, he doesn’t have any suggestions, he just told
me, Mr. Governor.
Barnett: Yes. Well, I . . .
Robert Kennedy: So I don’t know what . . .
Barnett: . . . I thought he did have.
Robert Kennedy: Well, he didn’t. I mean he said something about
sending Meredith, sneaking him into Jackson and getting him registered
while all of you were up at . . .
Barnett: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: . . . at Oxford. But that doesn’t make much sense,
does it?
Barnett: Well, I don’t know. Why? Why doesn’t it? That’s where
they’d ordered him to go at first, you know.
Barnett: You see, there’s an order on the minutes, Mr. General, for
him to register . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well, would you . . .
Barnett: . . . [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: . . . you’d get . . . As I understand it, you’d get
everybody up at Oxford, and then we’d, and then . . .
Barnett: Oh, well, that’s exactly what Tom Watkins must have had in
mind, you know.
Barnett: Let me talk with Tom and call you back in a little while.
He’s not but a block from me. That’s what he had in mind, I think. And,
of course, you know how it is in Jackson. Monday they, no school’s going
on here, you know, and . . . Uh, of course nobody would be anticipating
anyone coming here, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Are you going up to Oxford on Monday? Is that
your plan?
Barnett: Well, that’s what I planned to do, yes, sir. The lieutenant gov-
ernor and I, both, I guess, we’ll have to be up there to try to keep order,
you know. And, we’re to be up there pretty early Monday morning.
Robert Kennedy: Will you?
Barnett: We’ll be up there, unless you ask us not to.
Barnett: Well, like, you see, we’ll be up there and that’s where all the
people will be. Yeah. I thought you and Watkins were going to talk
about that kind of a situation, then what’d be the best thing to do under
those conditions, you know.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, I think, Governor, that the President has
some, uh, questions that he wanted some answers to . . .
Barnett: Well . . .
Robert Kennedy: . . . make his own determination.
Barnett: . . . that’s right. He wanted to know if I would obey the
orders of the court, and I told him I, I’d have to do some . . . study that
over. That’s a serious thing. I’ve taken an oath to abide by the laws of
this state and our state constitution and the Constitution of the United
States. And, General, how can I violate my oath of office? How can I do
that and live with the people of Mississippi? You know, they’re expecting
me to keep my word. That’s what I’m up against, and I don’t understand
why the court, why the court wouldn’t understand that.
President Kennedy: Oh, Governor, this is the President speaking.
Barnett: Yes, sir, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Now it’s, I know that . . . your feeling about the
law of Mississippi and the fact that you don’t want to carry out that
court order. What we really want to have from you, though, is some
understanding about whether the state police will maintain law and
order. We understand your feeling about the court order . . .
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: . . . and your disagreement with it. But what
we’re concerned about is how much violence [there] is going to be and
what kind of action we’ll have to take to prevent it. And I’d like to get
assurances from you that the state police down there will take positive
action to maintain law and order.
Barnett: Oh, they’ll do that.

President Kennedy: Then we’ll know what we have to do.
Barnett: They’ll, they’ll take positive action, Mr. President, to main-
tain law and order as best we can.
President Kennedy: And now, how good is . . .
Barnett: We’ll have 220 highway patrolmen . . .
Barnett: . . . and they’ll absolutely be unarmed.
President Kennedy: I understa—
Barnett: Not a one of them’ll be armed.
President Kennedy: Well, no, but the problem is, well, what can they
do to maintain law and order and prevent the gathering of a mob and
action taken by the mob? What can they do? Can they stop that?
Barnett: Well, they’ll do their best to. They’ll do everything in their
power to stop it.
President Kennedy: Now, what about the suggestions made by the
Attorney General in regard to not permitting people to congregate and
start a mob?
Barnett: Well, we’ll do our best to, to keep them from congregating,
but that’s hard to do, you know.
President Kennedy: Well, they just tell them to move along.
Barnett: When they start moving up on the sidewalks and different
sides of the streets, what are you going to do about it?
President Kennedy: Well, now, as I understand it, Governor, you
would do everything you can to maintain law and order.
Barnett: I, I, I’ll do everything in my power to maintain order . . .
President Kennedy: Right. Now . . .
Barnett: . . . and peace. We don’t want any shooting down here.
President Kennedy: I understand. Now, Governor, what about, can
you maintain this order?
Barnett: Well, I don’t know.
Barnett: That’s what I’m worried about, you see. I don’t know
whether I can or not.
Barnett: I couldn’t have the other afternoon.61
61. Barnett is undoubtedly referring to 27 September, when some 2,000 people, including stu-
dents, farmers, and self-styled vigilantes, converged on Oxford from all over Mississippi,
intent on stopping Meredith from registering. A worried Barnett telephoned the Attorney
President Kennedy: You couldn’t have?

Barnett: There was such a mob there, it would have been impossible.
Barnett: There were men in there with trucks and shotguns, and all
such as that. Not a lot of them, but some, we saw, and certain people
were just, they were just enraged.
President Kennedy: Well, now, will you talk . . .
Barnett: You just don’t understand the situation down here.
President Kennedy: Well, the only thing is I got my responsibility.
Barnett: I know you do.
President Kennedy: This is not my order; I just have to carry it out.
So I want to get together and try to do it with you in a way which is the
most satisfactory and causes the least chance of damage to people in
Mississippi. That’s my interest.
Barnett: That’s right. Would you be willing to wait awhile and let
the people cool off on the whole thing?
President Kennedy: Till how long?
Barnett: Couldn’t you make a statement to the effect, Mr. President,
Mr. General, that under the circumstances existing in Mississippi, that,
uh, there’ll be bloodshed; you want to protect the life of, of, of James
Meredith and all other people? And under the circumstances at this
time, it just wouldn’t be fair to him or others to try to register him at
this time.
President Kennedy: Well, then at what time would it be fair?
Barnett: Well, we, we could wait a, I don’t know.
Barnett: It might be in, uh, two or three weeks, it might cool off a little.
President Kennedy: Well, would you undertake to register him in
two weeks?
Barnett: Well, I, you know I can’t undertake to register him myself . . .
Barnett: . . . but you all might make some progress that way, you
know.
President Kennedy: [Laughs.] Yeah. Well, we’d be faced with, unless
we had your support . . .
Barnett: You see . . .
President Kennedy: . . . and assurance, we’d be . . .
General that day to report that he was uncertain if he could maintain order, claiming he could
not disperse the crowd.
Barnett: . . . I say I’m going to, I’m going to cooperate. I might not
know when you’re going to register him, you know.
President Kennedy: I see. Well, now, Governor, why don’t, do you
want to talk to Mr. Watkins?
Barnett: I might not know that, what your plans were, you see.
President Kennedy: Do you want to, do you want to talk to Mr.
Watkins then . . .
Barnett: I’ll be delighted to talk to him, we’ll call you back.
President Kennedy: OK, good.
Barnett: Call the General back.
President Kennedy: Yeah, call the General, and then I’ll be around.
Barnett: All right. I appreciate it so much . . .
President Kennedy: Thanks, Governor.
Barnett: . . . and I thank you for this call.
President Kennedy: Thank you, Governor.
Barnett: All right.
Barnett: Bye.
President Kennedy finally goes to the swimming pool. Burke Marshall

and the Attorney General returned to the Justice Department, where
they put finishing touches to two important telegrams, one to Louis
Oberdorfer and the Justice Department’s team in Oxford and the other
on behalf of the President to Governor Barnett. The Justice Department
ordered 300 deputy marshals to move to the campus at Oxford at 3:00
P.M., September 30, by helicopter.62 The plan was to lay the groundwork
so that Meredith could peacefully register at the Lyceum administration
building on Monday. The gist of the President’s wire was quite different.
The White House was prepared to accept the plan for Meredith’s sneak
registration at the university’s Jackson, Mississippi, campus on Monday
while the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor made their public
stand in Oxford.
A little after 7:12 P.M. on September 29, Barnett and the President
spoke again, their third conversation of the day.63 Beyond discussing the
62. Angie Novello to Evelyn Lincoln, 29 September 1962, with attachment, Robert F.
Kennedy, Personal Correspondence, Civil Rights, Mississippi, Box 11.
63. Due to a technical error with the recording system, this third conversation was not
recorded. An approximate time for this conversation comes from a memo written by Robert
Conversation with Torbert MacDonald 247
Monday plan for Meredith’s sneak registration, Barnett assured Kennedy

that the highway patrol would maintain law and order and guarantee
Meredith’s safety. The Kennedy administration, it seemed, had worked
out a deal. Robert Kennedy was with his brother in the White House at
the time of the call and then left for the night.
Although a political solution now seemed likely, Kennedy knew he
wouldn’t be going to Newport this weekend. He called an old friend,
Congressman Torbert MacDonald of Massachusetts, who he hoped
would substitute for him at a political event there.
7:36 P.M.
[Y]ou have to make a judgment about whether these trips are

worthwhile or those speeches are worthwhile.
Conversation with Torbert MacDonald64

Evelyn Lincoln: Hello?
Unidentified: I have Congressman MacDonald for the President, in
Malden. [Pause.]
President Kennedy: Hello. Hello?
Torbert MacDonald: Hello, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: How are you doing?
MacDonald: Oh, all right. How are you?
President Kennedy: Where are you? Up at York?
MacDonald: Oh, no. No, I’m in Malden, Jack.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see.
MacDonald: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Listen. Bill was down here this weekend. I didn’t
know whether you’d be able to come down.
Kennedy’s secretary Angela Novello in February 1963 (see Novello to Burke Marshall, 19
February 1963, Robert Kennedy, Mississippi File). At 7:12 Barnett called the Justice
Department to alert Robert Kennedy that he would be in his office for the next 10 to 15 min-
utes. Burke Marshall relayed this message to the Attorney General, who was with his brother
at the White House. Robert Kennedy responded that Barnett should be told that “he was out
of the office for a few minutes and to find out if this call was in answer to the wire sent by the
President.”
64. Dictabelt 4D2, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
MacDonald: Oh.
President Kennedy: And get Sam Atkinson.
MacDonald: Well, not until the first of the week.
President Kennedy: Oh, you can’t?
MacDonald: No.
President Kennedy: You can’t get away there tomorrow?
MacDonald: No.
President Kennedy: Oh. OK.
MacDonald: How long is he going—
President Kennedy: Well, he’s got to go back to . . . work tomorrow
night, late. What do you got tomorrow?
MacDonald: Well, you know, it’s been a full week.
President Kennedy: I know. Oh, I know you’ve had . . . I agree with that.
MacDonald: And, uh—
President Kennedy: You have to speak tomorrow?
MacDonald: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Oh.
MacDonald: And . . . they’ve sent some stuff up for me that has been
postponed during the week, you know.
President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah.
MacDonald: And so . . . I’d love to . . . not until . . . What time is . . .
he going back?
President Kennedy: Well, he’d probably go back . . . I don’t know. You
know, in time to get there at class Monday morning. But I didn’t know
whether you could sort of arrange your schedule, because it seems to me
this is going to be one of those things that you wouldn’t want to miss.
MacDonald: I’d certainly . . . I’d certainly try to do it—
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t you check on it and then give
me a call in the morning?
MacDonald: All right. I will.
President Kennedy: Will you be home in the morning?
MacDonald: Yes.
President Kennedy: Well, I . . . My judgment would be . . . based on
long years of . . . Bill’s been down here today. I’ve just talked to him. And
my judgment would be that it . . . it’s worth the trip.
MacDonald: Well, it’s worth the trip if I can do the trip.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but, well, you have to make a judgment
about whether these trips are worthwhile or those speeches are worth-
while.
MacDonald: Well, it’s—
President Kennedy: [laughing] OK.
Conversation with Torbert MacDonald 249
MacDonald: It isn’t just that, Mr. President.

President Kennedy: I understand. Oh, I understand. But I just
wanted to be sure that you knew about it.
MacDonald: The spirit is willing—
MacDonald: —and of course—
President Kennedy: Yeah, I know.
MacDonald: I think this will be nice.
President Kennedy: OK. Well, in any case—
MacDonald: You really want me to call you tomorrow?
President Kennedy: Well, no. But I think it would be worth doing.
MacDonald: Well, how about in the afternoon or night tomorrow?
President Kennedy: Yeah. Can you come down tomorrow?
MacDonald: Well, late afternoon, maybe. Yes.
President Kennedy: You mean when you get finished?
MacDonald: Well, I figure that I could get out of here by about four,
five o’clock in the afternoon—
President Kennedy: Yeah. That’s fine. Good.
MacDonald: All right.
President Kennedy: OK. I’ll call you. I’ll give you a call in the morn-
ing. You can get a hold of [unclear] Atkinson.
MacDonald: All right.
President Kennedy: OK. Bye now.
The President went to the Mansion and had some ice cream sent up. He
was settling into his evening’s activities when his brother called with bad
news. The deal with Barnett was off. For the next two hours, he was on the
telephone with Robert Kennedy and deputy press secretary, Andrew
Hatcher. At one point the President even roused Theodore Sorensen from
his hospital bed to draft a speech he could use if he decided to call in troops.
Ultimately, the President decided to federalize the National Guard, an
eventuality already under consideration. At 11:50 P.M., he sent word to the
Secret Service that he wanted to be notified when the Justice Department
had sent over the proclamation, which he intended to sign that night. At
11:58 P.M., Kennedy sat down with Norbert Schlei, head of the Office of
Legal Counsel, in the Oval Room of the family quarters and signed
Proclamation 3497, which ordered those who were obstructing justice in
Mississippi “to cease and desist therefrom and to retire peaceably forth-
with.” He then signed an executive order placing the Mississippi National
Guard units under federal control. Kennedy inquired whether these docu-
250 S U N DAY, S E P T E M B E R 30– M O N DAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962
ments were the same as those Eisenhower had signed in 1957 in the Little
Rock case. Schlei said they were, noting the wording had been improved.
As Schlei prepared to leave, Kennedy tapped the table, pointing out that it
had belonged to General Ulysses S. Grant. Not wanting to antagonize the
South, Kennedy advised Schlei not to mention Grant’s table to the press.
The South was already agitated. As Kennedy directed the drawing up
of the proclamation, Governor Barnett attended an Ole Miss football
game at Jackson Memorial Stadium, where 46,000 fans cheered not only
for their beloved university against the Kentucky Wildcats but also for
their Governor. It was then that Barnett, responding to the chant of “We
want Ross,” strode onto the floodlit field, stepped to the microphone, and
declared, “I love Mississippi. I love her people. I love our customs.”
Just after midnight, President Kennedy went to sleep. The crisis he
had predicted that fall was starting, but it was starting in Oxford,
Mississippi, not West Berlin.
Sunday, September 30–Monday, October 1, 1962
After attending mass at St. Stephen’s Church, the President hosted a lunch
for the British foreign secretary, Lord Home, at the White House. The
Anglo-American agenda was full. But Berlin, the Congo, and Cuba domi-
nated the conversation. The discussion continued for a while after lunch.
For the moment, Mississippi was the most dangerous place in the
world for the federal government. After the British delegation left,
Kennedy turned his principal attention to the problem of safely register-
ing an African American, James Meredith, at the all-white University of
Mississippi in Oxford. Governor Barnett had come up with a new plan for
ending this stalemate peacefully. He proposed that Meredith be brought to
the campus surrounded by a large group of federal agents. Barnett was
looking for a dramatic way to save face. The defenders of a white Ole Miss
would attempt to stare down Meredith but would then retreat in the face
of a much larger force. The Attorney General, to whom the Governor had
suggested the “show of force” scheme, turned it down. Robert Kennedy
then threatened Barnett with making public that the Governor had been
negotiating with the Kennedy brothers behind the backs of the segrega-
tionists. The Attorney General’s threat resulted in a new Barnett scheme.
He suggested that the federal government sneak Meredith onto the cam-
pus that afternoon. Barnett would then announce in a speech that he had
Meeting on Civil Rights 251
been tricked and Meredith was on campus. The President and Robert
Kennedy preferred this plan. At 6:00 P.M., James Meredith flew into
Oxford accompanied by some Justice Department officials. Before his
arrival, a force of 300 U.S. marshals had assembled around the Lyceum,
the main administration building on campus. The deputy attorney gen-
eral, Nicholas Katzenbach, who was in charge of operations on the cam-
pus, had expected that Meredith would be able to register that day. But
this was impossible. So, as Governor Barnett issued a press release that
Meredith was on campus, U.S. marshals remained posted around the
Lyceum, while some distance away, in the dormitory Baxter Hall,
Meredith was under federal protective guard for the night. The goal was
to keep him safe so that he could register the next morning.
At 10:00 P.M., the President spoke to the nation. He had delayed his
speech two hours to await word that Meredith was safely on campus.
From that moment on, the unexpected displaced the expected.
Approximately 10:40 P.M.–1:00 A.M.
I haven’t had such an interesting time since the Bay of Pigs.
Meeting on Civil Rights1

“Let us preserve both the law and the peace, and then, healing those
wounds that are within we can turn to the greater crises that are with-
out and stand united as one people in our pledge to man’s freedom.”
With those words, President Kennedy ended his televised address to the
nation on the situation in Mississippi. The speech was intended to signal
a victory in James Meredith’s struggle to be the first African American
to register at the University of Mississippi. Yet words less relevant to a
crisis have seldom been spoken by a U.S. president.
As the President began his speech at 10:00 P.M., Eastern Standard
Time, the situation was already unraveling in Oxford, Mississippi.
James Meredith had arrived on campus with a large escort of U.S. mar-
shals two hours earlier. According to an arrangement fixed earlier in
1. Including President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Burke Marshall, Lawrence O’Brien, Kenneth
O’Donnell, and Theodore Sorensen. Tapes 26 and 26A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s
the day, Kennedy called Mississippi governor Ross Barnett, who was
expected to announce ruefully that the state of Mississippi had been
“physically overpowered” and Meredith was on campus. Kennedy was
then supposed to give a conciliatory speech that stressed the victory of
the rule of law.
The rule of law was not winning where it counted this night, on the
streets of Oxford. In the interval between the Governor’s concession
speech and Kennedy’s address, all hell broke out at the university. A
crowd of 2,500 surged toward the Lyceum, the university’s central
administrative center. With 300 federalized U.S. marshals and hand-
picked border patrol officers now on campus and ringing the Lyceum,
the Governor’s representatives on campus decided to withdraw the
Mississippi highway patrol officers who had given a semblance of calm
to the campus in the tense days since the appeals court had ordered
Barnett to admit Meredith. Sensing a shift in the balance of power, the
crowd surged forward, and in self-defense the federal marshals launched
a volley of tear gas canisters. “I would like to take this occasion to
express the thanks of this nation to those southerners who have con-
tributed to the progress of our democratic development. . . . ” A cloud of
tear gas was rising from the campus and Kennedy gave this discordant
speech. Aides had tried to stop him as news of the growing riot reached
the White House. But the telecast had begun.
In the half-hour following the speech, the news from Mississippi has
gotten progressively worse. A jerry-built communications set-up relayed
information from the campus to the White House. A series of walkie-
talkies carried by the marshals and Justice Department aides in and
around the Lyceum kept Nicholas Katzenbach, Attorney General Robert
Kennedy’s field commander, informed. Using a pay telephone in the base-
ment of the building, Katzenbach or the Attorney General’s press secre-
tary, Ed Guthman, conveyed this information to Robert Kennedy or his
assistant Burke Marshall in the White House. Meanwhile down the mall
at the Justice Department another Kennedy aide, Ramsey Clark, the assis-
tant attorney general, maintained a direct line to the Justice Department’s
makeshift Oxford headquarters, which was in a post office building a few
minutes from campus. Periodically, Clark called the Attorney General at
the White House with updates.
President Kennedy started taping as the impromptu domestic crisis
team was absorbing news that the mob had turned violent. Burke Marshall
was handling the telephone in the Cabinet Room for the Attorney General,
with the President a worried observer.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Now don’t you have to . . . Do you
have some other men? Yeah. Did you get all the marshals there now?2
President Kennedy: State police or . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] How many you’ve got? And they’re
all there? Yeah. How are the state police? Is the crowd getting bigger?
Unidentified: [talking to Robert Kennedy in the room] [Unclear] wants
you?
Robert Kennedy: That’s fine.
[on the phone] OK, well I’ll get back. I’ll let you know.
[off the phone] Well, I think that—
Robert Kennedy: They think they have it in pretty good shape. [Puts
down the receiver.]
Robert Kennedy: Did one marshal get his arm broken?
President Kennedy: His arm broken?
Robert Kennedy: The lousy, I mean, there you are appointed, some
politician gets you appointed deputy marshal and you’re sitting in the
courtroom . . . [telephone rings] moving . . . close to the judge . . . and
suddenly . . .
Burke Marshall: [on the phone] Hello. Yes, he is.
President Kennedy: His arm broken, what, by a bottle?
Unidentified: No, but he said they’re throwing [unclear]. It’s Ed.
President Kennedy: Who?
Unidentified: Ed.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, Ed.3 Well, how’s it look to you?
Kenneth O’Donnell: Yeah, there might not be quite as much rush for
those bumps they’re handing out right after . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is it under control? Would you bring
the guard in?4
Theodore Sorensen: Yeah, but tomorrow’s going to be worse than
today.
Marshall: Yeah, I was . . . even tonight.
2. The civilian contingent of U.S. marshals, border police, and federalized prison guards arrived
in stages between 7:00 and 9:00 P.M. Washington time (5:00 and 7:00 P.M. Mississippi time).
3. Probably Edwin Guthman, director of public information, Department of Justice.
4. Earlier in the day President Kennedy federalized the Mississippi National Guard. There
were units in Oxford and Jackson, Mississippi, that could be deployed if necessary.
Marshall: . . . where the [unclear] keep up with him tonight.

President Kennedy: Yeah. You can’t help but get at it.
O’Donnell: That was the last [unclear] from the outside of the cam-
pus [unclear].
Sorensen: Most people like to—
Sorensen: Most people like [unclear] and then [unclear].
Lawrence O’Brien: I wish they were. Got to keep them in line though.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Are they mad at the marshals?
O’Brien: . . . otherwise [unclear].
Sorensen: As I say [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Evidently they just . . .
President Kennedy: [Unclear] from Alabama, who’s come to think a
lot of them are [unclear].
Unidentified: Get the judge to say that [unclear].
Unidentified: I [unclear] . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] OK, well, I’m going to see if I can
get these troops started anyway.5 We can see. Well, I think if they, I
think it’s better that we can control the situation. I don’t think it’s worth
screwing around. The weekend.6
President Kennedy: It’s going to be a long fall in Oxford, I think.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I’ll see if I can’t get them going any-
way. OK.
While Robert Kennedy is speaking on the telephone, in the background an
unidentified man says, “Kermit’s having trouble with his homework.”
Unidentified: What’s the story now?
Robert Kennedy: Well, he thinks the situation’s under control now,
but you know—
President Kennedy: —I think we ought to get the guard within, you
know, shouting distance outside of town. I think it’s probably [unclear].
Unidentified: Blocked off those roads?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. There’s enough people coming in from . . .
They got the . . .
5. The crisis has entered a new phase. It is about 10:45 P.M. in Washington, two hours earlier in
Mississippi, and the Kennedy administration is preparing to deploy the U.S. Army in Oxford.
6. Task Force Alpha is waiting for orders in Memphis. Organized in the last 24 hours, it
includes the 503rd Military Police Battalion, the 31st Light Helicopter Company, the 138th
Truck Company, a medical detachment, and two tear gas experts. The Attorney General is
pressing the introduction of these troops on his men in Oxford.
Unidentified: That’s [unclear].

Robert Kennedy: Well, [unclear] they got the people on the roads,
just to keep them informed about it.
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello?
Robert Kennedy: Then we get all around the city so as to [unclear].
Marshall: [on the phone] This is Burke Marshall.
Robert Kennedy: . . . came in and get control of . . . and then we have
control over the air. But if you have gas, you’ve got a pretty good opera-
tion going. They got 500 marshals . . .7 [Laughter in the background.]
Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: You see, they’re sitting there and they’re throwing
iron . . .
President Kennedy: Spikes?
Robert Kennedy: . . . spikes, and they’re throwing Coke bottles, and
they’re throwing rocks.
Unidentified: I gather they’re [unclear]—
Robert Kennedy: Well, you tell that guy that just came out of
Cleveland from . . . just appointed by . . .
Marshall: [on the phone] Dean?8
Robert Kennedy: Miller.
Marshall: [on the phone] I know that [unclear].
President Kennedy: But Bobby [unclear]’s a bookie from [unclear]—
Sorensen: [Unclear.]
O’Brien: That isn’t the way the American people envision marshals
[unclear].
Marshall: [talking to people in the room] Is it Johnny Vaught?9
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, the coach. What’s the good coach’s name?
Unidentified: Johnny Vaught.
Robert Kennedy: Let’s see if we can get him.
Unidentified: He won’t believe it.
Robert Kennedy: He might . . .
President Kennedy: What’s Barnett doing?
Marshall: [on the phone] . . . TCU or . . .
7. Apparently there were only 300. See Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America in the King
Years, 1954–63 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), pp. 662–63.
8. Dean P. Markham.
9. John H. Vaught was a University of Mississippi coach.

Marshall: Did he come from Tennessee? TCU, wasn’t it?
President Kennedy: Texas Christian University then.
Robert Kennedy: Where he came from originally?
Unidentified: Yeah.
President Kennedy: I think he was out of Texas. Yeah.
Unidentified: He was.
Marshall: [on the phone] Dean [Markham]?
President Kennedy: What are we waiting for . . . Cy Vance to tell us
how long it will take?
The U.S. Army had forces on standby in Memphis, Tennessee, to calm
the situation in Oxford, Mississippi, and there was supposed to be a local
Mississippi National Guard unit available for reinforcing the federal
marshals on campus.
Marshall: [on the phone] Do you think you could find him and talk to
him?
President Kennedy: Why don’t we just tell him to get on and tell
him to take them out [unclear].
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah. Vaught saw the [unclear].
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah.
President Kennedy: Let’s see this article.
Marshall: [on the phone] See if he talks to the kids, yeah.
President Kennedy: [reading] “Ross Barnett, Jr., son of the Mississippi
governor [unclear].”10
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, did Vaught talk to them tonight?
President Kennedy: [reading] “[Unclear] National Guard Patrol
[unclear].”
[Laughter.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Why don’t you do it, and then if you think it
would do any good to have some.
Unidentified: Did he get called up?
Robert Kennedy: Do we have any other phone system other than
that, this we’re using here?
Marshall: No.
Unidentified: We don’t have anything else?
President Kennedy: You want to get [unclear] and Secretary on it.
10. Ironically, the Governor’s son was called up with his Mississippi National Guard unit to
fight against his father’s segregationism.
Marshall: All right.

Unidentified: Do you want in or out?
Marshall: [on the phone] All right. [Pause.]
Marshall: [to people in the room] He said he wants to keep all the foot-
ball squad out of it if there were any demonstrations.
O’Brien: That would have been a hell of a squad. [Unclear] a couple
of hundred [unclear].
Unidentified: They want [unclear].
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: This reminds me a little bit of the Bay of Pigs.11
Unidentified: Yech! [Laughter.]
O’Brien: [Unclear], I will say that . . .
Sorensen: Well, especially when Bobby said we’d provide air cover.12
[Laughter.]
O’Brien: Yeah [unclear] they know [unclear].
Sorensen: We could control the air . . .
Unidentified: Except on one of the [unclear]. [Laughter.]
O’Brien: Ed described [unclear].
O’Donnell: What do you think [of] the response to Jim McShane’s
men without the President protecting them?13 As you say, they [unclear].
O’Donnell: What about Jim? [Laughter.]
Unidentified: One of the two places.
Sorensen: My guess is, Bobby, that we’ll have the control of outsiders
down pretty good.14 You may be able to introduce—
Marshall: —Well, we don’t have . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well, the only thing is to keep . . .
Marshall: . . . control of outsiders, I don’t think [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, we haven’t had any trouble from outsiders
11. In April 1961, the United States backed an invasion force composed of Cuban exiles that
sought to overthrow the Castro regime in Cuba. The invasion, marred by a series of errors in
planning and execution, failed miserably, much to the chagrin of the new administration.
12. The reference here is to the U.S. decision not to provide air cover to support the invasion
force during the Bay of Pigs landing. Some claimed the administration’s failure to do so
doomed the operation.
13. James McShane was chief of the federal marshals.
14. Outsiders was the codeword for Ku Klux Klansmen, John Birchers, and other extremists
who had been threatening to descend on Oxford from across the Deep South to keep Ole Miss
white.
yet. I suppose you’ll always have the difficulty of people storming onto
the campus. They have a lot of gates. It’s a hell of a big campus, you
know. So you have a few marshals and a few people at each gate, and I
suppose you can stick a car in [unclear] . . .
Marshall: [on the phone]15 Hello [unclear]. Yeah. All right.
Robert Kennedy: . . . we can always storm in there at eight tomorrow
morning or ten tomorrow morning. The problem is, you see, when you
don’t have anybody there that’s really interested in maintaining law and
order, and where their primary interest is to get us to bring troops in.16
You can imagine what would have happened if we’d gone through with
what he wanted to do tomorrow morning.
Marshall: [on the phone] It’s now against them.
Sorensen: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Walk in there and try to get through and he’s there
with all his . . . That’s what his plan was. That he’d be there with his
state police and sheriffs, and then assistant sheriffs and then volunteers
behind him, four lanes. And then we were to push our way through.
Unidentified: His agreement was they wouldn’t fire.
Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear] the state troopers.
Unidentified: . . . tend to resist them anyhow.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. With nobody else knowing the plot but him
and me.
Evelyn Lincoln: Peter Lawford is on the phone.17
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, he called on the students to act as
responsible citizens.
President Kennedy: That’s slightly ironic. I wish we’d taken that part
out.
Marshall: [on the phone with Joseph Dolan] Yeah. All right, Joe.
[to the people in the room] He says that the state police are against us.
President Kennedy: Who does?
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello. Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Of course, filled with all this poison.
Unidentified: This way we’ll now [unclear].
15. Marshall is monitoring a continuously open phone line to Justice Department officials in
Mississippi.
16. Robert Kennedy is referring to his failed negotiations with Ross Barnett. The Mississippi
Governor’s primary concern seemed to be to maneuver the Kennedy White House so that it would
overplay its hand in Oxford and make political martyrs out of the Governor and his defenders.
17. According to a White House telephone memorandum, Peter Lawford called the President
at 10:50 P.M. (Evelyn Lincoln Collection, Box 5, John F. Kennedy Library).
Unidentified: Feel a [unclear].

Marshall: [on the phone] Well, he could probably do that [unclear].
Unidentified: Jack [unclear] here in the Cabinet Room, would there
be [unclear].
Marshall: [on the phone] He may be trying to avoid that.
Robert Kennedy: And he just got word they ran him . . . [Laughter.]
Unidentified: And you said [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.] [Laughter.]
Unidentified: They court-martialed every last one of them.
Marshall: [to the people in the room] Dean [Markham] tried to call
the coach and his wife says he’s out.
Unidentified: You should have thought of that quote during the elec-
tion. I would . . .
Unidentified: That’s how I get the coach.
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] Why don’t I try [unclear]?
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, Bob will try to call him. Dean?
Robert Kennedy: Get the number.
Marshall: [on the phone] Dean? Oh, Dean. Dean? Listen, why don’t
we get Bob to try to call him from here? Well, he may . . . His wife may
be lying to you.
Sorensen: What do you think the chances are that Barnett is being
honest with you and he’s not . . .
Marshall: [on the phone] All right. Well, we’ll see what happens.
Sorensen: [unclear] . . . the state police? He’s just . . .
Robert Kennedy: I don’t think he would.
Marshall: [on the phone] All right.
Robert Kennedy: I don’t think he’s telling them to lay off, but I don’t
think they’re enjoying this. You know, it’s one thing to get in for the
wrong reason and not have a problem, and they see we’re having prob-
lems and then, might have a sense of greater problems.
Sorensen: He said he didn’t want to get anyone killed, though, or
does he mind that?18
Marshall: [on the phone] Sounds like it’s out of the country.
Robert Kennedy: The only thing, like he said the other day to me, if fifty
people get killed down here, it might be embarrassing for the two of us.19
[Laughter.] It might hurt us, and then he went on to say that [unclear].
18. Referring to Ross Barnett.

19. Again referring to Ross Barnett.
Marshall: [Unclear] two, three, four.

Lincoln: Secretary Vance.
Marshall: [on the phone] See, now, we’ll give that a try.
It appears that Robert Kennedy goes to speak with the secretary of the
Army, Cyrus Vance, who briefs him on the readiness of the forces in
Memphis to intervene.
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, no, I’ll stay here.
Unidentified: Bobby’s had [unclear].
Unidentified: Huh?
Unidentified: Bobby’s had a tough one.
Unidentified: Really a battle plan.
Unidentified: The Teamsters in Mississippi.
Unidentified: [Unclear].
Unidentified: They’re just fighting the law.
Unintelligible side conversation while Marshall listens on the telephone.
Marshall: [on the phone] No, you mean our marshal?
Unidentified: [in a side conversation] You’re just saying [unclear].
Marshall: [on the phone] Gee whiz. Well, can’t we get them some
food?
Unidentified: Hear that?
Robert Kennedy: So they go to the armory in Oxford. And there’ll be
someone there within an hour.20
Marshall: [on the phone] I know, but I mean, can’t we get . . .
Robert Kennedy: . . . company.
President Kennedy: They’ll be at . . .
Robert Kennedy: And they’ll be . . .
President Kennedy: . . . they’ll be at the armory in Oxford?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. Well, in four hours they’ll have about 800,
900.
President Kennedy: In Oxford? But that’s not in the, that’s not at . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well, that’s the armory there, so they’re not at the
university.
Robert Kennedy: I think that’s the . . .
20. The Attorney General had been given inaccurate information. The first contingent of U.S.
troops would not reach the airport at Oxford for another four hours.
President Kennedy: That’s the best. I think that’s fine. The problem
is really the time lapse, isn’t it?
Robert Kennedy: Well, I think that it’s in the . . . They’re going to be . . .
I mean, if you can tell, from what they say, they’re going to be all right for
an hour.
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, I know, but I . . .
President Kennedy: Then what happens after that?
Robert Kennedy: Well, then you could . . . We have [a] company of . . .
President Kennedy: Oh, you’re, so they’re flying them in?
Robert Kennedy: . . . couple of hundred. No, we’ll have a couple of . . .
They’ll be a couple of hundred there within an hour.
The President is relying on the Attorney General for information about
the troop movements. The order went out to Memphis at 11 P.M. to load
the first contingent of 200 men aboard helicopters for the one-hour
flight to Oxford. The White House assumes that the military operation
is already in progress. In fact, it hasn’t even started.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see. The others . . .
Robert Kennedy: And there’ll be eight within four hours if he needs
them.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see.
Unidentified: [Unclear] said there’d be 200 within . . .
President Kennedy: Where will they go?
Robert Kennedy: They’d all go into the armory.
Robert Kennedy: And they’re all Mississippians.
Unidentified: They’re dying in there.
Robert Kennedy: And they got gas masks.
Marshall: [may be on the phone] How long are they going out to . . .
Unidentified: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: And the General’s getting in touch with Nick, and
he can use them any time he wants.21 I’ll tell Nick or you can.
President Kennedy: So there’ll be 200 there within an hour? [Unclear
exchange.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Oh, Dean? Can we get Nick?
Robert Kennedy: He did a hell of a job on the narcotics thing.
21. Nick was Nicholas Katzenbach, the deputy attorney general.

President Kennedy: Was it a success? The conference?22

Robert Kennedy: Certainly. It really was.
President Kennedy: Background.
Marshall: How long will it take?
Robert Kennedy: They’ll have a company there within an hour.
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: And 800 within four hours.
Marshall: Oh, I see, a company. [Unclear] uniforms [unclear] Missis-
sippians.
Robert Kennedy: Well, I think that what we at least show that the
marshals couldn’t do it by themselves, so.
President Kennedy: Are we showing him or are they showing us?
[Laughter.]
Unidentified: Don’t you think that this . . . [Unclear exchange involv-
ing the President.]
Marshall: [talking on the phone] Hello, Nick?
Unidentified: [Unclear] southerners on [unclear].
Marshall: [talking on the phone] Just a minute, Bob wants to tell you
about these, and . . .
President Kennedy: [Unclear] news at eleven.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello, Nick? Well, there’ll be a com-
pany there at the armory within an hour. And there’ll be 800 there, as I
understand it, within four hours.23 Now, General Billingslea is going to
get in touch with you.24 Blakerslee or whatever the hell he’s named.
Marshall: Billingslea.
Robert Kennedy: So, how does that sound?
President Kennedy: Need any more marshals or some equipment?
Are the marshals holding up for some tear gas?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is the gas coming in there?
Unidentified: Now, what is next?
Marshall: They gassed some of our own marshals.
22. The White House Conference on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, organized by Dean
Markham, was held 27–28 September 1962.
23. This is Task Force Alpha, a 687-man team stationed at Millington Naval Air Station in
Memphis. The advance group of 170 was supposed to have left by helicopter already. The rest
was to travel by Interstate 55 to reach Oxford in the early morning. At this point, no troops
from the Task Force had yet left Millington.
24. Brigadier General Charles Billingslea was commander of the 82nd Infantry Division, Fort
Benning, Georgia.
President Kennedy: Did they?

Marshall: Dean says it’s bad for their morale.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] [Unclear.]
Unidentified: What?
Unidentified: Which isn’t too high, anyway.
Marshall: Well, they’re doing a good job.
O’Brien: You’re not kidding.
Marshall: They haven’t had anything to eat.
Unidentified: They’ll manage it.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I don’t mind that.
Unidentified: It’s [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] And they should be home watching
the President on television.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Listen, Nick. You got enough gas
there now? OK, you’re in pretty good shape now, though?
Marshall: [whispering] We’ll make these decisions tomorrow.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, is anybody trying to get . . .
With Robert Kennedy on the telephone and another conversation going
on simultaneously in the Cabinet Room, the recording becomes very dif-
ficult to understand. The President is apparently distracted by word that
James Reston has just filed a story for the New York Times alleging
that Nikita Khrushchev was inviting Kennedy to a summit meeting.
Unidentified: What is Reston [unclear] knock it down anyway.
[Unclear] ought to knock it down.
Unidentified: Do you have an explanation for [unclear]?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is that enough time for you?
President Kennedy: . . . see now I can get [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Did anybody else get any [unclear]?
Unidentified: When we visit Vienna, you . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah.
Unidentified: . . . the chairman extended an invitation to you and
Mrs. Kennedy.25 Basically it’s a standing invitation.
President Kennedy: Yeah. That’s right.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, should we try to find out if
they . . .
25. Nikita Khrushchev, the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union, also held the title of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
Unidentified: [Unclear] the American embassies. I hope your presi-

dent comes over.
Unidentified: [Unclear] for a long time.
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] That’s exactly it. That’s why Reston’s
words [unclear].26
Unidentified: [Unclear] do you see it? What did you say?
Robert Kennedy: Is there any other way we can get gas?
President Kennedy: At the appropriate time.
Unidentified: At the appropriate time. Well, see Reston’s hitting the
West Coast tomorrow and he wants a story. That’s his story.27
President Kennedy: We ought to knock it down tonight; that’s just
kicking that Reston right in the balls, isn’t it?
Unidentified: What’s that?
Unidentified: It is aimed at that.
Unclear speakers.
Unidentified: [Unclear] Udall.28
President Kennedy: That’s for Udall.
Unidentified: That’s right. Three columns. Head.
President Kennedy: Front page?
Unidentified: Front page.
President Kennedy: It’s just an inaccurate story.
Sorensen: Sure. Well, it’s an irresponsible story.
President Kennedy: I’m surprised Reston would do it. He said we got
an invitation?
Unidentified: Well, I haven’t seen the text.
President Kennedy: It depends how he words it. Our answer would be
that on many occasions, Mr. Khrushchev has said that he would be glad to
welcome—he’s told visitors—to welcome President and Mrs. Kennedy
when conditions would permit, but unfortunately because of the . . .
Sorensen: And Adzhubei told you that.29 And Dobrynin has said that.30
President Kennedy: He told you . . . yeah. I mean we’ve all on many
occasions have stated that we’d be glad to have President and Mrs.
26. James Reston was chief Washington correspondent for the New York Times.
27. In a front-page story that appeared in the New York Times on 1 October, James Reston
wrote that Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had sent a private invitation to Kennedy to visit
the Soviet Union. According to Reston, the message was delivered to Kennedy by Interior
Secretary Stewart Udall, who had recently returned from the Soviet Union.
28. Stewart L. Udall was secretary of the interior.
29. Aleksei I. Adzhubei was editor of Izvestia and Khrushchev’s son-in-law.
30. Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States.
Kennedy when the situation was such, but of course with the difficulty
we have in Berlin and other areas, it’s been generally agreed in both
Moscow and the United States that the situation would not have been
appropriate to [unclear]. That’s our position.
Unidentified: [Unclear] outcome.
President Kennedy: I don’t think we ought to at night knock down
Reston, ought we? Do you want to call him up? Or is that just going to
make him mad?
Sorensen: Well, you can’t . . . Don’t bother calling him up.
President Kennedy: But if he knocks it down?
Sorensen: He can’t. [Unclear.]
Sorensen: It’s probably too late anyway.
Sorensen: And his story is gone. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] I just think he’d be embarrassed about
that. This one.
Unidentified: Yeah, but I don’t think . . . Why don’t you just in your
morning briefing tomorrow give a routine answer? [Unclear voices.]
The President’s attention returns to the more immediate problem in
Oxford, Mississippi.
Marshall: I think that General Abrams and General Billingslea are
working on it. 31 Do you want to send those women down there?
Robert Kennedy: I guess I better not.
Marshall: What about the others? The lawyers?
President Kennedy: What women are these?
Marshall: Secretaries.
Robert Kennedy: Secretaries.
President Kennedy: Down to where, Oxford?
Marshall: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Oh, you mean Nick’s secretaries?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. Well, why don’t I put a hold on it and I’ll talk
to him later on tonight.
Marshall: Hold on [unclear].
President Kennedy: You don’t have any men secretaries?
Marshall: [Unclear] could probably find them. I would think [unclear].
31. Major General Creighton Abrams was assistant deputy Army chief of staff for military
operations.
President Kennedy: The FBI must have them.

Sorensen: At least one or two here in the correspondence section.
Marshall: They must have one.
The conversation becomes unclear and appears to be winding down.
Only a few fragments are understandable before there is a break in the
tape. When taping resumes, Robert Kennedy is on the telephone while an
indistinct conversation goes on beside him involving Evelyn Lincoln.
Robert Kennedy: [fades in] Yes [unclear].
Unidentified: Who’s writing these speeches?
Unidentified:[Unclear] the numbers you got.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yes, he did. Well, the Governor’s
announced it. The President’s announced it. Yeah. [Another phone rings.]
Unidentified: Yeah.
Lincoln: [Unclear] be back?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. What do they think of it?
Lincoln: [answering the second phone] Hello?
President Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen are having a separate con-
versation.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] says the debates didn’t do any good.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] No.
Sorensen: I just knew that’s a crock. I just can’t believe that. I know
that [unclear].
President Kennedy: I know it didn’t change Republican votes, but the
point is, my trouble was to keep the Democrats.
Sorensen: I know. [Evelyn Lincoln can be heard in the background.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Does it look under control? Yeah.
Where are you going to get the guards to? Well, we’ve got a couple of
hundred in the beginning and eight, seven or eight [unclear].
Sorensen: And then the undecided on this, well, that’s a major part,
the undecided. [Unclear] poll shows that you . . . the effect of a campaign
is to move the undecided into your camp.
Sorensen: . . . and that included the debates and the Houston speech.
I’m sure the call had a lot [unclear].32
Robert Kennedy: [continues on the phone] Do you? [Pause.] Well,
would you favor that I had troops coming in there? Yeah. Well, they’re
32. Sorensen is reminiscing about the key moments in the 1960 campaign. “The call” probably
refers to then Senator Kennedy’s telephone call to Coretta Scott King in October 1960 when
her husband, the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., was in a Georgia jail.
on their way. [Pause.] OK. No. [Pause.] Well, you can just stay there.
What about . . . Is Nick there? Well, I’d just like to find out what he’s
heard on getting that gas in there.
Marshall: Do you want to talk to Cy [Vance]? Cy would know.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. Well.
President Kennedy: Can we get, what’s his name? The Governor’s
man?33
Marshall: [starts speaking on the phone] Hello?
Robert Kennedy: He’s getting him.
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? Oh, listen, he went off and I’m on.
Unidentified: [in the background] What about gas?
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, are they on their way, do you know?
[A telephone rings.]
President Kennedy: [faintly in the background] Should I talk with the
General directly?34
Lincoln: Jim, did you want your girl to stay?
Unidentified: If she could do me one last favor, which is to bring me
a glass of milk
Marshall: [on the phone] All right. Where were they, at the airport?
Lincoln: A glass of milk? [Unintelligible exchange.]
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] from now?
Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear] well that’s something to . . .
Unidentified: Evelyn’s got some beers in the refrigerator.
Marshall: [on the phone] Well, they’re coming in. Well, have they
walked out on you? They don’t have any gas masks.
It appears that Sorensen and the President have reentered the room.
Sorensen: [Unclear] matter, did we like [unclear] the troops on the
ground?
President Kennedy: It seems to me [unclear].
Sorensen: Yeah.
President Kennedy: The governor has said the troops withdrew. The
marshals were . . . with nothing to do.
Sorensen: We’ll announce that. Yeah, but . . .
Marshall: [on the phone] The gas should be in there in a few minutes.35
Robert Kennedy: Is that Nick?
Marshall: [to Robert Kennedy] This is Ed.
33. Apparently a reference to Tom Watkins, the intermediary in the Barnett-Kennedy negotiations.
34. Up to now, the White House team has relied on Secretary Vance’s descriptions of the
movements of Task Force Alpha in Memphis.
35. The federal force protecting the Lyceum ran out of tear gas. Because the Mississippi
National Guard lacked their own supply, canisters of tear gas had to be flown in from Memphis.
President Kennedy: How do we get the gas in and out of there?

Robert Kennedy: [apparently speaking to someone else] I guess you can
come in.
Unidentified: I know, but one of us. [Chuckles.]
Marshall: [on the phone] They have?
Unidentified: Students [unclear] when they have a riot like this one,
do they?
President Kennedy: Well, that’s what I said. [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: You what?
President Kennedy: There weren’t any riots like this at Harvard just
because some guy yells . . . [Chuckling.]
Unidentified: What’s that?
Unidentified: That’s the only thing that [unclear].
Unidentified: Um huh.
Unidentified: Move [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [could be on phone] Well, you ought to leave it to
the [unclear].
Sorensen: [Unclear] have student riots like this and it is [unclear]
you ought to be prepared for the worst, but . . .
President Kennedy: That’s it. That’s what we’re preparing for.
[Laughter.]
Unidentified: Yeah, and evidently we got it.
President Kennedy: Where is Nick? Is he up in the attic or just . . .
[Laughter.]
Sorensen: He’s in the pillbox.
President Kennedy: He’s a candidate [unclear]. Get him out of there.
O’Donnell: Nick might see that this is a job that he was [unclear]
every year.
Unidentified: And almost died [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.]
O’Brien: You know, with the marshals, Bobby, at least they were out
booking numbers or something . . . [unclear] in Chicago.
Marshall: [possibly on the phone] No one saw it [down there].
[Laughter.]
Marshall: [on the phone] No, no. [Unclear.]
Soon the White House would face the problem of arranging a convoy to bring the gas from the
airport in Oxford to the campus.
Marshall: [possibly on the phone] No. [Unclear.]

President Kennedy: There are no Boston marshals, are there?
Marshall: [to the President] The coach is going to go out and talk to
them.
President Kennedy: Perhaps, perhaps . . .
Marshall: [to the people in the room] Perhaps?
Unidentified: Yeah [unclear].
President Kennedy: That’s why the . . . police . . . I remember in a riot
at Harvard, these guys go around and start asking for your identity card.
Unidentified: University police.
President Kennedy: Yeah. That’s the only one that scared the shit
out of me.
While Marshall continues on the phone, some voices can be heard.
Someone says, “If you could only ask her about . . . ” And Evelyn
Lincoln says, “That would be fine.”
Unidentified: We just got three points in the [unclear] match.
President Kennedy: This [unclear] department.
Marshall: [on the phone] He wants . . . Well, here’s Bob. He’ll talk to
you himself.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Yeah. Right. Okay. Now, the
question I think we have to decide, and Nick’s going to have to talk to
that general, if 200 fellows walking up there in uniforms, whether that’s
going to help or whether it’s going to really make it a . . . They’re all
Mississippians. No, I don’t know. They all have tear gas. But I think he
should talk to the military fellow there and see whether that would be
of . . . Well, they said he’d been in touch with them. [Pause.] All right.
Have we got the gas in there yet? [Pause.] Yeah. Could you if you had
your uniform on?
President Kennedy: Are we going to get this every night?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello?
Unidentified: [responding to the President] Huh?
President Kennedy: Are we going to get this every night?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Are you in touch with the military?
Sorensen: [to the President] I think that may well be Barnett’s strategy.
Sorensen: You know it’s what happened to Autherine Lucy.36 She had
some trouble—
36. In February 1956, an African American woman, Autherine Lucy, entered the University of
Alabama under a court order. Rioting ensued, and university officials suspended Lucy for her
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well now, is the gas on the way?37
Unidentified: What did she do, withdraw?
Unidentified: Yeah, personally [unclear]. Isn’t that right?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Will you? Do you want these troops
in there?38 Yeah. OK. [Pause.] He got hit by what? Yeah.
Unidentified: Who?
Robert Kennedy: Is he going to live? The state police have left?
[Unclear] put them in?
Marshall: I [unclear] talk with the Governor.
President Kennedy: What’d he say?
Marshall: He said they can’t have pulled them out.
Sorensen: What?
Marshall: Watkins.
Robert Kennedy: [having heard Marshall’s exchange with the President]
And he said, Watkins says, “They can’t have pulled out of there.” Yeah.
They have, though?
President Kennedy: What’s Watkins say otherwise?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Six what?
Marshall: [to the President] He said it’s dead.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] [Unclear.]
Marshall: He just talked to the Governor and the Governor had just
talked to the highway patrol [and] that everything was under control.
Concern rises in the Cabinet Room as news arrives that General Edwin
Walker is in Oxford to rally extremists in defense of a segregated
University of Mississippi. The President and the Attorney General begin
to take more seriously the need to deploy the U.S. Army on campus.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh why? There’s going to be a fight
in the infirm[ary] . . . Have the marshals done pretty well?
Marshall: The Bureau says there are people coming in from out of town.
Unidentified: There are, huh?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [to the people in the room] General Walker’s been
out downtown getting people stirred up.39
[on the phone] Can we get it arranged to get him arrested?
own protection. When she criticized the decision, she was expelled from the university, a rul-
ing upheld by a federal judge.
37. The Mississippi National Guard stationed at the Lyceum had run out of tear gas and were
waiting for a new supply. It wouldn’t reach them until much later.
38. At this point Katzenbach tells the Attorney General that he doesn’t need any troops.
39. Major General Edwin A. Walker, retired. For additional information on Walker, see
“Conversation with Archibald Cox,” 1 October 1962, note 5.
President Kennedy: By the FBI.

Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] [Unclear.] Well, let’s see if we can
arrest him. Will you tell the FBI that we need an arrest warrant.
President Kennedy: What’s his crime?
Robert Kennedy: [to the people in the room] He’s been stirring people up.
Sorensen: Incitement.
President Kennedy: Inciting.
Sorensen: Inciting insurrection.
Robert Kennedy: Obstruction of justice.
President Kennedy: [Grunts.] Would the FBI have trouble arresting
him on . . .
President Kennedy: How many agents do you have down there? I
think you ought to get those MPs into there and over near the airport. I
don’t see what you’ve got to lose, if they’re at the airport. You can always
send them back.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. OK. All right. I’ll do that. Now,
will you clear it with Nick? He said we didn’t need them a minute ago.
O’Brien: As far as [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear] is no longer . . .
O’Brien: . . . it depends on which is, you know, but I think that the
thing is, you have less risk [unclear] they do and bring ’em in.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah. All right. Oh, can somebody
sit on this? That’s it. [Hangs up the phone.]
[to the people in the room] He said that if they get the gas, they don’t
have a problem. 40
President Kennedy: When do they think they are going to get it?
Robert Kennedy: Well, they think a couple of minutes, at least.41
Unidentified: Somebody’s injured? [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Who got hurt?
Robert Kennedy: They’re going to have . . .
Unidentified: No way, I tell you.
Marshall: [on the phone] [Unclear] terrible [unclear].
President Kennedy: Imagine them coming in there with gas masks
and beginning again.
Unidentified: Yeah.
President Kennedy: That’s what happens to all of these wonderful
operations. War.
40. Referring to Katzenbach.

41. A new supply of tear gas was about ten minutes away.
O’Brien: They haven’t [unclear] some of the gas in those gas masks
so they all be [sound of sniffling].
Unidentified: And the next group. [Laughter.]
Unidentified: Well do you have . . .
President Kennedy: General Walker. Imagine that son of a bitch hav-
ing been commander of a division up till last year. And the Army pro-
moting him.
Unidentified: You’re right.
Unidentified: Yes.
Sorensen: Have you read Seven Days in May? 42
Unidentified: Damned good book.
President Kennedy: I thought that . . .
Sorensen: It’s pretty interesting.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Sorensen: I read it straight through. It’s interesting.
Unidentified: I didn’t really like it.
O’Brien: Unrealistic? [Laughter.]
Sorensen: And you thought it was too far-fetched, then?
President Kennedy: No, I thought this [had a] sort of awful amateur’s
dialogue.
Unidentified: Yeah, it was a [unclear].
Unidentified: No, it’s not great writing, but I mean—
President Kennedy: It’s not even good. . . . The only character that
came out at all was the general. The president was awfully vague. But I
thought the general was a pretty good character. [Extended pause.]
Robert Kennedy: . . . well, then General Walker starts bringing those
fellows, you know . . .
Robert Kennedy: If General Walker starts bringing in fellows from
[unclear] and that—
Marshall: There are rumors all over the place.
President Kennedy: He’s bringing in what?
Robert Kennedy: He’s getting them all stirred up. If he has them
march down there with guns, we could have a hell of a battle.
Unidentified: Thugs.
Sorensen: Did the FBI say Walker’s there [unclear]?
42. Popular novel of 1962, written by Fletcher Knebel, about a military plot to overthrow the
U.S. government.
Robert Kennedy: No. No. Walker’s baiting them.

Marshall: [on the phone] John?43
Robert Kennedy: They need to keep an eye on him.
Marshall: [on the phone] Is that football coach doing any good?
Lincoln: Tom Watkins is calling you.
Robert Kennedy: Why don’t you get it?
Two simultaneous phone conversations proceed.
Marshall: [on the phone] Oh, just a minute, I’m going to go and talk
to this fellow, Watkins.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Oh yeah. How’s it going?
Marshall: [on a different phone] Hello? Yes? [Unclear.]
Unidentified: . . . which isn’t based on just anything. We certainly do
want it to go as far as ever. We’ll just about [unclear] work hard [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, I get the picture. What about
getting the . . . Is Nick there? Would you ask him what the story is with
the gas?44
Unidentified: [possibly on the phone] What route is it going to be?
Sorensen: We talk about [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] You just, yeah . . .
Sorensen: [Unclear] be a shame to [unclear].
Unidentified: [in the background] John, do you want some milk?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, well, I think they got a report
from them five minutes ago. [Unclear.] John said he’s stirring people up.
It’s a long way from Wisconsin. Yeah, I know.
Oh, Nick? Oh, what’s the story? Well, I think I’m . . . Won’t you be able
to get it? How far away is it? Can these students see that? Is it covered all
right? How much more . . . You’d guess about how much longer? Yeah. OK.
[to Marshall] How was Watkins?
Marshall: He says [unclear] can’t send anything, can’t do anything.
President Kennedy: What are they saying? He’s there now?
Robert Kennedy: They’re saying . . .
President Kennedy: Where are they? Up around the third floor?
Where are they? Are they in the administration building with Meredith?
Robert Kennedy: No. Meredith is in another building.45
President Kennedy: Nobody knows where he is?
43. Probably John Doar, on the staff of the Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice.
44. The car bringing tear gas from the airport got lost on its way from the airport.
45. Meredith was in a dorm room in Baxter Hall. Evidently the President was unfamiliar with
the geography of the campus or the plan to protect Meredith.
Sorensen: How many are guarding the administration building?

Robert Kennedy: He’s got forty or fifty marshals. The gas is a quar-
ter of a mile.
President Kennedy: But they can’t get it through the . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well they just . . . Yeah. You know.
Marshall: They’re not guarding anything there.
Sorensen: Then why don’t . . .
Marshall: . . . the students.
Sorensen: . . . why don’t they just let . . . The marshals just left?
Marshall: What do you mean?
Sorensen: [Unclear] spend the night . . .
Unidentified: Where are the marshals?
President Kennedy: Why don’t they go inside the building? I think
they would. I haven’t had such an interesting time since the Bay of Pigs.
[Chuckling.]
Unidentified: Cuba [unclear]?
Robert Kennedy: Since the day what?
President Kennedy: Bay of Pigs.
Unidentified: Does Tom Watkins sound like he’s—
Robert Kennedy: The Attorney General announced today, he’s join-
ing Allen Dulles at Princeton University. 46 [Laughter.]
Marshall: He sounds . . .
Unidentified: You might take up this [unclear].
Marshall: So he is. He’s a very reliable fellow.
Marshall: He’s been a very reliable fellow. But he sounds—every
time . . . every time there’s a suggestion that that conversation would get
out, he sounds concerned.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? No, I’m just wondering if you
heard. No.
Unidentified: Do you want to hold that?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] When they say he’s sending more
gas, we’ll know we’re in.
Marshall: Sending what?
Robert Kennedy: More gas.
Marshall: [on the phone] Oh, I’m just holding it. Who?
46. Dulles was the retired director of Central Intelligence.

Unidentified: [Unclear] is loose as a goose. [Laughter.]

Marshall: [on the phone] That’s all right. This is Burke Marshall. A
what? A priest. Oh.
O’Brien: That’s the best shot they could take. That’ll [unclear] in
Mississippi.
Unidentified: Tell him to get that collar on quick.
Marshall: [on the phone] Do you know if the football coach has talked
to the students?
O’Brien: More appropriately [unclear] if his sweatshirt’s on.
President Kennedy: Yeah. [Unclear] He may be down there [unclear].
Unidentified: He’s coming.
Unidentified: Well the football coach would make a, get him, pretty
good [unclear]. [Laughter.]
Unidentified: Is that it?
Unidentified: It’s got to be better [unclear].
Unidentified: Training.
Marshall: Where was that company?47
Robert Kennedy: Right there. It’s just forming up.
Marshall: Oh, it’s just forming?
Robert Kennedy: The only question is, you want them there now?
That’s up to Nick.
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: All you’re going to have up to assist is 150 –200
fellows.
Marshall: Yes, it’s all there.48
Robert Kennedy: I think it’s all there. It’s within the hour, and that
was fifty minutes ago. I am [unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah, I think we ought to, I wouldn’t hesitate to
put them there. I don’t think that’s where we’re going to have the diffi-
culty. Not way beyond it. The problem is looking as if we’re not doing
enough rather than too much right now.
Marshall: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Good.
O’Brien: Oh, I agree.
President Kennedy: Better get them over there.
47. This is apparently a reference to a local unit of the federalized Mississippi National Guard.
48. This advance contingent was still three hours away from Oxford.
Marshall: I wonder if we shouldn’t just put them over there?

Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but if it’s forming up and we can’t put—
Marshall: Because it might discourage some of these people from . . .
Robert Kennedy: Throwing?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: That’s why, he’s in a . . . They’re just guessing.
[Pause.]
Robert Kennedy: If they get the gas, it’s not really a—
President Kennedy: Problem?
Robert Kennedy: . . . problem because they’re going to get the . . .
Marshall: Unless the Bureau . . . See the Bureau says that their peo-
ple are moving in.
Unidentified: From outside?
Marshall: Yeah. And they might be armed.
President Kennedy: You see, once some one fellow starts firing,
everybody starts firing. That’s what concerns me.49
Marshall: Yeah.
President Kennedy: If one person fires . . .
O’Brien: How are they getting in?
Marshall: What?
O’Brien: How are these people coming into the campus?
Marshall: How?
O’Brien: Yeah. Why don’t they have the, I thought . . .
Marshall: Well, you see . . .
O’Brien: . . . they had the entrances wired off.
Marshall: . . . that would be state police.
O’Brien: The state police which means that the city’s gone back.
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah? Well, that’s good. All right. Well,
that’s good.50
President Kennedy: What’s that?
Marshall: [to the President] They got the gas. They just got a gas truck.
Lincoln: Geoghegan for you.51
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: They got a gas truck.
49. Robert Kennedy seems to be supporting his team’s view that once the tear gas arrives, the
marshals under Katzenbach’s command can stabilize the situation.
50. At 11:44 P.M. this news was reported to Ramsey Clark, assistant attorney general, Lands
Division, who was overseeing the war room at the Justice Department during this crisis.
51. William Geoghegan, assistant deputy attorney general, legislative program, Department of
Justice. He was manning the command center at the Justice Department with Ramsey Clark.
Marshall: Yeah. Well, just hang on; I’ve got to go to another phone
for a minute.
Unidentified: I’ll hold this one.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] All right, can we get the answer to
that?
Unidentified: Which?
Marshall: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Or I can . . .
Evelyn Lincoln: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Do you have a switchboard? How do you handle
that?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I’m going to get direct lines in . . .
President Kennedy: From that building?
Robert Kennedy: Well, not this. We just kept an open line. But our
various installations around there, we have direct line that we put in last
week.52
[on the phone] Hello. Is Nick there? Let me speak to him, please.
[on the phone with Katzenbach] Yeah. Oh, you’re all set? Do you? I
think we should move that army up anyway, don’t you?53 Well, yeah. Up
to you? Yeah. I don’t want to make it appear that we didn’t do enough.
Let me ask Ed what he thinks, being there and talking. All right.
[to the people in the room] But he doesn’t think but, of course, the
problem is that they can’t . . . If we can get that Walker.
Marshall: That state trooper was seriously hurt.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] The kid’s arm?
President Kennedy: That’s too bad. What happened? Did one of
those pellets hit him?
Marshall: Yeah. But we’re flying him to Memphis to the hospital.
President Kennedy: Did he break his back? Did it break his back?
Marshall: I don’t know. But they’re putting him on a border patrol
plane and flying him up to the hospital in Memphis.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Ed, did the coach come?54
[to the people in the room] Well, he said, this is completely under control.
52. This is presumably the direct line between Louis Oberdorfer at the Justice command cen-
ter in the Oxford Post Office and Ramsey Clark at the Justice Department.
53. Robert Kennedy, who has accepted the President’s suggestion, may still be operating
under the assumption that the advance contingent from Memphis had already reached the
armory in Oxford, a short distance from the campus. In fact, this group was still in Tennessee.
54. Apparently Guthman spoke to John Vaught, the Ole Miss coach, who assured him that
there was only a small group of troublemakers.
President Kennedy: What does he say about the students, what they
want?
Robert Kennedy: Ed just said that, they say that because it’s a rela-
tively—compared to what a big campus it is, and there are so many stu-
dents—it’s a relatively . . .
President Kennedy: Small group?
Robert Kennedy: . . . small number. Because, you know . . .
President Kennedy: Too bad that fellow getting hurt.
Unidentified: [Unclear] pitchfork.
Unidentified: Just . . .
President Kennedy: Mrs. Lincoln?
Lincoln: Yes.
President Kennedy: Do you want us to put on the TV? Listen
[unclear]. Ask him to send it over some [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, do you think that they’re going
to move in there with some guns, though, from out of town?
Unidentified: Uh-huh.
Unidentified: Now here’s how you get errors [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] How do the marshals feel? Is that
where the . . . OK? Did they do anything about that?
Unidentified: It’s still [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] So that’s all right?
Unidentified: [Unclear] soldiers.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I mean if anything . . . Is there any-
thing you can do to send, you can’t send anybody in and arrest that
Walker, can we?55
Sorensen: She started a [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Suicide.
Sorensen: I wouldn’t hesitate to [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Are these kids breaking up at all?
Sorensen: [Unclear] haven’t used the [unclear] since I was a kid.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Can’t arrest any of them? Well, I
don’t know whether it would break it up or what.
55. About a half hour earlier (11:32 P.M.), Clark at Justice had instructed the FBI to arrest
General Walker, if possible.
Marshall: My guess is it won’t matter.

Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Would not. But you think the situa-
tion’s under control? How long will this ammunition last? Yeah, about that.
But better plan for two hours. All right. Well, Nick, I think we just . . . we
should . . . it’s got to be up to you, being on the scene, as to whether you
need these fellows, but I think it’s gone beyond the stage that . . . What’s
Millington?56 Well, they’re going to form in the armory there. Isn’t that
pretty close? Well, why don’t they go over to the armory? Are you in touch
with them, Nick?57 Well, I can’t send them right away. Well, did he get it up
there? [Pause.] Well, they can’t hurt you, though, can they?
Marshall: Did the guard unit seal off the campus?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, but they keep telling me that
you’re in touch with the military, and that this . . . So are you in touch
with them? Well, I mean, have they told you how many they’re coming
and . . . Well, can you ask them what the hell they’re doing?58 And will
you let me know? Right. [Pause.] Hello?
[to the people in the room] Oh, I’m just trying to get the operator.
[on the phone] Oh, would you hold? [He puts the phone down.]
Marshall: Wouldn’t that be just the thing for the guard to do?
Robert Kennedy: What?
Marshall: Seal off the campus.
Marshall: And they’ll fight it?
President Kennedy: What’s the problem now?
Robert Kennedy: Well, it’s not a problem. It’s the same problem . . . of
getting the people in there. They think that they have it under control.
President Kennedy: Are you questioning whether to bring the
guard in?
Robert Kennedy: No, I’m just questioning . . . I’m just trying to fig-
ure the fact that they don’t know when they are going to get there, and
all the rest of it. That is what I’ve been thinking about. And when you’re
dealing with, sort of, unknowns . . .
[on the phone] Hello?
Marshall: He can’t communicate with the guard?
56. Millington, Tennessee, site of the Memphis Naval Air Station.

57. The Attorney General wants to know whether Katzenbach had spoken with Lieutenant
Colonel John Flanagan, the chief of Task Force Alpha.
58. Ramsey Clark has apparently told the Attorney General that Katzenbach is fully informed
about the movements of the Memphis force.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, he can through my office.59

President Kennedy: Who is Vance in touch with? Memphis?
Robert Kennedy: That’s where the General is.60 And he’s going to
get on this plane and come down?
Marshall: Who’s the general? Is it General Abrams?
Robert Kennedy: Billingslea.
Marshall: Billingslea.
Robert Kennedy: Have you seen him?
Sorensen: Is he a National Guard general? Or . . .
Robert Kennedy: I think regular.
Sorensen: Huh?
President Kennedy: Regular.
Sorensen: Brought down in the National Guard under his [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, he’s the theater commander. [Pause.]
President Kennedy: This is what they must do every night in
Teheran and these places.
Unidentified: That’s a hell of a job, don’t you think?
Unidentified: Taking care of mobs and so forth. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear] beginnings.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, because we say you don’t have to use too
much force.
President Kennedy: The margin of force is . . .
Lincoln: [Unclear.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? Hello?
Lincoln: Ramsey Clark calling in. 61
Robert Kennedy: Ramsey Clark.
President Kennedy: Where is Nick? And where’s his command cen-
ter? Is it right in the administration building?
President Kennedy: He can see all that’s going on?
59. Only Robert Kennedy’s aide at Justice, Ramsey Clark, is able to communicate with the U.S.
Army or the National Guard. Katzenbach or Oberdorfer can only reach them through
Washington.
60. Referring to General Billingslea.
61. Clark was overseeing the war room at the Justice Department during this crisis.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. And then, Jim McShane’s head of the mar-
shals. And, Joe Dolan . . .62
President Kennedy: What’s Joe doing there?
Marshall: He’s sort of . . .
Robert Kennedy: Lou Oberdorfer.63
President Kennedy: McShane enjoy this?
Robert Kennedy: No, but I think they all like him.
President Kennedy: He’s pretty tough.
Robert Kennedy: He knows what he’s doing. I don’t think anybody’s
going to push him around much. Let’s see, we’ve got some other good
ones that they have. And then we’ve got three . . . We’ve got also about
150—
Marshall: Bob, are you sure Nick’s in touch with the guard? He just
told Ramsey that he wasn’t and that he’d like to know when they’re on
their way.64
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, well, that’s what I gave . . . He said the only
way through is through the office. Of course, Cy keeps saying that
they’re talking to one another. Let’s get Cy. You want to get Cy Vance
for me?
Marshall: [in the background, on the phone] Hello, Ramsey? [Unclear.]
You’re not in touch with . . .
Unidentified: Sure is a great day.
Unidentified: It’s been a great day.
O’Brien: Well, in substance, they’re defending this administration build-
ing and keeping students out of that one building where these students—
Robert Kennedy: Yeah; then they have a student that’s—
O’Brien: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: —named Meredith in another building.
O’Brien: Yeah. They don’t know where [unclear], do they?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, I suppose they do. I don’t know if they know.
Marshall: Right.
Robert Kennedy: And they’ve got 35, 40 marshals there. Actually,
62. Joseph P. Dolan was assistant deputy attorney general in the Justice Department.
63. Louis F. Oberdorfer was assistant attorney general in the Tax Division of the Justice
Department. He is running the command center in the Oxford Post Office.
64. Nick Katzenbach told Ramsey Clark at 12:05 A.M. (10:05 P.M. Mississippi time) that the sit-
uation had reached a point where he needed reinforcements. He wondered when the local
National Guard unit would arrive.
out of the 500 that we have, about 330 or so are border patrolmen—the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and about 150 marshals.
O’Brien: They’re a little tougher, aren’t they?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. The border patrol . . . But they haven’t been
through this, when we sent our marshals through a long special train-
ing. They haven’t been through that, but they’re very well disciplined.
They were the best [unclear].
Unidentified: Were they?
Marshall: That’s an impossible situation. No one’s in touch with the
guard unit, as far as I can see.
President Kennedy: Is it from Cy?
Lincoln: Secretary Vance.
President Kennedy: Yeah. [Pause.]
O’Brien: Maybe it’s by design. The guard unit is in touch with no one.
O’Donnell: [Unclear] to call the Attorney General’s office to call
them back to Memphis.
Marshall: Well, they have to call the Attorney General’s office to get
the Attorney General’s office to call the Secretary of the Army. The
Secretary of the Army to call to Memphis, and then back to the
Secretary of the Army to . . .
O’Donnell: They’re not really in Memphis but they’re supposedly
there on the road now. Aren’t they?
Marshall: They’re forming at the armory.
O’Donnell: They formed this afternoon. I saw them form on televi-
sion.65
Marshall: But they’re forming . . .
Sorensen: Again.
Marshall: —again at the armory in Oxford. You see, it’s a local unit.
O’Brien: Well, where were they forming when you saw them?
Sorensen: That’s what I’m talking about, that’s . . .
Marshall: But that’s that company.66
Sorensen: That’s just the Oxford units, you mean?
Marshall: Yeah.
Unidentified: Well, who are the [unclear]?
65. There is confusion in the room between Task Force Alpha and the local Mississippi
National Guard’s units shown getting prepared on television that afternoon.
66. Again, as stated in note 65, there appears to be some confusion among the men as to
whether they are discussing the movements of Task Force Alpha from Memphis or another
local Mississippi National Guard unit in the Oxford area.
Sorensen: Well, we [unclear] students. Huh?

Unidentified: Who were the [unclear]?
O’Donnell: You ought to include the student members.
Marshall: Yeah.
O’Donnell: Well, how about the ones that formed in Jackson this
afternoon?
Unidentified: Oh, but they . . .
Marshall: See, Jackson is 180 miles away.
O’Donnell: But aren’t they supposed to be on their way now?
Marshall: Yes. Uh. huh. Four hours away means about three.
O’Donnell: Then there’s a couple of thousand on their way, aren’t
they?
Marshall: Fifteen hundred. Twenty-five.
O’Donnell: The question is who’s in touch with their commander
[unclear] will carry out.
Marshall: Well, the one they would want to get in touch with right
now are the ones that . . . There’s a company in Oxford.
Sorensen: That are right there in the armory.
Marshall: Yeah.
Sorensen: The ones that are right there.
Marshall: Well, a company could do a lot of good.
Sorensen: Maybe there’s a phone in the armory.
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? If they what? [Laughter in back-
ground.]
Lincoln: Ramsey [unclear].
O’Donnell: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Yeah.
Marshall: Well, after dark. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: The hours are [unclear]. They’ll probably charge the
telephone. [Unclear.]
O’Brien: I just put that together. I thought it was valid.
Sorensen: It isn’t quite clear yet what our [unclear] administration
building is.
Unidentified: You know, I can’t think what [unclear].
O’Brien: [Unclear] I assume the students think he is there or why
would they keep [unclear]?
Marshall: Well, the marshal stood there.
Unidentified: Let’s say the marshal [unclear].
O’Brien: [Unclear] near a pay phone.
Unidentified: [Unclear] the phones in there. [Laughter.]

Unidentified: Phones.
Unidentified: I think maybe you’re right. That’s what it is.
Unidentified: [Unclear] tough when you’re fighting the bastards.
Unidentified: Is there any fight with [unclear]?
O’Brien: They got a very good [unclear].
O’Donnell: Yeah. Well, if the [unclear] injured, they . . . Then you
could get their [unclear] to [unclear] the students.
Unidentified: I can’t help, my impression was that the National
Guard unit was on its way to Oxford from their outlying [unclear].
Sorensen: Well some are, apparently, four hours away, but the one at
Oxford is being called to the armory in Oxford.67
O’Brien: By whom?
Unidentified: Cy. [Laughter.]
Unidentified: What’s the problem?
Unidentified: Well, it’s a rather vague one, I think. I don’t think I
could normally get in touch with them, the National Guard.
Sorensen: A bicycle could go to the armory faster.
Unidentified: Somebody ought to go down there.
Unidentified: Well, the general will be [unclear].
Unidentified: Yeah, [unclear] starting to fire . . .
President Kennedy: Want to call the Governor on that?
Sorensen: Unless they get rid of the . . .
Unidentified: [Unclear] fire marshals.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] marshals.
President Kennedy: Did you talk to Barnett?
Unidentified: Students riot?
Robert Kennedy: Well, I don’t [unclear] Walker’s crowd.
Sorensen: He’s arrived on campus? [Unclear] changes from outsiders.
Robert Kennedy: What?
Sorensen: I think there’s really a good justification for [unclear]
students.
President Kennedy: Well, [unclear] I would not . . .
Robert Kennedy: Not now.
67. Evidently, because of the delay in getting Task Force Alpha down, the Secretary of the
Army has located some National Guard reinforcements closer to the campus.
President Kennedy: The only way that [unclear].

Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? Yeah.
President Kennedy: They can keep their options open because [unclear]
the MPs have left yet.
Marshall: [on the phone] They need the Guard [unclear].
O’Brien: [Unclear.] Walker’s intent.
Unidentified: Huh?
O’Brien: General Walker’s plan.
Unidentified: [Unclear] Walker’s military career?
Sorensen: I hear it was pretty good.
Unidentified: It used to be in somebody . . .
Sorensen: [Unclear] beachhead.
Unidentified: We should . . .
O’Donnell: Better get Cy Vance. The General [unclear] he used to
shove messages over to the Germans [about] what area they were going
into. He would himself lead a company of guys no matter, and slit the
throats coming back on the way out. I tried to [unclear] they always had
a message that they were coming.
Unidentified: I asked Lemnitzer, one day, I said, gee, I just couldn’t
believe that any guy . . . That I saw him on television, I couldn’t believe
that such a stupid . . . could become a general because [unclear].68
O’Brien: [Unclear.]
Unidentified: You have exams or anything like that?
Unidentified: [Unclear] demonstrate conduct so . . .
Unidentified: Yeah.
Sorensen: According to [unclear]. In [unclear] and approach you on
question [unclear].
Unidentified: Yeah.
O’Brien: I saw them.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] The President could take [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear.] We’ll do it in the House.
Unidentified: Why, I hear those guys won’t mind their trucks.
They’re watching too much television. He saw the [unclear].
Unidentified: He thought they needed mobilizing. See all of them,
they all had to go down and organize that, plus TV. They watch them-
selves on TV.
68. General Lyman Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Unidentified: Would they like to be sworn in the federal service?

[Laughter.]
Unidentified: No.
Sorensen: I guess that’s the most we get now.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] to Cy Vance right here. [Unclear.]
Unidentified: Where is he?
Unidentified: Vance is [unclear].
Unidentified: Say listen, we’re contributing a lot to this.
Unidentified: Yeah.
O’Brien: Makes it kind of fascinating. It’s getting like an election
night or something. That door opens, I went for the next bulletin.
Unidentified: Bob asked me to stay and sleep good and then watch
the . . .
President Kennedy: Now look, you ought to do [unclear], as soon as
Vance calls us back.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Hello?
Unidentified: He’s been shot.69
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, can you get them back?
Unidentified: Walker isn’t . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, hello. Is Nick there?
Marshall: [Whispers.] [Unclear.]
Robert Kennedy: [to someone in the room] [Unclear.] The thing is
[unclear] about the military . . . He can’t tell me, can’t tell you anything.
Unidentified: Is there any word from Cy or [unclear]?
President Kennedy: I suppose he could get in the [unclear]. The
problem really is from there to here, not from . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Oh, Ed? Yeah, what’s bad again?
[Pause.] What can you do, though, you see those guards can’t get in
there for awhile.
[to the people in the room] An AP man got shot.70
[on the phone] Well, I can’t find out from the military. [Pause.] He
says what? Where does he get that word from? How does Ramsey Clark
know in 15 minutes, do you know?
69. Marshal Graham E. Same of Indianapolis was shot in the neck and in critical condition.
“How a Secret Deal Prevented a Massacre at Ole Miss,” Look, 31 December 1962.
70. William Crider of the Associated Press.
Marshall: What’s that [unclear]?

Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, how long can you hold there?
[Sound of door opening.]
Lincoln: Ramsey Clark.
Marshall: [on the phone in the distant background] Hello? Yeah.
[putting down the phone and speaking to the people in the room] They’re
storming where Meredith is.71
President Kennedy: Oh. The students are or the . . .
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] They’re storming where Meredith is.
Marshall: [in the background] They’re outside. [Unclear.] Yes. Yes.
President Kennedy: Well, are the other marshals going?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hey, Nick?
President Kennedy: [Unclear] necessary . . . You better try to stick
them, all the marshals in. . . . I suppose get in the cars. . . . I don’t see
how they can . . . They may not be able to move him out, I suppose.
Unidentified: Because they’re in . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Well, you better move them all out
and see if we can’t get them. You go ahead and do it. All right. [Puts the
receiver down.]
Marshall: Bob, do we have any word on the MPs?72
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, they’re on their way. You want to get Nick?
Robert Kennedy: You want to get Nick?
Telephone rings.
Lincoln: Hello?
Unidentified: Hello, [unclear].
O’Donnell: You don’t want to have a lynching.
O’Brien: Yeah. [Long pause.] Good. [Long pause.]
O’Donnell: [on the phone] Hello? Oh, you want Bob? Yeah. Who is
this? Ken O’Donnell. Yes. Yeah.
71. Fortunately, this was only a false rumor. Throughout the riot the lightly guarded Baxter
Hall escaped any serious harassment. There were only 24 marshals guarding Meredith in his
dormitory.
72. Task Force Alpha. It is still in Memphis.
O’Donnell: [on the phone] Were they after him, or what? Are they
after him now? [Pause.] Yeah. OK. [Replaces the receiver.]
[to Robert Kennedy] Bobby, it was the [unclear] that [unclear] firing.
Sounds of people coming into the room. An indistinct conversation is
overheard where someone says “side arms.”
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Hello? Well, I think they have
to protect Meredith now. Well, that’s what I mean. They better fire, I
suppose. They got to protect Meredith. What? [Pause.] [Unclear] can’t
do anything. Is Meredith all right?
Unidentified: Well, I don’t know. If they can.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] They better protect Meredith now.
Well, can you make sure that he’s protected, Dean? [Pause.]
While Robert Kennedy hastened to react to the possibility that Baxter

Hall might be stormed, the President was in the Oval Office trying to
pressure Governor Ross Barnett to help restore order to the campus.
Kennedy was especially concerned that the injured man receive medical
attention. This conversation was taped.
12:14 A.M.
We couldn’t consider moving Meredith if we haven’t been able

to restore order outside. That’s the problem, Governor.

Ross Barnett: . . . the Commissioner of the highway patrol to order
every man he’s got.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, now, how long’s that going to take?
We don’t want somebody . . .
Barnett: Well, I haven’t been able to locate him.
President Kennedy: You can’t locate . . .
Barnett: He went to the . . . Here’s what happened. He went to the
doctor’s office with this man that was hurt.
73. Dictabelts 4E and 4F, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files,
Presidential Recordings Collection.
Conversation with Ross Bar nett 289

Barnett: And I finally located him there after you’d told me to get,
have him to get more people, don’t you see, if . . .
Barnett: You needed ’em.
Barnett: And he thought then that fifty he had would be sufficient.
Barnett: But I told him by all means to order out every one he had if
he needed it.
Barnett: And I’m certainly trying in every way . . .
President Kennedy: Well, we can’t consider moving Meredith as
long as, you know, there’s a riot outside because he wouldn’t be safe.
Barnett: Sir?
President Kennedy: We couldn’t consider moving Meredith if we
haven’t been able to restore order outside. That’s the problem, Governor.
Barnett: Well, I’ll tell you what I’ll do, Mr. President.
Barnett: I’ll go up there myself . . .
President Kennedy: Well, now, how long will it take you to get there?
Barnett: . . . and I’ll get a microphone and tell them that you have
agreed to re—, to, for ’em to be removed . . .
President Kennedy: No. No. Now, wait a minute. How long . . .
Barnett: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Wait a minute, Governor.
Barnett: Yes?
President Kennedy: Now, how long is it going to take you to get up
there?
Barnett: About an hour.
President Kennedy: Now, I’ll tell you what, if you want to go up
there and then you call me from up there. Then we’ll decide what we’re
going to do before you make any speeches about it.
Barnett: Well, all right. Well . . .
President Kennedy: No sense in . . .
Barnett: . . . I mean, whatever you, if you’d authorize . . .
President Kennedy: You see, if we don’t, we got an hour to go, and
we may not have an hour.
Barnett: This, this man . . .
President Kennedy: It won’t take you an hour to get up there.
Barnett: . . . this man has just died.
President Kennedy: Did he die?

Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: Which one? State police?
Barnett: A state policeman.
President Kennedy: Yeah, well, you see, we got to get order up there,
and that’s what we thought we’re going to have.
Barnett: Mr. President, please. Why don’t you, can’t you give an
order up there to remove Meredith?
President Kennedy: How can I remove him, Governor, when there’s
a riot in the street, and he may step out of that building and something
happen to him? I can’t remove him under those conditions. You . . .
Barnett: Uh, but, but . . .
President Kennedy: Let’s get order up there; then we can do some-
thing about Meredith.
Barnett: . . . we can surround him with plenty of officials.
President Kennedy: Well, we’ve got to get somebody up there now to
get order and stop the firing and the shooting. Then when you and I will
talk on the phone about Meredith . . .
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy: . . . but first we got to get order.
Barnett: I’ll, I’ll call and tell them to get every official they can.
President Kennedy: That’s right and then you and I will talk when
they get order there, then you and I will talk about what’s the best thing
to do with Meredith.
Barnett: All right then.
President Kennedy: Well thank you.
Barnett: All right.
President Kennedy hangs up.
Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued

President Kennedy returns to the Cabinet Room to report on his conver-
sation with the Mississippi Governor.
President Kennedy: He wants us to move him again. And I say,
“Well, we can’t move him if the situation’s like this.” And he says, “Well,
we’ll take care of the situation if you move him.”
Robert Kennedy: I can’t get him out. How am I going to get him out?
President Kennedy: That’s what I said to him. Now, the problem is, if
he can get law and order restored, . . . OK, we’ll move him out of there if
he can get order restored.
Meeting on Civil Rights , Continued 291
Unidentified: I don’t see how we can . . .

Long pause. Sounds of doors opening and closing. Evelyn Lincoln can be
indistinctly heard talking in the background.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Now we’d better get this . . . Now,
they might not recognize the kids today. Get him . . . get him up there
and get him out or something. I don’t know what the exit is. Yeah, yeah,
they’re shooting at other . . .
Unidentified:. [Unclear.] He said [unclear] to you immediately.
Robert Kennedy: I’m glad to see that . . . They always make sure of
everything, even if they don’t know what time it is.
[on the phone] Can we be all right? Will they be all right? Have they
gotten into the room? I think we just have to protect him no matter
what it is.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] All right. Would you get that, Ed?
See if we can get Barnett to get [the] highway patrol to bring doctors
in. [Door opens.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Nick? I’ll hold.
O’Brien: Doctor.
Sorensen: From the inside of the arm[ory] or wherever [unclear].
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello.
President Kennedy: What about removing him if Barnett says that
he can restore law and order?
Robert Kennedy: Well, that’s not what they, they’re firing at the
marshals.
Unidentified: I’d sure as hell put all those bastards in the can.
Unidentified: Yeah. That’s for sure.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello. What’s it look like?
O’Donnell: [Edwin] Guthman’s so scared he can’t talk. Helpless
feelings on the other end of that phone. You have to [unclear].
O’Brien: [on the phone] This is Larry O’Brien. [Pause.]
O’Donnell: [in the background] I hate to say it, but I [unclear].
Unidentified: Well, we ought to do that [unclear] to Barnett.
[Indistinct exchange.]
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yes. Yes. Hello? Yes. Hello?
[to the people in the room] Two marshals have been shot.
[on the phone] Yes, we’re on this line down there. We’re on this line.
Well, we’re talking down there. This is Larry O’Brien in the Cabinet
Room. Hello? Yeah. So I understand. Yeah. Yeah. Are you able to move
them out of the administration building to where the boy is?
Marshall: Have they got authority to return, Bobby?

O’Brien: They know it.
O’Brien: First. I thought they said [they] haven’t eaten since this
morning. [Unclear.] [Unclear] in the field, probably didn’t spend a lot of
time on the campus.
Evelyn Lincoln: [Heard faintly in the background.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] people [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear] one reason was that the people [unclear].
O’Brien: They say they can’t determine just what his next move is.
Let’s see what’s going to happen. He says these students are getting
ready with a flying wedge to hit the dormitory and [face] these guys.
He says, “No, they just have to face us, and somebody’s going to get it.”
Unidentified: Have they not shot back yet? The marshals?
O’Brien: Apparently not. Said some of them were hit with buckshot. But
there are two of them seriously hurt. They really don’t know how badly yet.
The problem . . . One’s bleeding in the throat. [Possible door sound.]
President Kennedy: Well, can I talk to them directly and on . . .
Robert Kennedy: Do you want to get Nick for me?
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello? Is Nick there? All right.
Robert Kennedy: The problem is, if we move him, they’re liable to
[unclear].
Sorensen: About two hours.
President Kennedy: What about the Guard?
Robert Kennedy: Well, can’t the 82nd [unclear].
Unidentified: How long before they get any more guards?
Robert Kennedy: He told me he’d have several bunches in an hour.
President Kennedy: An hour from now?
Robert Kennedy: And in a pinch they’d have about [unclear interjec-
tion]. They took two hours.
Marshall: And they [unclear]. [Continues speaking faintly in the back-
ground.]
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah? Nick? Hold on, here’s Bobby.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hey, Nick? Oh, I just got, Ramsey
just asked me for . . . if they had permission to fire back. Do you have to
do that? Well, can’t they just retreat into that building? [Pause.] Is he
safe over the other place? Oh, I think that they can fire to save him. But
now, can you hold out for an hour there? [Pause.] Can you hold out if you
have gas? Is there much firing? Is there any way you could figure a way
to scare them off ? [Pause.] I’m sorry for that. I think that if we start a
battle with . . . Up in the air? Except then it might really start them. . . .
Once you start firing, they can forget this . . . Will that help? OK. OK.
[Puts down the receiver.]
President Kennedy: [on the phone] Will you hold?
[to the people in the room] Do you think they can hold for an hour?
Robert Kennedy: If they have gas.
President Kennedy: And do they?74
Robert Kennedy: I think it really depends on how much firing.
[Phone rings in the background.]
Unidentified: Pardon.
Lincoln: [answering phone] Hello? Hello?
Unidentified: How much firing?
Robert Kennedy: The guards have arrived since you . . .
Lincoln: [on the phone] This is Evelyn Lincoln. [calls out] Cy—
Robert Kennedy: Cy Vance. . . . The President can take it.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello. [Long pause.] Hello.
[to the people in the room] Pretty damn hard once firing takes place, to
shut it off.
Unidentified: Yeah, I know.
Operator: Hello?
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello.
Operator: Yes, do you want a line?
O’Brien: [on the phone] Just leave it open. Hello. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.
Well, we’ll leave this line open. All right. Right. [Puts the receiver down.]
[to the people in the room] Well, they can’t even get the injured guy to
the college dispensary. They’re trying to get a wedge to get him through.
O’Donnell: Trying to get him through the crowd? [Long pause.]
Sounds of a door opening and closing can be heard as Robert Kennedy
returns to the room, probably after a conversation with Cyrus Vance, the
secretary of the Army.
Robert Kennedy: Damn Army! They can’t even tell if [unclear] the
MPs have left [yet].75
The Attorney General now realizes that he hasn’t any federal reinforce-
ments in town. And Vance at the Pentagon cannot even tell him when
the advance contingent of Task Force Alpha will arrive at the Oxford
armory.
74. No. The embattled federal forces at the Lyceum are still without tear gas.
75. It is about 12:17 A.M., over ninety minutes since the Attorney General ordered the move-
ment of the troops from Memphis.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello?

O’Donnell: Whether they’ve left yet?
Robert Kennedy: Won’t even attempt to tell us.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello? Yeah. All right.
Sorensen: You mean they’re not in contact with anyone . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well, who knows what the reason is? Cy Vance
doesn’t know yet. [Pause.]
[Robert Kennedy leaves the room again.]
Lincoln: [Unclear.]
Pause. Sound of door opening. It appears that a midnight snack is being
served.
Unidentified: Cheese on this?
Unidentified: Yes.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello?
Unidentified: [referring to the snack] And a roll.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Nothing, huh? Right.
Unclear voice in the background.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Huh? Yes.
O’Brien: Well, where were they?
O’Donnell: [Unclear.] Out of the way. [Unclear.] I’ll be a son of a
bitch if the President of the United States calls up and says, “Get your
ass down there.” Yeah, I would think they’d be on that fucking plane in
about five minutes.
Unidentified: They sort of roped them in.
O’Brien: So, where they are afraid the problem is the . . . now this fly-
ing wedge of students that’s going to tackle the dormitory.76 Half these
guys, you know, they’ve about had it.
O’Donnell: But what’s the point of it . . . these guys . . . burning and
looting. I suppose they are going to kill us when they get here.
O’Brien: Yeah.
O’Donnell: You start firing at a bunch of students?
O’Brien: They’re afraid it’s going to happen.
O’Donnell: Uh?
O’Brien: That’s what they’re afraid is going to happen.77 . . . marshal
76. Baxter Hall, where Meredith is located.

77. Tape 26 ends. There appears to have been some conversation lost before the Secret Service
replaced the tape reel. Tape 26A begins, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files,
seriously hurt; the others, some others got buckshot. Well, this must have
been done under the premise that something’s going to happen [unclear].
[on the phone] Hello?
Pause. An indistinct conversation can be heard in the background.
O’Brien: [puts down the receiver] If necessary, is there any way that
we could get an ambulance?
Sorensen: The police ought to be able to get an ambulance to the
[unclear].
Unidentified: The Governor said, “Make sure and take that boy out
of there, and everything will be all right.”
O’Brien: That’s the main thing.
Unidentified: I’d take him out. By tomorrow, with those 5,000 bayo-
nets.
Unidentified: Certain that there be no repercussions whether you
choose to bring troops in or not.
Unidentified: No. No. I agree.
O’Brien: . . . write this thing off now. Obviously, the townies [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: They had in mind. [Doors open.]
Sorensen: One that was hit by the gas?
Unidentified: Yeah. [Unclear.] [Unclear exchange.]
Robert Kennedy: Well, we can’t last that long. [Doors close.]
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello. Yeah. Hmm. Don’t worry. Oh
yeah.
Robert Kennedy: The son of a bitch. He knows [unclear]. [Door opens
and closes.]
President Kennedy: What? Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear.] It’s not about the policemen. It’s about
other people being shot. If you get Barnett to get Meredith off the
campus . . .
Robert Kennedy: Just to get Meredith off the campus. That’s what he
wants.
Unidentified: Well he can [unclear]. [Sound of water being poured.]
Robert Kennedy: That’s what he said.
President Kennedy: Well, he wants to be able to say that he asked me
to get him off. And that I refused.
Robert Kennedy: Now, he’s too . . .
President Kennedy: You’ve got to get law and order and then you
can discuss what to do about Meredith. But he can’t do anything. He
doesn’t even get ahold of the head of the state police.
Robert Kennedy: What do they say?

O’Brien: They don’t know. Nothing at the moment.
Robert Kennedy: We’ll have to stick it to that Walker.78 [Door opens
and closes.]
Sorensen: Can’t you get him arrested?
Robert Kennedy: Well, I can’t do it now.
Sorensen: Why not?
Robert Kennedy: Well, he’s out there in the field.
Unidentified: You mean there’s nobody that can go out and arrest
him?
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello?
Robert Kennedy: Is he still being shot at, Larry?
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] No. Any shooting? Things quiet now?
Quiet. Yeah. Yeah.
[talking to people in the room] Everything’s quiet around there, but he
doesn’t know . . . they’re trying to check the dormitory.
Robert Kennedy: The what?
O’Brien: Trying to check around as to what’s going on in the dormi-
tories. He says it’s quiet around the area. One fellow’s seriously hurt and
they’re trying to get an ambulance.
Marshall: There’s supposed to be an ambulance going in, too. [Door
sounds.]
Unidentified: Jesus!
Sorensen: Sad day in our country.
No conversation as they wait for information to come in. Doors open
and close.
Sorensen: Any word yet on the military?
Marshall: Well, they’re just leaving Memphis.79
Sorensen: Can they handle that [unclear]? [Unclear exchange.]
Robert Kennedy: Hey, Burke?
Marshall: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Want to talk to Watkins?80 You put the call in?
Marshall: What?
Robert Kennedy: Watkins.
Marshall: Should we call him?
78. Major General Edwin A. Walker, retired.

79. At 12:26 P.M., the departure of Task Force Alpha was still about ninety minutes away.
80. Thomas A. Watkins.
Robert Kennedy: Yes.

Doors open and close followed by silence. Then again there are sounds of
doors opening and closing, with Evelyn Lincoln’s voice in the background
and an unclear exchange in the foreground ending with “Jesus Christ.”
The President enters the room.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] casualties [unclear] unless we’re lucky.
O’Brien: The state policeman died. It’s too bad.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello? Yeah. Yeah. All right.
President Kennedy: Shotgun wound in his back.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello? [Pause.] Right. No. All right.
[talking to people in the room] He told me they ought to get [unclear]
the fighting was [unclear] the campus [unclear] the assistant dean
[unclear].
Unidentified: I understand it was [unclear]. [Voices can be heard mur-
muring in the background.]
O’Brien: Yeah.
The Attorney General enters the room.
Robert Kennedy: What’s he say, Larry?
O’Brien: Nothing at the moment. He just said that we’ve got a
stretcher.
[on the phone] Hello? Maybe he . . .
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hello? Well, how does it look now?
O’Brien: So they sent 18 men out to the dormitory.81 They weren’t
sure if they were receiving fire or not.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] And what about there, they firing at
all now? [Pause.] Is Nick there? [Pause.] Well, I’d like to talk to him to
see what the . . . Oh, they’re there? Yeah. Who’s this?
Marshall: Let the people pick [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [in an aside] Now, they told them they had to land.
[Unclear exchange.]
Robert Kennedy: They think we shouldn’t do that.
Unidentified: Not today.
Robert Kennedy: You shouldn’t just, you shouldn’t say things.
Unidentified: Why don’t you pick up the phone? That will get them
flying.
81. Originally Katzenbach posted 6 men to guard Meredith; as the situation deteriorated on
campus, 18 additional men were dispatched from the Lyceum front to reinforce Baxter Hall.
Robert Kennedy: [Unclear] probably shouldn’t say anything [unclear].

These guys have capable fellows there.
O’Brien: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: The National Guard. They can [unclear].
O’Brien: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [talking on the phone] Yeah. Oh Nick? How’s it
look? The fellow from the London paper was there, was he?82 London
paper. [talking to the people in the room] He says the fellow from the
London paper died. . . . Yeah.
President Kennedy: We ought to get some more troops. I wonder if
it takes this long to get people ready around here.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Have the troops, have the National
Guard showed up? Did they fire? Are they firing at all down there?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Is it quieter?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Who’ve you got up there at the other
place? Yeah, but I mean I think you want to get somebody that’s up there
that knows how important it is to keep Meredith alive. Yeah, but I mean
it should be somebody that you know. And that should stay right by
Meredith and shoot anybody that puts a hand on him. And it has got to
be the absolute . . . OK? [The telephone rings in the background.]
[speaking to the people in the room] It’s a little quieter. [Unclear.]
The Attorney General steps out to call secretary of the Army Cyrus
Vance to inquire about the status of the long anticipated Task Force
Alpha. Hoping to reduce any further delays, the Attorney General
wants to know whether the advance contingent can be flown directly to
the campus. Robert Kennedy used his brother’s telephone and the call
was taped.
82. At approximately 12:30 A.M., Jack Rosenthal of the Justice Department called the White
House to report that a reporter for the London Daily Sketch, Paul Guihard, had been killed in
the riot. His body was found next to a women’s dormitory on campus. See Dictabelt 4F2,
Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
Approximately 12:40 A.M.
[H]ow long before they’ll be there?
Conversation from the Oval Office between

Robert Kennedy and Cyrus Vance83
Cyrus Vance: Yeah, see the problem is one of light getting in there,
and they’re just going to get in wherever they can on the campus.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, and then they’re, we could use at least a cou-
ple hundred right there.
Vance: Yeah, well . . .
Robert Kennedy: I don’t know how. They don’t have transportation
in from the airport.
Vance: No. They will land on the campus. These are their instruc-
tions. Wherever they can get in, Bob.
Robert Kennedy: OK.
Vance: Right.
Robert Kennedy: But when, how long before they’ll be there?
Vance: Uh, well, they left—take a look at my watch—must be about,
I would guess 10 or 15 minutes ago. And it was supposed to take about
an hour. Bob, I don’t want to guess . . .
Robert Kennedy: No.
Vance: . . . at the thing because I don’t know precisely.
Robert Kennedy: OK. All right.
Vance: Right.
Robert Kennedy: Thanks.
Robert Kennedy hangs up.
Meeting on Civil Rights, Continued

At approximately the same time that Vance is confirming to Robert
Kennedy that the helicopters have taken off, General Charles Billingslea
calls the Justice Department (12:42 A.M.) with similar information. The
first helicopters actually took off at 2:08 A.M. (12:08 A.M. Mississippi time).
O’Donnell:[Unclear.] Somebody shot [unclear] the London paper
[unclear].
83. Dictabelt 4F3, Cassette A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Unidentified: It’s going to be a big story over in Europe, don’t you
think?
Unidentified: Yeah.
O’Donnell: I have a hunch that Khrushchev would get those troops
in faster. That’s what worries me about this whole thing.
Unidentified: Why?
O’Donnell: I think that . . .
O’Brien: You know, but most of them [unclear] you get them there
first [unclear].
O’Donnell: I just don’t quite understand it. I mean, why would
[unclear].
O’Brien: [on the phone] Hello? Anything doing?
Marshall: Larry, is there any sign of the Guard?
O’Brien: [on the phone] Find any Guard there at all? Any arrivals?
Any word?
Unidentified: I wish those marshals would arrive. No state police
guarding them [unclear] troops [unclear]. The state police they can’t
find [unclear].
Marshall: That’s what the Governor said. We didn’t find the state police.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah, I know. National Guard.
O’Donnell: The MPs are airborne? At least?
Marshall: What?
O’Donnell: Are they airborne?
Marshall: Yeah. They’re airborne. No, they are. They are in fact air-
borne.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Marshall: I mean, unless they’re lying to us.
Sorensen: Well, they were not exactly accurate when they told us
that they were.
Marshall: They were two hours off to begin with.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Not at the airport?
Marshall: [Unclear] off something like that.
Sorensen: It wasn’t two hours? [Unclear] regular Army?
Marshall: Yeah.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah.
Marshall: Or at least one of them.
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah. Fine. Right.
[talking to people in the room] The current problem is how to get the
trucks off the campus back to the airport to bring the troops in.
Marshall: Are the troops . . .
O’Brien: The MPs.
Marshall: They’re going to land on the campus.
O’Brien: Well, he said that there’s a question whether they can or not.
Marshall: Why?
O’Brien: Well, I don’t know. Lights or what have you.
O’Donnell: They have a helicopter?
Marshall: Yeah.
O’Brien: So that’s what they’re checking out now. They were going to
have them land in the airport and bring them in by truck, but now . . . ?
Marshall: They can’t get the trucks off the campus?
O’Brien: Yeah.
Door opens. The President and the Attorney General enter.
Sorensen: A few hundred students and rednecks have really got the
entire U.S. Army [unclear].
Unclear chatter; someone jokes, “Take a cab from the airport.”
Unidentified: Think some of the townspeople would drive them in?
President Kennedy: What about a baseball field with night lights or
anything like that?
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello?
Robert Kennedy: Burke, should we [unclear] them?
Marshall: We cannot [unclear].
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Well, they won’t be able to land.
Unidentified: Unless they can open it. [Unclear] can get it open.
O’Brien: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: But can Ramsey look at the map and see whether,
where else there is?84
Marshall: Well, there is a practice field right next to the large [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Well, why don’t they [unclear].
Marshall: That’s where they [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Well, I don’t know whether they can find it,
though. [Unclear.]
Marshall: If there’s no lighting. That’s a problem.
84. Ramsey Clark was assistant attorney general in the Lands Division of the Department of
Justice.
O’Donnell: [Unclear] the weather’s all right, we can [unclear].

Unidentified: In the dark?
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Yeah. [Unclear exchange.] [talking on
the phone] Yeah.
Unidentified: Helicopters.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Second time in.
O’Brien: [to the people in the room] Maybe they have sixty guardsmen
there now. One of them was just wounded, so they know they’re there.85
President Kennedy: One of the guards was wounded?
O’Brien: They said they just brought him in. So he says they esti-
mate they’ve [unclear]. He arrived in a group of sixty.
Unidentified: You were right about it anyway.
Unidentified: That’s good anyway.
O’Brien: Sixty men . . . sixty men under the command of a Captain
Falkner, is the name.86
O’Donnell: That’s Faulkner’s son.87
O’Brien: Yeah.
Marshall: [talking on the phone] All right. Where did they land?
O’Brien: One of the Oxford group, then?
O’Donnell: Yeah. Must be.
O’Brien: That’s what they have, sixty.
Marshall: [Talking on the phone unintelligibly in the background. Unclear
exchanges.]
O’Brien: [on the phone] Yeah. Yeah. Oh. Yeah.
[to the people in the room] Taking care of those sixty guardsmen pretty
quick. One of them got hit in the arm with a brick. He’s down. And the
other one got a cut across [unclear].
O’Donnell: He won’t like it.
85. The first confirmation for the White House that some National Guard reinforcements, a con-
tingent of some 55, had reached the campus. Ramsey Clark at Justice learned this at 12:48 A.M.
86. Captain Murry Falkner, cousin of William Faulkner.
87. William Faulkner, author.
Unidentified: The corpsman.

O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Well, as long as they’re [unclear] backs
to the bricks and rocks, that’s a hope. Yeah. Yeah. [Unclear exchange in the
background.]
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Is that right? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. OK.
Right.
O’Donnell: [Unclear] the marshal who fired that gas gun . . .
O’Brien: [talking on the phone while Marshall is whispering in the back-
ground] No shooting, now though, huh? Yeah. Anything going? Yeah.
Good. OK. He’s in the next room. I’ll keep this line open. OK. All right.
[Meanwhile, an indistinct conversation is going on in the background.] OK,
Dean, I’ll tell him.88 He’s in the next room [unclear]. OK.
O’Donnell: [Unclear.] [telling a story] He said, “All right.” He said,
“Who?” He said, “Governor, this is the Boston Post.” “Who the hell else
would it be this time of the night?” “Governor, your daughter’s car has
been found cracked up down on the Cape. Do you have any statement?”
“Certainly, the thief must be apprehended.” [Laughter.]
Sounds of the door opening and closing followed by a pause.
O’Brien: You say you’re unsure about that car that’s been showered
and hit with bricks.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello? Hi Joe. [Pause.] Yeah. [Pause.]
Larry O’Brien. Yeah. [Pause.] Yeah. Well, I’ll get on it . . . yeah. OK.
[Pause.]
Sorensen: They say if you ever made a chronological listing of the
reports we’ve gotten over that phone in the last three hours, it wouldn’t
make any sense at all.
O’Brien: [talking on the phone] Hello. [Pause.] Yeah. You want
Bobby? Who’s this? Yeah, hold on a minute. [Puts down receiver.]
He wants Bobby. [Sounds of door opening and closing.]
Robert Kennedy: [talking on the phone] Hello? Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [talking on the phone] They tell me the fellow from
the London paper was killed. . . . Well, they found him back of some
dormitories. Yeah. Yeah, that’s true. What are we going to say about all
this, Ed?89 You know, we’re going to have a hell of a problem about why
88. Dean P. Markham.

89. Probably Edwin Guthman, director of public information at the Department of Justice.
we didn’t handle the situation better. Yeah, yeah. [Pause.] OK. Well, I
think we are going to have to figure out what we are going to say.
[Pause.] Do you want to? Oh yeah, well you did terrific. I think it’s just
a question of the fact that I made the decision to send [pause]. OK. You
want to hold on?
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello? This is Burke. Yeah. Yeah.
Lincoln: Bill Geoghegan calling you. 90 Want to take it?
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah. Oh, Mrs. Lincoln? Oh, Ed? Listen, can
you hold on just a minute while I take a call from Bill? Hello? Just hold on.
Phone rings. Then there are sounds of a door opening and closing.
Operator: What number?
Lincoln: One line. [Door opens and closes.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Ed? They can’t get the trucks out to them.
We’re going to try to land some on the campus. [Pause.] We’re not.
[Pause.] Yeah, we ought to do that. It’s really a [pause]. Yeah. Let him
know if they’ve gone. . . . Oh, he was there, all right. What he was doing
I don’t know. I don’t know, Ed.
Marshall: [on the phone] Yeah. Yeah, they did . . . Yeah. OK. They’ve all
been evacuated, I underst—[pause]. Yeah. Real war. No. God, that’s dumb.
That’s uh, that Army, you know, they’re just late. Well, they’re in the air.91
Yeah. I don’t think they do. They’ve got pistols. Well, they’re . . . Yes, they
do. I mean, they’ll all be there by the morning, Ed. Yeah, I know. Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: Is Ed there?
Marshall: What?
Robert Kennedy: Ed?
Marshall: He just said, “Hold on,” and . . .
Robert Kennedy: I’d like to speak to him, then.
Marshall: Fine. [on the phone] Hello? Who’s this? Oh Dean? Is Ed
around? Could—well, when he comes back, Bob wanted to talk to him.
[Pause.]
[to people in the room] Do they know what they’re going to do with
the MPs?
Unidentified: Not exactly.
Robert Kennedy: Well, I think they [unclear] and maintain law and
order, and then they can figure it out.
90. William A. Geoghegan was assistant deputy attorney general in the Department of
Justice. He was the number two at the crisis center in the Justice Department.
91. It was about 12:55 A.M. and the helicopters are about to take off.
Marshall: Well, I mean, do they know where they’re going to land

them?
Robert Kennedy: Oh, in another 15 or 20 minutes, I think. They have
it pretty much under control, though, in effect. [Unclear.]92
Marshall: Oh, here’s Ed. [on the phone] Just a minute, Ed.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Hey, Ed? I think that probably you
should get that crowd together and brief them on all that, when it quiets
down and all. [Door opens.]
Lincoln: Bill Geoghegan’s calling you.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, but you see, we’re going to be
blamed for not doing enough. And I think that you trace it. First, that
we had the agreement with the Governor. Uh—Do you . . . Do you want
to hold on? [He puts the receiver down.]
Marshall: [on the phone] Hello, Ramsey?
Robert Kennedy: [seems to walk to other side of the room] Well, he’s
besieged, of course, from behind. . . . But he’s under siege.
President Kennedy: So has he agreed with us?
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, of course, he just figured that he . . . but I
mean uh—
[on the phone] Hello.
Unidentified: What about?
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] What about the reporters there? Do
they see the picture? [Unidentified background conversation.]
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, I just think that, but the point
that we want to get over you know is that the Governor said . . . made
this arrangement. We didn’t sneak him in. I think that’s going to be the
cry, that we snuck him in unprepared.
Well, can I tell you what the . . . Of course, the point is, at first, he
said, he came in in [a] helicopter, and of course they know he didn’t, and
then the gate was opened to everybody to come through . . . and the state
police guided him in. Yeah. Well, I just think that we are going to take a
lot of knocks because of people getting killed, the fact that I didn’t get
the people up there in time.
President Kennedy: [on another phone] Well, now, did Bob Watkins
[unclear].93
92. The advance contingent of Task Force Alpha landed at 1:50 A.M. Not only were they about
45 minutes later than the Attorney General had assumed, but these troops had to land at
Oxford airport due to the cloud of tear gas that obscured any possible landing areas in or near
the campus. The situation on the campus was still far from being under control.
93. Tom Watkins, Governor Barnett’s intermediary.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I think the fact, then, they promised
the state police would stay and then the state police left. And he took
responsibility . . .
President Kennedy: [on the phone] All right.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] . . . under this arrangement for main-
tenance of law and order.
President Kennedy: [on another phone] Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] I’ll do that, but I just thought you’d
cover the points, and OK . . .
President Kennedy: [on another phone] All right. Just call me now
that it’s going to be important [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Yeah, but I mean, just so you know
the facts and so that that we can . . . Yeah. OK.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] Now, how is it down there now?
Marshall: OK. I’ll call you [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] OK.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Robert Kennedy: [on the phone] OK. Would you hold?
Marshall: Well, we ought to get . . . Oh, have we called up other
Guard units?
Robert Kennedy: Well, they were sending them all, I guess.
Marshall: They are?
Robert Kennedy: Well, I’m not sure. [Unclear.]
Doors close and the machine is left running. It is about 1:00 A.M. and
the Cabinet Room is empty. Someone enters the room again and turns
the machine off.
1:45 A.M.
[W]e’ve got to get this situation under control.

President Kennedy is losing his patience both with the U.S. Army, which
has yet to arrive on the scene in Oxford, and with the Mississippi
Governor, who has not contributed anything to restoring order at Ole
Miss since the unfortunate decision to remove the state troopers over
four hours earlier. The President does not know that Governor Ross
Barnett is indeed preparing to speak to the people of Mississippi about
the crisis in Oxford. All that is known in Washington is that the FBI in
Oxford has just detected a group of 150 state troopers sitting in their
cars doing nothing but watching the unfolding tragedy.
The conversation begins with unrelated fragments of phone conversation,

perhaps on another line; then the recording of the main conversation begins.
Unidentified: He treated a number of other people. I asked him how
many doctors he had, and how many . . .
Recording switches to following conversation.
Ross Barnett: [Unclear—]
Barnett: —and I, he said that what we were talking about we would-
n’t have any trouble. Do it tonight, you know.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, our people say that it’s still a very
strange situation. They wouldn’t feel that they could take a chance on
taking him outside that building. Now if we, can we get these fellows? I
hear they got some high-powered rifles up there that have been shooting
sporadically. Can we get that stopped? How many people have you got
there? We hear you only got 50.
Barnett: Well, I have approximately 200 there now, Mr. President.
That’s not that . . .
President Kennedy: You got 200?
Barnett: Sir, about 200.
President Kennedy: Well, now let me get in touch with my people.
Barnett: . . . and we don’t have but 210 or [2]12, patrolmen, you see.
President Kennedy: I see. Well, now, let me get my people back again.
Barnett: I’m doing everything in the world I can.
President Kennedy: That’s right. Well, we’ve got to get this situation
under control. That’s much more important than anything else.
Barnett: Yes. Well, that’s right.
President Kennedy: Now, let me talk to my people, and let me find
out what the situation is there.
Barnett: Yes.
President Kennedy: They called me a few minutes ago and said they
had some high-powered rifles there. So we don’t want to start moving . . .
Barnett: Mr. President . . .
President Kennedy: . . . anybody around.
Barnett: . . . people are wiring me and calling me saying, “Well,
you’ve given up.” I said, I had to say, “No, I’m not giving up, not giving
up any fight.”95
President Kennedy: Yeah, but we don’t want to . . .
Barnett: “I never give up. I, I have courage and faith, and, we’ll win
this fight.” You understand. That’s just to Mississippi people.
President Kennedy: I understand. But I don’t think anybody, either
in Mississippi or anyplace else, wants a lot of people killed.
Barnett: Oh, no. No. I . . .
President Kennedy: And that’s what, Governor, that’s the most
important thing. We want . . .
Barnett: . . . I’ll issue any statement, any time about peace and vio-
lence.
President Kennedy: Well, now here’s what we could do. Let’s get the
maximum number of your state police to get that situation so we don’t
have sporadic firing. I will then be in touch with my people and then you
and I’ll be talking again in a few minutes; see what we got there then.
Barnett: All right.
Barnett: All right now.
President Kennedy: I’ll be back.
1:50 A.M.
[C]an you get them so that we stop this rifle shooting?
Continuation of Conversation with Ross Barnett96

Kennedy again emphasizes to Barnett the importance of restoring order,
while Barnett assures the President that he is doing everything possible
to gain control of the situation.
95. Throughout the evening, the Governor was deluged with calls and telegrams urging him
not to “sell out” to the Kennedys. In response to such talk, Barnett went on the air shortly
before midnight (local time), and declared, “I call on Mississippians to keep the faith and
courage. We will never surrender.”
Continuation of Conversation with Ross Bar nett 309

Unidentified: Just one moment, sir.
Unidentified: There you are, sir. There’s the President.
President Kennedy: Hello. Hello.
Ross Barnett: Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Yes, Governor.
Barnett: I just talked with Colonel Birdsong . . . 97
Barnett: . . . who is our director of the highway patrol . . .
Barnett: . . . and he assures me that he has approximately 150 men
there now.98
President Kennedy: Now, we got a report that they’re all in their
cars two or three blocks away.
Barnett: I told ’em, just like you asked me, to get moving.
President Kennedy: I see. Now, can you get them so that we stop this
rifle shooting? That’s what we got to stop.
Barnett: Well, he says he’s doing all that he can. He says they’re
strangers in there.
President Kennedy: I know it, well that’s what we hear.
Barnett: And he’s calling for 50 more, and that’ll put it up around
200.
President Kennedy: Can they get those students to go to bed?
Barnett: Well, he says he’s trying to, and I don’t think it’ll be long
before he can get them all to bed.
President Kennedy: OK. Will you stay at . . .
Barnett: Maybe not, I can’t tell.
President Kennedy: Well, let’s stay right at it. We ought to be, that’s
what we got to do before we can do anything.
Barnett: . . . he’s reporting constantly to a gentleman who has con-
trol of the activities of the troops there.
Barnett: And he understands that he’s doing all he can.
President Kennedy: Well, I think that it’s very important, Governor,
aside from this issue; we don’t want a lot of people killed just because they,
particularly, evidently two or three guardsmen have been shot. And, of
course, our marshals and then that state trooper, so we don’t want . . .
97. T. B. Birdsong was head of the Mississippi Highway Patrol.

98. This is presumably the 150 men seen sitting in their cars near campus.
2:00 A.M.
When will they be there?
Conversation between Robert Kennedy and Creighton Abrams99

Task Force Alpha finally arrived at the Oxford Airport at 1:50 A.M., after
the cloud of tear gas over Ole Miss had prevented a daring landing at the
campus. The President and his brother feared new delays. It had taken
Captain Murry Falkner’s National Guard Unit well over an hour to
move the few miles from downtown Oxford to the Lyceum. With the air-
port even farther away from the campus, the White House wondered how
the U.S. Army could accelerate the deployment of its 200-man advance
contingent.
The tape begins with General Creighton Abrams’s trying to explain
the Army’s plan to move the men. Abrams is monitoring the situation
from the Millington Naval Air Station, outside Memphis, Tennessee.
Creighton Abrams: Mr. Geoghegan reports to me that there are more

than enough trucks at the strip, with 180 men in the helicopters. 100
Robert Kennedy: You got 180 men? Where are the rest of them?
Abrams: Moving on the road.
Robert Kennedy: When will they be there?
Abrams: Uh, about two hours and three-quarters. That would be
quarter of three in the morning our time.
Robert Kennedy: Quarter of five our time? How many of them are
there?
Unidentified: [off the phone in the room] Quarter of five.
Robert Kennedy: How many of them are there?
Abrams: The 500.
Robert Kennedy: And when do the rest of . . .
99. Dictabelts 4F7 and 4G1, Cassettes A and B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
100. Geoghegan and Ramsey Clark at the Justice Department War Room have maintained the
only continuous contact to the U.S. Army during this crisis. The U.S. Army evidently relies on
the Justice Department War Room for information about the battle conditions in Oxford.
After this crisis, the Army would be criticized for not having done any preliminary reconnais-
sance in Oxford.
Conversation between Robert Kennedy and Creighton Abrams 311
Abrams: Behind that’s another battalion, marching right behind

them, of 680.
Robert Kennedy: They’re MPs?
Abrams: MPs.
Robert Kennedy: What was the delay in getting them out of
Memphis?
Abrams: They . . . I don’t know the details of it, Mr. Kennedy. They . . .
this is the best response they could make, apparently, under the circum-
stances.
Robert Kennedy: Well, who’s in charge of that?
Abrams: Each of those battalions has a battalion commander, and both
battalions are under the command of General [Charles] Billingslea. They
had a meeting over here this afternoon, which I did not attend. But they
had a meeting in which they discussed all these plans.
Robert Kennedy: Well, didn’t they say they could get off and down
there within an hour?
Abrams: Yes, they expected a much more rapid response than has
occurred. I know General Billingslea did.
Robert Kennedy: What happened then?
Abrams: I don’t know.
Robert Kennedy: Is somebody going to find out?
Abrams: Yes, sir.
Robert Kennedy: [Sighs.] What about the battle group?
Abrams: We have gotten ahold of the battle group and have diverted
them. We got ahold of them at [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: When will they be down there?
Abrams: . . . Tennessee. I don’t have a new estimate on that, sir.
We’ve, it’s only been within the last 15 or 20 minutes that we got ahold
of them, and it hasn’t been recast. But I can get it very shortly.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. Will you call me back at the White House?
Unidentified: [Unclear.]101
Abrams: I will.
Robert Kennedy: OK. Thank you.
Abrams: Yes, sir.
Robert Kennedy hangs up.
101. This conversation continues on Dictabelt 4G.

4:20 A.M.
General, you ought to consider what kind of communication

you’re going to set up at that airport because you’re going to
have people flying in there.
Conversation with Creighton Abrams102

Five and one half hours after President Kennedy ordered U.S. troops to
the campus at the University of Mississippi, Task Force Alpha reached the
riot zone. President Kennedy is frustrated by the delays and misinforma-
tion swirling about this entire operation. Once he knows that the troops
have arrived, he decides to make a point of stressing the need for better
coordination and implementation once daylight returns to Oxford.
Evelyn Lincoln: Hello.

Unidentified: General Abrams calling the President from Millington,
Tennessee.103
Lincoln: [off the phone to President Kennedy] General Abrams is on
the line at the other end.
President Kennedy: Hello. Hello?
Unidentified: Here you are, sir?
Creighton Abrams: General Abrams.
President Kennedy: Yes, General.
Abrams: I have a report from General [Charles] Billingslea.
President Kennedy: That’s right. Now, the Attorney General has
him on the other phone.
[off the phone to Robert Kennedy] Is that General Billingslea you got?
[back to Abrams] We got him on the other phone. So we’ll be talk . . .
Abrams: The MP company arrived on the campus at 2:15 local time.
President Kennedy: Right. OK, now, General, what about the rest of . . .
When are these other MPs going to get there? Do you know?
Abrams: The 503rd MPs should arrive at approximately zero four-
thirty.
President Kennedy: That’s local time there?
102. Dictabelt 4G2, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
103. Location of Memphis Naval Air Station.
Conversation with Creighton Abrams 313
Abrams: Local time.

President Kennedy: That’s, in other words, that’s two hours?
Abrams: Local time here.
President Kennedy: That’s the group that set out by truck, is it?
Abrams: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: So, your addition—
Abrams: They’re followed by another MP battalion that should arrive
at five. There, there’s just the length of the battalion between them.
President Kennedy: In other words, but the next MP group to arrive
won’t be for two hours. Is that correct?
Abrams: That’s correct, sir.
President Kennedy: Then after that there’ll be some more in a half
hour. Then what about that battle group?
Abrams: They, they . . . Just a moment, sir.
[off the phone to someone in the room] The battle group is [unclear].
[back to President Kennedy] Six o’clock, sir.
President Kennedy: What? Six o’clock.
Abrams: Six o’clock.
President Kennedy: Well, now, General, you ought to consider what
kind of communication you’re going to set up at that airport because
you’re going to have people flying in there. Seems to me you ought to
have very good communications with that airport as well as the campus.
Abrams: Yes.
President Kennedy: With General . . . In other words, General
Billingslea ought to have a communication with the airport. You ought
to have a communication with the airport and Billingslea because we’re
going to have people flying in there all day tomorrow.
Abrams: Yes.
President Kennedy: And then, of course, we got the problem of
transportation and all the rest. So these are all matters that you’ll be
dealing with. But I think communication is very important.
Abrams: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: OK. Fine, General. Thank you.
The arrival of U.S. troops calmed the situation immediately on campus.

The student mob dispersed and an uneasy peace took hold. The change
in the situation in Oxford gave the President an opportunity to get some
sleep. The Attorney General and Burke Marshall went to the Justice
Department, and Kennedy retired to the Mansion for a nap.
314 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 1, 1962
Monday, October 1, 1962
The President managed to get about three hours’ sleep after the previ-
ous night’s vigil. Still in the family quarters, he called Governor Ross
Barnett to press for some local assistance in keeping order. Concerned
that a large number of outsiders would be in the area, the President
believed that local officials would be especially useful in helping to keep
the peace.
8:46 A.M.
And I think that doesn’t change your position on the issue, but
at least it helps maintain order, which is what we’ve got to do
today.

Begins in midconversation.
Ross Barnett: . . . let the public know we’ve talked so many times,
don’t you think?
President Kennedy: That’s correct. Now here’s what I’m going to . . .
Barnett: Now, I can tell you . . . I think you said it mighty well last
night, that “tried to reach the conclusion and couldn’t,” or words to that
effect.
President Kennedy: Now, I was very . . . As you know in my speech, I
didn’t even mention [unclear] . . .
Barnett: “[Unclear] fail,” I believe you said.2
President Kennedy: That’s right, you know, and I didn’t go into . . .
Barnett: You made a wonderful statement there.
2. The text of Kennedy’s 30 September 1962 radio and television speech on the situation at
the University of Mississippi can be found in the Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy,
1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 726–28.
President Kennedy: Well, now, the thing is, Governor, I want your
help in getting these state police to continue to help during the day
because they’re their own people. And we are going to have a lot of
strange troops in there, and we are going to have paratroopers in and all
the rest. And I think the state police should be the key, and that depends
on you.
Barnett: Oh, I . . . You’ll have, you’ll have the whole force that we
have.
President Kennedy: Well, now, you tell them . . .
Barnett: The [unclear] men are not equipped like yours.
President Kennedy: I understand that. But during the daytime they
can help keep order on these roads and keep a lot of people from coming
in. And I think that doesn’t change your position on the issue, but at
least it helps maintain order, which is what we’ve got to do today.
Barnett: All right, Mr. President.
Barnett: I’ll stay here now.
President Kennedy: Thank you very much.
Barnett: Thank you so much.
President Kennedy: And keep after your state police now.
Barnett: I will.
President Kennedy: Thanks.
Barnett: I’ll call him as soon as we hang up . . .
Barnett: . . . n’ tell him to do all he can to keep peace.
President Kennedy: OK, thanks, Governor.
Barnett: And when’ll I hear from you again?
President Kennedy: I’ll be talking to you about noon, my time.
Barnett: OK. Thank you so much. Good-bye.
President Kennedy: OK, Governor.
Still upstairs at the White House, the President called the solicitor gen-
eral, Archibald Cox, to discuss some legal issues raised by the Oxford
riot. In particular, the President was considering seeking the arrest of
Governor Barnett and Major General Edwin Walker. The President was
due to see Cox at the Supreme Court in less than a half hour at the
swearing in of Arthur Goldberg as associate justice. He was giving the
Solicitor General some warning as to what was on his mind.
316 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 1, 1962
9:31 A.M.
I wonder if we can get more precise information on where we

are legally on arresting people, including the Governor if nec-
essary and others?
Conversation with Archibald Cox3

Phone rings.
Evelyn Lincoln: Hello.
Unidentified: I have Mr. Archibald Cox, the solicitor general, return-
ing the President’s call.
Lincoln: OK.
Archibald Cox: Good morning, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Good morning, I’m just on my way up there.4
Now, the only question I had was whether there are any additional
proclamations or powers, et cetera, that we might need in the Mississippi
matter if it gets worse, for arresting people, and under what charge and
what legal penalties they face, and so on. For example, we want to arrest
General Walker, and I don’t know whether we just arrest him under dis-
turbing the peace or whether we arrest him for more than that. 5 I won-
der if . . . How long are you going to be at the court this morning?
Cox: Not beyond half past ten.
4. The President was on his way to the Supreme Court to attend the swearing in of Arthur J.
Goldberg as associate justice.
5. Major General Edwin A. Walker, U.S. Army, retired, was on the scene in Oxford and was
present in the crowd on the night of the riot. On 1 October, he was arrested on four charges,
including insurrection, and was held in lieu of $100,000 bail. After his arrest, Walker asserted,
“They don’t have a thing on me.” He also issued a statement to Governor Ross Barnett, claim-
ing his (Walker’s) efforts had been undertaken on behalf of the “stand for freedom everywhere.”
While Walker apparently played more of an observer’s role in the melee, prior to the riot, he
had issued a call from his home in Dallas, urging “patriotic” Americans to join him in
Mississippi to oppose the federal government and the integration of the campus. Worth noting
is that in 1957, Walker had commanded federal troops in Little Rock, Arkansas, in a celebrated
event in the history of the civil rights movement; in 1962, he observed, he would be on the
right side. After resigning from the Army in 1961, Walker had devoted himself to public affairs;
his activities often centered on the claim that Communists had infiltrated the U.S. Government
and the country generally. On 6 October, Walker was released on $50,000 bail, and returned to
Texas the next day, where he was greeted by some 200 supporters. He was never tried.
Conversation with Cyrus Vance and Robert McNamara 317
President Kennedy: Yeah, well then I wonder if we can get more pre-
cise information on where we are legally on arresting people, including
the governor if necessary and others?6
Cox: Right.
President Kennedy: And what the penalties are because we might
want to announce that on the radio and television that anyone involved
in any demonstration or anything would be subject to this penalty, and
maybe the General could announce it.7
Cox: Right. Good-bye.
President Kennedy: All right. OK. Thank you.
Cox: Thank you.
After returning from the Supreme Court, the President met with David
Bell and Elmer Staats on the federal budget. At 11:30 A.M., the President
would be presenting the Distinguished Service Medal to General Lyman
Lemnitzer, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cyrus
Vance, the secretary of the Army, was expected to be in attendance.
Before Vance came to the White House, Kennedy wanted to be sure that
the U.S. Army contingent in Mississippi was going to be large enough
for any contingency.
11:12 A.M.
Now how are we doing on our schedule?
Conversation with Cyrus Vance and Robert McNamara8

Cyrus Vance: Yes, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Oh, yeah, I understood they’re having some riot-
6. Barnett was never arrested because the Kennedy administration believed the potential costs
outweighed any possible gains that might accrue from his arrest and prosecution. According
to a January 1963 White House memorandum [see Victor S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice (pbk.
ed.; New York: Atheneum, 1977, pp. 237–38], there was little point in arresting and trying
the governor, which would have made him a “hero.”
7. Attorney General Robert Kennedy.
8. Dictabelt H, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
318 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 1, 1962
ing downtown, and so on, and throwing rocks, and so on, at the troops.
Now how are we doing on our schedule?
Vance: Our schedule is still proceeding as I gave it to you [seems to be
sound of hanging up a telephone], sir.
President Kennedy: Yeah, well, you don’t know . . . Has anybody
arrived this morning?
Vance: [speaking off the telephone to someone in the room] Has anybody
arrived this morning from those 1,700?
[speaking to President Kennedy] Not yet, due in earliest at, what [speak-
ing off the phone to someone in the room], ten o’clock their time is it? Let’s
see, what’s their time?
President Kennedy: Midnight. That’d be midday.
Vance: 11:20.
President Kennedy: 11:20 their time?
Vance: Yep.
President Kennedy: That’s 1:20 our time, isn’t it?
Vance: Yes.
President Kennedy: Now that is what, 1,700 more?
Vance: Yeah. That’s, let’s see, that first increment is 900. Yeah.
President Kennedy: And they’re due in at 1:20? What group is that?
Vance: 1:20. Yeah, 1:20 our time.
President Kennedy: What group is . . . ?
Vance: That is the 82nd Airborne.
President Kennedy: Right. I see. OK. Fine. All right. Are you going
to come over to this ceremony . . . ?9
Vance: No, I thought I’d better stay here, sir.
President Kennedy: I see. Well, now I talked to Secretary McNamara;
he said something about you might be able to have 20,000 troops by mid-
night. Is . . . ?
Vance: That’s right. We are taking steps to get them in. The orders
have been given. The only limiting factor may be the weather, which is
closing in. But we’re developing alternates so that we can get them in
some way or other.
President Kennedy: I see. You mean you might send them to Memphis
and then what?
Vance: If we can’t get into Memphis, we’ll try Columbus. Now this
may add a little bit of time in getting them back, so we may not be able
9. The Distinguished Service Medal was presented to General Lyman Lemnitzer in the White
House Rose Garden on 1 October 1962.
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962 319
to finally make it by twelve, but we’ll do everything we can to get them

in as soon as possible.
President Kennedy: I see. OK. Fine.
Vance: Just a second; Bob [McNamara] is here.
Robert McNamara: Hello, Bobby.
President Kennedy: Yes. Oh, this is . . . No, this is the President.
McNamara: [Unclear], oh, Mr. President.
McNamara: I think that with the priority the Air Force is giving this
and we’re diverting all our MATS aircraft and our troop carrier aircraft,
we can get them there by midnight.10
President Kennedy: Right. I see. You coming over for this . . . ?
McNamara: No, sir. I just gave my citation to Ros and he will read it.
I thought I’d stay here . . .
President Kennedy: I see. OK.
McNamara: . . . and follow this.
President Kennedy: Righto. Fine. Thank you.
McNamara: Thank you.
By late in the day, a force of nearly 5,000 National Guardsmen and sol-
diers were in Oxford, Mississippi. As of the next morning, 8,735 troops
would have reached the town.
After the ceremony for General Lemnitzer, the same group wit-
nessed the swearing in of Maxwell Taylor as Lemnitzer’s replacement.
The President then went for a swim and his lunch. In the afternoon, he
had an unrecorded conversation with George Ball, Ralph Dungan, and
Carl Kaysen. This brought the President’s official day to an end.
Tuesday, October 2, 1962
The legislative tide was turning in the administration’s favor. In July it

had seemed President Kennedy would achieve very little of his domestic
agenda due to congressional obstruction. But in two months, what was
10. The acronym MATS stands for Military Air Transport Service.
320 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
once called the “Won’t Do” Congress had been somewhat transformed.
On Monday the Senate had passed a version of the Foreign Aid Bill that
restored 70 percent of the cuts made by the House. And this morning
the President was able to sign one more bill that had seemed in trouble
earlier in the summer. At a 9:30 A.M. ceremony he signed the U.N. Bond
Act, which authorized a substantial U.S. loan to the international organi-
zation. This was encouraging too, in light of Kennedy’s concerns in late
August that events in the Congo would derail its passage.
Kennedy was taping very little at this point. Following a meeting with
former U.S. ambassador to France James Gavin, the President received a
confidential briefing from military aide Major General Chester V. Clifton.
It is possible the President received the results of the September 29 in-
and-out U-2 flight over Guantánamo and the western tip of Cuba. This
mission brought evidence of new SAM sites but no surface-to-surface mis-
sile installations. Cuba was certainly the subject of a meeting at 11:12 A.M.
with George Ball and Carl Kaysen. Ball presented the President with a
series of alternatives for dealing with non–Soviet bloc ships trading with
Cuba. As a result of this meeting, the President chose “to close all United
States ports to any ship that on the same continuous voyage was used or is
being used in Bloc-Cuba trade.”1
Cuba was also the focus of a luncheon given by Kennedy for the for-
eign ministers of 19 Latin American countries. There he pressed for a
joint hemispheric approach to the increasing Soviet presence in Cuba.
The one meeting Kennedy taped was a discussion of the 1963 budget
in light of its implications for future tax policy. Current budget estimates
exceeded the political threshold of $100 billion, a first for the federal
budget, with a $6 billion deficit. Would a budget that size kill any possi-
bility of tax cuts in 1963? Already Kennedy had to consider the possible
political consequences in 1964 of this level of deficit spending.
1. Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Ball to President Kennedy, 2 October 1962,
FRUS, 11: 3–4. Carl Kaysen noted the President’s reaction to this memorandum in National
Security Action Memorandum No. 194, 2 October 1962, ibid., pp. 4–5.
Meeting on the Budg et and Tax Cut Proposal 321
4:20 –5:20 P.M.
So, if we go ahead with the idea of a substantial tax cut, we

don’t believe in these people who say that they have to cut
expenditures equivalently. But we do believe that you have to
put on a performance that looks like you’re being careful with
the expenditures.
Meeting on the Budget and Tax Cut Proposal2

As the 87th Congress struggled to finish its business—adjourning on
October 13, 1962—and with the 1962 midterm elections fast approaching,
President Kennedy hoped to settle on a budget policy that would enhance
the prospects for his party in the midterm election, the passage of pending
tax cut legislation to be introduced in 1963, and his own reelection effort in
1964. He would make clear in the following discussion that the kind of pol-
icy he desired—a deficit now, produced largely with a tax cut and increased
or accelerated public works expenditures—would be exceedingly difficult
to sell to either Wilbur Mills or Harry Byrd, respective chairs of the House
and Senate committees on which the fate of his tax cut proposal ultimately
rested. Rehearsing the economics of gap-closing and full employment,
Kennedy and his advisers would discuss both the budget as a whole and
specific questions related to individual budget items.3 Should the official
budget be changed to reflect trust fund transactions? Would Senate
Finance Committee chairman Harry Byrd swallow any budget over the
potentially shocking $100 billion mark and still endorse the administra-
tion’s tax cut proposal?4 Could committee chairman Wilbur Mills deliver a
2. Including President Kennedy, Gardner Ackley, David E. Bell, C. Douglas Dillon, Walter
Heller, Charles Schultze, Theodore Sorensen, and Elmer B. Staats. Tape 27.1, John F. Kennedy
3. When Ted Sorensen wondered aloud why raising the employment “score” from 93 to 96 per-
cent, from A-minus to A, deserved such high political priority, Kennedy’s Council of Economic
Advisers (and staff economist Arthur Okun in particular) undertook to outline and document
the changes in general economic conditions that resulted from small changes in unemployment
rates. What came to be called Okun’s law suggested that 3 extra percentage points in unemploy-
ment implied a 10 percent gap between actual and potential GNP. This gap was estimated to be
approximately $51 billion at the time of Kennedy’s inauguration and had closed to approxi-
mately $30 billion at the beginning of 1962.
4. Indeed, when Lyndon Johnson finally convinced Byrd to pass the 1964 Tax Cut bill out of the
Senate Finance Committee in January 1964, a budget introduced then under $100 billion
assured the success of President Johnson’s lobbying efforts. “Harry,” Johnson announced after
322 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
tax cut from the House Ways and Means Committee with sufficient alacrity
to lift the economy before it fell too far behind its full-employment poten-
tial? Would a recession be required to force Mill’s hand, or could the
administration convince him and others that to wait for a recession would
mean failing to exploit the potential of an economy that was growing but
growing all too sluggishly?
Because the performance of the U.S. economy had most recently fallen
short of administration projections—a $555 billion GNP at midyear,
when the Council of Economic Advisors had forecast $570 billion—the
administration’s full-employment goal, established conservatively at 4
percent, was no longer a realistic target for 1963 but had to be pushed
back to the middle of the presidential election year of 1964.5 Slippage in
the employment target was a symptom of a larger problem for the
President and his economic team. Leading economic indicators were
offering only an indistinct picture of current economic trends; the signif-
icant durable goods orders category, for example, had reversed its direc-
tion every month from May to August. Kennedy needed to know where
the economy was heading to make a firm decision on tax cuts.
Somehow the White House had to reconcile a certain reluctance to
act, in the face of opposition from Congress and much of the U.S. busi-
ness community, with a growing unease at inaction, produced by an
uncertain, perhaps teetering, domestic economy. To find a good eco-
nomic policy when the best was beyond the political pale, as Kennedy
adviser Walter Heller once put it, was the task at hand as the President
convened the following meeting.
Elmer Staats: . . . well, we’ve thought of that, Mr. President, just to
inject . . . one note of optimism is that I think it is very likely that you
will not have a deficit on the income . . . the national income basis which,
as you know—and nobody else seems to know [unclear] the question—
presenting the official budget for fiscal year 1965, “I’ve got the damn thing under $100 billion . . .
way under. It’s only $97.9 billion. Now you can tell your friends that you forced the President of
the United States to reduce the budget before you let him have his tax cut” [quoted in Richard
Goodwin, Remembering America: A Voice From the Sixties (Boston: Little, Brown, 1988), p. 262].
5. The 1963 target was introduced in Kennedy’s first Economic Report to Congress delivered
on 22 January 1962 [see “Message to the Congress Presenting the President’s First
Economic Report. 22 January 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 45].
that the amount of the deficit will be less than the amount of the cut . . .
the net reduction in taxes.6 So that you could say that tax reduction is
really what’s causing the deficit. You need that for full-range growth
because . . .
President Kennedy: That is what sustains the argument that the
deficit is necessary to counteract [unclear], but you’d have a tough time
justifying this tax cut because they’ll say we should reduce expenditures.
As much as you have intended to reduce the taxes, we’re going to have to
make the argument that the deficit is desired.
Douglas Dillon: Yeah, well, also you have the other argument that
tax reduction is desirable to take the brakes off growth and provides
incentives and that to make reductions equivalent to that would mean
that you’d have to cut your defense budget and things like that. And,
obviously, either way it’s the—
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t, I don’t mind taking on that argu-
ment so much. I’m not as—
Dillon: Although I find the second one, that’ll pitch everything on the
economic angle, that people don’t understand, although I think it’s . . .
will have to be made politically.
Theodore Sorensen: That’s really my point also, Doug. In other
words, we can say that, at least on the income . . . national income basis,
we could give you a balanced budget if we’re not thinking a tax cut, but
we think the tax cut is needed.
David Bell: Well, you can’t, economically, sustain precisely that point . . .
if I recall the figures correctly. Because without the tax cut, the economy
would not be pushing high enough so that that would be true, you see.7
Sorensen: Because of the feedback on taxes?
Bell: Exactly—because of taxes. But, the point, I think, is—
President Kennedy: Well, the problem is . . . is ’64.
Dillon: Another thing that complicates that, Mr. President, is this idea
of what we said we’d do is to make a retroactive tax cut. And, the effect of
that really is that, for most of these assumptions, are that you won’t be able
to get any of that retroactivity in operation except by refunds which take
place in ’64. So in ’64 you have a double deduction: you have the deduction
6. The national income basis is a method of budgetary accounting, unlike the standard federal
procedure known as the administrative budget, that includes trust fund receipts and expendi-
tures (Social Security, highway grants-in-aid, unemployment compensation, etc.), omits gov-
ernment transactions in financial assets (e.g., federal loans), and records liabilities when they
are incurred (accrual basis) and not when cash changes hands.
7. To produce enough revenue to achieve balance.
324 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
on the income side, not only from tax-rate reduction but also from the
refunds for ’63, which are claimed backwards. So it’s—I’ve forgotten what
the figure is—about a 3 or 4 billion dollar deficit.
Bell: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Deficit?
Bell: Yeah. But . . . the assumption is made here that the figures you
see there is about 2 billion dollars. The deficit in ’60—fiscal ’64, which
represents refunds—
Charles Schultze: If—
Bell: —to people who paid—
Schultze: If you—
Bell: —their taxes in ’63.
Schultze: If you look on page 7, and look at that fiscal ’64 figure of a
13 billion dollar deficit, if the reductions were not retroactive, that figure
would be 9.6 billion.
Bell: Yes, you’re right. And—
Schultze: And even if the . . . if the corporate rates were retroactive,
but we coupled that with the Mills plan, but the personal rates were not
retroactive, it would still be 9.6—8
Bell: You’d get—
Schultze: You get below your 10 billion figure. This means that a
great deal of the . . . we put this into the picture, if we did that, went back
to where we left off and we left out the commitment, just on the personal
income tax, your 981/2 billion figure would be less than a 100 billion; it
would be a substantially less increase than in previous years; you could
probably cut your deficit below 10 billion to this 9.6; and you could cite
the fact that the tax cut is equal to about three fourths of the deficit.
That is, that the tax cut of 7 billion that this is based on is equal to three-
fourths of the deficit. Now, the argument against that is that the lack of
retroactivity would not permit your return to full employment, but
would bring it down to about 41/2 percent rather than 4 percent in ’64.
Bell: The retroactivity part of it that you really have to be asked to
make a decision on, very obviously, is a tricky one, because the time you
need the economic boost from a tax cut would probably be next spring,
8. Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, had suggested in ear-
lier meetings with the President and other administration officials that the Internal Revenue
Service could reduce withholding rates, alone or in conjunction with a tax cut, to jump-start
the economy.
and that’s not the most likely time to get the tax bill enacted. So, this is
going to be a difficult legislative problem.
President Kennedy: Unless you have to divide it, I don’t know. We
could look for that.
Dillon: Even if you do that, if, you see, if it passes very quickly, you . . .
there’s no particular feeling that, say if it even became law some time in
May, then you probably couldn’t get the refund checks out in time. On the
other hand, in ’63 . . .
President Kennedy: There’s nothing we can do about the deficit,
then, with respect to recession in the winter or spring, is there? As far as
a tax cut?
Walter Heller: But, do you really think that’s a . . . that’s an inescapable
con[clusion] . . . legislative judgment, given the fact that there had been a
couple of cases where Congress has whistled through a tax cut?
Dillon: Oh, if we could get a tax cut through in March, we could get,
oh . . . we could get, definitely, some of the refunds out in time, but not
all of them.
President Kennedy: Well, John Gerrity called, said in about thirty
minutes Kaiser Steel’s going to take the price on it and cut it. 9 Twelve
dollars a ton across the board?10
Unidentified: Fools! [A whistle.]
Unidentified: A cut!
Unidentified: A cut!
President Kennedy: Twelve dollars a ton?
Unidentified: Gee! [Unclear exchange. Laughter.]
Staats: Well, I would . . . Let’s see, It would be . . .
Unidentified: Eight percent . . .
Staats: One hundred and four dollars . . .
9. John Gerrity was the Washington bureau reporter for the New York–based Daily Bond
Buyer. See Walter Heller’s later comments in the transcript.
10. Later that day, Kaiser Steel Company announced cuts on products from its Fontana,
California, mill. It changed its price for plates and structural shapes to $108 a ton from $122
a ton; for hot-rolled steel to $104 a ton from $116.50 a ton (compared to the $106 a ton
charged by eastern mills); and for cold-rolled steel to $143 a ton from $148 a ton. The price
cut on which Kennedy and his advisers are commenting here is the price cut for Kaiser’s hot-
rolled steel. Chairman Edgar Kaiser noted later that day that the cuts were made to end
regional differences, to make the West more competitive domestically, and to “materially
assist in combating foreign steel imports to the West coast.” Immediately after the Kaiser
cuts, U.S. Steel’s Geneva Steel division in Torrance, California, and Pittsburg, California,
announced comparable cuts.
326 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
Unidentified: Twelve dollars . . .

Staats: I mean 140 dollars, which is about—
Unidentified: Eight percent.
Bell: Eight percent. Yeah.
Heller: This fellow Gerrity’s very close to the steel industry. . . .
President Kennedy: Who is it?
Heller: And there’s a good chance that that’s right. He’s a reporter
now for the Bond Buyer. He used to be up on the Hill. That’s one Irish
Catholic—
President Kennedy: What’s the effect going to be of that? On the
economy?
Sorensen: It ought to be good.
President Kennedy: Good?
Bell: It’ll stimulate buying of steel. . . .
President Kennedy: How would it?
Bell: On the other hand, it may be regarded as a symptom of a—
President Kennedy: Recession?
Bell: —of a recession.
Heller: Yes, I think the first reaction will be—
Unidentified: Stockholders will—
Heller: —the stock market will say—
Heller: —now the squeeze is going to get tighter.
Schultze: This may be what this stuff ’s all about, anticipating this.
[Unclear.]
Gardner Ackley: That lowers their profit position, too.
Schultze: Well, that’ll be the principal thing, I think, the impact on
profit.
Heller: Of course, steel users will not be entirely unhappy about this.
President Kennedy: That’s Roger’s. Roger Blough’s six-dollar
increase . . .11
Heller: This is a retroactive—
11. The President is referring here to the $6 a ton across-the-board increase implemented by
Roger Blough and U.S. Steel back on 10 April 1962, followed by increases by five other steel
companies the next day, and rescinded by all when the President objected publicly, said that he
had been double-crossed, and began deploying his government contract, antitrust, and tax law
leverage to force the rescission.
President Kennedy: Roger Blough is obviously . . . is just saying that—

Heller: —justification for the President’s action.12
Bell: Not long—
President Kennedy: Well, he could say, “No, it isn’t a justification,”
that if he ignored it, they would have to bring it down anyway.
Unidentified: No, I think it’s better than my calling Roger.
Ackley: What Walter’s saying is that this is not [unclear] this enter-
prise system we have, and so are our foreign competitors.
Dillon: And so . . .
Unidentified: They have [unclear].
Schultze: I would lay a small bet that this won’t—
Schultze: —involve one, more than one company.13
President Kennedy: Why?
Schultze: Why—
Heller: One percent of the industry, Mr. President.
Staats: And a maverick 1 percent at that.
Heller: Yeah.
Dillon: They don’t . . . barely sell the Pacific coast.
Schultze: This is a market maneuver, not only on the stock market
but in order to get Kaiser up a notch or two, you see.
Heller: Yeah, that’s right. That’s the competitive system.
President Kennedy: They’re all just a bunch anyway, you know.
Unidentified: [Unclear], that’s right.
Bell: Since the outlook for the economy is not clear . . .
Heller: Well, now, Dave, before . . . is it, is this an operating assump-
tion that we can’t possibly get a quick, simple kind of tax reduction,
across the board, of some kind?
Dillon: When? By March?
Bell: I take it that it depends on what the economic situation looks
like.
President Kennedy: I think it’s . . . I suppose it’s possible that you
12. Heller’s implication is that Kennedy’s effort to achieve a rescission of the April 1962 steel
price increases was an effort to force the steel companies to abide by, rather than thumb their
noses at, market fundamentals. Able to raise prices in the short run due to oligopoly positions
in the U.S. market and lucrative government contracts, the U.S. steel industry’s pricing power
was fast being undermined by increasing foreign competition.
13. As noted above, U.S. Steel’s Geneva division did follow suit.
328 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
could always, well, if you had any votes or if you broke even in the con-
gressional election maybe you can justify coming back and doing it if
you really thought it was necessary.14
Ackley: The economic conditions, I think, are obvious enough.
Dillon: Well, the vote answer is that’s the new Congress. They wouldn’t
start doing anything until close to the first of February.
Schultze: I would say in answer to your question, Walter, my own
judgment would be that if the economy is more or less moving along at
the present tide, no. You’ve got to have something that’s recognizable as
a recession.
Heller: Is there any, anything approaching a commitment from
Wilbur Mills to move fast if—?
President Kennedy: Oh, well, you know, it just depends really, on the
situation. I think—15 [Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: If you get those hearings, if they both have hearings, you
know, [unclear] but certainly Byrd would on anything like this. 16
President Kennedy: In June and July, is that the one?
Unidentified: In fact there [unclear] the hearings [unclear] month.
Bell: Well, in view of the fact, the possibility that, or the fact that we
don’t know what the most likely possibility is for the economy at this
stage, we are suggesting that the tax bills, in effect, be worked on over
the next Monday or two . . . which would be appropriate for either con-
tingency—if the outlook looks very good going on into ’63, or looks as
though a recession is going to be breathing down our neck. And that if
these questions of the timing and retroactivity and the nature of the tax
reduction and all that, on which the Treasury will be working on, be
brought back to you later this fall.
The presentation here, however, is intended to indicate that whichever
way it goes, you . . . it looks as though it’s kind of political to present a
deficit in ’64 of the size and magnitude . . . that we may want to be pre-
senting a proposition for economic reasons, which would be . . . make a
14. The President is returning to the idea of the special session of the lame duck Congress,
which he discussed with Wilbur Mills on August 6 (see Volume 1, “Meeting with Wilbur
Mills,” 6 August 1962).
15. Kennedy had arranged several recent meetings with Mills to discuss this issue (ibid).
16. Harry F. Byrd, Sr., was a U.S. senator from Virginia, 1933 to 1965; chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, 1955 to 1965; and founder of the Joint Committee on Reduction of
Federal Expenditures.
pretty, a pretty large deficit indeed. Now, so far as the expenditures are
concerned, we do have a need for some instructions on them at this point.
If you look at the thing that says “attachment” there, there’s no reason for
you to be called. And I’ll tell you in just a minute some other political
facts. The key point is that, as indicated there on pages 1 and 2, we find
built-in changes of about 5 billion dollars, which means—17
President Kennedy: What will those be . . . the major . . . in space, I
suppose?
Bell: Yeah. Space. At the bottom you’ll see a billion and a half of it is
defense, another billion and a half for NASA.18
President Kennedy: Where’s that? Oh, I see . . . both under five bil-
lion. Now, is that the pay increase?19
Bell: No, we do not count the pay increase as built-in, Mr. President;
we count that as optional. That’s on top of this. This is simply the
increased expenditures associated with the procurement plans and the
force plans that you’ve already approved.
President Kennedy: Three billion of the five billion is defense and
space . . . ?
Bell: Right.
President Kennedy: And a half a billion, really a half, is HEW?20
Bell: Right.
President Kennedy: Now, you’ve got a billion and a half left.
Bell: You’ve got a full table on page 5.
Bell: Now, beyond this, we think there is another billion seven, which
represents sensible carrying forward of your program, and, indeed, it
includes legislative proposals that are not passed this year but which
you’ve already recommended to the Congress. And that, the nature of
which . . . the amounts of those increases are also indicated in the table
on page 5. This is how we get the one being kept forward.
17. Early versions of this item may be found in the Theodore Sorensen Papers, Classified
Subject Files, Budget, 1966, Box 44, and Bureau of the Budget, Box 47.
18. National Aeronautical and Space Administration.
19. The reference is to the effects of the “Pay Bill” that Kennedy would sign nine days later on
11 October 1962 granting pay increases to all federal employees [see “Remarks Upon Signing
the Postal Service and Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents,
pp. 756–57].
20. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (later the Departments of Education and of
Health and Human Services).
330 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962

Bell: And we should warn you that there are a number of the cabinet
officers and agency heads that think these figures are too tight. And that
is also indicated in the table on page 5.
Staats: In other words, that’s [unclear], Mr. President, are in excess
of the amounts that we indicated here.
President Kennedy: Because [unclear] . . . what is the billion five
based on?
Bell: It is . . . out of the back . . . very detailed statements that includes
. . . The biggest single item is the 500 million dollar increase in Navy air-
craft . . . Navy aircraft expenditures which . . . let’s see, payments on the
planes that are, that are now being ordered or were ordered last year,
F4Hs in very large part.21 And another 300 million dollars of shipbuild-
ing, increased expenditures for shipbuilding under the shipbuilding pro-
gram which has already been embarked on. There, that’s principally the
start-up on Polaris submarines.22 There are other elements which add up
to close to a billion and a half as [unclear].
President Kennedy: AEC?23
Bell: Now, we would take the AEC down a little bit. This is strongly
opposed by Seaborg and it implies that both a tight program on weapons—
our advice does—and a tight program on civilian power reactors and that
sort of thing.24 The NASA program, if you would draw your attention to
the fact that our figures—the figure we have included in the 100.4 billion
which is 4 billion dollars of expenditures for NASA—that figure now looks
low, not because they are going to add anything in particular but because,
well, they’ve got better cost figures and this figure should be, according to
them—we haven’t fully reviewed this—about 4.7. We think that that’s
unnecessarily high, but it clearly is several hundred million dollars too low
unless some change were to be made in the ongoing program.
21. The F4Hs were fighter planes, later renamed F4A, and also known as “Phantoms.”
22. Polaris submarines, nuclear-powered submarines capable of submerged firing of Polaris bal-
listic missiles, began patrolling the seas in 1960. The third generation of Polaris submarines,
typified by the USS Lafayette and the USS Alexander Hamilton and capable of firing the 2,500-
mile A3 Polaris missile, were, at the time of this meeting, currently under development.
23. The abbreviation AEC stands for Atomic Energy Commission.
24. Glenn T. Seaborg was chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961 to 1971.
Recipient of the 1951 Nobel Prize in chemistry and discoverer of many of the known
transuranium elements, including plutonium, Seaborg also worked on the Manhattan Project
during World War II.
President Kennedy: I don’t like that. I notice aid to impacted school

districts and all the rest, built-in increases . . .25
Bell: Yes.
President Kennedy: That’s Interior . . . oh, we’re just not going to be
able to do all that, except saline water [unclear] less than that, but some
of the rest of that Interior, Justice . . .26
Bell: Beginning on page 15, Mr. President, we have indicated what
the kind of cutbacks below our figures which would be necessary to
reach this alternative target figure of 98.5. Let me get back to that point.
President Kennedy: What’s that on? What page?
Bell: On 15.
Unidentified: I think it’s to some advantage, though, Dave, to know
how [unclear] will look at the various increased expenditures.
Unidentified: Yeah, and lead up to—
President Kennedy: What about our putting in a . . . What effect
would it have if we put in the federal budget for the next three years? As
you know, the Congress, suddenly, they vote for these programs; nobody
realizes where it’s going to go. We have to take all this. I don’t know
whether we would gain or lose if we put in some of the next three years’
expenditures, and income, and estimates already put in this year.
Bell: Well, they would show . . . and a steadily improving relationship
between receipts and expenditures.27 I’m sure they would be sharply
attacked as “pie in the sky,” as just making the situation look good.
They would be perfectly honest figures, but any figures that far
ahead are necessarily fairly shaky. We would have to—in defending
them—we would need to not to unveil any news . . . that wouldn’t be
hard to defend under those carrying forward existing programs.
President Kennedy: What about when the FAA does a supersonic
string of jet transports?28 I see the French and the British have joined
together on that. I’m interested in that, because that’s a . . . an area
where we’ve got to maintain our position. There also is a dollar in it . . .
sale of aircraft abroad.
Bell: Well, it’s an item that thus far we do not have in—
25. Additional federal aid to school districts in areas of prominent federal installations, justi-
fied on the basis of diminished property tax base in the affected areas, was $229 million in the
final education appropriations bill for FY 1963.
26. “Saline water” refers to pilot desalinization projects.
27. Not, perhaps, what President Kennedy expected to be forecast.
28. The abbreviation FAA stands for the Federal Aviation Administration.
332 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
Bell: —the 100.4. So that would mean—

President Kennedy: I’d like to see if we could get a breakdown of
what he’s going to do with that 100 million, and then the arguments as
to why you don’t think they put it in.
Bell: [Volume fades several times during Bell’s comments.] Yes, well, we have
at our request, he has been making these contractors with special studies.
That’s not our concern. It’s difficult to separate the figures by the first of
December. Bob McNamara, as you may know, Mr. President, has expressed
some skepticism about this supersonic transport, whether we ever get an
urgency in terms of the market for it. 29 There’s also the question of why we
don’t do this with the British and the French. Why do we insist on being
competitive? It’s going to cost us a hell of a lot of money to develop it, and
it’s going to cost them a hell of a lot of money to develop it; maybe we ought
to do it together. How much of a revolutionary notion that would be—
Staats: Doesn’t he have a feeling it’s more of a prestige item—?
Bell: Yes.
Staats: —than it would be commercially profitable in that program,
for a long, long time?
Bell: This is a very high [unclear] for this fall’s budget consideration.
Do you want a special memorandum early in this—?
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t mean to put it in there, but I, any-
way . . . I was just sort of interested in itself . . . Whatever the proper
time would be.
Bell: Well, in any event, it’s not in our . . . [sound fades and returns] . . .
at this point, Mr. President.
Ten-second pause.
President Kennedy: Cancel the Skybolt?30 Well, you can’t do that;
there’s a commitment with the British, I think.31 Can’t cancel Skybolt.
Mobile Minuteman and [unclear] in all services.32 And a big Fall
29. Robert S. McNamara was secretary of defense.

30. The transport was an air-launched missile system on which Britain had relied to prolong its
manned-bomber nuclear deterrent. An American commitment to share Skybolt with the British
had been initiated in the Eisenhower administration, most likely at Camp David in March 1960.
Early in November 1962, according to Richard Neustadt’s “Top Secret” report to the President on
“Skybolt and Nassau,” “the Secretary of Defense put to the President and to the Secretary of State
the likelihood that we would terminate our Skybolt program” [Richard Neustadt, Report to JFK:
The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 27].
31. “They can’t cancel Skybolt on us,” one Air Force General told a budget bureau aide in
1962. “The British are in with us” (Neustadt, Report to JFK, p. 30).
32. The FY 1963 budget proposal included funding for 200 additional Minuteman interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (surface-to-surface).
increase in equipment modernization. Proposed pay legislation. Well,

he’s going to have . . . they have . . . . Are they due as much as the other
federal employees?33
Bell: We had thought so, and therefore we had . . . our figures include
a pay increase as of January 1 in ’64, one year after this Spring.
President Kennedy: Well, I’m inclined to think we’d have difficulty
avoiding increasing their pay.
Staats: You’d have difficulty letting it start earlier than that, and they
had difficulty, as you may recall, Mr. President, in getting them to post-
pone it because—
President Kennedy: Yeah. Well, I think we’ve got to go on that.
Bell: Well, these aren’t the only things you could do, but they are
illustrative of the fact that anything you did to try to knock this $100
billion figure down is going to run you into budgets like this.
Ten-second pause.
Bell: I would think, for instance, that it would be quite difficult to
eliminate all new starts for public works.34
President Kennedy: NASA. We got a pretty good . . . have you got a
good budget group that goes with . . . looking at all these NASA expen-
ditures?
Bell: Yes, we do. It’s handled by the same people that handle the mili-
tary budget: Veatch35 and Shapley,36 and then about four able, younger
guys who have been watching the program the last two or three years. We
have a pretty good feeling about the work, in so far as the budget side of it
is concerned . . . on the NASA program. But it’s a big program; . . . it’s
jumping up every day.
President Kennedy: It’s a question of whether we’re doing too many
things [unclear].
Bell: Well, this will be coming to you in about three weeks with a spe-
cial study and report on that. But, it does not look to me as though you
are going to want to trim it back to the extent it would be necessary to—
Ackley: Does your report read that, Defense and NASA, we’re deal-
33. Due to the “Pay Bill,” signed into law by President Kennedy nine days later (11 October
1962).
34. See “Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964,” 18 October 1962, in
which Bell advises against a policy of “no new starts.”
35. Ellis H. Veatch, chief of the Military Division, Bureau of the Budget. Though this division
would be renamed on several occasions, Veatch remained its chief until 1974.
36. Willis Shapley, deputy to Ellis Veatch and budget analyst for NASA and other science-
oriented agencies and programs.
334 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
ing with both space, both military and space just thrown together. . . .
Can your report [unclear]?
President Kennedy: I’m going to look here for some of the . . .
What’s your thought, Mr. Secretary?
Dillon: Well, the basic problem, where we see it, is that it’s probably
based on the extensive experience up until tax time of this year—
February, March, and quite a little bit—but we feel that instead it would
just be impossible to go up and get a tax reduction if our spending . . .
our increase in spending next year is larger than the increase in spend-
ing that we’ve had in any year so far. And that’s what the 100.4 is.
But the increase in spending in fiscal ’62 over ’61 was 6.2 billion
[unclear], and ’61 over ’60, rather, ’62 over ’61 it was 6 billion. And the
proposed increase here is 6.7 billion . . . increase in expenditures. And . . .
which is a larger increase than we’ve had before, so we just really, we
have to somehow get that down a respectable amount below the 6.2 and
6 billion increases, which were the previous ones, if we’re going to justify
a tax reduction.
Now the exact amount below is a difficult thing to judge. We said
981/2, which would put the increase at 4.8 compared with, with the 6
and 6.2. But the bulk of the real increase is that we think it has to be
substantially below what we think [unclear]. It might be you would
hold on the debt limit thing which you came mighty close to veto,
which could be quite a . . . be very difficult. Of course, we’ll know bet-
ter, we’ll be able to measure this better after we see what happens in
November, but—
President Kennedy: Obviously, if we get . . . set back seriously in
November, we will—
Dillon: Well, on the debt limit case, we seem to have the Republican
vote.37 Increasingly, they all decide they want to vote against the increase so
that when . . . This is just not responsible, but it is just symptomatic of a—
President Kennedy: Yeah. I’m sure it’s going to—
Dillon: So, if we go ahead with the idea of a substantial tax cut, we
don’t believe in these people who say that they have to cut expenditures
equivalently.38 But we do believe that you have to put on a performance
that looks like you’re being careful with the expenditures.
37. The administration had already lobbied successfully for a prior debt limit increase in
March 1962.
38. Harry F. Byrd, for example.
Unidentified: I would turn around and [unclear] your spending

increasing faster than you ever have—
Dillon: [Unclear] certain [unclear]. Well, right across the board for a
total figure of 6.7 increase, which is about 15 percent or 10 percent big-
ger than you’ve ever done before.
Bell: Aren’t the . . . but the bulk of the increase under our . . . more
than two-thirds of the increase that we projected here would be in the
national security and international field, and so on. So it could not be
attacked on the grounds it was letting loose of the strings on the civilian
side. I know that Aikman is not party to the increase with something at
West Point, but I guess he is.
Now, it’s difficult to make an accurate estimate—along the lines Doug
is talking about—because we don’t know how firm this 93.7 figure’s going
to be. It’ll be another three or four weeks before we have a really . . . a good
solid figure for ’63 expenditures, now that the Congress is completing
action. Remember last year when we had our midyear budget review, we
suddenly came up with a billion dollar agricultural expenditure that we
hadn’t expected. Now we hope we’ve guarded against any unexpected
finds this year, but we shouldn’t think of the 93.7 as too precise, as yet.
Think of it as being—
President Kennedy: Of course, Ken Galbraith, though, thinks we’re not
going to get the tax cut at all while we run a deficit. 39 It might be you’d do
better for the economy if you have the expenditures for those . . . [unclear]
and Berlin, that you get them and . . . tax . . . but, however, that’s a view-
point we’re just not going to be able to get. 40 Economic education has not
proceeded enough to let you . . . to think of the Congress, as tough as this is
going to be—next one probably—to get that kind of a tax cut through.
Bell: This is about the proper position to take. This is hammered-
down-type figure in the program that you’ve—
President Kennedy: Except I will say everybody wants to increase these
expenditures. I know how desirable all these programs are, but I just . . .
Bell: Remember, sir, that this is . . . the figure they gave us originally
was 108 billion.
Sorensen: More than the [unclear], Mr. President, it seems. What
39. John Kenneth Galbraith was ambassador to India and a Harvard economist. Galbraith had
argued, quite prominently, that increased expenditures were a preferred alternative to tax cuts
if the administration sought a fiscal stimulus.
40. Military buildup and added expenditures related to the ongoing Berlin crisis.
336 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
the Budget Bureau has done in their [unclear] submissions, and it wor-
ries me that some of it we’ve already cut too far to get down to the 100.4.
Bell: The third and fourth columns there.
President Kennedy: As far as 1964, the agency—
Bell: Yeah.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Ten-second pause.
Sorensen: So that while I’m sympathetic to Doug’s point, I don’t
know where the $2 billion can be cut out.
Twenty-second pause.
President Kennedy: About this goal in three years. Has that got the . . .
where do you think . . . or are we just suggesting what these expenditures
are going to be?
Heller: I like the idea.
Sorensen: I don’t think it . . . I’m trying to think of . . . you’d just,
you’d just be taking on that and many more enemies unnecessarily.
Bell: Maybe because it would show the expenditures rising.
Sorensen: Yes.
President Kennedy: Well, It doesn’t rise so much, though, except in
space. So far I’ve gotten space. They got NASA. That’s the big rise.
Bell: Well, these figures would have to be revised a lot—
Bell: —further than they have been.
Bell: My guess is—
President Kennedy: I don’t see any enormous—
Bell: —if you tightened them up, they would probably look like—
President Kennedy: HEW’s the biggest.
Bell: —105, 109.
President Kennedy: And HEW went from 4.2 in ’62 up to 9.3.
Dillon: Well, economic aid—
President Kennedy: Well, we’ll have to just cut that back. But, I see
nothing else except for HEW with a really big rise. Treasury interest,
but the—
Sorensen: Housing and Home Finance.
Bell: It would be comforting to a lot of people to see those NASA fig-
ures, because it would show that they’re going to taper off after another
year or more of a rapid rise.41 HEW would be the big issue, that’s right.
41. Figures are in the form of multiyear projections, discussed here.

President Kennedy: What is that increase for?

Bell: Well, it’s a—
President Kennedy: Population increases?
Bell: No, there’s a big increase in education, which is connected with
the bill, the elementary and secondary bills you’ve had up there now.
President Kennedy: Well, they’re not going to pass that.42 That’s just
a . . . start off with that realization.
Bell: What do you mean? You—
President Kennedy: Starting off, we ought to talk about whether
we’re going to go again with that.
Bell: Oh, yes, I see what you mean. Well, that’s . . . that’s a . . . well,
that’s at least a billion dollars and maybe more, but the increase that
shows here between ’64 and ’69 . . . Another substantial increase is in the
higher education field. There is some increase in welfare, which is natu-
ral. You know, they go up every year—by 2[00], 3[00], or 400 million
dollars. And—
Staats: NIH goes up over a billion dollars. 43
Bell: NIH keeps on rising—I’ve forgotten the precise rate we’ve
assumed in here, but 2 or 3, say $250 million a year, something like that—
increase.44
Dillon: Regularly.
Bell: The people who are in favor of health research have their eyes
set on $2 billion by 1970. This would be . . . to take it there this is less of
a rapid rate of increase than they have proposed. I believe those are the
principal increases in HEW, I don’t—
President Kennedy: HHFA.45 That would be . . . what’s the reason for
that hike?
Bell: Well, that’s mostly built-in. That’s the steady rise in the Urban
Renewal program which was financed a year ago, with the Housing Act
of ’61. And it would be showing quite substantial increases in outlays as
the cities get their Urban Renewal projects to the point at which pay-
ments made to those cities—
President Kennedy: What about mass transit?
Bell: Mass transit’s in here, also. I’ve forgotten the precise figures
42. These bills, for additional aid to schools, were defeated in the 87th Congress.
43. The abbreviation NIH stands for National Institutes of Health.
44. The original budget proposal for NIH for FY 1963 was $741 million, an increase of $113
million over FY 1962.
45. Housing and Home Finance Agency.
338 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
that are here. If you want to think seriously about this, Mr. President, we
can very readily put together a memo to show you the kinds of figures
connected to programs that would be implicit in—
President Kennedy: Well, it would only be if it were not going to be
a rapid increase which would look like we’re inundating them. And the
only advantage would be if you’re going to give an impression that this
is [unclear].
Dillon: This is [unclear] increase.
Bell: Well, and if it does give that impression . . . I mean it logically
does. Whether it would look that way and be politically vulnerable, I—
Heller: Dave, I doubt that it would look that way, and I’m not sure
that we want them all saying that it’s—[Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: —things way ahead of us and not too [unclear].
Unidentified: Umm . . .
Unidentified: That’s true.
Dillon: That’s very ostentatious.
Bell: Well, it’s up in the air with 3 more billion dollars than we said
we’d [unclear].
Heller: Well, not only that, when you’ve got the economy going full
tilt, you’d probably want to hold back some programs.
Bell: That wouldn’t be so hard.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Unidentified: On the other hand, you might take some [unclear].
Dillon: I think on the expenditures thing, while 981/2 seems a good
figure, providing you freeze inflation, but, the basic essence of the thing
is that you just have to come back, so that your increase in expenditures
is something clearly less than it has been. And I would say that this
shows you’ve done the best you possibly can on expenditures at the same
time you—
Schultze: This would . . . I would say, Doug, that in the eight years I
was up there, I never heard anyone use that as a measuring stick.46
Dillon: What?
Schultze: Whether expenditures increased more this year than they
increased last year or the year before that. And, secondly . . . and my
guess is that this increase, percentage-wise, is smaller than those previ-
ous increases.
Dillon: Probably about the same.
46. From 1952 to 1959, Schultze served as a staff economist with the Council of Economic
Advisers.
President Kennedy: Well, I don’t think the . . . you know, I think it’s
just really a question of whether it’ll be a 100 billion figure and so on,
plus the fact you’re asking for a tax cut of 6 or 7 million dollars; and then
have . . . maybe you can’t do anything about it.47 If you ask for a tax cut
with a $4 billion deficit, it’s probably just as hard a political struggle if
you ask for it with 6 billion . . . probably. We don’t know how many peo-
ple who . . . all of the Republicans are going to be against us unless we
get a tax bill which is so designed to take care, in a sense disproportion-
ately, of their constituency.48
Dillon: Because one thing is, too, is that this figure is a higher figure
than anyone has contemplated anywhere. It’s gonna be a shock. But
there’s not much you can do about it. I think everyone, I think, expects a
4 or 5 billion dollar increase in expenditures, but I don’t think any of
them think it should be moved this high next year. Even Mr. Byrd hasn’t
mentioned that [unclear].
Heller: Well, the Senate bill is high.
Sorensen: We’re probably going to go this high this year.
Dillon: Huh?
Sorensen: Yes, he [unclear]—
Unidentified: Well . . .
Sorensen: —in one of his speeches.
Dillon: Hmm.
Bell: If we can . . . one of the things that you’re suggesting, implicitly,
is that if you estimate a little generously on the ’63 expenditures, which
we’re about to put out a release on, that you’re likely—
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bell: —if that were 95 billion dollars instead of 93.7 . . . The
Congress, after all, has added a number of things. They moved forward
the date of the pay increase, and added money for health research and
military perks, and so on. Then, the big jump in ’63 to ’64, would fit your
description even of these figures.
47. Speaking rapidly here, President Kennedy said “million dollars” when he meant to say “bil-
lion dollars.”
48. Convinced that aggregate demand was the linchpin to greater private investment and to
the growth of the economy, both President Kennedy and Chairman Heller of the CEA origi-
nally sought a tax cut proposal under which the lion’s share of the decreases would go to indi-
viduals and to the less well-off. Other cuts and incentives for wealthier individuals and for
corporations were gradually added in as the political obstacles became clearer and the neces-
sary amendments were considered. This was true in the area of tax reform as well, where even
more compromises had to be made to secure only a few somewhat modest changes.
340 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
Dillon: Uh-huh . . . uh-huh. [Unclear.]

Bell: I don’t know but—
Schultze: One way of looking at it, in capsule form in terms of fiscal
policy, is that the first two years we’ve tried to get the economy going by
increasing expenditures and the budget deficits. Now if we go to a sharp
increase in expenditures and tax cuts on top of it, we leapfrog over the
intermediate step which is tax cuts, withholding expenditure increases—
down, which is a—
Bell: The budget that was presented to them—
Schultze: —kind of an intermediate step.
Bell: —in January of this year, because the budget will show a rela-
tively small expenditure increase—under 21/2 billion dollars—and a bal-
ance if the economy would perform as we hoped it would. Now, the
reason there isn’t a 31/2 billion increase in expenditures, but 6, is because
’62 expenditures were lower than we thought they would be, by about $2
billion, a little over. And ’63 is going to be higher than we thought in
January. But the budget policy was a very conservative one in January.49
It wasn’t a . . . it wasn’t a deficit policy to lift the economy; it was deliber-
ately a balanced-budget policy.
Schultze: No, I’m speaking in terms of results, so—
Bell: Yeah.
Schultze: But what we—[Unclear exchange.]
Bell: Well—[Unclear exchange.]
Bell: The result is that the economy has not moved forward as it
should and we’re stuck with a deficit. It isn’t because we planned it
that way.
Dillon: No.
Schultze: Oh, no. No, we haven’t planned it . . . yeah.
Heller: We need to remember that on the . . . on the basis that makes
economic sense—the income and product account—we went into bal-
ance . . . second quarter of this year, virtually.50
President Kennedy: What about the change in our method of
budget-keeping as far as the repayable loans, and so on?51 Has anybody
got any thoughts on that?
49. Revenues, from lower-than-expected levels of economic growth, also trailed most forecasts
for this period.
50. Income account is national income accounts basis. See note 3.
51. Prepared on the national income accounts basis, the federal budget would not include fed-
eral repayable loan outlays or proceeds.
Bell: We’ve been working with the council.52 We had some brief dis-
cussion earlier on this. We have a staff paper that everybody is looking
at. If you take out repayable loans, it doesn’t take out very much, around
$3 billion or 3 plus, in this particular series of budget years. If you just
take it out and say the budget should be regarded as the figures exclu-
sive of this, you don’t gain enough to make much impact on the deficit
figures, and you pick up a fight for yourself without much benefit. In
consequence, and third . . . secondly, we looked at the questions of . . .
President Kennedy: Three billion dollars might be of use to us.
Bell: Well, yes . . . in the sense that it would reduce the budget deficit,
apparent deficit. We’ve assumed that we should present a set of budget
figures that represent the federal financial transactions in some kind of
total sense. And then we say, and alongside of it, here are the income and
product account figures which are a more accurate indicator of the eco-
nomic effects of the federal budget.
And, of course, the repayable loans are excluded from that so that the
income and product account deficit will presumably look that much bet-
ter than the cash figures that we use. And, accordingly, we get that bene-
fit . . . we expect we will have that benefit by using the income and
product account figures.
And our question, therefore, is what about the overall budget figure?
Do we also take it out of there? You can, of course, ask, “Should we take
more out?” We could take out repayable loans plus capital items of vari-
ous kinds. Go to a quasi-capital budget. We’ve had some preliminary dis-
cussion with Walter and his boys on this. There’s a little disagreement
among us, and I think it might be better if we brought the question to
you a little later rather than today.
Heller: I agree.
Bell: I think there’s some majority sentiment against rather than for
this point, but it isn’t a matter that’s closed up, nor . . . one on which
we’re ready to ask you to sign off.
Take the Chamber of Commerce committee. You’ve seen the prelimi-
nary draft of their report that you asked Mallon53 to set up, I mean,
Plumley.54 Mallon’s the chairman of the committee. . . .
52. The President’s Council of Economic Advisers, Walter Heller, James Tobin, Kermit
Gordon, and staff.
53. Henry Neil Mallon was chairman and director of Dresser Industries.
54. H. Ladd Plumley was chairman and president of State Mutual Life Assurance Company of
America and president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. President Kennedy asked Plumley
342 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
President Kennedy: Have they been through much of this with you
about what the expenditures are?
Bell: We met with them, yes. There are on the committee two or
three quite able people—Frank Pace55 is a member, and Norman Ness56
is a member—who really know what they’re talking about. They’re . . .
we’ve been working with them all along. And one of them showed us a
draft of the report in an early stage, and what it was, if they carry
through as it is now drafted, it’s going to recommend, implicitly, aban-
donment of the administrative budget, but the use of the cash state-
ment—consolidated cash statement—as the main presentation of federal
receipts and expenditures.57 Now, this is not necessarily a bad idea. This
would show a total which next year would be around 116 billion dollars
of expenditures and around a hundred and—
Schultze: About three and a half lower in deficit.
Bell: Yeah. Now, that includes all the trust fund receipts. It includes
the trust funds, and since the trust funds are gonna be running some
small surplus next year, that will help the overall . . . would help the
overall appearance of the budget . . . cut the deficit. You could say this is
the overall summary of the federal receipts and expenditures. Within
this, there are the following categories—
President Kennedy: What’d be the advantage of having this?
Bell: Well . . .
President Kennedy: Why do they think it’s a good idea, this group?
Bell: Well, they have different ideas. Some of them think it’s good sim-
ply because it would produce a bigger figure than the one we’re now using.
President Kennedy: And they want to—
Bell: Make a horror story . . . say that the budget is obviously getting
out of hand. Others simply say that this is a better representation of the
transactions in the federal government, and a better figure to have in
people’s minds is how big the federal government’s financial transac-
tions actually are in relation to anything you want to measure it
against—total national income or product or what not.
and others at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to study both government budgeting and the
administration’s tax cut proposal.
55. Frank Pace, Jr., was chairman and director of General Dynamics Corporation.
56. Norman Ness was vice president and director of the International Milling Company,
Minneapolis, and director of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange.
57. Like the national income budget, the consolidated cash basis includes trust fund receipts.
Unlike the national income budget, it records transactions on a cash, rather than accrual, basis
and includes net loans and other credit transactions. In FY 1967 the federal government
would begin reporting its official budget in this form.
President Kennedy: There’s no doubt that all these programs are

desirable. I mean, like mass transit, I can go explain things that ought to
be done. The question really . . . I mean even in defense . . . I mean in
these other countries, nobody else is spending this kind of [unclear] are
even cutting their defense expenditures and all these other people. We’ve
got space and AEC in addition to defense, and foreign assistance which
none of the rest have. It’s really a question of whether we’re spending
and figuring and thinking about a tax cut, whether these agencies, I
don’t think we have confidence in their [outlook] . . . because they’re
only considering their own agency and not the overall . . . We really have
to worry about—
Bell: Their figures are 108; ours are 100. We’ve taken a big discount
from their figures already. We think that these both represent a reasonable
program to carry forward the kind of things that you . . . all of us have con-
sidered are desirable for the growth and security of the country.
Furthermore, we think that this is a . . . these are figures which are easily
sustainable by the economy. There isn’t the slightest doubt that this is a
sensible program in terms of the use of resources. On any real grounds, this
is a good program; however, what it is that the [unclear] that Doug talks
about and other political considerations are obviously very important.
Sorensen: As you know, Mr. President, this is one kind of meeting we
have where we all agree about what we’ve done. When we have a meet-
ing on, let’s say, on military assistance, and somebody else on how a dam
will save that state, and so on, and it’s a . . . it gets pretty tough to . . . I
think the Budget Bureau has cut hard. Now, and we . . . I think we really
need a decision from you today as to whether we want a budget in the
neighborhood of 100.4 or in the neighborhood of 98.4, so they can go
ahead and make their tax, economic, and budget decisions on that basis.
If you find on pages 15 to 19—
President Kennedy: I think we ought to—
Sorensen: [Unclear] that those things ought to be cut out, then.
President Kennedy: Well, I think we probably ought to try to get it
under a 100 billion just for . . . if we can do that, then we have the politi-
cal argument of the tax thing. So I suppose we’d better try to put it
ninety . . . I know that nobody doesn’t like to go the 99.3 route, but . . .
Sorensen: Because it just means for sure that you bust the 100 maybe
the year after, which is a worse year to do it.
Bell: Well . . .
President Kennedy: They’re going to say a 100 billion budget any-
way, but why don’t we say—[Obscuring noise.]
Unidentified: Keep it below a 100 . . . half a billion of leeway.
344 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962

Bell: Well . . .
Heller: If we shift emphasis to the other budget, they’re going to be
well above a 100 billion anyway.
Unidentified: Well, this is, again, the—
President Kennedy: This is the advantage of the cash—58 [Unclear
exchange.]
Bell: That’s true, Mr. President. That would be one advantage to fol-
lowing the Chamber of Commerce suggestion . . . cash total.
President Kennedy: Well, here’s what I’d like us to do with all . . .
to make this decision with a little more light than I have now. I think
the Treasury, if the Secretary thinks that that’s what we ought to do.
But I think we ought to get from the Treasury, after a consultation
with the Budget [Bureau], what it is we would take out in order to
reach that figure. Then we can tell whether we ought to do it, whether
it’s worth . . . whether the advantage we gain in the way we sell it,
whether it’s worth taking out 2 billion dollars. I don’t know. . . . That’s
what we have to decide. It may not well be, and I don’t know enough
about what we’d be taking out. Have you got down what we’d be taking
out of it?
Unidentified: Right. That’s what [unclear].
Dillon: Well, that’s . . . there’s a lot of things together there; I don’t
know whether they’re the only things to be taken out or not.
Unidentified: That’ll take a little longer than it’s worth?
Bell: We definitely tried to take the marginal items.
Dillon: What you considered really marginal?
Bell: [Unclear] not only [unclear].
President Kennedy: Those are the ones that we all want to take . . .
from 16 to 19?
Bell: That’s right. These are the ones which we think would be the—
President Kennedy: Well, we can’t . . . we can’t postpone the pay
thing.59
Dillon: Well, I just never figured that we could do anything about
the Skybolt. We’ve got an international commitment on that. [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear] into Skybolt?
Bell: Skybolt is . . . it’s pretty close to being up for consideration for
58. Consolidated cash budget.

59. Federal pay raises instituted by the “Pay Bill” signed nine days later (11 October 1962).
cancellation on its own merits. If it weren’t for the British commitment,

we might very well be recommending it as a normal part of—60
President Kennedy: Let me ask how much the British are putting
into the development of Skybolt compared to us?
Bell: Oh, damn little . . . damn little. It’s practically all ours.
Schultze: Mr. President, we haven’t really looked at the expenditure
figures since July. We made an estimate in July. Since that time we
haven’t a program to counter . . . a different mix or different selection
and then on . . . we haven’t attempted to do that today.
Bell: One thing that might be interesting, Mr. President . . .
President Kennedy: I think you ought to do that though, if you’re
gonna give—
Bell: We could pretty well, if you wanted us to, we could go shoot at
an increase—if that made any sense—an increase of less than $6 billion
from whatever the ’63 figure turns out to be when we know. I don’t think
that makes much difference in terms of bill consultations, but Doug said
he’d work with the Ways and Means Committee. . . . It may mean some-
thing to them.
President Kennedy: Do you think that if they’re given 100.4 is . . .
This is aside from what the increase is. Is it just the percent of the
increase that disturbs you, or is it the 100 billion?
Dillon: Well, it’s everything all added together. I mean it’s the fact
that it’s a 100 billion; that’s more than anybody expects. Now, if we’d
been at 96, and everybody had known that we’re coming up to 100, that’s
one thing. But Byrd and all these other people who think that we just
spend money much too fast, they’ll make their own estimates and say,
“Well, next year it’ll be another 4 or 5 billion and we’d be approaching
100 billion dollars.” None of them are dreaming that you’re going to go
over it, and so it would be a shock to them. And, again, I think that’s a
fact that we have to recognize. It’s very important. For that reason, the
100 billion figure does mean something to them. And I think it’d be bet-
ter if the . . . 99.3, that much out of 100.4, because it’d look like you’ve at
least tried.
60. Days later, on 26 October 1962, after receiving confidential information from Roswell
Gilpatric that Secretary McNamara would seek to cancel the Skybolt program, Dave Bell sent
a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, intended originally from the President, that noted a
“firm recommendation by the Secretary [McNamara] that the SKYBOLT missile be can-
celled” (Neustadt, Report to JFK, p. 33).
346 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
Schultze: Well, the simplest line to take, which is a very difficult line
to take budgetwise, but the simplest line to take from the standpoint of
accuracy, is that in this year in which we’re trying to reduce taxes and get
the economy moving to this prescription, we’re going to live with our
built-in increases, the things we have to live with, and we’re not going to
authorize any new programs. This is a price we’re going to have to pay.
Now, this is the only kind of simple, political logic, I think, that you can
make, rather than a . . . than a pick and choose. And, I guess—
President Kennedy: Now, I’ll tell you what; let’s get on with it.
Unidentified: About the consulting . . .
President Kennedy: Why don’t we get the Treasury with the Bureau
of the Budget to tell us what they would take out of that, in order to save
that which—
Dillon: We could do that, but [unclear] moot point is [unclear].
President Kennedy: [Unclear] we’ll have alternatives for what we
choose or not choose.
Dillon: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Well, that’s one question. Now, those will have
to wait until we see what you’re suggesting we omit in order to cut this
thing down.
Sorensen: Well, that . . . even that isn’t necessary, Mr. President,
unless the Treasury feels that the list which Dave’s put together on
pages 16 to 19 is not an adequate list.
Staats: I have a slant, Mr. President . . . [Unclear exchange.]
Staats: This list here adds up . . . adds up to 2.8 billion. To get down
to Doug’s figures, it’d be only 1.9. So we have definitely put in here more
items that add up to 2.8 than you would need to get down to—
President Kennedy: Why don’t you give us a [unclear].
Dillon: Some of the things aren’t on this list. For instance—
President Kennedy: What else have we got to decide?
Bell: That’s all . . . at this point.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] do something else, so we can talk a lit-
tle more?
Bell: All right.
President Kennedy: But, in other words, we don’t see any new budg-
eting procedures that are going to make our problem easier, do we?
Bell: I do not, Mr. President, but we haven’t signed off on—
President Kennedy: Is everybody agreed that we shouldn’t try to put
up an advance sort of list? It seems to me in some of these programs
where the increase will be much marked and where there is going to be a
plateau, that it may be advantageous to indicate it.
Bell: Yes. [Unclear exchange.]

Dillon: —the space program, and particularly with HEW you could
say that this list was [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.]
President Kennedy: —we won’t allocate for [unclear]. I think it’s fac-
ing the facts, because they’re the ones . . . two-thirds of our increases have
been in these areas. We can look for the next three or four years at this . . .
Ackley: We soften the impact of the $100 billion breakthrough, if we
add in the cash figures.
President Kennedy: It doesn’t say foreign aid, too. We’ve got to con-
sider what we should do with foreign aid.
Dillon: That’s something we want to look at, because actually these
figures—foreign aid—are too high, and the Budget Bureau reduced
them themselves, because they were based on back when . . . before
Appropriations had cut substantially. [Unclear] reduced these figures
automatically, so we [unclear].
Bell: [Unclear.] McNamara is not necessarily, when he gets through
with the next month or so, going to come in with figures this low.
Certainly, they’re not going to be lower, and they may very well be sub-
stantially higher. If he adds divisions, for instance, that he is considering—
President Kennedy: They’re the 16, in addition?
Bell: Above 16. That was Max Taylor’s recommended addition.61
President Kennedy: Well, Max is going to be an expensive chief.
Dillon: He’s gonna be an expensive [unclear]. [Laughter.]
Bell: The space budget looks as though it’s going to have to be
higher than what we have here. Seaborg, Celebrezze,62 Freeman63 are
among the agency heads who have already put us on notice that they
will be proposing substantially larger figures.
Bell: It isn’t going to be easy, but we come to this figure. If you want
to go to the lower figure, then I think we should start it by talking to the
Cabinet . . . who we’re going to need to take along. But we should say to
the Cabinet that the figures that they and we have been talking about,
that you have reviewed now, and they look to you too high, and you have
instructed us to go back and trim them back. Because this is the kind of
61. General Maxwell D. Taylor, former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy and
Army chief of staff, had been sworn in by President Kennedy as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff on 1 October 1962, the day before convening this recorded tax and budget meeting.
62. Anthony J. Celebrezze was secretary of health, education, and welfare, July 1962 to July 1965.
63. Orville L. Freeman was secretary of agriculture, January 1961 to January 1969.
348 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
backing that we would require to go back to these people and open it up

on the low side.64 And that could be better, you know . . . easier than—
Dillon: [Unclear.]
Bell: I’m not saying we don’t want to do it. But I think we ought to, if
that’s the way you want it.
Dillon: One thing, Mr. President, that’s . . . I think important.
Looking at this, it’s one of the big areas, and this is this NASA program
where for us to cut back anything you’d have to slow up the date of the
landing on the moon. I asked Dave what that meant and he said that
meant ’67. Now . . . well, I . . . we’ve always had this commitment to be
there by the end of the—
President Kennedy: No, we really felt that ’67 . . . . We said the end of
the—
Dillon: End of the decade.
President Kennedy: Yeah. I think we probably should not . . . I think
we . . . currently there may be some things we’re doing in space which
are superfluous or just supportive but not vital. But I don’t think we
ought to . . . I’d rather unbalance my budget and all the rest, and—
Dillon: You want us to get there by ’67?
Unclear exchange between Dillon and President Kennedy.
President Kennedy: —not have the commitment. Then if we could
justify it, we could make a mistake and we’d be penny-wise and [pound-
foolish]. And really . . . except, the only question I really have is whether
that agency isn’t doing many more things up in space than—
Bell: Well . . .
President Kennedy: —than is to be done.
Bell: Yeah.
President Kennedy: And the Defense Department.
Bell: Yeah, with this we have—
President Kennedy: Our Titan III, and so on.65
Bell: Yeah. For this we have a full-scale review which is now . . . just
coming into focus now, and we’ll be back to you in about two weeks on it,
which takes Titan III versus the C1 and the other elements.66 There isn’t
much duplication, direct, as you know. But the Air Force has a Gemini
program, now, as well as NASA. They want to use Gemini for military
flyers, to learn how to operate out there. And we are questioning that, so
64. See “Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964,” 18 October 1962.
65. The Titan III was the largest intercontinental ballistic missile.
66. The C1 is the Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport plane.
that . . . But I don’t think there’s much there; we won’t find there’s a
great deal of duplication to cut out. I think that we will achieve—when
we bring this to you, and it’s been nailed down—some limits on the mili-
tary program which will be very helpful.
Meeting begins to break up.
Unidentified: [Unclear.] I’m going to meet Senator Douglas on the
[unclear].67
President Kennedy: I’m meeting him at 5:30. [Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: Mr. President, if you could say that I have talked about this
overview, now, you know . . . if that would counteract the New York
Times last Sunday?68
President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah. That’s right, about the business thing.
Yeah. Well, what we can . . . what we’re going to put in the economy, we
got there. What we’re going to take out as opposed to the [unclear] . . . the
heart. What can we say?
Dillon: Well, we . . . I guess they’re getting the figures together. I think
that on an expenditure basis, on a national income accounts basis, we’re
giving much more stimulation, certainly, than we were in the last . . . in the
second quarter of this year. I think that would be something that . . . you’ll
have the figures in a couple of days, that—
Bell: Yeah, [unclear] difficulty is—
Dillon: —you could talk about.
Bell: —not the difficulty. But what the point is, that on an income . . .
on a real basis . . . on an income and product accounts basis, what we are
doing now is running a deficit. That is stimulating the economy. We, of
course, have not publicly announced any figure for the deficit. And we
will not, presumably . . . will not do so until this review of the budget
comes out a few days after the election . . . except determining that we
have plans for it, as the—
President Kennedy: I mean, isn’t it possible for us to say that we’re
spending $4 billion more to [unclear] last quarter?
67. Paul H. Douglas was a Democratic senator from Illinois, 1949 to 1967, and chairman of
the Joint Economic Committee, 1959 to 1967.
68. Possibly James Reston, “Seattle: The Mood of the Country and President Kennedy,” New
York Times, 23 September 1962, p. 10E. Reston noted: “Not since the heyday of anti-
Roosevelt feeling in the Thirties has there been such personal and emotional feeling against
‘that man in the White House.’” Though this feeling may well be what Dillon hopes to coun-
teract, Reston concluded by adding that “the main strategic objective of the Democratic
party now, as always, is to have elections decided on a simple partisan basis, and the
Republicans, by making a party issue out of the steel price controversy and the stock market
crash, have clearly furthered this aim.”
350 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
Bell: It would be possible, yes.

Dillon: Just to say that. Something like that.
President Kennedy: I think we have to go to . . . can’t we say that in
the first six months there was this plateau effect during the last—
Dillon: Everyone knows there’s a seasonal effect, and I think you’ve
got to disengage a little bit out of that, because that is so . . .
Bell: The seasonal effect is—
Dillon: You can’t take credit for the seasonal effect. That wouldn’t—
Bell: Well, the seasonal effect is not real. That’s simply a cash—
Dillon: A cash—
Bell: —that situation there. It doesn’t have to mean that—
Dillon: [Unclear.]
Bell: —there’s a real effect on the economy.
Sorensen: Oh, you mean we’re putting in 4 billion dollars more, sea-
sonally adjusted?
Bell: Yes, that’s right.
Heller: Well . . .
Dillon: In fact, you’re putting in some more, but—
Bell: Yeah.
Dillon: —in addition, they’re putting in more demands; it’s just sea-
sonal.
President Kennedy: I think we ought to try to get it in shape for put-
ting out, whether it ought to be put out by the Treasury, or the council,
or the Budget Bureau . . . . We can decide when we take a look at the fig-
ures.
Bell: That’s fine.
President Kennedy: I think that with all this trouble, right now, the
market’s having, the quicker we do that, the better.
Bell: Well, now, we’ll have the figures, I think, tomorrow.
President Kennedy: What do you think, the Sunday [New York]
Times? Should we get that fellow who writes to . . . where is the most
effective . . . ?
Heller: I think in the Sunday Times and send it [unclear].
Bell: Sunday Times, Monday Wall Street Journal. I think that’s proba-
bly the way to do it.
Dillon: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: Well, I think that we ought to probably let
Treasury or the . . . if we’re going to put it in those mediums, we ought
to let Treasury or the Bureau of the Budget do it.
Schultze: How about Treasury?
Dillon: Well, no one’s going to get past the [unclear].
Bell: [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: [Unclear.] I don’t think we—
Bell: [Unclear] statement of fact.
President Kennedy: Maybe it ought to come from the Bureau of the
Budget. I don’t think we want to have Walter do it. 69
Bell: No, I think that’s right.
Dillon: [Unclear] political thing with the Bureau of the Budget.
[Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: I think we can—
Dillon: It might need to be done right after the Congress quits.
Bell: There’d be some logic in a preliminary flash figure right after
the Congress leaves, you know, it would be something to hang it on
there if the Congress left and our quick estimate of the effect of their
actions on the budget seems to . . . indicates that we are now—
President Kennedy: I think it ought to come out of the [Bureau of
the] Budget. So let’s try to do it as quickly as we can. We can estimate
Congress going on Saturday. Maybe we could do it in the Sunday papers
or Monday because that’s a quicker—
Bell: OK.
President Kennedy turns the machine off.
Before welcoming the chairman of the Joint Economic Committee,

Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, into his office, the President had to take
care of a matter even more pressing than the ’63 budget. At about 2:30
P.M., Governor Barnett had called the White House to request that the
federalized Mississippi National Guardsmen be returned to state con-
trol. The President understood that he had to minimize the amount of
time that Oxford appeared to be under siege. Kennedy began taping a
conversation of this matter with Kenneth O’Donnell in the Oval Office
before calling the secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance. With the recorder
still running in the Oval Office, Kennedy also taped most of the tele-
phone conversation with Vance.
69. Walter Heller was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. Compared to Dave Bell
at the Bureau of the Budget, and Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon, Heller was considered
the most outspoken liberal voice in the administration on matters economic.
352 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
5:25 P.M.
[T]he first 24 hours the use of force was desirable, and now it
won’t be. So that I suppose every time you get a picture of some-
body getting knocked down, it feeds the fire around that place.
Conversation with Kenneth O’Donnell and Cyrus Vance70

On October 2 as of 8:00 A.M., 8,735 Army troops had reached Oxford,
with more heading toward the town. By the next day (October 3), the
number would reach 9,827. According to the New York Times, the total
number of troops (including the National Guard) in Oxford and the sur-
rounding area was approximately 15,000. The Army units were under
the direction of General Hamilton Howze.
President Kennedy: Secretary Vance, he doesn’t [unclear].71

Kenneth O’Donnell: Now, Mr. President, there are 2,500 National
Guard troops that we’d like to take out, you know, the chlorine that sunk
[unclear].
O’Donnell: There is a danger that we are going to use guards to do it.
[Unclear] have not been federalized. Twenty-five hundred to do it anyway.
President Kennedy: Get the guards in. Well, what will they use?
O’Donnell: The 2,500 are not involved anyway for the [unclear].
President Kennedy: Yeah. Who conducted? Who [do] we turn them
over to?
O’Donnell: The state.
O’Donnell: And these are the ones who’ll try to do something?
[Unclear.]
President Kennedy: OK, fine. Now, who are we going to have
announce that?
O’Donnell: Vance just called me, he said he’s proceeding to do it but
he won’t . . .
Collection. The telephone call with Cyrus Vance is on Dictabelt 4J.1, Cassette B, John F.
Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection. They have been
spliced together to reproduce all sides of this three-way conversation.
71. Cyrus Vance was secretary of the Army.
Conversation with Kenneth O’Donnell and Cyr us Vance 353
President Kennedy: Will he announce it then?

Evelyn Lincoln announces that Secretary Vance is on the line.
Evelyn Lincoln: Secretary Vance.
President Kennedy: [on the telephone] Hello?
Cyrus Vance: [Unrecorded.]
President Kennedy: Oh, yes this is fine about the 2,500 troops then?
Vance: [Unrecorded.]
President Kennedy: About being used for that chlorine business?
President Kennedy: Yeah, for that purpose?
President Kennedy: And then they would not be called back in?
President Kennedy: Right. Now, [the dictabelt recording begins here]
what about the other, the troop situation down there? How do you, how
are you, how many . . .
Vance: We have got, it should be about 10,000 now. Those are what
Howze is trying to stabilize in the Oxford area, sir.72 And what we pro-
pose to do on this, was General Wheeler was going to get in touch with
General Howze, ask him to prepare a plan with respect to the phased
withdrawal of troops of Mississippi.73 And to submit that back so that we
could then come and submit it to you, sir.
President Kennedy: Yeah, the quicker we could probably make some
public indication of that, then, of course, the better off—
Vance: Right, sir.
President Kennedy: —psychologically it would be. They think that
that’s the number that they may need for awhile?
Vance: Yeah. They think that for the time being or so that this is the
safest number to have there.
Vance: It may be somewhat excessive, sir, but my feeling is it’s better
to be safe on [unclear].
President Kennedy: Now, do they have some instructions down there
about how they should handle people? That they . . .
Vance: Minimum force [unclear] minimum force.
President Kennedy: . . . so we could, you know, that’s been sort of
restated. I think it may have to be restated today because in the first 24
72. Hamilton Howze, commander of the 18th Airborne Corps, was in charge of the military at
the Oxford campus.
73. General Earle G. Wheeler.
354 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 2, 1962
hours the use of force was desirable, and now it won’t be. So that I sup-
pose every time you get a picture of somebody getting knocked down, it
feeds the fire around that place. So I suppose at least it ought to be
brought to his attention to see how he thinks it should be done.
Vance: Right. Well, we will do so.
President Kennedy: OK. Fine.
Vance: Sir, do you want to release anything [unclear], would you like
us to do it in terms of the public release?
President Kennedy: Let me just think about that. Now, we’ve got the
question of this release back to the state. Probably if we do it, it’s a little
bit too . . . Has he asked us to do it, Barnett? Has Barnett asked us for
them or who’s asked?
Vance: Barnett has not asked us; Barnett has not asked us to do this.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Who has asked us to do it?
Vance: Mr. President, I can’t tell you who in the state of Mississippi has.
President Kennedy: He did. You see, well, now . . . Why don’t we do it
this way? You people announce that the President has approved the troop—
Vance: All right. [Unclear] “the President has approved.” We’ll
release it over here and check the [unclear] . . .
President Kennedy: We ought to find out who’s asked us to do it,
though, so that . . .
[off the phone to Kenny O’Donnell] Well, when did he ask us to do it?
O’Donnell: The Governor asked us to.
President Kennedy: Well, when did he ask us, do you know?
O’Donnell: He asked us about 2[:00] or 2:30.
President Kennedy: [on the phone to Vance] The guess is that they,
Kenny says that the Governor asked the civil defense, and so on. Of
course, I suppose he didn’t ask for the troops because he didn’t have to
ask us for the troops.
O’Donnell: No, he asked them for a declaration of a national emer-
gency so he could get . . . [unclear].
President Kennedy: We’d given them that [unclear], that we’d give
them a declaration of national emergency?
[speaking to Vance on the phone] Well, now who have you been talking
to about this, Cy? Is it McDermott?74
Vance: McDermott. Yeah.
President Kennedy: About the 2,500? What they’re going to do with
74. Edward A. McDermott was director of the Office of Emergency Planning and a member
of the National Security Council.
W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 3, 1962 355
2,500 troops, I don’t know. We agreed to help them get the thing out.75 But I
don’t know what they’re going to do with 2,500 soldiers to get it out, so . . .
Vance: The letter I have from McDermott says, “While we have no
way to judge the appropriate figure, the state director of civil defense of
Mississippi has informed the Public Health Service officials that 2,500
troops would be needed.”
O’Donnell is saying something to the President in the background.
President Kennedy: [to O’Donnell] Did they?
O’Donnell: He hasn’t [unclear] number of troops.
President Kennedy: I see. All right, well, I see. Well, then, I would
think we ought to say that at the request of the civil defense director—
Vance: State director of civil defense of Mississippi.
President Kennedy: —that yes, the President has approved the . . .
Vance: Yeah. Fine.
President Kennedy: And so we don’t get Barnett into it . . .
Vance: Right.
President Kennedy: Right. OK. Fine.
Vance: Yes, indeed, sir.
President Kennedy: Thank you, bye.
After hanging up the telephone, the President switches off both tape
machines.
President Kennedy’s next appointment was with Senator Paul Douglas

of Illinois. The Douglas meeting and one later with Allan E. Lightner,
Jr., the senior U.S. diplomatic representative in Berlin, went untaped.
Kennedy left the office for the pool at 8:00 P.M.
Wednesday, October 3, 1962
The Kennedy administration continued making gains in Congress. The

Senate sent the White House a tax revision bill containing the Kennedy
business investment deduction. The price for this was the defeat of a
measure to recoup some of the lost revenue through a withholding tax
75. Possibly another reference to the chlorine.

356 W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 3, 1962
on dividends and interest. Compromises also surrounded Senate passage

of the Foreign Aid Bill. The administration did not get as large an
appropriation as hoped; but the Senate was far more generous than the
House, which had cut the tab from $4.8 billion to $3.6 billion. The
Senate authorized $4.4 billion.
What little President Kennedy taped this day dealt with influencing
the Senate-House conference on foreign aid to discourage the House from
incorporating its cuts in the final bill. Kennedy also added to his record of
taped civil-rights calls to the secretary of the Army, Cyrus Vance.
9:20 A.M.
We would like to come over if we can . . . General Wheeler

and I, to discuss [a] withdrawal plan with you, sir.
Conversation with Cyrus Vance1

On October 3, 9,827 Army troops remained in Oxford. Small numbers of
forces began to depart from Oxford by truck and helicopter for either
Memphis or Columbus Air Force Base. Nevertheless, the total number of
regular troops in Oxford continued to increase slightly over the next
several days, reaching 10,113 by the morning of October 8.2
President Kennedy: Cy?

Cyrus Vance: Yes, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Morning.
1. Dictabelt 4J.2, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
2. On October 8, the Army removed the remaining check points from the Ole Miss campus,
allowing cars to enter without being searched. Despite this, troops still patrolled the grounds,
the town of Oxford, and the surrounding countryside. More than 5,400 troops that had been
standing by at installations in Memphis and Columbus, Mississippi, were ordered to return to
their bases. According to the New York Times, on 8 October, 3,000 National Guard troops,
14,000 regular troops, and 1,500 military police remained on duty. Of the regular troops on
duty, half were at bases in Memphis and Columbus, 90 miles away.
On 10 October, the Army completed a significant withdrawal of troops from the Oxford
area, reducing the number of men from 10,000 to 5,200. The remaining troops were divided
nearly equally between regular Army and federalized Mississippi National Guard members.
At peak strength, there had been some 23,600 men in Oxford and the surrounding area.
Conversation with John McCormack 357
Vance: Morning, sir. We would like to come over if we can, about

twelve, General [Earle G.] Wheeler and I, to discuss [a] withdrawal
plan with you, sir.
President Kennedy: Good. Fine. OK, I’ll be right here.
Vance: Fine, sir.
President Kennedy: Good. OK.
Vance: See you then.
Robert Kennedy recalled that as a result of the logistical foul-up on the

night of September 30, the President was “as mad at Cy Vance and the
information that Cy Vance was giving him as I’ve seen him during the
course of the administration. He asked for an investigation to be con-
ducted.”3 Vance and Lieutenant General Earl G. Wheeler, the new chief
of staff of the U.S. Army, were due to come to the White House later that
morning to discuss the withdrawal plan for Oxford and, perhaps, to dis-
cuss the conduct of the presidential investigation.
Before the arrival of Vance and Wheeler, the President made tele-
phone calls to the Speaker of the House and to Lawrence F. O’Brien, a
special assistant to the President, who handled congressional affairs, to
discuss the forthcoming conference on the foreign aid bill.
10:05 A.M.
I don’t know what my psychology would be these days on Otto.
Conversation with John McCormack4

The President wanted to discuss with the Speaker of the House possible
strategies for getting an increased authorization for foreign aid out of
the upcoming conference on the Foreign Aid Bill committee meeting.
Otto Passman, Democratic representative from Louisiana and chairman
of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
3. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy in His Own Words: The
Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years (New York: Bantam Books, 1988), p. 168.
4. Dictabelt 4K.3, Cassette B, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Committee, an inveterate foe of foreign aid, would have to be induced to

accept, in conference, the addition of $300 to $400 million to the $3.6
billion in foreign aid in the House version of the bill. Apparently before
starting to record, the President had told McCormack that Larry
O’Brien, his special assistant for congressional relations, would be com-
ing up to the Hill to see him and Passman.
President Kennedy: . . . foreign aid conference. I didn’t know whether it

would be possible for him to come up and speak to you about our thoughts.
Then perhaps you and I could talk on the phone again and you could give
me your judgment about what we ought to try to work out with Otto.
John McCormack: Sure. A . . . absolutely. And . . . we meet at eleven
today, and Larry can come up anytime. . . . Oh, I’ll come off the rostrum
once we get going. We’re going into the . . . I’ll get into the third supple-
mental, so will it be convenient for him about half past eleven or so?
President Kennedy: Good. Fine. I’ll have him up there.
McCormack: I think . . . You see, Otto agreed; when I said my under-
standing . . . I’ll put it that way . . . that he’d go at least 300 in this title
one, and probably a little more.
McCormack: Is that right?
President Kennedy: Right. That’s right. He . . . you remember, we
were talking about 350 and then he said, “Well, we will go over 300 and
see what more we can do.” Now, in view of the fact that we did well in the
Senate, actually an even split would take us to 400 million over the House
figure. So I thought that if he went up there with . . . Larry would have
two sets of figures, and then we could just see what we could do with him.
McCormack: And I was thinking that a . . . My thought would be
that . . . that you and I and Passman and whoever you wanted in from the
department would sit . . . get together down at the White House.
Naturally it would be at the White House.
McCormack: I think your . . . the psychological effect, don’t you see?
President Kennedy: Right. I don’t know what my psychology would
be these days on Otto. [Laughter.] I’ll tell you—
McCormack: Well, I know, Mr. President, it’s a pretty tough . . . It . . .
it may not get all we seek, but it will get a hell of a lot more than he
would give to someone else.
President Kennedy: OK. Good. Well, I’ll have Larry up there and
then I’ll be glad to meet whenever . . . you think would be best today.
Conversation with Lawrence F. O’Brien 359
McCormack: Today?
President Kennedy: Well, I think if they are going into conference
tomorrow, either today, or whatever time you thought. Today or tomor-
row would be fine with me.
McCormack: Better today. In other words, he’d . . . he would allocate
it, as I understood it, anyway you wanted.
President Kennedy: Right. What we got to try to do is get him up to
as near 400 as we can.
McCormack: I know. I agree with you.
President Kennedy: I’ll have Larry up there, though, at 11:30.
McCormack: All right.
President Kennedy: Thanks, Mr. Speaker.
McCormack: Right. Right.
The President then called Lawrence F. O’Brien to inform him of his dis-
cussion with the Speaker.
Sometime That Morning
[O]nce you get him briefed on the 400 . . . we can arrange to

see Otto.
Conversation with Lawrence F. O’Brien5

President Kennedy spoke to Special Assistant Larry O’Brien to follow
up on his discussion with the Speaker of the House John McCormack.
The President anticipated having a personal lobbying session with
Congressman Passman at the White House, but wanted O’Brien first to
talk over the foreign aid numbers with the Speaker. Kennedy would also
raise an unidentified matter with O’Brien. That portion of the conversa-
tion was either not recorded or erased.
Unidentified: Hello.
Evelyn Lincoln: The President asked for Mr. O’Brien. He’s on.
Unidentified: OK.
President Kennedy: Larry?
Larry O’Brien: Yes, sir, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Tell him to call . . . . The Speaker said that he’d
call you at 11:30 and then, perhaps, he will want to arrange—once you
get him briefed on the 400—6
O’Brien: All right.
President Kennedy: —we can arrange to see Otto, if necessary, down
here.7
O’Brien: Right.
President Kennedy: Now, the second thing is that I talked to Charlie . . .8
O’Brien: Yeah.
Secretary Vance and General Wheeler entered the White House at 12:14
P.M. Kennedy did not tape this meeting. After these military advisers left,
the President had lunch with J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. The President then went to the Executive
Mansion for the rest of the day. He did not swim today and may have
been feeling the initial effects of the illness that would keep him in bed
all of October 4.
During the afternoon, the President presumably received reports on
the progress of Walter Schirra’s nine-hour space mission. In early
September, Schirra’s mission had influenced the scheduling of the final
phase of the DOMINIC nuclear test series because of concerns over the
radiation effects of high-altitude testing.9 At 6:17 P.M., the President
spoke with Schirra, who had returned safely and was onboard the air-
craft carrier USS Kearsage. At 6:30, the President held an unrecorded
meeting in the Oval Room of the White House with his Soviet special-
ists. It is not known when that meeting ended.
6. The Speaker of the House, from 1962 to 1971, was John W. McCormack, Democratic con-
gressman from Massachusetts, 1928 to 1971.
7. Otto Passman was a Democratic U.S. House member from Louisiana, 1947 to 1977, and
chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee.
The most powerful and outspoken opponent of foreign aid in Congress, Passman continually
clashed with the Kennedy administration over its foreign aid requests.
8. Unidentified.
9. See “Meeting on the DOMINIC Nuclear Test Series,” 5 September 1962.
M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8 , 1962 361
Monday, October 8, 1962
After spending all of October 4 upstairs at the White House with a cold,
the President set off on a three-day campaign swing through Ohio,
Michigan, and Minnesota. Having returned home Sunday night, the
President entered the Oval Office at 9:32 A.M.
While the President was out of Washington, the Berlin situation had
heated up again. On October 6, a British military vehicle, seeking to
come to the aid of a man who had been shot at the Wall, had been pre-
vented from entering East Berlin. Meanwhile talks on Berlin between
Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko and Dean Rusk had brought no
progress. On Sunday the three Western powers were considering a for-
mal protest to the Soviets because the bar on the British military vehicle
was a violation of the Four Power agreements.1
Also during the President’s absence, another U-2 had flown a Cuba
mission. In accordance with the September 10 decision on the reconnais-
sance plan for Cuba, this U-2 hugged the Cuban coast without crossing
over any territory to avoid identified surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites.
Back from his honeymoon, the director of central intelligence, John
McCone, wanted the next U-2 flight to be more daring. Agents on the
island were reporting the existence of surface-to-surface missiles and
missile sites in one of the regions of Cuba not photographed since
August 29. McCone wanted a U-2 to cover those areas, even though this
meant risking the loss of the plane to a Soviet-made SAM.
McCone had met resistance from the West Wing of the White House
and was on the President’s schedule for October 8. On October 5,
McGeorge Bundy, the special assistant to the President for national secu-
rity affairs, had defended the reconnaissance plan in conversation with
McCone. Bundy argued that the lack of “hard information” from the cen-
ter of the island was not really cause for concern because the Soviets
“would not go so far” as to put nuclear missiles in Cuba.2 McCone would
have his chance today to make his case directly to the President.
1. See the New York Times, 6–8 October 1962; Telegram, Rusk (New York) to State
Department, 6 October 1962, FRUS, 15: 348–51.
2. McCone, “Memorandum of Discussion with the President’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs” (Bundy), 5 October 1962, FRUS, 11: 13–15.
362 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
Before McCone’s arrival, the President had scheduled a meeting with

Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon. As Morse was about to enter the
White House, the President called the Senate Majority Leader, Mike
Mansfield, for some advice.
10:30 A.M.
I think that a lot of them are a little bit afraid of Mike

because of his power on the Interior and other appropriations
committees over there. They thought, well, they better go along.
Conversation with Mike Mansfield3

A fight had developed on Capitol Hill over a proposed $10 million appro-
priation for a National Aquarium in Washington, D.C. The sponsor of the
project was Representative Mike Kirwan of Youngstown, Ohio. A longtime
supporter of organized labor and New Deal–Fair Deal legislation, Kirwan
was best known in recent years as a champion of pork-barrel legislation.
Chairman of the Interior and Related Agencies Subcommittee of the
House Appropriations Committee (and second-ranking Democrat on the
Appropriations Committee), he was nicknamed Big Mike and Prince of
Pork. Democratic Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon and Frank Church
of Iowa and others opposed the aquarium, with support from newspapers
that termed it a blatant boondoggle.4
Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield’s secretary, Bobby Baker,
one of the most astute vote counters on the Hill, had alredy warned
Democrats against letting principle dictate their positions on the aquar-
ium, and Morse, Church, and others who ignored this advice had already
suffered Kirwan’s retribution, seeing the conference committee on the
Interior Appropriations Bill eviscerate public works planned for their
states. With Mansfield, Kennedy sought to rescue Morse and the others
and undo some of the potential political fallout. Having asked the nation
to give him more Democrats in the upcoming midterm elections, to
4. Morse had developed a reputation for stubbornness and had shown a willingness to take
on his own party—Republican until 1952, an interlude as an independent, and Democratic
from 1955.
Conversation with Mik e Mansfield 363
change a simple numerical majority into a working majority by adding

liberals and moderates to offset conservative southern Democrats,
Kennedy could ill afford a party quarrel of this kind.
Recording begins in midconversation.

President Kennedy: I suppose that he’s going to blow me out of the
water? 5
Mike Mansfield: Not you. Kirwan.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but he’s asked . . . I suppose he’s probably
going to ask me to do something. Is there anything I can do?
Mansfield: Well, now, the only thing is this: What . . . he’s very much
disturbed that because of his opposition to the Aquarium Bill, that
Kirwan has knocked out a lot of his projects—6
Mansfield: —in the Public Works Bill. He will show you newspaper
clippings which will indicate his and Edith Green’s defeat.7 And there’s
nothing that you can do. . . . All you can say is that you’ll call up Kirwan
and see what you can do, and we’ll probably get Bob Kerr to do the same
thing over here.8
President Kennedy: I see. Well, why did the senators let it go?9
Because, I suppose they’re mad at him [Morse] too, aren’t they? He’s
been kicking everybody around for so long that—
Mansfield: Well . . .
President Kennedy: —finally, they decided to kick him, I guess,
didn’t they?
Mansfield: Of course, well . . . that’s partly it, but it was a personal
thing with—
President Kennedy: Kirwan.
Mansfield: —Mike. And I think that a lot of them are a little bit
5. Referring to Morse.
6. Morse was upset that the Interior Department Appropriations Bill, after passing the Senate
and having been sent to House-Senate conferees, had been stripped of planning appropriations
for the Columbia and Willamette river channel projects, funds for construction of the Yaquina
Bay and Harbor project, and funds for a reclamation project at Pendleton, all in Oregon.
7. Edith Green was a Democratic U.S. House member from Oregon, 1955 to 1974.
8. Robert S. Kerr was a U.S. senator from Oklahoma, 1948 to 1963, and chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee. The irony of Kennedy’s request to have Kerr intercede on behalf
of Morse here is that Morse had recently led a filibuster against Kennedy’s Comsat proposal, a
proposal to privatize government satellite development, ultimately steered through to passage
by none other than Senator Kerr.
9. In the conference committee.
364 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
afraid of Mike because of his power on the Interior and other appropria-
tions committees over there. They thought, well, they better go along.
Mansfield: And it’s . . . the amounts are really small. They don’t
mean anything.
Mansfield: But I think that, if you will, say, you will call Kirwan,
and I’ll get Bob Kerr to talk to Kirwan. That might be the best way
out of it.
President Kennedy: Yeah . . . yeah. Well, why don’t I call Kirwan
before I see Wayne, and see whether I can do anything?
Mansfield: OK.
President Kennedy: But, I mean, Wayne . . . [chuckles] OK, Mike.
Right.
Mansfield: OK, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Good-bye, now.
Following this bit of legislative business, Kennedy met with Wayne Morse
for twenty minutes. The rest of the morning was devoted to foreign policy,
and the President did not tape any of it. John McCone and McGeorge
Bundy came to discuss, among other topics, the secret negotiations with
Fidel Castro over the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners. James B.
Donovan, mediator for the United States, had just arrived in Havana for
his second meeting with Castro. Having negotiated the trade of Soviet spy
William Fisher, also known as Rudolf Abel, for imprisoned U-2 pilot
Francis Gary Powers in the winter of 1962, Donovan was trusted by both
sides in the Cold War as an honest negotiator. And U-2s may have figured
in another aspect of this conversation. As mentioned in the editors’ intro-
duction for October 8, McCone was in the midst of a campaign to per-
suade the White House to permit a U-2 to fly over east central Cuba,
where agents had pinpointed a possible missile installation. Bundy had
opposed McCone’s recommendation on October 5, considering it an
unnecessary risk. McCone must have made some progress, as he was able
to press Kennedy further on the need for a U-2 overflight of Cuba again
the next day, October 9.
Following this Cuba discussion, the President met with his science
adviser, Jerome B. Wiesner. The DOMINIC test series still had a month to
go, and with the successful completion of the Schirra mission, there was
nothing holding back the last remaining high-altitude tests. Then the
President performed some more legislative business, which he did tape.
Conversation with Alber t Gore 365
12:00 P.M.
Now, it’s really your choice, and I think that if you ask Hubert
and Bob not to override, they would not and would fight it.
But, I don’t know whether you want to put that much at stake
on it or not.
Conversation with Albert Gore10

The Self-employed Pension Bill, H.R. 10, was passed 361–0 by House
vote on September 25 and 70–8 by Senate vote on September 28.
Permitting self-employed persons to establish tax-deductible pension
funds, it vexed the President in several ways. It was estimated to cost the
U.S. Treasury an expected $100 to $125 million at a time when President
Kennedy hoped to produce a tight budget for the upcoming fiscal year—
mostly to secure passage of his tax cut proposals; it represented an
important step toward taxpayer equity but did not cover all groups with
equal claims; and it struck the President that if introduced later, in a gen-
eral tax reform package, it might well help secure passage of such reform,
in itself a principal goal of the administration.11
Because Senator George Smathers (D-Florida) threatened to block a
pocket veto by keeping Congress in session as long as it would take,
President Kennedy had determined that he could only sign the bill or
issue an outright veto. The lopsided margins by which the bill had passed
did little to encourage a veto, and his conversation here with Senator
Albert Gore, a prominent supporter of the administration and member of
the Senate Finance Committee, would focus on the likelihood of an over-
ride were Kennedy to issue a veto.12 Gore was one of the eight senators
who voted against the measure during its final passage, contending that it
conflicted with the administration’s tax reform proposals designed to
10. Dictabelts 4K.8 and 48.2, Cassettes band M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office
Files, Presidential Recordings Collection. Albert A. Gore was Democratic U.S. senator from
Tennessee, 1953 to 1971.
11. “The President’s Special News Conference with Business Editors and Publishers,” Public
Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1963), pp. 714–15. Under the bill, a self-employed person would be allowed to deduct
from taxable income 50 percent of contributions to a retirement fund. The annual deductions
would apply to a maximum of 10 percent of annual income with a ceiling of $2,500.
12. Along with Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, Gore was the chief supporter of administra-
tion plans for general tax reform.
366 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
eliminate special favors for the wealthy and politically well connected.
Having ten days with which to act on passed legislation while Congress
remained in session, Kennedy was fast approaching the deadline for a
decision on a veto.

Albert Gore: Yes?
President Kennedy: Albert, how are you?
Gore: Fine. How are you, Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Oh, very good. Well, now, it looks, unfortunately
like we’re beginning to run out of time—
Gore: Yeah, I’m afraid so.
President Kennedy: —on H.R. 10. Unfort[unately] . . . I wish to hell
that Congress had gotten out Saturday.13 Now, what is your thought
about how we should do this? I don’t want to veto it if . . . unless we’ve
got a prayer. Now, do you think we could . . . what do you think we could
get in the Senate? I don’t think we can do very well in the House.
Gore: Well, it depends on [unclear] . . . Mike will help you. 14
President Kennedy: Yeah, but Hubert’s for the bill. 15
Gore: Well, he’s for the . . . Now, Ralph Yarborough told me that he
would sustain a veto—16
Gore: —and announce for it. I’d say it would depend on Hubert and
Bob Kerr.17 If they will resist overriding a veto, then Mike and I can cor-
ral enough others to prevent its being overridden.
President Kennedy: Well, now Hubert has told me at the last week’s
breakfast, and he said it again Saturday, that he wants . . . that he’s for
the bill.
Gore: Well . . .
President Kennedy: I’ll tell you what I’ll do is I’ll get ahold of
Hubert and . . . but . . . and see where he thinks we are. What we don’t—
13. Allowing for a pocket veto.

14. Mike Mansfield was a Democratic U.S. senator from Montana, 1953 to 1977, and Senate
majority leader, 1961 to 1977.
15. Hubert H. Humphrey was a Democratic U.S. senator from Minnesota, 1949 to 1964 and 1971
to 1978; majority whip during the Kennedy administration; and vice president, 1965 to 1969.
16. Ralph Yarborough was a Democratic U.S. senator from Texas, 1957 to 1971.
17. Robert S. Kerr was a U.S. senator from Oklahoma, 1948 to 1963, and chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee during the Kennedy administration until his death on 1 January 1963.
Conversation with Alber t Gore 367
Dictabelt 4K.8 ends at this point, in the middle of the conversation

between President Kennedy and Senator Gore. The conversation is con-
tinued on Dictabelt 48.2.
President Kennedy: —to do is end up the session which is beginning
to pass some pretty good bills, and have it . . . have us overridden so that
we’re 300 to 3 in the House and, you know, get about 8 or 9 votes in the
Senate. That won’t . . . if we could get it close then we’ve got a . . . then it
seems to me that we’d be glad to . . . I’d like to veto it.
Gore: Yeah.
President Kennedy: But what we ought to do is see how many we can
get; otherwise we’ll end up on such a negative note that we won’t be in
very good shape going into the election to ask for a Democratic Congress,
and we’d give the Republicans something to write about for a week.
Gore: Well, of course, I want you to do whatever you think is best to
be done.
Gore: I am more or less saying that if you want to make a fight to
prevent the veto from being overridden, my opinion is it can be defeated
in the Senate. But it can’t be defeated unless you put yourself on the line
on the thing. Now, it’s really your choice, and I think that if you ask
Hubert and Bob not to override, they would not and would fight it. But,
I don’t know whether you want to put that much at stake on it or not.
President Kennedy: Right. Well, let me do this. Let me talk to Mike
Mansfield. He’s against the bill, Hubert’s for the bill, and Smathers is for
the bill. And, of course, Bobby Baker’s for the bill. . . .18
Gore: Well, you know it’s a hell of a thing, with a Democratic major-
ity, to have a paid employee who is a lobbyist for a special interest bill.
President Kennedy: I know, well, he’s working for you fellas.
Gore: I know [laughing].
President Kennedy: [chuckling] Not for me.
Gore: He never did work for you in the Senate.
18. Bobby Baker was secretary to the Senate majority leader, 1955 to 1963. As secretary to
Senate majority leaders Lyndon Johnson and Mike Mansfield, Baker established himself as a
preeminent head counter and dispenser of unofficial favors. He also became an unofficial lob-
byist through his Washington, D.C., law firm, Tucker and Baker, and earned a substantial
income even as he drew the meager salary attached to his official occupation. Though officially
attached to Senator Mansfield at this point, Baker worked much more closely with Senator
Kerr and often reflected Kerr’s views on any particular piece of legislation or government
business. In January 1967, Baker would be convicted of income tax evasion, theft, and conspir-
acy to defraud the government.
368 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
President Kennedy: [laughing] No, I know that . . . I know that. But I

will talk to Mike and ask Mike what . . . how many votes he thinks he can
get and also Bob Kerr, and I’ll be talking to you again before we do any-
thing. Now, it may be that the House won’t have a quorum by Wednesday.
We can see what that situation is. But I won’t do anything on this thing
until late . . . until whatever the time limit is on it.
Gore: I doubt very much if the House will have a quorum, and the
Senate will have a hell of a time getting a quorum.
President Kennedy: Well, we’ll take a look. So we’ve got another 48
hours on it, and in the meanwhile, I’ll be talking to you before
what[ever] . . . I make a decision.
Gore: Whatever you do is satisfactory to me, and I’ll come back up
and make whatever fight you want made.
President Kennedy: OK, fine . . . well—
Gore: Whatever you decide, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Good. Well, I’m going to have breakfast with
Mike in the morning and then I’ll be back in touch with you before we
make a final decision.
Gore: OK.
President Kennedy: Thanks, Albert.
On October 10, 1962, two days after this conversation and six hours
before the deadline, Kennedy signed the Self-employed Pension Bill
without comment.
Kennedy’s last appointment before lunch was an unrecorded meeting
with Walt W. Rostow, counselor of the Department of State and chair-
man of the Policy Planning Council.
The only meeting the President taped on this day was a continuation
of the previous Tuesday’s $100 billion budget discussion. This followed
an unrecorded meeting of Bell, Sorensen, O’Brien, and O’Donnell.
Meeting on the Budg et 369
4:48–5:10 P.M.
[S]ome feel that we’re going to have to break the 100 billion
dollar barrier. So we might as well break it now as in the elec-
tion year.
Meeting on the Budget19

Though Pennsylvania senator Joseph Clark lamented in 1963 when dis-
cussing the national debt and the federal deficit that “no topic in our
time has been the victim of so much nonsense,” few then were willing to
countenance the ideas of President Kennedy and his economic advisers
on the subject. Kennedy and CEA chairman Walter Heller and other
administration economists called for a small measure of deficit spending,
for accelerated public works outlays, and for a federal income tax cut to
move the nation’s economy toward full employment and toward its pro-
ductive potential.20 Though U.S. corporations had increased their indebt-
edness in the 1957 to 1962 period by approximately 200 percent, U.S.
individuals by approximately 380 percent, and state and local govern-
ments by approximately 400 percent, the federal government was
expected to avoid this trend; Kennedy’s political opponents lost little
sleep driving this point home to the American public.
As President Kennedy planned for last-minute campaign stops,
mostly in the Midwest and Northeast (and in Senator Clark’s home state
on five separate occasions), former President Eisenhower was engaged in
a campaign tour of his own, stumping for Republican congressional can-
didates, speaking pejoratively of Kennedy’s domestic program as the
“Far Frontier,” and warning the nation of Kennedy’s, and by proxy, the
Democratic Party’s, fiscal recklessness. At the meeting detailed below,
Douglas Dillon, Kennedy’s secretary of the Treasury, and formerly
under secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration, began by
recalling the methods under which spending plans had been presented in
19. Including President Kennedy, David Bell, C. Douglas Dillon, Henry Fowler, Walter Heller,
Charles Schultze, Theodore Sorensen, and Elmer Staats. Tape 27A, John F. Kennedy Library,
20. See “Letter to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House Transmitting a
Proposed Stand-By Capital Improvements Act. 19 February 1962,” Public Papers of the
Presidents, pp. 143–44; “Remarks Upon Signing the Public Works Acceleration Act. 14
September 1962,” ibid., pp. 682–83.
370 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
the previous administration. Though the first part of the meeting was
not captured on tape, the recorded portion began with Dillon counseling
the use of low-spending estimates and reminding his colleagues in the
Kennedy administration of how that device had helped the Eisenhower
administration limp toward its modestly higher spending targets.
Kennedy pressed Chairman Heller to use the White House as a “pul-
pit for public education in economics.” Nevertheless, the President
believed that there were limits on what the administration could do.
Though a tax cut would be difficult to pass, increased spending—in an
obvious and direct fashion—seemed politically out of the question.21
Consequently, with an eye toward the creation of a conservative-liberal
coalition and the postwar reconfiguration of a tax code designed largely
for World War II, Kennedy gravitated more and more toward the tax
cut proposal as the preferred economic stimulus.22 Accordingly, ques-
tions like how to spend more on targeted investments, how to avoid dra-
conian cuts elsewhere, and how to present a budget that would appear
“responsible” enough to win a tax cut, defined the discussion as Kennedy
and his advisers considered and wrestled with the administration’s
future budget proposals.
Douglas Dillon: . . . expenditures on the low side, because it wouldn’t
mean anything if they actually . . . if more was spent because it was . . .
how much you would spend on past commitments, whether you spent
more than estimated. It doesn’t stop you from delivering something
that’s already in the pipeline. And we deliberately made our estimates
low, thinking they might run over, and actually they very seldom, if ever,
did. Oh, it was . . . services couldn’t deliver quite as many and some hap-
pily stayed with it. But the key thing is what you request. And in a way,
what you rec[ommend] . . . put down for these two items in expendi-
tures; you really run off the preceding year’s tendency for a good esti-
21. Heller noted that when Kennedy called for a balanced budget in his 1961 State of the
Union address, “we counted seven escape hatches” [quoted in Walter W. Heller, New
Dimensions in Political Economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 31].
22. Kennedy may never have given up on the idea of economic prosperity through increased
government spending. Only 11 days before his assassination, with the tax cut bill as yet bot-
tled up in the Senate Finance Committee, Kennedy reminded Heller, “First we’ll get your tax
cut, and then we’ll get my expenditure programs” (quoted in Heller, New Dimensions, p. 113).
mate rather tightly. So I think that these two figures can stand up very
well on the basis of the previous criterion.
President Kennedy: I think we can do something there. Now, the . . .
Peace Corps.
David Bell: This is also, of course, the USIA and the State Department;
there are small increases for both.
Elmer Staats: For the Peace Corps, this would hold them at about the
level of where they would be just about a year from now. About a year
from now they’ll be just about 10,000.
President Kennedy: Soybeans? Has Larry O’Brien left?23 We’re
going to know a little more after this election about agriculture.24
Dillon: Sure. Well, Dave said there have been some other reductions;
. . . price support would be real difficult.25 He said he felt soybeans was
possible and wouldn’t make any difference anyway if you can use it
right.26
Bell: The main . . . the main money in here is the rural housing loans.
That’s the main issue, Mr. President.
Dillon: Let’s see . . . it’s 50 million and 75.
Bell: The REA generating loans is also a tough one.27 [Pause.] Well,
these—
Dillon: In determining anything, it’s just . . . just not going up as fast
as you were doing. That’s the whole point . . . if that’s where you’re plan-
ning to go.
President Kennedy: I don’t think we can probably get medical care
by if we don’t cover the non–Social Security beneficiaries.28
23. Lawrence F. O’Brien was special assistant to the President for congressional relations,
1961 to 1965.
24. In the domain of agricultural policy, the Kennedy administration was attempting to move
away from price supports to a regime characterized by direct payments to producers and less-
ened market interference.
25. The reference is to reductions in agricultural price supports.
26. Soybeans, emerging as a major export crop, were not subject to acreage control limita-
tions, nor would they later be eligible for direct payments. In most years—1957, 1958, and
1961 being the exceptions—soybean market prices had remained above predetermined sup-
port levels.
27. The REA is the Rural Electrification Administration.
28. Kennedy’s proposal for medical care for the aged was not faring well, politically, and at the
end of his administration, stood as one of his more notable legislative failures. Indeed, the
Medicare proposal that finally became legislation in 1965 required quite a bit of political
maneuvering, the addition of a Medicaid program for the poor of all ages, and the force of the
Johnson landslide in the 1964 presidential election in order to prevail.
372 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
Dillon: Well, this is just a deferment for one year—

Dillon: —if you wanted to.
Bell: Now, this would mean on the education, Mr. President, this
would mean no program at all in the elementary and secondary field.
That’s what the implication of this would be.
President Kennedy: Well, we can’t get it by.29 It’s just really as if . . .
almost a political question as to whether we update it or recommend it,
because [unclear] I think was—
Bell: There have been these suggestions to . . . Remember this year
you had a recommendation for a quality improvement bill. And this 141
million is just everything we had in for that and, as well as, direct aid to
school districts for construction and teachers’ salaries and so on.
President Kennedy: All right. Well I want Ted [Sorensen] to look at
what we ought to do about . . . what we ought to recommend in the field of
education.
Theodore Sorensen: I think, like many things in this list, Mr.
President, we can make a judgment on this at the time we make our leg-
islative program judgments, and the time we make that judgment really
is after election day. If we lose 40 seats, we’re not going to be going up
with the same education bill.
President Kennedy: If we lose ten seats. We lost one already.
Twenty-second pause.
All right, on the Interior Department, I think we can do something
on that by taking another item . . .
Bell: Well, the Indian schools is an important—
President Kennedy: That’s pretty hard to do, we don’t want to . . .
but the other thing, oceanography, helium, conservation, water fowl land
acquisition, fisheries program, increased acquisition of recreational land,
acceleration to improvement of parks and public lands. All those—
Dillon: This is all increased acquisition and acceleration of improve-
ments that we’re talking about; they’d still be moving ahead at present
rates which is already increased over what was ever done before.
[Unclear] that’s all we’re talking about.
President Kennedy: Occupational safety legislation. What is that, now?
29. As he predicted, Kennedy’s aid to education proposals for the 87th Congress were
defeated.
Bell: That’s a legislative proposal and it’s not much money. Six or
eight million . . .
Sorensen: Grants to states. It’s a very small amount.
Bell: Yeah, 6 or 8 million dollars.
President Kennedy: What does it do? What do we do with them?
Bell: They would be grants to the state labor departments to pro-
mote occupational safety standards in factories.
Unidentified: It’s research.
Bell: [Unclear] would also be involved.
Dillon: And, as I said to this thing, this is illustrative—
Unidentified: Uh-huh.
Dillon: —and economic [unclear] 6 or 7 million dollars . . .
Bell: The key point here—
President Kennedy: Well, I think the only way you’re really going to
save much with these 6 and 8 million dollar grants—
Bell: Yes. That’s right.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] big programs are too—
Bell: Yeah.
President Kennedy: —have too . . . but, I mean, if you get these agen-
cies all thinking about these smaller ones . . .
Bell: Well, the important issue here would be the training . . . piece of
that. We got in a big fight with the Labor Department about that. We’re
already a good deal lower than they think we should be.
Twelve-second pause.
President Kennedy: GSA.30 That could—
Bell: That, of course, is, that’s work on buildings, primarily. And you
can set that about any pace you want.
President Kennedy: Reduced direct housing loans are proposed,
25,000 housing loans, 23,000 loans?
Bell: Yeah.
President Kennedy: I don’t know really why the Veterans
Administration is in the direct loans these days, anyway. How is it?
Bell: Simply for historical reasons. We got in after World War II. And
successive Budget Bureaus and presidents have been trying to get them
out. Last year, after a considerable fight with Teague, we got an agreement
under which this program goes along, but the veterans begin to lose eligi-
30. The abbreviation GSA stands for General Services Administration.

374 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
bility after a certain number of years.31 And a good slug of the veterans are
beginning, now, to lose their eligibility under that legislation. So this will
be phased out in a period of four or five more years . . . the bulk of it, as I
recall. By ’68, I think . . . you’re just about through with this. But that was
the best we could do in terms of the legislative agreement. And, meantime,
they do have the authority and the veterans are eligible. So you, presum-
ably, have to . . . they . . . they’re under restriction now. They’re holding
back. They could lend a lot more. The question is kind of where you draw
the line of how much heat you’re willing to take to prevent loans being
made that actually could be made under the existing law.
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bell: Twenty-five thousand is about the level this year, and it’s about
the same as the level last year. This involves some cutback.
Fourteen-second pause.
President Kennedy: But, some feel that we’re going to have to break
the 100 billion dollar barrier. So we might as well break it now as in the
election year.
Dillon: Well, I think you may well. . . . I don’t know what you’re
gonna be in, you may well break it in NOA; that’s going to be a different
figure entirely.32 We’re talking about expenditures here. How much
higher is NOA in August, here?
Sorensen: I thought we’d already broken a 100 billion dollars.
Unidentified: Oh, we’re up by 6 or 7 billion.
Dillon: Well, that was a different NOA. [Pause.]
Sorensen: You know that it’s being broken this year?
Unidentified: Yeah.
Bell: About to be five . . . under these figures which are August 30th
figures.
Dillon: So that . . . that includes—
Bell: Mostly 2 billion dollars for the IMF and a lot of things like
that, that are not actual expenditures.33 It won’t be actual expenditures.
Dillon: If we break it next year in NOA so the budgets that are going
in would be over—
Bell: No, it’s broken now!
31. Olin E. “Tiger” Teague was a U.S. representative from Texas, 1947 to 1979; chairman of
the House Committee on Veterans Affairs, 1963 to 1973; and a much-decorated World War II
veteran.
32. The abbreviation NOA stands for new obligational authority.
33. The abbreviation IMF stands for the International Monetary Fund.
Dillon: Well, it will be again next year.

Bell: Oh, yes, yes . . . [unclear].
Dillon: So, for that reason, I would think in the . . . if it’s broken, then
the . . . I’m only thinking of the expenditure side, would seem to be your
. . . your tax reduction . . . what chance you have to get it.
Walter Heller: Well, there . . . there, you know, there are some other
arguments that point on the up side. Every dollar of expenditure increase
gives you more punch. You get a dollar of tax reduction because you’re
surer of the economic impact and certainly the . . . the slack in the economy.
Secondly, I suppose there is there some validity in the argument that if
Congress is going to cut taxes, and they’re going to want to make a show-
ing of cutting your expenditure proposals—as part of the price of admis-
sion of the tax cut—to put them up a little higher doesn’t make you look as
good, I grant, if they cut, but it gives them the feeling that they’ve paid the
price of admission for a tax cut. Well, it’s just that a number of these
things, I think, are cheaper if we do them now than if we do them later.
Dillon: The real problem with that cutting business is that they get
those people involved, and the Ways and Means Committee and the
Finance Committee are not the Appropriations Committee, and they
will, they’ll [unclear]. The chances of getting any tax reduction is going
to be very difficult anyway, and it’s required that . . . showing that we’re
really trying to hold down expenditures.
Bell: I think . . . I believe, now, that you have to—
Dillon: Well, they’re not—
Bell: I don’t make anything out of your third argument. The others, I
think, are something that, you know . . .
Bell: The basic problem is that the President’s program would cost
this much. And if you’re going to cut it, you’re going to cut the pro-
grams. And this is on the one side, and the strategy of dealing with the
Congress is on the other side, although there are arguments both ways
on the strategy side.
Dillon: But these are all sort of picking at things, and—
Unidentified: [Coughs.]
Dillon: —certainly they are all . . . the foreign aid ones are not
enough, are not any cuts, actually, and—
Bell: Yes, Congress—[Unclear exchange.]
Dillon: —very little.
Bell: Yeah, not very much, but—
President Kennedy: How about the Indian thing we can cut, but that
isn’t very much money in that anyway . . . it’s only about 4 or 5 million?
376 M O N DAY, O C T O B E R 8, 1962
Bell: Which, sir?

President Kennedy: The Indian schools.
Bell: Oh no, sir, it’s more than that. I’d say, probably, 15 or 20 million.
President Kennedy: Is it really?
Bell: Yeah. You see, the previous administration left us in lousy shape
on Indian schools.
Staats: I don’t believe it’s that much in this one year, but it’s about a
three- or four-year program all together. But in the first—
President Kennedy: Are the schools pretty bad?
Bell: Well, yeah.
Staats: Yeah, pretty—
Bell: Some of the kids didn’t have school at all.
Staats: A lot of the children just don’t have any school.
President Kennedy: Well, if we’ve got to get a good speech, well, we
ought to give it Wednesday night or through this weekend.34 I ought to
stick to my script, about some of the things we’ve done. As I say, that
thing on agriculture is really impressive. It’s hard to give these speeches
to these . . . threefold, obviously, but it seems to me, over the weekend, if
we can sort of get about three or four speeches—like this Indian school
thing—it’d show what we’ve done there as opposed to . . . it would build
a better base for—
Bell: I think this is, this is 10 million dollars.
President Kennedy: I think that’s sort of the theme for this weekend.
Bell: Ten million dollars [unclear].
President Kennedy: Congress will be closing . . . these will be dead-
locked.
Unidentified: [Unclear] the Indian schools.
Dillon: The increase.
Unidentified: Ten [unclear], sir.
President Kennedy: It’s a hell of a story, the . . . I think the agency
may even see it right. Put them all together . . . four different speeches or
three, you’ll have a chance to do these domestic things.
[Pause.] OK, now . . .
Dillon: We simply . . . approach on this, as Ted said, a lot of these
decisions you can’t take until you sit down and do the final thing. It’s just
34. President Kennedy gave a series of congressional campaign speeches in Ohio, Michigan,
and Minnesota, 5 to 7 October 1962, and in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and New
York, 12 to 15 October 1962. Wednesday, 10 October 1962, he spoke in Baltimore, Maryland.
a question whether to start off trying to make decisions up here or start

off down here and then if you spot down—
President Kennedy: All right, well, let’s start off with 98.5, Dave, and
then let’s . . . we’ll have to get each one.35 Anything that’s added beyond that
will have to be added as a result of a decision that we’ll take individually.
Bell: OK.
President Kennedy: We may go up to 108 billion, [unclear] go back
to a hundred, but let’s start with the . . . Are you going to [unclear]?
Dillon: I don’t know where you come out.
Unidentified: Before the last election—
Staats: These are bridges we can cross a little better after we get a
little further along with our message. [Pause.]
Dillon: Mr. President, you might like to note that [unclear].
Dillon: [Unclear.]
President Kennedy: We can divide that, Ted, I was thinking that. . . .
So what do you think about this thing, trying to—
Sorensen: Well, I think, you know it depends a little bit on the audi-
ence.
President Kennedy: Hard to make it as a speech, but I . . . I’d like to
get it in as a sort of—
Sorensen: Going on nationwide television, that is something that—
Sorensen: [Unclear] I’m already concerned [unclear] that the whole
thing together, although that’s . . . that’s—
President Kennedy: That’ll be a boring speech?36
Sorensen: It’s a less-boring speech. What you need to remember is,
given that audience type and—
Sorensen: Out in Minnesota and all . . .
President Kennedy: You haven’t got about15 [unclear] that’s a mean
feat. [Unclear] can stand on the ground. Now those [unclear].
Unidentified: Yeah.
35. Reference is to the $981/2 billion administrative budget (excluding trust fund transactions).
36. After his 13 August 1962 televised address to the nation on economic policy, delivered with a
plethora of statistics and accompanying charts and graphs, President Kennedy seemed particu-
larly concerned that such presentations never be delivered again in such an uninteresting style.
378 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 9, 1962
President Kennedy: That poll shows Judd ahead.37

Sorensen: [Unclear] the firsthand meeting [unclear].
President Kennedy: If Judd gets to 43 percent . . .
Sorensen: Yeah, [unclear] and Andersen’s pulled up an old [unclear].38
Unidentified: That just seems ridiculous.
Heller: Did Hubert say that he was doubtful about that poll?38
President Kennedy: Which one?
Heller: This . . . you haven’t [unclear] this poll, this last one?39
President Kennedy: Yeah, well, no . . . I think we’d better, I don’t
think they’ve got much of a poll. I just think the problem is that . . . oop,
turn that up, will you? Just turn them up.
The President turned off the machine.
The Secretary of the Treasury stayed behind to continue the discussion

with the President and Walter Heller. The President had some time for
more telephone calls, then he went to the pool at 7:03 P.M.
The President left only one recording from this important day. An hour
before he was to sign a piece of pork barrel legislation to satisfy a diffi-
cult and powerful congressman, the President called Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield for mutual congratulations on the approval of a
compromise version of the foreign aid bill providing for a $300 million
increase over the amount voted by the House.
37. Walter H. Judd was a Republican U.S. representative from Minnesota and keynote speaker
at the 1960 Republican National Convention. Judd, in what was considered a mild upset at the
time, lost in the 1962 election to Democratic state senator Donald M. Fraser.
38. This is mostly likely a reference to Elmer Lee Andersen, governor of Minnesota, then run-
ning for reelection in 1962. His reelection bid resulted in the closest election in Minnesota
history with a loss to his opponent by 91 votes.
39. Hubert H. Humphrey was a U.S. senator from Minnesota.
40. A University of Minnesota professor of economics before joining the Kennedy administra-
tion, Walter Heller was particularly interested in this Minnesota congressional race.
Conversation with Mik e Mansfield and Mik e Kirwan 379
9:54 A.M.
Are you sure you don’t want to witness this—this extraordi-

nary action as I’m bulldozed and bludgeoned and beaten into
being the greatest friend of the fish . . . ?
Conversation with Mike Mansfield and Mike Kirwan1

Congressman Michael “Big Mike” Kirwan had raised the hackles of Senator
Wayne Morse by removing, in conference committee on the Interior and
Other Agencies Appropriations Bill, several large public works projects
destined for Morse’s Oregon. His sole reason, publicly announced, was
that Morse had refused to support his $10 million national aquarium pro-
posal for the same bill. Recognizing both the capricious nature of Kirwan’s
maneuvers and also the importance of pleasing the chair of the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee, who was also a senior member of the
Appropriations Committee, Kennedy asked Senator Mansfield and Senator
Robert Kerr of Oklahoma to help him settle the Kirwan-Morse dispute.
President Kennedy confers here with Mansfield before speaking to Kirwan
in an effort to conclude a settlement agreeable to Kirwan, Morse, and the
President himself. And though the President signed the Aquarium Bill
later that morning, as he promises here, and Kirwan dutifully restored
Morse’s public works projects in the Supplemental Appropriations Bill, the
national aquarium project itself, planned for the Hains Point area of the
nation’s capital, remained dependent on congressional funding that was
ultimately never provided.
Mike Mansfield: [Unclear] it’s for you, Mike Kirwan and I.

Mansfield: I told Mike to put the Oregon items back.
Mansfield: And, he would appreciate it—if you’re going to do it—he
asked [unclear] that you sign the Aquarium Bill as soon as you can.
President Kennedy: Right. In other words, you would not wait on it?
1. Dictabelt 49.1, Cassette M, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
Recordings Collection. Mike Mansfield was Democratic U.S. senator from Montana, 1953 to
1977, and Senate majority leader, 1961 to 1977. Michael J. Kirwan was a Democratic U.S. rep-
resentative from Ohio, 1937 to 1970.
380 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 9, 1962
Mansfield: No.
Mansfield: It would make Mike very happy.
President Kennedy: Oh, good. I’ll sign it this morning, then.
Mansfield: Fine [unclear] here—wait a minute. Good-bye. Here’s
Mike.
Mike Kirwan: Hello.
President Kennedy: Hello, hello.
Kirwan: Yes.
President Kennedy: How are you doing?
Kirwan: This is Mike . . .
President Kennedy: Are you sure you don’t want to witness this—
Kirwan: No, no . . . no.
President Kennedy: —this extraordinary action as I’m bulldozed and
bludgeoned and beaten into being the greatest friend of the fish . . . ?
Kirwan: That’s . . . . Do you want me to go down, then?
President Kennedy: I’ve eaten more fish . . .
Kirwan: What? Well, do you want me to go down?
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t you come down and watch it?
Kirwan: All right. That’s what I’ll . . . when are you going to do it?
President Kennedy: Well, I’ll do it whenever you want to be down here.
Kirwan: All right. I’ll go right down now, then.
President Kennedy: OK. Right.
The President had an important meeting on Berlin scheduled with the

French foreign minister, Maurice Couve de Murville, with whom he
intended to share U.S. estimates of how long it would take the allies to
respond to a Soviet provocation in Berlin. It would take four days, for
example, to launch a battalion-sized probe on the Berlin autobahn. The two
men would agree that, given the current tensions on Berlin, contingency
planning had to be improved to allow for a much faster response time.2
The President also had two significant meetings on Cuba. Before
lunch he met with John McCone, Robert Kennedy, Edwin Martin,
George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Ralph A. Dungan. In the late after-
noon he met again with John McCone, and included Maxwell Taylor and
Roswell Gilpatric. The principal decision facing Kennedy was whether to
endorse the CIA request for a U-2 flight over San Cristóbal in west cen-
2. Memorandum of Conversation, 9 October 1962, FRUS, 15: 351–55.

W E D N E S DAY, O C T O B E R 10, 1962 381
tral Cuba. The flight was to be over Cuba for only 12 minutes but would
come close to some identified SAM sites. The risks were high. The last
time the CIA had photographed this part of the island was August 29
and new SAM sites might have been constructed since then. The
President approved this mission.3 The U-2 would make its direct over-
flight on October 14.
John McCone made an unscheduled visit to the White House on October

10. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had just met with the
House Appropriations Committee to discuss James B. Donovan’s negoti-
ations with Fidel Castro on the Bay of Pigs prisoners. McCone found
some congressional uneasiness about these negotiations. Newspapers on
Tuesday had carried front-page stories on Donovan’s mission, a poten-
tial partisan political issue. Donovan was running for the Senate against
the Republican Jacob Javits in New York. It was reported that the 1,113
prisoners were expected back in Miami by the weekend.1 The DCI also
wanted to brief the President on low-level photographs of the cargoes
on the Soviet merchant ships headed for Cuba. Several ships carried
crates that photoanalysts believed contained IL-28 bombers. This was
the first hard evidence of the delivery of weapons that might be con-
strued as offensive in character.
Kennedy did not tape this meeting; however, from McCone’s detailed
summary it is clear that the President was disturbed by these new pho-
tographs.2 As he had done when the first U-2 photographs of SAM sites
were developed, Kennedy asked that this material be withheld from the
rest of his administration. His argument was that the domestic political
situation was such that any leak of the information about possible
bombers would reduce his independence of action. McCone argued
against strict restriction and gained the President’s approval to reducing
the circle of the informed to the President’s key advisers and those intel-
ligence officers required to give expert analysis.
3. Gilpatric “Notes on a Meeting with the President,” 9 October 1962, described in FRUS, 11: 17.
1. “Final Parley Set on Cuba Captives,” New York Times, 9 October 1962. James Donovan
returned from Cuba on October 11 empty handed.
2. Memorandum on Donovan Project, Meeting 10 October 62, John McCone, FRUS, 11: 17–19.
“We’ll have to do something drastic about Cuba,” McCone recorded

the President as saying. Kennedy expected a new operational plan for
Cuba from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the week of October 14.
At some point during the day, the President called an old friend,
Senator George Smathers of Florida. Like McCone, Smathers was a prod
on the subject of Cuba. The President, Smathers later recalled, “always
identified me with pushing, pushing, pushing.”3 The immediate reason
for the telephone call was that the President had signed Smathers’s Self-
employed Pension Bill. The President so disliked his friend’s bill that he
signed it without ceremony.
Time Unknown
I just don’t want these guys around; particularly if this Cuban

thing ever works out . . . So, we’ve got to get them out tomor-
row night. Then everybody goes home, and, shit, nobody knows
what the hell’s going on.
Conversation with George Smathers4

Wanting to avoid the imminent override of a veto he had hoped to deliver,
Kennedy consented to sign H.R. 10, the Self-employed Pension Bill, only
hours before its deadline, and three days before the adjournment of the
87th Congress. The bill’s chief Senate sponsor, George Smathers of
Florida, had warned the President on September 28 not to consider a
pocket veto; Smathers pledged to keep Congress in session past the sign-
ing deadline to prevent just such a possibility. Though President Kennedy
objected to the legislation on the grounds that it would reduce federal
revenue by $100 to $125 million and would largely benefit wealthy attor-
neys and physicians, he signed it, reluctantly, and called Smathers after-
ward to break the news. There would, however, be no signing ceremony
for this bill and Kennedy would ask Senator Smathers not to broadcast
news of the signing that evening.
3. Cited in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (New York: Ballantine
Books, 1978), p. 530.
Recordings Collection. George A. Smathers was a Democratic U.S. senator from Florida, 1951
to 1969.
Conversation with Georg e Smathers 383
Despite their differences over this bill, Kennedy and Smathers enjoyed
a warm relationship marked by frequent golf outings and White House
breakfasts. Ostensibly a courtesy call to inform Smathers of the late-
breaking news, this conversation would meander, as well, into a discus-
sion of the James Meredith–University of Mississippi crisis, the Donovan
negotiations with Castro, and the lingering showdown over the handful
of appropriations bills yet to be completed.
President Kennedy: [Unclear] Smathers that I’d do what you want to

do, and I just signed that goddamned bill.5
George Smathers: Did you really?
President Kennedy: Yeah, in spite of the fact that they tell me there
isn’t a quorum present up there. I just figured that a hundred were going
to show—in spite of what Drew Pearson said.
Smathers: I was getting ready to say, that article by . . . Drew
Pearson’s going to be mad at you.6
President Kennedy: Well, I know that. He is going to be mad at me,
but that won’t be new.
Smathers: Yeah. That’s right, well he’s such a bad guy . . . But you
really signed it?
President Kennedy: Yeah, I signed it.
Smathers: Well, I think that’s fine. Actually, Mr. President, I—
President Kennedy: No, no, no . . . don’t tell me how good it is.
Smathers: No, I’m not going to tell you how good it is; I’m going to
tell you, politically, it’ll be good. It’ll be good.
President Kennedy: What about . . . can you get those guys out of
there tomorrow night? 7
Smathers: I think so. It’s Russell now. 8
5. The Self-employed Pension Bill, H.R. 10, also known as the Keough-Smathers Bill.
6. Reference to a Drew Pearson column published that morning in the Washington Post, dis-
cussed in greater detail, below (see Drew Pearson, “The Washington Merry-Go-Round: Sen.
Smathers Puts Up Roadblock,” Washington Post, 10 October 1962, p. D11).
7. A reference to the Senate and to Congress in general. On the heels of the first national elec-
tions during the Kennedy administration, the President is anxious to see Congress adjourn
and head home for the last few weeks of the campaign.
8. Richard Russell, Democratic U.S. senator from Georgia, was in the middle of a fight with
House conferees over the Department of Agriculture Appropriations Act, one of a handful of
appropriations bills not yet completed. Jamie Whitten, Democratic U.S. representative from
Mississippi and chair of the House Agriculture Subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee, had suggested that Senate amendments not previously considered by a House
President Kennedy: I know, but, God, can’t we tell him we’ll give it
out of the contingency or we’ll do it with something else? I mean isn’t
there something that we can do with that goddamned Jamie Whitten?9
Smathers: I know it, it’s awful. But that’s the . . . everything else is
soluble—quickly . . . except that. I—
President Kennedy: Well, if we get everything else, I just don’t want
these guys around; particularly if this Cuban thing ever works out, we
want them out of there.
Smathers: That’s right.
President Kennedy: So, we’ve got to get them out tomorrow night.
Then everybody goes home, and, shit, nobody knows what the hell’s
going on.
Smathers: Exactly . . . exactly.
President Kennedy: There’s nothing that can be done with those god
. . . Come on. You’d think those southerners . . . I thought you southern-
ers were thick as thieves?
Smathers: Well, we are! We are! But not . . . but Jamie doesn’t want
to go home. The difficulty is—
President Kennedy: He doesn’t want to go home?
Smathers: He doesn’t want to go home. He wants to stay up here.
President Kennedy: That’s a—
Smathers: And Dick Russell doesn’t want to go. He told me this after-
noon, he said . . . I said, “Dick, can’t we get this damn thing settled?” And
he said, “Well, not before next week.” I said, “Well, Jesus Christ!” And he
said, “Well, frankly, I’m not much interested in going home anyway.”
President Kennedy: God, that’s a selfish fucking attitude, isn’t it?
With a lot of guys running for reelection?
Smathers: Yes, it is . . . yes. I know it. It’s terrible. But many south-
erners don’t want to go home. This is a problem. Sam Ervin said, 10 “I’ve
lost my enthusiasm for going home, now with this Mississippi thing.”11
President Kennedy: He thinks he’s going to get a lot of—
committee or sent down from the President were to be excluded from the conference report
and final bill. Angered on the basis of principle and by the removal of a $1.6 million amend-
ment for a peanut-marketing research facility in Dawson, Georgia, Russell intended to keep
Congress working until he got his way.
9. See note 8.
10. Samuel J. Ervin, Jr., was Democratic U.S. senator from North Carolina, 1954 to 1975.
11. Reference to the crisis at the University of Mississippi following James Meredith’s
attempts to register from 25 September to 1 October.
Smathers: Sikes12 and Herlong, all of these fellas ought to be run-

ning, and they’re here.13 Paul Rogers talked to him a little while ago . . .
he’s not going home!14
President Kennedy: Why? He doesn’t want to listen to all that moan-
ing?
Smathers: Well, they don’t want to listen to all that moaning and
they don’t want to be put in a position where they’ve either got to jump
on you or, you know, get with Barnett.15 And they don’t figure that
either one is too good at the moment. So they’re just trying to let it cool.
President Kennedy: Yeah, yeah.
Smathers: And this is what I think is wrong—
President Kennedy: Of course, I think they ought to be able to get
some middle position . . . just regret this—
Smathers: That’s right. Well, the southern governors did very well.
Smathers: They did very well.
President Kennedy: I think, why don’t they just keep quiet about it
and just say “Well, it’s a regrettable incident—period.” That’s all I’d say
if I were a southerner.
Smathers: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Just say “I regret what happened, this is not very
. . . ” you know, and then just go on to something else. Shit, nobody’s—
Smathers: Well, that’s what I’m saying. We handled it all right—
President Kennedy: Then nobody knows whether you regret that
Meredith entered or you regretted that troops were used or you regret-
ted bloodshed or you regretted that you knew me.
Smathers: That’s right. I deplore—
Smathers: —extremism. See, we handled it well in Florida, and it could
have been handled with a little . . . exercised a little judgment and—
President Kennedy: Leadership.
Smathers: —and leadership, it could have been handled elsewhere.
And then I’d move on.
12. Robert L. F. Sikes was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1941 to 1979, and
senior member of the House Appropriations Committee.
13. A. Sydney Herlong, Jr., was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1949 to 1969.
14. Paul G. Rogers was a Democratic U.S. representative from Florida, 1955 to 1979.
15. Ross Barnett, segregationist governor of Mississippi from 1960 to 1964, refused to register
Meredith at Ole Miss, touching off a riot and President Kennedy’s deployment of federal troops.
President Kennedy: [Snickers.]

Smathers: Thompson said he was pretty disturbed about the fact that
. . . you . . . didn’t take his word for it . . . said Thompson.16 We’re going
to finally find the southern [unclear] that is going to say, “Thompson
talked to me about going to the President.” We haven’t found it yet. And
Drew Pearson gets you right over the barrel.
President Kennedy: What about Drew? He was pretty mean this
morning, wasn’t he?17
Smathers: God, he was nasty. Jesus!
President Kennedy: That comes out of “my shins are black and blue”?
Smathers: That’s right. I eat your food and then I spit all over you
and kick you in the shins . . .
President Kennedy: He doesn’t know about all those votes you gave us?
Smathers: That’s right. He doesn’t want to know about them. He’s
going to stay with those four fellas, or eight fellas.
President Kennedy: Estes? He’s got Estes.18
Smathers: Estes and Albert.19
President Kennedy: Yeah, Estes feeds him that stuff.
Smathers: Yeah, I know it.
President Kennedy: Estes and Albert.
Smathers: That’s right.
President Kennedy: And Wayne.20
Smathers: And Wayne gives it to him. Wayne’s up here raising hell
again.
President Kennedy: Is he? About what? His public works?21
Smathers: Yeah.
16. Reference to William “Bill” Thompson, president of the East Coast Railway, who had recently
joined President Kennedy, Smathers, and Bill Dale of the First National Bank of Orlando for a
cruise aboard the presidential yacht, Honey Fitz. All three of Kennedy’s guests were the subject of
an acerbic Drew Pearson column in the Washington Post that morning and were cited as evidence
of Kennedy’s predilection for treating his political enemies better than his political allies.
17. Pearson, “Sen. Smathers Puts Up a Roadblock.” “The interesting thing,” Pearson noted,
assaying the Kennedy-Smathers relationship, “is that the more the debonair Senator kicks him
on the legislative shins, the more his old golfing partner comes back smiling.”
18. Estes Kefauver was Democratic U.S. senator from Tennessee, 1949 to 1963, and the
Democratic vice-presidential nominee in 1956.
19. Albert A. Gore was Democratic U.S. senator from Tennessee, 1953 to 1971.
20. Wayne Morse was Republican U.S. senator from Oregon, 1945 to 1952; Independent U.S.
senator from Oregon, 1952 to 1955; and Democratic U.S. senator from Oregon, 1955 to 1969.
21. Public works projects for Oregon removed during conference committee on Interior and
Other Agencies Appropriations Act at the behest of Representative Michael Kirwan, the chair
of the House conferees.
President Kennedy: Jeez! We got that all fixed!

Smathers: I know, but he’s still mad, and still talking about it, and he
came in and made a big speech yesterday about how he told you. . . . He
said, “I said, Mr. President, I’m not going to permit this to happen. I’m
not going to let our Democratic party . . . ”Have you ever heard anything
so repulsive in your whole life?
President Kennedy: I know it. He never says . . . It doesn’t matter to
me, and here we got it all fixed with Kirwan and I signed his goddamned
bill, 22 and I called him up and said he’ll let it go on the Supplemental.23
No, no, he wants to . . . he’s sore at me because I took away his issue.
Smathers: That’s right. That’s right.
President Kennedy: But he comes . . . oh well.
Smathers: But he’s making some more over here.
President Kennedy: Another speech?
Smathers: Yeah. He’s got a speech on . . . I don’t know what the hell
it was. Something about the District of Columbia.
President Kennedy: Wait until he hears about H.R. 10.
Smathers: Oh, he’ll die. He’ll die. Well, I’m delighted you signed it,
and—
President Kennedy: Well, don’t say anything about it for a while.
Until they get out of there tonight. OK?
Smathers: I won’t say anything.
President Kennedy: OK. It’ll come out soon enough.
Smathers: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Gore will be coming in [unclear] up from
Tennessee.24
Smathers: Yeah. That’s right.
Smathers: Thank you a million.
President Kennedy: Righto.
Smathers: I really appreciate it, and best of luck.
After speaking with Smathers, the President called the House sponsor of
the pension bill.
22. Michael J. Kirwan was a Democratic U.S. representative from Ohio. See “Conversation
between President Kennedy and Mike Mansfield,” 8 October 1962, for additional detail on the
Kirwan-Morse confrontation.
23. Supplemental Appropriations Bill.
24. President Kennedy had promised to inform Senator Gore of his intentions regarding H.R. 10.
Time Unknown
Oh, God. You are the greatest . . .
Conversation with Eugene Keogh25

Congressman Eugene J. Keogh, the third-ranking member of the House
Ways and Means Committee, had championed and cosponsored the Self-
employed Pension Bill with Senator George Smathers.26 After signing
the bill quietly on October 10 and first phoning Smathers with the news,
the President then telephoned Keogh, most likely to deliver the same
news. What follows is a fragment of their conversation, in which Keogh
endorses the Communications Satellite Act, signed by President
Kennedy several weeks earlier on August 31, 1962.
Eugene Keogh: [Unclear] this communications satellite.

President Kennedy: Oh, God. You are the greatest . . . I just called
you and Smathers. You, obviously have a direct line to each other, or else
you’ve got one down here.
Keogh: No, I just cut him off to talk to you.
President Kennedy: Did you? Well . . .
Keogh: I do commend it though.
President Kennedy: I said to Smathers, “Don’t—
Before the end of the day, the President had a conversation with an
unidentified official about James Meredith’s public criticisms of the racial
composition of the troops sent to maintain order in Oxford, Mississippi.
On October 9, the Army had begun withdrawing large numbers of
troops from Oxford.
26. Eugene J. Keogh was Democratic U.S. representative from New York, 1937 to 1967. Keogh
retired in 1967 after 30 years in Congress, though he was only 59 years old at the time.
Conversation about James Meredith 389
Time Unknown
[A]pparently, we had no Negro troops on patrol.
Conversation about James Meredith27

On October 9, 1962, in a handwritten statement, James Meredith
asserted that the U.S. Army had “resegregated” the troops that remained
on campus. As Meredith wrote: “The first two days of my stay at the
University . . . the military units looked like American units. All soldiers
held their positions and performed the task for which they had been
trained. . . . Since that time the units have been resegregated. Negroes
have been purged from their positions in the ranks.” That same day,
Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance stated that when troops were “first
employed in the Oxford area Negro soldiers were not used on patrols in
order to avoid unnecessary incidents.” On October 6, when the situation
was stabilized, African American troops were again used “in the per-
formance of all normal functions in the units in all operations.”
President Kennedy: Now today, James Meredith charged that the

Army was segregating them and I wondered what had been done with
that discussion I had Friday night.28 Do you know anything about it?
Unidentified: No, sir. Except that Cy[rus Vance], you know he’s out
at the hospital, as you probably heard, at long last. Cy, he called me just a
few minutes ago and said that he talked with your brother about this.
Unidentified: And that he wants to put out a statement. Now what
the facts are, apparently, we had no Negro troops on patrol.
Unidentified: They were in the units, but they have been returned to
their full duties within the last days, or day or so, something like that.
We’re trying to find out exactly what Meredith said and we are fixing up
a statement for Cy to put out, describing exactly what the situation is.
President Kennedy: Well, you better let me have it.
28. “Meredith Charges Army Segregated Oxford Force,” New York Times, 10 October 1962.

President Kennedy: As I say, I assume that after I talked to him
Friday, he began to put them back in again.
President Kennedy: The only thing is [Deputy Attorney General
Nicholas] Katzenbach told me that on the patrols it was just the white
soldiers . . .
Unidentified: . . . Yes . . .
President Kennedy: . . . so I didn’t know what happened with that
discussion I had had Friday.
Unidentified: No, Cy didn’t tell me about talking with you, but I
assume that’s when they did it because I know . . .
President Kennedy: . . . Well, as of yesterday, they were still just
white in the patrol cars.
Unidentified: I see.
President Kennedy: So I’d like to find out. You better call Cy again
and ask him what he did after Friday, number one. Tell him, number two,
to be careful what he says because evidently Katzenbach said yesterday it
was just whites. And then let me know what the statement’s going to be
before you put it out.
President Kennedy: OK. Thanks.
Unidentified: Right. Bye
The President had at least one Mississippi-related meeting this day.

Between 5:26 and 5:50 A.M. he met with the U.S. Army chief of staff,
General Earle G. Wheeler. Kennedy did not tape it.
The White House was turning its attention ever more to the
midterm elections. At 8:00 P.M. the President left for a two-hour visit to
Baltimore. Thursday, October 11, would be a half day in the Oval Office.
Following meetings with the U.S. ambassador to Guinea, William
Attwood, and the journalist John Gunther the President signed the
Trade Bill and left for New York City. From Thursday afternoon
through Sunday night, October 14, the President would campaign in
New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962 391
On September 4 President Kennedy responded to reports of Soviet arms

shipments to Cuba by choosing to issue (through press secretary Salinger)
a statement noting that this was happening and drawing a line that
warned only against Soviet deployment of “offensive” weapons in Cuba.
Everyone, including the Soviets, understood that in this context offensive
meant systems able to deliver nuclear weapons to the United States. The
White House statement was at least as significant for what it said Kennedy
would tolerate. It told administration insiders, like those involved in the
ongoing debate about the future of the Mongoose program against Castro,
that Kennedy would accept Soviet arms shipments to Cuba. Kennedy’s
best hope thus was to overwhelm the critics with a barrage of official
statements downplaying the significance of these shipments of “defensive”
arms in order to deflate the opposition case.
The Republicans had reacted with even more serious charges. Probably
on the basis of the many reports and rumors coming out of Cuba and con-
veyed by private Americans in contact with Cuban exile groups, Republican
senator Kenneth Keating of New York announced on the floor of the Senate
that there were “Soviet rocket installations in Cuba.” With Republicans on
the offensive, Kennedy felt obliged to make yet another statement. Bundy’s
advice was critical. President Kennedy would be giving a press conference
on September 13. Cuba was bound to come up. On September 11 the
Soviet government declared unequivocally that Moscow had not sent and
would not send nuclear missiles to Cuba. There was no need for this, the
Soviet government announced. The next day Bundy urged Kennedy to
repeat, in person, the line Salinger had put out on September 4. Bundy
opened his memo by telling Kennedy that if he wanted to invade Cuba, he
should then reject his advice, because Kennedy would be minimizing the
Soviet threat there. But, as Bundy knew, President Kennedy had told his
aides repeatedly that he did not want a U.S. invasion of Cuba, that the real
danger came from the Soviet Union, and that this danger was likely to
arise later that year in Berlin.1
1. On the sources for Keating’s allegations, see Max Holland, “A Luce Connection: Senator
Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” Journal of Cold War Studies 1 (Fall
1999), pp. 139–67. Bundy to President Kennedy, “Memorandum on Cuba for the Press
392 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
President Kennedy himself underscored a position that accepted

what was already discovered and drew a line against what the Soviets
had just promised they would not do. Kennedy said that “unilateral mili-
tary intervention on the part of the United States cannot currently be
either required or justified.” He added that if Cuba “should ever . . .
become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet
Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its
own security and that of its allies.” The administration mounted a force-
ful campaign of denial, with the President right in the front line. The
Soviet assurances were repeated by the amiable Soviet ambassador,
Anatoly Dobrynin, who spoke with Robert Kennedy and soon afterward
with the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson, saying
flatly to each man that the Soviet government had no intention whatever
of using Cuba as an offensive military base.
Over the month until the crisis actually broke, Kennedy remained of
the view that the notion of the Soviets’ turning Cuba into a missile base
came largely from the imagination and zeal of Republicans campaigning
for Senate and House seats up for election in November (although his
brother Robert and the Republican CIA director, John McCone, had also
voiced this fear). Largely at the instance of Keating and Republican
Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana, the Senate on September 20 passed
by 86 to 1 a resolution authorizing the use of force against Cuba “to pre-
vent the creation or use of an externally supported offensive military capa-
bility endangering the security of the U.S.” On October 10, Keating rose in
the Senate to charge that the Soviets were establishing intermediate-range
missile bases in Cuba.
Kennedy knew of no intelligence data that warranted the Senate res-
olution or supported Keating’s allegation. He had learned that, in addi-
Conference,” 13 September 1962, National Security Files, Box 36, “Cuba General September
62,” John F. Kennedy Library. Bundy’s introduction comes quickly and clearly to the point:
1. The congressional head of steam on this is the most serious that we have had. It affects both
parties and takes many forms.
2. The immediate hazard is that the Administration may appear to be weak and indecisive.
3. One way to avoid this hazard is to act by naval or military force in the Cuban area.
4. The other course is to make a very clear and aggressive explanation of current policy and
its justification.
Bundy then argued for this “other course,” urging Kennedy to explain “The threat is under con-
trol [Bundy’s emphasis]. Neither Communist propaganda nor our own natural anger should
blind us to the basic fact that Cuba is not—and will not be allowed to become—a threat to the
United States.”
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962 393
tion to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), the Soviets were sending crates

containing unassembled IL-28 bombers to Cuba. These bombers, though
capable of carrying nuclear weapons, were being phased out of the Soviet
Air Force as obsolete. In themselves, they were not a cause for worry.
Moreover—though this was before evidence came in regarding the IL-
28s—the CIA’s topmost analytic group, its Board of National Estimates,
produced a Special National Intelligence Estimate. Use of Cuba by the
Soviet Union as a base for offensive ballistic missiles, said the board,
“would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet pol-
icy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness
to increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the U.S.S.R. has
displayed thus far. . . .”2
But as September turned to October with new kinds of Soviet arms
being discovered in Cuba almost every week, an increasingly worried
President was keeping an eye on accelerated contingency planning by
State and Defense in case he was driven toward some kind of military
action against Cuba.3 Kennedy not only had reason to feel justified in dis-
counting the Republicans’ charges; he also felt he had a right to curb
suspected leaks from the intelligence community feeding those charges.
After he had shown Kennedy photographs of the crates containing IL-28
bombers on October 11, McCone noted: “The President requested that
such information be withheld at least until after the elections as if the
information got into the press, a new and more violent Cuban issue
would be injected into the campaign and this would seriously affect his
independence of action.”4
That Kennedy could make such a request of McCone, a Republican, is
remarkable, but the final phrase, about his “independence of action,” may
well have had wider significance to him. A letter from Khrushchev dated
September 28 had brought Kennedy potentially ominous news about
2. Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62, “The Military Buildup in Cuba,” 19

September 1962; reprinted in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, ed. Mary
McAuliffe (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), pp. 91–93.
3. Kennedy met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 14 and was already wondering
about the feasibility of an air strike against SAM sites. See the meeting on 21 September in
which he reminded McNamara about the need to keep the plans up to date. On 2 October,
prodded by the Chiefs, McNamara offered them a big list of contingencies for possible action,
led off by a Soviet move against Berlin or Soviet deployment of “offensive” systems to Cuba
(see Kennedy to McNamara, 21 September 1962, in FRUS, 10: 1081; McNamara to Taylor, 2
October 1962, in FRUS, 11: 6–7).
4. McCone, “Memorandum on Donovan Project,” 11 October 1962, in CIA Documents,
McAuliffe, pp. 123–25.
394 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Berlin. In it, Khrushchev said, “the abnormal situation in Berlin should

be done away with. . . . And under present circumstances we do not see any
other way out but to sign a German peace treaty.” Moreover, Khrushchev
commented angrily on agitation in the United States for action against
Cuba. The congressional resolution, he said, “gives ground to draw a con-
clusion that the U.S. is evidently ready to assume responsibility for
unleashing nuclear war.” Khrushchev asserted that he would not force
the Berlin issue until after the U.S. congressional elections, but he
seemed to say that, by the second half of November, time would run out.
Kennedy discussed his reactions to the letter with his top “demonolo-
gists,” a nickname for his advisers on the Soviet Union, in the conversa-
tion that he recorded on September 29.
Therefore, as mid-October arrived, Kennedy and members of his cir-
cle had reason to expect a crisis, perhaps their greatest crisis yet, over
Berlin. To them, Khrushchev remained a mystifying figure, and in his
last high-level meeting with an American, on September 6 with Interior
Secretary Stewart Udall, Khrushchev had crudely threatened to go to
war in order to force the issue in Berlin. Then there was Khrushchev’s
meeting at the same time with the poet Robert Frost, in which the Soviet
leader said he believed the United States and Western Europe to be weak
and worn out. He invoked Tolstoy’s comment to Maxim Gorky about
old age and sex: “The desire is the same; it’s the performance that’s dif-
ferent.” As Frost cleaned this up when answering questions from U.S.
reporters, it came out: “He said we were too liberal to fight.” This was
how Kennedy first heard it, and it infuriated him, not least because it
provided fodder for Republicans in the congressional campaign.5
On Sunday, October 14, on ABC’s news program Issues and Answers,
Bundy was denying the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba to the
national television audience just as a high-flying U-2 reconnaissance air-
craft of the U.S. Strategic Air Command was flying a limited photo-
graphic mission directly over Cuba. For nearly a month, Director of
Central Intelligence John McCone had pressed for such a flight.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk had resisted. McCone suspected that the
Soviets planned to turn Cuba into an offensive military base. Rusk wor-
ried lest some protests about U.S. overflights or some incident like that of
1960 complicate delicate ongoing negotiations. Moreover, Rusk knew
that most Soviet experts, including those in McCone’s own CIA, thought
5. Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993),
p. 351.
T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962 395
McCone wrong. When Soviet SAMs were spotted in Cuba at the end of
August, McCone pressed harder for U-2 flights, for he interpreted these
SAMs as harbingers of offensive surface-to-surface missiles. Rusk’s resist-
ance also hardened, for the Soviet SAMs were SA-2s, which had shot down
Powers’s U-2 in 1960. The shootdown of a Taiwanese U-2 over western
China on September 8 added to Rusk’s and Kennedy’s fears. Bundy had
allied himself with Rusk. On September 10 Kennedy chose the cautious
approach. But, as worrying evidence mounted, McCone—with Robert
Kennedy’s support—won approval on October 9 for another U-2 flight
directly over Cuba.6 That flight took place on October 14.
During October 15, experts at the CIA’s National Photographic
Intelligence Center (NPIC), in a nondescript building at 5th and K Streets
in Washington, pored over photos from that October 14 U-2 flight over
Cuba. Seeing images of missiles much longer than SAMs, they leafed
through files of photos from the Soviet Union and technical data micro-
filmed by Soviet officer (and Anglo-American spy) Oleg Penkovsky. They
came up with a perfect match. These were medium-range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs) of the SS-4 family. At about 5:30 in the afternoon, Arthur
Lundahl, the head of NPIC, passed the news to CIA headquarters out in
Langley, Virginia.7
In ignorance of what was in progress at NPIC, McNamara had met
that afternoon with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and dozens of lower-level offi-
cials. Although McNamara explained that Kennedy had decided not to
take any military action against Cuba during the next three months, the
group reviewed plans for a massive air strike on Cuba and for an invasion.
That evening, Bundy and his wife gave a small dinner at their home
on Foxhall Road for Charles (Chip) and Avis Bohlen. Chip Bohlen was
going off to be U.S. ambassador to France. Called away to the telephone,
Bundy heard CIA deputy director for intelligence Ray Cline say crypti-
cally, “Those things we’ve been worrying about—it looks as though
we’ve really got something.” “It was a hell of a secret,” Bundy wrote
later. Though he considered immediately calling Kennedy, he concluded
that a few hours made no difference. The President had been in New
York State, speaking for Democratic congressional candidates, and had
6. For more background on the discovery of the missiles, see Graham Allison and Philip
Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2d ed.; New York: Longman,
1999), pp. 219–24, 331–37.
7. Full details are in Dino Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, ed. Robert F. McCort (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 187–217. (Brugioni was in
NPIC at the time.)
396 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
gotten back to Washington in the early hours of the morning. Bundy, as

he also wrote later, “decided that a quiet evening and a night of sleep
were the best preparation” the President could have for what lay ahead
of him. Kennedy never reproached Bundy for giving him that extra rest.8
Bundy brought his news to the private quarters of the White House
at about 9:00 A.M. on Tuesday, October 16. In the major morning papers,
the President had seen one front-page story about Cuba. The Washington
Post reported that “Communist sources” were floating a rumor of a pos-
sible trade—the West to make concessions on Berlin in return for a
slowdown in the Soviet buildup of Cuba. State Department spokesman
Lincoln White denied seeing any such proposal and said, “It would have
been kicked out the window so fast it would have made your head swim.”
The Post’s front page and that of the New York Times featured a Boston
address by Eisenhower, attacking the Kennedy administration’s “dreary
foreign record.” In his administration, Eisenhower said, “No walls were
built. No threatening foreign bases were established.”
President Kennedy told Bundy to round up officials—secretly—for a
meeting later that morning. He phoned his brother Robert and asked
him to come to the White House, where they briefly discussed the sensa-
tional news. At 9:25 President Kennedy began his regular schedule,
meeting astronaut Walter Schirra and his family. In a brief break, just
before 10:00, the President went to Kenny O’Donnell’s office and, as
O’Donnell later recalled, said, “You still think the fuss about Cuba is
unimportant?”
“Absolutely,” O’Donnell answered. “The voters won’t give a damn
about Cuba.”
Kennedy then gave O’Donnell the news. “I don’t believe it,” O’Donnell
replied. “You better believe it,” Kennedy said and added drily, “Ken
Keating will probably be the next President of the United States.”9
After two more routine meetings that morning, Kennedy was able to
open up about the missiles again for about half an hour with Bohlen, who
was paying a previously scheduled farewell call as he prepared to depart
for Paris. Kennedy finished his meeting with Bohlen and went on to the
Cabinet Room.
8. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 395–96.
9. Kenneth P. O’Donnell and David F. Powers, with Joe McCarthy, “Johnny, We Hardly Knew
Ye” (New York: Pocket Books, 1972), p. 369.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 397
11:50 A.M.–1:00 P.M.
We’re certainly going to do [option] number one. We’re going

to take out these missiles.
Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis10

Kennedy was in the Cabinet Room with his five-year-old daughter,
Caroline, when his advisers filed into the Cabinet Room, accompanied by
Lundahl and other experts from NPIC who set up photograph displays
on easels. As Caroline was taken back to the residence and the meeting
began, Kennedy turned on the tape recorder.
Marshall Carter: This is the result of the photography taken Sunday,

sir. There’s a medium-range ballistic missile launch site and two new
military encampments on the southern edge of the Sierra del Rosario in
west-central Cuba.
President Kennedy: Where would that be?
Carter: West-central, sir. That’s . . .
Arthur Lundahl: South of Havana. [quieter, as an aside] I think this
[unclear] represents these three dots we’re talking about.
Carter: Have you got the big pictures?
Lundahl: Yes, sir.
Carter: The President would like to see those.
The launch site at one of the encampments contains a total of at least
14 canvas-covered missile trailers measuring 67 feet in length, 9 feet in
width. The overall length of the trailers plus the tow bars is approxi-
mately 80 feet. The other encampment contains vehicles and tents but
with no missile trailers.
Lundahl: [quietly to President Kennedy] These are the launchers here.
Each of these are places we discussed. In this instance the missile trailer
is backing up to the launching point. The launch point of this particular
vehicle is here. This canvas-covered [unclear] is 67 feet long.
Carter: The site that you have there contains at least eight canvas-
10. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, C. Douglas
Dillon, Roswell Gilpatric, Sidney Graybeal, U. Alexis Johnson, Vice President Johnson,
Robert Kennedy, Arthur Lundahl, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, and Maxwell Taylor. Tape
28, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
398 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
covered missile trailers. Four deployed probable missile erector launch-

ers. These are unrevetted.11 The probable launch positions as indicated
are approximately 850 feet, 700 feet, 450 feet—for a total distance of
about 2,000 feet.
In Area Two, there are at least 6 canvas-covered missile trailers,
about 75 vehicles, and about 18 tents. And in Area Number Three we
have 35 vehicles, 15 large tents, 8 small tents, 7 buildings, and 1 build-
ing under construction. The critical one — do you see what I mean?— is
this one.
Lundahl: [quietly to President Kennedy] There is a launcher right
there, sir. The missile trailer is backing up to it at the moment.
[Unclear.] And the missile trailer is here. Seven more have been enlarged
here. Those canvas-covered objects on the trailers are 67 feet long, and
there’s a small building between the two of them. The eighth one is the
one that’s not on a particular trailer. [Unclear] backs up. That looks like
the most-advanced one. And the other area is about 5 miles away. There
are no launcher erectors on there, just missiles.
President Kennedy: How far advanced is this?
Lundahl: Sir, we’ve never seen this kind of an installation before.
President Kennedy: Not even in the Soviet Union?
Lundahl: No, sir. Our [nine seconds excised as classified information].12
But from May of ’60 on we have never had any U-2 coverage of the
Soviet Union.13 So we do not know what kind of a practice they would
use in connection with—
President Kennedy: How do you know this is a medium-range ballis-
tic missile?
Lundahl: The length, sir.
11. An erector launcher trailer can carry a missile and then be secured in place at a designated
launch point. The missile launcher is then erected to the firing angle and the missile is fired
from it. To say the site is unrevetted means that earthworks or fortifications to protect against
attack or the blast from the missile have not been constructed.
12. In an earlier, less stringent declassification of this material, more of this sentence was left
intact, reading (once errors were corrected): “Our last look was when we had TALENT cover-
age of [three seconds excised as classified information] and we had a 350-mile [range] missile
erected just on hard earth with a kind of field exercise going on.” TALENT was a codeword
for overhead photography. The briefer was probably describing photography of the Tyuratam
missile test range in the Soviet Union.
13. May 1960 was when Soviet air defenses shot down a CIA U-2 reconaissance aircraft
piloted by Francis Gary Powers. Then-President Eisenhower suspended further U-2 flights
over the Soviet Union. Powers was captured and eventually repatriated to the United States.
President Kennedy: The what? The length?

Lundahl: The length of it, yes.
President Kennedy: The length of the missile? Which part? I mean
which . . . ?
Lundahl: The length of the missile, sir, is—
President Kennedy: Which one is that?
Lundahl: This will show it, sir.
President Kennedy: That?
Lundahl: Yes. Mr. Graybeal, our missile man, has some pictures of
the equivalent Soviet equipment that has been dragged through the
streets of Moscow that can give you some feel for it, sir.
Sidney Graybeal: There are two missiles involved. One of them is
our [designation] SS-3, which is 630 mile [range] and on up to near
700. It’s 68 feet long. These missiles measure out to be 67 foot long. The
other missile, the 1,100 [mile range] one is 73 foot long.
The question we have in the photography is the nose itself. If the nose
cone is not on that missile it measures 67 feet—the nose cone would be 4
to 5 feet longer, sir—and with this extra length we could have a missile
that’d have a range of 1,100 miles. The missiles that were known through
the Moscow parade—we’ve got the data on that [unclear] on the pictures.
President Kennedy: Is this ready to be fired?
Graybeal: No, sir.
President Kennedy: How long . . . ? We can’t tell that can we, how
long before it can be fired?
Graybeal: No, sir. That depends on how ready the GSC [ground sup-
port for the missile] [is], how—
President Kennedy: Where does it have to be fired from?
Graybeal: It would have to be fired from a stable, hard surface. This
could be packed earth. It could be concrete, or asphalt. The surface has to
be hard. Then you put a flame deflector plate on that to direct the missile.
Robert McNamara: Would you care to comment on the position of
nuclear warheads? This is in relation to the question from the President—
when can these be fired?
Graybeal: Sir, we’ve looked very hard. We can find nothing that would
spell nuclear warhead in terms of any isolated area or unique security in
this particular area. The mating of the nuclear warhead to the missile—
from some of the other short-range missile data—[it] would take about a
couple of hours to do this.
McNamara: This is not fenced, I believe, at the moment?
Lundahl: Not yet, sir.
400 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
McNamara: This is important, as it relates to whether these, today,

are ready to fire, Mr. President. It seems almost impossible to me that
they would be ready to fire with nuclear warheads on the site without
even a fence around it. It may not take long to place them there, to erect
a fence. But at least at the moment there is some reason to believe the
warheads aren’t present and hence they are not ready to fire.
Graybeal: Yes, sir. We do not believe they are ready to fire.
Maxwell Taylor: However, there is no feeling that they can’t fire
from this kind of field position very quickly: isn’t that true? It’s not a
question of waiting for extensive concrete pads and that sort of thing.
Graybeal: The unknown factor here, sir, is the degree to which the
equipment has been checked out after it’s been shipped from the Soviet
Union here. It’s the readiness of the equipment. If the equipment is
checked out, the site has to be accurately surveyed—the position has to
be known. Once this is known, then you’re talking a matter of hours.
Taylor: Well, could this be an operational site except perhaps for the
fact that at this point there are no fences? Could this be operational now?
Graybeal: There is only one missile there, sir, and it’s at the actual,
apparently, launching area. It would take them—if everything were
checked out—it would still take them in the order of two to three hours
before they could get that one missile up and ready to go, sir.
Lundahl: Collateral reports indicated from ground observers that
convoys of 50 to 60 of these kinds of Soviet vehicles were moving down
into the San Cristobal area in the first couple of weeks of August. But
this is the first time we have been able to catch them on photography, at
a location.
Theodore Sorensen: You say there is only one missile there?
Graybeal: There are eight missiles there. One of them is in what
appears to be the position from which they’re launched, in the horizon-
tal, apparently near an erector to be erected in vertical position.
Dean Rusk: Near an erector? You mean something has to be built?
Or is that something that can be done in a couple of hours?
Graybeal: Mobile piece of equipment, sir. We haven’t any specific
[unclear] on this, but here is the way we believe that it could actually be
lifted. Something of this nature. [Unclear] evidence would be the erec-
tor’s helping to raise the missile from its transporter up into a vertical
position with the flame deflector on the ground.
McNamara: Am I correct in saying that we have not located any
nuclear storage sites with certainty as yet?
This is one of the most important problems we face in properly inter-
preting the readiness of these missiles. It’s inconceivable to me that the
Soviets would deploy nuclear warheads on an unfenced piece of ground.

There must be some storage site there. It should be one of our important
objectives to find that storage site.
Lundahl: May I report, sir, that two additional SAC [U-2] missions
were executed yesterday. They were taken to the Washington area last
night. They’re currently being chemically processed at the Naval Center
in Suitland and they’re due to reach us at the National PI Center around
8:00 tonight.14 Both of these missions go from one end of Cuba to the
other, one along the north coast and one along the south. So additional
data on activities, or these storage sites which we consider critical, may
be in our grasp, if we can find them.
McNamara: And is it correct that there is, outside of Havana, an
installation that appears to be hardened that might be the type of instal-
lation they would use for nuclear warheads, and therefore is a prospec-
tive source of such warheads?
Lundahl: Sir, I couldn’t put my finger on that. The Joint Atomic
Energy people may be looking at that and forming a judgment.15 But
from photos alone I cannot attest to that.
Carter: There would appear to be little need for putting this type
of missile in there, however, unless it were associated with nuclear
warheads.
Rusk: Don’t you have to assume these are nuclear?
McNamara: Oh, I think there’s no question about that. The question
is one of readiness to fire, and this is highly critical in forming our plans.
The time between today and the time when the readiness to fire capabil-
ity develops is a very important thing. To estimate that, we need to
know where these warheads are. And we have not yet found any proba-
ble storage of warheads. And hence it seems extremely unlikely that they
are now ready to fire, or may be ready to fire within a matter of hours, or
even a day or two.
Twenty-four seconds excised as classified information.16
14. These are references to the Naval Photographic Intelligence Center in Suitland,
Maryland, and to the National Photographic Interpretation Center, directed by Lundahl, that
was part of the CIA.
15. Lundahl was referring to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) of the
U.S. Intelligence Board.
16. In an earlier, less stringent, declassification of this material, most of the next sentence was
left intact, reading (once errors were corrected): Lundahl: “ . . . If new types of radars, or
known associated missile firing radars or associated with missile firing, are coming up on that,
that might be another indicator of readiness. We know nothing of what those tapes [of elec-
tromagnetic emissions] hold, at the moment.”
402 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Rusk: When will those be ready? By the end of the day, do you think?
Lundahl: They’re supposed to be in, sir. I think that’s right. Isn’t it,
General Carter?
Carter: The readout from Sunday’s [U-2 flights] should be available
now. We have done some—
Rusk: Weren’t there flights yesterday as well?
Carter: Two flights yesterday.
Rusk: You don’t have the results from those yet?
Carter: No.
The room is silent for about eight seconds.
Lundahl: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: Well, when is . . . ? [Are] there any further
flights scheduled?
Carter: There are no more scheduled, sir.
President Kennedy: These flights yesterday, I presume, cover the . . .
Lundahl: Well, we hope so, sir—
McGeorge Bundy: [Unclear], Mr. President. Because the weather
won’t have been clear all along the island. So we can’t claim that we will
have been—certainly we surely do not have up-to-date photographic
coverage on the whole island. I should think one of our first questions is
to—
President Kennedy: Authorize more flights.
Bundy: —consider whether we should not authorize more flights on
the basis of COMOR priorities.17
There’s a specific question of whether we want a closer and sharper
look at this area. That, however, I think should be looked at in the con-
text of the question of whether we wish to give tactical warning and any
other possible activities.
McNamara: I would recommend, Mr. President, that you authorize
such flights as are considered necessary to obtain complete coverage of
the island. Now this seems to be ill defined. But I purposely define it that
way because we’re running into cloud cover on some of these flights and
I would suggest that we simply repeat the flight if we have cloud cover
and repeat it sufficiently often to obtain the coverage we require.
17. The acronym COMOR stands for the interagency Committee on Overhead Reconaissance,
a committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board. Chaired by James Reber, COMOR set guidelines
and priorities for U.S. surveillance overflights of other countries.
President Kennedy: General Carter, can you go do that?

Carter: Yes, sir.
McNamara: Now this is U-2 flying.
Carter: U-2, sir.
McNamara: This specifically excludes the question that Mac [Bundy]
raised of low-level flying, which I think we ought to take up later, after our
further discussions of the possibilities here.18
Lundahl: I have one additional note, sir, if I may offer it.
Of the collateral information from ground observers as to where
these kinds of trailers have gone, we don’t have any indications else-
where on the island of Cuba except for this San Cristóbal area, where we
do have coverage. But we have no ground collateral which indicates
there might be an equivalent thing going on somewhere else.
President Kennedy: In other words, the only missile base—interme-
diate-range missile base—that we now know about is this one. Is that cor-
rect? Is this one or two? This is one. . . .
Carter: There’s three of them.
Lundahl: Three, sir.
Bundy: Three [unclear] associated. Do I understand that this is a bat-
talion, as you estimate it, Mr. Graybeal?
Graybeal: Yes, sir. We estimate that four missiles make up a battalion.
So that in this one that you’re looking at, Mr. President, has eight mis-
siles. That’d be two battalions out of a regiment size. This one in front of
the table is a second separate installation from which we can see six mis-
siles. So there are probably two more battalions there. The other missiles
may be under the tree. The third installation has the tents, but there are
no missiles identified anywhere in that area.
President Kennedy: These are the only [ones] we now know about?
Graybeal: Yes, sir.
Lundahl: Other than those cruise missiles that you’re familiar with,
those coastal ones. And the surface-to-air missiles.19
18. Low-level reconnaissance overflights went underneath clouds, low and fast, over their tar-
gets. These flights were carried out by air force or navy tactical reconnaissance units with air-
craft like the F-101 or F8U. In September the CIA had asked McNamara to dispatch low-level
overflights over Cuba but at that time he declined, preferring to leave the work to the U-2.
19. The Soviet SAM sites in Cuba were first identified after a U-2 overflight of Cuba on 29
August and the White House was briefed about this discovery on 31 August. The discover-
ies contributed to the first U.S. warning to the Soviets against deploying “offensive
weapons” announced on 4 September. The same U-2 mission revealed another kind of mis-
404 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Unidentified: Any intelligence on that thing?

President Kennedy: Mr. Rusk?
Rusk: Mr. President this is, of course, a very serious development.
It’s one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could carry
this far. They seemed to be denying that they were going to establish
bases of their own [in Cuba] and this one that we’re looking at is a
Soviet base. It doesn’t do anything essential from a Cuban point of view.
The Cubans couldn’t do anything with it anyhow at this stage.
Now, I do think we have to set in motion a chain of events that will
eliminate this base. I don’t think we can sit still. The question then becomes
whether we do it by a sudden, unannounced strike of some sort or we build
up the crisis to the point where the other side has to consider very seriously
about giving in, or even the Cubans themselves take some action on this.
The thing that I’m, of course, very conscious of is that there is no
such thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States. It’s so inti-
mately involved with 42 allies and confrontation in many places that any
action that we take will greatly increase the risks of a direct action involv-
ing our other alliances and our other forces in other parts of the world.
So I think we have to think very hard about two major courses of
action as alternatives. One is the quick strike. The point where we think
there is the overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks that
are involved in doing that. I don’t think this in itself would require an
invasion of Cuba. You could do it with or without such an invasion—in
other words, if we make it clear that what we’re doing is eliminating this
particular base or any other such base that is established. We ourselves
are not moved to general war. We’re simply doing what we said we would
do if they took certain action. Or we’re going to decide that this is the
time to eliminate the Cuban problem by action [unclear] the island.
The other would be, if we have a few days from the military point of
view, if we have a little time, then I would think that there would be another
sile site, near Banes in eastern Cuba, that CIA analysts needed more time to analyze. They
finally judged (correctly) that this missile was a cruise missile (more akin to a small
unguided jet aircraft, without a ballistic trajectory) with a range of 20 to 40 nautical miles,
apparently designed for coastal defense. President Kennedy was briefed in person about this
finding on 7 September (see Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 120 –27).
President Kennedy was concerned that the nature of this arguably defensive system not
be misunderstood and that news about it not leak out into the ongoing, volatile domestic
debate over his response to the Soviet buildup in Cuba. A new codeword classification,
PSALM, was thereupon created—with a tightly restricted distribution—for future reports on
Soviet deployments in Cuba. A new, even more explicit, public warning against deployment of
“offensive weapons” was announced by the White House on 13 September.
course of action, a combination of things, that we might wish to consider.

First, that we stimulate the OAS procedure immediately for prompt action
to make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere considers that the Rio Pact
has been violated, and [unclear] over the next few days, under the terms of
the Rio Pact.20 The OAS could constitute itself as an organ of consultation
promptly, although maybe it may take two or three days to get instructions
from governments and things of that sort. The OAS could, I suppose, at
any moment take action to insist to the Cubans that an OAS inspection
team be permitted to come and itself look directly at these sites, provide
assurances to the hemisphere. That will undoubtedly be turned down, but
it will be another step in building up our position.
I think also that we ought to consider getting some word to Castro,
perhaps through the Canadian ambassador in Havana or through his
representative at the U.N. I think perhaps the Canadian ambassador
would be the best, the better channel to get to Castro, get him apart pri-
vately and tell him that this is no longer support for Cuba, that Cuba is
being victimized here, and that the Soviets are preparing Cuba for
destruction, or betrayal. You saw the [New York] Times story yesterday
morning that high Soviet officials were saying, “We’ll trade Cuba for
Berlin.” This ought to be brought to Castro’s attention. It ought to be
said to Castro that this kind of a base is intolerable and not acceptable.
The time has now come when he must, in the interests of the Cuban peo-
ple, must now break clearly with the Soviet Union and prevent this mis-
sile base from becoming operational.
And I think there are certain military actions that we might well
want to take straight away. First, to call up highly selected units, up to
150,000, unless we feel that it’s better, more desirable, to go to a general
national emergency so that we have complete freedom of action. If we
announce, at the time that we announce this development—and I think
we do have to announce this development some time this week—we
announce that we are conducting a surveillance of Cuba, over Cuba, and
we will enforce our right to do so. We reject the condition of secrecy in
this hemisphere in a matter of this sort.
20. The Organization of American States (OAS) was created after World War II as a collective
organization of states in the Western Hemisphere for several cooperative purposes, including
the task of responding (by a two-thirds vote) to aggression from a member or nonmember
state, including economic or political sanctions. The founding documents were signed in
Mexico City (1945) and especially the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed
in Rio de Janeiro (1947) and usually referred to as the Rio Pact. The OAS, spurred by the
United States, had adopted sanctions against Cuba in early 1962.
406 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
We reinforce our forces in Guantánamo.21 We reinforce our forces in

the southeastern part of the United States, whatever is necessary from
the military point of view, to be able to give, clearly, an overwhelming
strike at any of these installations, including the SAM sites. And also to
take care of any MiGs or bombers that might make a pass at Miami or
at the United States. Build up heavy forces, if those are not already in
position.
We then would move more openly and vigorously into the guerrilla
field and create maximum confusion on the island [of Cuba]. We won’t
be too squeamish at this point about the overt/covert character of what
is being done.
We review our attitude on an alternative Cuban government, and get
Miro Cardona and his group in, Manuel Ray and his group, and see if
they won’t get together on a progressive junta that would pretty well
combine all principal elements, other than the Batista group, as the lead-
ers of Cuba. And have them, give them, more of a status—whether we
proceed to full recognition or not is something else. But get the Cuban
elements highly organized on this matter.
I think also that we need a few days to alert our other allies, for con-
sultation in NATO. I’ll assume that we can move on this line, at the same
time, to interrupt all air traffic from free world countries going into
Cuba, insist to the Mexicans, the Dutch, that they stop their planes from
coming in. Tell the British, and anyone else who’s involved at this point,
that if they’re interested in peace they’ve got to stop their ships from
Cuban trade at this point. In other words, isolate Cuba completely with-
out, at this particular moment, a forceful blockade.
I think it would be important for you to consider calling in General
Eisenhower, giving him a full briefing before a public announcement is
made as to the situation and the courses of action which you might
determine upon.
But I think that, by and large, there are these two broad alternatives:
One, the quick strike.
The other, to alert our allies and Mr. Khrushchev that there is an
utterly serious crisis in the making here, and that Mr. Khrushchev may
not himself really understand that or believe that at this point.
I think then we’ll be facing a situation that could well lead to general
war. Now with that we have an obligation to do what has to be done, but
21. Guantánamo was and is a U.S. naval base on the eastern end of Cuba, with U.S. rights
secured by a long-term treaty signed decades before Castro seized power.
to do it in a way that gives everybody a chance to pull away from it before

it gets too hard.
Those are my reactions of this morning, Mr. President. I naturally
need to think about this very hard for the next several hours, what I and
my colleagues at the State Department can do about it.
McNamara: Mr. President, there are a number of unknowns in this
situation I want to comment upon and, in relation to them, I would like to
outline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask General
Taylor to expand upon them.
But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining some
military alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that we
ought to accept as foundations for our further thinking. My first is that if
we are to conduct an air strike against these installations, or against any
part of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to the
time these missile sites become operational. I’m not prepared to say
when that will be. But I think it is extremely important that our talk and
our discussion be founded on this premise: that any air strike will be
planned to take place prior to the time they become operational. Because,
if they become operational before the air strike, I do not believe we can
state we can knock them out before they can be launched. And if they’re
launched there is almost certain to be chaos in part of the East Coast or
the area in a radius of 600 to 1,000 miles from Cuba.
Secondly, I would submit the proposition that any air strike must be
directed not solely against the missile sites, but against the missile sites
plus the airfields, plus the aircraft which may not be on the airfields but
hidden by that time, plus all potential nuclear storage sites. Now this is a
fairly extensive air strike. It is not just a strike against the missile sites,
and there would be associated with it potential casualties of Cubans, not
of U.S. citizens, but potential casualties of Cubans in, at least, in the hun-
dreds, more likely in the low thousands—say two or three thousand. It
seems to me these two propositions should underlie our discussion.
Now, what kinds of military action are we capable of carrying out
and what may be some of the consequences? We could carry out an air
strike within a matter of days. We would be ready for the start of such an
air strike within a matter of days. If it were absolutely essential, it could
be done almost literally within a matter of hours. I believe the Chiefs
would prefer that it be deferred for a matter of days. But we are prepared
for that quickly.
The air strike could continue for a matter of days following the initial
day, if necessary. Presumably there would be some political discussions
taking place either just before the air strike or both before and during.
408 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
In any event, we would be prepared, following the air strike, for an

invasion, both by air and by sea. Approximately seven days after the
start of the air strike that would be possible, if the political environment
made it desirable or necessary at that time.
Fine. Associated with this air strike undoubtedly should be some
degree of mobilization. I would think of the mobilization coming not
before the air strike but either concurrently with or somewhat following,
say possibly five days afterwards, depending upon the possible invasion
requirements. The character of the mobilization would be such that it
could be carried out in its first phase at least within the limits of the
authority granted by Congress. There might have to be a second phase,
and then it would require a declaration of a national emergency.
Now this is very sketchily, the military capabilities, and I think you
may wish to hear General Taylor outline his.
Taylor: We’re impressed, Mr. President, with the great importance
of getting a strike with all the benefit of surprise, which would mean ide-
ally that we would have all the missiles that are in Cuba above ground,
where we can take them out.
That desire runs counter to the strong point the Secretary made, if
the other optimum would be to get every missile before it could become
operational. Practically, I think, our knowledge of the timing of the
readiness is going to be so difficult that we’ll never have the exact, per-
fect timing. What we’d like to do is to look at this new photography, I
think, and take any additional, and try to get the layout of the targets in
as near an optimum position as possible, and then take them out without
any warning whatsoever.
That does not preclude, I don’t think Mr. Secretary, some of the things
that you’ve been talking about. It’s a little hard to say in terms of time,
how much I’ve discussed. But we must do a good job the first time we go
in there, pushing a hundred percent just as far, as closely, as we can with
our strike. I’m having all the responsible planners in this afternoon, Mr.
President, at 4:00, to talk this out with them and get their best judgment.
I would also mention among the military actions we should take, that
once we have destroyed as many of these offensive weapons as possible,
we should prevent any more coming in, which means a naval blockade.
So I suppose that, and also, a reinforcement of Guantánamo and evacua-
tion of dependents.
So really, in point of time, I’m thinking in terms of three phases.
One, an initial pause of some sort while we get completely ready and
get the right posture on the part of the target, so we can do the best job.
Then, virtually concurrently, an air strike against, as the Secretary
said, missiles, airfields, and nuclear sites that we know of. At the same
time, naval blockade. At the same time, reinforce Guantánamo and evac-
uate the dependents. I’d then start this continuous reconnaissance, the
list that you have is connected, continuing over Cuba.
Then the decision can be made as we’re mobilizing, with the air strike,
as to whether we invade or not. I think that’s the hardest question militar-
ily in the whole business, and one which we should look at very closely
before we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba.
Rusk: There are certainly one or two other things, Mr. President.
[Soviet foreign minister Andrei] Gromyko asked to see you Thursday
[October 18]. It may be of some interest to know what he says about
this, if he says anything. He may be bringing a message on this subject. I
just want to remind you that you are seeing him and that may be rele-
vant to this topic. I might say, incidentally, sir, that you can delay any-
thing else you have to do at this point.
Secondly, I don’t believe, myself, that the critical question is whether
you get a particular missile before it goes off because if they shoot those
missiles we are in general nuclear war. In other words, the Soviet Union
has got quite a different decision to make if they shoot those missiles,
want to shoot them off before they get knocked out by aircraft. So I’m
not sure that this is necessarily the precise element, Bob.
McNamara: Well, I would strongly emphasize that I think our plan-
ning should be based on the assumption it is, Dean. We don’t know what
kinds of communications the Soviets have with those sites. We don’t
know what kinds of control they have over those warheads.
If we saw a warhead on the site and we knew that that launcher was
capable of launching that warhead I would, frankly, I would strongly
urge against the air attack, to be quite frank about it, because I think the
danger to this country in relation to the gain that would accrue would be
excessive. This is why I suggest that if we’re talking about an air attack I
believe we should consider it only on the assumption that we can carry it
off before these become operational.
President Kennedy: What is the advantage? There must be some
major reason for the Russians to set this up. It must be that they’re not
satisfied with their ICBMs. What’d be the reason that they would . . . ?
Taylor: What it’d give them is, primarily, it makes a launching base
for short-range missiles against the United States to supplement their
rather defective ICBM system, for example. That’s one reason.
President Kennedy: Of course, I don’t see how we could prevent fur-
ther ones from coming in by submarine. I mean, if we let them blockade
the thing, they come in by submarine.
410 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
McNamara: Well, I think the only way to prevent them coming in,
quite frankly, is to say you’ll take them out the moment they come in.
You’ll take them out and you’ll carry on open surveillance. And you’ll
have a policy to take them out if they come in.
I think it’s really rather unrealistic to think that we could carry out
an air attack of the kind we’re talking about. We’re talking about an air
attack of several hundred sorties because we don’t know where these
[Soviet] airplanes are.22
Bundy: Are you absolutely clear on your premise that an air strike
must go to the whole air complex?
McNamara: Well, we are, Mac, because we are fearful of these MiG-
21s.23 We don’t know where they are. We don’t know what they’re capa-
ble of. If there are nuclear warheads associated with the launchers, you
must assume there will be nuclear warheads associated with aircraft.
Even if there are not nuclear warheads associated with aircraft, you must
assume that those aircraft have high-explosive potential.
We have a serious air defense problem. We’re not prepared to report
to you exactly what the Cuban air force is capable of; but I think we must
assume that the Cuban air force is definitely capable of penetrating, in
small numbers, our coastal air defense by coming in low over the water.
And I would think that we would not dare go in against the missile sites,
knock those out, leaving intact Castro’s air force, and run the risk that he
would use part or all of that air force against our coastal areas—either
with or without nuclear weapons. It would be a very heavy price to pay
in U.S. lives for the damage we did to Cuba.
Rusk: Mr. President, about why the Soviets are doing this, Mr.
McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may
have in mind is that he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superi-
ority, but he also knows that we don’t really live under fear of his nuclear
weapons to the extent that he has to live under fear of ours.
Also, we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that.
President Kennedy: How many weapons do we have in Turkey?
Taylor: We have the Jupiter missiles.
Bundy: We have how many?
McNamara: About 15, I believe to be the figure.
22. A sortie is one mission by one airplane. If eight airplanes flew against a target, that would
be 8 sorties. If the planes flew two missions in one day, that would be 16 sorties in the day.
23. The MiG-21 (NATO designation “Fishbed”) was a short-range Soviet fighter-interceptor
that could, in some configurations, carry a light bomb load against nearby targets.
Bundy: I think that’s right. I think that’s right.

Rusk: But then there are also delivery vehicles that could easily be
moved through the air.
McNamara: Aircraft.
Rusk: Aircraft and so forth, route them through Turkey.
And Mr. McCone expressed the view that Khrushchev may feel that
it’s important for us to learn about living under medium-range missiles,
and he’s doing that to sort of balance that political, psychological flank.
I think also that Berlin is very much involved in this. For the first
time, I’m beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is
entirely rational about Berlin. [Acting U.N. secretary-general] U Thant
has talked about his obsession with it. And I think we have to keep our
eye on that element.
But they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba
against each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in
Cuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to
Berlin. In other words, like the Suez-Hungary combination [in 1956]. If
they could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then the world
would be confused and they would have what they would consider to be
justification for making a move somewhere else.
But I must say I don’t really see the rationality of the Soviets push-
ing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba
to this country.
Bundy: It’s important, I think, to recognize that they did make this
decision, as far as our estimates now go, in early summer, and that this
has been happening since August. Their TASS statement of September
12 [actually 11] which the experts, I think, attribute very strongly to
Khrushchev himself, is all mixed up on this point. It has a rather explicit
statement: “The harmless military equipment sent to Cuba designed
exclusively for defense, defensive purposes. The president of the United
States and the American military, the military of any country, know what
means of defense are. How can these means threaten the United States?”
Now there. It’s very hard to reconcile that with what has happened.
The rest, as the Secretary says, has many comparisons between Cuba
and Italy, Turkey, and Japan. We have other evidence that Khrushchev
honestly believes, or at least affects to believe, that we have nuclear
weapons in Japan. That combination . . .
Rusk: Gromyko stated that in his press conference the other day, too.
Bundy: Yeah. They may mean Okinawa.
McNamara: It’s unlikely, but it’s conceivable the nuclear warheads
for these launchers are not yet on Cuban soil.
412 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Bundy: Now it seems to me that it is perfectly possible that they are

in that sense a bluff. That doesn’t make them any less offensive to us,
because we can’t have proof about it.
McNamara: No. But it does possibly indicate a different course of
action. And therefore, while I’m not suggesting how we should handle
this, I think this is one of the most important actions we should take: to
ascertain the location of the nuclear warheads for these missiles. Later in
the discussion we can revert back to this. There are several alternative
ways of approaching it.
President Kennedy: Doug, do you have any . . . ?
Douglas Dillon: No. The only thing I would say is that this alterna-
tive course of warning, and getting public opinion, and OAS action, and
telling people in NATO and everything like that. It would appear to me
to have the danger of getting us wide out in the open and forcing the
Russians, the Soviets, to take a position that if anything was done they
would have to retaliate.
Whereas a quick action, with a statement at the same time saying
this is all there is to it, might give them a chance to back off and not do
anything. Meanwhile, you’ve got to think that the chance of getting
through this thing without a Russian reaction is greater under a quick
strike than building the whole thing up to a climax, and then going
through with what will be a lot of debate on it.
Rusk: That is, of course, a possibility, but . . .
Bundy: The difficulties. I share the Secretary of the Treasury’s
[Dillon’s] feeling a little bit. The difficulties of organizing the OAS and
NATO. The amount of noise we would get from our allies saying that if
they can live with Soviet MRBMs, why can’t we? The division in the
alliance. The certainty that the Germans would feel that we were jeop-
ardizing Berlin because of our concern over Cuba. The prospect of that
pattern is not an appetizing one.
Rusk: Yes, but you see, everything turns crucially on what happens.
Bundy: I agree, Mr. Secretary.
Rusk: And if we go with the quick strike, then, in fact, they do back it
up, then you have exposed all of your allies and ourselves to all these great
dangers without the slightest consultation, or warning, or preparation.
Bundy: You get all these noises again.
President Kennedy: But, of course, warning them, it seems to me, is
warning everybody. And obviously you can’t sort of announce that in
four days from now you’re going to take them out. They may announce
within three days that they’re going to have warheads on them. If we
come and attack, they’re going to fire them. So then what’ll we do? Then
we don’t take them out. Of course, we then announce: “Well, if they do

that, then we’re going to attack with nuclear weapons.”
Dillon: Yes, sir. That’s the question that nobody—I didn’t under-
stand—nobody had mentioned is whether this takeout, this mission, was
going to be able to deal with it with high explosives?
President Kennedy: How effective can the takeout be, do they think?
Taylor: It’ll never be a hundred percent, Mr. President, we know. We
hope to take out a vast majority in the first strike. But this is not just one
thing, one strike—one day, but continuous air attack for whenever nec-
essary, whenever we discover a target.
Bundy: You are now talking about taking out the air force as well, I
think, speaking in those terms.
I do raise again the question whether we [unclear] the military prob-
lem. But there is, I would think, a substantial political advantage in lim-
iting the strike in surgical terms to the thing that is in fact the cause of
action.
Alexis Johnson: I suggest, Mr. President, that if you’re involved in
several hundred strikes, and against airfields, this is what you would do:
Preinvasion. And it would be very difficult to convince anybody that this
was not a preinvasion strike.
I think also, once you get into this volume of attack, that public opin-
ion reaction to this, as distinct from the reaction to an invasion—there’s
very little difference. And from both standpoints it would seem to me
that if you’re talking about a general air attack program, you might as
well think about whether we can eradicate the whole problem by an
invasion just as simply, with as little chance of reaction.
Taylor: Well, I would think we should be in a position to invade at
any time, if we so decide. Hence that, in this preliminary, we should be
thinking that it’s all bonus if we are indeed taking out weapons.
President Kennedy: Well, let’s say we just take out the missile bases.
Then they have some more there. Obviously they can get them in by
submarine and so on. I don’t know whether you just can’t keep high
strikes on.
Taylor: I suspect, Mr. President, that we’d have to take out the sur-
face-to-air missiles in order to get in. To get in, take some of them out.
Maybe [unclear].
President Kennedy: How long do we estimate this will remain secure,
this information, until people have it?
Bundy: In terms of the tightness of our intelligence control, Mr.
President, I think we are in unusually and fortunately good position. We set
up a new security classification governing precisely the field of offensive
414 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
capability in Cuba just five days ago, four days ago, under General Carter.
That limits this to people who have an immediate, operational necessity in
intelligence terms to work on the data, and the people who have—
President Kennedy: How many would that be, about?
Bundy: Oh that will be a very large number, but that’s not generally
where leaks come from. And the more important limitation is that only
officers with a policy responsibility for advice directly to you receive
this.
President Kennedy: How many would get it over in the Defense
Department, General, with your meeting this afternoon?
Taylor: Well, I was going to mention that. We’d have to ask for
relaxation of the ground rules that Mac has just enunciated, so that I can
give it to the senior commanders who are involved in the plans.
President Kennedy: Would that be about 50?
Taylor: No, sir. I would say that, at this stage, 10 more.
McNamara: Mr. President, I think, to be realistic, we should assume
that this will become fairly widely known, if not in the newspapers, at
least by political representatives of both parties within, I would say, I’m
just picking a figure, I’d say a week. And I say that because we have
taken action already that is raising questions in people’s minds.
Normally when a U-2 comes back, we duplicate the films. The dupli-
cated copies go to a series of commands. A copy goes to SAC. A copy
goes to CINCLANT.24 A copy goes to CIA. And normally the photo
interpreters and the operational officers in these commands are looking
forward to these. We have stopped all that, and this type of information
is going on throughout the department.
And I doubt very much that we can keep this out of the hands of
members of Congress, for example, for more than a week.
Rusk: Well, Senator Keating has already, in effect, announced it on
the floor of the Senate.
Bundy: [speaking over Rusk] Senator Keating said this on the floor of
the Senate on the 10th of October: “Construction has begun on at least a
half-dozen launching sites for intermediate-range tactical missiles.”
Rusk: That’s correct. That’s exactly the point. Well, I suppose we’ll
have to count on announcing it not later than Thursday or Friday of this
week.
Carter: There is a refugee who’s a major source of intelligence on
24. Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Atlantic. Headquartered in Norfolk, CINCLANT at this
time was Admiral Robert Dennison.
this, of course, who has described one of these missiles in terms which
we can recognize, who is now in this country.
President Kennedy: Is he the one who’s giving Keating his stuff ?
Carter: We don’t know.
Bundy: My question, Mr. President, is whether, as a matter of tactics,
we ought not to interview Senator Keating and check out his data. It
seems to me that that ought to be done in a routine sort of way by an
open officer of the intelligence agency.
Carter: I think that’s right.
President Kennedy: You have any thoughts, Mr. Vice President?
Vice President Johnson: I agree with Mac that that ought to be done. I
think that we’re committed at any time that we feel that there’s a buildup
that in any way endangers, to take whatever action we must take to assure
our security. I would think that the Secretary’s evaluation of this thing
being around all over the lot is a pretty accurate one. I wouldn’t think it’d
take a week to do it. I think they ought to [unclear] before then.
I would like to hear what the responsible commanders have to say
this afternoon. I think the question we face is whether we take it out or
whether we talk about it. And, of course, either alternative is a very dis-
tressing one. But, of the two, I would take it out—assuming that the
commanders felt that way.
I’m fearful if we . . . I spent the weekend with the ambassadors of
the Organization of American States. I think this organization is fine.
But I don’t think, I don’t rely on them much for any strength in any-
thing like this.
And I think that we’re talking about our other allies, I take the posi-
tion that Mr. Bundy says: “Well we’ve lived all these years [with mis-
siles]. Why can’t you? Why get your blood pressure up?” But the fact is
the country’s blood pressure is up, and they are fearful, and they’re inse-
cure, and we’re getting divided, and I don’t think that . . .
I take this little State Department Bulletin that you sent out to all the
congressmen. One of the points you make: that any time the buildup
endangers or threatens our security in any way, we’re going to do what-
ever must be done immediately to protect our own security. And when
you say that, why, they give unanimous support.
People are really concerned about this, in my opinion. I think we
have to be prudent and cautious, talk to the commanders and see what
they say. I’m not much for circularizing it over the Hill or with our allies,
even though I realize it’s a breach of faith, not to confer with them.
We’re not going to get much help out of them.
Bundy: There is an intermediate position. There are perhaps two or
416 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
three of our principal allies or heads of government we could communi-

cate with, at least on a 24-hour notice basis—
Vice President Johnson: I certainly—
Bundy: —ease the . . .
Vice President Johnson: Tell the alliance we’ve got to try to stop the
planes, stop the ships, stop the submarines and everything else they’re
[the Soviets] sending. Just not going to permit it. And then—
Bundy: Stop them from coming in there.
Vice President Johnson: Yeah.
President Kennedy: Well this is really talking about are two or three
different potential operations.
One is the strike just on these three bases.
The second is the broader one that Secretary McNamara was talking
about, which is on the airfields and on the SAM sites and on anything
else connected with missiles.
Third is doing both of those things and also at the same time launch-
ing a blockade, which requires, really, the third and which is a larger step.
And then, as I take it, the fourth question is the degree of consulta-
tion. I don’t know how much use consulting with the British . . . I expect
they’ll just object. Just have to decide to do it. Probably ought to tell
them, though, the night before.
Robert Kennedy: Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Yes?
Robert Kennedy: We have the fifth one, really, which is the invasion. I
would say that you’re dropping bombs all over Cuba if you do the second,
air and the airports, knocking out their planes, dropping it on all their
missiles. You’re covering most of Cuba. You’re going to kill an awful lot
of people, and we’re going to take an awful lot of heat on it. And then—
you know the heat. Because you’re going to announce the reason that
you’re doing it is because they’re sending in these kind of missiles.
Well, I would think it’s almost incumbent upon the Russians then, to
say, “Well, we’re going to send them in again. And if you do it again,
we’re going to do the same thing to Turkey. And we’re going to do the
same thing to Iran.”
President Kennedy: I don’t believe it takes us, at least . . . How long
does it take to get in a position where we can invade Cuba? Almost a
month? Two months?
McNamara: No, sir. No, sir. It’s a bare seven days after the air strike,
assuming the air strike starts the first of next week. Now, if the air strike
were to start today, it wouldn’t necessarily be seven days after today, but
I think you can basically consider seven days after the air strike.
President Kennedy: You could get six divisions or seven divisions

into Cuba in seven days?
Taylor: No, sir. There are two plans we have. One is to go at maxi-
mum speed, which is the one referred to you by Secretary McNamara,
about seven days after the strike. We put in 90,000 men in 11 days.
If you have time, if you can give us more time, so we can get all the
advance preparation and prepositioning, we’d put the same 90,000 in, in
five days. We really have the choice of those two plans.
President Kennedy: How would you get them in? By ship or by air?
McNamara: By air.
Several: Airdrop and ship.
McNamara: Simultaneous airdrop and ship.
President Kennedy: Do you think 90,000 is enough?
Taylor: At least it’s enough to start the thing going. And I would say
it would be, ought to be, enough.
McNamara: Particularly if it isn’t directed initially at Havana, the
Havana area. This is a variant. General Taylor and . . .
President Kennedy: We haven’t any real report on what the state of
the popular reaction would be to all this, do we? We don’t know
whether . . .
Taylor: They’d be greatly confused, don’t you think?
Taylor: Great, great confusion and panic, don’t you think? It’s very
hard to evaluate the effect from what the military consequences might be.
McNamara: Sometime today, I think, at the State Department, we
will want to consider that. There’s a real possibility you’d have to invade.
If you carried out an air strike, this might lead to an uprising, such that
in order to prevent the slaughter of the free Cubans, we would have to
invade to reintroduce order into the country. And we would be prepared
to do that.
Rusk: I would rather think if there were a complete air strike against
all air forces, you might as well do it. Do the whole job.
President Kennedy: Well, now, let’s decide what we ought to be
doing.
Robert Kennedy: Could I raise one more question?
Robert Kennedy: Is it absolutely essential that you wait seven days
after you have an air strike? I would think that seven days, that’s what
you’re going to have all—
Taylor: If you give less, you run the risk of giving up surprise. If you
start moving your troops around in order to reduce that.
418 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. The only thing is, there’s been so much
attention on Berlin in the last . . . Would you have to move them so that
everybody would know it was Cuba?
Taylor: Well, it’s troops, plus shipping even more so, you know.
You’re going to have to assemble the ships necessary, and that will be
very very overt, and we can think of no way to cover that up.
McNamara: May I suggest, Max, that we mention this other plan we
talked about. We should be prepared for a series of eventualities after the air
strike starts. I think it’s not probable, but it’s conceivable that the air strike
would trigger a nationwide uprising. And if there was strong opposition
among the dissident groups, and if the air strike were highly successful, it’s
conceivable that some U.S. troops could be put in in less than seven days.
Taylor: That’s correct. At first our air, our airdrops, and our Marines.
Well, the airdrop at least, beginning in five days. That might do the trick
if this is really a national upheaval.
McNamara: So we should have a series of alternative plans is all I’m
suggesting, other than the seven days.
Robert Kennedy: I just think that five days, even a five-day period—
the United States is going to be under such pressure by everybody not to
do anything. And there’s going to be also pressure on the Russians to do
something against us.
If you could get it in, get it started so that there wasn’t any turning
back, they couldn’t . . .
President Kennedy: But I mean the problem is, as I understand it . . .
you’ve got two problems.
One is how much time we’ve got on these particular missiles before
they’re ready to go. Do we have two weeks? If we had two weeks, we
could lay on all this and have it all ready to go. But the question really is
whether we can wait two weeks.
Bundy: Yeah.
Taylor: I don’t think we’ll ever know, Mr. President, those opera-
tional questions, because with this type of missile, it can be launched
very quickly with a concealed expedience—
Bundy: Do we have any intelligence—
Taylor: —so that even today, this one, this area, might be opera-
tional. I concede this is highly improbable.
Bundy: One very important question is whether there are other
areas which conceivably might be even more operational that we have
not identified.
McNamara: This is why, I think, the moment we leave here, Mac, we
just have to take this new authority we have and put it—
Bundy: May I ask General Carter whether the intelligence, the col-
lateral intelligence [information from human sources], relates only to
this area, as I understood it this morning?
Carter: That’s right. That’s why we specifically covered this area on
the one [U-2 flight] Sunday [October 14] because [unclear].
McNamara: May I go back for a second, however, to the point that
was raised a moment ago? Mr. President, I don’t believe that if we had
two weeks, if we knew that at the end of two weeks we were going in, I
don’t believe we could substantially lessen the five- or seven-day period
required after the air attack, prior to the invasion, for the size force we’re
talking about. Because we start with the assumption the air attack must
take them by surprise. We would not be able to take the actions required
to shorten the five- to seven-day period and still assure you of surprise in
the air attack. And, therefore, we haven’t been able to figure out a way to
shorten that five- to seven-day period while maintaining surprise in the
air attack.
President Kennedy: What are you doing for that five days? Moving
ships, or where are the ships?
McNamara: Moving ships. And we have to move transport aircraft
by the scores around the country. We should move ships. Actually, the
ship movement would not be as extensive in the 7-day invasion as it
would be in an 11-day [invasion] after the air strike.
Taylor: [Unclear] place after the air strike.
McNamara: We have been moving already, on a very quiet basis,
munitions and POL. We will have by the 20th, which is Friday I guess
[actually Saturday], we will have stocks of munitions, stocks of POL
prepositioned in the southeast part of this country. So that kind of move-
ment is beginning.
President Kennedy: What’s POL?
McNamara: Petroleum, oil, and lubricants. So that kind of movement
has already been taking place and it’s been possible to do it quietly.
President Kennedy: What about armor, and so on? What about armor?
McNamara: The armor movement would be noticeable if it were car-
ried out in the volume we require. And hence the point I would make is
that, knowing ahead of time, two weeks ahead of time, that we would
carry out the invasion, would not significantly reduce the five- to seven-
day interval between the strike by air and the invasion time, given the
size force we’re talking about.
Taylor: I think our point of view may change somewhat with a tacti-
cal adjustment here, a decision that would take out only the known mis-
sile sites and not the airfields. There is a great danger of a quick dispersal
420 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
of all the interesting aircraft. You’d be giving up surprise. There’s no

[unclear] attack. Missiles can’t run off quite as readily.
President Kennedy: The advantage of taking out these airplanes
would be to protect us against a reprisal by them?
Taylor: Yes.
President Kennedy: I would think you’d have to assume they’d be
using iron bombs and not nuclear weapons. Because, obviously, why
would the Soviets permit nuclear war to begin under that sort of half-
assed way?
McNamara: I think that’s reasonable.
Roswell Gilpatric: But they still have 10 IL-28s and 20 to 25 MiG-
21s.25
President Kennedy: So you think that if we’re going to take out the
missile sites, you’d want to take out these planes at the same time?
Gilpatric: There are eight airfields that are capable of mounting
these jets. Eight—
Bundy: But, politically, if you’re trying to get him to understand the
limit and the nonlimit and make it as easy for him as possible, there’s an
enormous premium on having a small, as small and clear-cut an action as
possible, against the hazard of going after all the operational airfields
becomes a kind of—
President Kennedy: General—
McNamara: War.
Gilpatric: —the number of hours required for each type of air strike,
if we were just going for the . . .
McNamara: Yeah, sure. Sure.
President Kennedy: Well, now, what is it we have, what is it we want
to, need to, do in the next 24 hours to prepare for any of these three? It
seems to me that we want to do more or less the same things, no matter
what we finally decide.
25. The IL-28 (NATO designation “Beagle”) was a twin-engined light/medium jet bomber of
an early postwar design (production began in 1950) with a cruising radius of about 750 miles,
able to carry 6,500 pounds of nuclear or conventional (“iron”) bombs. On 28 September a
Navy reconaissance aircraft in the Atlantic had photographed a Soviet freighter carrying ten
fuselage crates for these bombers to Cuba. The Soviet freighter arrived on 4 October. Due to
delay in the Navy’s transmission of its photos to CIA interpreters, the IL-28s were not identi-
fied until 9 October. McCone briefed President Kennedy about this discovery on 11 October.
At that time Kennedy told McCone, “We’ll have to do something drastic about Cuba” and said
he was looking forward to the JCS operational plan that was to be presented the following
week (see McCone to File, “Memorandum on Donovan Project,” 11 October 1962, in CIA
Documents, McAuliffe, p. 124; Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, pp. 172–74).
Bundy: We’ve authorized, Mr. President, we have a decision, for addi-

tional intelligence reconnaissance.
A minor decision that we’ll talk to Keating. It seems to me—
President Kennedy: I don’t think Keating will be that helpful.
Bundy: We’ll leave that out.
Robert Kennedy: I think that then he’ll be saying afterwards that we
tried to . . .
Bundy: All right. The next item. I should think we need to know the
earliest readiness for the various sizes of air strike and how long they
would take to execute.
President Kennedy: Mean probability.
Dillon: One other question is: What, if anything, has to be done to be
prepared for an eventuality of a Soviet action?
Bundy: [Unclear] alert [unclear].
President Kennedy: And then I think what we ought to do is to fig-
ure out: What are the minimum number of people that we really have to
tell. I suppose, well, there’s de Gaulle.
Bundy: You want de Gaulle. It’s hard to say about Adenauer. You’ve
got to tell, it seems to me, you’re going to have to tell SACEUR, and the
commandant.26
Dillon: I would think this business about the Soviet reaction, that
might be helpful if we could maybe take some general war preparation
type of action that would show them that we’re ready if they want to
start anything without, what you might, risk starting anything. You just
don’t know. . . .
Bundy: On this track, one obvious element on the political side is: Do
we say something simultaneously to the Cubans, to the Soviets, or do we
let the action speak for itself ?
Rusk: This is the point, whether we say something to the Cubans and
the Soviets before any, before . . .
President Kennedy: I think, what we ought to do is, after this meet-
ing this afternoon, we ought to meet tonight again at six, consider these
various proposals.
In the meanwhile, we’ll go ahead with this maximum, whatever is
needed, from the flights. And, in addition, we will . . .
26. The acronym SACEUR stands for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe—always
a U.S. officer. The SACEUR at that time was General Lauris Norstad. The commandant was
the commandant of the U.S. Sector of Berlin, Major General Albert Watson.
422 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
I don’t think we’ve got much time on these missiles. They may be . . .
So it may be that we just have to . . . We can’t wait two weeks while
we’re getting ready to roll. Maybe we just have to just take them out,
and continue our other preparations if we decide to do that. That may be
where we end up.
I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to present
what we’re going to do anyway. We’re certainly going to do [option]
number one. We’re going to take out these missiles.
The questions will be whether, what I would describe as number two,
which would be a general air strike. That we’re not ready to say, but we
should be in preparation for it.
The third is the general invasion. At least we’re going to do number
one. So it seems to me that we don’t have to wait very long. We ought to
be making those preparations.
Bundy: You want to be clear, Mr. President, whether we have defi-
nitely decided against a political track. I, myself, think we ought to work
out a contingency on that.
Rusk: We’ll develop both tracks.
President Kennedy: I don’t think we ought to do the OAS. I think
that’s a waste of time. I don’t think we ought to do NATO.
We ought to just decide who we talk to, and how long ahead, and how
many people, really, in the government. There’s going to be a difference
between those who know that—this will leak out in the next few days—
there are these bases. Until we say, or the Pentagon or State, won’t be hard.
We’ve already said it on the . . . So let’s say we’ve got two or three days.
Bundy: Well, let’s play it, shall we, play it still harder and simply say
that there is no evidence. I mean, we have to [unclear] be liars.
President Kennedy: We ought to stick with that until we want to do
something. Otherwise we give ourselves away, so let’s—
Bundy: May I make one other cover plan suggestion, Mr. President?
Bundy: There will be meetings in the White House. I think the best
we can do is to keep the people with a specific Latin American business
black and describe the rest as intensive budget review sessions.27 But I
haven’t been able to think of any other.
President Kennedy: Nobody, it seems to me, in the State Department.
I discussed the matter with Bohlen of the Soviet part and told him he
could talk to [Llewellyn] Thompson. So that’s those two. It seems to me
27. In this context the word black means to keep undercover, covert.
that there’s no one else in the State Department that ought to be talked to
about it in any level at all until we know a little more.
And then, as I say, in Defense we’ve got to keep it as tight as possible,
particularly what we’re going to do about it. Maybe a lot of people know
about what’s there. But what we’re going to do about it really ought to
be, you know, the tightest of all because [unclear] we bitch it up.
McNamara: Mr. President, may I suggest that we come back this
afternoon prepared to answer three questions.
First, should we surface our surveillance? I think this is a very impor-
tant question at the moment. We ought to try to decide today either yes
or no.
President Kennedy: By “surface our”?
McNamara: I mean, should we state publicly that, that you have
stated we will act to take out any offensive weapons. In order to be cer-
tain as to whether there are or are not offensive weapons, we are sched-
uling U-2 flights or other surveillance—
Bundy: [chuckling] This is covert reconnaissance.
McNamara: Well, all right, or reconnaissance flights to obtain this
information. We’ll make the information public.
President Kennedy: That’d be one. All right, why not?
McNamara: This is one question. A second question is: Should we
precede the military action with political action? If so, on what timing?
I would think the answer is almost certainly yes. And I would think
particularly of the contacts with Khrushchev. And I would think that if
these are to be done, they must be scheduled, in terms of time, very, very
carefully in relation to a potential military action. There must be a very,
very precise series of contacts with him, and indications of what we’ll do
at certain times following that.
And, thirdly, we should be prepared to answer your questions regarding
the effect of these strikes and the time required to carry them off. I think—
President Kennedy: How long it would take to get them organized.
McNamara: Exactly. We’ll be prepared—
President Kennedy: In other words, how many days from tomorrow
morning would it . . . How many mornings from tomorrow morning
would it take to get the, to take out just these missile sites, which we
need to know now. How long before we get the information about the
rest of the island, do you figure, General?
Bundy: It could take weeks, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Weeks?
Bundy: For complete coverage of a cloud-covered island.
Unidentified: Well, depending on the weather.
424 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Taylor: Well, we’ve got about 80 percent now, don’t we?

Carter: Yes, sir. It depends much on what we get out of yesterday’s
flight, sir. They won’t be—
Bundy: There are clouded areas, Mr. President, as I understand it.
And there are areas that are going to be very substantially in permanent,
or nearly permanent, cloud cover.
Carter: We’ll have preliminaries by six tomorrow morning.
President Kennedy: Well, there is the part of the island that isn’t
covered by this flight we’re [expecting to learn about] by tomorrow
morning. What about doing that tomorrow, plus the clouded part, doing
low level? Have we got a plane that goes—
Bundy: We can certainly go low level, and we have been reluctant to
do that.
The one thing to worry about on low level is that that will create a
sense of tactical alert in the island. And I’m not sure we want to do that.
Our guess is that the high-level ones have not, in fact, been detected.
Taylor: I think that’s correct.
Bundy: No reactions.
President Kennedy: I would think that if we are going to go in and
take out this, and any others we find, that we would at the same time do
a general low-level photographic reconnaissance.
Bundy: You could at the same time do a low level of all that we have
not seen. That would certainly be sensible.
President Kennedy: Then we would be prepared, almost any day, to
take those out.
Bundy: As a matter of fact, for evidentiary purposes, someone has
made the point this morning that if we go in on a quick strike, we ought
to have a photographic plane take shots of the sites.
President Kennedy: All right. Well, now, I think we’ve got to watch
out for this, for us to be doing anything quickly and quietly and com-
pletely. That’s what we’ve got to be doing the next two or three days. So,
we’ll meet at 6:00?
Robert Kennedy: How long? Excuse me. I just wondered how long it
would take, if you took it and had an invasion.
Taylor: To mount an invasion?
Robert Kennedy: No. How long would it take to take over the island?
Bundy carries on a side conversation about how to describe this meeting
to the press.
Taylor: Very hard to estimate, Bobby. But I would say that in five or
six days the main resistance ought to be overcome. We might then be in
there for months thereafter, cleaning that up.
McNamara: Five or seven days of air, plus five days of invasion,

plus—
President Kennedy: I wonder if CIA could give us the state . . . the
latest on his popular . . . so we get some idea about our reception there.
I just hate to even waste these six hours. So it may be that we will
want to be doing some movements in the next six hours.
Unidentified: About the execution of the [unclear]?
The meeting now begins to break up. Various separate conversations
begin as some people leave. President Kennedy’s next appointment was
for a formal lunch with the crown prince of Libya.
President Kennedy: I want to add [unclear], better also. Are you two
coming to lunch?
Rusk: I was supposed to, but . . .
President Kennedy: George, are you supposed to come?
Ball: No.
President Kennedy: You went to check out [unclear].
Rusk: Ros [Gilpatric], were you supposed to go [unclear]? Could you—
President Kennedy: Six tonight?
Bundy: Six.
President Kennedy: All right, seven.
Bundy: Seven is better actually for you, Mr. President. Is 6:30 man-
ageable? That would be still better because you’re supposed to be out
there [at a dinner party] at eight.
President Kennedy: Well, that’s all right. That, then, seven. Between
6:30 and 7:00. As close to 6:30 as you can, be there.
How many would there be? I’d like to have, I think we ought to have
the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff here. [Unclear reply from Gilpatric.]
Well, then, you bring who you think ought to be brought.
Bundy: [calling to departing participants] And I urge everybody to use
the East Gate rather than the West Gate.28
President Kennedy: I think we ought to get . . . What’s Mr. McCone
doing out there, General?
Carter: He’s burying his stepson tomorrow morning.29
28. The West Gate was on the same side of the White House as the White House Press Room
and was the usual path for observing the comings and goings of official visitors. The East
Gate was the usual entrance for the residential side of the White House, used more for social
functions and tours.
29. McCone had remarried in August. His wife’s son, Paul Pigott, had died on 14 October
426 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Others are talking in the background.

Robert Kennedy: He’s back tomorrow.
Unidentified: I just talked to him on the phone. I think he’d rather come
back.
President Kennedy: So, why don’t . . . you discussed it with him? Is
he familiar with this information?
Carter: Yes, sir. He’s aware of what has happened.
Robert Kennedy: I talked to him about an hour ago.
President Kennedy: Is he coming here?
Robert Kennedy: He’ll be here tomorrow morning. They’re burying
the child today, his son.
President Kennedy: Why don’t we leave it in his judgment. [Mixed
voices.]
Robert Kennedy: I think we might tell him. He said he’s going to talk
to you about this. Maybe just tell him about the meeting tonight.
President Kennedy: All right. Now the other question is on—he’s
[McCone] the man to talk to the General, Eisenhower. Where is the General
now? Eisenhower?
I’ll take care of that. I’ll have [unclear]. I want to get [unclear].
Bundy: [apparently to Dillon] It’s too complicated. [Dillon makes an
unclear reply.] Yeah.
Rusk: George, the President wants you to take my place at lunch [with
the Libyan crown prince].
Ball: All right. But I’ve got . . . You know that I’ve got a 1:45 speech.
Look, look, maybe they can reschedule that. [Rusk makes an unclear reply.]
They can reschedule that.
Rusk: That’s fine.
There is a brief, unclear exchange between President Kennedy, McNamara,
and Taylor about reconnaissance flights and then Kennedy leaves, with the
tape machine still running.
Taylor: [Unclear] mission pilots [unclear]. If we can make a decision
here to use whatever facilities we have. [Mixed voices.]
McNamara: [Unclear] hold off on this thing until tomorrow. [Unclear]
first thing.
Bundy: But you will run the reconnaissance?
McNamara: Yeah, I was just talking to him. I’m going to get there right
now. And I would suggest in this period we get [unclear names] and every-
from injuries suffered in an auto racing accident in California. McCone had left Washington to
accompany the body to Seattle for the funeral.
body else and sit down at the table and figure out where these planes are.
And consider what camps there are. [Mixed voices.]
Why don’t you come down with, drive back [with us]? Why don’t you
ride—pick up your car and drive over with us to the Pentagon and have
lunch with us over there? Why don’t you call from here [unclear names] and
come over, or anybody else you choose? [Unclear.] And then we can sit
down [unclear] and sort out in great detail and see what we really need.
Vice President Johnson: [concerned about improving his jet transport and
communications as he travels] I have [unclear] authority. I wonder if there’s
any good reason why you shouldn’t go to somebody and put [unclear]. If
you had immediate [unclear] or something else, I’m away from you for four
or five hours. I have a Grumman Gulfstream that I’ve leased. I want you to
lease it for MATS [Military Air Transport Service], after the election. Let
me use it for the [Lockheed] Jetstar. It’s a hell of a lot better for these small
airfields. When I think about [unclear].
Anyway, I have a lease now and what I’d like to have is the best commu-
nication that you have that you’re . . . if it can be done.
McNamara: Oh sure, sure.
Vice President Johnson: As it is now, I’m going to get 100–200 miles
from Washington on the [unclear reference to communication].
McNamara: Oh sure.
6:30 –8:00 P.M.
I think any military action does change the world. And I

think not taking action changes the world. And I think these
are the two worlds that we need to look at.

The morning meeting had ended with an understanding that the Pentagon
team would analyze possibilities for a quick air strike, possibly followed
by an invasion. Rusk and others at State would study how the adminis-
30. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Marshall Carter, C. Douglas
Dillon, Roswell Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Vice President Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Edwin
Martin, Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Theodore Sorensen, and Maxwell Taylor. Tapes 28
and 28A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
428 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
tration could act promptly and effectively against the missiles without
surprising allies in the hemisphere and Europe and possibly losing their
support.
While this went on, Kennedy kept to his announced schedule. He
presided over a formal lunch for the crown prince of Libya. Adlai Stevenson
was present. After lunch, Kennedy invited Stevenson to the family quarters.
Showing Stevenson the U-2 photos, Kennedy said, “I suppose the alterna-
tives are to go in by air and wipe them out or to take other steps to render
the weapons inoperable.” Stevenson’s position was: “Let’s not go into an air
strike until we have explored the possibilities of a peaceful solution.”
During the afternoon, Stevenson took part in the meetings at the
State Department. So did Soviet experts Bohlen and Thompson and the
assistant secretary for Latin America, Edwin Martin.
At Justice, Robert Kennedy had meanwhile held in his own office a
meeting of those involved in Operation Mongoose. Describing the “gen-
eral dissatisfaction” of the President with progress thus far, the Attorney
General focused discussion on a new and more active program of sabo-
tage that had just been prepared by the CIA. Pressed by the CIA repre-
sentative (Richard Helms) to explain the ultimate objective of the
operation and what to promise the Cuban exiles, Robert Kennedy hinted
the President might be becoming less averse to overt U.S. military
action. He wondered aloud how many Cubans would defend Castro’s
regime if the country were invaded. After discussing the possibility of
having Cuban émigrés attack the missile sites, he and the rest of the
group seemed to agree this was not feasible.
At the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferred with CIN-
CLANT, the commanders of SAC and the Tactical Air Command (TAC),
and the general commanding the 18th Airborne Corps. McNamara
joined later. Presuming that the Soviets would not initiate a nuclear war
against the United States, the JCS favored an attack, regardless of
whether the missiles were operational. They nevertheless approved sev-
eral prudential steps to increase U.S. readiness for nuclear war. After
McNamara left, the JCS agreed that they did not favor use of low-level
reconnaissance flights over Cuba, fearing that they would “tip our hand.”
They also agreed they would rather do nothing than limit an air strike
only to MRBMs.31 In the last 40 minutes before returning to the White
31. Based on notes taken from transcripts of JCS meetings in October–November 1962. The
notes were made in 1976 before these transcripts were apparently destroyed. They have since
been declassified and are available from the National Security Archive, in Washington, D.C.
House, McNamara and Gilpatric worked out an outline of three alterna-

tive courses of action, which McNamara would present at the meeting.
From 4:00 on, Kennedy himself had been occupied with his regular
schedule. He was able to return to the missile problem only as his advis-
ers gathered in the Cabinet Room at 6:30. Taylor arrived a bit late, after
the meeting began. President Kennedy activated the tape recorder as the
meeting opened with the intelligence briefing.
President Kennedy: Find anything new?

Marshall Carter: Nothing on the additional film, sir. We have a much
better readout on what we had initially.
There’s good evidence that there are back up missiles for each of the
four launchers at each of the three sites, so that there would be twice the
number, for a total of eight which could eventually be erected. This would
mean a capability of from 16 or possibly 24 missiles.
We feel, on the basis of information that we presently have, that these
are solid propellant, inertial guidance missiles with 1,100-mile range,
rather than the oxygen propellant [and] radar controlled [type]. Prima-
rily because we have no indication of any radar, or any indication of any
oxygen equipment. And it would appear to be logical from an intelligence
estimate viewpoint that if they are going to this much trouble, that they
would go ahead and put in the 1,100 miles because of the tremendously
increased threat coverage. I’ll let you see the map.
President Kennedy: What is this map?
Carter: That shows the circular range capability.
President Kennedy: When was this drawn? Is this drawn in relation
to this information?
Carter: No, sir. It was drawn in some time ago, I believe. But the
ranges there are the nominal ranges of the missiles rather than the max-
imum. That’s a 1,020 [mile] circle, as against 1,100.
President Kennedy: Well, I was just wondering whether . . . San
Diego de los Baños is where these missiles are?
Carter: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: Well, I wonder how many of these [maps] have
been printed out.
McGeorge Bundy: The circle is drawn in red ink on the map, Mr.
President.
President Kennedy: Oh, I see. It was never printed?
Carter: No, that’s on top.
President Kennedy: I see. It isn’t printed.
430 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Carter: It would appear that with this type of missile, with the solid
propellant and inertial guidance system, that they could well be opera-
tional within two weeks, as we look at the pictures now. And once opera-
tional they could fire on very little notice. They’ll have a refire rate of
from four to six hours, for each launcher.
President Kennedy: What about the vulnerability of such a missile to
bullets?
Robert McNamara: Highly vulnerable, Mr. President.
Carter: They’re vulnerable. They’re not nearly as vulnerable as the
oxygen propellant, but they are vulnerable to ordinary rifle fire.
We have no evidence whatsoever of any nuclear warhead storage near
the field launchers. However, ever since last February we have been
observing an unusual facility which now has automatic antiaircraft weapon
protection. This is at Bejucal. There are some similarities but also many
points of dissimilarity between this particular facility and the national
[nuclear] storage sites in the Soviet Union. It’s the best candidate for a
site, and we have that marked for further surveillance. However, there is
really totally inadequate evidence to say that there is a nuclear storage
capability now.
These are field-type launchers. They have mobile support, erection,
and check-out equipment. And they have a four-in-line deployment pat-
tern in launchers which is identical, complexes about five miles apart,
representative of the deployments that we note in the Soviet Union for
similar missiles.
President Kennedy: General, how long would you say we had before
these, at least to the best of your ability for the ones we now know, will
be ready to fire?
Carter: Well our people estimate that these could be fully operational
within two weeks. This would be the total complex. If they’re the oxy-
gen type, we have no . . . it would be considerably longer, since we don’t
have any indication of oxygen refueling there, nor any radars.
Alexis Johnson: This wouldn’t rule out the possibility that one of
them might be operational very much sooner.
Carter: Well, one of them could be operational much sooner. Our
people feel that this has been being put in since, probably, early
September. We have had two visits of a Soviet ship that has an eight-foot
hold capacity sideways. And this, about so far, is the only delivery vehicle
that we would have any suspicion that they came in on. And that came in
late August, and one in early September.
George Ball: Why would they have to be sideways though?
Carter: Well, it’s just easier to get them in, I guess.
President Kennedy: Well, that’s fine.

Dean Rusk: The total readout on the flights yesterday will be ready
tonight, you think?
Carter: It should be finished pretty well by midnight.
President Kennedy: Now wasn’t that supposed to have covered the
whole island? Was it?
Carter: Yes, sir. In two throws [flight paths].
President Kennedy: Except for . . .
Carter: But part of the central and, in fact, much of the central and
part of the eastern [portions of Cuba] was cloud covered. The western
half was in real good shape.
President Kennedy: I see. Now what have we got laying on for
tomorrow?
Carter: There are seven, six or seven—
McNamara: I just left General Carroll.32 We’re having ready seven U-2
aircraft: two high-altitude U-2s, five lesser-altitude U-2s; six equipped
with an old-type film, one equipped with a new type, experimental film,
which hopefully will increase the resolution.
We only need two aircraft flying tomorrow if the weather is good.
We will put up only two if the weather is good. If the weather is not
good, we’ll start off with two and we’ll have the others ready to go dur-
ing the day as the weather improves. We have weather aircraft surround-
ing the periphery of Cuba, and we’ll be able to keep track of the weather
during the day over all parts of the island. Hopefully, this will give us
complete coverage tomorrow. We are planning to do this, or have the
capability to do this, every day thereafter for an indefinite period.
Carter: This is a field-type missile. And from collateral evidence, not
direct, that we have with the Soviet Union, it’s designed to be fielded,
placed, and fired in six hours.
It would appear that we have caught this in a very early stage of
deployment. It would also appear that there does not seem to be the
degree of urgency in getting them immediately in the position. This
could be because they have not been surveyed. Or it could also be because
it is the shorter-range missile, and the radars and the oxygen have not
yet arrived.
President Kennedy: There isn’t any question in your mind, however,
that it is an intermediate-range [actually medium-range] missile?
32. General Joseph Carroll, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

432 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Carter: No. There’s no question in our minds at all. These are all the
characteristics that we have seen with live ones.
Rusk: You’ve seen actual missiles themselves and not just the boxes,
have you?
Carter: No, we’ve seen . . . in the picture there is an actual missile.
Rusk: Yeah. Sure there is [tone is serious, not sarcastic].
Carter: Yes. There’s no question in our mind, sir. And they are gen-
uine. They are not a camouflage or covert attempt to fool us.
Bundy: How much do we know, Pat? I don’t mean to go behind your
judgment here, except that there’s one thing that would be really cata-
strophic, [which] would be to make a judgment here on a bad guess as
to whether these things are . . . We mustn’t do that.
How do we really know what these missiles are, and what their
range is?
Carter: Only that from the readout that we have now, and in the
judgment of our analysts, and of the Guided Missile and Astronautics
Committee which has been convening all afternoon, these signatures are
identical with those that we have clearly earmarked in the Soviet Union,
and have fully verified.33
Bundy: What made the verification? That’s really my question. How
do we know what a given Soviet missile will do?
Carter: We know something from the range firings that we have vet-
ted for the past two years. And we know also from comparison with the
characteristics of our own missiles as to size and length and diameter. As
to these particular missiles, we have a family of Soviet missiles for which
we have all accepted the specifications.
Bundy: I know that we have accepted them, and I know that we’ve
had these things in charts for years. But I don’t know how we know.
Carter: Well, we know from a number of sources, including our
IRONBARK sources, as well as from range firings which we have been
vetting for several years, as to the capabilities.34 But I would have to get
the analysts in here to give you the play-by-play account.
Rusk: Pat, we don’t know of any 65-foot Soviet missile that has a
range of, say, 15 miles, do we?
33. The Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) was another
interagency committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board.
34. The word IRONBARK was a codeword for information passed to the United States by
Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, an officer in Soviet military intelligence. Penkovsky had already
fallen under suspicion and was arrested six days later (on 22 October, Washington time). He
was later executed by the Soviet government.
Carter: Fifteen miles? No, we certainly don’t.

Rusk: In other words, if they are missiles this size, they are missiles
of considerable range, I think.
McNamara: I tried to prove today—I am satisfied—that these were
not MRBMs. And I worked long on it. I got our experts out, and I could
not find evidence that would support any conclusion other than that they
are MRBMs. Now, whether they’re 1,100 miles, 600 miles, 900 miles is
still a guess in my opinion. But that they are MRBMs seems the most
probable assumption at the moment.
Bundy: I would apparently agree, given the weight of it.
President Kennedy: Is General Taylor coming over?
McNamara: He is, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: Have you finished, General?
Carter: Yes, sir. I think that’s it.
Rusk: Mr. President, we’ve had some further discussions with people
this afternoon and we’ll be working on it, probably this evening. But I
might mention certain points that some of us are concerned about.
The one is the chance that this might be the issue on which Castro
would elect to break with Moscow if he knew that he were in deadly
jeopardy. Now this is one chance in a hundred, possibly. But in any event
we are very much interested in the possibility of a direct message to
Castro, as well as Khrushchev, [which] might make some sense here
before an actual strike is put on. Mr. Martin, perhaps you would outline
the kind of message to Castro that we had in mind.
Edwin Martin: This would be an oral note, message through a third
party, first describing just what we know about what exists in the missile
sites, so that he knows that we are informed about what’s going on.
Second, to point out that the issues this raises as far as U.S. security
is concerned: It’s a breach of two of the points that you have made pub-
lic. First the ground-to-ground missile and, second, and obviously, it’s a
Soviet-operated base in Cuba.
Thirdly, this raises the greatest problems for Castro, as we see it. In
the first place, by this action the Soviets have threatened him with attack
from the United States, and therefore the overthrow of his regime—
used his territory to put him in this jeopardy. And secondly the Soviets
are talking to other people about the possibility of bargaining this sup-
port and these missiles against concessions in Berlin and elsewhere, and
therefore are threatening to bargain him away. In these circumstances,
we wonder whether he realizes the position that he’s been put in and the
way the Soviets are using him.
Then go on to say that we will have to inform our people of the
434 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
threat that exists here, and we mean to take action about it in the next
day or so. And we’ll have to do this unless we receive word from him that
he is prepared to take action to get the Soviets out of the site. He will
have to show us that, not only by statements—privately or publicly—
but by action. That we intend to keep close surveillance by overflights of
the site to make sure, to know, what is being done. But we will have to
know that he is doing something to remove this threat, in order to with-
hold the action that we intend, we will be compelled, to take.
If Castro feels that an attempt by him to take the kind of action that
we’re suggesting to him would result in serious difficulties for him
within Cuba, we at least want him to know that, ask to convey to him
and remind him of the statement that you, Mr. President, made a year
and a half ago, to the effect that there are two points that are nonnego-
tiable. One is the Soviet tie and presence. And the second is aggression
in Latin America. This is a hint, but no more than that, that we might
have sympathy and help for him in case he ran into trouble trying to
throw the old-line Communists and the Soviets out.
Rusk: Yes.
Martin: And give him 24 hours to respond.
Rusk: The disadvantage in that is, of course, the advance notice if he
judges that . . . We would not, in this approach here, say exactly what we
would do. But it might, of course, lead him to bring up mobile antiaircraft
weapons around these missiles themselves, or take some other action that
will make the strike there more difficult. But there is that move.
There are two other problems that we are concerned about. If we strike
these missiles, we would expect, I think, maximum Communist reaction in
Latin America. In the case of about six of those governments, unless the
heads of government had some intimation requiring some preparatory
steps from the security point of view, one or another of those governments
could easily be overthrown. I’m thinking of Venezuela, for example, or
Guatemala, Bolivia, Chile, possibly even Mexico. And therefore the ques-
tion will arise as to whether we should not somehow indicate to them, in
some way, the seriousness of the situation so they can take precautionary
steps, whether we tell them exactly what we have in mind, or not.
The other is the NATO problem. We would estimate that the Soviets
would almost certainly take some kind of action somewhere. For us to
take an action of this sort without letting our closer allies know of a
matter which could subject them to very great danger is a very far
reaching decision to make. And we could find ourselves isolated, and the
alliance crumbling, very much as it did for a period during the Suez
affair, but at a moment of much greater danger over an issue of much

greater danger than the Suez affair for the alliance.
I think that these are matters that we’ll be working on very hard this
evening. But I think I ought to mention them because it’s necessarily a
part of this problem.
President Kennedy: Can we get a little idea about what the military
thing is? Well, of course, [number] one, is to suggest taking these out.
McNamara: Yes, Mr. President. General Taylor has just been with
the Chiefs, and the unified commanders went through this in detail.
To take out only the missiles, or to take out the missiles and the MiG
aircraft and the associated nuclear storage facilities, if we locate them,
could be done in 24 hours warning. That is to say, 24 hours between the
time of decision and the time of strike, starting with a time of decision
no earlier than this coming Friday [October 19] and with the strike
therefore on Saturday [October 20], or anytime thereafter with 24
hours between the decision and the time of strike.
General Taylor will wish to comment on this, but the Chiefs are
strong in their recommendation against that kind of an attack, believing
that it would leave too great a capability in Cuba undestroyed. The spe-
cific number of sorties required to accomplish this end has not been
worked out in detail. The capability is for something in excess of 700
sorties per day. It seems highly unlikely that that number would be
required to carry out that limited an objective, but at least that capability
is available in the Air Force alone, and the Navy sorties would rise on
top of that number. The Chiefs have also considered other alternatives
extending into the full invasion. You may wish to discuss [that] later.
But that’s the answer to your first question.
President Kennedy: That would be taking out these three missile
sites, plus all the MiGs?
McNamara: Well, you can go from the three missile sites, to the
three missile sites plus the MiGs, to the three missile sites plus MiGs
plus nuclear storage plus airfields, and so on up through the potential
offensive.
President Kennedy: Just the three missiles [sites], however, would be—
McNamara: Could be done with 24-hours notice, and would require a
relatively small number of sorties. Less than a day’s air attack, in other
words.
President Kennedy: Of course, all you’d really get there would be . . .
what would you get there? You’d get the, probably, you’d get the missiles
themselves that have to be on the . . .
436 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
McNamara: You’d get the launchers and the missiles on the—

President Kennedy: The launchers are just what? They’re not much,
are they?
McNamara: No. They’re simply a mobile launch device.
Maxwell Taylor: This is a point target, Mr. President. You’re never
sure of having, absolutely, getting everything down there. We can cer-
tainly do a great deal of damage because we can whip [unclear]. But, as
the secretary says here, there was unanimity among all the commanders
involved in the Joint Chiefs that, in our judgment, it would be a mistake
to take this very narrow, selective target because it invited reprisal
attacks and it may be detrimental.
Now if the Soviets have been willing to give nuclear warheads to
these missiles, there is just as good reason for them to give a nuclear
capability to these bases. We don’t think we’d ever have a chance to take
them again, so that we’d lose this first strike surprise capability.
Our recommendation would be to get complete intelligence, get all
the photography we need, the next two or three days—no hurry in our
book. Then look at this target system. If it really threatens the United
States, then take it right out with one hard crack.
President Kennedy: That would be taking out some of those fighters,
bombers, and—
Taylor: Fighters, the bombers. IL-28s may turn up in this photogra-
phy. It’s not at all unlikely there are some there.
President Kennedy: Think you could do that in one day?
Taylor: We think that [in] the first strike we’d get a great majority
of this. We’ll never get it all, Mr. President. But we then have to come
back day after day, for several days. We said five days, perhaps, to do the
complete job. Meanwhile we could then be making up our mind as to
whether or not to go ahead and invade the island.
I’m very much impressed with the need for a time, something like
five to seven days, for this air purpose, because of the parachute aspect of
the proposed invasion. You can’t take parachute formations, close forma-
tions of troop carrier planes in the face of any air opposition, really. So
the first job, before there is any land attack including parachutes, is
really cleaning out the MiGs and the accompanying aircraft.
McNamara: Mr. President, could I outline three courses of action we
have considered and speak very briefly on each one?
The first is what I would call the political course of action, in which we
follow some of the possibilities that Secretary Rusk mentioned this morn-
ing by approaching Castro, by approaching Khrushchev, by discussing with
our allies. An overt and open approach politically to the problem, attempt-
ing to solve it. This seemed to me likely to lead to no satisfactory result,

and it almost stops subsequent military action. Because the danger of start-
ing military action after they acquire a nuclear capability is so great, I
believe we would decide against it, particularly if that nuclear capability
included aircraft as well as missiles, as it well might at that point.
A second course of action we haven’t discussed, but lies in between the
military course we began discussing a moment ago and the political
course of action, is a course of action that would involve declaration of
open surveillance: A statement that we would immediately impose a block-
ade against offensive weapons entering Cuba in the future and an indica-
tion that, with our open surveillance reconnaissance which we would plan
to maintain indefinitely into the future, we would be prepared to immedi-
ately attack the Soviet Union in the event that Cuba made any offensive
move against this country.
Bundy: Attack who?
McNamara: The Soviet Union. In the event that Cuba made any
offensive move against this country. Now this lies short of military
action against Cuba, direct military action against Cuba. It has some
major defects.
But the third course of action is any one of these variants of military
action directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the mis-
siles. The Chiefs are strongly opposed to so limited an air attack. But
even so limited an air attack is a very extensive air attack. It is not 20
sorties or 50 sorties or 100 sorties, but probably several hundred sorties.
We haven’t worked out the details. It’s very difficult to do so when we
lack certain intelligence that we hope to have tomorrow or the next day.
But it’s a substantial air attack. And to move from that into the more
extensive air attacks against the MiGs, against the airfields, against the
potential nuclear storage sites, against the radar installations, against the
SAM sites, means—as Max suggested—possibly 700 to 1,000 sorties
per day for five days. This is the very, very rough plan that the Chiefs
have outlined, and it is their judgment that that is the type of air attack
that should be carried out.
To move beyond that, into an invasion following the air attack,
means the application of tens of thousands, between 90 and over 150,000
men, to the invasion forces.
It seems to me almost certain that any one of these forms of direct
military action will lead to a Soviet military response of some type, some
place in the world. It may well be worth the price. Perhaps we should
pay that. But I think we should recognize that possibility and, moreover,
we must recognize it in a variety of ways.
438 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
We must recognize it by trying to deter it, which means we probably

should alert SAC, probably put on an airborne alert, perhaps take other
alert measures. These bring risks of their own associated with them.
It means we should recognize that by mobilization. Almost certainly,
we should accompany the initial air strike with at least a partial mobi-
lization. We should accompany an invasion following an air strike with a
large-scale mobilization, a very large-scale mobilization, certainly exceed-
ing the limits of the authority we have from Congress, requiring a decla-
ration therefore of a national emergency.
We should be prepared, in the event of even a small air strike and
certainly in the event of a larger air strike, for the possibility of a Cuban
uprising, which would force our hand in some way. [It] either forces us
to accept an unsatisfactory uprising, with all of the adverse comment
that would result, or would force an invasion to support the uprising.
Rusk: Mr. President, may I make a very brief comment on that?
I think that any course of action involves heavy political involve-
ment. It’s going to affect all sorts of policies, positions, as well as the
strategic situation. So I don’t think there’s any such thing as a nonpoliti-
cal course of action. I think also that we have to consider what political
preparation, if any, is to occur before an air strike or in connection with
any military action. And when I was talking this morning, I was talking
about some steps which would put us in the best position to crack the
strength of Cuba.
President Kennedy: I think the difficulty, it seems to me, is . . . I com-
pletely agree that there isn’t any doubt that if we announced that there
were MRBM sites going up that that would change . . . we would secure
a good deal of political support after my statement. And that the fact
that we indicated our desire to restrain, this really would put the burden
on the Soviets.
On the other hand, the very fact of doing that makes the military . . .
we lose all the advantages of our strike. Because if we announce that it’s
there, then it’s quite obvious to them that we’re gonna probably do
something about it, I would assume.
Now, I don’t know that. It seems to me what we ought to be think-
ing about tonight is: If we made an announcement that the intelligence
has revealed that there are . . . If we did the note, message, to
Khrushchev . . . I don’t think that Castro has to know we’ve been paying
much attention to it, any more than . . . Over a period of time it might
have some effect, [but] he’s not going to suddenly back down, change. I
don’t think he plays it that way.
So having a note to Khrushchev. It seems to me my press statement
was so clear about how we wouldn’t do anything under these conditions,

and under the conditions that we would. He must know that we’re going
to find out. So it seems to me he just . . .
Bundy: That’s, of course, why he’s been very, very explicit with us in
communications to us about how dangerous this is—
Bundy: —in the [September 11] TASS statement and his other mes-
sages.
President Kennedy: But he’s initiated the danger, really, hasn’t he?
He’s the one that’s playing God, not us.
McNamara: So we could—
Rusk: And his statement to Kohler on the subject of his visit and so
forth, completely hypocritical.35
At this point, about 30 minutes into this meeting, the recording was
interrupted, apparently while the reels were being changed on the tape
recorder in the basement. About a minute of conversation appears to
have been lost before recording resumed.36
McNamara: There is a great possibility they can place them in oper-
ational conditions quickly unless, as General Carter said, the system may
have a normal reaction time, set up time, of six hours. Whether it has six
hours or two weeks, we don’t know how much time has started.
Nor do we know what air-launch capabilities they have for warheads.
We don’t know what air-launch capability they have for high explosives.
It’s almost certainly a substantial high explosive capability, in the sense
that they could drop one or two or ten high-explosive bombs some place
along the East Coast. And that’s the minimum risk to this country we
run as a result of advance warning, too.
Taylor: I’d like to stress this last point, Mr. President. We are very
vulnerable to conventional bombing attack, low-level bombing attacks,
in the Florida area. Our whole air defense has been oriented in other
directions. We’ve never had low-level defenses prepared for this country.
35. The U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Foy Kohler, had met with Khrushchev earlier in the
morning of 16 October (Moscow time). His report on their long conversation had arrived in
Washington during the afternoon (Washington time), so Rusk and others would have read the
report just before this meeting. In the initial summary report of that conversation (Moscow
970, 16 October 1962), Khrushchev promised that he would not do anything to worsen rela-
tions until after the U.S. congressional elections in early November. He planned to visit New
York later in November for a meeting of the U.N. General Assembly and would then renew
the dialogue on Berlin and other matters. Khrushchev said the Americans “could be sure he
would take no action before meeting which would make situation more difficult.”
36. At this point Tape 28 ends and the recording resumes on Tape 28A.
440 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
So it would be entirely possible for MiGs to come through with conven-

tional weapons and do some amount, some damage.
President Kennedy: We’re not, talking overall, not a great deal of
damage. If they get one strike.
Taylor: No. But it certainly is [unclear]—
Douglas Dillon: What if they carry a nuclear weapon?
President Kennedy: Well, if they carry a nuclear weapon . . . you
assume they wouldn’t do that.
Taylor: At minimum, I think we could expect some conventional
bombing.
Rusk: I would not think that they would use a nuclear weapon unless
they’re prepared for general nuclear war. I just don’t see that possibility.
Bundy: I would agree.
Rusk: That would mean that—you know we could be just utterly
wrong—but we’ve never really believed that Khrushchev would take on
a general nuclear war over Cuba.
Bundy: May I ask a question in that context?
President Kennedy: We certainly have been wrong about what he’s
trying to do in Cuba. There isn’t any doubt about that. Not many of us
thought that he was going to put MRBMs on Cuba.
Bundy: No. Except John McCone.
Carter: Mr. McCone.
Bundy: But the question that I would like to ask is, quite aside from
what we’ve said and we’re very hard locked on to it, I know: What is the
strategic impact on the position of the United States of MRBMs in
Cuba? How gravely does this change the strategic balance?
McNamara: Mac, I asked the Chiefs that this afternoon, in effect.
They said: “Substantially.” My own personal view is: Not at all.
Bundy: Not so much.
McNamara: And I think this is an important element here. But it’s all
very . . .
Carter: The reason our estimators didn’t think that they’d put them
in there, is because of—37
37. Carter was referring to the Special National Intelligence Estimate, “The Military Buildup
in Cuba,” of September 19, which had concluded that the Soviet Union “could derive consider-
able military advantage” from deploying MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba but that such a devel-
opment was incompatible with Soviet practice and policy because “it would indicate a far
greater willingness to increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the U.S.S.R. has
displayed thus far. . . .” in CIA Documents, McAuliffe, document 33.
Bundy: That’s what they said themselves in [the] TASS statement.

Carter: That’s what they said themselves. But then, going behind
that—
President Kennedy: But why? Didn’t they think they’d be valuable
enough?
Bundy: Doesn’t improve anything in the strategic balance.
Carter: Doesn’t improve anything. That was what the estimators felt,
and that the Soviets would not take the risk.38
Mr. McCone’s reasoning, however, was: If this is so, then what possi-
ble reason have they got for going into Cuba in the manner in which
they are, with surface-to-air missiles and cruise-type missiles? He just
couldn’t understand why the Soviets were so heavily bolstering Cuba’s
defensive posture. There must be something behind it. Which led him
then to the belief that they must be coming in with MRBMs.
Taylor: I think from a cold-blooded point of view, Mr. President,
you’re quite right in saying that these are just a few more missiles tar-
geted on the United States. However, they can become a very, rather
important, adjunct and reinforcement to the strike capability of the
Soviet Union. We have no idea how far they will go.
But more than that, these are, to our nation it means a great deal
more, as we all are aware, if they have them in Cuba and not over in the
Soviet Union.
Bundy: Oh, I ask the question with an awareness of the political . . .
[chuckles]
President Kennedy: Well, let’s say . . . I understand, but let’s just say
that they get these in there. And then you can’t . . . They get sufficient
capacity, so we can’t . . . with warheads. Then you don’t want to knock
them out because that’s too much of a gamble.
Then they just begin to build up those air bases there, and then put
more and more. I suppose they really . . . Then they start getting ready
to squeeze us in Berlin. Doesn’t that . . . ?
You may say it doesn’t make any difference if you get blown up by an
ICBM flying from the Soviet Union or one from 90 miles away.
Geography doesn’t mean that much. . . .
38. Carter was partly in error. In fact, as indicated in the previous note, the estimators
thought the deployment would improve the Soviet military position. This was a unanimous
view in the intelligence community. Every lower-level expert, whether in State, the Office of
the Secretary of Defense, the armed forces, or the CIA, all believed (and separately wrote) that
MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba would materially improve the Soviet position in the strategic
balance of power.
442 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Taylor: We would have to target them with our missiles and have the
same kind of pistol pointed at the head situation as they have in the
Soviet Union at the present time.
Bundy: No question. If this thing goes on, an attack on Cuba
becomes general war. And that’s really the question: Whether . . .
President Kennedy: That’s why it shows the Bay of Pigs was really
right. If we had done it right. That was [a choice between] better and
better, and worse and worse.
Taylor: I’m impressed with this, Mr. President. We have a war plan
over there for you. [It] calls for a quarter of a million American soldiers,
marines, and airmen to take an island we launched 1,800 Cubans against,
a year and a half ago. We’ve changed our evaluations about it.
Robert Kennedy: Of course, the other problem is in South America a
year from now. And the fact that you’ve got these things in the hands of
Cubans here, and then, say, some problem arises in Venezuela. And
you’ve got Castro saying: “You move troops down into that part of
Venezuela; we’re going to fire these missiles.” [Unclear interjection by
Douglas Dillon.] I think that’s the difficulty, rather than the [unclear]. I
think it gives the [unclear] image.
President Kennedy: It makes them look like they’re coequal with us.
And that . . .
Douglas Dillon: We’re scared of the Cubans.
Robert Kennedy: We let the . . . I mean, like, we’d hate to have it in
the hands of the Chinese.
Dillon: I agree with that sort of thing very strongly.
Edwin Martin: It’s a psychological factor. It won’t reach as far as
Venezuela is concerned.
Dillon: Well, that’s—
McNamara: It’ll reach the U.S., though. This is the point.
Dillon: Yeah. That is the point.
Martin: Yeah. The psychological factor of our having taken it.
Dillon: Taken it. That’s the best [way of putting it].
Robert Kennedy: Well, and the fact that if you go there, we’re gonna
fire it.
President Kennedy: What’s that again, Ed? What are you saying?
Martin: Well, it’s a psychological factor that we have sat back and let
them do it to us. That is more important than the direct threat. It is a
threat in the Caribbean. . . .
President Kennedy: I said we weren’t going to [allow it].
Bundy: That’s something we could manage.
President Kennedy: Last month I said we weren’t going to [allow
it]. Last month I should have said that we don’t care. But when we said
we’re not going to, and then they go ahead and do it, and then we do
nothing, then I would think that our risks increase.
I agree, what difference does it make? They’ve got enough to blow us
up now anyway. I think it’s just a question of . . . After all, this is a politi-
cal struggle as much as military.
Well, so where are we now? Where is the . . . ? I don’t think the mes-
sage to Castro’s got much in it.
Let’s just try to get an answer to this question: How much . . . ? It’s
quite obviously to our advantage to surface this thing to a degree before . . .
first to inform these governments in Latin America, as the Secretary sug-
gests. Secondly, let the NATO people who have the right to some warning:
Macmillan, de Gaulle. How much does this diminish . . . ? Not [telling
them] that we’re going to do anything, but the existence of them, without
any say about what we’re gonna do.
Let’s say, 24 hours ahead of our doing something about it, we inform
Macmillan. We make a public statement that these have been found on
the island. That would be a notification, in a sense, of their existence and
everybody could draw whatever conclusion they wanted to.
Martin: I would say this, Mr. President. That I would . . . that if
you’ve made a public statement, you’ve got to move immediately, or
you’re going to have a [unclear] in this country.
President Kennedy: Oh, I understand that. We’ll be talking about . . .
Say we’re going to move on a Saturday. And we would say on a Friday
that these MRBMs, that the existence of this, presents the gravest threat
to our security and that appropriate action must be taken.
Robert Kennedy: Could you stick planes over them? And say you made
the announcement at six, Saturday morning? And at the same time, or
simultaneously, put planes over to make sure that they weren’t taking any
action or movement and that you could move in if they started moving in
the missiles in place or something. You would move in and knock . . . That
would be the trigger that you would move your planes in and knock them
out. Otherwise you’d wait until six or five that night. I don’t . . . is that . . . ?
Taylor: I don’t think anything like that [would work]. I can’t visual-
ize doing it successfully that way. I think that anything that shows our
intent to strike is going to flush the airplanes and the missiles into con-
cealment. These are really mobile missiles.
President Kennedy: They can just put them—
Taylor: They can be pulled in under trees and forest and disappear
almost at once, as I visualize it.
McNamara: And they can also be readied, perhaps, between the time
444 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
we, in effect, say we’re going to come in and the time we do come in.
This is a very very great danger to this coast. I don’t know exactly how
to appraise it, because I don’t know the readiness period, but it is possi-
ble that these are field missiles. And then in that case they can be readied
very promptly if they choose to do so.
Carter: These are field missiles, sir. They are mobile-support type
missiles.
Taylor: About a 40-minute countdown. Something like that’s been
estimated.
Roswell Gilpatric: So you would say that the strike should precede
any public discussion?
McNamara: I believe so, yes. If you’re going to strike. I think, before
you make any announcements, you should decide whether you’re going to
strike. If you are going to strike, you shouldn’t make an announcement.
Dillon: What is the advantage of the announcement earlier? Because
it’s to build up sympathy, or something, for doing it. But you get the
simultaneous announcement of what was there, and why you struck,
with pictures and all—I believe would serve the same [purpose].
Ball: Well, the only advantage is it’s a kind of ultimatum in which
there is an opportunity of a response which would preclude it [the
strike]. I mean it’s more for the appearance than for the reality. Because
obviously you’re not going to get that kind of response.
But I would suppose that there is a course which is a little different,
which is a private message from the President to the prime . . . to . . .
Alexis Johnson: To Macmillan and to de Gaulle.
Ball: And that you’re going to have to do this. You’re compelled, and
you’ve got to move quickly, and you want them to know it. Maybe two
hours before the strike, something like that, even the night before.
Dillon: Well, that’s different.
Ball: But it has to be kept on that basis of total secrecy. And then the
question of what you do with these Latin American governments is
another matter. I think if you notify them in advance, it may be all over.
President Kennedy: That’s right. They could take . . .
The Congress would take; [we would have to take] the Congress
along.
Bundy: I think that’s just not right.
President Kennedy: I’m not completely . . . I don’t think we ought to
abandon just knocking out these missile bases, as opposed to . . . That’s a
much more defensible [and] explicable, politically, or satisfactory in
every way, action than the general strike which takes us into the city of
Havana, and it is plain to me, takes us into much more hazardous . . .
shot down . . .
Now, I know the Chiefs say: “Well, that means their bombers can take
off against us.” But . . .
Bundy: Their bombers take off against us. Then they have made a
general war against Cuba of it, which then becomes much more their
decision.
We move this way and the political advantages are very strong, it
seems to me, of the small strike. It corresponds to “the punishment fits the
crime” in political terms. We are doing only what we warned repeatedly
and publicly we would have to do. We are not generalizing the attack. The
things that we’ve already recognized and said that we have not found it
necessary to attack, and said we would not find it necessary to attack . . .
President Kennedy: Well, here’s . . . Let’s look, tonight. It seems to
me we ought to go on the assumption that we’re going to have the gen-
eral, number two we would call it, course number two, which would be a
general strike and that you ought to be in position to do that, then, if you
decide you’d like to do number one.
Bundy: I agree.
Robert Kennedy: Does that encompass an invasion?
President Kennedy: No. I’d say that’s the third course.
Let’s first start with, I’d just like to first find out, the air, so that I
would think that we ought to be in position to do [options] one and two,
which would be:
One would be just taking out these missiles and whatever others
we’d find in the next 24 hours.
Number two would be to take out all the airplanes.
And number three is to invade.
Dillon: Well, they’d have to take out the SAM sites also, Mr.
President.
President Kennedy: OK, but that would be in two, included in num-
ber two. Of course, that’s a terrifically difficult—
Dillon: Well, that may be [option] three and invasion [is option]
four.
Taylor: In order to get in to get the airfields, there’s a certain num-
ber we’d have to get.
Martin: Well, isn’t there a question whether any of the SAM sites are
operational?
Taylor: We’re not sure yet.
446 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
President Kennedy: OK. Well, let’s say we’ve decided we’re going the
whole way. So let’s say that number two is the SAM sites plus the air.
Bundy: It’s actually to clear the air, to win the air battle.
President Kennedy: Yeah, well, whatever.
Now, it seems to me we ought to be preparing now, in the most covert
way, to do one and two, with the freedom to make the choice about num-
ber one depending on what information we have on it. I don’t know what
kind of moves that requires, and how much is that going to . . . ?
McNamara: Mr. President, it requires no action other than what’s
been started. And you can make a decision prior to the start, Saturday or
any time thereafter.
President Kennedy: Well, where do we put all these planes?
Taylor: You recall we have this problem, Mr. President. We’re going
to get new intelligence that will be coming in from these flights and
that’s gonna have to be cranked into any strike plans we’re preparing. So
there is that factor of time. The Secretary has given you the minimum
time to make a decision now, so that we can brief the pilots and then
crank in the new intelligence. I would point out that—
McNamara: If I may, Max, to answer the question you asked: As I
understand it, we don’t have to decide now we’re going to do it. All we
have to decide is if we want Sweeney to be prepared to do it.39
Taylor: That’s correct.
McNamara: And Sweeney has said that he will take the tape that
comes in tomorrow and process it Thursday and Friday [October 18 and
19] and prepare the mission folders for strikes on Saturday [October 20]
or earlier, every day thereafter.
Taylor: Yes. The point is that we’ll have to brief pilots. We’re holding
that back. And there’ll be, I would say, 400 pilots will have to go to be
briefed in the course of this. So I’m just saying this is widening the
whole military scope of this thing very materially, if that’s what we’re
supposed to do at this time.
President Kennedy: Well, now, when do we start briefing the pilots?
Taylor: They’ll need at least 24 hours on that, when this new intelli-
gence comes in.
President Kennedy: In other words, then, until tomorrow. All I was
thinking of—at least until—
39. General Walter Sweeney, commander of USAF Tactical Air Command. Sweeney had ear-
lier been placed in charge of all tactical strike planning under the relevant operational CINC,
which was CINCLANT (Admiral Dennison).
Bundy: Can they be briefed in such a way that they’re secure? They
have no access to—
McNamara: Let’s go back just a second, now. The President does not
have to make any decision until 24 hours before the strike, except the
decision to be prepared. And the process of preparation will not, in itself,
run the risk of overt disclosure of the preparation.
Bundy: Doesn’t it imply briefing, the preparation?
Taylor: It does, but—
McNamara: It implies the preparation of mission folders.
Taylor: Say, 24 hours before they go, they start a briefing.
I’d like to say this, Mr. President, the more time you can give, the
better. Because they can then do a lot more rehearsing and checking out
of all these pilots. So, while I accept the time cycle, I—
President Kennedy: Well, now, let’s say you give a pilot . . . I mean,
how does he find his way down to a SAM site off of one of those things?
Taylor: Well, they’ll give him a target folder with all the possible
guidance, and so on, to hit the target.
President Kennedy: They know how to do that.
Taylor: Yes, sir. They’re well trained in that procedure.
McNamara: Mission folders have already been prepared on all the
known targets. The problem is that we don’t have the unknown targets,
specifically these missile launchers and the nuclear storage, and we won’t
have that until tomorrow night at the earliest. And it’ll be processed pho-
tographically on Thursday, interpreted Thursday night, turned into target
folders on Friday, and the mission could go Saturday. This is Sweeney’s
estimate of the earliest possible time for an air strike against the missiles.
Decision by the President on Friday, strike on Saturday.
As General Taylor pointed out, if we could have either another day of
preparation, which means no strike till Saturday, and/or alternatively
more than 24 hours between the time of decision and the first strike, it
will run more smoothly.
President Kennedy: Right. Well, now, what is it, in the next 24 hours,
what is it we need to do in order, if we’re going to do, let’s first say, one
and two by Saturday or Sunday? You’re doing everything that is . . .
McNamara: Mr. President, we need to do two things, it seems to me.
First, we need to develop a specific strike plan limited to the missiles
and the nuclear storage sites, which we have not done. This would be a
part of the broader plan, but I think we ought to estimate the minimum
number of sorties. Since you have indicated some interest in that possi-
bility, we ought to provide you that option. We haven’t done this.
448 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
McNamara: But that’s an easy job to do.

The second thing we ought to do, it seems to me, as a government, is
to consider the consequences. I don’t believe we have considered the con-
sequences of any of these actions satisfactorily. And because we haven’t
considered the consequences, I’m not sure we’re taking all the action we
ought to take now to minimize those.
I don’t know quite what kind of a world we live in after we have
struck Cuba, and we’ve started it. We’ve put, let’s say, 100 sorties in, just
for purposes of illustration. I don’t think you dare start with less than
100. You have 24 objects. Well, you 24 vehicles, plus 16 launchers, plus a
possible nuclear storage site. Now that’s the absolute minimum that you
would wish to kill. And you couldn’t possibly go in after those with less
than, I would think, 50 to 100 sorties.
Taylor: And you’ll miss some.
McNamara: And you’ll miss some. That’s right.
Now after we’ve launched 50 to 100 sorties, what kind of a world do
we live in? How do we stop at that point? I don’t know the answer to
this. I think tonight State and we ought to work on the consequences of
any one of these courses of actions, consequences which I don’t believe
are entirely clear to any of us.
Ball: At any place in the world.
McNamara: At any place in the world, George. That’s right. I agree
with you.
Taylor: Mr. President, I should say that the Chiefs and the com-
manders feel so strongly about the dangers inherent in the limited strike
that they would prefer taking no military action rather than to take that
limited first strike. They feel that it’s opening up the United States to
attacks which they can’t prevent, if we don’t take advantage of surprise.
President Kennedy: Yeah. But I think the only thing is, the chances of
it becoming a much broader struggle are increased as you step up the . . .
Talk about the dangers to the United States, once you get into beginning
to shoot up those airports. Then you get into a lot of antiaircraft. And
you got a lot of . . . I mean you’re running a much more major operation,
therefore the dangers of the worldwide effects, which are substantial to
the United States, are increased. That’s the only argument for it [the lim-
ited strike].
I quite agree that, if you’re just thinking about Cuba, the best thing
to do is to be bold, if you’re thinking about trying to get this thing under
some degree of control.
Theodore Sorensen: In that regard, Mr. President, there is a combi-
nation of the plans which might be considered, namely the limited strike
and then the messages, or simultaneously the messages, to Khrushchev

and Castro which would indicate to them that this was none other than
simply the fulfilling of the statements we have made all along.
President Kennedy: Well, I think we . . . in other words, that’s a mat-
ter we’ve got to think about tonight. I don’t . . .
Let’s not let the Chiefs knock us out on this one, General, because I
think that what we’ve got to be thinking about is: If you go into Cuba in
the way we’re talking about, and taking all the planes and all the rest,
then you really haven’t got much of an argument against invading it.
Martin: It seems to me a limited strike, plus planning for invasion
five days afterwards to be taken unless something untoward occurs,
makes much more sense.
Taylor: Well, I would be . . . personally Mr. President, my inclination
is all against the invasion, but nonetheless trying to eliminate as effec-
tively as possible every weapon that can strike the United States.
President Kennedy: But you’re not for the invasion?
Taylor: I would not be, at this moment. No, sir. We don’t want to get
committed to the degree that shackles us with him in Berlin.
McNamara: This is why I say I think we have to think of the conse-
quences here. I would think a forced invasion [an invasion forced the
United States], associated with assisting an uprising following an exten-
sive air strike, is a highly probable set of circumstances. I don’t know
whether you could carry out an extensive air strike of, let’s say, the kind
we were talking about a moment ago—700 sorties a day for five days—
without an uprising in Cuba. I really—
Alexis Johnson: Based on this morning’s discussion we went into
this, talked to some of your people, I believe, a little bit. And we felt an
air strike, even of several days, addressed to military targets primarily,
would not result in any substantial unrest. People would just stay home
and try to keep out of trouble.
McNamara: Well, when you’re talking about military targets, we
have 700 targets here we’re talking about. This is a very damned expen-
sive target system.
Taylor: That was in that number [unclear], Mr. Secretary. But that’s
not the one I recommended.
McNamara: Well, neither is the one I’d recommend.
President Kennedy: What does that include? Every antiaircraft gun?
What does that include?
Taylor: This includes radar and all sorts of things.
McNamara: Radar sites, SAM sites, and so on. But whether it’s 700
or 200, and it’s at least 200 I think—
450 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Taylor: More in the order of 200, I would say.

McNamara: It’s at least 200. You can’t carry that out without the
danger of an uprising.
Robert Kennedy: Mr. President, while we’re considering this problem
tonight, I think that we should also consider what Cuba’s going to be a
year from now, or two years from now. Assume that we go in and knock
these sites out. I don’t know what’s gonna stop them from saying: “We’re
going to build the sites six months from now, and bring them in [again].”
Taylor: Nothing permanent about it.
Robert Kennedy: Where are we six months from now? Or that we’re
in any better position? Or aren’t we in a worse position if we go in and
knock them out, and say: “Don’t do it”? I mean, obviously, they’re gonna
have to do it then.
McNamara: You have to put a blockade in following any limited
action.
Robert Kennedy: Then we’re going to have to sink Russian ships.
Then we’re going to have to sink Russian submarines.
Taylor: Right. Right.
Robert Kennedy: Now, [think] whether it wouldn’t be the argument,
if you’re going to get into it at all, whether we should just get into it,
and get it over with, and take our losses. And if he wants to get into a
war over this . . .
Hell, if it’s war that’s gonna come on this thing, he sticks those kinds
of missiles in after the warning, then he’s gonna get into a war over six
months from now, or a year from now on something.
McNamara: Mr. President, this is why I think tonight we ought to
put on paper the alternative plans and the probable, and possible conse-
quences thereof, in a way that State and Defense could agree on. Even if
we disagree, then put in both views. Because the consequences of these
actions have not been thought through clearly. The one that the Attorney
General just mentioned is illustrative of that.
President Kennedy: If it doesn’t increase very much their strategic
strength, why is it—can any Russian expert tell us—why they . . . ?
After all Khrushchev demonstrated a sense of caution over Laos. Berlin,
he’s been cautious—I mean, he hasn’t been . . .
Ball: Several possibilities, Mr. President. One of them is that he has
given us word now that he’s coming over in November to the U.N. He
may be proceeding on the assumption, and this lack of a sense of appar-
ent urgency would seem to support this, that this isn’t going to be dis-
covered at the moment and that, when he comes over, this is something
he can do, a ploy—that here is Cuba armed against the United States.
Or possibly use it to try to trade something in Berlin, saying he’ll

disarm Cuba if we’ll yield some of our interests in Berlin and some
arrangement for it. I mean that—it’s a trading ploy.
Bundy: I would think one thing that I would still cling to is that he’s
not likely to give Fidel Castro nuclear warheads. I don’t believe that has
happened or is likely to happen.
President Kennedy: Why does he put these in there, though?
Bundy: Soviet-controlled nuclear warheads.
President Kennedy: That’s right. But what is the advantage of that?
It’s just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs in
Turkey. Now that’d be goddamn dangerous, I would think.
Bundy: Well, we did, Mr. President.
Alexis Johnson: We did it. We did it in England.
President Kennedy: Yeah, but that was five years ago.40
Alexis Johnson: That’s when we were short. We put them in
England too when we were short of ICBMs.
President Kennedy: But that was during a different period then.
Alexis Johnson: But doesn’t he realize he has a deficiency of ICBMs
vis-à-vis our capacity perhaps? In view of that he’s got lots of MRBMs
and this is a way to balance it out a bit.
Bundy: I’m sure his generals have been telling him for a year and a
half that he was missing a golden opportunity to add to his strategic
capability.
Ball: Yes. I think you look at this possibility that this is an attempt to
add to his strategic capabilities.
A second consideration is that it is simply a trading ploy, that he
wants this in so that he can—
Alexis Johnson: It’s not inconsistent. If he can’t trade then he’s still
got the other.
Various speakers begin talking simultaneously.
Bundy: —political impact in Latin America.
Carter: We are now considering these, then, Soviet missiles, a Soviet
offensive capability.
Ball: You have to consider them Soviet missiles.
40. In late 1957, in the wake of fears arising from the Soviet Sputnik flight and concerns about
Soviet missiles targeted at Europe, the United States had publicly offered to deploy intermedi-
ate-range ballistic missiles, Jupiters, on the territory of its European allies. The Jupiters were
not actually deployed to Turkey (and Italy) until 1961–62. A similar type of missile, the Thor,
was deployed to England; those are the ones Johnson is talking about.
452 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Carter: It seems to me that if we go in there lock, stock, and barrel,

we can consider them entirely Cuban.
Bundy: Ah, well, what we say for political purposes and what we
think are not identical here.
Ball: But, I mean, any rational approach to this must be that they
are Soviet missiles, because I think Khrushchev himself would never,
would never, risk a major war on a fellow as obviously erratic and fool-
ish as Castro.
Taylor: His second lieutenant.
Robert Kennedy: Well, I want to say, can I say that one other thing is
whether we should also think of whether there is some other way we can
get involved in this, through Guantánamo Bay or something. Or whether
there’s some ship that . . . you know, sink the Maine again or something.41
Taylor: We think, Mr. President, that under any of these plans we
will probably get an attack on Guantánamo, at least by fire. They have
artillery and mortars easily within range, and with any of these actions
we take we’ll have to give air support to Guantánamo and probably rein-
force the garrison.
President Kennedy: Well that’s why, it seems to me, that if we decide
that we are going to be in a position to do this, either [strike options]
one and two, Saturday or Sunday, then I would think we would also want
to be in a position, depending on what happens, either because of an
invasion, attack on Guantánamo, or some other reason, to do the inva—
to do the eviction.
Taylor: Mr. President, I personally would just urge you not to set a
schedule such as Saturday or Sunday—
President Kennedy: No I haven’t.
Taylor: —until all the intelligence that could be . . .
President Kennedy: That’s right. I just wanted, I thought, we ought
to be moving. I don’t want to waste any time, though, if we decide that
time is not particularly with us. I just think we ought to be ready to do
something, even if we decide not to do it. I’m not saying we should do it.
Taylor: All of this is moving, short of the briefing. We’ve held back,
we’ve restricted people. . . .
41. A reference to the mysterious explosion that sank the USS Maine while it was visiting
Havana harbor during a period of tension between the United States and Spain over the condi-
tions of Spanish rule in Cuba. Robert Kennedy is echoing the belief that this incident precipi-
tated the U.S. declaration of war that began the Spanish-American War in 1898.
President Kennedy: I understand.

What about, now, this invasion? If we were going to launch that,
what do you have, what do we have to be doing now so that ten days
from now we’re in a position to invade, if that was the need?
Taylor: I would say that my answer would be largely planning, par-
ticularly in the field of mobilization, just what we will want to recreate
after we earmark these forces to Cuba.
I might say that air defense measures we’re starting to take already.
We moved more fighters into the southeastern United States and are
gradually improving some of our patrol procedures, under the general
guise of preparations for that part of the country. We don’t think there’d
be any leaks there that might react against our military planning. But I
repeat that our defenses have always been weak in that part of the country.
President Kennedy: Mr. Secretary, is there anything that, or any of
these contingencies, if we go ahead, that . . . the next 24 hours . . . We’re
going to meet again tomorrow on this in the afternoon. Is there any-
thing . . .
McNamara: No, sir. I believe that the military planning has been car-
ried on for a considerable period of time and is well under way. And I
believe that all the preparations that we can take without the risk of
preparations causing discussion and knowledge of this, either among our
public or in Cuba, have been taken and are authorized. All the necessary
reconnaissance measures are being taken and are authorized.
The only thing we haven’t done, really, is to consider fully these
alternatives.
Bundy: Our principal problem is to try and imaginatively to think
what the world would be like if we do this, and what it will be like if we
don’t.
McNamara: That’s exactly right. We ought to work on that tonight.
Sorensen: This may be incidental, Mr. President, but if we’re going
to get the prisoners out, this would be a good time to get them out.42
President Kennedy: I guess they’re not gonna get . . . Well . . .
Bundy: You mean, take them out. [Laughs.]
42. Sorensen was referring to long-standing negotiations between the Kennedy administration
and Castro, carried on by intermediaries, to obtain the release of Cuban exiles imprisoned after
the failed landing at the Bay of Pigs. The most recent intermediary, lawyer James Donovan, had
persuaded Castro to accept some exchange of food and drugs rather than money, but his nego-
tiations were still in progress at the time of the crisis. The negotiations eventually succeeded,
and the released prisoners arrived in the United States at the end of 1962.
454 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Sorensen: No. What I meant was, if we’re gonna trade them out . . .
President Kennedy: They’re on the Isle of Pines, these prisoners?
Robert Kennedy: No, some of them are. They’re split up.
Bundy: If you can get them out alive, I’d make that choice.
President Kennedy: There’s no sign of their getting out now, is
there? The exchange?
Robert Kennedy: No, but they will take a few weeks.
President Kennedy: A few weeks.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. You know they’re having that struggle
between the young Cuban leaders and the [unclear] . . .
Bundy: We have a list of sabotage options, Mr. President. It’s not a
very loud noise to raise at a meeting of this sort, but I think it would
need your approval. I take it you are in favor of sabotage.
The one question which arises is whether we wish to do this in naval
areas, international waters, or in positions which may—mining interna-
tional waters or mining Cuban waters may hit . . . Mines are very indis-
criminate.
President Kennedy: Is that what they [the Special Group-Augmented
that dealt with covert action against Castro] are talking about? Mining?
Bundy: That’s one of the items. Most of them relate to infiltration of
raiders, and will simply be deniable, internal Cuban activities.
The question that we need guidance from you on is whether you now
wish to authorize sabotage which might have its impact on neutrals, or
even friendly ships.
President Kennedy: I don’t think we want to put mines out right
now, do we?
McNamara: Should wait for 24 hours at least before any [unclear].
Bundy: Well, let’s put the others into action then in Cuba, the inter-
nal ones, not the other ones.
President Kennedy: Mr. Vice President, do you have any thoughts?
Between [strike options] one and two?
Vice President Johnson: I don’t think I can add anything that is
essential.
President Kennedy: Let’s see, what time are we going to meet again
tomorrow? What is it we want to have by tomorrow from the . . .
We want to have from the Department [of State] tomorrow, in a lit-
tle bit more concise form, whether there is any kind of a notification we
would have to give. How much of a [unclear]?
And, number two, what do you think of these various alternatives
we’ve been talking about.
Three, whether there is any use in bringing this to Khrushchev in the
way of, for example . . . Do we want to, for example . . . Here is Dobrynin
now, he’s repeated . . .43
I’ve got to go to see Schroeder. Let’s meet at . . . why don’t we meet
at twelve? What time do I get back tomorrow night [from
Connecticut]?44
Sorensen: Reasonably early. Get back about 7:45.
President Kennedy: Can we meet here at nine?
Bundy: Mr. Secretary, some of us are in trouble with the dinner for
Schroeder tomorrow night.
President Kennedy: OK. Well, why don’t we . . . I don’t think we’ll
have anything by noon tomorrow, will we?
Bundy: Do you want to wait until Thursday morning [October 18],
Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Looks to me like we might as well. Everybody
else can meet if they want to, if they need to. Well, the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of Defense, can call [meetings]—
McNamara: I think it’d be very useful to meet, or else stay after-
wards tonight for a while.
Bundy: It would be a great improvement not to have any more
intense White House meetings. The cover will grow awfully thin. If we
could meet at the State Department tomorrow . . .
President Kennedy: All right. Then I could meet you, Mac, when I
get back tomorrow and just as well, whatever the thing is. And then we
can meet Thursday morning.
The question is whether . . . I’m going to see Gromyko on Thursday
and I think the question that I’d really like to have some sort of a judg-
ment on is whether we ought to do anything with Gromyko, whether we
ought to say anything to him, whether we ought to indirectly give him
sort of an ultimatum on this matter, or whether we just ought to go
ahead without him.45 It seems to me that he said we’d be . . . The ambas-
sador [Dobrynin] told the attorney general, as he told Bohlen the other
day, that they were not going to put these weapons there. Now either
he’s lying, or he doesn’t know.
Whether the Attorney General saw [might see] Dobrynin, not act-
43. Anatoly Dobrynin was Soviet ambassador to the United States.

44. President Kennedy was scheduled to see West German foreign minister Gerhard
Schroeder on Wednesday morning, 17 October. He was then scheduled to take a brief cam-
paign trip after lunch to Connecticut and return late on Wednesday evening.
45. Andrei Gromyko, foreign minister of the Soviet Union, had just arrived in the United
States for a series of meetings.
456 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
ing as if we had any information about them, [and] say that: “Of course,
they must realize that if this ever does happen that this is going to cause
this . . .” Give a very clear indication of what’s going to happen.
Now I don’t know what would come out of that. Possibly nothing.
Possibly this would alert them. Possibly they would reconsider their
decision, but I don’t think we’ve had any clear evidence of that, and it
would give them . . . We’d lose a week.
Sorensen: You mean tell them that . . .
President Kennedy: Well, not tell them that we know that they’ve got
it. But merely, in the course of a conversation, Dobrynin, having said that
they would never do it . . . The Attorney General, who sees Dobrynin
once in a while, would . . .
Sorensen: How would we lose a week?
Sorensen: How would we lose a week?
President Kennedy: Oh, we would be . . . what Bobby would be saying
to them, in short, is: “If these ever come up, that we’re going to do . . . the
President stated that we would have to take action. And this could cause
the most far reaching consequences.” On the possibility that that might
cause them to reconsider their action.
I don’t know whether he [Dobrynin] is, they are, aware of what I
said. I can’t understand their viewpoint, if they’re aware of what we said
at the press conferences [of September 4 and 13]. As I say, I’ve never . . .
I don’t think there’s any record of the Soviets ever making this direct a
challenge ever, really, since the Berlin blockade.
Bundy: We have to be clear, Mr. President, that they made this deci-
sion, in all probability, before you made your statements. This is an
important element in the calendar.
Dillon: They didn’t change it.
Bundy: No, indeed they didn’t change it. But they . . . It’s quite a dif-
ferent thing.
Dillon: There was either a contravenance on one . . .
Bundy: My, I wouldn’t bet a cookie that Dobrynin doesn’t know a
bean about this.
President Kennedy: You think he does know.
Robert Kennedy: He didn’t know. He didn’t even know [unclear], in
my judgment.
Carter: Oh, yes. There’s evidence of sightings in late August, I think,
and early September, of some sort.
Gilpatric: It seems to me, Mr. President, in your public presentation
simultaneous or subsequent to an action, your hand is strengthened

somewhat if the Soviets have lied to you, either privately or in public.
Bundy: I’ll agree to that.
Alexis Johnson: And therefore, without knowing, if you ask Gromyko,
or if Bobby asks Dobrynin again, or if some other country could get the
Soviets to say publicly in the U.N.: “No, we have no offensive . . .”
Robert Kennedy: But TASS, of course, said they wouldn’t.
President Kennedy: What did TASS say?
Unidentified: That was a while back.
Robert Kennedy: —said that they wouldn’t send offensive weapons
to Cuba.
Bundy: Yeah, the TASS statement I read this morning. . . . No, the
TASS statement. It’s . . .
Dillon: We don’t know if Khrushchev’s in control [unclear].
Bundy: No, we don’t have any detail on that.
President Kennedy: Well, what about my . . . the question would be
therefore what I might say to Gromyko about this matter, if you want
me to just get in the record, by asking him whether they plan to do it.
Bundy: Putting it the other way around, saying that we are putting
great weight upon the assurance of his.
Ball: Well, I think what you get is to call their attention to the state-
ment that you’ve made on this. And that this is your public commitment
and you are going to have to abide by this, and you just want assurances
from him that they’re living up to what they’ve said, that they’re not
going to . . .
President Kennedy: Well, let’s say he said: “Well, we’re not plan-
ning to.”
Bundy: [reading from TASS statement of September 11] “The government
of the Soviet Union also authorized TASS to state that there is no need for
the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression for a
retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance, Cuba. Our nuclear
weapons are so powerful in their explosive force, the Soviet Union has so
powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need to
search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.”
President Kennedy: What date was that?
Bundy: September 11th.
Dillon: When they were all there.
Carter: Or certainly on the way.
President Kennedy: But isn’t that . . . But, as I say, we haven’t . . .
really ever had a case where it’s been quite this. . . . After all, they backed
458 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
down in [supporting the] Chinese Communists in ’58. They didn’t go

into Laos. Agreed to a cease-fire there.46 We haven’t had [unclear].
Several speakers begin conversing simultaneously.
Bundy: I was troubled before by the absence of a nuclear storage site.
That’s very queer.
Bundy: I’m as puzzled as Bob is by the absence of a nuclear storage site.
Taylor: We don’t know enough about it yet, and we [unclear] . . .
Bundy: I understand that. We may learn a lot overnight.
Martin: Isn’t it puzzling, also, there are no evidence of any troops
protecting the sites?
Taylor: Well there are troops there. At least there are tents, presum-
ably they have some personnel.
Bundy: But they look like [unclear]. It’s as if you would walk over the
fields and into those vans.
President Kennedy: Well it’s a goddamn mystery to me. I don’t know
enough about the Soviet Union, but if anybody can tell me any other
time since the Berlin blockade where the Russians have given us so clear
a provocation, I don’t know when it’s been. Because they’ve been awfully
cautious, really. The Russians . . . I’ve never . . .
Now, maybe our mistake was in not saying some time before this
summer, that if they do this we’re going to act. Maybe they’d gone in so
far that it’s . . .
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but then why did they put that [TASS] state-
ment in?
President Kennedy: This was following my statement, wasn’t it?
Robert Kennedy: September 11th.
President Kennedy: When was my statement?
[to General Taylor, who had started to speak] What?
Taylor: [From the] ground up. Well, I was asking Pat [Carter] if
they had any way of getting quick intelligence. That means somebody in
there and out of there so we can really take a look at the ground.
Ball: No, this [TASS statement] is two days before your statement
[but seven days after the White House statement of September 4].
46. President Kennedy was referring to the most recent of several confrontations in the Taiwan
Straits, in 1958, when China shelled offshore islands under Taiwan’s control and threatened to
invade Taiwan, then linked by a mutual defense treaty with the United States. He was also refer-
ring to a Communist insurgency against a pro-Western government in Laos that became the recip-
ient of significant U.S. aid. Heading off the threat of direct U.S. intervention, a negotiated cease-fire
in Laos took effect in May 1961, followed by negotiations about neutralizing the country.
Carter: We can try it. Your problems about exfiltration and your
problems with training an individual as to what to look for are not han-
dled in 24 hours.
McNamara: A better way would be to send in a low-flying airplane,
and we have today put those on alert. But we would recommend against
using the low-flying planes until shortly before the intention to strike.
Taylor: That was considered by the commanders today, and they’re
all of the opinion that the loss of surprise there was more serious than
the information we’d get from that.
Ball: I would think it would be very valuable to have them go in
shortly before the strike, just to build the evidence. I mean, then you’ve
got pictures that really show what was there. . . .
President Kennedy: Now with these great demonologists, did Bohlen
and Thompson, did they have an explanation of why the Russians are
sticking it to us quite so . . . ?
I wonder what we’re going to say up in Connecticut. We expect the
domestic [unclear]. [Chuckles.] Don’t care for the . . .
Overlapping discussions about schedules for Wednesday, October 17, follow.
President Kennedy: We’re going to be discussing [unclear] budget
[in a Cabinet meeting on October 18].
What about Schroeder? Do I have anything we want to say to
Schroeder?47
Bundy: We haven’t a lot on that, Mr. President, which we’ll have for
you early in the morning. I don’t think it’s very complicated. The big
issue that has come up is Schroeder makes a very strong case for refus-
ing visas on the ground that he thinks that that would undermine morale
in Berlin in a very dangerous way. I think that’s the principal issue that’s
between us.
President Kennedy: I wonder if we could get somebody to give me
something about what our position should be on that.
Bundy: You want that? Yeah, very happy to. You want it tonight?
President Kennedy: No, no. Just in the morning.
The meeting is breaking up. There are more fragments of simultaneous
conversations.
President Kennedy: That’s very good, General. Thank you.
47. The principal subject at the forthcoming meeting with Schroeder was to be the contin-
gency that the Soviets or East Germans might require formal visas for entry to East
Germany or East Berlin. For the West Germans this prospect skirted too close to diplomatic
recognition of the East German regime.
460 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Carter: Mr. McCone is coming in tonight.

Fragments of other discussions are heard. Someone mentions a man
named Riley, possibly Rear Admiral Riley, director of the Joint Staff,
who is waiting for McNamara, who answers: “Is he in Mac’s office?
Yeah I’ll go down to see him.” At the same time Carter is talking to
President Kennedy.
Carter: I would suggest that we get into this hot water partly
because of this.
President Kennedy: Yeah. I want to talk to him in the morning. I’d
like to just debrief [unclear] Mr. McCone [unclear] General Eisenhower.
Bundy: He won’t be . . . Does he get back tonight?
Carter: Coming in tonight, yes, sir.
Bundy: Could you have him come in in the morning?
Carter: I’m going in to meet him in the morning.
Bundy: Could he come in then at 9:30?
Carter: Sure.
President Kennedy leaves the Cabinet Room. The recording machine is
still running as McNamara, Bundy, Ball, and a few others begin their
own informal discussion of the crisis issues.
McNamara: Could we agree to meet, midafternoon?
Ball: Any time you say, Bob.
McNamara: And then guide our work tonight and tomorrow on that
schedule? Why don’t we say three? This’ll give us some time to cover what
we’ve done, and then do some more tomorrow night if necessary [unclear].
Bundy: Would it be disagreeable to make it a little earlier? I ought to
get to a four [o’clock] meeting with Schroeder.
McNamara: I thought he said two, I think. We have really plenty of
time between now and then. At two P.M. we’ll do it at State.
Now, could we agree what we’re gonna do? I would suggest that—
Max, I would suggest that we, and I don’t . . . In fact, I know
[unclear]. [Taylor replies.]
I would suggest that we divide the series of targets up by, in effect,
numbers of DGZs and numbers of sorties required to take those out, for
a series of alternatives starting only with the missiles and working up
through the nuclear storage sites and the MiGs and the SAMs, and so
on, so we can say: “This target system would take so many aiming
points, and so many objects would take so many sorties to knock out.”48
Not because I think these are reasonable alternatives—
48. The DGZs are Designated Ground Zeros, the precise aim points for explosives.
Bundy: They’re not really going to be realistic, even, but they give—
McNamara: —but they give us an order of magnitude to [give to]
the President, to get some idea of this. And this we can do, and this can
be done very easily.
But the most important thing we need to do is this appraisal of the
world after any one of these situations, in great detail.
Bundy: Sure, that’s right.
McNamara: And I think probably this is something State would have
to do, and I would strongly urge we put it on paper. And we, I’ll, be
happy to stay now or look at it early in the morning, or something like
that, in order that we may inject disagreement if we—
Bundy: What I would suggest is that someone be deputied to do a
piece of paper which really is: What happens?
I think the margin is between whether we [do the] take out the mis-
siles only strike, or take a lot of air bases. This is tactical, within a decision
to take military action. It doesn’t overwhelmingly, it may substantially, but
it doesn’t overwhelmingly change the world.
I think any military action does change the world. And I think not
taking action changes the world. And I think these are the two worlds
that we need to look at.
McNamara: I’m very much inclined to agree, but I think we have to
make that point: Within the military action [there is] a gradation.
Bundy: I agree, I agree. Oh, many gradations. And it can have major
effects. I don’t mean to exaggerate that now.
The question is: How to get ahead with that, and whether . . . I would
think, myself, that the appropriate place to make this preliminary analy-
sis is at the Department of State. I think the rest of us ought to spend
the evening, really, to some advantage separately, trying to have our own
views of this. And I think we should meet in order, at least, to trade
pieces of paper, before 2:00. Tomorrow morning, if that’s agreeable.
McNamara: Why don’t we meet tomorrow morning? And with
pieces of paper, from State, and—maybe you don’t feel this is reasonable,
but I would strongly urge that, tonight, State—
Bundy: Well, who is State’s de facto [person in charge for this]? Are
you all tied up tonight? Or what?
Ball: No, no. The situation is that the only one who’s tied up tonight
is the Secretary, and he is coming down at eleven from his dinner to look
at what we will have done in the meantime.
Martin: Alex [Johnson] is back waiting for him.
Ball: Oh, good. We’ll have Alex; we’ll have Tommy [Llewellyn
Thompson]. Well, we’ve kept this to our . . . this has been . . .
462 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Bundy: But you have Tommy? I . . .

Martin: I talked to him this afternoon some.
Bundy: Do you have any . . . ? I’d be fascinated by this, the first sense
of how he sees this.
Martin: Well the argument was really between Hilsman’s demonolo-
gists, who were already cut in because they [unclear], who thought this
was a low-risk operation.49 Tommy thought it was a high-risk operation
by the Soviets, in other words, that they were taking real chances. The
other people rather thought that they probably had miscalculated us and
thought this wasn’t a risky operation. You know, from the way they were
going at it, either impatient like the SAM sites hadn’t been set up to pro-
tect it—the various factors which suggest to them that they didn’t think
anything was going to happen. Tommy leaned the other way.
McNamara: Could I suggest that tonight we actually draft a paper,
and it start this way:
Just a paragraph or two of the knowns. The knowns are that the SAMs
are here. Let’s say, the probable knowns, because we’re not certain of any
of them. The probabilities are the SAM system isn’t working today. This
is important. The probabilities are that these missiles are not operational
today. The probabilities are that they won’t be operational in less than x
days, although we can’t be certain. Pat said two weeks. I’m not so sure I’d
put it that far. But there’s just two or three of these knowns.
I would put in there, by the way, the number of [unclear] they’re
unprotected. Another known I’d put in is that they have about 50x MiG-
15s, -17s, and -19s. That they have certain crated—I’ve forgotten—say
10x crated MiG-21s, only one of which we believe to have been assem-
bled. That they have x crated IL-28s, none of which we believe to have
been assembled. This is, in a sense, the problem we face there.
Bundy: You should state, or the [Central Intelligence] Agency should
state the military knowns.
McNamara: Well, we can do this in just ten seconds, a very, very sim-
ple statement, I think. But then I would follow that by the alternatives,
not all of them, but the more likely alternatives that we consider open to
us. And I would hope we could stay just a second here and see if we
could sketch them out now.
Bundy: I’d like to throw one in of a military kind—shall we get them
in order, and you [unclear]?
49. Roger Hilsman was assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research. A demonolo-
gist is a Kremlinologist, or an expert on the Soviet Union.
I would like to throw one in that I do not think the army and the
Chiefs would normally consider. And that is the possibility of genuinely
making a quite large-scale strike, followed by a drop, followed by a recov-
ery of the people dropped to get these things, and not simply to increase
the chance that we’ve hit most of them. There’s always incompleteness in
a military, in an air, operation. But if these things are what the pictures
show, you could drop a battalion of paratroopers and get them. Now what
you do with a battalion, I grant you, is a hell of a problem.
I think there’s an enormous political advantage, myself, within these
options, granted that all the Chiefs didn’t fully agree, to taking out the
thing that gives the trouble and not the thing that doesn’t give the trouble.
McNamara: This, as opposed to an air attack on them?
Bundy: This would be supplementary to an air attack. I mean, how
are you gonna know that you’ve got them? And if you haven’t got them,
what have you done?
Ball: Well this, of course, raises the question of: Having gotten this
set, what happens to the set that arrives next week?
McNamara: Oh, I think . . . Let me answer Mac’s question first. How
do we know we’ve got them? We will have photo recon, military, with
the strike. Sweeney specifically plans this and—
Bundy: Proving a negative is a hell of a job.
McNamara: Pardon me?
Bundy: Proving a negative is a hell of a job.
Carter: Yeah, but the [unclear] on the ground very well [unclear], Mac.
Bundy: It’s true.
McNamara: Terrible risk to put them [paratroopers] in there.
Bundy: I agree, I think it’s probably a bad idea, but it troubles me
[unclear].
McNamara: I think the risk troubles me. It’s too great in relation to
the risk of not knowing whether we get them.
Bundy: Well . . .
McNamara: But, in any case, this is a small variant of one of the plans.
Bundy: That’s right, it’s a minor variant of one of the plans.
McNamara: It seems to me that there are some major alternatives
here. I don’t think we discussed them fully enough today. And I’d like to
see them laid out on the paper, if State agrees.
The first is what I still call the political approach. Let me say it: a non-
military action. It doesn’t start with one and it isn’t going to end with one.
And I, for that reason, call it a political approach. And I say it isn’t going
to end with one because, once you start this political approach, I don’t
think you’re going to have any opportunity for a military operation.
464 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
Ball: It becomes very difficult.

McNamara: But at least I think we ought to put it down there.
Ball: You’re right.
Bundy: And it should be worked out. I mean, what is the maximum—
Unidentified: Your ride is waiting downstairs.
Ball: Very good, thank you.
McNamara: Yeah, it should definitely be worked out. What, exactly,
does it involve? And what are the chances of success of it? They’re not
zero. They’re plus, I think.
Gilpatric: We did an outline this morning along these lines.
McNamara: All right. That’s [alternative] one, anyway.
Bundy: But, do you see, it’s not just the chances of success. It ought to
be examined in terms of the pluses and minuses of nonsuccess, because
there is such a thing as making this thing pay off in ways that are of some
significance, even though we don’t act, or go with that.
McNamara: I completely agree with that. And this is my second
alternative, in particular, and I want to come to in a moment. But the
first one, I completely agree it isn’t . . . I phrased it improperly. It’s not
the chances of success. It’s the results that are following this [unclear].
Bundy: Following this.Yep.
McNamara: Now, the second alternative, I’d like to discuss just a sec-
ond because we haven’t discussed it fully today, and I alluded to it a
moment ago.
I’ll be quite frank. I don’t think there is a military problem there.
This is my answer to Mac’s question—
Bundy: That’s my honest [opinion?] too.
McNamara: —and therefore, and I’ve gone through this today, and I
asked myself: “Well, what is it then if it isn’t a military problem?”
Well, it’s just exactly this problem: that if Cuba should possess a capac-
ity to carry out offensive actions against the U.S., the U.S. would act.
Unidentified: You can’t get around that one.
McNamara: Now it’s that problem. This is a domestic political prob-
lem. In the announcement we didn’t say we’d go in and not [that] we’d
kill them. We said we’d act. Well, how will we act? Well, we want to act
to prevent their use. That’s really the [unclear].
Now, how do we act to prevent their use? Well, first place, we carry
out open surveillance, so we know what they’re doing. At all times.
Twenty-four hours a day from now and forever, in a sense, indefinitely.
What else do we do? We prevent any further offensive weapons com-
ing in. In other words, we blockade offensive weapons.
Bundy: How do we do that?

McNamara: We search every ship.
Ball: There are two kinds of blockade: a blockade which stops ships
from coming in; and simply a seizure—I mean simply a search.
McNamara: A search, that’s right.
Ball: Yeah.
Martin: Well, it would be the search and removal, if found.
Bundy: You have to make the guy stop to search him. And if he won’t
stop, you have to shoot, right?
Martin: And you have to remove what you’re looking for if you find it.
McNamara: Absolutely. Absolutely. And then an ultimatum. I call it
an ultimatum. Associated with these two actions is a statement to the
world, particularly to Khrushchev, that we have located these offensive
weapons. We’re maintaining a constant surveillance over them. If there
is ever any indication that they’re to be launched against this country, we
will respond not only against Cuba, but we will respond directly against
the Soviet Union with a full nuclear strike.
Now this alternative doesn’t seem to be a very acceptable one. But
wait until you work on the others.
Bundy: That’s right. [Laughter.]
McNamara: This is the problem, but I’ve thought something about
the others this afternoon.
Ball: Bob, let me ask you one thing that seems slightly irrelevant.
What real utility would there be in the United States if we ever actually
captured one of these things and could examine it and take it apart?
McNamara: Not very much. No, no.
Ball: Would we learn anything about the technology that would be
meaningful?
McNamara: No, no. I don’t . . . Pat may disagree with me. . . .
Carter: No.
McNamara: Well, in any case, that’s an alternative [the blockade].
I’d like to see it expressed and discussed.
Martin: If it takes two hours to screw a [war]head on, as a guy
[Sidney Graybeal] said this morning, two to four hours. . . .
McNamara: Oh, by the way, that should be one of the knowns in this
initial paragraph.
Martin: Yeah. They’ve got all night. How are we gonna surveil them
during the night? I think because there are some gaps in the surveillance.
McNamara: Oh, well, it’s really . . . yes. It isn’t the surveillance, it’s
the ultimatum that is the key part in this.
Martin: Yeah.
466 T U E S DAY, O C T O B E R 16, 1962
McNamara: And really, what I tried to do was develop a little pack-

age that meets the action requirement of that paragraph I read. Because,
as I suggested, I don’t believe it’s primarily a military problem. It’s pri-
marily a domestic political problem.
Carter: Well, as far as the American people are concerned, action
means military action, period.
McNamara: Well, we have a blockade. Search and removal of offen-
sive weapons entering Cuba. Mac again, I don’t want to argue for this
because I don’t—
Carter: No. I think it’s an alternative.
McNamara: —think it’s a perfect solution by any means. I just
want to . . .
Bundy: Which one are [we] still on, would you say?
McNamara: Still on the second one.
Ball: Now, one of the things to look at is whether the actual opera-
tion of a blockade isn’t a greater involvement almost than a military
action.
McNamara: Might well be, George.
Bundy: I think so.
McNamara: It’s a search, not an embargo.
Ball: No.
Carter: It’s a series of single, unrelated acts, not by surprise. This
coming in there, on a Pearl Harbor [kind of surprise attack], just fright-
ens the hell out of me as to what goes beyond. The Board of National
Estimates have been working on this ever since . . .
Bundy: What goes beyond what?
Carter: What happens beyond that. You go in there with a surprise
attack. You put out all the missiles. This isn’t the end. This is the begin-
ning, I think. There’s a whole hell of a lot of things . . .
Bundy: Are they working on a powerful reaction in your [agency]?
Carter: Yes, sir. Which goes back to [what] Mr. Secretary—
Bundy: Good.
Martin: Because this is the central point.
McNamara: Well, that then takes me into the third category of
action. I’d lump them all in the third category. I call it overt military
action of varying degrees of intensity, ranging . . .
And if you feel there’s any difference in them, in the kind of a world
we have after the varying degrees of intensity, you have to divide cate-
gory three into subcategories by intensity, and probable effect on the
world thereafter. And I think there is, at least in the sense of the Cuban
uprising, which I happen to believe is a most important element of cate-

gory three. It applies to some elements, some categories in category
three, but not all.
But, in any event, what kind of a world do we live in? In Cuba what
action do we take? What do we expect Castro will be doing after you
attack these missiles? Does he survive as a political leader? Is he over-
thrown? Is he stronger, weaker? How will he react?
How will the Soviets react? What can . . . How could Khrushchev
afford to accept this action without some kind of rebuttal? I don’t think he
can accept it without some rebuttal. It may not be a substantial rebuttal,
but it’s gonna have to be some. Where? How do we react in relation to it?
What happens if we do mobilize? How does this affect our allies’ sup-
port of us in relation to Berlin? Well, you know far better than I the prob-
lems. But it would seem to me if we could lay this out tonight, and then
meet at a reasonable time in the morning to go over a tentative draft, dis-
cuss it, and then have another draft for some time in the afternoon . . .
Ball: One kind of planning, Bob, that we didn’t explicitly talk about
today, which is to look at the points of vulnerability around the world,
not only in Berlin, not only in Turkey.
McNamara: Sure. Iran.
Ball: Iran and all of them.
McNamara: And Korea.
Ball: What precautionary measures ought to be taken.
McNamara: Yes, yes.
Ball: These are both military and political.
McNamara: Exactly. And we call it a worldwide alert. Under that
heading we’ve got a whole series of precautionary measures that we think
should be taken. All of our forces should be put on alert. But, beyond that,
mobilization, redeployment, movement, and so on.
Well, would it be feasible to meet at some time in the morning? Mac,
what would you think?
Bundy: I ought to join the President for the meeting with Schroeder,
and I’ll be involved in getting started for that from about 9:30 on. I could
meet any time before that.
Carter: Well, now, the President was going to see Mr. McCone at
9:30.
McNamara: Well, why don’t we meet at 8:30.
Bundy: Fine.
McNamara: Let’s try that.
Bundy: OK.
McNamara: Now, there’s not much we can do to help. I’d be happy to,
though, if you think of anything we can do. We’ll go to work tonight and
get these numbers of sorties, by target systems, laid out. [Admiral]
Riley’s up in Mac’s office and I’ll go down there now and get them started
on it.
Carter: I think Mr. McCone could be helpful to you all in the
morning.
McNamara: Well, I think he should try to stay here at 8:30.
Carter: He’s been worrying about this for a heck of a long time.
Ball: Sure.
This small informal meeting then breaks up. The recording picks up a few
fragments of conversation. Bundy and Ball talk about eating supper
together. Bundy and Ball apparently refer to the secretarial problems that
arose from informing so few people about the crisis. Then there is silence.
After a few minutes a man comes in to clean the room. Evelyn Lincoln
walks in, speaks briefly to him, and apparently she turns off the machine.
Everyone was still trying to conceal the start of the crisis by appearing
to maintain their known schedules. President Kennedy went to another
farewell dinner for Bohlen, hosted by columnist Joseph Alsop. At the din-
ner he drew Bohlen aside and they had a long, animated, private conversa-
tion. Kennedy reportedly asked Bohlen if he could stay, but Bohlen feared
that delaying his long-planned departure for Paris might arouse unwanted
notice and comment.
Meetings resumed that evening at the State Department, winding up
in Rusk’s office at about 11:00 P.M. McNamara slept at the Pentagon that
night. McCone returned to Washington.
As arranged on Tuesday, Kennedy’s advisers had met at 8:30 Wednesday

morning, October 17, in a conference room on the seventh floor of the
State Department. McCone, now back in Washington, joined them. There,
Ball reiterated his opposition to any military action, expressing doubt
that the Soviet leaders really understood what they had done. Thompson
Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder 469
argued that Khrushchev knew what he was doing and wanted a showdown
on Berlin. In this view, Khrushchev thought the missiles in Cuba armed
him for that confrontation. Taylor and McCone sided with Thompson.
After less than an hour, McCone and Bundy left for the White House.
Arriving at about 9:30 A.M., McCone briefed President Kennedy. The
CIA director came away with the impression that Kennedy, too, leaned
toward prompt military action. Kennedy asked McCone to go to
Gettysburg and give Eisenhower a full briefing. McCone then drove off
to Pennsylvania and reported back later that Eisenhower thought the
situation was intolerable. The former president said he would support
any decisive military action.
Meanwhile Kennedy had moved on to his 10:00 meeting.
10:00 –11:30 A.M.
I don’t know, Mr. Minister . . . if we should make this the

great issue, whether we can win that fight. . . . Can we jus-
tify—we’re talking about opinion in the world—fighting our
way up the autobahn because they won’t give a visa?
Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder1

On September 10 Kennedy had met with his top advisers to approve a pre-
ferred sequence of military actions in a conflict over Berlin. Rusk urged
allied ambassadors in Washington to accept the plan, hoping the Soviets
would notice this united resolve and step back from confrontation.
McNamara declared in a press conference on September 28 that the
Berlin situation was the most severe since the combat operations during
the Korean War. The United States would “utilize whatever weapons are
needed to preserve our vital interests,” he said. “Quite clearly, we con-
sider access to Berlin a vital interest.”2 This sense of danger intensified
in the early weeks of October.
Khrushchev’s letter of September 28 made it clear that, once the U.S.
1. Including President Kennedy, Gerhard Schroeder, and translator Kusterer. Tape 29, John F.
Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings Collection.
2. Editorial Note, FRUS, 15: 336.
congressional elections were over, he would return to the issue of Berlin,

this “dangerous hotbed which spoils our relations all the time.” Kennedy
believed that Soviet interference with access to Berlin was imminent and
that the West needed to make some move to defuse the situation before
such action took place. Kennedy also believed that the vulnerable
Western position in Berlin was complicating the situation in Cuba. He
told West Berlin mayor Willy Brandt on October 5 that, if not for Berlin,
the United States would feel free to take action against Cuba. A few days
later, he told French foreign minister Couve de Murville that the Soviet
actions on Cuba made the chances of reaching agreement on Berlin very
slim. Kennedy feared that Khrushchev might try to “force something.”
Kennedy’s sense of urgency was aggravated by his frustration with
the West Germans. The general atmosphere of U.S.–West German rela-
tions was bad. Kennedy felt, with some cause, that Adenauer was voicing
complaints about U.S. weakness to almost anyone who would listen and
was planting hostile stories in the press. More concretely, the visa issue
was one point of contention. The East Germans wanted visitors from
the Western zones of Berlin to have to obtain East German visas for
their passports. Getting those visas would acknowledge that the visitor
was crossing from one country into another rather than from one Allied
Zone to another. Since the Western position in Berlin rested on preserv-
ing the Allied Zones, German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and his for-
eign minister, Gerhard Schroeder, said the GDR visa requirement must
be resisted. Brandt favored accepting East German visas rather than
resort to countermeasures that might risk a clash.
Frustrated by the impasse over Berlin, Kennedy wanted the Germans
to come up with new ideas. But the proposals coming from Bonn and
Berlin did not impress him. Brandt had warmed to Adenauer’s sugges-
tion of a plebiscite in Berlin, an idea the chancellor discussed with Bundy
at the beginning of October. Adenauer also advocated another offer to
the Soviets: The Germans would accept a ten-year moratorium on dis-
cussions of German reunification if Moscow would promise not to dis-
turb Western access to Berlin. Adenauer thought Kennedy might make
this proposal to Khrushchev during the Soviet leader’s planned visit to
the United States in November.3
Behind all this the Americans and West Germans had quite different
perspectives on the Soviet threat, which came quickly to the surface. The
3. Memorandum of Conversation between Adenauer and Ambassador Walter Dowling, 12

October 1962, Adenauer Papers, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, III/61.
Americans thought they could see various signs pointing to a coming

crunch on access to Berlin, including intelligence information on East bloc
security preparations for some sort of confrontation by November. A week
earlier, Kennedy warned Adenauer: “I have been reviewing our plans for
preparations for any crisis that may be forced upon us by the Soviet Union in
Berlin, and I am increasingly convinced that we need to make stronger and
clearer arrangements.”4 Rusk had just met with Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko in Paris, the first such high-level U.S.-Soviet meeting in
months. The entire three-hour discussion was devoted to arguments about
Berlin. So the U.S. leaders, from Kennedy on down, were deeply uneasy
about Berlin, though a bit puzzled about whether the Soviets would really
test U.S. promises to go to war over Berlin. Worried about the threat, the
Americans wanted to improve their military readiness for a crisis and (espe-
cially Kennedy) wanted to avoid any unnecessary flash points.
The West German government stance, by contrast, was to persuade
the U.S. government to take a very tough stand on every detail of Western
status in Berlin. Their argument was that the Soviets were not such a
big threat if they could see the Americans were strong and determined.
So the West Germans appeared to downplay the Soviet threat in order to
argue for a tough U.S. political position, while the Americans empha-
sized the Soviet threat in arguing that they needed more political flexi-
bility. The Americans felt that NATO militaries needed to be more ready
for action. These differing perspectives had surfaced in Rusk’s own meet-
ing with Schroeder two days earlier (on October 15).
Going into his meeting with Schroeder, Kennedy understood all this.
He also knew that, just the day before (October 16), in addition to the
alarming and still secret news about Soviet missiles in Cuba, Ambassador
Foy Kohler had cabled a report back from Moscow of a lengthy conver-
sation with Khrushchev. Khrushchev had repeated that the Soviets
would make no move on Berlin until after the U.S. midterm elections in
November.5 As for the U.S. threat to defend access to Berlin with force,
Khrushchev commented: “If U.S. doesn’t agree [to the Soviet position],
that would force Soviets to sign peace treaty [ending Allied rights in
Berlin] despite fact U.S. is threatening to start war. [It] must be recog-
4. See State Topol 399, 25 September 1962, in FRUS, 15: 327; letter from Kennedy to
Adenauer, in “Germany, Security, 10/62–12/62” folder, President’s Office Files, Box 117, John
F. Kennedy Library.
5. Khrushchev also discussed Cuba, protesting U.S. provocations. Moscow 981, 16 October
1962, FRUS, 15: 359–62.
nized that, in our electronic age, when one button is pressed, other but-
ton is pressed automatically. There is no sense in dialogue of threats.
This is silly policy. So U.S. should take position of reason.”6
Kennedy will not say a word about missiles in Cuba to the West
German foreign minister. But as the discussion slowly comes to the heart
of the matter—U.S. readiness to threaten war in taking a rigid stance on
Allied rights (as on the visa issue he knows Schroeder will emphasize7)—
the Soviet missiles in Cuba cannot be far from Kennedy’s thoughts.
Schroeder spoke English reasonably well. So while he used his trans-
lator to be sure he expressed himself clearly, the translator did not
bother to translate what Kennedy said.
President Kennedy: Mr. Minister, would you care for some coffee or
orange juice?
Gerhard Schroeder: Oh, I’d prefer tea, if [unclear].
President Kennedy: [to others] Coffee? Tea?
Unidentified: Tea.
President Kennedy: [on phone] Maybe we can get three or four teas
and three or four coffees and a cup of orange juice?
[aside, to someone else] . . . Yes, I left them on the table in my, on the
desk in my office.
[turns to Schroeder] Well, I’m glad to see you, Mr. Minister. You’ve
come in a couple of times, but . . . We have pretty strong feelings, as
you’re aware, that we’re going to have great difficulty with Berlin in the
next few months. And I wanted to, first, to see what your thought was
about what the Soviet schedule might be, and what actions they were
most likely to take. I thought you might know what our contingency
planning is to deal with those actions.
Schroeder: If you’ll allow me to speak German and get translated, it
makes a big difference.
Zunächst [unclear] für die Gelegenheit danken, das wir hier zusam-
men sind, insbesondere herzliche Grüße des Bundeskanzlers überbrin-
gen, der sich freut, Sie in ein Paar Wochen zu sehen. Und ich betrachte
diese Reise als eine sehr nützliche Vorbereitung, auch für den Besuch,
den der Bundeskanzler machen wird.
6. Moscow 981, 16 October 1962, in FRUS, 15: 360.

7. Bundy warned Kennedy that Schroeder would raise the visa issue, during the previous
evening’s deliberations on the missiles in Cuba.
Kusterer [hereinafter referred to as Translator]: Well, first of all, Mr.

President, I would like to thank you very much indeed for the opportu-
nity which you provide us [to] meet with you. And I’d like to extend to
you the most cordial greetings of the chancellor, who is looking forward
personally to seeing you in a few weeks’ time, and I myself consider my
trip to be a quite useful preparation for that very visit.8
Schroeder: Nun, dazu ihre Fragen zur Berlin-Situation, zu den
möglichen Absichten der anderen Seite und unserer Haltung zu der Vor-
bereitungsmaßnahmen. Nach unserer Auffassung ist nicht mit Sicherheit
zu sagen, ob die Russen tatsächlich die Absicht haben, gegen Ende
November, oder gegen Ende des Jahres, die Krise durch eigene Handlung
zu verschärfen oder nicht. Wir neigen eher zu der Meinung, daß die
Sowjets bei allen versuchen, [unclear] Dings psychologischen Druck,
auszuüben. Im Gründe darauf [unclear] auch sind weiter zu sprechen, und
weiter zu versuchen, ihre Ziele ohne Gewalt zu erreichen. Das kann man
nicht mit Sicherheit sagen, aber ich glaube, man muß folgende Faktoren in
Recht [unclear]. Erstens haben die Sowjets, dort wo sie herumgefragt
haben, bei den anderen Nationen wenig Unterstützung für den Gedanken
des Separatvertrags gefunden. Und einen Separatvertrag zu unterzeich-
nen, in den sozusagen nur mit der eigenen Firma und ihren Unterfirmen
unterzeichnen, ist für die Sowjets nicht so furchtbar reizvoll, denn dann
werden sie international keine gute Ausgangsposition haben, um das
durchzustehen, was sich daran anschließen könnte. Insoweit würde ich die
Haltung der anderen nicht festgelegten Staaten, eher als, von unserem
Standpunkt aus, positiv betrachten.
Die weitere Frage ist, welche konkreten Maßnahmen haben die
Sowjets etwa in Berlin weiter vor. Die Zahl von Maßnahmen, die sie noch
ergreifen könnten, ohne zu einer Konfrontation zu kommen, ist nur noch
sehr beschränkt. Es ist nicht mehr viel Spielraum zwischen Dingen, die
sie tun können und einer wirklichen, und im Augenblick, einer wirklichen
Konfrontation. Deswegen muß man gleichzeitig ins Auge fassen, welche
Maßnahmen können etwa die sowjetzonaler Leute ergreifen, nur natür-
lich abgestimmt mit dem Auftrag mit den Sowjets. Und das bedeutet
[unclear] gibt es ein Problem, den wir eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit
zuwenden müssen. Das ist dieses Problem, ob der Zivilzugang durch
weitere Paß—und Visumforschriften erschwert werden soll. Aber vielle-
icht darf ich erst einmal.
Translator: Now as to the question of the Berlin situation and the pos-
8. Adenauer had been invited to visit Washington November 7 to 8.

sible Soviet intentions, and also our views as to the contingency planning.
In our opinion, it is not certain that the Russians really do have the inten-
tion, by the end of November or by end the year, to increase the crisis by
any action of their own. We are more inclined to believe that the Soviets,
in spite of all attempts to bring psychological pressure to bear, have, in
spite of this, they basically continue, and will want to continue, to talk and
to try to achieve their objectives without having to resort to force.
Now, of course one cannot be quite sure about this, but I think one
should take account of several factors. First of all, the Soviets, in their
attempts up to now at getting support from other nations for a separate
peace treaty, have so far registered rather little support, and for them to
sign a separate treaty only with their own signature, and the signature of
their subcontractors [the East Germans and other bloc states], so to
speak, isn’t really something really much worthwhile, because from the
international point of view this would not provide them with any really
firm and good point of departure. So I think that the attitude which the
noncommitted states have taken so far can really be considered to be posi-
tive from our point of view.
Now the further question, of course, is what special measures the
Soviets may have in mind over Berlin, and the number of steps which
they could still take without coming to the point of confrontation is
really rather limited. And there isn’t really much more margin for them,
for any measures or steps or actions they could take, without coming
really close to that point of confrontation. And therefore, it is for us, of
course, at the same time necessary to envisage what possible action the
Soviet-occupied zone authorities [East Germans] might take, of course,
after having received approval from the Soviets. And there’s one specific
problem which I think we should study, and that is the problem of
whether they might try, by the introduction of passport and/or visa
requirements, to arrest and interfere with civilian traffic.
Schroeder: Dieser Problem ist, nach meiner Meinung, deswegen so
wichtig, weil wir verhindern müssen, daß sich in der Zugangsfrage über-
haupt irgendwelche Verschlechterungen gegenüber dem derzeitigen Stand
ergeben. Und ist das ja leider eben so, daß diese Fragen dort zum Teil aus-
gesprochene Papierfragen sind, in dem Sinne, daß wenn man jetzt durch die
Zone fahren will, man an den Grenzpunkt ankommt, man sein Personal-
ausweis abgibt, einen Stempel bekommt, und dann durch die—ein Paar
Mark bezahlt—und dann durch die Zone durchfährt. Und natürlich könnte
die andere Seite dieses Stück so spielen, daß anstatt, daß man ein—
zunächst so spielen—daß als man ein Zettel bekommt und dann [den]
Ausweis, sie sagen, “Das ist jetzt ein Visum, was Sie [unclear] bekommen.
Dieses Visum kann man hier bekommen, und dieses Visum kann man auch
in Ostberlin beantragen.” In anderen Worten, das, was sich hier zunächst
einmal für das Auge ändert, ist unter Umständen nicht so furchtbar tief-
greifend. Das ändert sich aber eine Menge in der rein rechtlichen Situation,
weil nämlich die Visaerteilung eine Geschichte ist, die man ganz nach
reinem [unclear] kann, es gibt dann keinerlei Anspruch auf ein Visum. Mit
anderen worten, wenn es zu dieser Einführung käme, und [unclear] es
akzeptieren wollte, würde das praktisch bedeuten, viel stärker als bisher,
diesen Landzugang nach Berlin abhängig zu machen von der Sowjetzone,
und damit natürlich ihre rechtliche—völkerrechtliche Bedeutung, im Sinne
eine Anerkennung, einige Stufen höher gehen.
[Unclear] gibt es ein Paar Probleme. Es gibt zum Beispiel das
Problem, daß im Verhältnis zu allem anderen ausländischen Verkehr, am
Beispiel amerikanischen Zivilverkehr, solche Visa bereits erteilt worden
sind, was ein sehr dummer Punkt ist, von unserem Standpunkt aus, bei
[unclear] Geschichte. Ich will das nicht im Einzelnen darstellen. Ich
habe die Überzeugung, daß wenn man irgendwelche weiteren Versch-
lechterungen des Zivilzugangs findet, man eines Tages an der Stelle ist,
wo der militärische Zugang im—in eine ganz große Notenlage gerät
dadurch. Das braucht er vielleicht zunächst, nur weitere Papier-
erfordernisse unterworfen werden soll, und die Weltöffentlichkeit nur
sehr schwer verstehen wird, daß wir mal gerade in dem anderen Weg
durch sehr viel neue Stempel Papiere hingenommen haben, man für den
militärischen Verkehr nicht bereit sein würdest zu tun.
Translator: The question is so important in my mind because we will
have to avoid any further deterioration of access as compared to what the
present situation is. Unfortunately, most of these questions can easily be
paper questions, if I may say so, because if now, you want to go through,
to transit the Soviet-occupied zone, you drive up to the checkpoint, you
give them your identity card—in the civilian field—you give them your
identity card, you get it stamped, you pay a few marks’ toll, and then you
proceed on your way. Now, of course, this could, at least in the begin-
ning, be played by the other side in this way: that instead of giving the
passengers a little paper, they will say, “Now what you receive now is a
visa. This visa can be obtained here at the checkpoint; it can also be
applied for in East Berlin.” In other words, the visible change isn’t really
very great, and doesn’t visibly reach really far, but it changes, of course,
a lot in the legal situation, because a visa is, of course, something which
you’re at complete liberty to issue or to deny. And in other words, if the
visa was introduced and accepted, this would really mean that demand
access, much more than up to now, would be dependent on the discretion
of the . . . or left to the discretion of Soviet-occupied zone, and this would

by inference mean some further steps in recognition in—under interna-
tional law.
Now, there are some problems connected with that type of thing. For
example, the problem that, so far as other foreign civilian traffic is con-
cerned, it appears that even up to this point, visas have already been
accepted for American civilian travelers, for instance, which of course is
a rather unfortunate point in this matter. Now, I don’t want to go into
any detail, but I am convinced that if one would accept any deterioration
of the civilian access, this might [unclear] place oneself one day in a spot
insofar as military access is concerned, because if, in the field of military
access also some paper formalities were introduced, it would really be
difficult to reject them, especially in the eyes of world opinion. And it
would be very difficult for world opinion to understand why one has just
accepted the same thing in the civilian field, and why now suddenly this
is such an impossible thing to accept in the military field.
Schroeder: Die Sowjets werden ja, wenn die klug sind, und sie sind
ganz bestimmt sehr klug, das ganze Spiel so spielen, daß sie es möglichst
nicht gegen die Weltmeinung zu spielen brauchen, und daß sie es
möglichst ohne Einsatz von eigener Gewalt spielen können. Das kann
zum Beispiel folgendermaßen aussehen, wenn ich das einmal an einem
hypothetischen Beispiel darstellen darf. Nehmen wir an, die Sowjets wür-
den unterzeichnen am ersten Dezember einen Friedensvertrag in dem
alle Bestimmungen über Berlin darin stünden, die Alliierten dürfen dort
nicht länger sein, alle Befugnisse gehen nach Pankow über, und so weiter.
Und sie würden sagen, “Dieser Friedensvertrag tritt in Kraft am ersten
Januar 1963, und wir brauchen eine Übergangszeit für ein halbes Jahr,
während die westlichen Alliierten noch in Berlin bleiben. Sie werden aber
ein anderes Papier als bisher brauchen, um nach Berlin zu kommen. Diese
Papiere werden in Pankow ausgestellt, aber da wir großzügige Leute
sind, sind wir auch bereit, sie an den Übergangsstellen auszustellen. Dort
sind die Papiere bereits vorbereitet, und dieses Verfahren tritt am ersten
Januar in Kraft.”
Was tut man dann auf der westlichen Seite, in der Zeit vom ersten
Dezember bis zum ersten Januar? Und was tut man wenn der erste Januar
herangekommen ist? Vor allendings was wird die Weltöffentlichkeit sagen?
Was soll man tun am ersten Januar? Soll man am ersten Januar nur noch
mit Gewalt durchfahren? Oder wird die Weltöffentlichkeit nicht sagen,
“Nun, also, ihr habt schon doch so viele Stempel hingenommen, in der
[unclear] hat sich nicht viel geändert.” Mit anderen Worten, man braucht
eine Haltung die den Sowjets ganz klar macht, daß sie mit dem Versuch,
dieses Spiel [unclear] Rattenweise zu spielen, eben nicht durchkommen

werden. Und deswegen, eben glaube ich, muß man im Grunde anfangen,
bereits das Problem der etwa des [unclear] Zivilverkehrs, ganz energisch
zu behandeln.
Translator: Now if the Soviets are shrewd people, and they certainly
are, they will play the game, if ever possible, not against world opinion,
and they will play that game if possible without having to resort to force.
And they can do that, for instance, in the following hypothetical case: let
us assume that the Soviet Union signs a separate peace treaty on the first
of December, a separate treaty which contains all of the provisions which
they have announced. That is to say, the Western Allies have no longer
any right to be in Berlin, everything is being transferred to Pankow [the
East German capital], and so on; that they would further say that this
peace treaty will enter into force on the first of January 1963, but that
there appears a requirement for a transitional period, and that therefore
the Western powers can continue to stay in Berlin for another six
months as of the first of January ’63. But in order to be able to transit
through the Soviet occupied zone, it is required to have a different docu-
mentation than up to now. This documentation can be obtained at the
checkpoints as well as in Pankow itself. But it can also be obtained at the
checkpoints. That they would say these papers would be prepared, and
the whole arrangement or procedure would enter into force on the first
of January.
The question, of course, arises: What does the West do in the period
between the first of December and the first of January? And what does it
do on and after the first of January? Especially, what will be the reaction
of world opinion if, for instance, the West were to decide that, as from
the first of January, the access will be kept open by force? What would
world opinion say? It would say, “Well, you’ve just accepted this stamp,
it’s not really much of a new requirement, and there hasn’t been a lot of
change which it would be worthwhile the use of force.” In other words, it
is necessary for us to have an attitude which makes it quite clear to the
Soviet Union that any attempt on their part to try and proceed by
installments will fail. And therefore, I think that basically we should
react very strongly already in the case of any further deterioration of the
civilian traffic.
Schroeder: Und [unclear] ein Paar Folgerungen. Die eine ist die, daß
man in der “contingency planning” auch ein ganz genaue, realistische
Betrachtung über etwaiger Erschwerung des Zivilzugangs haben muß.
Dafür gibt es verschiedene Varianten, die wir vielleicht jetzt nicht zu
erörteren brauchen.
Da gibt’s es hier aber zweitens daraus, daß man vom politisch-, diplo-
matisch-, und psychologischen Standpunkt aus, alles tun muß, um den
Sowjets rechtzeitig klar zu machen, daß man nicht die Absicht hat, zum
Beispiel die Einführung von Visa hinzunehmen, und daß man darauf mit
energischen Mitteln reagieren wird. Das sind die beiden Dinge, die in
diesen Zusammenhang von . . . erforderlich sind. Und ich glaube tatsäch-
lich, es gibt eine Art Interdependenz, um den Ausdruck [Tea is delivered,
Schroeder interrupts himself to say “Danke schön.”] zu gebrauchen, zwis-
chen dem zivilen Verkehr und dem militärischen Verkehr, und ich meine,
es wird notwendig sein, daß man das bei den ganzen Planung[en] real-
istisch in Rechnung stellt.
Translator: Now, there are of course some conclusions to be drawn
from this situation, and the first conclusion I see is that the contingency
planning of course must really realistically consider and take into account
any possible deterioration in the field of also civilian access. There are
certain numbers of variations that can be imagined, but I don’t think it is
necessary to go into that detail now.
The second conclusion would be that in the political, diplomatic, and
psychological fields, one really must do everything to make it quite clear,
to drive it home to the Soviet Union, that we have no intention whatso-
ever of, for example, accepting the introduction of a visa requirement, but
that on the contrary the West would react very strongly to any such
move. I think that is necessary, and I further think that there is, to use
that term, a clear interdependence between civilian and military traffic,
and I think that should be taken into account realistically in our planning.
President Kennedy: Let me say, Mr. Minister, that I agree that there
is a clear interdependence between the military and the civilian. There is
a substantial difference between them, however, with regards to access.
We could always supply ourselves militarily by air if we can’t supply the
city by ground. Now, in addition, at the present time, as I understand it,
the civilian traffic is treated differently than military traffic. The docu-
mentation presented by civilian traffic is different from the documenta-
tion presented by military traffic. The degree of authority which the
East German regime exercises on civilian traffic is different from the
authority that they exercise on military traffic. Is this at all true?
Schroeder: Ja, das ist sicherlich, das ist sicherlich so. Aber es kommt
eine Stelle, wo die Sache ganz gefährlich wird, wo nämlich weitere
Verschlechterung[en] des Zivilverkehrs eine Situation hervorrufen, das
macht zunächst geringfügige Verschlechterung, zu optisch geringfügige
Verschlechterung des militärischen Verkehrs schwer hinnehmen, schwer-
er und schwerer ablehnen kann. Und die Frage ist natürlich ob man,
[unclear] gerade bei [unclear] Änderung des zivilen Verkehrs einfach

sagen mögen, “Nun, wir akzeptieren das”; oder man sagt, “Wir akzep-
tieren das unter gar keinen Umständen.”
Und wenn wir sagen, “Wir akzeptieren das unter gar keinen
Umständen,” dann bliebt die Frage: “Was zu tun?” Darauf gibt es eine the-
oretische Antwort. Man kann sagen, “Nun, das ganze Verkehr aufs Land
und Wasser und Straße stoppt, und wir gehen nur durch die Luft.” Das
mag [unclear] des Personenverkehrs mehr oder weniger möglich sein. Da
haben wir bereits große Verzweifel, da wenn es eine [unclear] elektronis-
che Störung gibt in den Luftwegen, in der schlechten Jahreszeit, und so
weiter und so weiter, läßt sich nicht einmal nach unsere [unclear] den
Zivilverkehr durch die Luft absichern, von der Güterversorgung ganz zu
schweigen. Und im selben Augenblick, das natürlich “viability” von Berlin
auch schwerste gefährdet. Wir sind sogar der Meinung, daß bereits die
Einführung, auch ohne daß man diese Art von Reaktion wöhlt, die ein-
fache Einführung des Visumszwangs, der täglich also für—die Visen, die
sind täglich erteilt werden, für 20,000 Leute, nicht wahr, daß das bereits
eine solche Verlangsamung und Verminderung des Berlinzugangs wird,
daß damit einfach eins der Hauptessentials in die “viability” von Berlin auf
dem Spiele steht.
Wenn man darauf erstmal reagiert hat, daß man in die Luft gegangen
ist, und wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen keine Wirkung auslösen, muß man
unter Umständen unter schweren schweren [unclear] verlust, und da wer
weiß welchen Konzessionen, dabei wieder zurückgehen. Deswegen ist es
eine sehr weittragende Frage, wie man sich einstellt bei der Visaerteilung.
Die Linien, die man da bei Verkehrsteuerung wohl über zieht, daß
man den lebensnotwendigen Verkehr nach Berlin weiter gehen läßt und
ihn im Grunde für ihn das Visaerfordernis akzeptiert, die Bevölkerung
aufruft, alle unnötigen Reisen zu hinterlassen und den Luftweg dafür zu
benutzen, gleichzeitig wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen zu ergreifen. Dies ist
eine mittlere Lösung; ob man mit einer solchen mittleren Lösung wirk-
lich durchkommen würde, daß mag zweifelhaft sein. Ich meine, aber, daß
die Planung, gleich würdig ob man einen milden oder einen sehr stren-
gen Standpunkt wählt, tatsächlich noch einmal auf das Genaueste
durchgedacht werden muß, und so daß man ein [unclear] stellen muß,
wie man sich verhalten wird.
Vor allendingen, auch mit den Berlinern. Denn hier gibt es ein Bißchen
eine Verschiedenheit der Betrachtung, die aus eine gewissen Verschiedenheit
der Interessen stammt. Die Berliner brauchen die Anerkennungsproblem
und die Gesamtdeutschen Probleme nicht als ihre unmittelbare Hauptsorge
anzusehen. Die Berliner sehen den möglichst unbehinderten Zugang nach
Berlin als ihre Hauptsorge an, aber die Auseinandersetzung geht in dem
Grunde über Berlin hinaus, in dieser Sache, so daß es nicht—die Interessen
hier—nicht ganz identisch sind. Und man muß versuchen, diese Interessen
auf einem Punkt zu bringen, damit sie ungefähr harmonisiert [sind].
Translator: Well, that’s certainly true. But the point comes where it
would be very dangerous to have accepted already a further deteriora-
tion in the civilian traffic, because this would place us in a situation
where optically minor changes in the field of military traffic would be
very difficult to reject. And the question of whether we say, if there’s any
further deterioration of civilian traffic, the question now is, whether we
say, “Okay, we will acquiesce in it,” or whether we say we are not going
to accept that in any way.
If we say we are not going to accept that in any way, we of course
have to ask ourselves what are we going to do? There is a theoretical
answer, the theoretical answer being that surface transport to Berlin
would come to an end. Now, there may be a possibility of ensuring more
or less the transportation of personnel from and to Berlin by air, but
even there we have our doubts insofar as bad seasons, any serious elec-
tronic interference is concerned, leaving completely aside the question
of goods transportation, which we do not think it will be possible to
carry out by air. And then, of course, we’ve reached a point where via-
bility is really seriously affected. We even think that the simple intro-
duction of visa, the very fact that a visa requirement would be introduced,
would mean that per day 20,000 visas would have to be issued for people
traveling to and from Berlin. And this fact in itself would already slow
down and reduce the Berlin access. So really, [unclear] there’s one
essential, that is, viability, which really is at stake if anything of the kind
happened.
If we move, lift the traffic up into the air, and if the economic coun-
termeasures we take do not have the effect which we are thinking of,
then we might well find ourselves at the point where, at the price of high
concessions and high loss of prestige, we would have to come back from
that stand which we have taken. So the question, of course, of how we
react to these requirements is, I think, extremely important.
The line which has been followed in planning up to now is that the
vital surface transport would continue and that one would, for that pur-
pose, accept the visa, at the same time appealing to the population not to
do any unnecessary surface travel, and at the same time, of course, intro-
ducing economic countermeasures. Now, this is an intermediate solution.
The question as to whether it will have the result which we are expecting
it to have is, of course, an open one. But I think that, at any rate, whether
one will in the final analysis come to a more restricted or a very strict
reaction in the planning stage, it is necessary to rethink very hard the
whole planning and to come to agreement as to how we will really act.
We also, especially, have to come some agreement on that point with
the Berliners, because there is some difference in the perspective between,
and some difference of interests between, the Berliners and the Federal
Republic as such. The problem of—
Schroeder: [interrupting translator] Or the Western position as such.
Translator: Or the Western position as such, thank you. The problem
of recognition and the problem of all-German policy is not felt by the
Berliners as their really direct concern and really immediate concern.
The Berliners think that their immediate and direct concern, of course, is
the unrestricted access, but the problem itself, of course, and all the impli-
cations reach far beyond Berlin alone, so there is not quite the same inter-
est with the western Berliners and with the West, and therefore it is
necessary for us to try to bring these interests to a certain point.
President Kennedy: Mr. Minister, if you . . . if they insist on these
visas, and then West Germans going in, or traffic, say that they won’t
submit to them, and that traffic stops, then where are we?
Schroeder: Das bedeutet—im Grunde, bedeutet das Ganze die Frage,
ob man ins Auge fassen will, oder ins Auge fassen kann, und ich stelle das
nur als eine Frage, den Landzugang nach Berlin vom ersten Augenblick,
an dem ernsthaft blockiert wird, wirklich mit Gewalt offenzuhalten, oder
ob man, die ganze Gedankenführung so ordenlich, daß man sagt, “Lassen
wir das Land, nehmen wir die Luft, und warten wir ab die Wirt-
schaftsmaßnahmen und der Gleichen wirken.”
Ich glaube, und das sage ich aus meiner persönlichen Meinung, daß es
eine sehr gefährliche Vorstellung wäre, mich darauf einzulassen, daß man
das Problem durch Ausweichen in die Luft [unclear] zu lösen [unclear].
Translator: Basically the question of course is—and I am only rais-
ing the question without trying to give an answer now to it—but basi-
cally the question is whether we will and whether we can, in case the
land access is harassed, whether we will and whether we can, from the
first moment of such blockage onward, keep that access open by force, or
whether we will say, “Well, let’s drop the land traffic, the surface traffic,
and let’s lift it up into the air and wait for the effect of the economic
countermeasures.”
Now, I personally believe that it would be really dangerous to think that
the problem could be solved by simply lifting up the traffic into the air.
President Kennedy: Well, I think that we discussed what action we
would take if there was a forcible blockage of traffic on the ground. The
only question would be whether the blockage took place because of the,
of a paper barrier rather than one of arms or force. Whether we, in that
case, would be warranted, if the blockage is by paper, warranted taking
the force if we didn’t like the kind of visa or the kind of papers which
were being requested of the civilian traffic.
Schroeder: Aber wir sind—das Problem ist gerade, wenn man das
hier nicht tut, obwohl die “viability” von Berlin im Grunde daran hängt,
welche Chance hat man, sich bei, dann denn für den militärischen
Verkehr, nur in Anführungszeichen das Erfordernis, von etwas mehr
Papier gestellt wird, zu sagen, “Dies aber ist eine gewaltsame Stelle.”
Translator: Well, Mr. President, the question of course arises, if one
doesn’t do it at that stage, at that point, although viability is involved,
what are our chances of doing it when, in the military field only, some
paper requirement, new paper requirement is introduced? What chance
do we then stand to reply, to react by force?
President Kennedy: Well, I would think it does raise the question of
whether any sort of paper documentation which we would accept in the
civilian traffic. I say, military traffic you can always move by air, so that
you don’t have quite the same problem. But the civilian traffic you can’t
move by air, so civilian traffic as a practical matter is basically a different
problem. If you’re going to say that you’re not going to have any civilian
traffic submit to these visas, and you can’t carry the civilian traffic by air,
then you’re going to have, in a sense, a blockade of Berlin imposed by us.
And with all the difficulties that would come upon the city, with the city
not wholly sympathetic to that position, vis-à-vis arguing that this is an
unreasonably legalistic position that we’ve taken, it seems to me that that
may end up in a somewhat more . . . slightly ambiguous position than we
would if we said, “Well, we don’t accept this authority, but if it’s a matter
of moving civilian traffic in and out, we would agree.” [Unclear.]
Schroeder: Ich meine es liegt auf der Hand, das wird eine sehr
schwierige Frage ist, aber die hängt im—einfach eben damit zusammen,
und das gilt nach meiner Meinung eben vor Allendingen auch für den
militärischen Verkehr, ob man sich gegenüber dem militärischen Verkehr
vorstellen, “Nun, wir können die Luft ausweichen.” Oder man sagt, “Dies
ist ein lebenswichtiges Problem, oder ein militärisch-lebenswichtiges
Problem, den Landverkehr aufrecht zu erhalten.”
Ich sage ihnen ganz offen, ich würde der Auffassung sein, daß es ein
militärisch-lebenswichtiges Problem ist, den Landverkehr offen zu halten,
um mich nicht damit mit zu vergnügen, daß man in die Luft gehen kann.
Ich bin mir ganz darüber klar, daß das schwere Entscheidungen beinhal-
tet, aber unter Umständen ist man ganz anderen Entwicklung entgegen,
wenn mal den militärischen Verkehr durch die Luft nimmt, um dann zu
sehen, wieviel weiter man kommen wird. Das hat man ’48–’49 getan. Und
zwar diese Luftbrücke hat es gegeben. Die ist dann schließlich aus einer
anderen Situation mehr oder weniger ohne Entscheidung, ohne jedenfalls
wirklich wirksame Verbesserung zu schaffen, aufgegeben worden, weil
die Interessenlage auf der sowjetischen Seite geändert hat, aber ich würde
nicht glauben, daß man heute mit dieser Art von militärischer Aktion
wirklich die Auseinandersetzung mit den Sowjets positiv bestehen kann,
sondern auf dieser Weise geht man möglicherweise einer schweren poli-
tisch-diplomatischen Niederlage entgegen.
Ich habe das Problem eigentlich nur in dieser Schärfe aufgeworfen,
damit man [unclear] sieht, in welche Lagen man geraten kann, und man
muß die möglichen Lagen vorher, glaube ich, absolut realistisch und gener-
alstabsmäßig durchgedacht haben, um nicht eines Tages an einer Stelle zu
stehen, wo man, wo das Publikum den Eindruck gewinnt, “ihr habt doch
nicht ganz entschlossen gehandelt,” weil man versucht [unclear] auszuwe-
ichen. Die Lösung, die wir jetzt für derzeit [unclear], für das Problem des
Zivilzugangs, sieht so aus, um es noch einmal zu sagen, daß man sagt,
“Nun, der lebenswichtige Verkehr muß weiter gehen. Nimmt die Visa, dafür
[unclear] unten Potenz [unclear]. Macht keine unnötigen Reisen. Wer
sonst reisen muß, geht durch die Luft. Wir werden das bezahlen, wir wer-
den das organisieren, und wir werden das finanzieren. Und wir werden
dann wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen eintreten lassen.” Und Verhinderungen
des Interzonenhandels oder Kündigung des Interzonenhandels, entsprech-
ende Handlung der drei Westallierten, möglichst entsprechende Handlung
alle NATO-Partner gerichtet gegen die Sowjetzone.
Aber wenn das nicht den gewünschten Effekt dabei führt, dann bleibt
man in der Situation, entweder nur ein[en] begrenzten Berlinverkehr zu
haben, oder das Visaerfordernis ganz zu nehmen, und man befindet sich,
in der Tat, auf einer gleitenden Skala, die leider nach unten gleitet, und
nicht auf einer aufsteigenden [unclear] zur Besserung.
Translator: I’m certainly fully aware that this is an extremely diffi-
cult problem, and it is connected also especially with the question [of]
whether in the military field, military traffic, one will want to take a
decision then in case of any such introduction, also in the military field,
to lift it up into the air, or whether it is considered vital—also militarily
vital—to keep land access open. I frankly believe that it is also militarily
vital to keep the land access open and not simply try and lift everything
up into the air.
I am, of course, aware that this implies a very heavy and very difficult
decision, but it is possible that if one goes into the air and says, “Well,
let’s see how we can get along,” we might be placed before different
developments, which might place us rather in a spot. Now there was, of
course, the airlift in 1948–49, and under a different situation it more or
less came back on the surface without any effective improvement. And it
came back because the interests for the Soviet side had changed. But I do
not think that now, with any such military action as taken in ’48–’49, it
will be possible for us to really meet the Soviet challenge. But [instead]
we may be well in for a major diplomatic and political defeat.
Having raised the question . . . and I only want to see that every pos-
sible development, every possible situation is really thought about in a
war-gaming manner, if I may say, so as not one day to find oneself in a
position where the public would gain the impression that after all they
[the Western allies] are not so very firm, firmly resolved and they are
trying to evade the problems. The solution which up to now has been, to
repeat that, which up to now has been envisaged for any such deteriora-
tion of civilian traffic was that the vital traffic would continue, that
under protest one would accept the visa, that one would appeal to the
population not to do any unnecessary travel, that the necessary travel
would have to be financed and lifted up into the air, and that economic
countermeasures would be taken by us insofar as the interzonal trade is
concerned, either diminishing or completely renunciating it, and corre-
sponding action, economic counteraction, by the three Western powers
and possibly by all NATO members.
But if all these measures remained without effect, then of course we
would be in a situation where we would either have reduced access to
Berlin or we would have to accept all the visa requirements for all the
traffic, and we would find ourselves suddenly on a declining gliding scale.
President Kennedy: I don’t know, Mr. Minister, if the question of the
visas is the . . . if we should make this the great issue, whether we can
win that fight [unclear]. That’s the problem. We don’t want to have a
diplomatic defeat. We don’t want to have Berlin isolated either, because
of the forcible blockade of their own or because of a decision of ours not
to move. And the question really is as to whether a visa is the issue upon
which to hang our use of force, your use of economic countermeasures
and your use of force with us. Can we justify—we’re talking about opin-
ion in the world—fighting our way up the autobahn because they won’t
give a visa? When [unclear]—when, after all, civilian traffic has been
submitting itself to being stamped? That’s a pretty sophisticated—
Schroeder: Das ist in der [unclear], aber die ganze Schwierigkeit der
Auseinandersetzung der Berlinfrage mit der Sowjets liesst leider in dieser

Art von Dingen—man hat das immer mit der Salami verglichen—ich
habe das Beispiel nie sehr schön gefunden, weil es aus der Lebens-
mittelbranche stammt—aber die ganze Schwierigkeit ist natürlich, daß
man hier ein Stück weiter und weiter und weiter gedrückt wird, bis man
an einer Stelle ist, wo die Anderen [unclear], “Das habt [unclear] alles
schon getan. Sollte das noch eine—soll das nicht auch noch gehen?” Und
deswegen ist man dabei, dieses Paket sozusagen stückweise zu verlieren,
ohne das sich bedeutende Dinge eigenen.
Die Schwierigkeit liegt, nach meiner Meinung, in gerade, in poli-
tisch-psychologischen Dingen. Wie das ganze Berlinproblem, letztlich
noch, so wie es jetzt steht, eher auch ein großer politisch-, diplomatisch-,
psychologischer Krieg ist, als ein militärischer Krieg ist. Und auf
unserer Seite muß Folgendes gelten: Wie reagiert die Bevölkerung wenn
wir wieder eine neue Sache hinnehmen müssen? Ist das—ermutigt das
die Bevölkerung? Oder entmutigt das die Bevölkerung? Die Antwort ist
klar. Es müßte die Bevölkerung entmutigen. Das ist ganz sicher, [unclear]
sagen ein Schritt weiter bergab. Ob der Schritt groß ist oder klein ist,
spielt keine Rolle. Und es bedeutet für Pankow, wenn sein Visarecht
anerkannt ist, ein Stück weiter Bergauf. Das kann man, glaube ich, nicht
verzweifeln.
Nun, man kann versuchen, das noch mit ein Kompromiß zu überbi-
eten. Die zweite Frage ist, wie reagieren die Sowjets darauf ? Was
bedeutet das, da diesja alle Stücke sowjetischer Strategie sind? Was
bedeutet es für die Sowjets? Es bedeutet für die Sowjets einen gewissen
weiteren Erfolg—mit anderen Worten, ein Stückchen Ermutigung.
Und Berlin kann überhaupt nur dadurch gehalten werden, daß die
Sowjets die Überzeugung haben, “Hier gibt es irgendwo, ohne das wir
das genau wissen, wir die Sowjets, eine unübersteigbare Grenze, die wir
unter gar keinen Umständen übersteigen können. Das wissen die Sowjets.
Ich bin der Überzeugung, daß Khrushchev seinerseits überzeugt ist, daß
[es] gewisse Dinge gibt, für die, die Amerikaner und [unclear], die der
Westen wirklich kämpfen würde. Er muß nur die Partie so spielen, daß
man sozusagen weiter und weiter eingeengt ist, ohne reagiert zu haben.
Und dann hat er natürlich in dieser psychologischen Auseinandersetzung
[unclear] einen großen Erfolg erhoben.
Es ist nicht, nach meiner Meinung, also nicht, daß die Sowjets wissen,
unter bestimmten Umständen würde man kämpfen. Das wissen sie, und
das glauben sie auch. Sie glauben sogar, das man ein Nuklearkrieg wegen
Berlin riskieren wird, obwohl ihnen—den Sowjets—das ziemlich ver-
rückt erscheint. Aber sie glauben das. Aber sie werden ihre eigenen
politisch-diplomatisch-psychologischen Möglichkeiten daran ermessen,

wie wir diese anderen Fragen behandeln. Und deswegen ist es eben so
wichtig, obwohl das nun ein Visum ist oder nicht, daß diese Frage—ich
will jetzt nur einmal sagen—mit dem größtmöglichen Nachdruck behan-
delt wird, und nicht angesehen wird, als eine Frage, ein Stück Papier wird.
Translator: Now, that certainly is quite true, but the difficulty over
all this Berlin conflict with the Soviets is that . . . well, it has always been
compared to a salami—an example which I never liked very much
because it comes out of a food store—but really the difficulty is that
piece by piece and little by little, one is being maneuvered into a point
where everybody will say, “Now you’ve accepted all that already, why
should just this little thing not be possible for you to accept?” And that is
the, really, the problem for us, that we might well lose this whole game
by installments without there ever occurring any major event, or having
occurred any major event. But the game would still be lost.
And the difficulty, in my opinion, really lies in this political and psy-
chological field. Quite as Berlin, quite generally, is as of now much more
a political, psychological, diplomatic war than it is a military one. And
for us, it is also important what the reaction of the people will be when
we acquiesce in the next minor change in, deterioration in access. Will it
be encouraging for the—will our reaction be encouraging or discourag-
ing for the population? And I think the answer to that one is quite clear:
It will discourage them, and it will be considered as a further step, small
as it may be, on the declining scale. And to Pankow [the East German
capital], of course, the recognition of its visa requirement would
undoubtedly be one step up. There can be no doubt about this.
Now, of course one can try to avoid this by finding a compromise, but
the second question involved is of course also: What will the Soviet reac-
tion be? Because all this is part of a more comprehensive Soviet strategy.
And what does our reaction to any such move mean to them? And it means,
of course, some success to them, and that means encouragement to them.
Now, Berlin can only be held if the Soviets can be convinced, and are
convinced, that there is some specific point—without our wanting to be
forced or being able to say in this discussion now which that point should
be—but somewhere there is this point which we will not go beyond, and
beyond which we will not accept any [unclear]. And the Soviets certainly
know that. I’m convinced that Khrushchev himself is convinced that there
are some things at points which the U.S. and the West will fight. But of
course, he will try to play this game in such a way as to whittle down our
freedom of action without our reacting to every slice that is torn off, and
that would, of course, mean success to him, psychologically.
I don’t think it’s enough, really, for the Soviets only to know that under
certain circumstances we will fight. They do know that. They even believe
that we’re going to wage a nuclear war over Berlin, although from their
point of view this looks a rather crazy decision to take. But they still
believe that we will wage a nuclear war over Berlin if necessary. But their
own intentions, or their further moves, of course depend on how we deal
with the precedent, or how we have dealt with the precedent move. Now
the question is really so vitally important, now, whether this is the visa or
whether it is something else. But it is not merely a paper requirement. It
really goes much further than that.
President Kennedy: Well, I understand the difficulty, but you have to
make some decisions in the next three or four weeks about the matter.
I know this argument about salami, and what point we draw the line.
I agree that that’s important. I just think we ought to make sure that in
our desire to demonstrate some firmness, that we don’t draw the line at
the wrong place. The civilian traffic at the present time accepts East
German control. That traffic submits its documents to the East German
authorities. They stamp the documents—that’s a kind of acquiescence in
their authority. The degree of difference between that kind of acquies-
cence and acquiescence in the acceptance of a different paper doesn’t
seem to me to be dramatic enough to hang all of our future on that issue.
The West German government has made it clear it’s not going to
recognize [East Germany]. All the rest of us [in the Alliance] have.
Whether we therefore want to set in train all the reactions on this ques-
tion of a difference in the paper, I think, is a matter that we ought to
make up our mind about very shortly. If we make it the important issue
and then acquiesce, then it’s going to be a major defeat. [Schroeder inter-
jects: “No.”] If we say that we would accept East Germans on the check-
points, and that this . . . we’ll sign these papers which we don’t have any
regard for, and which have no standing, then it will become less impor-
tant. So we’ve got to decide in advance whether we want to make it
important or whether we want to attempt to downgrade it and regard
the actual movement in and out as the key issue.9
Schroeder: Ich möchte nur einen Satz noch zu diesen Problemen sagen.
Es ist eben doch ein ganz großer Unterschied, ob ich an einen Grenzpunkt
9. Acceptance of East Germans at the checkpoints as surrogates or agents of the Soviet

Union, in contrast to accepting them as representatives of a sovereign East Germany, had
been a little-known part of contingency planning since 1954. But this practice was discarded
in 1958, when leaders and the public became aware of it.
heranfahre und dort eine Sache abgestempelt wird, und ich durchfahre,
oder aber, ob man das tun kann, was die Leute ohne weiteres tun können,
sagen “Alle Visa gibt es überhaupt nur noch in Ostberlin. Oder wir sind
bereit auf Eurem Boden Visabureaus zu eröffnen, zum Beispiel in West
Berlin.” In anderen Worten, die Zone kommt durch das anerkannte
Visaerfördernis in eine ganz andere Lage, darauf zu sagen, “Wir geben im
Monat überhaupt nur 50,000 Visen.” Und was machen wir dann? Mit
anderen Worten, sie könnten sowohl die Zahl der Visen als den Ort der
Visaerteilung feststellen. Von daran eine Menge Förderung knüpfen, die
angeblich entgegenkommen sein sollen, in Westdeutschland oder in West
Berlin Visastellen zu eröffnen. Das ist die [unclear] Gefahr, die hinter
dieser Sache liegt.
Translator: I just wanted to add one point, Mr. President, on this
issue. There is, of course, a big difference of whether you drive up to a
checkpoint and you get your stamp and then you proceed, or whether
they can do—the Soviet-occupied Zone people [East Germans] can do
what they certainly could do to say that visas can only be issued in East
Berlin. Or they say, “We’ll be very generous; we’ll make it easy for you.
We’ll open visa-issuing agencies in West Berlin,” for instance.
Schroeder: Or in West Germany.
Translator: Or in West Germany. In other words, the zone really
comes into a completely different situation. They might as well say,
“We’ll only issue 50,000 visas per month.” And they can fix the number,
fix the place and connect it up with other demands that are worse. Under
the label of being very generous, saying, “We’ll open up these visa-issu-
ing agencies—”
President Kennedy: [interrupting] But I would assume that under
those conditions the economic countermeasures that we would take
would be sufficiently oppressive to them that this kind of action, which is
rather superficial, would not be useful to them.
Schroeder: Das ist die Frage, wie weit wirtschaftliche Maßnahmen
dabei wirksam sind. Ehrlich gesagt, bin ich von der Wirksamkeit der
wirtschaftlichen Maßnahmen dann nicht überzeugt, wenn die andere
Seite bereit ist, das Risiko zu laufen. Dann wenn sie—die andere Seite
bereit ist, das Risiko zu laufen, dann kann sie die wirtschaftlichen
Maßnahmen dann sich hinnehmen. Ich würde jedenfalls davor warnen,
zu glauben, daß wirtschaftlicher Druck genügte, um die gewünschten
Veränderungen hervorzurufen.
Translator: Berlin, of course, is at risk as to how far the economic
countermeasures will be effective. Quite honestly, I’m not convinced that
they are effective if the other side is prepared to really run the risk. Then
they can certainly put up with everything we can do in the field of eco-
nomic countermeasures. So I would rather warn to the belief that eco-
nomic countermeasures alone, and in themselves, will be sufficiently
effective.
President Kennedy: Let me say, there’s a couple of other matters
which . . . I appreciate the Minister’s discussion.
Schroeder: Well, I’m sorry they’re just a little bit long on this.
[Kennedy interjects: “No, no, but I—”] I think it’s very important we both
get to make a start with it—
President Kennedy: I want . . .
Unidentified: Go on.
President Kennedy: The other question is on this matter of the nego-
tiations with . . . these discussions which have been carried on with
[Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko, which so far have been
unsuccessful. Since last spring [spring of 1962], the Communist insis-
tence on the withdrawal of Western troops from Berlin, of course, has
meant that nothing has proceeded.
Now, it may be they won’t always stay on that, that they’ll withdraw
that condition and come back again to access and boundaries and atomic
weapons and all these other matters which were discussed some months
ago before they got on this other matter. Do you have any thoughts
about . . . particularly . . . I don’t see why Mr. Khrushchev would want to
come over here and talk about Berlin if all he’s going to talk about is
what we’ve been very clear is not a matter that is subject to negotiation.
Schroeder: Nach meiner Meinung ist erstens noch nicht ganz sicher,
ob Khrushchev wirklich kommen wird, und kommen will. Khrushchev
hat diese Besuchsankündigung, nach meiner Meinung hervorragend
benutzt, um den Westen mit Spekulation zu beschäftigen. Aber, deswe-
gen weiß ich nicht ob er es wirklich tun wird. Ich will nur einmal
annehmen, daß er es tatsächlich vor hat.
Dann würde ich es als ein Zeichnen dafür ansehen, daß er nicht
geneigt ist, den sagen Sie mal härtesten Kurs zu steuern. Er müßte, also,
schon kommen, in der Erwartung, daß man irgendwelche Dinge arrang-
ieren kann. Khrushchev—wir haben das in Genf gesehen im März, und
wir haben das in Juli gesehen mit Gromyko—man wird das—Sie werden
das vielleicht morgen Nachmittag wieder sehen—haben in der Tat den
scheidenden Punkt daraus gemacht, westliche Anwesenheit in Berlin.
Wir haben [unclear]—die Sowjets haben sich ein Bißchen zu optimistisch
ausgedrückt, darüber, daß man sich über Grenzen, Demarkationslinien,
Nichtangriffspakte, Nuklearfragen, und so weiter geeinigt hätte. Nach

meiner Meinung, haben wir [unclear] doch keineswegs über diese Fragen
geeinigt, die Sowjets stellen es aber so dar, durch diplomatische Kanälen,
als ob man sich in diesen Fragen geeinigt hätte.
Stellen Sie sich mal auf den Standen der Sowjets, man hätte sich in
diesen Fragen geeinigt, dann möchten Sie im Grunde annehmen, daß die
Sowjets weiter den Versuch machen werden, über die Anwesenheit des
Westens in Berlin sozusagen eine Verständigung auf gleichender Skala,
anbei zu verführen. Nach meiner Meinung war das im Grunde deutlich zu
sehen in Genf, daß sie im Grunde folgende Fragen gestellt haben, “Wie
lange wollt ihr in Berlin bleiben? Wollt ihr ewig in Berlin bleiben?” Dann
haben die Sowjets den Vorschlag gemacht, “Also, man halte die Hälfte
Eurer Truppen vier Jahre da, nimmt dazu noch einige Polen, Tschechen,
und einige Dänen und Holländer, vermindert diese Sachen jedes Jahr um
ein Viertel, und nach Vier Jahre werde die Sache erledigt.” Ich bin der
Überzeugung, daß die Sowjets tatsächlich geglaubt haben, daß sei eine
weitere Kompromißangebot. Ich gehe davon aus, daß das, was sie im
November ’58 gesagt haben, “Nun, schön, also, machen wir in Berlin
Status quo in Berlin. Machen wir [unclear] entmilitarisierten Stadt.” Daß
sie sich das vorgestellt haben, als eine Kompromißangebot, was ihnen das
Gesicht wahren, wie es [unclear] das Gesicht wahren [unclear].
Sie sehen, diese Angebot ist nicht angenommen worden, und ich
halte im Grunde für möglich, daß sie noch weiter arbeiten an einer in
ihren Augen—nicht in unseren Augen—Kompromißangebot zu sagen,
“Nun, wenn Ihr nicht Vier Jahre bleibt, vielleicht bleibt Ihr acht Jahre,
oder neun Jahre, oder zehn Jahre, oder sechs Jahre, oder was immer.” Ich
würde glauben, daß Khrushchev eine Anstrengung in dieser Richtung,
und ein Erfolg in dieser Richtung, sehr, sehr viel lieber wäre, als das er
Berlins wegen jetzt ein noch höheres Risiko laufen muß. Mit anderen
Wörteren, ich glaube, daß Khrushchev, wenn er kommen sollte, im
Grunde eher kommen wird mit dem Versuch, sozusagen, nach einem
Kompromiß, der nicht angenommen worden ist, eine Art zweiten
Kompromiß versucht. Aber daß ist meine persönliche Auffassung. Das
kann man wie immer, wie alles was die Sowjets tun werden, nicht wirk-
lich beweisen.
Translator: Now in my opinion, first of all, I would like to say that I
am not sure in any way, either in the negative nor in the positive way,
whether Khrushchev will or will not come. I think he has very extremely
skillfully used that announcement to get the press to indulge in all sorts
of speculation, and that is why I’m not quite sure that he will come.
But just for the sake of argument, let’s assume he will come. And if he
does, I would consider that as some indication that he is perhaps not really
coming along with the intention of going the toughest course. So he
would probably come expecting that something could be arranged. Now,
we have seen this in Geneva in March, and also in July with Gromyko—
you’ll probably have the same experience tomorrow, Mr. President, [in
your meeting] with him [Gromyko]—that Khrushchev and the Soviets
have always made the crucial point, or the only point really for them, was
the Western presence in Berlin.10 And in my opinion the Soviet Union has
been a little too optimistic in its utterings about boundaries, demarcation
lines, nonaggression pacts, nuclear weapons, acting as though all this was
practically and virtually settled and agreed, while in my opinion there is
certainly not yet any agreement on these questions. But in their view in
the diplomatic, through diplomatic channels, the Soviets present it as
though these matters had already been agreed.
Now, putting myself in the Soviets’ place for a moment, if all this . . .
and taking it as they do, that all this is practically arranged and agreed,
then I would rather think that the Soviets would continue to try via the, or
[unclear] concerning, the Western presence in Berlin, to come to an
understanding on a sort of gliding scale. In my opinion, this has been quite
clear in Geneva, where they raised the question, “How long do you want
to stay in Berlin? Do you want to stay in Berlin forever?” And then they
suggested that the forces in Berlin should be reduced by one-half, and for
the next four years we would add some Poles, Czechs, Danes, and Dutch
[troops], and we would reduce it by 25 percent each year, and after a
period of four years, that’s the end of it. Now I’m convinced that the
Soviets, from their point of view, really thought that this was a compro-
mise offer. And I even think that the November ’58 proposal of
Khrushchev’s to turn Berlin into a free and demilitarized city was, in their
eyes, a compromise offer intended to serve as a face-saver for both sides.
Now they’ve seen that this offer has not been accepted, and therefore
10. Schroeder is referring to the major talks on Berlin between Rusk and Gromyko, in
Geneva, in March and July 1962. On both occasions the Soviets had pressed the issue of the
Western troop presence in Berlin very hard, reinforced by secret letters sent to Kennedy from
Khrushchev. It was after the July 1962 round of meetings that Khrushchev began telling U.S.
diplomats and visitors that it was "clear our dialogue was coming to [an] end." He would
have to proceed to settle the Berlin matter without being intimidated any longer by U.S.
threats. See, for example, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson’s conversation with Khrushchev
recounted in Moscow 228, 26 July 1962, in FRUS, 15: 253.
I think that they simply continue to work on what they consider—we

certainly would not, of course—but what they consider to be a compro-
mise proposal, where they would say, “Well, if it’s not four years, it may
be six, or ten, or eight years, or something of that sort.” So I think that
really Khrushchev would simply prefer to see his effort in that direction
crowned by success than at the present moment to run any higher risk in
Berlin. And therefore, I believe that if he comes, having seen that one
compromise has not been accepted, what they consider to be a compro-
mise, he may come along with a second one. Now this is, of course, my
very personal opinion. As in everything that has to do with the Soviets,
there’s no possibility of proving that one is right.
Schroeder: [adding to translator’s words] At least not beforehand.
[Laughter.]
President Kennedy: Well I agree there are. . . . I think Mr. [Foy]
Kohler [U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union] yesterday was given the
impression that we had practically agreed on a nuclear test ban, except
for a few minor details which I am sure are unimportant. Well, I, Mr.
Minister, I think we . . . I don’t know why Mr. Gromyko wants to see us
tomorrow. I’m seeing him tomorrow, and I don’t know what proposal
he’ll have in regard to Khrushchev, to the possibility of coming, or what
discussion he wants on Berlin.
The other problem which we have . . . I think we ought to get this
question of visas settled between the British and French and you and us.
Schroeder: And the Berliners, too.
President Kennedy: And the West Berliners, before the end of the
month. I know you feel very strongly about it. I think we ought to get it
loud and clear ourselves, all of us. I suppose the Ambassadorial Group is
[unclear].11
Schroeder: Yes.
President Kennedy: My impression was that we had more or less
come to some conclusion. What had we settled in that conference in the
last year, 18 months—
Unidentified: I’m not sure at all, Mr. President, but this has been dis-
cussed.
Schroeder: Wenn sie mir erlauben, daß mal zu sagen, Herr President,
wenn man ein oder zwei Jahre geplant hat, und immer wieder geplant
11. Kennedy is referring to the Washington Ambassadorial Group, a working group of repre-
sentatives from the United States, Britain, France and West Germany that regularly met to
discuss Berlin and German issues.
hat, dann liegt die Gefahr sehr nah, daß der Plan ein Bißchen auseinan-
der läuft, und ich glaube, wir sind jetzt in einem Stadium, in dem man
sich das alles noch einmal neu ansehen muß, und das ganz realistisch
und klar auf die [unclear] und Annahmen bringen muß, um zu sehen,
was der Kern der ganzen Geschichte ist. Ich habe gestern mit dem
Secretary of Defense gesprochen, und er war offenbar sehr klar der
Meinung, daß man diese ganze Planung jetzt einmal, sozusagen auf dem
neuesten Stand überholen, und daß mal Stromlinien—der Ausdruck ist
von mir—etwas Stromlinien [unclear] sein muß.
Translator: If you’ll permit me to say this, Mr. President, if one has
been going on planning and replanning for one or two years, of course,
there is the danger that the harmonization is not 100 percent between the
various stages of the plans. And therefore I think that we have reached a
point where the whole thing should be reexamined and brought up to
date under the most realistic and sober consideration, and to really try to
find what is the crux of the matter. Yesterday I had a really interesting
talk with Mr. McNamara, and he rather was of the opinion, it seemed to
me, that really this planning should be brought up to date, and—that’s
not a term he used, but I would use it—should be streamlined.
Schroeder: Darf ich nur einen Satz dazu [unclear]. Ich [unclear] die
Meinung, man muß diese ganzen Möglichkeiten noch einmal wieder
richtig wie Kriegsspiele hin und her spielen, und da wird es gut sein, die
klügsten Leute die wir haben, die Sowjets spielen zu lassen.
Translator: May I add just one sentence? I am of the opinion that all
of these various contingencies should be played through in a sort of war
game, and then it would be quite good to have the most intelligent [peo-
ple we have] play the Soviet part.
President Kennedy: Well, I’m not as generous as you about the
Russians. [All laugh.]
Schroeder: [laughing] Nein, also, ich möchte nicht falsch verstanden
werden. Nur um ganz sicher zu gewinnen, sollten wir möglichst, die
klügsten für die [unclear] auf die anderen Seite setzt. Ich würde die
Russen sonst auch nicht zu [unclear].
Translator: Now, don’t misunderstand me, Mr. President, it’s just to
be quite sure that we don’t miss any point, but that is why we should
have the most intelligent play the Soviet part. But I certainly wouldn’t
think that the Soviets are more intelligent as well.
President Kennedy: Yeah, they’ve got a great geography as their
asset.
I read this morning Mr. [West German defense minister Franz
Josef] Strauss’s interview in the New York Times which made two points.
One is the completeness of the comradeship between the French and the
Germans in military matters. And the other is the question of at what
point . . . his opposition to the use of German forces, if this matter came
to a crunch, until [unclear] secondary stage [of a Berlin crisis]. If this
matter comes to a military [unclear], it seems to me that the law is going
to rest with the side which has the larger force and that therefore there
isn’t much use once the military action begins in questioning whether
the use of German troops would throw a shadow on our judicial—juridi-
cal rights to be in West Berlin.
Schroeder: I’m not sure whether you said “completeness” of Franco-
German understanding or “not completeness.”
President Kennedy: “Completeness of comradeship,” I think, is the
phrase Mr. Strauss used.
Schroeder: Did he really say completeness of comradeship? That’s—
[Resumes speaking German.]
Ich will mal die deutsch-französischen Sachen herauslassen. Ich
denke, über die französischen Möglichkeiten in dieser Sache, so realis-
tisch, wie ich annehme daß Sie, Herr President, darüber denken.
Aber der andere Punkt ist wichtiger, denn [unclear] die Frage, wie
stark ist das deutsche Engagement in dieser Sache. Und daran darf es über-
haupt keiner Zweifel geben, das das deutsche Engagement in dieser Sache
genau so stark ist, wie das amerikanische, aus, in welchen Sachen, aus
Gefühlsgründen und aus patriotischen Gründen daraus, eher betonter als
das amerikanische, es überhaupt sein kann. Das dürfte eigentlich zwischen
uns keine Frage sein. Und das was ich—dieses Interview habe ich nur
flüchtig gelesen, es ist mit der Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung gewesen—das
was dort drinnen gesagt ist, wenn man es objektiv ließt, ist genau der
Stand der Planung zwischen Live Oak und NATO. Es gibt hier eine Live
Oak Planung, die dann übergeht in einer NATO Sache, und da unsere
ganzen Truppen der NATO unterstellt sind, gehören wir in dem NATO-
Abschnitt dieser Sache. Das [unclear] die [unclear] auf dem Papier und
nach der derzeitigen Planung. Aber ich habe überhaupt keinen Zweifel
daran, daß wenn es jetzt zur größeren militärischen Auseinandersetzung
kommt, wir einfach deswegen von vornherein drinnen sind, weil wir halt
vorne stehen. Das ist auch eine große Selbstverständlichkeit, in meiner
Meinung.
Translator: I may leave perhaps the German-French thing aside—
just one sentence on that. I have about as realistic a view of these things
as you, I suppose, Mr. President.
But the second point, I think, is more important, and that is to what
degree is Germany committed in this matter, and there can be no doubt
about the fact that our commitment is exactly the same as that of the
United States, and perhaps even a little more so, out of feeling and out of
patriotism, than it ever could be for the United States, so there should
really be no question whatsoever between us. Now I haven’t read this
interview, which was given to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung by Herr
Strauss. I haven’t read it in every detail; I just had a short look at it. But
when you look at what it says, really, it means that it is—it corresponds
exactly to what the stage of planning is between Live Oak and the
NATO planning.12 And as all our forces are assigned to NATO, we are
automatically a part of the NATO plan in that context. But that is, of
course, the situation on paper. I have no doubt that the real situation, if
there were any major military confrontation or conflict, would be that
we are in it right from the very first moment, simply because we are
right up in front, so this is a matter of course.
President Kennedy: And the . . . this doesn’t really have so much to
do with what we’re talking about, but the other day in talking to the
French foreign minister about the disposition of French forces, of actu-
ally France maintaining its forces in France rather than in eastern
Western Germany and forward strategy, because this indicates a rather
sharp division between us all on this question of exactly what our mili-
tary strategy is, and where our forces ought to be, where the division
between those forces and the use of nuclear weapons ought to be.13
These are matters which seem to be somewhat unresolved, and West
Germany has an important role to play in helping resolve them. We’ve
been unable to persuade the French to move [unclear] their forces into
West Germany and up into the forward line. And if we don’t have the
French forces up there then really, we’ve got inadequate forces.
Schroeder: Wir haben an sich vorgesehen—ich weiß nicht ob es
schon geschehen ist—de Gaulle diesen Punkt noch mal sehr klar zu
machen, daß wir das in der Zeit den Zustand als ganz unbefriedigend
ansehen. Wenn ich richtig unterrichtet bin, sozusagen von französischer
Seite [unclear] sind, seien die Unterhaltungen, die sie damals gehabt
haben, von der französischen Seite der Standpunkt entwickelt worden,
ihre Schwierigkeiten legen im Augenblick darin, daß sie dabei sein, ihre
Truppen von Algerien nach Frankreich zurückzunehmen und sie mehr
12. Live Oak was the planning group for NATO, created by General Lauris Norstad to deal
with military contingencies surrounding Berlin. Its headquarters were outside of Paris. It was
headed by a British general assisted by U.S. and French officers, and a German observer.
13. The French foreign minister was Maurice Couve de Murville.
aus Gründen des Innerenaufbaus, und der Disziplin, und so weiter, lieber
auf französischen Boden zu haben. Angeblich ist dieses Argument
vorgebracht worden. Ich halte das Argument nicht für so sehr überzeu-
gend, denn die Franzosen würden, nach meiner Meinung, in der Lage
sein, unter Umständen mit amerikanischer Unterstützung, so weit es
nicht um die Ausstattung der Truppen und Divisionen handelt, diese
Division weiter vorne zu postieren.
Ein Bißchen liegt, nach meiner Überzeugung, in der französischen
Strategie, die Auffassung, das es eine Art von—daß es zwei Schlachten
daß es im Grunde zwei Schlachten gebe: eine Schlacht um Deutschland,
die verloren wird, und eine Schlacht um Frankreich, die gewonnen wird.
Die letzen französischen Manöver haben in der Tat einen Stand gehabt, in
dem—in der Zusammenfassung, am Schluß, oder in dem Ausgangslage,
glaube ich sogar, [unclear] Franzosen ist gesagt würde, “Die Schlacht in
Deutschland ist verloren gegangen, und nun stellt sich hier für uns die
soundso Situation.” Ich bin kein Stratege und kein Berufssoldat, aber ich
finde, daß diese Annahmen, die die Franzosen ihren Übung zugrunde
legen, nicht ganz im unseren Jahrhundert gehören. Aber vielleicht täusche
ich mich, und vielleicht sind die große militärischer Genies die Franzosen.
Ich möchte darüber keine [unclear].
Translator: Now we have the intention—I don’t know if this has
already been done—but we intend to make it very clear to de Gaulle that
we feel that the present situation is very unsatisfactory. If I am well
informed, in that discussion with you, you were referring to just now, the
French have said that that sort of difficulty now about these French
forces was that they were moving them back from Algeria to France and
for reasons of discipline and morale and so on it was better to have them
on French soil. Now, I don’t really think that this is an extremely con-
vincing argument, because in my opinion the French would be quite
able, with some American aid, to equip their forces in such a way that
they can be sent to the forward line.
In my conviction, the French strategy really is based on the rather
well-known French opinion that there are actually [going to be] two
battles, one [a] battle of Germany, which will be lost, and one [a] battle
of France, which will be won. In fact, the last French maneuvers had that
assumption—that the battle of Germany was lost—as their point of
departure, and from there they proceeded in their maneuvers. Now, I am
not a strategist nor a professional soldier, but I would think that these
assumptions, and working assumptions, do not fully belong to our cen-
tury [laughter]. I may be wrong; the French may be more ingenious in
the field of military strategy. I don’t want to voice any, or to attribute

any value to these things. I’m just voicing my opinion.
President Kennedy: I would think that when Mr. [French defense
minister Pierre] Messmer and Mr. Strauss are together that this would
be a matter in which, their accord being complete, that they would be
able to settle. [More laughter.]
Schroeder: Wenn ich dazu eine Meinung aüßeren darf, würde ich
glauben, daß es dann besser sei, sich nicht mit Monsieur Messmer zu
verständigen, sondern mit General de Gaulle zu verständigen [unclear].
[Laughter.]
Translator: If I may just voice an opinion on that, I think that in that
case it would be better to come to an accord not with Messmer but with
General de Gaulle.
President Kennedy: Well, the Chancellor [Adenauer] may be, and
General de Gaulle . . . [unclear] but we haven’t been able to convince him.
Let me say that I have to go, unfortunately, up to Connecticut but I’m
glad to get a chance to talk to you, Mr. Minister. We’ve been very appre-
ciative of your efforts to maintain and coordinate our joint policy in the
last months. I’m sure that you and Mr. Rusk can come to a host of under-
standings while you’re here.
I’ll certainly consider very carefully what you said about the matter
of the visas. I think we ought to reach a conclusion on the issue that we
talked about. If we decide to take the line that you suggested, that’s one
thing. If we decide together that we ought to go the other way, then we
ought to prepare for that. I think this is really a symbolic concession,
because I think if we increase our ground forces, and this is either/or, we
come to the conclusion that here is where we stand. Or, if we don’t, we
ought to prepare the way for making it unimportant.
After we see Mr. Gromyko, we may have a somewhat clearer idea
about Mr. Khrushchev’s visit. I don’t think this is very important. I don’t
think it’s very desirable. Do you see any evidence out of it, that it would
be useful if the Soviet position was to change substantially over Berlin?
Is there some evidence of that? If we were going to be able to reach an
accord on nuclear matters, [but] it [the test ban agreement] seems to
be quite far away. So I don’t think the visit’s going to be useful. I have a
sense it might actually make it rather dangerous, and as far as I’m con-
cerned, I’m not going to encourage it. Mr. Khrushchev asked [unclear]
we could talk about that at this time. If he still wants to come, then of
course we could see him.
But I think we ought to try to improve the [Berlin] planning. I think
the Ambassadorial Group is going to be the repository of our hopes, and

their planning should be more realistic.
In addition, I think governments ought to commit themselves some-
what more to their plans. Don’t you think? I hadn’t realized until just the
other day that it would take almost three days to mobilize this force for the
initial probe, by the time you get it on the autobahn. Well, in three days, to
put a company of engineers on the autobahn is much too long a time. You
ought to have that stationed right next to the autobahn. You need to do it
in two to three hours, because time is so vital in this matter. So that I do
think that the planning . . . Couve de Murville didn’t realize this, Secretary
Rusk didn’t realize it, and I didn’t realize it until I just happened to ask
two weeks ago, because we had had similar experience a year or so ago
when we put that battalion up the autobahn and it took 48 hours to reach
the autobahn, which I hadn’t been aware of. So that I think that we’re . . .
I don’t think our planning is as good as it ought to be, and I don’t
think the governments involved—the German, the French, the British
and the American—all of us have given as many commitments as I think
we ought to give. We don’t really know what the British are ready to do,
and the French are ready to do. They may say they don’t know what
we’re ready to do, but we’re ready to say what we would do under these
various contingencies in some detail. So I think that your visit is very
useful, and I hope before the end of the month we can get a greater
degree of finality in understanding, as I say, between the British and the
French and ourselves and you.
Schroeder: Zunächst möchte ich noch mal herzlich danken für diese
Unterhaltung und für das, was Sie gerade zuletzt [unclear] gesagt
haben, und ich hoffe, daß wenn wir das nächste Mal, bei Gesundheit, uns
wieder sehen, ich denke am 7. November, daß wir dann schon ein gutes
Stück weiter sind in der Überholung der Pläne, und daß wir dann die
Unterhaltung fortsetzten können.
Translator: Mr. President, let me just thank you very much indeed
for this conversation, this opportunity which you’ve offered me. And I do
hope that by the next time we meet, which will be, if everything goes
well [for Chancellor Adenauer’s visit], by the 7th of November, we will
already have achieved much progress in the planning, and we will then
be able to continue to talk about it.
The meeting then concluded. President Kennedy returned to his sched-

ule, attending the National Day of Prayer at St. Matthew’s Cathedral and
then going to a lunch at the Libyan embassy for the visiting Crown
Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 1964 499
Prince. He was back at the White House for only about 20 minutes before
taking off for his previously scheduled political trip to Connecticut. He
would return to Washington that night.
Thursday, October 18, 1962
President Kennedy had spent most of the previous day on a scheduled

campaign trip to Connecticut. After his return the previous evening, he
was still concealing the crisis from the press and public by keeping to his
regular schedule as much as he could. That schedule began on October
18 at 9:30 A.M. with an awards ceremony, followed by a Cabinet meeting
to discuss the budget, a meeting Kennedy chose to record.
10:00 –10:38 A.M.
We are, therefore, going to have to review . . . what is in the

administration’s program. . . . And we may very well end up
by cutting back on some of the things that the administration
has stood for. . . . [E]ven when we have done this . . . [t]he
problem that the President spoke of, in presenting an expendi-
ture increase, and a deficit, and a tax reduction proposal—all
at once—will remain.
Cabinet Meeting on the Federal Budget for Fiscal Year 19641

Compared to the unfolding missile crisis, the Cabinet meeting may seem
mundane. Kennedy is planning a tax cut to stimulate the economy. He
expects opposition from conservative committee chairmen in Congress.
So in this meeting he focuses on both current spending levels and trends
and on his budget planning for fiscal year 1964. Anxious to propose new
1. Including President Kennedy, David Bell, Anthony Celebrezze, J. Edward Day, C. Douglas
Dillon, Najeeb Halaby, Walter Heller, Luther Hodges, Theodore Sorensen, Aubrey Wagner,
James Webb, and Jerome Wiesner. Tape 30, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files,
500 T H U R S DAY, O C T O B E R 18, 1962
programs and stimulate the economy with greater federal spending, the
President nonetheless wants to present budgets that run only modest
deficits and appear to be tightly managed products of surpassing frugal-
ity, budgets that can favorably be compared to those produced by his
Republican predecessor.
This meeting offers a brief and unvarnished portrait of the budgetary
politics that would come to dominate the Kennedy and Johnson adminis-
trations. Embracing a “New Economics” that sought to boost the econ-
omy with some deficit spending and employ more presidential activism,
President Kennedy at the same time feels drawn toward the older verities
of political economy. Budgets and economic policies characterized by lais-
sez-faire, fiscal austerity, and the smallest possible federal workforce
remained popular with the public and the U.S. Congress alike. President
Kennedy seems to know this, and perhaps even shares the sentiment.
David Bell: When you consider the portions of the budget that are
essentially unmalleable . . . interest on the debt, payments to veterans
under the compensation laws [and] other unchangeable commitments,
then you will see that we have some substantial review work to do dur-
ing this fall budget season.
You want me to continue, sir, while the photographers are here?2
President Kennedy: Yeah, sure . . . yeah, you can go ahead. [Unclear.]
Bell: Now there are two principal points to bear in mind. First of all,
the President recognizes that the planning figures that we all reached
last summer represent a sensible program for carrying forward the com-
mitments the administration has made—
President Kennedy: You might as well wait, Dave.
There is some mostly inaudible, quiet conversation, as some machine
noise disturbs the discussion. To the listener it sounds like a workman’s
drill is being used on some construction in the West Wing of the White
House. The following exchange can be heard.
President Kennedy: This [unclear], I have learned, was designed by
Mr. Jones for the . . . possibly the death of [unclear].
Unidentified: I thought the Vice President might want to give you
this but since he’s not here, here is the Sam Rayburn stamp.3
[Unclear exchange.]
2. Photographers are taking pictures at the beginning of the meeting; they leave as it begins.
3. Sam Rayburn of Texas, then the Speaker of the House, died of cancer in November 1961.
Unidentified: On the stamp?

Unidentified: [Unclear, but clearly a good punch line, followed by loud
laughter.]
Unidentified: All of this was done by the Bureau of Engraving and
Printing, right here.
Mixed voices. An unclear exchange, perhaps about a donation or appro-
priation to a college, can be made out.
Unidentified: It seems to me [unclear] make the request. I think we
might [unclear]. Jim Farley talked to with me about it, [unclear].4 You
see he has [unclear].
Oh all kinds. You see, it’s one of the world’s great intellectuals. . . . I
thought, then, maybe the college up there [unclear]. They’re all quali-
fied [unclear] come down here or something. He has it up there as a
kind of a foundation and he has a full-time staff of people to take care of
that sort of thing. [Unclear exchange.] [Unclear] ease into giving him
some pictures [unclear].
Unidentified: [Unclear] talk to the college about it.
[Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: Well, I believe it’s already turned over to this collection
of [unclear] women’s Catholic college, and [unclear]. [Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] discussion of numbers.
Unidentified: Yeah, that’s all they get.
Unidentified: Well I intend to pay for it out of my own pocket and
get rid of any questions.
President Kennedy: Why don’t you let me know how much it costs?
The group settles down as David Bell restarts the meeting.
Bell: Mr. President, I would mention the point that the President
recognizes that to reduce the expenditure total, as he has asked us all to
do, will necessarily require some cutbacks in program commitments that
have been made, or that have been stood for by this administration, in
terms of legislation that has been sent on to Congress or plans that we
all have had in mind with his approval. We are, therefore, going to have
to review, during the fall, not with the idea of limiting what we add to
the administration’s program, but reconsidering what is in the adminis-
tration’s program, and to some extent . . . And bringing to the President
4. Jim Farley was Franklin Roosevelt’s postmaster general from 1933 to 1940 and chairman of
the Democratic National Committee from 1932 to 1940.
a series of issues. And we may very well end up by cutting back on some
of the things that the administration has stood for.
Secondly, even when we have done this there will still be a substan-
tial increase, necessarily, in the ’64 budget on the expenditure side. The
problem that the President spoke of, in presenting an expenditure
increase, and a deficit, and a tax reduction proposal—all at once—will
remain. And we’re not going to be able to get him off that hook. But,
obviously, under those circumstances, the budget should be rock solid.
I have a suggestion about procedure. It seems to me it would be unwise,
at this point, to stop and ask all of you to reconsider the budgets you are
submitting. Many of the budgets have already reached the bureau. Others
are in the final stages. I suggest they come right on in. We will consider
them and will be suggesting areas for considering possible reductions. And
I suggest that you all—from this meeting on—direct your staffs to do the
same thing. And we will then be, simultaneously the bureau and your own
organizations—working on the question of what reductions can be made
below the final figures we had previously agreed on.
With respect to policy, we have a few suggestions. It is clear that in
nearly . . . well, I should probably say in every agency, it will be neces-
sary to go below the planning figures. This is going to mean different
things in different agencies. I suspect that, on the civilian side, the two
agencies where we are going to have the most difficulty is Agriculture
and Health, Education and Welfare. Those are the largest civilian budg-
ets. They both have very volatile elements within them. They both have
large legislative programs, to this point. Therefore, we will need to be
spending a good deal of time.
And for the benefit of those two secretaries, may I illustrate the prob-
lem by saying, in preparing the planning figures, we had already agreed
that the difference in view between us and the departments—in the case of
Agriculture, of some 400 million dollars; in the case of HEW of some 200
million dollars. It now appears to me, that to meet the President’s target it
is likely to be necessary to cut below our figures, in the case of Agriculture
by another 1[00] or 200 million dollars, and in the case of Health,
Education and Welfare by as much as 2[00] to 400 million dollars.
Anthony Celebrezze: More?
Bell: Yes, sir.
Celebrezze: You mean 600 million all together?
Bell: Yes, sir. This simply illustrates the extent of the range of dis-
cussion that we’re going to be engaged in during this next few weeks.
We do not think that it would be wise or appropriate to set arbitrary
figures or arbitrary rules. We do not, for example, want to propose a “no

new starts” policy.5 We think that some new starts are as urgent as any-
thing that will be in the budget. Clearly, we will be proposing fewer new
starts than we had in mind last summer. But we don’t think a flat, arbi-
trary rule of no new starts would be a wise thing to do.
Instead we want to apply—and you to apply—a priority sense across
the whole range of what is now being done and what is proposed to be
added. We will ask you to consider what is going to be done in 1963 that
may have effect on ’64. For illustration, the Food Stamp Program is one
which is expanding during this year.6 The rate of expansion during this
year will clearly have a significant impact on what is going to be the
budget situation for next year. Therefore, in a case like that, we will be
asking you to consider ’63 plans as well as ’64 plans.
We would ask you to be careful, especially during these next few
campaign weeks, on specific commitments to figures or to projects or to
programs. The glowing words should be used without figures attached,
insofar as possible. We’ll have to ask that legislative proposals be
reviewed. For illustration, the education proposals will obviously have to
be reviewed. The urban mass transit proposal will have to be reviewed.
The recreational land purchase program will have to be reviewed.
Finally, we would suggest that we all try to hit especially hard at
increases in the number of employees. The State Department was, I
think, the main agency which in the 1963 budget did not ask for
increased employees. Now this made a very favorable impression on
Capitol Hill and in the country at large and I think that the impression,
the image, the public understanding of what this next budget will . . .
represents will be substantially influenced by the degree to which it can
be clearly, on its face, an extremely tight and restricted budget in so far
as personnel increases are concerned. They may not involve, really, very
much money, but the numbers of persons by themselves, the numbers of
employees, are looked at, will be looked at. And in consequence, I think,
they are worth very special attention.
5. This refers to a hypothetical policy under which no new initiatives or programs would be
entertained in planning the following year’s budget.
6. Adopted in 1939 and discontinued in 1943, the federal Food Stamp Program was adopted
anew in 1961 as a pilot program in selected counties and municipalities. Changed fundamen-
tally at this point from a program designed to distribute farm surpluses to one that focused
more on improved nutrition, it grew markedly as it expanded to cover more people and a
greater variety of foodstuffs.
President Kennedy: What has our personnel gone up since January

’61, Dave? Do you know?
Bell: Yes, about—
Luther Hodges: 160,000, but—7
President Kennedy: How much?
Hodges: 160,000, but only 117,000 of that, Mr. President, could be
called regular employment. The rest of them are seasonal. But, [at] the
latest date 160,000 since January 31.
President Kennedy: Well, now how does that compare to the period
of President Eisenhower’s?
Bell: His first 18 months? I don’t know.
President Kennedy: We don’t know even his first 18 months? I heard
that was quite a substantial increase.
Bell: Yes, sir, but during the first year or so of President Eisenhower’s
term, the employment in the Executive Branch was declining because of
the closing out of the Korean War, and the—
President Kennedy: Well, let’s just take the last two or three years.
What was the ratio of his increases compared to the—
Bell: This would be substantially larger than what was happening in
the closing years of the Eisenhower administration.
President Kennedy: It seems to me—
Theodore Sorensen: It’s a lot more stable at that point, Mr. President,
the last two years [of the Eisenhower administration].
President Kennedy: I think 160’s quite a lot, even if you adjusted, say
for—
Bell: Even take out the 70,000 that’s seasonal, it is a lot, that’s right.
President Kennedy: I think we ought to . . . I don’t see, really, that we
ought to approve every one of these from now on. Because I think that’s
the . . . one of the most obvious evidences of things not being completely
in control.
Unidentified: It’s fewer in total than it was ten years ago, though.
President Kennedy: The total of the whole federal government?
Unidentified: Yes.
Bell: The total, yes, that’s correct. The total civilian employment is
below what it was ten years ago . . . that was the time of the Korean War
bulge, and there were a lot of—
7. The total number of federal employees in 1962, including postal workers, was approxi-
mately 1.6 million.
President Kennedy: How much is the Post Office?

J. Edward Day: That’s 584,000.
President Kennedy: What was that? How much of an increase have
we had?
Day: It goes up about 15,000 a year.
Hodges: It’s 28,000 over January ’61.
Bell: That increase, Mr. President, the increase in Post Office is
roughly comparable to the increases in the preceding years. The big
jumps we’ve had have been in Defense, in Space, in Agriculture, and
Interior, and scattered also to some extent in HEW reflecting the Old
Age Survivors Insurance expansion.
Unidentified: I think the figure we ought to emphasize is the relation
to population, of 19 out of 1,000 in ’45. Now it’s 13 out of 1,000 new fed-
eral employees.
Bell: Now these are points of defense, and they are good ones.
Nevertheless, I think the President is correct. The impression in Congress
and in the country, is that these are large increases in personnel. No mat-
ter how solidly they are justified, they look big. It would be hard to go
along with that kind of increase and a budget presentation such as is nec-
essary to be made.
Sorensen: On the other hand, you can show a great savings in person-
nel and not a savings in money by contracting out to a lot of workers.
Jerome Wiesner: This is particularly true of space where we were
likely to do a great deal in-house that we might have contracted out.
Now that we’ve started on that course we can’t really change it.
Bell: Especially since it is the preferable course.
Wiesner: Yeah.
Bell: That’s all I had, Mr. President, but there may be some questions.
President Kennedy: Well, what’s the next subject on the agenda?
Sorensen: Let’s just say a word about welfare programs.
Bell: Excuse me, Ted, before you do that . . . Are there any questions?
James Webb: I’d just like to make one point, though, so that we don’t
leave the wrong impression. We spend 92 cents out of every dollar
appropriated to us now, outside government. And have only enough in-
house capability to manage this large enterprise. And our in-house per-
sonnel, Jerry, is not going up by anything like the magnitude of the
outside. I just want to be sure that you know that we have elected to do
in-house certain things that are quite important to us as a means of con-
trolling the whole program, we still have got this 90 :10 ratio.
Unidentified: 8 Well, we have determined that [unclear] basis for Indian

projects. For example, there’s a program with the objective of [unclear]
that number. There aren’t very many, but that’s a policy decision.
Douglas Dillon: I would think one thing that might be of interest to
all of you is . . . just happened. Just pure coincidence to come out at the
same time—the U.S. News and World Report, in their current issue, dated
October 22nd, has the lead article right across here on the front page:
“Can the U.S. Support a Tax Cut in ’63?”9 And it’s really a type of politi-
cal problem that’s illustrated here that the President and his director of
the budget were referring to. We don’t guarantee that previous goal, but
this is the general problem we’re up against. And I thought you might be
interested in reading that.
Day: I need to be sure everybody knows about another aspect. The
Pay Bill that has passed also provides that there might well be another
pay increase next spring that would be indicated at least by—BLS
[Bureau of Labor Statistics] statistics aside—from the two steps that
are spelled out in the law.10
Bell: That’s right.
Day: I think that’s another thing a lot of people are going to wake up
to, sort of at the last minute, and raise their hands in horror, once they
find that out.
Bell: The postmaster general’s referring to the fact that the new Pay
Bill, which requires the President to submit annually recommendations for
changes that would be necessary to keep federal pay levels comparable to
those in private industry. There’s an annual survey conducted by the BLS
as to what the levels are in private industry. And the President then, each
8. The presidential daily diary lists both Stewart Udall, secretary of the interior, and John A.
Carver, Jr., assistant secretary of the interior, as being in attendance at this meeting. It is likely
that one or the other is making this statement.
9. See “People of the Week: Byrd vs. Dillon, Differing Views on a Tax Cut,” U.S. News and
World Report, 22 October 1962, p. 21. The opening line of this brief article reads, “Should the
U.S. Government cut taxes without a cut in federal spending?” Harry F. Byrd, Sr., chairman of
the Senate Finance Committee, answered by saying that to do so would be evidence of “unmit-
igated fiscal irresponsibility.” Dillon argued instead that the nation’s growing infrastructure,
training, and research requirements made the tax cut, without offsetting spending cuts, an
absolute necessity.
10. Day was referring to H.R. 7927, signed by President Kennedy on 11 October 1962. This
legislation mandated salary increases (of approximately 11 percent) for approximately 590,000
postal employees and (of approximately 10 percent) for approximately 1 million nonpostal fed-
eral employees. It also provided for a 5 percent increase in retirement benefits for all federal
employees and included a postal rate increase, increasing first class postage from 4 cents to 5
cents. Its estimated costs were $504 million in FY 1963 and $1.049 billion in FY 1964.
spring, will be submitting to the Congress recommendations to keep fed-

eral pay levels in line with comparable levels of work in private activity.
At the same time that the President signed this bill, as you all know,
he sent each of you a memorandum on manpower control and utilization.
Our basic notion is that we should be able to offset, to a very large
extent, the annual increases in pay levels by annual increases in produc-
tivity. As you know, as we, starting this fall, as we review the budget, we
are going to try to be finding . . . trying to focus on the question of
whether we cannot plan into each agency’s program increases in produc-
tivity, so that we can program fewer employees where workloads stay
level. And where workloads rise, the rise in employees would be less
than the rise in workload. There’s a long way to go before we can do this
efficiently in each agency, but this is the effort on which we are now
embarked, and we’ll be discussing this with each of you during the fall.
Najeeb Halaby: Dave, does this effect in any way the acceleration of
the public works impact programs that we’ve all been busily working on
for immediate implementation?
Bell: Well, you’ll recall, Najeeb, that the only public works, the only
thing that is being accelerated, are those public works which are in the
’63 budget—
Halaby: Yeah.
Bell: —and are supported by appropriations that the Congress has
made. If there are any of those which seem to you to have substantial
1964 effects—and to be of relatively low priority—yes, indeed, they
should be reexamined. If they are simply part of the ’63 program, that
should go ahead in any event, then the instruction stands from the
President to get it done as quickly in the year as is possible then in order
to assist the general economic situation.
Aubrey Wagner: If we have a choice, throwing an expenditure to fis-
cal ’63 or fiscal ’64, which way should we throw it, speaking generally?
Bell: To ’63. [Short pause.]
Sorensen: I simply wanted to say that at the same time that we’re
preparing next year’s budget, we must prepare next year’s legislative pro-
gram. For a variety of reasons, we will not make any decisions in that pro-
gram until after the election, but some of them will be . . . aren’t going to
be able to be fully developed in that short period of time between the elec-
tion and the first of the year when the President begins to present his mes-
sage to the Congress. So, I would hope that if all of you already have been
officially and formally contacted by the Budget Bureau as to whether you
have any new legislative proposals, if you have any new proposals, if you
would make sure that they are being staffed out in your department, that
they are being sent over to the Budget Bureau or to my office so that we
will have them in plenty of time to think them through and to consider
them for inclusion in the President’s program.
Secondly, there is a great deal of the President’s program which went
to the 87th Congress which they simply didn’t have time to consider.
There are a few which they had time to consider, and which they didn’t
pass. I think that you ought to examine each of those proposals to see
whether you want to make some change in the President resubmitting
them next year, or whether they should be resubmitted at all. In any
case, if the Congress altered them in committee or sent them for testi-
mony or further experience, some change would be required. [Dillon
whispering in background.] I hope you’ll be making those changes and be
ready to discuss them with my office and the Budget Bureau. I just
wanted to make sure everyone was on notice that they would be having
that work completed in a month or so.
President Kennedy: Anybody got anything else? Otherwise, Ted do
you—
Unidentified: The Secretary of State will not be here, so there won’t
be—
President Kennedy: Right. I think we probably all got hung up in the . . .
I think it’s tough on this budget. But I will say, just before we leave,
that Ambassador Galbraith says that we’ll never get a tax cut through
anyway, and what the economy needs is expenditures.11 And that, there-
fore, you shouldn’t cut your programs, because that’s the only way you’re
ever going to get the kind of spending which this economy needs to
maintain a reasonable rate of growth.
But I figured you’d be doing that anyway. [Boisterous laughter.]
Webb: Mr. President, it looks like we’re going to get the range of
orbit 12–37.12 If we can, it’ll—
Unidentified: I think we [unclear]. Good job.
At this point the formal meeting comes to a close as some participants
11. John Kenneth Galbraith, Harvard professor of economics, had been appointed ambassador
to India by President Kennedy in 1961. Though he understood the primary political virtues of
the tax cut proposal—the speed with which it could be implemented and its potential to
attract support from the business community and from conservative politicians—Galbraith
consistently pressed for increased public expenditures as a more appropriate alternative.
12. With Wally Schirra’s recent Mercury orbit (3 October 1962), and two “secret” satellite
launchings from Vandenberg Air Force Base also taking place in the month of October 1962 (9
October and 26 October), “range of orbit” speculations were, perhaps, a frequent part of Kennedy
White House conversation, and in this case, it appears, an integral part of an inside joke.
begin filing out of the room. Some remain and engage in less formal
conversation for about another 20 minutes. With the exception of the
following excerpts, most of these conversations are not distinct and are,
therefore, difficult to comprehend. Douglas Dillon, Dave Bell, and
chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Walter Heller, who
apparently came in late, are among the last to leave and can be heard
more clearly over the last few minutes of the recording. Few of the frag-
ments are meaningful until the following exchange.
Walter Heller: I take it your fellows are getting together something
on the growth side for next Monday, because that meeting a week from
Thursday, the 26th . . .
Dillon: I’ve got that trip to Mexico [for an Inter-American Confer-
ence] and everything else, the EPC meeting. [Unclear.]
Another unclear set of exchanges in overlapping conversations. There
are several audible fragments, clearly referring to estimates of economic
growth.
Heller: Well, you know, what strikes me that we need to do, really . . .
We’re trying to get the administration to put out a statement on growth,
and you know, in that statement, it could say that [unclear]. [Background
conversation ensues.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] could be growth in your office.
Unidentified: No, no . . . I’m not talking about my personal office.
Heller: [continuing] Now then, if there is some easing, maybe the first
step in growth policy should be to maintain the expansion, to sharpen
expansion, to keep up, to try to get to the limits of potential. Something
like that might be, you know, if we could get that in there, clearly, in the
policy section, we have the statement you want.
[aside, to Dave Bell] Dave, before you get away, I wonder . . . we’re
going to have a problem in connection with the midyear review, aren’t
we, of how clean we come? Well, there are two problems.
Bell: Yes, we sure are.
Heller: There are two problems. One is: What are our internal fig-
ures going to be for GNP and so forth? And the second is: What is our
stance? Last year, after all, we came awfully damn clean and said what
our . . . I think we went on and said what our GNP estimates were for
the first and second quarters of the ensuing year, because, in connection
with the I & P. 13
13. Reference to income and product accounts and related National Income and Product
Accounts budget. The latter refers to the method of budgetary accounting (unlike the standard
Bell: Well, all we’ve said so far is that there will be a release on this
after the election. Now, your question is what’s going to be in that release?
Heller: Yeah. That’s right.
Bell: And—
Unidentified: We have [unclear] every day that we would need to put
out the projections of GNP.
Dillon: If you want to put any out, the most I’d go is a projection—
Heller: For the fourth quarter for the year.
Bell: Well, presumably . . . we could presumably say our revenue esti-
mates for the year will be such and such. How much you break down the
revenue estimates remains a detail to be discussed—the extent to which
you back it up with a GNP estimate. I had assumed we would have to put
out the equivalent of a GNP estimate for calendar year ’62.
Dillon: That’s right.
Heller: Now, however, last year we, after all, went more heavily on to
the I & P Accounts budget. That implied an estimate. . . . I don’t know
whether we . . . I think we specified . . . I may be wrong. Either in your
press conference on it—
Bell: Yeah . . . now, remember, we’re not going to publish a pamphlet
this year. We’re not going to do the whole thing in a press release.
Dillon: This could be a very brief [statement].
Bell: We’ll get together as much—
Heller: At the midyear there’s going to be no [unclear] budget review
at all?
Bell: Nevertheless, I had assumed we would have some reference to
the income and product figures.
Heller: Yes. Well, now, if you do—
Bell: Without going into any detail.
Heller: All right. But suppose they say, “Well now, your income and
product figures for the year are so and so.”
Bell: Yeah.
Heller: “Clearly, Mr. Bell, you must have some GNP figures underly-
ing that for the first and second quarters of next year.” What? You’ve
got to be prepared for that.
Bell: Yeah.
federal procedure known as the administrative budget) which includes trust fund receipts and
expenditures (Social Security, highway grants-in-aid, unemployment compensation, and so on),
omits government transactions in financial assets (federal loans, for example), and records lia-
bilities when they are incurred (accrual basis) and not only when cash changes hands.
Heller: And . . . but that’s the externals. And internally, we have a big
unresolved difference for the first and second quarters of next year.
Bell: Well, internally, [unclear].
Dillon: Our basic thing on that was—
Heller: We’ll have to resolve it towards the high side in order to
make this [deficit?] thing seem—
Dillon: [apparently in a separate conversation] Also, our basic thing on
that was that we wouldn’t have said what the balance is if we didn’t want
to face this now. We could face it a lot better when we have to which is
early December.
Bell: Early November, this is after the election.
Dillon: No, no . . . I mean for the next year . . . January 1st.
Bell: Oh yes, but the next . . . we will need some choice of figures.
Heller: Yes.
Dillon: Oh yes, [unclear] choice of figures for this thing. But the pub-
lic, the basic thing, will feel much “solider” about it. And I don’t think in
our next choice of figures we necessarily have to resolve our thing about
the first . . .
Unidentified: Well what have we got to do?
Bell: We’ll have to . . . I don’t know that we need to resolve the pres-
ent figures, but we have to come down—
Unidentified: A single revenue figure.
Dillon: That can be just by ad hoc sort of thing. [A few people
chuckle.]
Bell: Yeah, that’s right. We don’t need to resolve the substantive
issue—
Dillon: Yeah.
Unidentified: The first and second quarter issue, well sure we’ll get
some tough questions. Well then we’ll just have to, just have to . . .
Bell: Dance.
Unidentified: Well, I think this could be [unclear]. I’d rather do the
dance than get my [unclear, laughs].
Unidentified: Oh, there, sure, sure.
At this point, voices begin to fade as the remaining meeting participants
leave the room. Minutes later, Evelyn Lincoln speaks to an unidentified
male just before recorder is turned off.
Lincoln: Are we coming here? Is the eleven [o’clock] meeting . . . is
it in here?
Unidentified: Oh yes it is. I think it’s a fine time to go back and . . .
11:10 A.M.–1:15 P.M.
Somehow we’ve got to take some action. . . . Now, the question

really is to what action we take which lessens the chances of a
nuclear exchange, which obviously is the final failure.

Sometime during the previous day, possibly before he left the White
House for his scheduled political trip to Connecticut, Kennedy received a
memo from Adlai Stevenson urging that Kennedy send personal emis-
saries to Khrushchev and Castro instead of taking any military action.
Stevenson warned that any U.S. military action could lead to reprisals in
Turkey or Berlin and could then escalate. “To start or risk starting a
nuclear war is bound to be divisive at best,” he wrote, “and the judgments
of history seldom coincide with the tempers of the moment.” While he
said that he understood Kennedy’s dilemma, he wrote with underscoring:
“the means adopted have such incalculable consequences that I feel you
should have made it clear that the existence of nuclear missile bases any-
where is negotiable before we start anything.”15 Stevenson then returned
to his duties at the United Nations in New York.
That same morning of October 17 the Joint Chiefs of Staff reconvened
to plan just the military action that Stevenson so abhorred. The Joint Staff
had worked through the night to come up with plans for air strikes against
five different sets of targets. Identified by Roman numerals I to V, these
alternative plans were frequently discussed in the following days. They are
given here, with associated numbers of sorties; the estimated sortie num-
bers continued to climb as planning continued.16 The initial numbers were:
14. Including President Kennedy, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, Douglas Dillon, Roswell
Gilpatric, U. Alexis Johnson, Robert Kennedy, Arthur Lundahl, Edwin Martin, John McCone,
Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Theodore Sorensen, Maxwell Taylor, and Llewellyn
Thompson. Tapes 30 and 30A, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential
15. Stevenson letter to President Kennedy, 17 October 1962; reprinted in The Cuban Missile
Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader, eds. Laurence Chang and Peter
Kornbluh (New York: New Press, 1992), pp. 119–20.
16. The sortie numbers were derived by examining a target and determining how many indi-
vidual aim points should be hit in order to destroy it. Then planners used training experi-
ence to judge how many bombs would need to be dropped on an aim point to be fairly sure
that one would hit it. From that, after incorporating attrition from enemy action or mechani-
I. Missile and nuclear storage sites only 52

II. Same as above plus IL-28s, MiG-21s 104
III. Same as above plus other aircraft,
SAMs, cruise msls, and msl boats 194
IV. All military targets but tanks 474
V. All military targets; prelude to invasion 2,002
The Chiefs still opposed any strike limited only to the missile sites.
They continued also to view any blockade as merely a complement to,
not an alternative for, an air strike. They assumed, in addition, that a
blockade would require a formal declaration of war.
About 15 senior officials had met again for several hours the after-
noon of October 17.17 Almost all leaned toward taking some political
action before launching an air strike. They reviewed a large number of pos-
sible courses of action and speculated about imaginable Soviet responses.
McNamara and Taylor worried that any diplomatic efforts would alert
the Soviets and thwart an effective strike. McNamara and Gilpatric belit-
tled the significance of the Soviet MRBM deployments for the overall
strategic balance. McCone and Taylor argued that the MRBMs did,
indeed, change the balance. But this difference of opinion did not prevent
general agreement that the United States could not allow the Soviet
deployment to stand.
It was in this context that Kennedy’s advisers, for the first time, dis-
cussed in detail the pros and cons of a blockade. Bohlen and Thompson
continued to insist that Khrushchev’s aim was to achieve something with
regard to Berlin and that the U.S. government ought not to be diverted
from that by concentrating its attention exclusively on Cuba.
Kennedy had invited former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to join
his circle of advisers. Formidably self-assured and gifted not only with
cutting wit as well as great ability in advocacy, Acheson participated in
cal problems, planners could come up with sortie numbers. These numbers first grew
because new targets were identified. They later grew because the staff began incorporating
additional requirements for escort, air defense suppression, and poststrike reconnaissance. A
few days later, exasperated by the latest revision, Taylor exclaimed to his JCS colleagues:
“What! These figures were reported to the White House. You are defeating yourselves with
your own cleverness, gentlemen.” Notes taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, p. 6.
17. These meetings were attended (though not everyone was there all of the time) by Robert
Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy, McCone, Ball, Gilpatric, Alexis Johnson, Charles
Bohlen, Thompson, Theodore Sorensen, Martin, possibly Paul Nitze, and (late in the day for a
shorter time) Dean Acheson.
these Wednesday meetings, calling for a prompt air strike with no

attempt at prior negotiation. Before adjourning for dinner, the conferees
had also reviewed the possibility of a blockade coupled with a declaration
of war against Cuba.
During the dinner break Robert Kennedy and Sorensen drove to the
airport to meet the President, returning from Connecticut. Sorensen
gave him a written summary of the day’s discussions, emphasizing how
fluid matters remained. (It included a list of around twenty questions as
yet unresolved.) President Kennedy decided to stay out of the discus-
sions until the next day. Robert Kennedy and Sorensen then returned to
the State Department. The meeting resumed at 10:00 P.M. and went until
nearly midnight.
During this late-hour meeting, Rusk had endorsed and elaborated on
the alternative of a strike against the missile sites with no prior negotia-
tion. Taylor and McCone supported him, with McCone’s mentioning
Eisenhower’s views. Bohlen still urged that an ultimatum be given before
an attack. Thompson, Martin, and Gilpatric preferred a complete block-
ade with the declaration of war.
At the end of this meeting, Robert Kennedy summarized the major
options that had been aired. They apparently were:
An ultimatum to Khrushchev followed by a strike

A limited strike without prior warning or negotiation, but with
notifying key allies
A political warning followed by a naval blockade and readiness
for other actions
A large-scale strike after some political preparation
Proceeding directly to an invasion.
Sorensen’s earlier note for Kennedy had a similar list. Various forms
of political action and messages to Khrushchev were considered, as well
as various kinds of strikes. Many questions were identified for further
analysis, especially about likely Soviet responses.
During the night of October 17–18, a few officials wrote brief papers
for the President summarizing their personal beliefs. Douglas Dillon
submitted a memo stating opposition to negotiations of any kind with
Khrushchev. He recommended a blockade coupled with intensive surveil-
lance of Cuba and a demand that Cuba begin removal of the weapons
forthwith. If the Cubans refused or the military pronounced the blockade
infeasible, Dillon favored an immediate air strike. He said that the Soviet
Union had “initiated a test of our intentions that can determine the
future course of world events for many years to come.” He continued, “I

. . . believe that the survival of our nation demands the prompt elimina-
tion of the offensive weapons now in Cuba.”18
George Ball wrote a passionate memo arguing that the MRBMs
made little strategic difference. Noting that “we tried Japanese as war
criminals because of the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor,” Ball argued that
a surprise strike, “far from establishing our moral strength . . . would, in
fact, alienate a great part of the civilized world by behaving in a manner
wholly contrary to our traditions, by pursuing a course of action that
would cut directly athwart everything we have stood for during our
national history, and condemn us as hypocrites in the opinion of the
world.” Ball recommended a blockade that might ultimately cripple and
bring down the Castro government.19
Bohlen, preparing to depart for Paris, also wrote a memo for Rusk,
concisely explaining his preference for giving the Soviets an ultimatum
before launching a strike. Though he had taken a different view, Rusk
was impressed and apparently persuaded by Bohlen’s memo and decided
to share it with his colleagues and President Kennedy when they next
gathered at the White House.20
On the morning of October 18, Sorensen noted for Kennedy that “two
big questions must be answered, and in conjunction with each other.” One
was which kind of military action to choose, and the other was whether
political action, such as a letter to Khrushchev, should precede any mili-
tary move. The Rusk approach, he said, was for a strike without warning.
The Bohlen approach was to approach Khrushchev first.21
18. C. Douglas Dillon, “Memorandum for the President,” 17 October 1962; reprinted in The
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, Chang and Kornbluh, pp. 116–18.
19. “Position of George W. Ball,” 17 October 1962, ibid., pp. 121–22.
20. In their conversation at dinner on Tuesday night, October 16, Kennedy had asked Bohlen
to postpone his highly publicized departure for Paris and help with the crisis. Bohlen worried
about the notice his change of plans would cause but said he would try to come up with a
cover story. The next day Bohlen discussed the matter with Rusk, who thought that Bohlen
should proceed with his plans and that Thompson could provide the needed advice on the
Soviet Union. Rusk called President Kennedy, and Kennedy called Bohlen and told him to go
ahead with his departure.
On the morning of 18 October, Kennedy changed his mind, possibly after reading Sorensen’s
note highlighting Bohlen’s advocacy. Just before the 11:00 meeting transcribed here, Bohlen was
summoned (from the airport) to come to the White House. On the phone, Bohlen convinced the
President to let him go ahead with his travel, since he was now expected at a public event that day
in New York. Robert Kennedy later voiced bewilderment and anger about Bohlen’s decision.
21. Sorensen to Kennedy, 18 October 1962, “Cuba—General: 10/15/62–10/23/62” folder,
National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Library. Dillon’s approach—an ultimatum and block-
Meanwhile, intelligence analysts had pored over photos from the ear-
lier U-2 flights. They found something new—evidence of fixed IRBM
sites in addition to the MRBM sites that had already been identified.
With twice the range of MRBMs (2,200 miles instead of 1,100) and war-
heads of roughly twice as much yield (up to 5 megatons), these missiles
could menace all parts of the continental United States except the Pacific
Northwest.
As officials received this new information on the morning of October
18, their attitudes hardened. McNamara called McCone to say that he now
thought prompt and decisive action necessary. Taylor told the Joint Chiefs
that the news tipped him toward supporting the maximum option—full
invasion of Cuba. This then became the unanimous position of the JCS.
These early-morning discussions of the new intelligence set the mood as
officials filed into the Cabinet Room.
John McCone: . . . photography of one mission on Sunday, October

14, and two on Monday, October 15. These are quite completely read
out. There were six missions run yesterday. We expect the initial read-
out to start late tonight and probably take 36 to 48 hours to complete
the readout from the six missions.
Dean Rusk: Those missions involve any incident?
McCone: Not to my knowledge, no.
President Kennedy: They don’t know what coverage they got, do
they?
Arthur Lundahl: The weather picture has not yet emerged, sir. We’re
flying in clouds and we don’t have the film yet in the National PI
[Photographic Interpretation] Center [also known as NPIC]. It starts
to come in this afternoon, shortly after lunch.
McCone: We think we got the entire island. What we didn’t get
because of clouds, we won’t know until after we develop them.
I think you should know that these six missions involve 28,000 linear
feet of film. And when this is enlarged, it means the Center [NPIC] has
to examine a strip of film 100 miles long, 20 feet wide. Quite a job.
Go ahead, Art.
Lundahl: Yes, sir. Mr. President, gentlemen, the first and most impor-
tant item I would seek to call to your attention is a new area hitherto never
ade, then a strike—was thus close to Bohlen’s. Ball’s suggestion—a blockade followed by
political pressure—was different.
seen by us, some 21 miles to the southwest of Havana, which we have at the
moment labeled a probable MRBM/IRBM launch complex. The name of
the town nearest is this [Guanajay]. It is there.
The two sites, sir, numbers one and two—are 21/2 miles apart. And
enlarging this one, we look at it, and we see for the first time a pattern of
medium/IRBM sites that looks like the things we have been seeing in
the Soviet Union. There are two [launch] pads, here—and here. They
are separated by 750 feet. There’s a control bunker with cable scars
[marks on the ground showing cable emplacements] going up into
small buildings inboard of each of the pads. There’s no equipment on the
pads yet. They’re under construction. The security fence has been super-
imposed around the place and on 29 August, the last time we went over
this area, the ground had just scarcely started to be scratched.
At the same time, 21/2 miles south of there is site number two. On 29
August, there were no scratchings on the ground at all and since that
time, these scratchings have taken a form slightly different. There’s this
pattern 2-1-2-1-2, [which] is called the offset inline. They’re slightly
more inline in here. There looks like there’s going to be a fourth one
[pad] up in here, but the spacing is the same.
The orientation of the axis of the pads, 315 [degrees], which will
bring you into the central massif of the United States. We call it
M/IRBM, sir. We have never identified, irrevocably, the signature of the
Soviet intermediate range ballistic missile which is estimatedly a 2,000-
mile missile. But the elongation of the pads and the location of the con-
trol bunkers, between each pair of pads, has been the thing that has
suggested to our hearts, if not our minds, the kind of thing that might
accompany an IRBM.
So we have at the moment labeled it as such and let the guided mis-
siles intelligence analysts come up, finally, with a true analysis of what
the range of these missiles might be that are eventually accommodated
on this set of pads.
If I may switch to the next one, sir.
President Kennedy: Let’s take a look?
Lundahl: Yes, sir. For comparison purposes, Mr. President, I showed
the other day, when I was here [Tuesday, October 16], the sites that we
had described to you the other day, the three that we showed you were
these down near San Cristobal. The one with erectors and missiles. The
one here, just with the missiles and no erectors. And this one here at an
early stage of construction, with tenting and encamping materials, but
neither missiles nor erectors. The date of that photography was 14
October, and the impression of this third site is contained in this illusion
here, wherein I think you can see the equipment, the buildings and the
housing, and so forth.
On the next day, and admittedly in better photographic cover, we see
this same area that is shown in here with, now, missile erectors, probably
off in here, vehicles, more vehicles, buildings, missile transporters, and a
variety of equipment and additional things under construction. The
impression one would gather is that there is some sense of speed with
which they are proceeding in the construction of this particular base.
May I pass that one over to you, sir? Thank you.
Also, earlier, Mr. President, we reported to you a number of what we
call cruise missile sites, short-range coastal defense-type missiles start-
ing out with the Banes site, with another one located at Santa Cruz del
Norte, up here in the Havana area.22 At the time of that reporting, there
were two launchers at this position, here and here.
Since the coverage of that day, two more launching positions have
been added outboard of those two positions. The launchers here—the
[unclear] is uncovered. You can actually see the launcher itself and,
down in this small revetment here, appears to be the winged kind of air-
breathing missile which will go on it. It’s a short stubby-winged fellow
which conforms with the cruise type of missile that we have seen before.
So our opinion of this thing remains the same. We now just would
report two additional launching positions at that complex.
Finally, Mr. President, at the very westernmost tip of Cuba, the
island, we have San Julian airfield, 7,000 feet by 150 feet, which has hith-
erto been barricaded. Rows of stones and other kinds of materials pre-
venting this [from being able] to be used by anybody. Now we see the
barricades being removed from the two runways. And in this hardstand
at the edge of the tarmac, enlarged up in here, we find 22 of those crates,
some 60 feet long, which we have interpreted from the deckside photog-
raphy that the Navy had taken, to be, possibly, the crates that would
accommodate the IL-28, or Beagle, type of aircraft. This field is long
enough to accommodate those craft. I think they need something around
6,000 feet to take off. We have 7,000 feet. We definitely had not yet seen
the Beagle IL-28. One fuselage has been taken from one of the boxes. It’s
up at this location. It’s 58 feet long, which is about the length of the
Beagle fuselage, and you can see the wing roots, but the actual wing tips
have not yet been installed. We’ve just caught them, apparently, at the
22. These briefings had been given on 7 September.

start of the assembly operation. And it would appear that San Julian, this
hitherto unused airfield, may be the locus for IL-28 activity.
That’s all I have at the moment, Mr. President.
President Kennedy: What percentage of the island have we got cov-
ered here?
Lundahl: In these separate missions, the one of Sunday, October the
14th, and two on Monday, October the 15th, [the coverage] represents a
considerable percentage from north to south and from east to west. But
the business of plotting the [areas obscured by] clouds has not been
completely done, so I can’t give you a good figure.
President Kennedy: But, in other words, from the information we
have prior to the development of these new films, you would say there
are how many different missile sites? As well as how many different
launch pads on each site?
Lundahl: Well, sir, we had not found anything like the MRBM sites
in any of the photography up to this 15 October bit. We had found, and
added to it last night, one more surface-to-air missile site, so that made
a total of 23, as of this location. However, one of them has been pulled
up and moved away, at Santa Lucia. We don’t know where they pull
these things up and move them to, but we have seen 23 surface-to-air
missile sites. We’ve seen three of these surface-to-surface cruise type of
missile sites at Banes and up here over at del Norte, and then down on
the Isle of Pines.
We have one other type of missile site up here north of Havana
which we haven’t been able to identify yet, as being either cruise or some
other type of site, but which we’re carrying [as] unknown.
And now we’ve added to this. In the briefings of the last couple of
days we’ve added the field type of installation, this 650- or 1,100-mile
missile as it probably is, near San Cristóbal with these three sites located
here which we briefed on the other day [October 16]. And in the pho-
tography of Monday of this week, we’ve now added what looks like a
more fixed type of site, conforming to a signature which we have seen—
President Kennedy: In other words, you have got five different mis-
sile sites?
Lundahl: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: And how many pads on each site?
Lundahl: Well sir, at this location here we don’t have pads, we have
these erectors, these 60-foot long objects that lay on the ground. There
were four erectors there. We have found three erectors not yet in posi-
tion but lying around to be disposed here. And we had more erectors but
they’re under the trees and we can’t tell. But it would seem as though
there are going to be four erectors at each of those locations, and it
would appear that there are going to be four launch pads at each of those
too. But these [new sites] will be firmer type of launchings. And these
will be the portable field type of launching equipment.
McCone: The GMAIC committee made an estimate that between 16
and 32 missiles would be operational within a week, or slightly more.23
This was an estimate that appeared yesterday.
Maxwell Taylor: Have any electronic emissions from the SAMs been
picked up? I had a report they were showing life.
McCone: No. If they are, there are some SIGINT [signals intelli-
gence] responses on Monday [October 15] that did not state conclu-
sively that the radars were operational. However, we do estimate that
some of these SAM sites will be operational within a week’s time.
President Kennedy: If an unsophisticated observer . . . If we wanted
to ever release these pictures to demonstrate that there were missiles
there, it would not be possible to demonstrate this to the satisfaction of
an untrained observer, would it?
Lundahl: I think it would be difficult, sir. By some eight years of
experience in looking at the evolution in the Soviet Union, the signature
emerges very clearly to us. I think the uninitiated would like to see the
missile and the tube that it fits in.
President Kennedy: May I—
McGeorge Bundy: The implication is, if we go in by air [with a
strike], we would have simultaneous low-level photography for this pur-
pose.
McCone: That’s right.
Robert McNamara: And there is a picture that is not here of what I
call site number 1, of which I believe the uninitiated could be persuaded
there were missiles.
Lundahl: I would concur on that, sir. The canvas coverings of all
those missiles lying on trailers in there at lower level, particularly as Mr.
Bundy says, could, I think, very clearly impact on people.
Lundahl: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: But when will we get the data, really, on the
entire island, to the extent that we can?
23. The abbreviation GMAIC stands for the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence
Committee, an interagency committee of the interagency U.S. Intelligence Board.
Lundahl: Sir, there are five missions coming in today, as Mr. McCone
said, some 28,000 feet [of film], the first two of which are in slightly after
noon. We would seek to read them out during the night. And then as the
others come in, in the next two to three days, we will be going all out to
read it on a 24-hour basis. But it is quite a volume of film to look at. We’re
trying to be accurate, as accurate as we possibly can. I would hope that,
comes the weekend, we might have a fair grasp on all five [McCone had
mentioned six missions], plus whatever number of additional ones Mr.
McNamara will run between yesterday and the end of the week.
Lundahl: Yes, sir. [He collects his briefing materials.]
Rusk: Mr. President, I think this changes my thinking on the matter
if you have to [unclear] from the point of view of U.S. [unclear]. The
first question we ought to answer is: Is it necessary to take action? And I
suppose that there is compelling reason to take action here. For if no
action is taken, it looks now as though Cuba is not going to be just an
incidental base for a few of these things, but, basically an [unclear] with
MRBMs, and IRBMs, and that sort of thing. Cuba could become a formi-
dable military problem in any contest we would have with the Soviet
Union over a threat in any other part of the world. I think our colleagues
in Defense will want to comment on that very carefully because that’s a
very important point. But I do think that when the full scope of this
becomes known, that no action would undermine our alliances all over
the world very promptly.
On September 4th you said, “There is no evidence of any organized
combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country, or of military bases
provided by Russia, in violation of the ’34 treaty relating to Guantánamo,
or of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or other signifi-
cant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction
and guidance. Were it to be otherwise the gravest issues would arise.”
Now that statement was not made lightly at that time. These ele-
ments that were mentioned were pointing our fingers to things that
were very fundamental to us. And it was intended as a clear warning to
the Soviet Union that these are matters that we will take with the
utmost seriousness. When you talk about the gravest issues, in the gen-
eral language of international exchange, that means something very
serious.
I think also we have to think of the effect on the Soviets if we were to
do nothing. I would suppose that they would consider this a major back-
down and that this would free their hands for almost any kind of adven-
ture they might want to try out in other parts of the world. If we are
unable to face up to a situation like Cuba against this kind of threat, then
I think they would be greatly encouraged to go adventuring and would
feel that they’ve had it made as far as intimidation of the United States is
concerned.
I think also that we have an almost unmanageable problem in this
country getting any support for the foreign policy that we would need to
pursue, if we are going to sustain the cause of independence of states and
freedom in all parts of the world. We’ve got a million men in uniform
outside the United States. We’ve got foreign aid programs. We’ve got a
major effort we’re making in every continent. And it seems to me that
inaction in this situation would undermine and undercut the enormous
support that we need for the kind of foreign policy that will eventually
ensure our survival.
Now action involves very high risks indeed, and I think that this
additional information, if anything, increases the risk because the chal-
lenge is much more serious and the counteraction, I would suppose,
would have to be heavier than we have, in fact, been talking about. But
we can expect you would have to have in the back of your own mind,
with whatever decision you take, the possibility—if not the likelihood—
of a Soviet reaction somewhere else running all the way from Berlin
right around to Korea, and the possibility of a reaction against the
United States itself. I don’t think that you can make your decision under
any assumption that this is a free ride, or easier, or anything of that sort.
I would suppose that with those first missiles that we were talking
about, that a quick strike with quick success in the matter of a couple
hours’ time—with 50 to 60 sorties, that sort of thing, where it’s obvious
then that the matter is over and finished and that was the purpose of our
engagement—that that would have a much more reduced risk of a mili-
tary response on the other side. But getting these other installations and
getting involved in various parts of the island, I think would increase the
risk of a military response down there.
The action also has to be thought of in connection with alliance soli-
darity. There we’re faced with conflicting elements. Unless we’re in a sit-
uation where it is clear that the alliance is with us and understands the
problem, then an unannounced, or unconsulted, quick action on our part
could well lead to a kind of allied disunity that the Soviets could capital-
ize upon very strongly.
It’s one thing for Britain and France to get themselves isolated
within the alliance over Suez. But it’s quite another thing for the alliance
if the United States should get itself in the same position because we are
the central bone structure of the alliance. I think this is a different kind
of problem that we have to think very hard about.
Now, I think that, as far as I’m concerned, I would have to say to you
that if we enter upon this path of challenging the Soviets, the Soviets
who themselves have embarked upon this fantastically dangerous course,
that no one can surely foresee the outcome.
I was prepared to say when I came over here, before when I got this
information, that even the 50-sortie strike would very probably move by
specific steps into much more general action, at least as far as Cuba is
concerned, and possibly in other situations.
Now, there is another fact, Mr. President, that bothers me consider-
ably. I think the American people will willingly undertake great danger
and, if necessary, great suffering, if they have a deep feeling that we’ve
done everything that was reasonably possible to determine whether this
trip was necessary. Also that they have a clear conscience and a good
theory of the case.
The first point, whether this trip is necessary. We all, of course, remem-
ber the guns of August where certain events brought about a general situa-
tion in which at the time none of the governments involved really wanted.24
And this precedent, I think, is something that is pretty important.
We had a clear conscience in World War II, the Pearl Harbor attack
up against the background of Hitler’s conduct resolved that problem. In
the case of Korea, we had an organized large-scale aggression from
North Korea, and we were doing it as part of a general United Nations
commitment. Even with that start, the Korean aspect of it—the Korean
war—got out of control as far as the general support of the American
people were concerned, before it was over.
Now, these considerations that I’ve just mentioned would militate in
favor of a consultation with Khrushchev and an implication that we will
act because, in the first instance, there is the possibility, only a possibil-
ity, that Mr. Khrushchev might realize that he’s got to back down on
this. We can’t be . . . I have no reason to expect that. This looks like a
very serious and major commitment on his part. But at least it will take
that point out of the way for the historical record, and just might have in
it the seeds of prevention of a great conflict.
24. Rusk was referring to events that preceded and immediately followed the outbreak of
World War I in 1914, using the title of a well-known book recently published about this
episode, The Guns of August, by Barbara Tuchman.
The Rio Pact is, I think clearly, our strongest legal basis for whatever
action we need to take. The other possibility is a straight, is a straight
declaration of war, which carries with it many legal privileges as a bel-
ligerent that would be extremely useful for us to have. But there is
plenty of room in the Rio Pact for meeting this kind of threat, and I
would suppose—Mr. Martin will have to comment on this—I would
suppose there would be no real difficulty in getting a two-thirds vote in
favor of necessary action.
But if we made the effort and failed to get the two-thirds vote at the
time, which I would doubt would be the result, then at least we will have
tried. And as far as the American people are concerned, we’d have done
our very best on that.
Now, it seems to me, that the further information we have about the
bases, other bases in other parts of the island, the buildup generally
throughout Cuba, does raise the question as to whether a declaration of
a national emergency and, if necessary, a declaration of war on Cuba may
not be the necessary step here rather than spotty single strikes here and
there around about the island. Because this could become a cops and rob-
bers game, each strike becoming not only more difficult from a military
point of view, but more difficult from your, from a political point of view,
and it looks as though we have a larger problem to solve. And we may
have to solve it in a larger way.
Now the principal alternative to that is, of course, to put in the short
strikes, the brief strikes, and try our hand at getting it over with
promptly as far as these particular installations are concerned. But these
other bases, I think, create larger problems. Casualties go up a great deal
and the challenge goes up a great deal. I think that the question is
whether—I’d like to hear my colleagues comment on this—whether the
action we would take, would have to take even in the most limited sense,
would have to be large enough to involve the greatest risks in any event.
Therefore we might as well solve the problem.
I would like to . . . Mr. Bohlen left a note last night after our meeting,
wrote it out at about midnight or early this morning, just before he left.
And I would like to read you certain paragraphs of this. He said:
The existence of Soviet MRBM bases in Cuba cannot be toler-

ated. The objective therefore is their elimination by whatever means
may be necessary.
There are two means in essence: by diplomatic action or by mili-
tary action.
No one can guarantee that this can be achieved by diplomatic
action, but it seems to me essential that this channel should be tested

out before military action is employed. If our decision is firm (and it
must be) I can see no danger in communication with Khrushchev pri-
vately, worded in such a way that he realizes that we mean business.
This I consider an essential first step no matter what military
course we determine on if the reply is unsatisfactory. The tone and
tenor of his reply will tell us something, but I don’t believe that a
threat of general nuclear war should deter us. If he means it, he
would have so reacted even if the strike should come first.
My chief concern about a strike without any diplomatic effort is
that it will eventually, that it will immediately, lead to war with Cuba
and would not be the neat quick disposal of the bases, as was sug-
gested. Furthermore, I am reasonably certain that the allied reaction
would be dead against us, especially if the Soviet Union retaliated
locally (in Turkey or Italy or in Berlin).
A communication with Khrushchev would be very useful for the
record in establishing our case for action.
In general I feel that a declaration of war would be valuable since
it would open up every avenue of military action: air strikes, invasion
or blockade. But we would have to make a case before our allies to
justify such a declaration of war. If we acted first and sought to jus-
tify it later we would be in a spat of great consequence.
Finally, I feel very strongly that the belief in a limited, quick action
is an illusion and would lead us into a total war with Cuba on a step-
by-step basis which would greatly increase the probability of general
war.
That best course would be, he says, a carefully worded and serious
letter to Khrushchev, before we take the action, the steps, and then fol-
lowed by a declaration of war. We were talking about this last night. I
think it is in this range of problems that we need to concentrate our
attention, Mr. President. Otherwise we just . . . how we see the nature of
the threat. I think our Defense colleagues ought to talk a moment about
the actual military aspect of the threat itself.
McNamara: Mr. President, here is listed . . . there are a series of
alternative plans ranging from Roman numeral I was about 50 sorties,
directed solely against the known MRBMs, known as of last night, to
Roman numeral V, which covers the alternative invasion plan.
All of these plans are based on one very important assumption: That
we would attack, with conventional weapons, against an enemy who is
not equipped with operational nuclear weapons. If there’s any possibility
that the enemy is equipped with operational nuclear weapons, I’m certain
the plans would have to be changed.
Last evening we were discussing the relative merits of these forms of
military action, assuming that at some point military action was required.
It has been the view of the Chiefs, based on discussions within the last
two days, and it was certainly my view, that either Roman numeral I or
Roman numeral II, very limited air strikes against very limited targets,
would be quite inconclusive, very risky, and almost certainly lead to fur-
ther military action prior to which we would have paid an unnecessary
price for the gains we achieved.
And therefore the Chiefs and I would certainly have recommended
last night, and I would recommend more strongly today, that we not
consider undertaking either Roman numeral I, or Roman numeral II. In
other words, we consider nothing short of a full invasion as applicable
military action. And this only on the assumption that we’re operating
against a force that does not possess operational nuclear weapons.
President Kennedy: Why do you change . . . why has this informa-
tion changed the recommendation?
McNamara: Last evening, it was my personal belief that there were
more targets than we knew of, and it was probable there would be more
targets than we could know of at the start of any one of these strikes.
The information of this morning, I think, simply demonstrates the valid-
ity of that conclusion of last evening.
Secondly, when we’re talking of Roman numeral I, it’s a very limited
strike against MRBMs only, and it leaves in existence IL-28s with nuclear
weapon-carrying capability, and a number of other aircraft with
nuclear weapon-carrying capability, and aircraft with strike capability
that could be exercised during our attack, or immediately following our
attack on the MRBMs, with great possible risk of loss to either
Guantánamo and/or the eastern coast of the U.S.
I say great loss, I’m not thinking in terms of tens of thousands, but
I’m thinking in terms of sporadic attacks against our civilian population,
which would lead to losses, I think, we would find it hard to justify in
relation to the alternative courses open to us, and in relation to the very
limited accomplishment of our limited number of strikes.
Robert Kennedy: Bob, what about alternative number II, on the basis
that you’re going against offensive weapons? You’re going to go against
the missiles, and you’re going to go against their planes. What are the
arguments against that? I mean that would prevent them knocking our
population.
McNamara: It is much to be preferred over number I, in my opinion.
It would have to be larger than is shown now because of the additional

number of targets required, and it gets very close to alternative III, in
terms of number of sorties. Number II [strike] was prepared before we
had the additional information, of last night’s [photo] interpretation.
We showed a hundred sorties. I think it more likely that number II, with
the information we now have, and the information we’re likely to have
today and tomorrow, would merge into number III, which is a 200-sortie
strike. I doubt very much we could stop there.
Taylor: I would agree with that statement of the Secretary’s, that
really II is hardly possible now. We’re really talking about III, you real-
ize, because you’ll have to take the SAM sites out, if you’re going to go
for all the airfield strikes. We’re probably going out to the point where
you’re going to have to take other targets related to affecting [unclear].
McCone: I think that’s particularly true if you expect to have any fol-
low-on surveillance. The SAM sites will soon become operational and
even though we take out, if we follow I and II, we are still going to have
a requirement to know what’s going on.
Taylor: We’re going to have a prolonged air war, I would say, indefi-
nitely either under I, II, or III, actually.
Theodore Sorensen: Well, under II, you don’t need to take out the
SAM sites before they become operational.
Taylor: They may be operational at any time.
McNamara: We have almost certainly added 2 more targets than are
indicated here. There were 16 targets shown. We have at least 3 more
targets from evidence since last night, and we will certainly have some
more tonight and tomorrow. And, therefore, II merges very directly into
III. If the SAM sites become operational, II becomes III because, in a
very real sense, that’s maybe the—
President Kennedy: Let me ask you this, Bob, what we’re talking
about is III versus V, isn’t it?
McNamara: Yes, sir.
President Kennedy: Then the advantage of III is that you would
hope to do it in a day.
McNamara: Yes, and it could be done in a day.
President Kennedy: And invasion V, would be seven, eight, or nine
days, with all the consequences. . . .
McNamara: That is correct.
President Kennedy: The increase in tension.
Now, if we did III, we would assume that by the end of the day their
ability to use planes against us, after all they don’t have that much range,
so they’d have to come back to the field and organized it right.
McNamara: Yes. You would assume, by the end of the day, their air
force could be nearly destroyed. I say nearly because there might be a
few sporadic weapons around.
Taylor: Yes, I would stress the point, Mr. President, that we’ll never
be guaranteeing 100 percent.
McNamara: That’s right. That’s right.
President Kennedy: But at least as far as their . . . except with
nuclear. I would think you would have to go on the assumption that they
are not going to permit nuclear weapons to be used against the United
States from Cuba unless they’re going to be using them from everyplace.
McNamara: Well, they could . . . I’m not sure they can stop it. This is
why I emphasized the point I did. I don’t believe the Soviets would
authorize their use against the U.S., but they might nonetheless be used.
And, therefore, I underline this assumption, that all of these cases are
premised on the assumption there are no operational nuclear weapons
there. If there’s any possibility of that I would strongly recommend that
these plans be modified substantially.
Now I would go back just one second. I evaded the question Secretary
Rusk asked me, and I evaded it because I wanted this information dis-
cussed first. The question he asked me was: How does—in effect—how
does the introduction of these weapons to Cuba change the military
equation, the military position of the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R.?
And, speaking strictly in military terms, really in terms of weapons,
it doesn’t change it at all, in my personal opinion. My personal views are
not shared by the Chiefs. They are not shared by many others in the
department. However, I feel very strongly on this point and I think I
could argue a case, a strong case, in defense of my position.
This doesn’t really have any bearing on the issue, in my opinion,
because it is not a military problem that we’re facing. It’s a political
problem. It’s a problem of holding the alliance together. It’s a problem of
properly conditioning Khrushchev for our future moves. And the prob-
lem of holding the alliance together, the problem of conditioning
Khrushchev for our future moves, the problem of dealing with our domes-
tic public, all requires action that, in my opinion, the shift in military bal-
ance does not require.
President Kennedy: On holding the alliance. Which is going to
strain the alliance more: This attack by us on Cuba, which most allies
regard as a fixation of the United States and not a serious military
threat? I mean, you’d have to . . . an awful lot of conditioning would have
to go in before they would accept, support our action against Cuba,
because they think that we’re slightly demented on this subject.
So there isn’t any doubt that whatever actions we take against Cuba,
no matter how good our films are, are going to cause [problems] in
Latin America. A lot of, a lot of people would regard this as a mad act by
the United States, which is due to a loss of nerve because they will argue
that, taken at its worst, the presence of these missiles really doesn’t
change the . . . If you think that, they’re going to, certainly. With all the
incentives to think the other way, viewing this as you do as an American,
what’s everybody else going to think who isn’t under this gun?
McNamara: Aren’t the others going to think exactly as I do?
Taylor: May I comment, Mr. President?
With regard to what we’ve just seen in intelligence, it seems to me
three things stand out. The first is the very rapid . . . the energy with
which they are developing the mobile missiles. In the course of 24 hours
since Sunday [October 14, the day of the U-2 flight that first pho-
tographed the MRBM sites]. They are moving very fast to make those
weapons operational.
Whether they’re operational today? I would agree with the Secretary
that probably not, but I don’t think anyone can assure you. At any time at
least one or more of these missiles will become operational.
Now, number two, the IL-28s. We’ve been expecting this. But now
they’ve turned up in a very plausible location, I would say, and they’re
lying there inviting attack—an ideal time to take them out.
Now third, the IRBMs really put a new factor in, as I look at it.
Yesterday, when we looked at this we had only a few of the mobile type
[MRBMs]. I was far from convinced that the big showdown would be
required. Today we’re getting new pictures, and the vision of an island
that’s going to be a forward base, can become a forward base, of major
importance to the Soviets.
Also, the targets that we’re seeing, however, the kind of air attack
we’re talking about means nothing. We can’t take this threat out by
actions from the air. So that we have argued more and more that if,
indeed, you’re going to prevent that kind of thing, invasion is going to
be required.
Bundy: But you don’t mean that you can’t prevent it in the sense of
stopping it from happening the next day. You mean that for the long pull
you’re going to have to take the island.
Taylor: Yes, you can’t destroy a hole in the ground. We can’t prevent
this construction going ahead by any air actions. Conceivably diplomatic
action might stop it, but only diplomatic action, or occupation as far as I
can see, can prevent this kind of threat from building up.
Now, if those statements are roughly correct, then what does it mean
in terms of time? Well, it means that, insofar as getting the mobile mis-
siles out, time is of the essence. But the faster the better, if it’s not
already too late. And I would say that, again, we’re not sure that it is not
too late, with respect to one or more of the missiles.
With the IL-28s, our air people think it would be two to three weeks
before they’re ready to fly. So that would give us considerably more lati-
tude in terms of time.
The MRBMs give us a rather complete time because, the experience
in the Soviet Union is an average of about six months to get these ready.
And these started about the first of September.
President Kennedy: You say MRBM. That’s—
McNamara: It’s the fixed site, yes [that had been identified as a prob-
able IRBM, not MRBM].
President Kennedy: That [missile] gives an extra 800 miles [of
range], gives them an extra—
McNamara: It makes it 2,000 miles [range]. An extra 1,000 miles
[over the MRBMs].
Taylor: So that there is no pressure of time from that point of view
even though it’s the more egregious danger in the long run. So that’s
about the thoughts that arise in my mind, and I think the Chiefs will join
me in that.
There is one factor we talked about at length yesterday. It’s the polit-
ical actions which Mr. Bohlen recommends, and many others think must
be done. Certainly militarily that is undesirable, if we really have in mind
the urgency of taking out by surprise the missiles, and the IL-28s.
On the other hand, if we consider it politically necessary, it’s quite
true that an offsetting [unclear] if we could be making military moves of
readiness to reinforce the political action, and actions that can shorten
the time of our reaction.
President Kennedy: Let me ask you: If we gave, say, this 24-hour
notice, getting in touch with Khrushchev, or taking the other actions
with our allies, I would assume that they would move these mobile mis-
siles into the woods, wouldn’t they?
Taylor: There’s is a danger, Mr. President. If you’re talking in terms
of 24 hours I would doubt it. But the more you add on—
President Kennedy: [Unclear] carry them away?
McNamara: Mr. President, I don’t believe they’re equipped to do
that. I say that because if they are equipped to do that, they would have
been equipped to erect them more quickly. I think that it’s unlikely they
would move them in 24 hours. If they were to move them in 24 hours, I
think we could keep enough reconnaissance over the island during that
period to have some idea of where they moved. I have every reason to
believe we’d know where they were.
McCone: It would take a little longer though.
McNamara: What?
McCone: It would take a little longer and take very careful recon-
naissance to know where they are.
Bundy: Why are you so confident that they couldn’t hide them or get
them in immediate readiness in 24 hours?
McNamara: Well, I’m not confident. I didn’t say they couldn’t get
them in immediate readiness in 24 hours, Mac. I don’t believe that we
would lose them with a 24-hour discussion with Khrushchev.
President Kennedy: How quick is our communications with Moscow?
I mean, say we sent somebody to see him, I mean he was there at the
beginning of the 24-hour period, to see Mr. Khrushchev, how long would
it be before Khrushchev’s answer could get back to us, just by communi-
cation?
Llewellyn Thompson: I think it would have to go in code. Probably . . .
what, five to six hours, I guess.
President Kennedy: Well, you can—
Thompson: You could telephone, of course.
Robert Kennedy: It wouldn’t really have to go in code, would it?
Thompson: Well, you would shorten the time a lot by not putting it
into a highly confidential code [unclear].
President Kennedy: That would be a couple of hours?
Thompson: Yes.
Rusk: I think the quickest way might be, actually, not to run into any
delays on their end, would be to give it to Dobrynin here in an actual
text, and let him transmit it, because that would get to Khrushchev
straight away, whereas somebody else might have the problem of setting
up an appointment.
McCone: I think more importantly—
McCone: I think the one point on this that ought to be . . . bear in
mind—this was brought up in the [U.S.] Intelligence Board meeting
this morning rather forcefully, that, so far as we know, there is no stated
relationship that makes these Soviet missiles or Soviet bases. The
attempts that Castro made to ally himself with the Warsaw Pact, or to
join the Warsaw Pact, or even to engage in a bilateral [defense treaty]
with Moscow, apparently either were deferred or failed. He sent Raul
[Castro] and Che Guevara to Moscow a few months ago, apparently for
that purpose, that and his other purposes.
Hence, if we were to take action with this present status, the Soviets
would have some latitude as to how they might want to respond if they
did at all.
On the other hand, if as a result of a warning, or of a communication
with them, they declare these their bases, then we would have a different
kind of problem because it would be the problem of committing an
action against a stated base of theirs. And this might mean a war of dif-
ferent proportions.
President Kennedy: The question is really whether the Soviet reac-
tion, and who knows this, would be measurably different if they were
presented with an accomplished fact days after, I mean one day, not the
invasion [unclear] just the accomplished fact. [The question is] whether
their reaction would be different than it would be if they were given a
chance to pull them out.
If we said to Khrushchev that: “We have to take action against it. But
if you begin to pull them out, we’ll take ours out of Turkey.” Whether he
would then send back: “If you take these out, we’re going to take Berlin”
or “We’re going to do something else.” And then we’d be . . .
Thompson: An important factor there is, if you do this first strike,
you’d have killed a lot of Russians and that doesn’t . . . inevitable reac-
tion. On the other hand, if you do give him notice, the thing I would fear
the most is a threat to Turkey and Italy to take action, which would
cause us considerable difficulty [unclear].
President Kennedy: You mean if . . .
Bundy: What is your preference, Tommy?
Thompson: My preference is this blockade plan. I think this declaration
of war and these steps leading up to it. I think it’s very highly doubtful that
the Russians would resist a blockade against military weapons, particularly
offensive ones, if that’s the way we pitched it before the world.
President Kennedy: What do we do with the weapons already there?
Thompson: Demand they’re dismantled, and say that we’re going to
maintain constant surveillance, and if they are armed, we would then
take them out. And then maybe do it.
I think we should be under no illusions; this would probably in the
end lead to the same thing. But we do it in an entirely different posture
and background and much less danger of getting up into the big war.
The Russians have a curious faculty of wanting a legal basis despite
all of the outrageous things they’ve done. They attach a lot of impor-
tance to this. The fact that you have a declaration of war. They would be
running a military blockade legally established. I think it would greatly
deter them.
President Kennedy: In other words . . . what?

Robert Kennedy: Could you maybe just run through it? Because he
hasn’t heard the explanation of the blockade, what that entails.
Roswell Gilpatric: There is a paper there on that, the course number
two there, Mr. President, in front of you. There is a concept for this.
President Kennedy: In other words, under this plan however, we
would not take these missiles that they now have out, or the planes they
now have out.
Thompson: Not in the first stage. I think it would be useful to say
that if they were made operational we might, or would—
President Kennedy: Of course then he would say that: “Well, if you
do that, then we will . . .”
Thompson: As Chip [Bohlen] says, I agree with him, that if they’re
prepared to say: “All right, if you do this, then this is nuclear world war,”
then they would do that anyway. I think he [Khrushchev] would make a
lot of threatening language but in very vague terms in keeping his—
President Kennedy: Yeah. I would think it more likely he would just
grab Berlin. That’s the more likely.
Thompson: I think that or, if we just made the first strike, then I
think his answer would be, very probably, to take out one of our bases in
Turkey, and make it quick too and then say that: “Now I want to talk.”
I think the whole purpose of this exercise is to build up to talks with
you, in which we try to negotiate out the bases. There are a lot of things
that point to that.
One thing that struck me very much is, if it’s so easy to camouflage
these things or to hide them in the woods, why didn’t they do it in the
first place? They surely expected us to see them at some stage. That, it
seems, would point to the fact their purpose was for preparation of
negotiations.25
Robert Kennedy: Maybe they have some in there.
Thompson: They may.
Taylor: May I ask whether military moves in this five day period
would be acceptable from the point of view of the State Department?
Alexis Johnson: Oh yes, certainly.
George Ball: I think it would be helpful, certainly be helpful—
Sentences unclear; Thompson refers to “credibility.”
25. In fact it is not at all easy to hide even the MRBMs in the woods and of course not the
fixed IRBM sites. But Thompson is relying on the assumption that was then prevalent, if
unexamined.
Alexis Johnson: Now, of course, Mr. President, there are obvious

counters to the blockade. The obvious one being in Berlin.
Robert Kennedy: And also the argument against the blockade is that
it’s a very slow death. And it builds up, and it goes over a period of months,
and during that period of time you’ve got all these people yelling and
screaming about it, you’ve got the examination of Russian ships and the
shooting down the Russian planes that try to land there. You have to do all
those things.
President Kennedy: Submarines.
Edwin Martin: Since we’re all clear on the Soviet reaction, if as
Tommy and Chip predicted the Soviets would not try to run the block-
ade, then they would have deserted their friends in Cuba. And I think
there would be considerable political chaos in Cuba, if the Soviets
deserted them before our conference.
Thompson: Also, I would assume you would be in negotiations
directly with Khrushchev.
Taylor: In the case of any of these attack plans, in all logic we would
have a blockade concurrently. In other words, in my judgment all of
these military actions imply also the blockade.
Bundy: I agree.
Ball: Oh yeah, sure, sure. But what would you do about a declaration
of war as a military action? Do it?
Bundy: Simultaneously, it seems to me you declare that a state of war
exists, and you call the Congress.
Thompson: I think Khrushchev will deny that these are Soviet bases.
[Unclear.] I think that what he’d say is: “What are you getting so excited
about? The Cubans asked us for some missiles to deal with these emigre
bases that are threatening, have attacked and are threatening attack.” And
that: “These are not missiles other than defensive. They’re much less
offensive than your weapons in Turkey. You’ve got these armed with
nuclear warheads. We haven’t given any nuclear weapons to them. These
are simply to deal with the threat to Cuba.” That would be his general line.
Rusk: Well, that would be patently false on its face because of the
nature of the weapons. [Mixed voices.]
Bundy: If we act, they’d better be Cuban missiles, surely.
Rusk: I think our action is aimed at Cuba just as much as possible in
this situation.
Thompson: You want to make it, if you do any of these steps, make it
as easy as possible for him to back down.
I think almost certainly it leads to . . . his answer would be also: “This
is so serious, I’m prepared to talk to you about it.” We could scarcely

refuse then. That’s if you have world war being threatened. So I think
you’d just immediately assume the next step. That’s why I think that the
Attorney General’s point, while certainly valid, is somewhat weakened in
that during this period you would be negotiating out this thing.
Rusk: But if he were to say: “Let’s talk.” Then you’d have to say to him:
“Stop immediately all activities on such and such fields, sites and so forth.”
Thompson: I’d impose a blockade while you do it.
President Kennedy: The blockade wouldn’t be sufficient. Because he
could go on developing what he’s got there. We don’t know how much
he’s got there.
Alexis Johnson: Yeah. But he would—You impose the blockade on
Cuba, and he imposes the blockade on Berlin. And then you start to talk.
And he would trade these two off.
Rusk: That’s what he would figure.
Alexis Johnson: That’s what he would figure, yes.
Thompson: Seems to me that one point on this—there are a lot of
little signs—but I was always curious as to why he [Khrushchev] said
he would defer this [a renewed confrontation over Berlin] until after the
election. It seems to me it is all related to this.
McCone: I’m sure he was waiting for Berlin to ask.
Mr. President, you might be interested in General Eisenhower’s
reaction to this. I talked to him at your request.
I briefed him, showed him the photography and all the rest of this.
He was careful, I think, not to take a position, because I had no position
and I was very careful not to indicate to him your position, as agreed in
our telephone conversation.
However, I can report that the thrust of his comments would indicate
that he felt first that the existence of offensive capabilities in Cuba was
intolerable from the standpoint of this country.
Secondly, I think he felt that limited actions such as strafing, as antic-
ipated in I, or II, or even III, in this paper, would not be satisfactory. It
would cause the greatest fear and concern with our allies and in all areas
of the world where the Soviets might take similar action against installa-
tions—the United States installations that were in jeopardy with others
such as Turkey or Pakistan or elsewhere.
He felt really that if a move was made—and I think if I pinned him
down he would recommend that—it should be an all out military action.
He talked of conceiving it to go right to the jugular first, not an invasion
that involves landing on the beach and working slowly across the island.
But a concentrated attack right on Havana first and taking the heart of the
government out. And he felt if this was done, probably the thing would be
in disarray, so it could be done with a minimum loss of life and time.
Now he said that without the benefit of specific knowledge of troop
deployments, and equipment deployments, and so forth of the Soviets, or
of the Cubans, but I thought this would be of interest to you.
Rusk: Mr. President, one thing that would have to be considered:
There would be a number of steps that you would have to take on which
you would need the authority of a national emergency or a declaration of
war, some of the defense steps and some of these kind of steps would
bring in additional manpower and there are other powers that the attor-
ney general would know about that could be important here.
Thompson: One other point that maybe . . . seems to me might be
missed, that is since Castro’s gone this far in conniving, I suppose—
assuming that he didn’t protest at putting these things in there—it
seems to me that in the end it does lead to the fact that Castro has to go.
But if we did this blockade, and any of these steps, and Castro attacked
Guantánamo and so on, you’ve got a much better position in which then to
go ahead and take him out than if it’s started by some surprise attack by
us. I gather it’s fairly likely that Castro would do something there to—
Taylor: Certainly, if we take any of these military actions, I think we
have to assume a reaction against Guantánamo.
Douglas Dillon: Mr. President, what is the whole idea, I’m not quite
clear, of talking to Khrushchev ahead of time? What could he do that
would remove this danger that we have from these MRBMs that are
present and already there? What could he do that would satisfy us? It
seems to me very difficult to see any action you can take that he might
say: “Sure, I’ll take them out sometime,” and then do the opposite their
old way.
I can’t quite understand how we achieve anything. We may achieve
something in sort of . . . for history in showing we’ve done something.
But that’s a different argument than the argument of really trying to
achieve anything. I don’t see how we really achieve anything with them.
Rusk: Yes, sir. There are the two alternatives. In general, he might
reduce his involvement. He might step it up in his reply.
Dillon: But you can’t believe his reply, whatever it is.
Rusk: But you can check his reply.
Thompson: I think the most he’d do in the way of concession would
be to say that he will not take any further action while these talks go on.
Meantime, we’ve said that we were going to keep an eye on him, and the
problem is that if they become operational, they might be turned to the
Cubans. [Unclear.] But I don’t think he’d ever just back down.
Unidentified: As Bob said, they are operational, or they will be next

week. Nothing’s going to stop that.26
Ball: No, I think that your position with the rest of the alliance is going
to be stronger if you have given Khrushchev a chance to do something.
Bundy: It depends what he says and does, George, it seems to me.
Ball: Well, if he makes a threat you go ahead, I mean you can’t be
stopped. But that seems to me to be very much—
Bundy: He must have that speech all figured out. The one thing that he
[Khrushchev] must know is that he’s going to have to say something to
us about this at some point. I think there’s a reasonable chance Gromyko’s
going to make the speech [in his meeting with President Kennedy] this
afternoon.
Thompson: He gave [U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union] Foy
[Kohler] some indication of it, what he plans, I think [in a conversation
on October 15 ].
President Kennedy: Well what did he say, how do you mean—yeah.
Taylor: Well, I presume that our communication with Khrushchev
could be in such terms that it wouldn’t indicate the detail of our knowl-
edge of these weapons, in other words, make him feel the American eye is
right on this particular site. Think we can convey that message without
giving it away?
McCone: I don’t think he can believe that we don’t know all about this.
It’s done in a semiovert way. These convoys have moved. People have
observed them. We’ve got refugee reports, gossip of all kinds. All that we
know doesn’t come from our aerial photography, by any manner or means.
I’m inclined to think that if we were . . . I think the board studying
this would agree that there would be a . . . that Khrushchev would
engage us in some type of a negotiation, that we’d be locked into [it] and
couldn’t move.27 I don’t think there would be an answer that would be so
negative that it would give us freedom of action. Hence, it would be
somewhat like the Geneva test suspension business. We got into it and
we couldn’t get out of it!
President Kennedy: The only, to me—
McCone: The [unclear] thing would be built up right under our—
26. At this point Tape 30 ends and Tape 30A begins, in the John F. Kennedy Library catalogu-
ing system.
27. The Board of National Estimates at the CIA was then preparing a Special National
Intelligence Estimate, distributed the next day, on “Soviet Reactions to Certain U.S. Courses
of Action on Cuba.”
President Kennedy: The only offer we would make, it seems to me,

that would have any sense, according to him, would be the . . . giving
him some out, would be our Turkey missiles.
Bundy: I believe, Mr. President, that that is equally valid if we make
the sudden strike. Now, I think it may well be important to have a mes-
sage in Khrushchev’s hands at that moment, saying that we, among other
things, all the wicked things that have led to this, but also that we under-
stand this base problem and that we do expect to dismantle our Turkish
base. That has one small advantage, which is that if he strikes back, we
will have at least given him a peaceful out on that.
President Kennedy: You see, Berlin is—
Bundy: I don’t think we can keep that Turkish base in this counter
[-move].
Dillon: I think you get your same point by doing this thing simulta-
neously. That way as you do by the other thing [unclear].
Rusk: A direct exchange though that seems to be a Cuba-Turkey
exchange, would be quite serious. Now it’s true that we have talked with
the Turks a year ago about getting those, taking the Jupiters out of there
for other reasons.28
Bundy: No, no, I don’t . . . to advance it is good, but as simply one
way of reducing your costs and controlling your dangers.
Alexis Johnson: What you want is to talk to the Turks as if you were
going to put a Polaris or two in those waters.29
Bundy: Yeah. Which should make everyone feel better. We have
Soviet submarines are going to be in the Caribbean. I mean this is a
political not a military problem.
McNamara: If there is a strike without a preliminary discussion with
Khrushchev, how many Soviet citizens will be killed? I don’t know. It’d
be several hundred at absolute minimum.
Bundy: Killed, as in casualties?
28. The Kennedy administration had considered abandoning the delayed deployment of
Jupiter missiles to Turkey and had discussed the possibility with Turkish officials in the
spring of 1961. The Turks wanted the missiles. Before top administration officials resolved
the problem, the confrontation in Vienna between Kennedy and Khrushchev over Berlin inter-
vened. After Khrushchev’s intimidating rhetoric in Vienna, the administration agreed that the
Turkish deployment had to proceed, since canceling the deployment might then be mistaken
as a sign of U.S. fear or weakness.
29. The principal idea then being considered for the replacement of Turkish and other obso-
lescent land-based ballistic missiles deployed in Europe was to offer some sea-based substitute
for them, possibly linked to the Polaris nuclear missile submarines then entering service.
McNamara: Killed. Absolutely. We’re using napalm, 750-pound bombs.

This is an extensive strike we’re talking about.
Bundy: Well, I hope it is.
McNamara: I think we must assume we’ll kill several hundred Soviet
citizens. Having killed several hundred Soviet citizens, what kind of
response does Khrushchev have open to him?
It seems to me that it just must be a strong response, and I think we
should expect that. And, therefore, the question really is are we willing
to pay some kind of a rather substantial price to eliminate these missiles?
I think the price is going to be high. It may still be worth paying to elim-
inate the missiles. But I think we must assume it’s going to be high—the
very least it will be will be to remove the missiles in Italy and Turkey. I
doubt we could settle [the problem] for that.
Dillon: Well, I think they’ll take Berlin.
Ball: Mr. President, I think that it’s easy sitting here to, to underesti-
mate the kind of sense of affront that you would have in the allied coun-
tries within—even perhaps in Latin America, if we act without warning,
without giving Khrushchev some way out. Even though it may be illu-
sory, I think we still have to do it because I think that the impact on the
opinion and the reaction would be very much different.
A course of action where we strike without warning is like Pearl
Harbor. It’s the kind of conduct that one might expect of the Soviet Union.
It is not conduct that one expects of the United States. And I have a feel-
ing that this 24 hours [warning] to Khrushchev is really indispensable.
President Kennedy: And then if he says: “Well if you do that, we’re
going to grab Berlin.” The point is, he’s probably going to grab Berlin
anyway.
Ball: Sure. We go ahead.
President Kennedy: He’s going to take Berlin anyway.
Alexis Johnson: We pay that price.
McNamara: I suspect the price we pay to Khrushchev will be about
the same, whether we give him the advance warning or don’t give him
the advance warning. The advance warning has the advantage of possibly
giving him an out that would reduce the requirement that we enter with
military force. That’s a bare possibility, not great. It has the advantage
George has mentioned of causing less friction with the rest of the world.
It has some disadvantages: a reduction of military surprise, but the
disadvantage of that is not very great.
It carries with it, however, I believe, the great disadvantage that once
you start down that course he outmaneuvers you.
Dillon: Well, the only advantage I see to it is the one you say, George,
and that is that if you decide to do this, and you want to put yourself in
the right position with the world, you [do this] as part of a [military]
program that never stops. You have 24-hour notice. But you’re under no
illusion that anything he says is going to stop you.
You go ahead and do it [the strike]. You’re not doing it for the pur-
pose of getting him to come up and do something. What you’re doing is
to set the stage. That makes some sense.
Alexis Johnson: If you go the blockade route, you could take more
time in these steps; on the other hand, you hold the danger of his outma-
neuvering you.
President Kennedy: If he grabs Berlin, of course. Then everybody
would feel we lost Berlin, because of these missiles, which as I say, do not
bother them.
Thompson: My guess is that he would not immediately attack Berlin,
but he would precipitate the real crisis at first, in order to try to sap our
morale and—
Dillon: The difference is that in Cuba we’ve shown that we will take
action, at a point which nobody knows. That’s the great danger, now, to
us; they think we will never take action. So I think our position has
[unclear] possibility [unclear].
Bundy: I think he [Thompson] and I agree. I think the precipitation
of a Berlin crisis is just as bad, if we’ve let this happen to us, against all
our promises to ourselves.
Dillon: Worse.
President Kennedy: You mean, in other words, in late November
when he [Khrushchev] grabs Berlin?
Robert Kennedy: What do we do when he moves into Berlin?
Bundy: If we could trade off Berlin, and not have it our fault.
[Chuckles.]
Dillon: Well, that’s the danger. To have already acted in Cuba and—
McNamara: Well, when we’re talking about taking Berlin, what do
we mean exactly? Does he take it with Soviet troops?
President Kennedy: That’s what it would seem to me.
McNamara: Then we have . . . I think there’s a real possibility. We
have U.S. troops there. What do they do?
Taylor: They fight.
McNamara: They fight. I think that’s perfectly clear.
President Kennedy: And they get overrun.
McNamara: Yes, they get overrun, exactly.
Unidentified: Well, you have a direct confrontation.
Robert Kennedy: Then what do we do?

Taylor: Go to general war, if it’s in the interest of ours.
Unidentified: It’s then general war. Consider the use of . . .
President Kennedy: You mean nuclear exchange? [Brief pause.]
Taylor: Guess you have to.
Bundy: I do see your . . . If you go in at the same time that you do this
[attack on Cuba] and you’ll say to him: “Berlin still means general war.”
I don’t think he will do it that way.
Unidentified: I doubt whether he would . . . I don’t think he’d
[unclear].
Rusk: You’d have to start at least with tactical nuclear weapons if he
tried to attack Berlin [unclear] a blockade.
Taylor: I think they’d use East German forces, rather than bringing
their own troops in.
President Kennedy: Let me ask you. It seems to me we have been
talking about the alliance, you’ve got two problems. One would be the
problem of the alliance when we say to them that the presence of these
missiles requires a military action by us. There’s no doubt that they will
oppose that, because they’ll feel that their risks increase, and this is a risk
to us. They’ll argue what is Secretary McNamara’s point.
If we don’t take any action, then of course there will be a more grad-
ual deterioration, I suppose. Isn’t that the argument?
Rusk: I think that will be very fast.
Dillon: Very rapidly.
Bundy: Very rapid.
Dillon: Very rapid.
President Kennedy: After my statement, and then, I mean . . .
Somehow we’ve got to take some action because we couldn’t . . . Because
the alliance would disintegrate.
Now, the question really is to what action we take which lessens the
chances of a nuclear exchange, which obviously is the final failure. That’s
the obvious direction. . . . so that . . . And at the same time, maintain
some degree of solidarity with our allies. Now, if you want that to be the
course, then it would seem to me that II might [unclear].
Dillon: From the point of view of our allies, they think that certainly
this strong setup in Cuba, this sort of weakens our ability to help them
everywhere. So it is in the interest of the alliance to have this thing elim-
inated even though it does create some dangers.
President Kennedy: Now, to get a blockade on Cuba, would we have
to declare war on Cuba with a blockade?
Bundy: Yes, we do.
Alexis Johnson: Yes, we do. This contemplates a declaration of war

as well.
Bundy: We don’t have to, in the sense that . . . but it makes it easier,
and better.
Ball: Well, it makes it legal. Otherwise, we’d have great difficulty
with our allies if we didn’t have a declaration of war, in my judgment.
Alexis Johnson: [Unclear] under the Rio Pact, under the [September
20] resolution that was passed by the Congress.
President Kennedy: I think we shouldn’t assume we have to declare
war. The declaration of a state of war is a . . . Because it seems to me if
you’re going to do that, you really—it doesn’t make any sense not to
invade. I think we ought to consider whether we do need the . . .
At least let’s just think with this a minute. We do the message to
Khrushchev and tell him that if work continues, etcetera, etcetera. We at
the same time launch the blockade. If the work continues, that we go in
and take them out.
We don’t declare war. It doesn’t seem to me that a declaration of war . . .
Then I think you have to get into an invasion. What do you do—when
he—?
Ball: The great difficulty of a blockade without a declaration of war
is that it is an illegal blockade, that it will be very difficult—
Bundy: It is an act of aggression against everybody else.
Ball: Everybody. Including our allies.
Rusk: What? You could have a blockade imposed under Article 8 of
the Rio Treaty. After all, this is within the territorial framework of the
Rio—
President Kennedy: None of our allies. I don’t think anybody who
gets excited because their ships are stopped under these conditions.
They’re not very much help to us anyway. What does Article 8 say?
Rusk: Article 8 is—
President Kennedy: [reading from Article 8] “For the purposes of this
Treaty, the measures on which the Organ of Consultation may agree will
comprise one or more of the following: recall of chiefs . . . breaking of . . .
breaking of consular . . . interruption of [economic relations or] of rail, sea,
air. . . .”
Under what authority would we—
Rusk: [quoting the last phrase of Article 8] “use of armed forces.”
President Kennedy: Yes, but we can’t unilaterally . . .
Rusk: No, but I mean in the Organ of Consultation [of the
Organization of American States]—
President Kennedy: That would take a week, wouldn’t it?
Rusk: No, I don’t think it would. Ed, how quickly could they—?
Martin: I think two or three days it could be done. But I don’t think . . .
Unidentified: I doubt it that quickly. I don’t think you would do it so
fast.
Robert Kennedy: How many votes [in the OAS] would you have
against it [a blockade]?
Martin: Probably four for sure.
President Kennedy: Mexico. Brazil. Chile.
Martin: Cuba and Bolivia.
President Kennedy: Yeah. Probably Ecuador.
Martin: No, Cuba’s not in it. Ecuador I think we might get.
Rusk: Bolivia might not come.
Martin: Bolivia might well not attend. So you would have three sure.
Rusk: Because they’re temporarily out of the OAS.
President Kennedy: Now, obviously, knowing the Soviets and the
way Khrushchev reacts always, I don’t think that we could assume that
he’s going to stop working.
I’m not sure exactly what we get out of this particular course of action,
except that it doesn’t go quite—it doesn’t raise it [the escalation] imme-
diately as high as it would be under ordinary, other conditions.
Ball: Mr. President, I would like to suggest that if you have a block-
ade, without some kind of ultimatum, that work must stop on the missile
sites or you take them out. That you’ll have an impossible position with
the country, because they will not sit still while work goes on making
these things operational. And I think this is one of the real problems of
the blockade, is that it’s a rather a slow agony and you build up all kinds
of fears and doubts in the minds of people here.
Now on the question of the blockade, I think that it is Tommy’s view
that even the Soviet Union would be influenced by the question as to
whether there was a declaration of war or not.
Thompson: Yes, I think so. You might be able to frame it in such a
way that if your world postures were going to prevent this threat to us
from these offensive weapons, and therefore, you were surveilling prop-
erly, if they . . . if work goes on, then we will stop any further supplies
coming in. And for that reason, and to that extent, we are in a state of
war with Cuba. It’s a little different from saying we’re going to war to
destroy them. That’s really the thing to make you . . . At least your
world posture isn’t [unclear].
Bundy: It seems to me that’s your whole posture. Even if you go in
with a strike, your posture is simply that this man has got entangled in
the notion of doing unacceptable things, from the point of view of the
security of the hemisphere. That has to be your posture. And if those

stop, we’re not concerned with what there is, the freedom of Cuba.
You will, in fact, get into the invasion before you’re through, I’m
sure. Either way.
Thompson: Well, I think you probably will the other way too, in the
end, very likely.
Alexis Johnson: On the other hand, if you do declare a blockade, and
the Soviets do observe it, this could very quickly bring down Castro
within Cuba, very quickly. If they in effect appear to be deserting him.
This is the problem of course in their [the Soviets’] observing it.
Ball: And Khrushchev’s ability to observe it would be greatly helped
if there were a legal basis.
Alexis Johnson: Yes, yes.
McCone: Don’t you think that it would be an almost impossible
thing for him to accept?
Dillon: Well, except this is the confrontation with them rather than
Cuba.
McCone: With his prestige at stake. I don’t think he would recog-
nize a blockade. I think he would tell you [unclear] was his right and he
would go right through.
Taylor: Well, John, I don’t think you have to have a blockade in any of
these military situations. Certainly if we invade, we’re going to blockade.
McCone: I’m not talking about what we have to do. I realize that. I’m
talking about his observance of it, or recognition of it, or respect of it. I
don’t think he’d do that.
Thompson: I don’t think he’d want to take military action around
Cuba. He’s too much at a disadvantage there. It would be more danger-
ous than somewhere else. That’s why I think he might respect it, or
maybe he takes the big action in Berlin which is this gamble which he’s
shown for four years he’s reluctant to take.
I think he’s building up now to, and probing to see whether or not he
could do it [Berlin]. The strongest argument to me for a strike, is that
that would be very convincing and dangerous to him in Berlin.
Rusk: I think that this is the other part of the coin. He may feel he has
to respond. But he knows that he’s dealing with people [the American
government] who are going to respond to him. [Khrushchev thinks:] Or
maybe he’s a little crazy and you can’t trust them.
Taylor: I would think the credibility of our response in Berlin is
enhanced by taking action in Cuba, rather than being diminished.
Bundy: I think this could be right. [Mixed voices murmuring agreement.]
Taylor: If he’s going to blockade Berlin, he’ll do it regardless of the . . .
President Kennedy: Let’s say the situation was reversed, and he had
made the statement about these missiles similar to the ones I made about
[Cuba]. Similar to the ones about our putting missiles in Turkey. And he
had made the statement saying that serious action could result if we put
them in, and then we went ahead and put them in. Then he took them out
[attacked them] some day.
To me, there’s some advantages of that if it’s all over. Hungary.30 It’s
over so quick, supposedly, then really . . . almost the next move is up to
him. Now, he may take these moves, but . . .
Dillon: I think that’s entirely right.
Thompson: I gather, it’s the military view that this would lead, in the
end, to an invasion. It wouldn’t be over quickly. We’d bomb and the
whole deal. And you’d have to have air cover over these people and block
the planes as they come out.
McNamara: I would think so.
Taylor: I think we’ll get into this air gambit regardless, Mr.
President.
President Kennedy: The invasion?
McNamara: Invasion.
Taylor: Because [of] actions against Guantánamo, for example. And
our surveillance requirements will get us into dogfights over the island.
We’ll be threatened by—
President Kennedy: No, but we’ll be taking out their planes—
Taylor: —I think sooner or later, we’ll be—
President Kennedy: Well, that’s what I meant. We go ahead. Let’s
just say this is a prospective course of action.
And tomorrow afternoon [Friday, October 19] I’d announce these
[unclear] and the existence of these missiles, and say that we’re calling
Congress back, and when we consider this Saturday morning, so every-
body knows about it. It isn’t Pearl Harbor in that sense. We’ve told
everybody.
Then we go ahead Saturday [October 20] and we take them out, and
announce that they’ve been taken out. And if any more are put in, we’re
going to take those out.
Bundy: And the air force.
30. President Kennedy was referring to the rapid Soviet suppression of the revolt in Hungary
during November 1956 and the perceived Western inability to organize an effective response,
especially because of the simultaneous distraction of the Anglo-French-Israeli military action
against Egypt arising from the Suez crisis.
President Kennedy: And the air force. And that we don’t want any
war, and so on and so forth, but we’re not going to permit this, in view of
the fact that—
Taylor: We would take the air force out tomorrow, too? I mean, that’s
a little too fast for us—
President Kennedy: On Saturday.
Taylor: On the 21st [Sunday] we could get this [attack] out.
President Kennedy: Sunday has historic disadvantages [referring to
memories of Pearl Harbor]. [Bundy laughs.]
Taylor: Any additional time at all is good.
Taylor: Any additional time at all is good.
President Kennedy: The race is against these missiles, but obviously
Sunday or Monday. To announce, the day before, the existence of these.
We won’t announce what we’re going to do. But we are going to call the
Congress back. Then we go ahead and do it the next morning.
Robert Kennedy: Even if you announce pretty much, you can almost
hint that you’re going to have to take some action.
President Kennedy: Well, we don’t . . . We can decide exactly how far
we’d go.
Taylor: Of course, a public announcement, militarily, is more disad-
vantageous than just talking to Khrushchev.
President Kennedy: Well there’s no doubt they’d move the planes
and so on . . . Wouldn’t they?
Taylor: They would make every effort to, yes.
Sorensen: Mr. President, what is the advantage of your public
announcement?
Rusk: He can simply announce what is there.
Sorensen: What is the advantage of that?
President Kennedy: The advantage of calling Congress back is only
that we don’t launch . . . as I can see the only advantage, is that every-
body gets the information that they are there before we attack. Whatever
solidarity that that may induce. And it wouldn’t put us quite in the posi-
tion of almost acting in such a bad way. But I—
Taylor: Would a few hours do rather than 24 hours, Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Well that’s what I—
Bundy: U.S. solidarity is the least of our problems.
President Kennedy: What did you say?
Bundy: U.S. solidarity—
President Kennedy: Oh, I meant the solidarity—
Robert Kennedy: I think George Ball—
Sorensen: A simultaneous announcement would do that really, Mr.

President.
Robert Kennedy: I think George Ball has a hell of a good point.
Robert Kennedy: I think just the whole question of, you know,
assuming that you do survive all this, we don’t have, the fact that we’re
not . . . what kind of a country we are. The fact that you just don’t
[unclear].
Rusk: This business of carrying the mark of Cain on your brow for
the rest of your lives is something [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: The fact that they’ll be mad. We did this against
Cuba. We’ve talked for 15 years that the Russians being [planning for]
the first strike against us, and we’d never do that. Now, in the interest of
time, we do that to a small country. I think it’s a hell of a burden to carry.
Thompson: By far the strongest argument against this is that, killing
the Russians, which to my mind means you are going to end up the
whole way, and [unclear].
McNamara: Yes, this is why I don’t believe we can stop with a large
air strike. If we’ve killed Russians, we’re going to have to go in. They
can’t stop. That’s the main reason we have to go on.
President Kennedy: Let’s just say, wait a second Bob, but if we make
this announcement. Say, the afternoon before we send a message to
Khrushchev, saying that: “We said that we’d have to do it. We’re going to
have to do it, and you ought to get the Russians out of there within the
next 12 hours.”
Now that . . . we lose a good deal of advantage as far as surprise. But
what, of course, we are trying to do is to get these missiles. I’m not so
worried about the air. If they [the aircraft] have got atomic bombs, they
can get a couple of them over on us anyway, but at least the air you can
take out, can’t you? After all they don’t maintain their position over that
island each time a plane takes off. There are not that many, after all.
Alexis Johnson: You get a denial out of Gromyko this afternoon, that
they have any bases there, that the Russians are establishing anything
there. . . .
Taylor: He might deny the Russians are in.
Alexis Johnson: He might deny there are any Russians there.
Bundy: He won’t do that.
President Kennedy: They’ve said there are Russians.
Bundy: They’ve said there were Russians, in the TASS statement [of
September 11].
Alexis Johnson: Yes. As far as these bases are concerned, then you’re
striking against Castro. Nobody could be more surprised than we were

to find Russians there, because we’ve been told there were none and that
it was not a Russian base.
Rusk: If the military situation doesn’t require it, if you took just a lit-
tle more time before you actually hit, and you let the several public opin-
ions know about this in Cuba, as well as in the Soviet Union. It would be
more difficult in the Soviet Union to get really informed. But if people
realize that this is a major thing coming, then something may crack.
Thompson: There’s one important related point to that, on which we
have the first varied information. That is that Khrushchev got himself
into this aggressive posture in Berlin and everything on his own. I mean,
he’s taken credit for it time and time again.
And the advantage that hasn’t been mentioned about the notification
to him is that he would have to show it to his colleagues, and there is a
possibility of restraint there. I think there was some indication that in
the abortive Paris summit meeting, that he was under strict instructions
to break that up because they were afraid to go down the course he was
following.31 There is some chance that this could happen.
I mean we haven’t had any solid information on this. But I can cite
very minor things that happened at the time of the U-2 [shootdown]
where the military, who normally never talk to me, came over and tried
to calm me down, that sort of thing, and showing that they were con-
cerned that Khrushchev was being impetuous and running risks.
Although there are advantages and disadvantages, I feel strongly
about some notification to him.
President Kennedy: Now, what is it we ask him to do under that notifi-
cation?
Thompson: We have a draft letter there, in which . . .
Rusk: Got to get him to provide some [unclear] to the United Nations.
Thompson: It would have to be changed, that’s right.
President Kennedy: What is it we’d be trying to get out of him?
Sorensen: I think you would have to say, perhaps with high-level repre-
sentation, that only . . . and his instructions would [be] that the only satisfac-
tory answer he could return with, or report to you, would be Khrushchev’s
31. Thompson was referring to the planned Paris summit between Eisenhower and
Khrushchev in May 1960. After the shoot-down of a U.S. U-2 over Soviet airspace and after
Eisenhower took personal responsibility for authorizing such flights, Khrushchev canceled the
summit shortly before it was to take place. At the time Thompson was the U.S. ambassador in
Moscow.
agreement that he was going to begin immediately to dismantle these bases

and we would do the same in Turkey—
Rusk: We’re asking, that in order to keep the fig leaf—
Sorensen: —and a summit meeting.
Rusk: —in order to keep the fig leaf on for the President, we’d tell
him that we expect him to use, tell Castro—
Bundy: Castro to do it.
Rusk: —to stop these bases. And we’d urge him to let us know that
any Russian missile technicians are being withdrawn.
Sorensen: And the message or messenger would have to make clear
that any other answer, whether it’s delay or other counterproposals, is
unsatisfactory.
Thompson: Well I think that’s worth a little bit of discussion if there
is the possibility, and I don’t know about a deal for the bases for Turkey.
And we substitute Polaris for the missiles we’ve got there. It seems to
me in negotiations this isn’t entirely to be rejected. Negotiations with
him over this whole broad complex of questions. We’ve got to have it
eventually or else have war.
And there’s some advantage even in our proposing it. Say: “This
won’t wait for your trip in November, come on over.”
Because these other paths, it seems to me, you’re playing Russian
roulette. You’re flipping a coin as to whether you end up with world war
or not.
President Kennedy: The only question is whether, giving him the
time, whether he makes a guarantee. Now, as I say, he’s not going to be
any more happy about this than we are, I assume. Though the only thing
is, he seems to be happier with the fact that he’s taking much more of a
risk than perhaps we would have taken.
But . . . if he responds, giving us an ultimatum in a sense, the ques-
tion really is whether we’re worse off then. There is an argument that
we are worse off, if . . . in that . . .
He might accept something when it’s accomplished, just like we
might. [As] in the case of Hungary. He wouldn’t accept it perhaps so
much in advance.
Thompson: I think Mr. McCone’s right. If you approach him, you are
almost certainly going to have to get into negotiations.
Rusk: Well you may have a negotiation proposal, that doesn’t mean
that you have to get into it. Because the condition of it might be: You
stop this work on these missiles—
Thompson: But if this is accompanied with this notification that we
are going to bomb Cuba if the work goes on in this. And if it’s accompa-
nied with the blockade on any further supplies of this sort, this is a
strong action.
President Kennedy: No, I feel that there’s a difference in our action,
and therefore in their response, between our knocking out these missiles
and planes, and invading Cuba.
Thompson: I think there is.
President Kennedy: Obviously, if he knocked out our missiles . . . If he
had said that he that was going to knock out our missile sites, and went and
did it one afternoon in Turkey, it would be different than if the Russian army
started to invade Turkey. Face it: there’s a ten-day period of shootings.
And nobody knows what kind of success we’re going to have with
this invasion. Invasions are tough, hazardous. They’ve got a lot of equip-
ment. A lot of—thousands of—Americans get killed in Cuba, and I think
you’re in much more of a mess than you are if you take out these . . .
I mean, this is all presumption, but I would think that if he invades
Iran, it takes ten days and there’s a lot of fighting in Iran. We’re in a
much more difficult position [with an invasion] than if he takes out
those bases out there. It may be that his response would be the same,
nobody can guess that, but by stretching it out you increase the . . .
Robert Kennedy: I don’t think you have to make up your mind if
you’re going to invade. Even in the first 24 hours, 48 hours—
Taylor: We can’t invade that fast, Mr. President. It will take at least
seven days, unless we have some advance preparations that we can’t
make now.
President Kennedy: Why is that? Why? You mean, getting these
people into there?
Taylor: Getting in position. We’re now not making any moves that
could give away our intentions.
Robert Kennedy: So I think you can always hold that out.
President Kennedy: The only question is Guantánamo. I would think
Castro’s reprisal would be against Guantánamo, wouldn’t it?
Taylor: That’s right. And we can immediately jump in there and
defend Guantánamo.
Rusk: Is this quite clear, would it not be well to bring the dependents
out?
Taylor: We have that—that could be done very quickly [four seconds
excised as classified information]—will be there, all during this period.
We’ll keep shipping there.
Rusk: I just think if we reinforced Guantánamo and simply explained
at the moment, do this as quick as possible, that we are pulling the
dependents out only to make room for the reinforcements.
Taylor: Well, you could do that if that is acceptable. We’d like to do

that if that’s acceptable to you.
President Kennedy: How many dependents are there?
Taylor: Twenty-two hundred plus.
President Kennedy: Now, what about holding Guantánamo itself ?
Shouldn’t we, really, if we’re considering taking some action on Sunday,
shouldn’t we really be having some ships and troops off of there?
Taylor: We have—
One minute and forty-nine seconds excised as classified information.
But they can leave under the guise of going to the Pacific, if you
want to.
Alexis Johnson: Wouldn’t you, at the same time you make your
approach to Khrushchev, wouldn’t you immediately start evacuation of
dependents?
Taylor: Anytime you can give us the word go—
President Kennedy: Obviously, yeah. [Others agree.] But I’m just
wondering about whether . . .
Obviously Castro’s response wouldn’t be against Guantánamo. If he
overruns Guantánamo, we’re going to have to invade. But . . .
Taylor: He won’t overrun Guantánamo, I’ll tell you. We may have a
big fight around the place. But by the time we get the Marines in, with
the carrier-based aviation, we can hold Guantánamo.
President Kennedy: Now, there isn’t anything we ought to be doing
in the next three or four days, as far as the Navy?
Taylor: Many things, sir, but all of them have a certain visibility.
The great bottleneck in this invasion plan is the assembly of ship-
ping. The shipping and moving of heavy equipment such as the tanks
out of Fort Hood. So that anything that we do in that field will tend to
contract the time. Thus if you do decide that you have to have a period of
discussion, if we could be doing those things in that period of time, then
we’d reduce the reaction time.
Rusk: Well, some of this surfacing it wouldn’t be bad if the time
[unclear].
McNamara: Very good. Mr. President, I would suggest that we not
consider the actions we might take here which would surface, or in any
way might surface, until you’ve decided: One, when you want to make
this information available to our public. Because we’re sitting tight on all
this at the present time and any of these actions are likely to cause—
President Kennedy: Let’s start going through now what—
Robert Kennedy: Can I just ask a question?
Robert Kennedy: How much time . . . ? For instance, the President

goes on Sunday [October 21], say you had the attack on Monday
[October 22], the air attack. How many days after that would you be
prepared to invade, if that was necessary?
McNamara: Seven to ten days.
Taylor: There are two ways to do it—
Robert Kennedy: Get these fellows [the Marine units] around from
the West Coast?
Taylor: There are two ways to do it, Mr. President, while we’re on
the subject. One is a quick reaction to landing which gets troops in
seven—[Twelve seconds excised as classified information.]
The second is certainly preferable militarily. On the other hand, if that
length of time doesn’t fit into the overall plan, we could do it the other way.
Rusk: Mr. President, on the declaration of war point, on the invasion
side of things, [if you made the quick strike against these Cuban installa-
tions, you could at that point say that any reaction against the United
States or Guantánamo]32 would bring about a state of war with Cuba.
Then you’ve put considerable pressure on them to stop it right there.
President Kennedy: Well, now, as I said, the advantage of giving
Khrushchev notification—if we’re going to give Khrushchev notification
we might as well give everybody else—is to get his Russians out of
there if we wants to, or to back down if he wants to?
Thompson: I think the first [advantage] is the point about our allies.
If we eventually face the crunch on Berlin that we would have some of
them still with us.
Secondly, to give him a chance to back down or at least to . . .
Thirdly, to get a negotiation with him.
President Kennedy: What is the suggested method if we are going to
communicate with Khrushchev? Dobrynin? Or send somebody?
Thompson: I’d be inclined to telegraph to Foy [Kohler, in Moscow]
to . . .
Rusk: I’d do it simultaneously. I’d do it [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: What do you think about a personal emissary from
the President? I think it would be somebody who could go in and just . . .
as well as having a letter, be talking to him about it.
Rusk: Well you’d . . . you’d almost have to announce at the same time
what the situation is in Cuba.
32.The bracketed clause was transcribed from the sound segment that is missing from our
current copy of this tape.
Bundy: Yeah.
Rusk: Because unless you send someone that has no visibility . . .
Robert Kennedy: Well, I think you can get somebody on a plane.
President Kennedy: It might take you a couple of days to get an
appointment with Khrushchev and so on.
Rusk: I just think a written message through Dobrynin is probably . . .
Dillon: A written message to which he has to reply in writing is . . .
Thompson: Otherwise you get a fuzzy conversation in which it’s
very hard to . . .
Robert Kennedy: How do you handle the letter?
Thompson: He’s pretty adept at these matters.
Rusk: Adlai Stevenson thinks a special emissary might be very advis-
able.
President Kennedy: Let’s say we ask Mr. Robert Lovett to go over
there, with a letter. You’d have to put him on a plane; you’d have to send
him to Moscow; you’d have to make an appointment with Khrushchev;
all that would take . . .
Rusk: You’d have to wrap up the Soviet pilots, get a special plane.
Thompson: You’d have to fill him in pretty completely on the back-
ground. I don’t know how he would handle the conversation.
Bundy: You’re going to have to do that with Foy. He doesn’t know
much.
Thompson: I wouldn’t suggest he necessarily needs to deliver it per-
sonally. You can just send it around. I would think just getting it to
Khrushchev is . . .
President Kennedy: What does that do for us though, Tommy? I mean,
do you think that there’s a chance that he might—do what with the . . .
Thompson: What Khrushchev will do?
Bundy: Khrushchev will call for a summit.
Thompson: I think that’s almost certain.
I think it’s quite possible that he would say that: “I’m prepared to
take no further action in Cuba pending these talks.” And in the meantime
if we made this announcement there, would then make the announce-
ment: That we will knock these things off; if there were any further
work done on them. And stop any others from coming in.
In the meantime, the military makes their moves in preparation for
an invasion. So I don’t think [unclear]. The Russians would know this,
and this is a strong warning to them. In some ways . . .
President Kennedy: Well, if we ever get to a summit, then he’s going
to be talking about Berlin.
Dillon: Well the only point in talking to them is the point originally
that George made, [which] is that it gives us a better position with our
allies. Not perhaps with Khrushchev but with the world.
Ball: I think the history too would give us a better position.
Dillon: That’s it. For history, or to the world, we’ve done it. But
that’s what we’re doing it for. We’re not doing it to the . . . and if he does
have other [unclear].
McCone: [Unclear] a demand on him right away. For instance, there
are quite a number of ships, in transit. You demand that they would be
turned around.
Thompson: If he does have trouble at this point—
McCone: And demand that this work stop at once.
Bundy: How much better are you off before history if you ask him 24
hours ahead of time, if he says: “I want a summit,” and you say, “Nuts.”
Rusk: [Unclear.] It’s what has to happen in Cuba. Before there can be
a summit.
Sorensen: And before we would call off—
Bundy: You can have that in the first message. It’s very likely he
would propose that we meet. But we can’t meet unless we can have
agreement on these things.
Taylor: Doesn’t the Gromyko call this afternoon have some advan-
tages from the possibility that we can get him to lie that he doesn’t have
them—
Rusk: Well I was going to suggest that the President consider
expressing to Gromyko our deep disturbance about all this provocation
in Cuba. Read to him from this paragraph of this statement of September
4th and see what Gromyko says. See if he will lie about it, because
Ambassador Dobrynin said there are no offensive weapons there and so
forth, but Dobrynin might not know.
Robert Kennedy: Well, what if he says there are? Then what do you do?
Rusk: I don’t think the President ought to disclose to Gromyko what
we have in mind, until we get an actual message to him [Khrushchev].
Robert Kennedy: What if he says to you: “We’ve just got the same
kind of weapons you’ve got in Turkey. Because they’re no more offensive
than your weapons in Turkey”? Then what do you do? What do you do?
Rusk: He’s talking about [a Turkish and NATO deployment decision
made] five years ago and that’s not relevant. Well, first the Rio Treaty.
Second, that we have here in this postwar era a rough status quo.
When they took strong action against Hungary, on the ground that this
was on their side of that status quo. Now they’re penetrating into this
hemisphere which violates not only modern obligations but historic
well-known policies of the United States toward this hemisphere.
In fact, in any event NATO was itself built as a direct response to

Soviet aggression, fully registered on the agenda of the U.N. In 1946 we
didn’t have any allies. There was no Rio Pact or NATO or CENTO or
SEATO. The only allies that we had were those that were the disappear-
ing allies that fought together during World War II. And these things
came into being as a result of Stalin’s policies. It makes all the difference
in the world in this situation.
President Kennedy: How many missiles do we have in Turkey?
Bundy: Fifteen.
Plus nuclear-equipped aircraft?
McNamara: Yes.33
Gilpatric: Yes.
Robert Kennedy: Well if you went that far [in talking to Gromyko]
and decided to do that, we could perhaps resolve the thing about
Khrushchev saying: “Well . . . this poses a problem for us. We’re going to
have to take whatever steps . . .”
Ball: Well I think you’d have to say this is totally unacceptable.
Robert Kennedy: I mean, if you get into it at all, if you went into it as
blatantly as that . . .
I suppose the other way is to do it rather subtly [with Gromyko]
with me saying: “What are you doing in Cuba? It’s embarrassing in this
election. What kind of missiles are you sticking down there?”
Taylor: Well, if he admits it, we have the advantage of being able to
discuss it without indicating our own knowledge of the situation. If he
denies it, you have something that we can [unclear] Khrushchev with
later.
Bundy: That’s correct.
Robert Kennedy: This would indicate, the frontal approach would
indicate that you have knowledge of it. If you did it you’re likely
[unclear].
Rusk: I think you start off talking about a general provocation in
Cuba, as far as the American people are concerned, in the hemisphere.
Sorensen: Actually, I think the Attorney General’s suggestion is a
pretty good gambit, to say to him: “Well, Khrushchev was not going to
do anything before our election. But look what he’s doing in Cuba and so
on.” And see if he . . .
McCone: [suggesting another line] “Well, the accusations that are
33. The United States had stockpiled nuclear bombs in Turkey, under U.S. control, for possible
use by Turkish (or U.S.) F-100 aircraft.
being made by Senator Keating and others is that there are missiles
down there.”
Ball: I wouldn’t think the President would disclose it this afternoon,
though [with Gromyko].
Bundy: The President ought to get him down and [unclear].
Sorensen: No, just talk about what appears in the press, which is stir-
ring up these elections.
Rusk: There would be some significance that Khrushchev in his talk
with [U.S. ambassador to Moscow Foy] Kohler did not deny there were
missiles there.34
President Kennedy: He didn’t?
Rusk: No.
Bundy: He wasn’t charged with it, but he didn’t put it that way.
Rusk: I think . . . referring to refugee reports [unclear] that they
know now that we know. They must know now that we know. That’s
why they’re working around the clock down there.
Robert Kennedy: Well, then maybe if they [the Soviets] said that, I
suppose you wouldn’t have to send a message to Khrushchev. Then you
could do it all.
Bundy: At this point.
Taylor: One point we haven’t mentioned, Mr. President, is the fact
we still haven’t all the intelligence. I’m impressed with how our minds
have changed on this in 24 hours based upon this last intelligence. I
think before we really commit ourselves we ought to get the full picture
of this island.
Bundy: I agree.
Gilpatric: That’s why Monday [October 22], I think, is better than
Saturday [October 20].
Taylor: I think so, very much so.
President Kennedy: Monday?
Taylor: As long as you think you can hold it.
McCone: I think, tomorrow morning at this time we could have a
quite a good deal more information, from the photography we ran yes-
terday.
I’m worried about this getting out. I think it’s remarkable that it’s
been held this week. For that reason I feel that we mustn’t delay too long.
President Kennedy: We haven’t much time.
34. Rusk is referring to Khrushchev’s conversation with Ambassador Kohler on 16 October,

described in a cable Kohler sent back to Washington that day.
McNamara: Mr. President, I think we can hold it, however, till

Monday [October 22]. I think the thing that is lacking is not more intel-
ligence, although that will modify our position somewhat. What’s lacking
here is a real well thought out course of action, or alternative courses of
action.
I think we ought to go back this afternoon and split up into a couple
of groups and assign one group one course of action, another group
another course of action and work them out in great detail. My guess is
that both of these courses of action—really there are only two we’re
talking about.
I would call one a rapid introduction to military action. The other is
a slow introduction to military action. Those are really the only two
courses of action that we are talking about.
The slow introduction is a political statement followed, or accompa-
nied, by a blockade. The rapid introduction is a brief notice to Khrushchev
followed by a strike.
Now those are basically the only two alternatives we’ve discussed
with you. We ought to take both of those and follow them through and
find out what the prices are likely to be and how to minimize those
prices.
President Kennedy: Well, let me ask you this. Is there anyone here
who doesn’t think that we ought to do something about them? I guess
there’s only . . .
McNamara: I, for one, am not clear however which of these two
courses we should follow.
President Kennedy: Well, we’ve got so many different alternatives
as far as the military action. As I say, we have the blockade without a
declaration of war. We’ve got a blockade with a declaration of war.
We’ve got strikes I, II, and III. We’ve got invasion. We’ve got notifica-
tion to Khrushchev and what that notification ought to consist of.
Robert Kennedy: In other words, it’s not really that bad though.
Because if you have the strike, you don’t have to make up your mind
about the invasion. I mean, that’s not going to come for three or four
days—
President Kennedy: A blockade—
Bundy: In one sense you have to make up your mind to face it if you
have to.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah. I think everybody’s [unclear]. So all you have
really, as Bob says, all you have is really the two courses of action.
And I think that as long as it really has come down to this after talk-
ing about this for 48 hours . . .
Alexis Johnson: Mr. President, there’s one problem—

Robert Kennedy: I think his idea of us going back and trying to put it
down for you more definitively rather than you trying to discuss it . . .
Rusk: Well, and even there I think the real issue is: What do you do,
if anything, before you strike?
Dillon: When do you tell the press? Exactly what do you say to
them?
Robert Kennedy: And then what do you tell the American people.
And I think that we should go back . . .
President Kennedy: Well now as I . . . militarily you’re not really in a
position to do this strike until Monday, is that it?
Taylor: That is correct.
McNamara: May I suggest, Max, that we still keep open the possibility
of [a decision on] Saturday [October 20]. [Air Force General Walter]
Sweeney, the other night, said Saturday. Now I know that events have
changed. We’ve got more targets and so on since then, Mr. President. But
I don’t think this is absolutely critical and I don’t think we need to decide
this morning.
Taylor: Unless the President really needed it [unclear]; we can cer-
tainly need it militarily. . . .
McNamara: We need it. We need it.
President Kennedy: Well, now the only argument for going quicker
than that really, not only is the one that it may leak but also that the—
Bundy: Level of readiness.
President Kennedy: I don’t know, whether if there are two of them
[Soviet MRBMs in Cuba] ready, whether that makes a hell of a differ-
ence anyway.
Bundy: I don’t think so.
President Kennedy: Because if they’re going to fire nuclear missiles
at us . . .
Bundy: If they were rational, Mr. President.
Taylor: We may find on this photography that has been taken, Mr.
President, how it’s highly desirable to take out everything that is visible
at the time we go.
McNamara: It would seem to me your instructions to us, or our
assumptions, ought to be that we’re going to be ready at the earliest pos-
sible moment regardless of whether you want us to go there or not. And
that earliest possible moment is for an air strike Saturday morning
[October 20]. That’s the earliest possible moment.
Taylor: The strikes should be number III and number IV.
McNamara: And we ought to be ready for strikes III, IV, or V, in

effect.
And the second thing we ought to do is get this intelligence in here
and interpret it as rapidly as possible. Now, we’ve taken actions to do that.
The third thing we ought to do is really think through these courses
of action more definitively and get back to you tonight, I would think,
with options laid out.
Taylor: That’s right.
Robert Kennedy: Bob, militarily, which would be the best day to
strike? Saturday, Sunday or Monday? Militarily. Considering . . .
McNamara: Balancing everything off . . .
Robert Kennedy: I think that’s the entire question before us.
McNamara: Max is figuring, they keep saying Monday [October
22]. I would say Saturday [October 20].
Taylor: I would say Tuesday [October 23].
Robert Kennedy: Well, even though the missiles will be in place?
Taylor: The more time we’ve got, the better we can do it. [Mixed
voices.]
Robert Kennedy: The missiles will be in place though, Max.
Rusk: Mr. President, on that, General Taylor mentioned yesterday
that we’ve got a relatively untrained armed forces at the moment in
terms of combat experience. It’s going to take some very careful work in
all echelons. And if we overlook steps that are necessary to give us the
protection that we need against, say, mining and things of that sort,
through a rush here, and if somebody really gets hurt . . .
Taylor: It’s one thing for us to have time to get the orders out but
another thing to get the orders out and then have experienced men as a
check that everything has gone as we ordered.
McNamara: I’m not suggesting a date. I’m simply suggesting that
our action ought to be to plan for the earliest possible strike because
there is another penalty we pay with untrained personnel, and with
operational nuclear weapons we run great dangers. And that this is the
thing that we must keep in our minds. I don’t know when these [Soviet]
weapons are going to be operational but we may find some tonight that
are, or tomorrow night, or Saturday night.
But I don’t think that we have to decide that now. That is a judgment.
We ought to be ready—
President Kennedy: We ought to be ready in case. It looks like
they’re [the Soviets] going to be and you’ve got to be ready Saturday
morning.
McNamara: That’s right. Exactly.

Taylor: But may I assume that category I and II is out? That we are
planning for III, IV, or V? If we do that, that will simplify our planning
and arrangements.
Bundy: Can I raise the question of the President’s going away?
President Kennedy: Yeah, I want to ask about that. I’m supposed to
go . . . start at 11:30 or 12:00 tomorrow [on a scheduled campaign trip].
If I cancel it, of course, it’s a major—What?
Unidentified: It’s pretty important, I should think.
President Kennedy: To go?
Robert Kennedy: It really is.
Dillon: You can’t cancel it.
Dillon: It’s very difficult to cancel it now.
President Kennedy: Without an explanation. I better figure on going
on Friday. I can always come back late Friday night if this turns out . . .
So we better just go ahead on that.
Now, the only thing is, we ought to have, probably, a meeting before I
go see Gromyko. I see him at five.
Ball: Mr. President, the only question I think you ought to consider
is that if there should be a leak and, given the campaigning, I think that
the public might find it pretty underhanded.
Robert Kennedy: I’d just deny the leak.
Bundy: Which leak? Of what?
McCone: I don’t think you can. I don’t think [Senator Kenneth]
Keating would leak this.
Robert Kennedy: No, I’d just say that, John, this couldn’t be more
untrue. And so what, after it’s all over. I think everybody just has—
McCone: I don’t think you can deny the leak. I think that there’s too
much information on this through the refugee channels.
Robert Kennedy: Yeah, but it’s been in there all the time, John.
Nothing has come up in the last three days that’s going to—
McNamara: You don’t deny the leak. What you say is: “There have
been a number of rumors going around. I’ve asked the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Defense Department to check every one of these. We’re
investigating it; we’re querying refugees; we’re taking every possible step
to determine the condition.”
Bundy: And there’s no present change in the government’s position.
Sorensen: But the President isn’t going to hold a press conference
anyway.
Rusk: There is the other question too, as to whether, since we’re
heading into, what we are heading into here. The President hopes to
unify or not, by going on this trip this weekend? Unify the country?
President Kennedy: I don’t need to unify the country. That’s not the
purpose of the trip. [Laughter.]
The only problem is, calling it off, obviously that’d be a major story
as to why we called it off. So unless we were about to proceed Saturday
or Sunday, I’d better not call it off.
We are going over to Monday unless we get our sequences into a
position where we can surface this thing by Friday afternoon. The
minute I call off [this trip], this thing is going to break. Because then
every newspaperman will be around to everybody and then they’re
going to get it. So I don’t think I can call this thing off tomorrow with-
out having this thing—unless we are ready to have it surface tomorrow.
Dillon: I don’t think there’s any problem about unifying the country
because once you . . . This action will unify it just like that. No problem
at all. [Mixed voices, general agreement.]
Bundy: I wouldn’t [unclear] this weekend.
President Kennedy: Well, I’m not going to.
McCone: [Unclear] unanimously support that.
Rusk: Now there may be some inquiries about this meeting this
morning.
Bundy: I still believe that our best cover is intensive review of the
defense budget. Now we haven’t had to use it yet. [Laughter.]
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s all right because we had this
[10:00] Cabinet meeting.
Dillon: It’s credible after the Cabinet meeting. More credible than it
was.
Thompson: And, of course, I’d be seeing you in preparation for
Gromyko’s visit.
Bundy: Martin isn’t here and I think it’s really very important.35
Martin: No, I’ll disappear.
Rusk: Now, Mr. President, I have invited Gromyko to dinner after
our talk, but I’m inclined to call him and say that talks may go on for a
while and that we better cancel this dinner. I think this . . .
Bundy: I think it’s worth thinking about the channel of yourself to
Gromyko, though. And if we decide on a warning, having [someone
35. Martin was there. Bundy meant that people should not reveal that Martin was there, since
that would reveal that the meeting concerned Latin America and their cover story would
unravel.
with] a good deal of responsibility and having someone play it both

ways. Not for Friday night, not for tonight.
Rusk: [Unclear] won’t happen. I can see some real disadvantages in
sitting through a dinner there and appearing to be cozy and [unclear]
and friendly and that sort of thing. But I think with the translation,
with the interpretation going on, this meeting [between President
Kennedy and Gromyko] is apt to go beyond 7:30. It will go three or
four hours.
President Kennedy: What, my meeting with him?
Rusk: Yes.
Dillon: Mr. President, I have one thing.
President Kennedy: It won’t go that long.
Dillon: As you know, I am supposed to be leaving Saturday after-
noon to go down to Mexico City for this—the Inter-American confer-
ence opens Monday. I could wait and go Sunday if that made any
difference. I’ll have to leave various things that we’ll have to—
President Kennedy: Well, why don’t we wait on that because we’ll all
know a little better on the schedule.
Why don’t you . . . if you want to just call off the dinner on some . . . I
don’t know what your pretext is going to be. They’ll probably want us . . .
Rusk: You’re leaving town tomorrow night?
President Kennedy: Yeah. Let’s see what happens. Why don’t you
wait to call it off until things are really [unclear], saying: “The President
has asked . . .”
But now, what have we . . . ? What is this group going to do as far as
meeting? Trying to get some more final judgments on all these ques-
tions which we turned around?
Sorensen: Well, can I make a suggestion there, Mr. President?
It seems to me that the various military courses have been outlined
here as the Secretary says. They need to be developed in more detail,
step by step, and so on. But there has also been general though not
unanimous agreement that you are likely to be making some kind of rep-
resentation to Khrushchev ahead of time, maybe very shortly ahead of
time. And I think that you ought to have, in great detail, drawn up what
that representation would consist of. Were it a letter, what will be a sat-
isfactory answer? And soon.
President Kennedy: Yes. Well, we have to have . . . certainly to do the
Khrushchev. We have to decide in advance we’d do it, or whether I would
make the public statement that we really had talked about the afternoon
before.
These are some of the questions now. How do we want to function?
Rusk: Well, I think that we ought to draw the group together except
for those who are going to be needed on military assignments.
McNamara: I don’t believe the military problem, the military plans,
need much elaboration. That isn’t really what I was thinking about.
What I was really thinking about is this give-and-take here.
Bundy: That’s very true.
McNamara: Which we haven’t gone through. I think the price of any
one of these actions is going to be very very high. I can visualize a whole
series of actions that the Russians are going to take. And it seems to me
we ought to lay those down. And then we ought to consider, how can we
reduce that price?
And I would suggest, therefore, that under the guidance of State,
because this is primarily an international political problem, we develop
two groups here. And that we have Defense and State people in those two
groups, and we take two or three hours this afternoon to let those
two groups take these two basic alternatives. They can derive any
number of variations they wish to.
But one is a minimum military action, a blockade approach, with a
slow buildup to subsequent action. And the other is a very forceful mili-
tary action with a series of variants as to how you enter it. And consider
how the Soviets are going to respond. This is what we haven’t done.
Dillon: Well, not only the Soviet response but what the response to
the response will be.
McNamara: [Mixed voices.] I think that’s it, exactly. So then, how we
respond to these responses.
Rusk: They’re beginning to work on them already.
Ball: We’ve done a good deal of work on this.
Rusk: Yes, we could pull those together.
McNamara: Well, I think it would be useful to pull it together.
President Kennedy: Well, now, let’s see. Mr. Secretary [Rusk], I
ought to meet with you at 4:30 with Tommy before the Gromyko [meet-
ing] to see where we are on this conversation. Then, at the end of the
Gromyko conversation, we may want to have . . . I don’t think we’ll go
three or four hours but let’s say we finish in two hours. I don’t know what
he wants to see us about. And then, whether we ought to, some time this
evening, have another meeting based on what Gromyko said and see
where we are with planning.
Bundy: I hate to be worried about security all the time but I think
evening meetings are very dangerous. I think they create a feeling
around the town and almost inevitably people have to leave dinners. I
think it’s a very—
President Kennedy: Well, I’m going to leave right now so why don’t
you, Mr. Secretary and Mr. McNamara, decide how we are going to pro-
ceed for this afternoon. In any case, I will meet you [Rusk] at 4:30 and
we will meet . . .
Mr. Lovett is coming down here. He’ll be here at a quarter of five or
at five. We can . . .
[speaking to Bundy] Are you going to be in with me with Gromyko?
Bundy: Whatever you want.
President Kennedy: There’s no need to be. Why don’t you—
Bundy: I’ll talk to him.
President Kennedy: —discuss with Mr. Lovett and see whether he’s
got any thoughts about it. And we will then be in touch tonight. At least,
Bundy will communicate anything that Gromyko may have said to see
whether that affects any of our . . . [Bundy whispers something, perhaps
about Lovett.] I’ll talk to him.
President Kennedy then leaves the meeting, and it begins to break up. A
few participants stay behind and continue to talk in mixed conversations.
The following are the more audible fragments of these conversations on
the recording.
Dillon: As long as this has been all briefed to the Congress, I quite
agree [unclear].
Bundy: He’s coming into the White House, I gather, at five to five.
Do you want to [unclear] briefing [unclear] here or go over it yourself ?
Gilpatric: Actually, Mr. Secretary, I think this blockade paper might
interest you [unclear].
Bundy: Well, the question of reactions is what Bob has in mind [for
the analytical work to be done].
McNamara: That’s right.
Bundy: That’s . . .
Alexis Johnson: Soviet reactions and our counterreactions.
Bundy: Yeah.
Alexis Johnson: We’ve catalogued Soviet reactions, but . . .
Rusk: [aside to someone else] Why don’t you come to my office at
around, say, 2:00 or 2:30. 2:30.
Taylor: Bob, one of the things that has not been laid out in front of
the President is mobilization requirements. At this point I—
McNamara: Yes, certainly, and [unclear].
Rusk: [Unclear] Bob is that . . . well, we can put some words on a
piece of paper. But you can’t really say much about the Soviet reaction.
You can say what they may be.
Taylor: For that reason, though, I think we have to recognize that
we will have to start mobilizing when we make this strike. We have to

have the necessary alert [unclear] available strength to meet any of
these possibilities.
Rusk: Yeah.
Gilpatric: There are about five areas; we’ve done a fair amount of
work trying to figure out where it is possible—
McNamara: I don’t think we have had enough discussion among this
group, enough serious discussion, of a blockade approach versus imme-
diate strike approach.
Gilpatric: No, that’s true.
McNamara: So I’d at least suggest we get together to do that.
Dillon: I think you ought to think on the blockade approach too, of
not just of what it does to the Russians but what the effect is on the rest
of our own people and on the rest of Latin America of allowing these
things that’s there. The commitment [unclear] which they will under the
blockade approach.
Thompson: If you announce at the same time that you are going to
take them out of there [unclear] remove [unclear].
Martin: As far as the blockade approach is concerned, if it is a blockade
which is adequate, if it has a chance of bringing down Castro. This will be
much more satisfactory in Latin America than just taking out the missiles.
Robert Kennedy: Has a blockade ever brought anybody down?
Bundy: The missiles go to blockade, I think. The missiles are . . . I
can’t see that you do the missiles without the . . .
Taylor: I wouldn’t take these things out without resolving to let
nothing else in.
Dillon: Oh no. But I mean the blockade without the missiles.
Alexis Johnson: If you don’t make them operational.
Rusk: I would think blockade with at least [strikes] I or II. [Option]
One I guess would be a pretty good size wallop. But a blockade plus that
would be a minimum in any event. Wouldn’t it?
Taylor: The minimum. That would make the only sense—
Bundy: Well, are there people for a blockade without a strike?
Thompson: I am.
McNamara: I am. [Unclear].
Robert Kennedy: I am.
Alexis Johnson: Well, I think there’s a big difference, [unclear].
Taylor: If you’re talking about 24 hours or something like that, but
not for longer.
Thompson: A blockade on military weapons, plus moving your
troops, getting into position, and that would be in connection with the
announcement that you’re going to overfly it, and that you were going to
strike if this thing went on.
Taylor: If there were any further work done.
Thompson: And all these other measures to . . .
Dillon: Well that would mean overflying low altitude [reconnaissance].
Alexis Johnson: That’s right. At low altitude.
Thompson: Yes. I would do all those things.
Taylor: And air engagement over the island.
Bundy: The great advantage of that, of course, is you don’t kill any
Russians.
McNamara: This is the main theory.
Alexis Johnson: Or Cubans.
Bundy: Or Cubans.
Gilpatric: It’s not a direct conflict.
Dillon: Well what happens when they start shooting down your
planes?
Taylor: Well, yeah. That’s the point. You hit them [unclear] chance
again.
Rusk: Then they’ve escalated. Then they’ve escalated.
Taylor: Now the only military advantage is the fact you can be doing
these things which you would like to do before we execute an invasion.
Alexis Johnson: Now, the blockade approach we contemplated here
though has a considerable number of steps leading up to it.
Alexis Johnson: This is not an immediate, we didn’t contemplate—
Martin: Both in terms of political negotiations and military pre-
paredness.
Alexis Johnson: Military preparedness and political negotiations.
Gilpatric: If you announce a blockade, how long before it is actually
imposed?
Rusk: Well immediately.
McNamara: Well it becomes effective over a period of hours, 48 hours.
Alexis Johnson: You see if you are going to do it within the frame-
work, you have the two choices. You do it—well, three choices really. You
do it unilaterally without declaration of war. This is about the worst of all.
Unidentified: This would get you in real trouble.
Bundy: You must declare. I think the President did not fully grasp that.
Alexis Johnson: Then you’ve got the OAS track that the Secretary
[Rusk] was talking about here. Some way of getting it sanctioned under
the OAS support.
And then you have getting it sanctioned under OAS plus declaration
of war on our part are the three—
Martin: May I also point out that I think you can start the political
discussions, and the military preparations, and have a blockade as part of
these initial actions, without having decided whether your final action
will stop with the blockade or will include military—
Bundy: Do your blockade before OAS consent?
Dillon: The purpose of a war is to destroy your enemy and that’s
the only purpose of it. And so, if you do declare war, how do you . . . I
mean, you only justify the blockade on the basis of that is what it’s
going to do. And that you’re going to carry it through completely and
totally, so there’s not much difference between that and straight
action.
Rusk: Of course, there’s another advantage to the blockade action
too. Put on a blockade and then the Soviets hit the Turkish missile sites.
Then your hands are probably free to [unclear].
McNamara: I think you have to look to the end of the other course to
really see the potential of a blockade. The end to the other course, the
end to the other course is the missiles out of Cuba and some kind of a
price. Now the minimum price are missiles out of Turkey and Italy, it
seems to me.
Martin: With Castro still there?
McNamara: Pardon me?
Martin: Castro’s still there.
Bundy: No, Castro goes out on either of these roads in my judgment,
at the end of the road.
McNamara: He may or may not. This is something to think about.
But, in any case, the minimum price you pay under the military
course of action is missiles out of Turkey and Italy. And they may be out
by physical means. Because of the Russians moving against them. And
you have a serious potential division in the alliance. Now it seems to me
that’s the best possible situation you could be in as a result of the military
course. I can visualize many worse situations.
Under the blockade, [tapes changing, material repeated] the best possi-
ble situation—
Bundy: The other thing you can do with a blockade is consult. That’s
clear. You can consult with everybody.
McNamara: The best possible conclusion of a blockade, it seems to
me, is that the alliance is not divided. You have agreed to take your mis-
siles out of Turkey and Italy, and the Soviets have agreed either to take
them out of Cuba or impose some kind of control comparable to your

control over the missiles in Turkey and Italy. Now that’s the best possible
solution. There are many worse solutions.
Taylor: Now, I thought we were hoping last night that we would get
the collapse of Castro.
McNamara: Well you might get that.
Martin: I think so, too. [Unclear] best, I think—
Bundy: I believe that Castro is not going to sit still for a blockade and
that that’s to our advantage. I’m convinced myself that Castro has to go.
I always thought . . . It never occurred to [me before], I just think, his
[Castro’s] demon is self-destruction and we have to help him do that.
McNamara: Well, then you’re going to pay a bigger price. Because—
Bundy: Later.
McNamara: Later. And I think that’s a possibility. But the price is
going to be larger. I really think we’ve got to think these problems
through more than we have.
At the moment I lean to the blockade because I think it reduces the
very serious risk of large-scale military action from which this country
cannot benefit under what I call program two [surprise strike].
Bundy: Russian roulette and a broken alliance.
McNamara: Russian roulette, exactly so, and a broken alliance.
Robert Kennedy: Can I say this? What are the chances of . . . You’ve
got to say to him, “They can’t continue to build these missiles. All right
then, so you’re going to have people flying over all the time.” Well, at
night it looks a little different than it did the next morning.
McNamara: Oh, he’s not going to stop building. He’s going to con-
tinue to build.
Robert Kennedy: But not if you knock them out though, Bob?
McNamara: I think this goes back to what you say, at the time of
blockade. I’m not sure you can say that.
Robert Kennedy: Are you going to let him continue to build the mis-
siles?
McNamara: This goes back to what you begin to negotiate. He says:
“I’m not going to stop building. You have them in Turkey.” At the time
you’ve acted by putting the blockade on. That’s done.
Robert Kennedy: All right. Then you let them build the missiles?
And you let them—
McNamara: Then you talk.
Thompson: Is your assumption that he would run the blockade?
McNamara: No, no. But they have goods inside that they use to carry
on construction.
Robert Kennedy: We tell them they can build as many missiles as

they want?
McNamara: Oh, no. No, what we say is: “We are going to blockade
you. This is a danger to us. We insist that we talk this out and the dan-
ger be removed.”
Robert Kennedy: Right. Now, but they’re going to go ahead and build
the missiles.
[responding to an interjection] Overflights, definitely.
So they—
Robert Kennedy: They put the missiles in place and then they
announce they’ve got atomic weapons.
McNamara: Sure. And we say we have them in Turkey. And we’re
not going to tolerate this.
Sorensen: What is the relationship then between the blockade and
the danger?
McNamara: Well, all this time Castro is being strangled.
Thompson: Why wouldn’t you say that if construction goes on, you
would strike?
McNamara: Well, I might, I might. But that is a more dangerous
form of the blockade.
Taylor: What is your objection to taking out the missiles and the air-
craft?
McNamara: My real objection to it is that it kills several hundred
Russians, and I think we’re going to have [unclear] a very strong response
to it.
Taylor: [Unclear] all around the world. They have—
Unidentified: Then you start killing Russians, you get into escalation.
McNamara: All right. Then I’ll go through the other courses of
action and—
Robert Kennedy: Let’s just pursue that a little bit. You put the block-
ade on and then you tell them they can go ahead and construct the . . .
McNamara: No, I don’t tell them.
Robert Kennedy: Well, you don’t tell them [to go ahead,] but they
go ahead.
McNamara: What I say is: “The danger must be removed.”
Robert Kennedy: All right. They construct their—
McNamara: But I don’t say that it has to be stopped tomorrow.
Robert Kennedy: —they construct their missiles.
Bundy: Could I ask how the discussion is going to proceed? I’m
sorry, I have to [unclear].
Robert Kennedy: Can we resume?

Rusk: Could you come on that basis at 2:00 or 2:30?
Bundy: I have a speech at 1:30 which is going to be very conspicuous
if I don’t give it.
Rusk: Yeah. All right. Come when you can, at any time.
Robert Kennedy: At 2:30?
Rusk: 2:30. I suppose several [of us] have got to get away here at the
moment [unclear]. I think we’ve got to pursue this further and, Bob, I
think that perhaps we could detail Alex [Johnson] and Paul [Nitze] and
Tommy [Thompson] to sketching in the body of these two alternatives
[unclear].
Bundy: I thought Ted [Sorensen] [would] try various sizes of mes-
sage with the drafts that exist with Tommy.
Rusk: I think we ought to get together as a group and talk about
these issues [unclear] heart of the matter.
McNamara: Yeah, I agree.
Rusk: At 2:30.
McNamara: 2:30. All right.
Bundy: Couldn’t you and Tommy work on drafts—possible mes-
sages?
Almost everyone but McNamara, Taylor, Bundy, Sorensen, and Thompson
then gathers his papers and leaves, talking on the way out.
Bundy: The Secretary wants to do it. [Unclear exchanges.]
Thompson: Alexis, are you going to be free to work on this?
Alexis Johnson: Free? [Unclear.] [Laughter.] [Unclear exchanges.]
Unidentified: You want to come right over?
Unidentified: I’ve got to have lunch with [unclear].
Unidentified: Oh, are you?
Unidentified: I’ve got to eat sometime! I haven’t eaten a thing yet.
Laughter; more trailing discussions of departing officials. Two sepa-
rate, simultaneous conversations can be overheard.
Alexis Johnson: I might bring [unclear name] and Bill Bundy
[unclear].
Taylor: I’ll be talking to you.
Alexis Johnson: All right. Are we going to enlarge this out?
Taylor: Meanwhile, they’re mobilizing and [unclear]. We’ll take out.
[Unclear response.]
Unidentified: I haven’t enlarged this out at all. I thought everybody
in the office just—
Unidentified: What did you figure out doing?
Unidentified: Me too! [Unclear exchanges.]
McNamara (?): Are you going to handle the recon briefing?

Taylor: Sure, sure.
McNamara (?): Well, this is what I’d really like you—
Taylor: We’ve got the President here. He says [strike options] III,
IV, or V. That’s what we’re going to [unclear] at this point.
McNamara: In effect those cover I and II anyhow.
Taylor: You can’t—you’re not quite—he’s not quite seeing as
[unclear] that one out because they get interlocked [unclear].
McNamara: I know it. I realize that, but I’d rather work on III, IV,
and V that I or II.
Taylor: [Unclear] take that decision [unclear].
McNamara: Yeah.
Bundy: I’m just checking the security of this chamber. [Quiet; unclear
exchanges.]
Taylor: I suspect that [unclear].
McNamara: Mac, one thing . . . I realize [unclear] security [unclear]
get in here without [unclear]. I really think we ought to [unclear]. We
have to come up with [unclear].
Bundy: The President has all morning tomorrow. I . . .
McNamara: I think we’re two meetings away from a decision
[unclear] and now it’s entirely a decision of security [press leaks].
Bundy: That’s the problem.
McNamara: But, we don’t have [unclear] in terms of time [unclear].
It’s well worth wasting the time if that’s the case.
Bundy: Oh, I don’t think time bothers me at all.
McNamara: I wouldn’t worry about the security. Not that much. We
can hold this [unclear]. I’m certain we can hold it.
Bundy: But now let me tell you what [unclear].
Sorensen: Particularly with the fact that [unclear]. There’s so much
speculation driving so many rumors.
McNamara: [Unclear] rumor and all.
Sorensen: Congress is out of town now, and there’ll be a lot of
[unclear].
McNamara: My only point, Ted, is I think we need a meeting to see
the President. Because, we’re advancing. We’re further than we were
yesterday at this time. We might be further ahead tomorrow if we talk
[unclear].
Bundy: I think everybody ought to give real attention . . . I’ve got, for
example, a newspaper [unclear].
McNamara: Yeah. Yeah.
Bundy: It’s complicated.
Thompson: Did you figure on [unclear].

McNamara: Well, I would strongly urge [perhaps urging the night
meeting that had worried Bundy] . . . At least I would urge you not to
cancel it solely because of security. Because otherwise there are other
ways [unclear] security.
Unidentified: Twenty-four hours.
Unidentified: That’s vital.
Then the room fell silent. The tape recorder continued running for more
than 20 minutes until it ran out of tape or was turned off.
President Kennedy went to his scheduled meeting with the Japanese
minister for trade and industry, Eisaku Sato, and then had lunch in the
Mansion.
Near Midnight
During the course of the day, opinions had obviously switched

from the advantages of a first strike on the missile sites and on
Cuban aviation to a blockade.
Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meeting

on the Cuban Missile Crisis36
After lunch and a brief swim, while still in the Mansion, President
Kennedy met with former secretary of state Dean Acheson. Acheson
outlined his views in favor of an immediate air strike without prior
warning to the Soviets.
At 3:30 P.M. Rusk and McNamara came back over to the White House
from their meetings at the State Department and reported on their
progress. At 4:30 Rusk again returned to the White House, this time with
Thompson, to prepare President Kennedy for his meeting with Soviet for-
eign minister Andrei Gromyko. That meeting began at 5:00. Meanwhile
Bundy, as planned, briefed and talked with former secretary of defense
Robert Lovett. McNamara and McCone also spoke to Lovett.
36. Tape 31.1, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings
Collection.
Kennedy Summarizes a Late-Night Meeting 573
The meeting with Gromyko lasted until about 7:15. Gromyko empha-
sized the need to settle the Berlin issue. Though he repeated the promise
that the Soviets would do nothing before the November elections in the
United States, he warned that later in that month the Soviet government
would bring the Berlin problem to conclusion. If there was no understand-
ing, Gromyko said that “the Soviet government would be compelled, and
Mr. Gromyko wished to emphasize the word compelled,” to take steps to
end the Western presence in Berlin. Gromyko described the Western mili-
tary presence in Berlin as a “rotten tooth which must be pulled out.”
Gromyko also complained about U.S. threats against Cuba. The
Soviet Union was only training Cubans in the use of defensive weapons.
President Kennedy said that “there was no intention to invade Cuba” and
that he would have been glad to give Khrushchev assurances to that
effect, if asked. Yet Soviet shipments of arms to Cuba were an extremely
serious matter, as a result of which the two countries faced “the most
dangerous situation since the end of the war [World War II]. ”
Returning to Cuban fears, Gromyko referred to the Bay of Pigs inva-
sion attempt of 1961. Kennedy cut in to say that he’d already admitted
that this had been a mistake. He repeated that he “would have given
assurances that there would be no further invasion, either by refugees or
by U.S. forces.” But since the Soviet shipments of arms had begun in July,
the situation had changed.
Kennedy then read from his September 4 and 13 public statements,
looking for a reaction. None was evident. The two leaders also discussed
the ongoing negotiations to restrict nuclear testing and Kennedy agreed
to see Khrushchev when the Soviet leader came to the United States for
the U.N. meeting in November.37
After Gromyko left, Rusk and Thompson stayed and President
Kennedy asked Lovett and Bundy to join them. Two years later Lovett
recalled their discussion as follows:38
[Kennedy] phoned down and asked me to come up to his office.

When I went in, there was the President, Dean Rusk, Llewellyn
Thompson, and that was all. At his suggestion, I went into Mrs.
37. Quotations are from the full State Department Memorandum of Conversation for the
meeting (A. Akalovsky was the notetaker), in National Security Archive, Cuban Missile Crisis
Files, 1992 Releases Box.
38. From an interview by Dorothy Fosdick for the John F. Kennedy Library Oral History
Project, 19 November 1964. The interview was only two years after the event, and Lovett had
kept substantial notes of the session that he had reexamined in preparing for this interview. So
Lincoln’s office to avoid the press which seemed to have taken over
that section of the office building [the north side of the West Wing
of the White House]. I learned that the reason for this was that
Gromyko had just left.
When I went into the President’s office [the Oval Office], he was
sitting in his rocking chair, with Rusk and Thompson on his left and
the sofa, on his right, vacant. He motioned Bundy and me to it. He
asked me if I had gotten the briefing and all the facts available, and I
said that I had. He grinned and said, “I ought to finish the story by
telling you about Gromyko who, in this very room not over 10 min-
utes ago, told more bare-faced lies than I have ever heard in so short
a time. All during his denial that the Russians had any missiles or
weapons, or anything else, in Cuba, I had the low-level pictures in the
center drawer of my desk and it was an enormous temptation to
show them to him.”39
The President then asked me what I thought of the situation
and I outlined briefly the philosophy which I felt would be appro-
priate here for the President to take, as well as the military steps
which seemed to be called for. I urged the quarantine route [Lovett
is using the term that later passed into common usage; it was then
still called the blockade] as the first step . . . and the matter was
discussed in some detail with Rusk and Thompson joining in.40
At about this stage of the discussion the door onto the Rose
Garden opened and the Attorney General came in and joined the dis-
cussion. The President asked me to repeat what I had previously
said, and I did so. Robert Kennedy asked two or three very searching
questions about the application of any blockade and indicated that he
felt as I did about the necessity for taking a less violent step at the
outset because, as he said, we could always blow the place up if neces-
sary but that might be unnecessary and then we would then be in the
position of having used too much force. He did not support one of the
we find the account an unusually detailed record of a key moment in the shaping of Kennedy’s
conclusions about how to proceed.
39. In fact they were not low-level pictures. Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba had not begun.
40. Lovett explained in the same oral history interview that he thought a tight blockade
should precede air strikes and a possible invasion. The blockade allowed a demonstration of
national will to persuade the Russians to withdraw their missiles without great bloodshed,
without appearing trigger-happy. His doubt, according to his notes of the time, “lay in the area
of the willingness of the Administration to follow through on a course of action undertaken by
it.” This meant a full blockade, not letting up until the objective was accomplished, and being
ready to escalate if necessary.
arguments which I had made to the effect that it might be contended

in the United Nations that we were guilty of an act of aggression if
we ordered an air strike or an invasion whereas the imposition of a
quarantine [blockade] could, I thought, be . . . justified far more eas-
ily on the grounds that we were trying to prevent an aggression by
removing the tools which might make it possible in the hands of the
Cubans. I was, however, delighted to see that he was apparently of
the same opinion that I was.
He also indicated that the President had received advice from
another source that a full-stage invasion should be made and that
still another adviser had strongly pled for an air strike. I remember
commenting that the President would undoubtedly receive two or
three more opinions, as I had observed it was a normal occupational
hazard in dealing with military matters to get three men together
and get at least four opinions.
A considerable amount of the discussion with the President cen-
tered on the possible reaction of the Russians and Thompson talked
on this point at some length. There seemed to be a consensus—by
this time various members of his staff had come in on three or four
occasions to tell the President that it was past dinnertime—that those
were risks which had to be taken in the national interest and as a mat-
ter of national and world security. The whole subject of the protection
of the Western Hemisphere was gone over at some length and finally
the Secretary of State and Ambassador Thompson withdrew [to go
to the Gromyko dinner that was beginning at 8:00] and the President
went over again three or four elements in this picture. The Attorney
General and I were asked to stay and join him for dinner.
As I had been through a rather rugged day, which started at 6:30
in the country, I asked the President’s leave to return to New York at
some reasonable hour and he smilingly agreed. I caught the last
shuttle out to LaGuardia [airport in New York City] and got home
after midnight.
President Kennedy returned to his residential quarters for dinner at

about 8:20. Meanwhile, at the State Department, meetings had contin-
ued with people coming and going. State’s acting legal adviser, Leonard
Meeker, had been brought into the deliberations to do a legal analysis of
blockade options. Meeker suggested the term defensive quarantine instead
of blockade.
At about 9:15 P.M. Kennedy called the group of advisers back to the
White House. Since the meeting was after hours, he dared not hold it in
the West Wing of the White House for fear that reporters would notice
and wonder. So the meeting was held in the Oval Room on the second
floor of the Executive Mansion. Therefore the session could not be tape-
recorded.
At this meeting there was continued agreement that the United
States must act, though Bundy voiced a dissenting view. The group gen-
erally agreed that U.S. action should probably start with a blockade
rather than an immediate attack. Kennedy discussed the timing of a pos-
sible announcement of the blockade and directed that detailed planning
begin. The meeting broke up sometime near midnight.
After the others left, President Kennedy went to the Oval Office, pos-
sibly accompanied by his brother. Aware that he had been unable to
record the meeting, President Kennedy turned on the recording machine
there in the Oval Office and began to dictate.
President Kennedy: [Unclear], Secretary [Robert] McNamara, Deputy

Secretary [Roswell] Gilpatric, General [Maxwell] Taylor, Attorney
General [Robert Kennedy], George Ball, Alexis Johnson, Ed Martin,
McGeorge Bundy, Ted Sorensen.41 During the course of the day, opinions
had obviously switched from the advantages of a first strike on the mis-
sile sites and on Cuban aviation to a blockade.
Dean Acheson, with whom I talked this afternoon, stated that while he
was uncertain about any of the courses, favored the first strike as being
most likely to achieve our result and less likely to cause an extreme Soviet
reaction. That strike would take place just against the missile sites.
When I saw Robert Lovett, later after talking to Gromyko, he was
not convinced that any action was desirable. He felt that the missile
strike, the first strike, would be very destructive to our alliances. The
Soviets would inevitably bring about a reprisal; that we would be blamed
for it—particularly if the reprisal was to seize Berlin. And that we’d be
regarded as having brought about the loss of Berlin with inadequate
provocation, they having lived with these intermediate-range ballistic
missiles for years.
Bundy continued to argue against any action on the grounds that
there would be, inevitably, a Soviet reprisal against Berlin and that this
41. These were apparently the participants in the White House meeting that had just ended.
Dean Rusk and Llewellyn Thompson had stayed at the State Department attending the dinner
for Gromyko, which dragged on until after midnight.
would divide our alliance and that we would bear that responsibility. He
felt we would be better off to merely take note of the existence of these
missiles, and to wait until the crunch comes in Berlin, and not play what
he thought might be the Soviet game.
Everyone else felt that for us to fail to respond would throw into
question our willingness to respond over Berlin, [and] would divide our
allies and our country. [They felt] that we would be faced with a crunch
over Berlin in two or three months and that by that time the Soviets
would have a large missile arsenal in the Western Hemisphere which
would weaken our whole position in this hemisphere and cause us, and
face us with the same problems we’re going to have in Berlin anyway.
The consensus was that we should go ahead with the blockade begin-
ning on Sunday night. Originally we should begin by blockading Soviets
against the shipment of additional offensive capacity, [and] that we
could tighten the blockade as the situation requires. I was most anxious
that we not have to announce a state of war existing, because it would
obviously be bad to have the word go out that we were having a war
rather than that it was a limited blockade for a limited purpose.
It was determined that I should go ahead with my speeches so that we
don’t take the cover off this, and come back Saturday night [October 20].
President Kennedy then turned off the tape recorder.

578 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
Friday, October 19, 1962
To the press and public, this was a day on which the President was sched-
uled to fly to Cleveland, Ohio, and then on to Illinois for speeches and
activities in Springfield and Chicago. But before leaving town, Kennedy
wanted to confer secretly and directly with his military leaders.
9:45–10:30 A.M.
This blockade and political action, I see leading into war. I

don’t see any other solution for it. It will lead right into war.
This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis1
Continuing their analysis of earlier U-2 photography, National Photo-
graphic Interpretation Center analysts confirmed that the two MRBM
sites near San Cristobal each had a regiment with eight SS-4s on launch-
ers and eight more at hand for a second salvo. They pronounced both
sites already operational. They had found another regiment of SS-4s east
of Havana near Sagua La Grande. They expected these eight missiles to
be operational within a week.
Although they had still spotted no IRBMs, the suppositions of the
day before were hardening into a certainty that the two sites near
Guanajay were intended for 2,200-mile-range SS-5s. The photos showed
permanent construction, for SS-5s were too big and heavy to be fired
from mobile launchers. And it was the construction pattern that was the
giveaway, for they had not only seen it in photographs of the Soviet
Union; they had technical data supplied by the spy Oleg Penkovsky.
Seeing evidence of a nuclear warhead storage site in the area, the ana-
1. Including President Kennedy, George Anderson, Curtis LeMay, Robert McNamara, David
Shoup, Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler. Tape 31.2, John F. Kennedy Library, President’s
Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Cuban Missile Crisis 579
lysts predicted that the IRBMs would be up and operational in six to

eight weeks.2
The Joint Chiefs of Staff met at 9:00. Taylor told them about the pre-
vious night’s meeting and that the President and his advisers were lean-
ing toward a blockade of some kind. He said President Kennedy wanted
to see them in a few minutes. The Chiefs agreed to recommend a massive
air strike against Cuban military targets with no advance warning. They
disagreed on the question of invasion; Taylor resisted this step. They
then drove to the White House. McNamara joined them for their meet-
ing with the President.
President Kennedy’s view of the Joint Chiefs was respectful but
skeptical, with a touch of the former junior Navy officer’s attitude
toward top brass. His most recent experience with the military in a cri-
sis had angered him —not for the first time. On September 30, only a
few weeks earlier, at the peak of the crisis over the admission of a black
student, James Meredith, to the University of Mississippi, Kennedy had
called on troops to provide security amid violent chaos on the campus.
He had felt the military was unresponsive, remarking at one point to an
aide (with the tape recorder running) that “They always give you their
bullshit about their instant reaction and their split-second timing, but it
never works out. No wonder it’s so hard to win a war.”
The Chiefs filed into the Cabinet Room at 9:45. Taylor was accompa-
nied by Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay, a formidably competent fig-
ure then widely respected in the country for his prowess as a leader and
organizer both during World War II and in the creation of the Air Force’s
Strategic Air Command. With them was Chief of Naval Operations
George Anderson, a tall, handsome admiral who looked as if Hollywood
had cast him for the part. Anderson was widely admired in the Navy as a
“sailor’s sailor,” and his sermons on clean living had earned him the nick-
name “Straight Arrow.” There was also Army Chief of Staff Earle
Wheeler, whose reputation had been earned as a brilliant staff officer and
Washington planner. Marine Corps commandant David Shoup had the
opposite reputation. Shoup had won the Medal of Honor on the blood-
soaked atoll of Tarawa in 1943 but was known, by 1962, as uninformed or
erratic in the paper battles of the Pentagon. President Kennedy turned on
the recorder in the Cabinet Room as the meeting began.
2. The estimates briefed on 19 October were written down in a joint estimate of GMAIC,
JAEIC, and NPIC, “Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba,” 19 October 1962.
580 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
Maxwell Taylor: Mr. President, as you know, we’ve been meeting on

this subject ever since we discovered the presence of missiles in Cuba.
And I would say the debates in our own midst have followed very closely
in parallel those that you’ve heard from your other advisers.
From the outset I would say that we felt we were united on the mili-
tary requirement: we could not accept Cuba as a missile base; that we
should either eliminate or neutralize the missiles there and prevent any
others coming in. From a military point of view that meant three things.
First, attack with the benefit of surprise those known missiles and
offensive weapons that we knew about. Secondly, continued surveillance
then to see what the effect would be. And third, a blockade to prevent the
others from coming in.
I would say, again, from a military point of view, that seemed clear.
We were united on that.
There has been one point, the importance of which we recognize,
where we have never really firmed up our own position. Namely, the
political requirements and the measures to offset the obvious political
disabilities of this course of action. We know it’s not an easy course of
action, and it has at least two serious weaknesses.
The first is we’re never sure of getting all the missiles and the offen-
sive weapons if we fire a strike. Secondly, we see—all of us, all your advis-
ers—that there would be a very damaging effect of this on our alliances.
To offset that, I have reported back some of the political measures
considered. I think most of us would say we recognize that some of those
things must be done, although they would be at some loss to our mili-
tary effectiveness of our strikes. I reported the trend last night which
I’ve detected for a couple of days, to move away from what I would call a
straight military solution toward one based on military measures plus
blockade. And that has been reported to the Chiefs this morning. I’ve
taken the task Mr. McNamara assigned last night and we’re working on
that at this time.3
I think the benefit this morning, Mr. President, would be for you to
hear the other Chiefs’ comments either on our basic, what I call the mili-
tary plan, or how they would see the blockade plan.
3. Very late on 18 October Gilpatric, acting for McNamara, asked that the Chiefs work on how
to help Latin American countries with their internal security, which of these countries could
help the United States blockade Cuba, which offensive weapons should be included in a block-
ade, the possibility of blockading aircraft as well as ships, and related questions.
President Kennedy: Let me just say a little, first, about what the
problem is, from my point of view.
First, I think we ought to think of why the Russians did this. Well,
actually, it was a rather dangerous but rather useful play of theirs. If we
do nothing, they have a missile base there with all the pressure that
brings to bear on the United States and damage to our prestige.
If we attack Cuba, the missiles, or Cuba, in any way then it gives
them a clear line to take Berlin, as they were able to do in Hungary
under the Anglo war in Egypt. We will have been regarded as—they
think we’ve got this fixation about Cuba anyway—we would be regarded
as the trigger-happy Americans who lost Berlin. We would have no sup-
port among our allies. We would affect the West Germans’ attitude
towards us. And [people would believe] that we let Berlin go because we
didn’t have the guts to endure a situation in Cuba. After all, Cuba is
5[,000] or 6,000 miles from them. They don’t give a damn about Cuba.
And they do care about Berlin and about their own security. So they
would say that we endangered their interests and security and reunifica-
tion [of Germany] and all the rest, because of the preemptive action
that we took in Cuba. So I think they’ve got . . . I must say I think it’s a
very satisfactory position from their point of view. If you take the view
that what really . . .
And thirdly, if we do nothing then they’ll have these missiles and
they’ll be able to say that any time we ever try to do anything about
Cuba, that they’ll fire these missiles. So that I think it’s dangerous, but
rather satisfactory, from their point of view.
If you take the view, really, that what’s basic to them is Berlin and
there isn’t any doubt [about that]. In every conversation we’ve had with
the Russians, that’s what . . . Even last night we [Soviet foreign minister
Andrei Gromyko and I] talked about Cuba for a while, but Berlin—
that’s what Khrushchev’s committed himself to personally. So, actually,
it’s a quite desirable situation from their point of view.
Now, that’s what makes our problem so difficult. If we go in and take
them out on a quick air strike, we neutralize the chance of danger to the
United States of these missiles being used, and we prevent a situation
from arising, at least within Cuba, where the Cubans themselves have
the means of exercising some degree of authority in this hemisphere.
On the other hand, we increase the chance greatly, as I think they—
there’s bound to be a reprisal from the Soviet Union, there always is—of
their just going in and taking Berlin by force at some point. Which leaves
me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons—which is a hell
of an alternative—and begin a nuclear exchange, with all this happening.
582 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
On the other hand, if we begin the blockade that we’re talking about,
the chances are they will begin a blockade and say that we started it.
And there’ll be some question about the attitude of the Europeans. So
that, once again, they will say that there will be this feeling in Europe
that the Berlin blockade has been commenced by our blockade.
So I don’t think we’ve got any satisfactory alternatives. When we
balance off that our problem is not merely Cuba but it is also Berlin and
when we recognize the importance of Berlin to Europe, and recognize
the importance of our allies to us, that’s what has made this thing be a
dilemma for three days. Otherwise, our answer would be quite easy.
Curtis LeMay: Mr. President—
President Kennedy: On the other hand, we’ve got to do something.
Because if we do nothing, we’re going to have the problem of Berlin any-
way. That was very clear last night [in the meeting with Gromyko]. We’re
going to have this thing stuck right in our guts, in about two months
[when the IRBMs are operational]. And so we’ve got to do something.
Now the question really is, what are we . . . let’s see. [Apparently read-
ing passages from a document.] Three . . . [unclear]. It’s safe to say that
two of these missiles [sites] are operational now; [missiles] can be
launched within 18 hours after the decision to fire has been reached.
We’ve seen [unclear] already alerted. These missiles could be launched
within 18 hours after the decision to fire. We have now located 12 fixed
launch pads near Havana. They’d [the IRBMs] be ready in December of
’62. It says [unclear] additional missiles may be [unclear] . . . nuclear
storage [unclear] . . . yields in the low megaton range. Communication,
targeting, and an integrated air defense system is now nearing opera-
tional status. What does that mean, integrated?
Taylor: That means that we’re hearing electronic emissions now,
suggesting that they have sectors for the air defense of Cuba. I believe
this is the latest intelligence here.
President Kennedy: I just wanted to say that these were some of the
problems that we have been considering. Now I’d be glad to hear from . . .
Taylor: Well, I would just say one thing and then turn it over to
General LeMay. We recognize all these things, Mr. President. But I
think we’d all be unanimous in saying that really our strength in Berlin,
our strength anyplace in the world, is the credibility of our response
under certain conditions. And if we don’t respond here in Cuba, we think
the credibility of our response in Berlin is endangered.
President Kennedy: That’s right. That’s right. So that’s why we’ve
got to respond. Now the question is: What kind of response?
LeMay: Well, I certainly agree with everything General Taylor has
said. I’d emphasize, a little strongly perhaps, that we don’t have any
choice except direct military action. If we do this blockade that’s pro-
posed and political action, the first thing that’s going to happen is your
missiles are going to disappear into the woods, particularly your mobile
ones.4 Now, we can’t find them then, regardless of what we do, and then
we’re going to take some damage if we try to do anything later on.
President Kennedy: Well, can’t there be some of these undercover
now, in the sense of not having been delivered?
LeMay: There is a possibility of that. But the way they’ve lined these
others up—I would have say that it’s a small possibility. If they were
going to hide any of them, then I would think they would have hid them
all. I don’t think there are any hid. So the only danger we have if we
haven’t picked up some that are setting there in plain sight. This is pos-
sible. If we do low-altitude photography over them, this is going to be a
tip-off too.
Now, as for the Berlin situation, I don’t share your view that if we
knock off Cuba, they’re going to knock off Berlin. We’ve got the Berlin
problem staring us in the face anyway. If we don’t do anything to Cuba,
then they’re going to push on Berlin and push real hard because they’ve
got us on the run. If we take military action against Cuba, then I think
that the . . .
President Kennedy: What do you think their reprisal would be?
LeMay: I don’t think they’re going to make any reprisal if we tell
them that the Berlin situation is just like it’s always been. If they make a
move we’re going to fight. Now I don’t think this changes the Berlin sit-
uation at all, except you’ve got to make one more statement on it.
So I see no other solution. This blockade and political action, I see
leading into war. I don’t see any other solution for it. It will lead right
into war. This is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.
[Pause.]
Because if this [unclear] blockade comes along, their MiGs are going
to fly. The IL-28s are going to fly against us. And we’re just going to
gradually drift into a war under conditions that are at great disadvan-
tage to us, with missiles staring us in the face, that can knock out our
airfields in the southeastern portion [of the United States]. And if they
4. In fact the SS-4 MRBMs, the only type which were mobile, were far too large to move into
dense woods, especially with all their associated equipment. But it took a few more days before
U.S. officials comprehended this limitation. The SS-5 IRBMs were to be deployed at fixed con-
crete sites.
584 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
use nuclear weapons, it’s the population down there. We just drift into a
war under conditions that we don’t like. I just don’t see any other solu-
tion except direct military intervention right now.
George Anderson: Well, Mr. President, I feel that the course of
action recommended to you by the Chiefs from the military point of view
is the right one. I think it’s the best one from the political point of view.
I’ll address myself to the alternative of the blockade. If we institute a
blockade, from a military point of view we can carry it out. It is easier
for us and requires less forces if we institute a complete blockade rather
than a partial blockade, because instituting a partial blockade involves
visit and search of all of these neutral ships, and taking them in, perhaps,
to ports, will certainly cause a great deal more concern on the part of the
neutrals, than if we go ahead and institute a complete blockade.
If we institute a complete blockade, we are immediately having a con-
frontation with the Soviet Union because it’s the Soviet-bloc ships which
are taking the material to Cuba.
The blockade will not affect the equipment that is already in Cuba, and
will provide the Russians in Cuba time to assemble all of these missiles, to
assemble the IL-28s, to get the MiGs and their command and control sys-
tem ready to go. And I feel that, as this goes on, I agree with General
LeMay that this will escalate and then we will be required to take other
military action at greater disadvantage to the United States, to our mili-
tary forces, and probably would suffer far greater casualties within the
United States if these fanatics do indeed intend to fire any missiles.
We certainly cannot guarantee under those circumstances that we
could prevent damage and loss of life in the United States itself. I think
we have a good chance of greatly minimizing any loss of life within the
United States under the present conditions, if we act fairly soon,
although we do recognize they’re moving very fast. I do not see that, as
long as the Soviet Union is supporting Cuba, that there is any solution
to the Cuban problem except a military solution.
On the other hand, we recognize fully the relationship to the Berlin
situation. The Communists have got in this case a master situation, from
their point of view, where every course of action posed to us is character-
ized by unpleasantries and disadvantages. It’s the same thing as Korea
all over again, only on a grander scale.
We recognize the great difficulty of a military solution in Berlin. I
think, on balance, the taking [of] positive, prompt affirmative action in
Berlin demonstrating the confidence, the ability, the resolution of the
United States on balance, I would judge it, would be to deter the Russians
from more aggressive acts in Berlin and, if we didn’t take anything, they’d
feel that we were weak. So I subscribe fully to the concept recommended
by the Joint Chiefs.
President Kennedy: It seems to me that we have to assume that just
when our two military . . . When we grabbed their two U.N. people [as
spies] and they threw two of ours out [of the Moscow embassy], we’ve
got to assume there’s going to be—
Anderson: Tit for tat.
President Kennedy: —that they would strike this . . . I mean they can’t
do it [accept our attack] any more than we can let these go on without
doing something. They can’t let us just take out, after all their statements,
take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians and not do anything.
It’s quite obvious that what they . . . I would think they would do, is
try to get Berlin. But that may be a risk we have to take, but it would
seem to me . . .
LeMay: Well, history has been, I think, the other way, Mr. President.
Where we have taken a strong stand they have backed off. In Lebanon,
for instance.5
Taylor: I would agree, Mr. President. I think from the point of view
of face they’ll do something. But I think it will be considerably less,
depending on the posture we show here. I can’t really see them putting
the screws in. The dangers of hitting Berlin are just as great or greater
after our action down here, because we have our—
President Kennedy: Right. But I think they’re going to wait for three
months until they get these things [the IRBMs as well as the MRBMs]
all ready, and then squeeze us in Berlin. The only thing, at that point, for
what it is worth [and] it may not be worth much, but at least we’d have
the support of Europe this way.
Taylor: That is true.
President Kennedy: We have to figure that Europe will regard this
action . . . no matter what pictures we show afterwards of [missiles] as
having been . . .
Taylor: I think that’s right.
Earle Wheeler: Mr. President, in my judgment, from a military point
of view, the lowest-risk course of action if we’re thinking of protecting
5. A landing of thousands of U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1958 was unopposed, and the blood-
less action was believed to have prevented a takeover of Lebanon by anti-Western dissidents
supported by the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union.
586 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
the people of the United States against a possible strike on us is to go

ahead with a surprise air strike, the blockade, and an invasion because
these series of actions progressively will give us increasing assurance
that we really have got the offensive capability of the Cuban-Soviets cor-
nered. Now admittedly, we can never be absolutely sure until and unless
we actually occupy the island.
Now, I’ve also taken into consideration a couple of other things at the
present time. To date, Khrushchev has not really confronted us with
Soviet power. In other words, he has not declared Cuba a part of the
Warsaw Pact. Nor has he made an announcement that this is a Soviet
base, although I think that there is a chance that he may do this at any
time, particularly later in November when he comes to the United States.
And this course of action would then immediately have us confronting
the Soviets and not Cuba. And at that time Soviet prestige, world pres-
tige, would be at stake, which it is not at the present time.
The effect of this base in Cuba, it seems to me, has at least two siz-
able advantages from his point of view and two sizable disadvantages
from our point of view.
First, the announcement of a Soviet base in Cuba would immediately
have a profound effect in all of Latin America at least and probably
worldwide because the question would arise: Is the United States inca-
pable of doing something about it or unwilling to do something about it?
In other words, it would attack our prestige.
Not only that. Increasingly, they can achieve a sizable increase in
offensive Soviet strike capabilities against the United States, which they
do not now have. They do have ICBMs that are targeted on us, but they
are in limited numbers. Their air force is not by any manner of means of
the magnitude and capability that they probably would desire. And this
short-range missile force gives them a sort of a quantum jump in their
capability to inflict damage on the United States. And so as I say, from a
military point of view, I feel that the lowest risk course of action is the
full gamut of military action by us. That’s it, sir.
President Kennedy: Thank you, General.
David Shoup: Mr. President, there’s a question in my mind. Under
what circumstance would Cuba want to inflict damage on the United
States? The placing of the kind of weapons and the bombers that can do
that certainly demand a hell of a lot of attention. There’s one feature of
this that I’ve been unable to reconcile. And I wonder whether the
American people and the other nations of the world can reconcile it. That
is that we are now so anxious or we’re discussing the anxiety of eliminat-
ing the possibility of damage to America from the Cuban area, whereas for
a good many months the world has known, and we’ve known, that we have
tremendously greater potential already aimed in on us from Russia and it
has been for many months. And we didn’t attack Russia. I think that’s a
hard thing to reconcile, at least it is in my mind, and I would think it
would be in the American public and other nations of the world. If it’s a
matter of distance, that it’s closer now, well, missiles land pretty . . . If they
have nuclear warheads down there, we know they have them in Russia. So
if they want to inflict damage, it’s a question of whether Khrushchev
wants to have them do it, and him keep out of it.
So if there is a requirement to eliminate this threat of damage, then
it’s going to take some sizable forces to do it. And as we wait and wait
and wait, then it will take greater forces to do it.
And as long as it isn’t done, then those forces . . . increasingly
requirements for greater forces will be absolutely tied to that function.
They’re going to have to stand by to take care of that function. And you
will then have a considerable force of troops, ships, aircraft tied to this
requirement that some day may happen.
I can’t conceive that they [the Cubans] would attack us just for the
fun of it. They might do it at the direction of Khrushchev. But I cannot
see why they would attack us because they couldn’t invade and take us.
So there’s a question in my mind, in the political area and as I say the
public and the people, what does this mean?
Does it mean they’re [Cuba] getting ready to attack us, that little
pipsqueak of a place? If so, Russia has a hell of a lot better way to attack
us than to attack us from Cuba.
Then, in my mind, this all devolves upon the fact that they [the
Soviets] do have it. They can damage us increasingly every day. And
each day that they increase, we have to have a more sizable force tied to
this problem and then they’re not available in case something happens
someplace else. And each time you then have to take some action in
Berlin, South Vietnam, Korea, you would be degrading. You’d have to
degrade your capability against this ever-increasing force in Cuba.
So that, in my opinion, if we want to eliminate this threat that is now
closer, but it’s not nearly the threat that we’ve experienced all these
months and months, if we want to eliminate it, then we’re going to have
to go in there and do it in a full-time job to eliminate the threat against
us. Then if you want to take over the place and really put in a new gov-
ernment that is non-Communist, then you’ll have to invade the place.
And if that decision is made, we must go in with plenty of insurance of a
decisive success and as quick as possible.
President Kennedy: Well, it is a fact that the number of missiles
588 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
there, let’s say . . . no matter what they put in there, we could live today
under. If they don’t have enough ICBMs today, they’re going to have
them in a year. They obviously are putting in a lot of—
LeMay: This increases their accuracy against the 50 targets that we
know that they could hit now.
But the big thing is, if we leave them there, is the blackmail threat
against not only us but the other South American countries that they
may decide to operate against.
There’s one other factor that I didn’t mention that’s not quite in our
field, [which] is the political factor. But you invited us to comment on this
at one time. And that is that we have had a talk about Cuba and the SAM
sites down there. And you have made some pretty strong statements about
their being defensive and that we would take action against offensive
weapons. I think that a blockade and political talk would be considered by
a lot of our friends and neutrals as being a pretty weak response to this.
And I’m sure a lot of our own citizens would feel that way, too.
In other words, you’re in a pretty bad fix at the present time.
President Kennedy: What did you say?
LeMay: You’re in a pretty bad fix.
President Kennedy: You’re in there with me. [Slight laughter, a bit
forced.] Personally.
Taylor: With regard to the blockade plan, Mr. President, I say we’re
studying it now to see all the implications. We’re not . . . we really
haven’t gone into it deeply. There are two things that strike us from the
outset. One is the difficulty of maintaining surveillance. We just don’t
see how they can do that without taking losses and getting into some
form of air warfare over this island.
Second, there is the problem of Guantánamo, which is a curious
obstacle to us to some degree. I might ask Admiral Anderson to com-
ment on how we can protect our position in Guantánamo during a state
of blockade.
Anderson: Well, our position in Guantánamo becomes increasingly vul-
nerable because certainly the imposition of the blockade is going to infuri-
ate the Cubans and they have got a mass of militia and they can come on
around Guantánamo. And I don’t know whether they would actually attack
Guantánamo or not. But we would certainly have to provide increased
forces around there to defend Guantánamo, which we’re in the process of
reinforcing right now. Also, they have these short-range cruise missiles.
They have three groups of those primarily for coast defense. Their MiGs,
their aircraft, all pose a threat to Guantánamo. So the threat is greatly
increased and intensified during the course of a blockade.
Taylor: I think Guantánamo is going to cease to be a useful naval base

and become more of a fortress more or less in a permanent state of siege.
President Kennedy: If we were going to do the . . . There’s a good
deal of difference between taking a strike which strikes just the missiles
that are involved—that’s one action which has a certain effect, an escalat-
ing effect. The other is to do a strike which takes out all the planes, that’s
very much of an island sweep. Third is the invasion, which takes a period
of 14 days or so by the time we get it mounted. Maybe 18 days. Well we
have to assume that—I don’t know what—the Soviet response to each of
these would have to be different. If one were slowly building up to an
invasion and fighting our way across the island . . . That’s a different situ-
ation from taking out these offensive weapons. It seems to you that—
LeMay: I think we have got to do more than take out the missiles,
because if you don’t take out their air at the same time you’re vulnerable
down in that section of the world [unclear] strikes from their air. They
could come in at low altitude and do it. Because we haven’t got much of a
low altitude capability.
In addition, that air would be used against any other surveillance you
have, too. So if you take out the missiles, I think you’ve got to take out
their air along with it, and their radar, and their communications, the
whole works. It just doesn’t make any sense to do anything but that.
President Kennedy: Well, except that what . . . they’ve had the air
there for some time. And what we’ve talked about is having ground-to-
ground missiles.
There isn’t any . . . You know, as I say, the problem is not really some
war against Cuba. But the problem is part of this worldwide struggle
where we face the Communists, particularly, as I say, over Berlin. And
with the loss of Berlin, the effect of that and the responsibility we would
bear. As I say, I think the Egyptian and the Hungary thing are the obvi-
ous parallels that I’m concerned about.
LeMay: If you lose in Cuba you’re going to get more and more pres-
sure right on Berlin. I’m sure of that.
Taylor: This worldwide problem has certainly been before us, Mr.
President. We haven’t ignored it. For me, it’s been a deterrent to my
enthusiasm for any invasion of Cuba, as I think you know.
On the other hand, now that we’ve seen that it’s not just going to be
a place where they needle us by mobile missiles as I thought perhaps
earlier in the week, but really an organized base where the numbers of
missile complexes are—
President Kennedy: Of course General Shoup’s point, which is also
made, is that there isn’t any doubt [that] if it isn’t today, it’s within a
590 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
year they’re going to have enough. . . . when we’ve talked about the num-
ber of ICBMs they have. They may not be quite as accurate. [But]
they’ve got enough, they put them on the cities and you know how soon
these casualty figures [mount up]—80 million, whether it’s 80 or 100—
you’re talking about the destruction of a country. So that it . . . just
regardless if you begin to duplicate your . . .
Taylor: And we lose our—
President Kennedy: You’ll lose it all on cities.
Taylor: And we can never talk about invading again, after they get
these missiles, because they’ve got these pointed at our head.
President Kennedy: Well, the logical argument is that we don’t really
have to invade Cuba. That’s not really . . . That’s just one of the difficulties
that we live with in life, like we live with the Soviet Union and China.
That problem, however, is after . . . for us not to do anything, then wait
until he brings up Berlin. And then we can’t do anything about Cuba.
But I do think we ought to be aware of the fact that the existence of
these missiles does add to the danger but doesn’t create it. The danger is
right there now. They’ve got enough to give us, between submarines and
ICBMs, or whatever planes they do have, I mean now they can kill, espe-
cially if they concentrate on the cities, I mean they’ve pretty well got us
there anyway.
Taylor: And by logic we ought to be able to say we can deter these
missiles as well as the Soviet missiles, the ones from the Soviet Union. I
think the thing that worries us, however, is that these [being] in poten-
tially under the control of Castro. Castro would be quite a different fel-
low to own missiles than Khrushchev. I don’t think that’s the case now,
and perhaps Khrushchev would never willingly do so. But there’s always
the risk of their falling into Cuban hands.
Shoup: Mr. President, one other item about the Guantánamo thing.
Any initiative on our part immediately gives them the—I don’t know the
authority—but the right probably to let fly at Guantánamo. And thus,
the weapons that they have, including now another SAM site or two at
work on the place, plus surface-to-surface missiles . . . They have a con-
siderable number of gun emplacements within range of Guantánamo. So
unless something is done to also at the same time neutralize this ability
to take on Guantánamo, well Guantánamo is in one hell of a fix.
President Kennedy: The only thing is, General, it’s going to take us . . .
before we could . . . what can we do about Guantánamo if we do this air
strike and they retaliate on Guantánamo?
Anderson: Mr. President, our thinking on Guantánamo is this. We’re
reinforcing it right now, building up the strength for the defense of

Guantánamo. We have air all earmarked to suppress the weapons which
would be brought to bear immediately on Guantánamo. We would evacu-
ate the dependents from Guantánamo immediately prior to the air strike;
get them clear. I think that with the forces that we’ve put in there and the
air that is available, we can handle the situation in Guantánamo.
LeMay: The bulk of the naval air is available to defend Guantánamo.
Taylor: This can go on indefinitely. This could become a sort of
Cuban Quemoy, where they shell us on odd days and make strikes and
things of that sort.6 There’s no end in sight, really.
Anderson: Unless you carry on, yeah.
Taylor: That’s right. I see.
Shoup: It eliminates the airfield there, in a sense so we can operate.
They can bombard; then we can fix it; and we can operate. But it certainly
terrifically reduces the potential value of the airfields there, the potential
value of the shipping area, and what you then have is just a hunk of dirt
that you’re hanging on to for pride, prestige, political reasons, or what
have you.
Taylor: It’s a liability, actually.
Shoup: It becomes of no value unless [we destroy] the weapons and
that, of course, includes your doggone airplanes that can bomb it. Unless
the weapons that can cause trouble there are eliminated, all you have is a
hunk of dirt that’s taken a hell of a lot of people to hang on to.
President Kennedy: Well, let me ask you this. If we go ahead with this
air strike, either on the missiles or on the missiles and the planes, I under-
stand the recommendation is to do both. When could that be ready?
LeMay: We can be ready for attack at dawn on the 21st [Sunday],
that being the earliest possible date. The optimum date would be
Tuesday morning [October 23].
Taylor: Tuesday is the optimum date.
President Kennedy: I suppose with this news now . . . They’ve got
two of them [MRBM sites] ready, we’re running out of time, are we?
Taylor: This is the mobile missiles you’re referring to sir? I have not
seen that.
Robert McNamara: Mr. President, I think it’s highly questionable
6. Taylor is suggesting an analogy between the potential Cuban harassment of Guantánamo and
China’s continuing shelling beginning in 1958 of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu,
held by Taiwan, accompanied by China’s threats to invade both these islands and Taiwan itself.
592 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
that they have two ready. This says . . . it’s best to assume they do, but
the best information we have indicates it’s still highly [doubtful].
President Kennedy: Why is it Tuesday instead of Sunday, General?
What’s the argument for that?
LeMay: Well—
President Kennedy: We can’t hold this much longer.
Taylor: We were told to get ready as fast as possible. We aren’t rec-
ommending Sunday. We’d prefer Tuesday.
President Kennedy: Well, the only problem I see is that it starts to
break out in the papers.
LeMay: Well, we would prefer Tuesday. Here’s the only reason. We’ve
had this plan for some time.
Some outside noise begins to interfere with general sound quality. For
several minutes, only fragments of conversations are audible.
McNamara: For the U-2 photography we’ll have complete coverage
of the island, interpreted I would guess by late today.
President Kennedy: So then just—
Taylor: This morning I asked the question, Bob, and the estimate
was later than that to see everything [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, let’s say it’s this evening then. But you say
that would be Monday. It’s just really a question of how long this thing
can hold without getting out.
Taylor: Mr. President, I’ve never been impressed with the argument
of some of your advisers on that point. It seems to me we’ve had so many
reports out of Cuba we can shrug them all off as rumors that [unclear].
President Kennedy: Well, when is that you begin to tell so many of
the military that there’s going to be this strike, that there’s a chance of it
getting out? The pilots and so on and their families.
Taylor: I don’t think . . . The danger is minimal. The danger is mini-
mal. The last time we spoke to these pilots—and we are briefing pilots
today—it’s not a very large number of pilots—it’s only a briefing on
these particular subjects. The other srikes are all [unclear].
President Kennedy: How effective is an air strike of this kind gener-
ally against a missile base?
LeMay: Well, I think we can guarantee hitting them.
President Kennedy: If it doesn’t take care of the mobile, what does it
do to them? [Unclear.]
Le May: The mobile missiles aren’t the problem. It’s the other ones,
where there isn’t much there [unclear] are now [unclear].
Anderson: But these are [unclear].
Taylor: [Unclear] the island.

Taylor: Twenty thousand [unclear].
Anderson: You could hit it with a rocket or something like that, but
[unclear] more important.
President Kennedy: Then, now the invasion would take . . .
Taylor: Seven days after the air strike you could start the invasion
going on for about 11 days.
President Kennedy: It would go on for 11 days and then we would . . .
We would, in other words, be prepared for it, but not necessarily . . . we’d
still have seven days to decide whether we want to go in.
Taylor: We have flexibility. Once we strike we would start moving
[unclear] even though you didn’t decide that [unclear].
Wheeler: Mr. President, going back to the relationships between
Cuba and Berlin. And I certainly feel that the Soviets have concocted
what they think is a masterful strategy.
There is no acceptable military solution to the Berlin problem, whereas
there is in Cuba. There’s no acceptable political-economic solution to
the Cuban problem. Conceivably, a solution to the Berlin problem lies in
the diplomatic-economic-political field, if we put enough pressure on the
Soviet bloc.
Now if we act in Cuba and they respond by making immediately a
treaty with the East Germans and surrounding Berlin, denying our access
to Berlin, our garrison—the people in Berlin—can survive there for a
long time, assuming that the Russians are not just overrunning the city
with their own troops. Could we not apply sufficient diplomatic-economic-
financial pressures to the entire Soviet bloc and gradually expand this so
that we, for a suitable period of time, we’re progressively cutting the
Soviet bloc off from their access to most of the countries in the free world?
And at the same time have some sort of an acceptable, what would appear
to be an acceptable long-range political solution to all of Berlin?
Forty-eight seconds excised as classified information.
President Kennedy: In any case, there’s no . . . unfortunately. I’m just
thinking we come out second-best. So we just . . . I think there’s a meeting
at eleven. I might as well continue with my tour because [unclear] surface
all this, and we’ll be back in touch tonight. I’m probably [unclear].
I appreciate your views. As I said, I’m sure we all understand how
rather unsatisfactory our alternatives are. The argument for the block-
ade was that what we want to do is to avoid, if we can, nuclear war by
escalation or imbalance. The Soviets increase; we use [force]; they
blockade Berlin. They blockade for military purposes. Then we take an
594 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
initial action so that . . . We’ve got to have some degree of control. Those
people [the Soviets] last night were so away from reality that there’s no
telling what the response would be.
Taylor: Did he [Gromyko] give any clue, Mr. President?
President Kennedy: Well, he talked tough about Berlin. On Cuba he
really just talked about their defensive aspirations. He said, “We’re only
sending defensive weapons in.” Of course, that’s how they define these
weapons, as defensive.
Taylor: Well, Mr. President—
President Kennedy: General Shoup, your point is not to argue against
action by saying that we’ve been living with this sort of thing for years.
Shoup: A lot of people advance that. That is a real question for a rec-
onciliation, for our people, and you and everybody else when . . . We’ve
had a hell of a lot more than this aimed at us, and we didn’t attack it. But
they’re closer, their distance is closer, and as General LeMay pointed
out, there are certain areas in which he will certainly get in, if, as I pre-
sume, we’re going to take him on.
President Kennedy: Well, I think . . . I don’t think that it adds partic-
ularly to our danger. I think our danger is the use of nuclear weapons
[unclear] anyway. Particularly on urban sites. With submarines and
planes. They’ve got enough now; they sure will have in a year’s [time]. I
don’t think that’s probably the major argument. The major argument is
the political effect on United States [unclear] Cuba. The certainty is the
invasion is key for us.
On the other hand, there are going to be a lot of people that are just
going to move away from us, figuring that our . . . I mean, we haven’t
prepared [unclear] existence. There isn’t any doubt if we announce evi-
dence of the missile sites, most people, including the Soviets would take
a provocative act. Instead, the first announcement may be, under the
plan suggested, an act that we took. So that we’ve got a real problem in
maintaining the alliance.
Wheeler: Today . . . am I clear that you are addressing yourself as to
whether anything at all should be done?
Wheeler: But that if military action is to be taken, you agree with us.
Shoup: I question how to reconcile . . . the last thing you really want
is [unclear] less threat than you’ve had for a long time.
Taylor: Mr. President, may I mention one thing before you go on
because time is running out: the question of the low-level [reconnais-
sance] flights to get evidence. We discussed [them] last night and we’re
prepared to do them tomorrow. I’m a little concerned about doing that if
there’s any likelihood of our following a military course.
President Kennedy: Exactly. Oh, I agree. That’s why we’ve got—
McNamara: No question that we should not undertake those until a
decision has been made as to which course of action would—presumably
you’re ready?
LeMay: Yes, sir. We are.
McNamara: Good.
LeMay: [Unclear.]
Taylor: Thank you very much, Mr. President. We appreciate the
chance to talk with you.
Anderson: Sir, did you make a decision on the [unclear], I mean the
[unclear].
President Kennedy: I told [unclear] to go ahead [unclear].
Anderson: All right then.
President Kennedy: The Attorney General told me all the reports
that he got was that your reaction [unclear].
Anderson: I think everything is pretty well under control.
President Kennedy: Yeah, that’s right.
President Kennedy and McNamara begin talking privately to one side.
Taylor: I know the press is out here talking about [unclear]. [Unclear
exchanges.]
McNamara: [Unclear.] Max, may I suggest this? That for [unclear]
the Chiefs organize themselves following two alternative courses. One,
the blockade in great detail. What are the instructions you ought to do?
What ships can you do? And how would you do it without endangering
the ships? In other words you—
Taylor: Pull them out.
McNamara: Pull them out. Exactly. Now, I realize that this [unclear]
the ocean and that [unclear] greater naval force and so on. That would
be the assumption you would try to start on. At the same time, let some
other Chief or Chiefs work in great detail on the air strike. Because—I
say this because as far as the President is concerned, we’ve just talked in
very general terms about the air strike.
Taylor: Yeah.
McNamara: And with every passing day the number of airplanes that
we would have in the air, the firepower, is increasing.
Taylor: The civilian targets are increasing too.
McNamara: Oh, I’m not suggesting that. I’m just saying that, if the
596 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
President were to decide on this, we should tell him exactly what we

mean. What will we include? What authorities do we want?
Taylor: Those figures I showed you last night are the last [unclear].
McNamara: Well, just take Guantánamo. What authority does the
Navy want in the event that the Air Force carries out an air strike on
missiles, SAM sites, airfields, and so on?
Taylor: The Navy is doing a certain amount of that in coordinating
problems related to the [unclear]. At the same time, they’d have close
defense aircraft [unclear].
McNamara: Right. But how many air strikes are they likely to carry
out from Guantánamo? It’s maybe 200 to 300.
Taylor: 125 a day is roughly [unclear].
McNamara: Yeah. Yeah, that’s right.
Taylor: I think we can get that information very quickly. We have
that [unclear]. We don’t have the surveillance requirements of the block-
ade and also the level of defense in Guantánamo [unclear].
McNamara: That’s right. Yes. And we ought to plan both of those.
I’m surprised the surveillance of the blockade isn’t [unclear].
LeMay: I agree with you.
McNamara: I’m not sure that I would fully agree that this is bound
to lead to some consequences. Can’t we use these drones?7
Taylor: If they’re adequate. I don’t think any of us have any great
confidence.
McNamara: Oh. Oh sure, they’d knock some of them down. But the
rate of loss might be 10, 15, 20 percent.
Taylor: Well—
McNamara: And it takes quite a while. It’d take at least four to six
weeks I would think given [unclear] drones [unclear]. [Unclear exchanges.]
Taylor: Any other chores, Bob, that you want us to—
McNamara: No, I think not, Max. The—
Taylor: Well, I will go with you and Vern.
Wheeler: I gather that with the authorization of the movement of the
reinforced battalion from the West Coast to Guantánamo, if we see fit to
move an extra company in, that’s perfectly OK.
Taylor: I saw that covert plan [unclear] in the cable. You might want
to look at that and decide if it looks alright. It seemed to me a bit, a little
7. Drones are pilotless, remote-controlled reconnaissance aircraft.

too much. I don’t think we have anything to say on that. In fact I don’t
think you need to say anything when we’re coming in in this staggered
way [unclear].
Shoup: Is the coast clear out there? [Perhaps referring to President
Kennedy’s having taken off from the South Lawn in the presidential helicopter.]
Mixed voices murmuring, a few fragments are intelligible. The remain-
ing generals seem to be discussing various topics, including targets and
their transportation back to the Pentagon.
Wheeler: The way to do that is the Joint Reconnaissance Group
[JRG] getting the requirements from DIA, the input on the public rela-
tions from us. They already have wide profiles. They will have to be
adjusted in the light of the [unclear].
Taylor: And you do [unclear] surrogate possibilities.
Wheeler: Yes, sir. Actually, we have authorized the Joint Reconnais-
sance Group to deal directly with the flight leader.
McNamara: I think it would be helpful if some one of the Chiefs would
talk with DIA about it and get this formalized before [unclear, unclear
exchange]. And have [DIA director General Joseph] Carroll work with the
other groups here. There’s this National Reconnaissance Office that’s
involved in this thing. There’s a, in a sense, a third agency, that’s responsi-
ble for the U-2, the drones, anything relating to special reconnaissance for
CIA and DIA. We need to keep him involved. Carroll knows how to do this.
Wheeler: I think the JRG has all these strengths. That’s a real fine
outfit. Real fine outfit. They deal with DIA and some of these people on a
daily basis, so I’m sure we can pull it together really quickly.
After a brief, inaudible exchange McNamara and Taylor leave. Appar-
ently only three or four people remain in the room.
Shoup: Well what do you guys [unclear]. You, you pulled the rug
right out from under him.
LeMay: Jesus Christ. What the hell do you mean?
Shoup: I just agree with that answer, General. I just agree with you.
I just agree with you a hundred percent. I just agree with you a hundred
percent. That’s the only goddamn . . .
He [President Kennedy] finally got around to the word escalation.
[Unclear] I heard him say escalation. That’s the only goddamn thing
that’s in the whole trick. It’s been there in Laos; it’s been in every god-
damn one [of these crises]. When he says escalation, that’s it. [Pause.]
If somebody could keep them from doing the goddamn thing piece-
meal. That’s our problem. You go in there and friggin’ around with the
missiles. You’re screwed. You go in and frig around with anything else,
you’re screwed.
598 F R I DAY, O C T O B E R 19, 1 962
LeMay: That’s right.

Shoup: You’re screwed, screwed, screwed. And if some goddamn thing,
some way, he could say: “Either do this son of a bitch and do it right, and
quit friggin’ around.” That was my conclusion. Don’t frig around and go
take a missile out.
Wheeler: Well, maybe I missed the point [unclear].
LeMay: [Unclear] off any decision, Dave.
Shoup: Well, that wasn’t my intention. Goddamn it, if he wants to do
it, you can’t fiddle around with taking out missiles. You can’t fiddle
around with hitting the missile sites and then hitting the SAM sites. You
got to go in and take out the goddamn thing that’s going to stop you
from doing your job.
Wheeler: It was very apparent to me, though, from his earlier
remarks, that the political action of a blockade is really what he’s . . .
Shoup: That’s right. His speech about Berlin was the real . . .
Wheeler: He gave his speech about Berlin, and
LeMay: He equates the two.
Shoup: That’s right.
Wheeler: If we smear Castro, Khrushchev smears Willy Brandt [in
Berlin].
LeMay: Berlin [unclear] talk about it. I think our best chance is that
we won’t have anything happen.
Wheeler: [Unclear, mixed voices.] I gather that I can go ahead and
issue these orders? [Unclear exchange.]
Unidentified: [Unclear] do the National Guard, cut it down to 600
and come back over a month with 300 replacements. [Unclear exchange.]
LeMay: We’re all set then.
Wheeler: Well, this is good. I can get those people moving.
Unidentified: Right. OK then.
The generals leave, and the tape runs out shortly afterward in the now -
empty room.
President Kennedy was now less sure that the blockade was the right
answer. This might have been because of the weight of arguments he had
heard from the Joint Chiefs. He had also talked again to Bundy, probably
at the start of his day, before the meeting with the Joint Chiefs. Bundy
had changed his mind during the night and had switched from support-
ing no action (because of concerns about Berlin) to supporting a surprise
air strike. Though we can see from the meeting with the Chiefs that
President Kennedy continued to favor a blockade, it is possible that
Bundy’s change of heart gave the President added cause for reflection.
S AT U R DAY, O C T O B E R 2 0, 1962 599
After the crisis Bundy privately recorded that Kennedy, just before he
left Washington on October 19 (in the few minutes after his meeting
with the Joint Chiefs), asked Bundy to keep the air strike option open
until he returned. In another brief exchange as he prepared to depart on
his campaign trip to Ohio and Illinois, President Kennedy asked his
brother, with Sorensen standing by, to “pull the group together.”8
The President wanted to act soon and said Bobby should call if and and
when he should cut short his trip and return to Washington. At 10:35 the
presidential helicopter lifted off from the South Lawn of the White House.
Saturday, October 20, 1962
On Friday, October 19, the meetings at the State Department ran all day
and into the night. The day started with advisers divided into two camps,
one favoring a blockade and the other favoring an air strike. Bundy said
that, in the course of a sleepless night, he had decided that an air strike
was needed. Decisive action would confront the world with a fait accom-
pli. He said he had spoken with President Kennedy and passed along this
advice. Acheson, Dillon, McCone, and Taylor agreed with Bundy.
McNamara disagreed. Ball said he was wavering. Robert Kennedy
then said, with a grin, that he too had spoken with the President and that a
surprise attack like Pearl Harbor was “not in our traditions.” He “favored
action” but wanted action that gave the Soviets a chance to pull back.1
Rusk then suggested that the group divide into working groups to
refine the blockade and air strike scenarios. It became plain to all, after
8. Bundy’s recollection is drawn from notes excerpted from his private papers by Francis
Bator. Bator shared this information in an April 1998 letter to Ernest May and Philip
Zelikow. Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson, who attended almost all of the
meetings during the crisis, remembered that the apparent consensus that had formed in
favor of the blockade on October 18 “came unstuck” on Friday, 19 October. Alexis Johnson
thought this was because of Dean Acheson’s argument for an air strike. U. Alexis Johnson
with Jef Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,
1984), p. 383. In fact Kennedy had already heard Acheson’s case on the afternoon of the 18th,
before the consensus formed that night, and had not talked again to Acheson. On the “pull the
group together” exchange, see Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row,
1965), p. 692.
1. This account draws on several sources, but these and other quotations from the 19 October
meetings are from minutes drafted by State Department deputy legal adviser Ralph Meeker,
in FRUS, 11: 116–22 (Robert Kennedy’s emphasis on action is in Meeker’s notes).
600 S AT U R DAY, O C T O B E R 20, 1962
hearing from Justice Department and State Department lawyers, that a

declaration of war was not needed in order to impose a blockade and that,
under the U.N. Charter, the U.S. could obtain authorization for this from
the OAS. Martin predicted that OAS approval could be obtained. Robert
Kennedy stressed how crucial this judgment was, since a failed attempt to
gain approval would be disastrous. Martin stood by his estimate.
After hours of discussion within and among the working groups,
McNamara emerged as the chief advocate of a more diplomatic option that
envisioned a blockade as a prelude to negotiations. McNamara thought
that the United States would at least have to give up its missile bases in
Italy and Turkey, probably more.
As the blockade option became dominant, its advocates split again
into two factions. One, led by McNamara, emphasized a blockade accom-
panied by diplomacy and proffered concessions. The other faction would
couple the blockade with a stern ultimatum demanding removal of the
missiles. The previous day, when this version of the blockade was articu-
lated by Llewellyn Thompson, McNamara had called it “the more dan-
gerous form of the blockade.”
During a sobering discussion of the danger of war, Robert Kennedy
argued that the time for confrontation had arrived. “[I]n looking into the
future it would be better for our children and grandchildren if we decided
to face the Soviet threat, stand up to it, and eliminate it, now. The circum-
stances for doing so at some future time were bound to be more unfavor-
able, the risks would be greater, the chances of success less good.”
As the afternoon waned, Rusk said there needed to be a planned
action, then a pause to consider other steps. Advocates of a blockade
could not support any military action unless the Soviets were given some
chance to back out. Advocates of a strike insisted on doing something
about the missiles already in Cuba. Dillon stressed that a blockade could
be a first step, effectively conveying an ultimatum, with further pressure
or military action following on. To some, this tougher version of the
blockade seemed to combine the virtues of both the blockade and the air
strike options.
So when McNamara and other military representatives commented
that a strike might still be effective after a blockade (though Taylor had
his doubts), Robert Kennedy “took particular note of this shift.” Toward
the end of the day, Robert Kennedy began portraying the blockade as
only a first step that would not preclude other action. “He thought it was
now pretty clear what the decision should be.”
Sorensen had begun to draft a presidential speech. After reviewing the
draft on Saturday morning, October 20, Robert Kennedy called his brother
National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis 601
and asked him to come back to Washington.2 Feigning a cold, President

Kennedy left Chicago on Saturday morning and arrived back at the White
House at about 1:30 P.M. He read the draft speech as his advisers sneaked
by various routes into the Oval Room on the second floor of the Executive
Mansion. Just as on the night of October 18, the meeting was held in the
Mansion rather than in the West Wing business area of the White House.
Therefore the meeting could not be tape-recorded. We include a record of
it here because this was the decision meeting that completes the delibera-
tions detailed and recorded of the preceding four days. Also, the documen-
tary record of this meeting is unusually good.3
2:30 –5:10 P.M.
The Attorney General said that, in his opinion, a combination

of the blockade route and the air strike route was very attrac-
tive to him. . . . The President said he was ready to go ahead
with the blockade and to take actions necessary to put us in a
position to undertake an air strike on the missiles and missile
sites by Monday or Tuesday.
National Security Council Meeting on the Cuban Missile Crisis

Four general approaches had emerged by the time of the meeting. One
was that of Taylor and Bundy, who wanted to start with an air strike. A
second was that of Robert Kennedy, Dillon, Thompson, and McCone, who
2. The timing of the call is based on Sorensen’s account. Much later, however, Lundahl told Dino
Brugioni that Robert Kennedy, worried about the tone of the 19 October discussions, called his
brother on Friday, 19 October, failed to reach him, then called him again on Saturday, got him,
and urged him to return [Dino Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, ed. Robert F. McCort (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 303–4].
3. The notetaker of the NSC meeting was Bromley Smith. This was the first meeting during the
missile crisis which Smith was allowed to attend, because it was the first such meeting styled as
a formal meeting of the NSC, of which Smith was the executive secretary. Smith attended and
took notes at every subsequent major meeting during the crisis, because the next two meetings
were also deemed NSC meetings and then, after that, this crisis management body was formally
constituted as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (or Excom for short).
Smith’s notes of this 20 October meeting were more detailed than his notes of subsequent NSC
and Excom meetings during the crisis, perhaps because this growing accumulation of work left
Smith less and less time to type up more detailed summaries. Fortunately Kennedy was able to
tape the subsequent NSC and Excom meetings during the crisis, from 22 October on.
preferred to start with a blockade but to treat it as a kind of ultimatum

that might soon be followed by a strike. A third approach, advocated by
Rusk, was to start with a blockade, try to freeze the Soviet action rather
than reverse it, and then decide what to do. A fourth approach, supported
chiefly by McNamara and Stevenson, and apparently also by Sorensen,
would start with a blockade but treat the blockade as an opening to nego-
tiations, including the offer of a summit meeting, at which trades would be
offered to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.
It was, officially, a meeting of the National Security Council. McCone
led off and asked Ray Cline, deputy director of intelligence at the CIA, to
begin the intelligence briefing. Cline followed his marked-up script,
which was as follows:4
Mr. President: We want to bring you up to date very briefly on the

deployment of Soviet military weapons systems to Cuba. You have
been briefed many times on the major buildup of equipment in Cuba
prior to mid-October.
In the past week we have discovered unmistakable evidence of the
deployment to Cuba of medium range ballistic missiles (i.e., 1020
NM range) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (i.e., 2200 NM
range). These ranges imply coverage of targets from Dallas through
Cincinnati and Washington, D.C. (by MRBMs) and practically all of
the continental United States (by IRBMs).
There are 4 and possibly 5 MRBM sites deployed in field-type
installations, 4 launchers at each site. Two of these sites are in a state
of at least limited operational readiness at this time. All of the sites
are in a state of continuous construction and improvement and we
would expect the remaining MRBM sites to become operational in
about one week’s time.
In addition 2 fixed IRBM sites (with 4 launch pads at each site and
permanent storage facilities) are being constructed near Havana. One
of these sites appears to be in a stage of construction that leads to an
estimate of operational readiness of 6 weeks from now, i.e. about 1
December and the other in a stage indicating operational readiness
between 15 December and the end of the year.
We have not seen nuclear warheads for any of these missiles, but
we do not rely on ever seeing them in our photography. [Small exci-
sion of classified information.] We have found what appears to be a
4. The briefing notes, with Cline’s handwritten annotations, are reproduced in CIA Documents on
the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962, ed. Mary McAuliffe, (Washington, DC: CIA, 1992), pp. 221–26.
nuclear warhead storage facility at one of the IRBM sites at Guanajay,

near Havana. It will probably be completed about 1 December along
with the missile site itself.
Since the missile systems in question are relatively ineffective
without them, we believe warheads either are or will be available.
They could be in temporary storage prior to completion of the stor-
age facility we have seen. The Poltava, a Soviet ship which we think is
the most likely carrier of security-sensitive military cargoes into the
tightly guarded port of Mariel, has made 2 trips to Cuba and is due
back in about 10 days.
In summary, we believe the evidence indicates the probability
that 8 MRBM missiles can be fired from Cuba today. Naturally oper-
ational readiness is likely to be degraded by many factors, but if all 8
missiles could be launched with nuclear warheads, they could deliver
a total load of 16–24 megatons (2 to 3 MT per warhead). If able to
refire, they could theoretically deliver the same load approximately
5 hours later.
When the full installation of missile sites we now see under con-
struction is completed at the end of the year, the initial salvo capability
if all missiles on launchers were to reach target would be 56–88 MT.
Lundahl then went through the photographs. When he had finished, he
turned to the President and said, “Mr. President, gentlemen, this sum-
marizes the totality of the missile and other threats as we’ve been able to
determine it from aerial photography. During the past week we were
able to achieve coverage of over 95 percent of the island and we are con-
vinced that because of the terrain in the remaining 5 percent, no addi-
tional threat will be found there.” 5
According to someone who talked to Lundahl, “The President was
on his feet the moment Lundahl finished. He crossed the room directly
toward Lundahl and said, ‘I want to extend to your organization my
gratitude for a job very well done.’ Lundahl, rather embarrassed, hesi-
tantly thanked the President.” 6
Nonverbatim minutes, taken by NSC executive secretary Bromley
Smith, pick up at this point. 7
The President summarized the discussion of the intelligence material
5. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, p. 314.

6. Ibid. About two hours earlier Robert Kennedy and McNamara had visited NPIC (National
Photographic Interpretation Center), escorted by John McCone, and reviewed its operations.
7. Minutes of the 505th Meeting of the National Security Council, 20 October 1962, FRUS,
11: 126–36.
as follows. There is something to destroy in Cuba now and, if it is

destroyed, a strategic missile capability would be difficult to restore. . . .
Secretary [Robert] McNamara explained to the President that there
were differences among his advisers which had resulted in the drafting of
alternative courses of action. He added that the military planners are at
work on measures to carry out all recommended courses of action in
order that, following a presidential decision, fast action could be taken.
Secretary McNamara described his view as the “blockade route.”
This route is aimed at preventing any addition to the strategic missiles
already deployed in Cuba and eventually to eliminate these missiles. He
said to do this we should institute a blockade and be prepared to take
armed action in specified instances.
(The President was handed a copy of Ted Sorensen’s “blockade
route” draft of a presidential message, which he read.)8
Secretary McNamara concluded by explaining that following the
blockade, the United States would negotiate for the removal of the
strategic missiles from Turkey and Italy and possibly agreement to limit
our use of Guantánamo to a specified limited time. He added that we
could obtain the removal of the missiles from Cuba only if we were pre-
pared to offer something in return during negotiations. He opposed as
too risky the suggestion that we should issue an ultimatum to the effect
that we would order an air attack on Cuba if the missiles were not
removed.9 He said he was prepared to tell Khrushchev we consider the
missiles in Cuba as Soviet missiles and that if they were used against us,
we would retaliate by launching missiles against the U.S.S.R.
Secretary McNamara pointed out that SNIE 11-19-62, dated October
20, 1962, estimates that the Russians will not use force to push their ships
through our blockade.10 He cited Ambassador [Charles] Bohlen’s view
that the U.S.S.R. would not take military action, but would limit its reac-
tion to political measures in the United Nations.
Secretary McNamara listed the disadvantages of the blockade route
as follows:
8. No copy of this draft has been found: ibid., p. 128, note 3.

9. Afterward, McNamara recalled in some detail the arguments that he had made at this meet-
ing for and against a blockade, but he appeared to have no recollection of taking this
Stevenson-like position with regard to possible negotiations with the Soviets. Interview with
Robert McNamara conducted by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., John F. Kennedy Library Oral
History Project, 1964, pp. 23–25.
10. “Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba,” in CIA Documents,
McAuliffe, pp. 211–20.
1. It would take a long time to achieve the objective of eliminat-

ing strategic missiles from Cuba.
2. It would result in serious political trouble in the United States.
3. The world position of the United States might appear to be
weakening.
The advantages which Secretary McNamara cited are:
1. It would cause us the least trouble with our allies.

2. It avoids any surprise air attack on Cuba, which is contrary to
our tradition.
3. It is the only military course of action compatible with our
position as a leader of the free world.
4. It avoids a sudden military move which might provoke a
response from the U.S.S.R. which could result in escalating
actions leading to general war.
The President pointed out that during a blockade, more missiles

would become operational, and upon the completion of sites and launch-
ing pads, the threat would increase. He asked General Taylor how many
missiles we could destroy by air action on Monday.
General [Maxwell] Taylor reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor
an air strike on Tuesday when United States forces could be in a state of
readiness. He said he did not share Secretary McNamara’s fear that if we
used nuclear weapons in Cuba, nuclear weapons would be used against us.
Secretary [Dean] Rusk asked General Taylor whether we dared to
attack operational missile sites in Cuba.
General Taylor responded that the risk of these missiles being used
against us was less than if we permitted the missiles to remain there.
The President pointed out that on the basis of the intelligence esti-
mate there would be some 50 strategic missiles operational in mid-
December, if we went the blockade route and took no action to destroy
the sites being developed.
General Taylor said that the principal argument he wished to make
was that now was the time to act because this would be the last chance
we would have to destroy these missiles. If we did not act now, the mis-
siles would be camouflaged in such a way as to make it impossible for us
to find them. Therefore, if they were not destroyed, we would have to
live with them with all the consequent problems for the defense of the
United States.
The President agreed that the missile threat became worse each day,
adding that we might wish, looking back, that we had done earlier what
we are now preparing to do.
Secretary Rusk said that a blockade would serious affect the Cuban
missile capability in that the Soviets would be unable to deploy to Cuba
any missiles in addition to those now there.
Under Secretary [George] Ball said that if an effective blockade was
established, it was possible that our photographic intelligence would
reveal that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba; hence, none of the
missiles now there would be made operational.
General Taylor indicated his doubt that it would be possible to pre-
vent the Russians from deploying warheads to Cuba by means of a block-
ade because of the great difficulty of setting up an effective air blockade.
Secretary McNamara stated that if we knew that a plane was flying
nuclear warheads to Cuba, we should immediately shoot it down.
Parenthetically, he pointed out that there are now 6,000 to 8,000 Soviet
personnel in Cuba.
The President asked whether the institution of a blockade would
appear to the free world as a strong response to the Soviet action. He is
particularly concerned about whether the Latin American countries
would think that the blockade was an appropriate response to the Soviet
challenge.
The Attorney General [Robert Kennedy] returned to the point
made by General Taylor, i.e., that now is the last chance we will have to
destroy Castro and the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba.
Mr. [Theodore] Sorensen said he did not agree with the Attorney
General or with General Taylor that this was our last chance. He said a
missile buildup would end if, as everyone seemed to agree, the Russians
would not use force to penetrate the United States blockade.
Air Strike Route
Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy handed to the President the “air strike
alternative,” which the President read. It was also referred to as the
Bundy plan.
The Attorney General told the President that this plan was supported
by Mr. Bundy, General Taylor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with minor
variations, by Secretary [Douglas] Dillon and Director [John] McCone.
General Taylor emphasized the opportunity available now to take
out not only all the missiles, but all the Soviet medium bombers (IL-28)
which were neatly lined up in the open on airbases in Cuba.
Mr. McNamara cautioned that an air strike would not destroy all the
missiles and launchers in Cuba, and, at best, we could knock out two-thirds
of these missiles. Those missiles not destroyed could be fired from mobile
launchers not destroyed. General Taylor said he was unable to explain why
the IL-28 bombers had been left completely exposed on two airfields. The
only way to explain this, he concluded, was on the ground that the Cubans
and the Russians did not anticipate [a] United States air strike.
Secretary Rusk said he hesitated to ask the question but he wondered
whether these planes were decoys. He also wondered whether the Russians
were trying to entice us into a trap. Secretary McNamara stated his
strong doubt that these planes were decoys. Director McCone added
that the Russians would not have sent one hundred shiploads of equip-
ment to Cuba solely to play a “trick.” General Taylor returned to the
point he had made earlier, namely, that if we do not destroy the missiles
and the bombers, we will have to change our entire military way of deal-
ing with external threats.
The President raised the question of advance warning prior to mili-
tary action—whether we should give a minimum of two hours notice of
an air strike to permit Soviet personnel to leave the area to be attacked.
General Taylor said that the military would be prepared to live with
a 24-hour advance notice or grace period if such advance notice was
worthwhile politically. The President expressed his doubt that any
notice beyond seven hours had any political value.
There was a brief discussion of the usefulness of sending a draft mes-
sage to Castro, and a copy of such a message was circulated.11
The President stated flatly that the Soviet planes in Cuba did not
concern him particularly. He said we must be prepared to live with the
Soviet threat as represented by Soviet bombers. However, the existence
of strategic missiles in Cuba had an entirely different impact throughout
Latin America. In his view the existence of 50 planes in Cuba did not
affect the balance of power, but the missiles already in Cuba were an
entirely different matter.
The Attorney General said that in his opinion a combination of the
blockade route and the air strike route was very attractive to him. He felt
that we should first institute the blockade. In the event that the Soviets
continued to build up the missile capability in Cuba, then we should inform
the Russians that we would destroy the missiles, the launchers, and the mis-
sile sites. He said he favored a short wait during which time the Russians
could react to the blockade. If the Russians did not halt the development of
the missile capability, then we would proceed to make an air strike. The
11. Not found. FRUS, 11: 131, note 6.

advantage of proceeding in this way, he added, was that we would get away
from the Pearl Harbor surprise attack aspect of the air strike route.
Mr. Bundy pointed out that there was a risk that we would act in such as
way as to get Khrushchev to commit himself fully to the support of Castro.
Secretary Rusk doubted that a delay of 24 hours in initiating an air
strike was of any value. He said he now favored proceeding on the block-
ade track.
Secretary Dillon mentioned 72 hours as the time between instituting
the blockade and initiating an air strike in the event we receive no
response to our initial action.
Director McCone stated his opposition to an air strike, but admitted
that in his view a blockade was not enough. He argued that we should
institute the blockade and tell the Russians that if the missiles were not
dismantled within 72 hours, the United States would destroy the missiles
by air attack. He called attention to the risk involved in a long drawn-out
period during which the Cubans could, at will, launch the missiles against
the United States. Secretary Dillon said the existence of strategic missiles
in Cuba was, in his opinion, not negotiable. He believed that any effort to
negotiate the removal of the missiles would involve a price so high that
the United States could not accept it. If the missiles are not removed or
eliminated, he continued, the United States will lose all of its friends in
Latin America, who will become convinced that our fear is such that we
cannot act. He admitted that the limited use of force involved in a block-
ade would make the military task much harder and would involve the
great danger of the launching of these missiles by the Cubans.
Sorensen recalled later that these presentations by McCone and Dillon,
taking direct issue with McNamara’s proposal for negotiations, resulted
in “a brief awkward silence,” which was then broken by Gilpatric, “nor-
mally a man of few words in meetings with the President when the
Defense Secretary was present.” 12
Bromley Smith’s minutes continue.
Deputy Secretary [Roswell] Gilpatric saw the choice as involving
the use of limited force or of unlimited force. He was prepared to face the
prospect of an air strike against Cuba later, but he opposed the initial use
of all-out military force such as a surprise air attack. He defined a block-
ade as being the application of the limited use of force and doubted that
such limited use could be combined with an air strike.
12. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 694.

General Taylor argued that a blockade would not solve our problem
or end the Cuban missile threat. He said that eventually we would have
to use military force and, if we waited, the use of military force would be
much more costly.
Secretary McNamara noted that the air strike planned by the Joint
Chiefs involved 800 sorties. Such a strike would result in several thou-
sand Russians being killed, chaos in Cuba, and efforts to overthrow the
Castro government. In his view the probability was high that an air
strike would lead inevitably to an invasion. He doubted that the Soviets
would take an air strike on Cuba without resorting to a very major
response. In such an event, the United States would lose control of the
situation which could escalate to general war.
The President agreed that a United States air strike would lead to a
major Soviet response, such as blockading Berlin. He agreed that at an
appropriate time we would have to acknowledge that we were willing to
take strategic missiles out of Turkey and Italy if this issue was raised by
the Russians. He felt that implementation of a blockade would also result
in Soviet reprisals, possibly the blockade of Berlin. If we instituted a block-
ade on Sunday, then by Monday or Tuesday we would know whether the
missile development had ceased or whether it was continuing. Thus, we
would be in a better position to know what move to make next.
Secretary Dillon called attention to the fact that even if the Russians
agreed to dismantle the missiles now in Cuba, continuing inspection
would be required to ensure that the missiles were not again made ready.
The President said that if it was decided to go the Bundy route, he
would favor an air strike which would destroy only missiles. He repeated
this view that we would have to live with this threat arising out of the
stationing in Cuba of Soviet bombers.
Secretary Rusk referred to an air strike as chapter two. He did not
think we should initiate such a strike because of the risk of escalating
actions leading to general war. He doubted that we should act without
consultation of our allies. He said a sudden air strike had no support in
law or morality, and, therefore, must be ruled out. Reading from notes,
he urged that we start the blockade and only go on to an air attack when
we knew the reaction of the Russians and of our allies.
At this point Director McCone acknowledged that we did not know
positively that nuclear warheads for the missiles deployed had actually
arrived in Cuba. Although we had evidence of the construction of stor-
age places for nuclear weapons, such weapons may not yet have been
sent to Cuba.
The President asked what we would say to those whose reaction to
our instituting a blockade now would be to ask why we had not block-
aded last July.
Both Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Ball made the point that we did not insti-
tute a blockade in July because we did not then know of the existence of
strategic missiles in Cuba.
Secretary Rusk suggested that our objective was an immediate freeze
of the strategic missile capability in Cuba to be inspected by United
Nations observation teams stationed at the missile sites. He referred to
our bases in Turkey, Spain and Greece as being involved in any negotia-
tion covering foreign bases. He said a United Nations group might be
sent to Cuba to reassure those who might fear that the United States
was planning an invasion.
Ambassador Stevenson stated his flat opposition to a surprise air
strike, which he felt would ultimately lead to a United States invasion
of Cuba. He supported the institution of the blockade and predicted
that such action would reduce the chance of Soviet retaliation of a
nature which would inevitably escalate. In his view our aim is to end
the existing missile threat in Cuba without casualties and without
escalation. He urged that we offer the Russians a settlement involving
the withdrawal of our missiles from Turkey and our evacuation of
Guantánamo base.
The President sharply rejected the thought of surrendering our base
at Guantánamo in the present situation. He felt that such action would
convey to the world that we had been frightened into abandoning our
position. He was not opposed to discussing withdrawal of our missiles
from Turkey and Greece [sic], but he was firm in saying we should only
make such a proposal in the future.
The Attorney General thought we should convey our firm intentions
to the Russians clearly and suggested that we might tell the Russians
that we were turning over nuclear weapons and missiles to the West
Germans.13
13. To reassure the German allies but also to discourage any thoughts on their part of an inde-
pendent nuclear deterrent, the United States in the late 1950s had begun to equip Luftwaffe air-
craft with “tactical” nuclear bombs and missiles. The nuclear devices remained under U.S.
control. The proposed multilateral nuclear force [MLF] was supposed to include Germans
among the multinational crews whose ships would carry nuclear-armed missiles, but authority
for the release of the weapons remained exclusively with the U.S. President. Champions of the
MLF in the United States, mostly in the State Department and sometimes referred to as the
“cabal,” hoped that it would not only dampen any German interest in nuclear weapons but
would lead the French and perhaps the British to abandon their own independent nuclear forces
[see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New
Ambassador [Llewellyn] Thompson stated his view that our first

action should be the institution of a blockade. Following this, he thought
we should launch an air strike to destroy the missiles and sites, after giv-
ing sufficient warning so that Russian nationals could leave the area to
be attacked.
The President said he was ready to go ahead with the blockade and
to take actions necessary to put us in a position to undertake an air strike
on the missiles and missile sites by Monday or Tuesday.
General Taylor summarized the military actions already under way,
including the quiet reinforcement of Guantánamo by infiltrating marines
and the positioning of ships to take out United States dependents from
Guantánamo on extremely short notice.
The Attorney General said we could implement a blockade very
quickly and prepare for an air strike to be launched later if we so decided.
The President said he was prepared to authorize the military to take
those preparatory actions which they would have to take in anticipation
of the military invasion of Cuba. He suggested that we inform the Turks
and the Italians that they should not fire the strategic missiles they have
even if attacked. The warheads for missiles in Turkey and Italy could be
dismantled. He agreed that we should move to institute a blockade as
quickly as we possibly can.
In response to a question about further photographic surveillance of
Cuba, Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President agreed,
that no low level photographic reconnaissance should be undertaken
now because we have decided to institute a blockade.
Secretary Rusk recommended that a blockade not be instituted before
Monday in order to provide time required to consult our allies.
Mr. Bundy said the pressure from the press was becoming intense
and suggested that one way of dealing with it was to announce shortly
that we had obtained photographic evidence of the existence of strategic
missiles in Cuba. The announcement would hold the press until the
President made his television speech.
The President acknowledged that the domestic political heat follow-
ing his television appearance would be terrific. He said he had opposed
an invasion of Cuba but that now we were confronted with the possibil-
York: Random House, 1988), pp. 487–90]. Some Western officials interpreted Khrushchev’s
position regarding Berlin as traceable chiefly to Soviet concern lest Germany acquire nuclear
weapons [see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1991), pp. 169–234]. Robert Kennedy’s suggestion here must have been startling to the
State Department contingent, especially to Ball, who was active in the cabal.
ity that by December there would be fifty strategic missiles deployed

there. In explanation as to why we have not acted sooner to deal with
the threat from Cuba, he pointed out that only now do we have the kind
of evidence which we can make available to our allies in order to con-
vince them of the necessity of acting. Only now do we have a way of
avoiding a split with our allies.
It is possible that we may have to make an early strike with or with-
out warning next week. He stressed again the difference between the
conventional military buildup in Cuba and the psychological impact
throughout the world of the Russian deployment of strategic missiles to
Cuba. General Taylor repeated his recommendation that any air strike in
Cuba included attacks on the MIGs and medium bombers.
The President repeated his view that our world position would be
much better if we attack only the missiles. He directed that air strike
plans include only missiles and missile sites, preparations to be ready
three days from now.
Under Secretary Ball expressed his view that a blockade should
include all shipments of POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants] to Cuba.
Secretary Rusk thought that POL should not now be included because
such a decision would break down the distinction which we want to
make between elimination of strategic missiles and the downfall of the
Castro government. Secretary Rusk repeated his view that our objective
is to destroy the offensive capability of the missiles in Cuba, not, at this
time, seeking to overthrow Castro!
The President acknowledged that the issue was whether POL should
be included from the beginning or added at a later time. He preferred to
delay possibly as long as a week.
Secretary Rusk called attention to the problem involved in referring
to our action as a blockade. He preferred the use of the word quarantine.
Parenthetically, the President asked Secretary Rusk to reconsider the
present policy of refusing to give nuclear weapons assistance to France.
He expressed the view that in light of present circumstances a refusal to
help the French was not worthwhile. He thought that in the days ahead
we might be able to gain the needed support of France if we stopped
refusing to help them with their nuclear weapons project.14
14. Like Eisenhower before him, Kennedy had never been an all-out opponent of France’s hav-
ing independent nuclear forces. He had gone along, however, with the MLF scheme and had
approved public statements by McNamara that described such forces as “dangerous, expen-
sive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.” He had also drawn upon
There followed a discussion of several sentences in the “blockade

route” draft of the President’s speech. It was agreed that the President
should define our objective in terms of halting “offensive missile prepa-
rations in Cuba.” Reference to economic pressures on Cuba would not be
made in this context.
The President made clear that in the United Nations we should
emphasize the subterranean nature of the missile buildup in Cuba. Only
if we were asked would we respond that we were prepared to talk about
the withdrawal of missiles from Italy and Turkey. In such an eventuality,
the President pointed out that we would have to make clear to the
Italians and the Turks that withdrawing strategic missiles was not a
retreat and that we would be prepared to replace these missiles by pro-
viding a more effective deterrent, such as the assignment of Polaris sub-
marines. The President asked Mr. Nitze to study the problems arising
out of the withdrawal of missiles from Italy and Turkey, with particular
reference to complications which would arise in NATO. The President
made clear that our emphasis should be on the missile threat from Cuba.
Ambassador [Adlai] Stevenson reiterated his belief that we must be
more forthcoming about giving up our missile bases in Turkey and Italy.
He stated again his belief that the present situation required that we
offer to give up such bases in order to induce the Russians to remove the
strategic missiles from Cuba.
Mr. [Paul] Nitze flatly opposed making any such offer, but said he
would not object to discussing this question in the event that negotia-
tions developed from our institution of a blockade.
The President concluded the meeting by stating that we should be
ready to meet criticism of our deployment of missiles abroad but we
should not initiate negotiations with a base withdrawal proposal.
During the 2 hours and 40 minutes of this meeting, lines had been
clearly drawn between the groups that would later be labeled doves and
hawks.15 It is a pity that Kennedy held the meeting outside the reach of
himself strong French criticism because of a loosely worded press conference remark which
seemed to single out French nuclear forces, not British, as “inimical to the community interest
of the Atlantic alliance.” (see Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 484–86).
15. The terminology may have been Kennedy’s own. It achieved popularity through a post-
mortem on the crisis: Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett, “In Time of Crisis,” Saturday
Evening Post, 8 December 1962, for which Kennedy was a source [see Michael Beschloss, The
Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960 –1963 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 569].
his microphones, for not even the anodyne vocabulary of an official note-
taker conceals the intensity of the exchanges. McNamara seems even
more emphatic than usual in describing the possible consequences of not
following a blockade and negotiate strategy. Stevenson pleads for such
a strategy even after the President has “sharply rejected” negotiations
about Guantánamo and has declared that the United States will not initi-
ate talks about trading away the IRBMs in Turkey and Italy. Nitze has
“flatly opposed” Stevenson. Dillon has come down hard in saying that
the missiles in Cuba are “not negotiable.” Taylor has intervened time and
again to argue for an air strike and against a blockade, while Rusk has
said categorically that “a sudden air strike had no support in the law or
morality, and, therefore, must be ruled out.”
President Kennedy has emerged from the meeting midway between
the hawks and the doves. He has rejected making any offer to negotiate,
at least for the time being. He has come down in favor of a blockade, now
to be labeled a quarantine. The blockade is to be coupled with a demand
that Khrushchev remove the missiles, with at least an air strike (a nar-
row one, President Kennedy hopes) readied if Khrushchev does not com-
ply. This was the option pressed by Thompson, Dillon, and McCone,
vitally backed by Robert Kennedy. After the meeting McCone followed
up with Robert Kennedy to nail down this outcome. Later in the evening
President Kennedy called to reassure McCone that “he had made up his
mind to pursue the course which I had recommended and he agreed with
the views I expressed in the afternoon meeting.”16
When Taylor returned to the Pentagon, he told the Chiefs, “This was
not one of our better days.” He added that President Kennedy had said,
“I know you and your colleagues are unhappy with the decision, but I
trust that you will support me in this decision.” Taylor said he had
assured the President they would. General Wheeler remarked, “I never
thought I’d live to see the day when I would want to go to war.”17
16. McCone to File, 20 October 1962, in FRUS, 11:137–38.

17. Notes taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October–November
1962, p. 13, National Security Archive, Washington, DC. These notes must be used with some
caution, but we rely on passages that the original notetaker marked as direct quotations.
Index
ABC, 394 nuclear weapons testing and, 88n

Abel, Rudolf (William Fisher), 364 Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 163–64
Abrams, Creighton W., xxxi and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 228, Union, 5n, 6, 8–9, 16
265, 280, 310–13 see also Strategic Air Command
JFK’s conversation with, 312–13 Alabama, University of, Lucy’s registration at,
RFK’s conversation with, 310–11 269n–70n
Acheson, Dean, 513–14, 572, 599–600 Albert, Carl, 52n
Ackley, H. Gardner, xxxi Alexander, Henry, xxxi
at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n, Alexander, Sir Harold, 122
326–28, 333–34, 347 Alexander Hamilton, USS, 330n
Adenauer, Konrad, xxxi, 118–24, 131–33, Algeria, French war with, 129n, 144, 495–96
190n–91n Allen, Ward P., xxxi
on Berlin, 187, 205, 470–71 Alliance for Progress, 116n
Common Market and, 121–22, 131–32 Alphand, Hervé, 125, 129
Cuban missile crisis and, 421 Alsop, Joseph, 111, 468
Eisenhower’s meeting with, 112, 118–19, Berlin and, 186, 201
121–26, 131–32, 143–44 America’s Cup Challenge, 111, 154–55
on French-West German relations, 121, 125, Andersen, Elmer Lee, 378
131 Anderson, George W., xxxi, 217
on Hallstein Doctrine, 191 on Cuban missile crisis, 578n, 579, 584–85,
JFK-Eisenhower letter to, 133 588, 590–95
and nuclear weapons for West Germany, 218 on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 50, 588,
on relief of Norstad, 122 590–91
on Taylor, 122–24 on naval blockade of Cuba, 584, 588
on U.S.-West German relations, 470, 497–98 Andreotti, Giulio, 216n
on West German defense budget, 126 ANDROSCOGGIN test, 110n
administrative budget, 323n AP (Associated Press), 286
Adzhubei, Aleksei I., 264 Apollo program, 83n
AEC, see Atomic Energy Commission Arends, Leslie C., 52n
aerial reconnaissance, see photoreconnaissance Argentina, 59, 65, 115n
of Cuba; U-2 reconnaissance flights Arkansas, University of, Schola Cantorum choir
AFL-CIO, xxxvii, 110, 178 of, 16–19, 54
agriculture, 335, 347n, 371, 376, 502 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 93n
in South Vietnam, 165–69 Army, U.S.:
Agriculture Appropriations Act, 383n–84n ABM system of, 108n
Agriculture Department, U.S., 502, 505 and call-up of reserve and guard units, 75–76
airdrop nuclear weapons testing, 94–95, 96n, and crisis at University of Mississippi, 223,
103–4, 110n 225, 228, 254n, 256, 260–62, 265–67,
Air Force, U.S., 446n, 579 270–72, 278, 279n, 280, 282–83, 284n,
and call-up of reserve and guard units, 287n, 293–96, 298–302, 304–6, 310–13,
75–76, 78–79 317–19, 352–57, 388–90, 579
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 319 Cuban missile crisis and, 463
Cuban missile crisis and, 435, 596 Little Rock crisis and, 316n
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, racial composition of, 388–90
348–49 Army Signal Corps, U.S., xvii
616 INDEX
Associated Press (AP), 286 Berlin, 26, 110–12, 118–19, 134–49, 154n, 156,
Atkinson, Sam, 248–49 355, 469–98
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 215 Bohlen on, 185–90, 193–98, 200–206, 219,
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 330, 221, 513
343 and briefing of congressional leadership on
on nuclear weapons testing, 82–83, 85, 90, Cuba, 32, 52, 62–63, 72
97–98 call for withdrawal of Western troops from,
Attwood, William, 390 489–91, 573
Ausland, John C., xxxi and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24, 53,
Austria, 131n 73–74, 76, 146–47
Ayub Khan, Mohammed, 155, 177 Cuba press statement and, 42
economy of, 483–84, 488–89
Baker, Bobby, 362, 367 Eisenhower on, 119, 129–31
balanced-budget policy, 340, 370n German unification and, 205–6, 394
Baldwin, Hanson, 153–54 Gromyko and, 361, 471, 489, 491–92, 497,
Ball, George W., xxxi–xxxii, 153n, 155, 205, 573, 581–82, 594
319, 380 JFK and, xxiv, 13, 22, 110–12, 119, 127, 129,
Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 425–26, 427n, 135, 137–46, 161–62, 183, 185–86,
430, 444, 448, 450–52, 457–61, 463–68, 191–97, 200–207, 219, 221, 265, 335,
512n–13n, 515, 516n, 533–34, 537, 380, 391, 394, 469–98, 532–33, 538–40,
539–40, 542–44, 546–47, 554–56, 560, 581–83, 585, 589–90, 592–93, 598, 609
563, 576, 599, 606, 610, 612 Khrushchev on, 64n, 110–12, 129–30, 147,
on Laos, 178n, 179 183, 185–87, 190, 193–98, 201–6, 219,
on naval blockade of Cuba, 465–66, 515, 265, 394, 411, 439n, 449, 451, 469–72,
542–43, 606, 610, 612 485–86, 489–92, 497, 513, 535, 538n,
on non-Soviet bloc trade with Cuba, 320 539–40, 544, 548, 553, 581, 590, 598,
Barbour, Walworth, xxxii 611n
Barnett, Ross R., Jr., 256 meetings on, 135–49, 459, 469, 472–98
Barnett, Ross R., Sr., xxxii military contingency planning for, 135–41,
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 181, 380, 393n, 469, 471, 476, 486–87
223–27, 229, 232–37, 239–47, 249–52, Norstad and, 127, 135–36, 139n, 143–45,
255–56, 258–59, 266–67, 269–70, 284, 189, 495n
288–91, 295, 300, 303, 305–9, 314–16, political, diplomatic, and psychological impli-
351, 354, 385 cations of, 478, 485–87
JFK’s conversations with, 232–36, 239–47, public opinion on, 477, 483–86
252, 288–90, 306–9, 314–15, 351 Schroeder and, 459, 469, 472–98
JFK-Sorensen conversation and, 237 Soviet harassment of commercial aircraft en
popularity of, 250 route to, 81, 188–89
proposed arrest of, 315–17 Soviet restriction of access to, 62, 470–71,
Batista, Fulgencio, 406 472n, 473–88, 493–94, 497, 535, 541,
Bator, Francis, 599n 544, 582, 593, 609
Bay of Pigs invasion, 178, 198, 200, 251, 257, Soviet War Memorial in, 65–66, 81
274, 442, 573 strategic linkage of Cuba and, xxiv, 22, 84,
prisoners taken in, 364, 381, 383, 453–54 190–93, 197–98, 207, 396, 405, 411–12,
Belgium, 122n 418, 433, 441, 449, 451, 467, 469–70,
Berlin and, 204–5 512–13, 522, 525, 532–35, 539–41, 544,
NATO and, 137–38 548, 552–53, 576–77, 581–85, 587,
Bell, David E., xxxii, 317 589–90, 593–94, 598–99, 609
and JFK’s budget and tax cut proposal, 321n, Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 161–62
323–33, 335–51, 368, 369n, 371–77, U-2 reconnaissance flights and, 4, 5n, 6,
499n, 500–507, 509–11 12–13
Bennett, Philip, xx Berlin airlift, 124n, 130n
BERCON/MARCON plans, 135–36, 140 Berlin blockade, 456, 458
Index 617
Berlin Wall, 201, 206 Brosio, Manlio, 216

casualties at, 65n, 361 Brown, Harold, 95n
Billings, LeMoyne “Lem,” xxxii, 229 Brugioni, Dino, 601n
JFK’s conversation with, 238–39 budget:
Billingslea, Charles, 228, 262, 265, 280, 299, JFK’s proposal on, 317, 321–51, 355–56,
311–12 365–66, 368–78, 499–511
Birdsong, T. B., 309 Self-employed Pension Bill and, 365–66
Black, Hugo, 224 budget deficits, 323–24, 329, 340–42, 349, 369,
Blough, Roger, xxxii, 326–27 500, 502, 511
BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics), 506 Bullard, Sir Edward, 208–9
BLUEGILL tests, 95–96, 99–100, 103–5, 107, Bundy, McGeorge, xxxii, 132, 182n, 188, 207,
110n 380
Board of National Estimates, 393, 466, 537n Bay of Pigs prisoners and, 364
Boeschenstein, Harold, xxxii on Berlin, 135, 137, 139–44, 470, 576–77
Boggs, Thomas Hale, xxxii, 52n and briefing of congressional leadership on
Bohlen, Avis, 5, 395 Cuba, 32
Bohlen, Celestine, 5n on buildup of conventional forces in Europe,
Bohlen, Charles E. “Chip”, xxxii, 5–7, 146, 145
395–96 on call-up of reserve and guard units, 80
on Berlin, 185–90, 193–98, 200–206, 219, and Cuban aggression in Latin America, 23,
221, 513 31
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 199, Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 402–3,
221 410–16, 418–26, 427n, 429, 432–33,
on China, 198 437, 439–42, 444–47, 451–69,
Cuban missile crisis and, 422, 428, 455, 459, 512n–13n, 520, 529, 531–32, 534,
513–15, 524–25, 530, 533–34, 604 537–47, 549, 553–58, 560–74, 576–77,
Cuba press statement and, 34n 598–99, 601, 606, 608–9, 611
farewell dinner for, 468 Cuba press statement and, 24–25, 29, 31–37,
on German unification, 205–7 40–47, 50–52
on Hallstein Doctrine, 190–91 on foreign aid, 147–48
Khrushchev and, 182–83, 187–88, 190–91, on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 47
193, 195–98, 200–201, 203–4, 207, 214, JFK-Schroeder meeting and, 472n
513 on NATO, 137, 139–41, 144
on naval blockade of Cuba, 199, 534 on naval blockade of Cuba, 84, 465–66,
on nuclear weapons for France, 214, 216–18, 541–42, 565, 567–68
220–21 on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 85, 89–97,
and nuclear weapons for West Germany, 218 99–100, 102–6, 142
nuclear weapons negotiations and, 182–85, on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 16, 49,
188, 198, 208–13 134, 361, 395, 402–3, 423–24, 429, 520
on Soviet Union, 4n, 6–7, 9–15, 19–20, 192, on Rio Pact, 37
197–98, 208, 515, 525, 604 Skybolt and, 345n
Bolivia: and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n,
Cuban missile crisis and, 434 21–27, 29, 31–33, 35, 41–43, 391,
and naval blockade of Cuba, 543 394–96
Boston Globe, xixn, xx on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 35–36
Boston Post, 303 space program and, 93–94, 96, 104
Bouck, Robert, xvii–xviii on Thorneycroft meeting, 145–46
Brandt, Willy, 470 and University of Arkansas Schola Cantorum
Brazil: choir, 18
and briefing of congressional leadership on on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
Cuba, 59, 65 Union, 4n, 7–8, 10–12, 14–15
Graham in, 115n, 116 Bundy, William P., xxxii
and naval blockade of Cuba, 543 on Laos, 178n
618 INDEX
Bundy, William P. (continued) and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n, 20,
on nuclear weapons, 160 25–27, 29, 54–56
on South Vietnam, 168–69 on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 35–36,
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 160–61, 55–56, 70
167–69 on Soviet submarines, 58
Bunker, Ellsworth, 157 Carver, John A., Jr., 506n
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, 501 Cary, John B., 160–61
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 506 Castro, Raul, 531
Bureau of the Budget, 333n, 336, 343–44, Castro Ruz, Fidel, xxxii, 391
346–47, 350–51, 373, 507–8 Bay of Pigs invasion and, 178, 257n,
Burgess, General, 75 364, 381, 383, 453
Burke, Richard, xix and briefing of congressional leadership on
Burma, 172 Cuba, 59, 62–66, 68–69, 71
Bush, Prescott, 152n and call-up of reserve and guard units, 80
Byrd, Harry F., Sr., 133 covert actions against, xx, 391, 428, 454
on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 321, Cuban missile crisis and, 405, 410, 433–34,
328, 334n, 339, 345, 506n 436, 438, 442–43, 449, 451–52, 467,
512, 515, 531, 536, 544, 548–51, 565,
C1 transport planes, 348 567–69, 590, 598, 606–9, 612
Cambodia, 170–73 Graham on, 114, 116
Laotian relations with, 178 and naval blockade of Cuba, 62, 515, 536,
Taylor’s visit to, 156, 170–72 544, 565, 568
U.S. military aid to, 171 popularity of, 64, 66
Cameron, Ben, 224 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20
Canada: Soviet support for, 63, 66, 69, 192–93
Cuban missile crisis and, 405 Thompson on, 192–93
Cuban trade with, 60–61 CEA, see Council of Economic Advisers
NATO and, 138 Celebrezze, Anthony J., xxxii, 347
Capehart, Homer, 392 on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n,
Cardona, Miro, 406 502
Caribbean: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 50, 67n,
and briefing of congressional leadership on 126n, 132, 154–55, 179n, 537n
Cuba, 59, 68 and briefing of congressional leadership on
Cuban aggression in, 22–23, 31 Cuba, 54
Cuban missile crisis and, 442, 538 Cuban missile crisis and, 397, 401n, 414,
Cuba press statement and, 30n, 31–32 420n, 425, 441n, 462, 469, 537n, 560,
Monroe Doctrine and, 29n 597, 602
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 153 Cuba press statement and, 47
Soviet submarines in, 58 journalists and officials investigated by, xxiv,
see also Latin America 134, 154
Carroll, Joseph, 431, 597 on Laos, 176
Carter, Marshall S., xxxii, 126n, 132–33 and leaks of classified information, 154
and briefing of congressional leadership on NPIC of, 395, 397, 401n, 516, 578, 579n,
Cuba, 32, 50, 52n, 54–58, 61, 66–67, 70 603n,
Cuban missile crisis and, 397–98, 401–3, nuclear weapons testing and, 88n
414–15, 419, 424–26, 427n, 429–33, Operation Mongoose and, 428
439–41, 444, 451–52, 456–60, 463, and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20,
465–68 393
on Cuban missile sites, 55, 57, 61, 66–67, 132 U-2 reconnaissance flights and, 3–4, 5n, 14,
Cuba press statement and, 34n, 35–36, 40, 47, 16, 134, 380–81, 394–95, 397, 398n,
50 401n, 403n–4n, 414, 441n, 462, 516, 578,
on naval blockade of Cuba, 466 579n, 597, 603n
on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 48–50 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 555
Index 619
CHAMA test, 96n, 110n Eisenhower on, 121–22, 131–32

Chamber of Commerce, U.S., 341–42, 344 France and, 121, 131–32, 206, 218
Charyk, Joseph V., xxxii Communications Satellite Act, 388
CHECKMATE test, 110n Communists, communism, 316n, 392n
Childs, Marquis, 175 Berlin and, 489, 584
Chile, 115n and briefing of congressional leadership on
and briefing of congressional leadership on Cuba, 59, 63–64, 66–69, 71
Cuba, 61, 65 and call-up of reserve and guard units, 80
Cuban missile crisis and, 434 Cuban missile crisis and, 434, 589
Cuban trade with, 61 Cuba press statement and, 38, 45n, 46
and naval blockade of Cuba, 543 Graham on, 115–16
China, Nationalist, see Taiwan Laos and, 179–81, 458n
China, People’s Republic of (Communist China), and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 153
167, 442, 458, 590 Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 165, 174
crop destruction program in, 168 Thompson on, 192–93
Quemoy and Matsu shelled by, 591n see also China, People’s Republic of; Cuba;
Soviet relations with, 198 German Democratic Republic; Soviet
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156–61, 163 Union
U-2 reconnaissance flights over, 110, 134, COMOR (Committee on overhead
395 Reconnaissance), 134, 402
Chiperfield, Robert B., 52n Comsat proposal, 363n
Choate, xxxii, 238 Congo, 320
Church, Frank, 362 Congress, U.S., 134n, 182–83, 191–92, 349n,
CIA, see Central Intelligence Agency 383n–84n
CINCLANT (Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, briefing on Cuba for, 32–33, 50–73
Atlantic), 414, 428, 446n and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24,
civil rights, 223 52–53, 73–81, 110, 147n, 150, 199
and crisis at University of Mississippi, see Cuban missile crisis and, 408, 414–15, 438,
Mississippi, University of, crisis at 439n, 444, 524, 534, 542, 545–46, 563,
Little Rock crisis and, 181, 226, 237, 250, 571
316n on foreign aid, 111, 159n, 192, 358–59
at University of Alabama, 269n–70n and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,
Clark, Joseph, 369 321–22, 325, 328–29, 331, 334–35, 339,
Clark, Ramsey, xxxii 351, 355–56, 372n, 375–76, 499–501,
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 252, 503, 505, 506n, 507–8
276n–80n, 280–81, 286–87, 292, 301, JFK’s relationship with, 319–20
302n, 305, 310n JFK’s secret recordings and, xix, xxiii
Clay, Lucius D., xxxii, 124, 129–30, 189 on nuclear weapons for France, 215, 217
Cleveland, J. Harlan, xxxii nuclear weapons negotiations and, 214
Clifford, Clark, xxxii–xxxiii, 133–34, 153 Self-employed Pension Bill and, 111–14,
Clifton, Chester V., 320 365–66, 382
Cline, Ray S., xxxiii, 43, 395 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3–4, 20,
Cuban missile crisis and, 602–3 22, 24, 26–27, 32, 74
Cuba press statement and, 34n, 36–38, 43 Watergate hearings of, xii–xiii
on Laos, 178n, 179–80 see also House of Representatives, U.S.;
on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 49 Senate, U.S.
on Rio Pact, 37–38 Constitution, U.S., 214
on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 36 and crisis at University of Mississippi, 233,
Cold War, 3 235, 243
Colombia, 68, 115–16 conventional forces:
Committee on overhead Reconnaissance in Europe, 119, 121, 125, 145, 216n
(COMOR), 134, 402 Taylor on, 156, 158–60, 162, 164
Common Market: Cooper, John Sherman, 53
620 INDEX
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), 509 565–66, 568–69, 572, 575–76, 579–81,
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 586, 588–93, 595–602, 604–14
321n, 322, 338n–39n, 341, 350, 369 proposed declaration of war against, 514,
Couve de Murville, Maurice, 186, 380, 470, 498 524–25, 532, 534, 536, 541–43, 552,
Cox, Archibald, xxxiii, 133 557, 567, 600
and crisis at University of Mississippi, proposed invasion of, 25–26, 47–48, 62,
315–17 70–72, 391, 395, 408, 413, 416–19, 422,
Crider, William, 286n 424–25, 427–28, 435–39, 442, 445, 449,
crop destruction programs, 165n, 166–69 453, 463, 513–14, 525–27, 529, 532, 535,
Cuba, 154n, 380–84 542, 544–45, 550–53, 557, 566, 573,
Bay of Pigs invasion of, see Bay of Pigs inva- 575, 579, 586, 589–90, 593–94, 609–11
sion refugees from, 31, 54, 414–15, 556, 560
and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24, Soviet arms shipments to, xxiii–xxiv, 3–4, 16,
51–53, 73–81, 110, 150–53, 199, 221 19–52, 54–56, 59, 62–65, 67–68, 70–72,
congressional leadership briefed on, 32–33, 74, 80–81, 83, 149, 153, 156, 207, 320,
50–73 361, 381–82, 391–96, 400–401, 411,
government-in-exile of, 31 415–16, 420n, 440–41, 455, 457, 462,
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and, see 464, 513, 528, 530, 536, 543–54, 573,
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base 588, 602–3, 606–7, 609, 612
JFK-Smathers conversation on, 382–84 Soviet military personnel in, 35–36, 55–56,
Khrushchev on, 190–92, 197–98, 207–8, 394, 64–66, 69–70, 80, 549, 552, 569, 606–7,
469 609
Latin American and Caribbean aggression of, Spanish rule in, 452n
22–23, 31 strategic linkage of Berlin and, xxiv, 22, 84,
missile sites in, xxiii–xxiv, 3–4, 16, 19–34, 190–93, 197–98, 207, 396, 405, 411–12,
39–40, 42–43, 47–49, 51, 55–57, 61–62, 418, 433, 441, 449, 451, 467, 469–70,
64, 66–67, 69–72, 74, 80, 132, 134, 153, 512–13, 522, 525, 532–35, 539–41, 544,
320, 361–62, 364, 381, 391–95, 548, 552–53, 576–77, 581–85, 587,
397–416, 418–20, 422–23, 428–38, 589–90, 593–94, 598–99, 609
443–52, 455, 460–62, 466–69, 471–72, trade relations of, 60–62, 320
512–20, 524–34, 536–37, 539, 541, 543, Cuban missile crisis, xiii, 120n, 134n, 397–472,
545–50, 552, 555–56, 558–59, 565, 499
568–69, 576–95, 598, 600–606, 608–14 JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 472
naval blockade of, 22, 25, 27, 45, 52, 62, 76, JFK’s meetings with JCS on, 578–99
83–84, 199, 406, 408–10, 416, 437, 450, JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii–xix,
454, 464–66, 513–15, 525, 532–36, xxii–xxiv
540–44, 550, 557, 563–69, 574–77, JFK’s summary of late-night meeting on,
579–80, 582–86, 588, 593, 595–96, 572, 576–77
598–602, 604–14 meetings of advisers on, 397–469, 512–614
photoreconnaissance of, 3, 6, 13, 16, 20, military contingency planning in, 199, 393,
48–50, 67n, 110, 134, 320, 361–62, 364, 395, 406–10, 412–13, 416–25, 427–28,
380–81, 394–95, 397–405, 408–9, 414, 435–38, 442–50, 452–54, 459–64,
419, 420n, 421, 423–24, 427–31, 434, 466–69, 512–16, 520, 522–29, 532–36,
436–37, 443, 446–47, 453, 463–65, 538–41, 544–52, 557–60, 562–69,
516–21, 527, 529–32, 535, 537, 545, 574–76, 579–80, 583–602, 604–14
556, 558–59, 566, 571, 574–75, 578–79, NSC meeting on, 601–14
583, 588, 592, 594–97, 602–3, 606, 611 potential casualties in, 416, 524, 526, 532,
press statement on, 3, 24–52, 71–72, 83, 149 536, 538–39, 547, 550, 566, 569,
proposed air strike against, 395, 407–10, 413, 584–85, 590, 609
416–23, 425, 427–28, 435–39, 442, proposed declaration of national emergency
445–49, 460–61, 463, 466–68, 512–14, in, 524, 536
516, 520, 523–27, 529–30, 532–33, proposed political courses of action in, 405,
535–36, 538, 545–50, 552, 557–59, 412, 415, 422–23, 434, 436–38, 443–45,
Index 621
451–52, 463–64, 466, 512–15, 521–25, French-West German relations and, 121, 218
529–30, 533–39, 542–43, 549, 553–55, NATO and, 119
566–68, 580, 583–84, 586–87, 589, 591, on nuclear weapons, 128n, 215
593–94, 598, 600, 602, 604, 607–8, Democratic Congressional Campaign
610–14 Committee, 379
public opinion and, 412–13, 417, 523–24, Democratic National Committee, 501n
528–29, 539, 548, 555, 558, 561, Democrats, Democratic party, 266, 387
586–87, 611 on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–63
secrecy concerns in, 413–14, 422–23, 453, and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 349n
560–61, 571, 576–77, 592 midterm election campaigning of, 321,
Czechoslovakia, 207, 490–91 395–96
Self-employed Pension Bill and, 365–67
Daily Bond Buyer, 325n, 326 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 24
Dale, Bill, 386n Denmark, 131n, 490–91
Dalton, George, xviii–xx Dennison, Robert S., xxxiii, 414n, 446n
Day, J. Edward, xxxiii Department of State Bulletin, 38n–39n
on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n, desalinization projects, 331n
505–6 DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), 431n, 597
Dean, Arthur H., xxxiii Diem, Ngo Dinh, 166, 172
debt limit, 334 Dillon, C. Douglas, xxxiii
Declaration on Solidarity for the Preservation at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n,
of the Political Integrity of the 323–25, 327–28, 334–40, 344–51,
American States Against International 369–78, 499n, 506, 508–11
Communist Intervention, 37–38 Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 412–13, 421,
Defense Department, U.S. (DOD), 197, 579 427n, 440, 442, 444–45, 456–57, 512n,
on Berlin, 135, 201 514–15, 536, 538–41, 544–45, 553–54,
and briefing of congressional leadership on 558, 560–67, 599–602, 606, 608–9,
Cuba, 57 613–14
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 74 Cuba press statement and, 34, 37, 39–44
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 293 on naval blockade of Cuba, 514, 565, 567,
Cuban missile crisis and, 414, 422–23, 600–602, 608
427–28, 441n, 450, 521, 525, 528, on Self-employed Pension Bill, 112–14
560–61, 563, 599–600 Dirksen, Everett M., xxxiii, 114n
on foreign aid, 147–48 briefing on Cuba for, 52n, 53, 60, 66
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 323, on call-up of reserve and guard units, 53, 73n,
329–30, 332–34, 339, 343–45, 347–49, 76–78, 110
505 on Cuban missile sites, 66
and leaks of classified information, 154 on Cuban trade, 60
and military contingency planning on Cuba, Doar, John, 224–25, 273n
393 Dobrynin, Anatoly, xxxiii
on nuclear weapons for France, 215 Cuban missile crisis and, 455–57, 531,
nuclear weapons testing and, 82, 95n, 98, 553–54
101–2, 105, 109 nuclear weapons negotiations and, 182, 184n,
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 165–66 188, 193, 214
on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet proposed JFK-Khrushchev summit and, 264
Union, 4, 13 RFK’s meeting with, 12, 33–34
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 431n, 597 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 34n,
deficit spending, 369, 500 392
de Gaulle, Charles, xxxiii, 216n, 497 on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
Berlin and, 186–88, 195–96, 205 Union, 11–12, 15
Common Market and, 131n DOD, see Defense Department, U.S.
Cuban missile crisis and, 421, 443–44 Dolan, Joseph P., 258, 281
Eisenhower on, 119, 125, 128–29 Dominican Republic, 68
622 INDEX
DOMINIC nuclear test series, 82–83, 85–110, Little Rock crisis and, 226n, 237, 250
360, 364 midterm election campaigning of, 369
Donovan, James B., 178, 364, 381, 383, 453n on nuclear weapons, 123, 128, 130, 613n
Douglas, Paul H., 53, 113n, 349, 351, 355, 365n on relief of Norstad, 122, 124, 126–27
Douglass, Frederick, 82 secret recordings by, xii–xiii
Dowling, Walter C., xxxiii, 470n on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 396
Dresser Industries, 341n on Taylor, 122–24, 126
Drummond, Nelson Cornelius, 230–32 U-2 reconnaissance flights and, 4, 6n, 398n,
Dryfoos, Orvil, 153–54 548n
Duke, Angie Biddle, 17 on West German defense budget, 120–21,
Dulles, Allen, 274 125–26
Dulles, John Foster, 126 West German trip of, 112, 118–26, 131
Duncan, John P., xxxiii employment, and JFK’s budget and tax cuts
Dungan, Ralph A., 319, 380 proposal, 321–22, 504–5
Duvalier, François, xxxiii, 68 Erhard, Ludwig, 120
Ervin, Samuel J., Jr., 384
East Coast Railway, 386n Escalante, Anibal, 66n
Eastland, James O., xxxiii Europe:
economy, economics: conventional ground force buildup in, 119,
of Berlin, 483–84, 488–89 121, 125, 145
Interior Appropriations Bill and, 362–64, Taylor’s Far East trip and, 160–62
379, 386–87 European Advisory Council, 130
international gold reserves and, xxiv, 155 European Atomic Energy Commission
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 317, (EURATOM), 121n–22n
321–51, 355–56, 365–66, 368–78, European Economic Community, see Common
499–511 Market
Self-employed Pension Bill and, 111–14, European Free Trade Association (EFTA),
365–68, 382–83, 387–88 131n
Ecuador, 115n, 543 Evers, Medgar, 223
education, 331, 337, 372, 375–76 Executive Committee (Excom), 601n
EFTA (European Free Trade Association), Exner, Judith, xix
131n Experiment in International Living program,
Egypt, 43, 545n, 581, 589 82
Eighth Army, U.S., 162
Eisenhower, Dwight D., xxxiii, 151n, 332n F4H fighters, 330
Adenauer’s meeting with, 112, 118–19, F8U reconnaissance planes, 403n
121–26, 131–32, 143–44 F-84 fighter-bombers, 78–79
on Berlin, 119, 129–31 F-101 reconnaissance planes, 49–50, 403n
on budget, 369–70, 504 Fair Deal, 362
on conventional ground forces in Europe, Falkner, Murry, 302, 310
121 Far East, Taylor’s trip to, 155–76
Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 426, 460, 469, Farley, Jim, 501
514, 535–36 Faubus, Orval, 226n
on Cuban missile sites, 132 Faulkner, William, 302
on de Gaulle, 119, 125, 128–29 Fawcett, Stephanie, xxi
and Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West Fechter, Peter, 65n
Irian, 157 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 331
on French-West German relations, 121, 125, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 142, 266,
131 360
JFK’s meeting with, 111–12, 114–16, and crisis at University of Mississippi,
118–33, 143–44 270–73, 276, 278n, 307
JFK-Sorensen conversation and, 237 Drummond spy case and, 230
on Latin America, 116 Feldman, Myer, xxxiii
Index 623
Fenoaltea, Sergio, 16–17 Fulbright, J. William, xxxiii

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, U.S., 224–25, briefing on Cuba for, 52n, 54, 69, 72
235 and University of Arkansas Schola Cantorum
Finletter, Thomas, 143, 146 choir, 16–17, 54
First National Bank of Orlando, 386n
fiscal austerity, 500 Galbraith, John Kenneth, 335, 508
Fisher, Adrian “Butch,” xxxiii Gavin, James, 124, 146n, 320
on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 93 on nuclear weapons for France, 214–15, 217,
Fisher, William (Rudolf Abel), 364 220
FitzGerald, Desmond, xxxiii Gemini program, 83n, 149, 348
Florida: General Dynamics Corporation, 342n
Cuban missile crisis and, 439 General Services Administration (GSA), 373
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 27 Geneva:
Fluvio test, 93 meetings on Berlin in, 489–91
Food Stamp Program, 503 nuclear weapons negotiations in, 83, 212, 537
Ford Motor Company, xxxvii Geneva Declaration on Laos, 176n, 178–80
foreign aid, 111, 159n, 192, 320, 356–60, 364 Geoghegan, William A., 276, 304–5, 310
Cuban missile crisis and, 522 German Democratic Republic (GDR) (East
DOD budget for, 147–48 Germany), 81
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 343, Berlin and, 64n, 111, 193–95, 201–3, 206,
347, 356, 375 470, 474, 477–78, 485–88, 541, 593
McCormack-JFK conversation on, 357–59 Bohlen on, 205–7
Mansfield-JFK conversation on, 378 Hallstein Doctrine on, 191n
O’Brien-JFK conversation on, 357, 359–60 JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 474, 477–78,
in post-World War II Europe, 128 485–88
see also military aid as Soviet surrogate, 487n
Foreign Aid Bill, 320, 356 Germany, Federal Republic of (West Germany),
foreign exchange, 60–61 130
Forrestal, James, 181 Berlin and, 136, 139, 141n, 142, 146, 189–90,
Forrestal, Michael V., xxxiii, 135n, 156n, 176, 195–96, 204, 206, 412, 469–71, 481,
181 487–88, 492, 494–95, 498, 581
Fosdick, Dorothy, 573n Common Market and, 121, 131–32
Foster, William, xxxiii Cuban missile crisis and, 412, 610
Fowler, Henry H., xxxiii, 369n Cuban trade with, 61
Fowler, James R., xxxiii defense budget of, 120–21, 125–26
France, 122n, 205 Eisenhower’s trip to, 112, 118–26, 131
Algerian war with, 129n, 144, 495–96 French relations with, 119–21, 125, 129, 131,
Berlin and, 136, 139, 141n, 144, 146, 186–87, 215, 218, 494–97
189–90, 195–96, 203, 492, 494–98 and JFK-Eisenhower letter to Adenauer, 133
Common Market and, 121, 131–32, 206, 218 NATO and, 120, 125, 139–40
NATO and, 119, 125, 129, 139–40 nuclear weapons and, 12n, 218, 611n
nuclear weapons and, 124, 128, 214–21, U.S. postwar aid to, 128
611n, 612, 613n U.S. relations with, 470, 497–98, 581
Suez crisis and, 522, 545n Germany, unification of, 205–7, 394, 470, 581
supersonic jet transport program of, 331–32 Gerrity, John, 325–26
U.S. postwar aid to, 128 Gilpatric, Roswell L., xxxiii, 178n, 368, 380
West German relations with, 119–21, 125, and crisis at University of Mississippi, 319
129, 131, 215, 218, 494–97 Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 420, 425,
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 494–95 427n, 429, 444, 456–57, 464, 512n,
Fraser, Donald M., 378n 513–14, 555–56, 564–66, 576, 580n, 608
Freeman, Orville L., xxxiii, 347 on naval blockade of Cuba, 514, 533, 564, 566
Frondizi, Arturo, 59 on nuclear weapons for France, 215–16, 219
Frost, Robert, 111, 204, 394 Skybolt and, 345n
624 INDEX
Globke, Hans, 120 537, 547, 554–56, 560–64, 572–74,

GMAIC, see Guided Missile and Astronautics 581–82
Intelligence Committee JFK’s meeting with, 572–73, 576, 594
GNP (gross national product), 321n, 322, on Laos, 180
509–10 nuclear weapons negotiations and, 12, 492,
gold, xxiv, 155 497, 573
Goldberg, Arthur J., xxxiv, 110, 133 and U.S. nuclear aid for France, 220
Supreme Court swearing in of, 315, 316n, gross national product (GNP), 321n, 322,
317 509–10
Goodrich, Alan, xx Gruenther, Alfred, 127
Goodwin, Richard N., xxxiv GSA (General Services Administration), 373
Gordon, A. Lincoln, xxxiv Guantánamo Bay Naval Base:
Gordon, Kermit, xxxiv, 341n and briefing of congressional leadership on
Gore, Al, 149 Cuba, 50, 57–58, 71
Gore, Albert, Sr., xxxiv, 145, 149, 386 and call-up of reserve and guard units, 80
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 80 Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 408–9, 452,
JFK’s conversation with, 365–68 521, 526, 536, 545, 550–52, 588–91,
on Self-employed Pension Bill, 112n–13n, 596, 604, 610, 613
365–68, 387 Cuba press statement and, 28, 47
Gore, Nancy, 149 proposed evacuation of, 591, 610
Gorky, Maxim, 394 U-2 reconnaissance flights over, 320
Goulart, João, xxxiv Guatemala:
Graham, Philip, 200 and briefing of congressional leadership on
Graham, William Franklin, Jr. “Billy,” xxxiv Cuba, 68–69
JFK’s meeting with, 114–18 Cuban missile crisis and, 434
Latin American tour of, 114–16 Guevara, Ernesto “Che,” 192, 531
Grant, Ulysses S., 250 Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence
Graybeal, Sydney N., xxxiv, 397n, 399–400, Committee (GMAIC), 432, 520, 579n
403, 465 Guihard, Paul, 298n
Great Britain: Guns of August, The (Tuchman), 523n
Berlin and, 136, 139, 141n, 144, 146, 189–90, Gunther, John, 390
195, 202–3, 361, 492, 495n, 498 Guthman, Edwin, 252–53, 267, 277–78, 286,
Common Market and, 131–32 291, 303–5
Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 416
Cuban trade with, 60 Haiti, 68–69
Malayan crop destruction and, 167 Halaby, Najeeb E., xxxiv
NATO and, 137, 139–40 on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n,
nuclear weapons and, 82–83, 96–97, 208n, 507
209, 451, 611n, 613n Halleck, Charles A., xxxiv
Skybolt project and, 332, 345 briefing on Cuba for, 52n, 54, 57–58
Suez crisis and, 522, 545n, 581 on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 58
supersonic jet transport program of, Hallstein, Walter, 190n–91n
331–32 Hallstein Doctrine, 190–91
U.S. postwar aid to, 128 Hamburg, 130
Greece, 60, 610 Harkins, Paul D., 166, 169, 172
Green, Edith, 363 Harriman, W. Averell, xxxiv
Greenewalt, Crawford H., xxxiv on Indonesia, 174–75
Gretel, 155 on Laos, 178n, 179
Grewe, Wilheim, 190 on South Vietnam, 167–69
Gromyko, Andrei, A., xxxiv, 575 Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 167–69,
Berlin and, 361, 471, 489, 491–92, 497, 573, 172, 174–75
581–82, 594 Harrington, Frank, xix–xx
Cuban missile crisis and, 409, 411, 455, 457, Hart, Philip A., xxxiv
Index 625
Hartington, Marquis of, xxxvii and crisis at University of Mississippi, 385

Harvard University, xxxv, 335n, 508n Foreign Affairs Committee of, 150, 152, 221n
Graduate School of Public Administration at, on foreign aid, 192, 320, 356–58, 378
xxxii on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362, 363n,
student riots at, 268–69 364, 386
Hatcher, Andrew, 249 on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,
Haworth, Leland, J., xxxiv 321–22, 324n, 345, 347, 356, 375
on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 90, 92n on Self-employed Pension Bill, 112–14, 365,
HAYMAKER tests, 95, 99, 109 367–68, 387–88
Health, Education, and Welfare Department, on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 392
U.S. (HEW), 502, 505 Veterans Affairs Committee of, 374n
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 329, Ways and Means Committee of, 322, 324n,
336–37, 347 345, 375, 388
health care, health research, 337, 339, 371 see also Congress, U.S.
Heller, Walter W., xxxiv, 149 Housing Act of 1961, 337
at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n, Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA),
322, 325–28, 336, 338–41, 344, 350–51, 336–37, 371, 373
369–70, 375, 378, 499n, 509–11 Howze, Hamilton, 352–53
Helms, Richard M., xxxiv, 428 Humphrey, Hubert H., xxxiv, 52n, 378
Herlong, A. Sydney, Jr., 385 on Self-employed Pension Bill, 366–67
HHFA (Housing and Home Finance Agency), Hungary, Soviet invasion of, 72, 208, 411, 545,
336–37, 371, 373 549, 554, 581, 589
Hickenlooper, Bourke B., xxxiv
briefing on Cuba for, 52n, 56–58, 63–65, 68 IL-28 bombers:
on Castro, 64–65 in Cuba, 381, 393
on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 57 Cuban missile crisis and, 420, 436, 445, 462,
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 63–64 512, 518–19, 583–84, 606–7, 612
on Soviet military presence in West Berlin, IMF (International Monetary Fund), 175, 374
65 Immigration and Naturalization Service, 282
on Soviet submarines, 58 India, 170
Hillenbrand, Martin J., xxxiv Indian projects, 506
on Berlin, 135n, 141, 146 Indonesia:
Cuba press statement and, 34n SAMs sent to, 43
on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet Taylor’s visit to, 156–57, 174–76
Union, 4n, 7–10, 13–14 infrastructure, 506n
Hilsman, Roger, xxxiv, 168, 178n, 462 Inter-American Conference, 38n, 509, 562
Hitch, Charles, 148 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Hitler, Adolf, 123, 523 Assistance, see Rio Pact
Hodges, Luther H., xxxiv, 133 Interior and Other Agencies Appropriations
on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n, Bill, 362–64, 379
504–5 JFK-Smathers conversation on, 386–87
Home, Lord, 250 Interior Department, U.S., 331, 372
Honey Fitz, 386n Internal Revenue Service, 324n
Hoover, Herbert H., xxxiv International Control Commission, 181
Hoover, J. Edgar, 360 International Milling Company, 342n
HOUSATONIC test, 110n International Monetary Fund (IMF), 175, 374
House of Representatives, U.S., 285 investment, 370
Appropriations Committee of, 347, 357–58, Iran, 28, 64, 72, 200, 202, 208, 416, 467, 550
360n, 362, 364, 375, 379, 381, 383n–85n Iraq, 43
Armed Services Committee of, 150, 152 IRONBARK, 432
Bay of Pigs prisoners and, 381 Israel, 545n
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 75, Issues and Answers, 394
147, 150–53 Italy, 60, 122n, 216n, 451n
626 INDEX
Cuban missile crisis and, 411, 525, 532, 539, on nuclear weapons for France, 215
567–68, 600, 604, 609, 612–13 on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 382
Izvestia, 81, 264n Taylor’s appointment to chairmanship of,
119, 122, 123n, 156
Jackson, Henry “Scoop,” 182n Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 159–61, 165
on nuclear weapons for France, 215, 217–20 Joint Committee on Armed Services and
Jackson State University, 223 Foreign Relations, 151
JAEIC (Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal
Committee), 217n, 401, 579n Expenditures, 328n
Japan: Joint Economic Committee, 349n, 351
Cuban missile crisis and, 411 Joint Reconnaissance Group (JRG), 597
Pearl Harbor attack and, 515, 523, 539, Jordan report, 22
545–46, 607 Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., USS, 155
Taylor’s visit to, 156, 163–64 Judd, Walter H., 378
and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet Justice Department, U.S., xviii
Union, 9 and crisis at University of Mississippi,
Javits, Jacob, 381 223–24, 246, 247n, 249, 251–52, 253n,
JCS, see Joint Chiefs of Staff 258n, 273n, 276n–77n, 280n–81n, 298n,
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, xix–xxii 299, 301n–4n, 310n, 313
Johnson, Lyndon B., xxxiv, 367n, 371n Cuba press statement and, 41
and briefing of congressional leadership on and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 331
Cuba, 52 Tax Division of, 281n
Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 415–16, 427,
454 Kahn, Herman, xviii
economic policy of, 321n–22n Kaiser, Edgar, 325n
JFK’s assassination and, xviii Kaiser Steel Company, 325–27
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 500 Kamchatka, nuclear weapons negotiations and,
secret recordings by, xii–xiii 212–13
on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 415–16 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., xxxv
Johnson, Paul, 224–25, 243, 246 and crisis at University of Mississippi,
Johnson, U. Alexis, xxxiv–xxxv 251–52, 261–63, 265, 267–69, 276n,
on Berlin, 534–35 277, 279–81, 286–87, 291–93, 297–98,
Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 413, 427n, 390
430, 444, 449, 451, 457, 461, 512n–13n, on racial composition of troops at University
533–35, 538–40, 542, 544, 547–48, 551, of Mississippi, 390
558, 564–67, 570, 576, 599n Kaysen, Carl, xxxv, xxxviii, 155, 319
on naval blockade of Cuba, 534–35, 540, 542, Cuba press statement and, 34n, 40
544, 565–66, 599n on Laos, 176
on South Vietnam and Cambodia, 171–73 on non-Soviet bloc trade with Cuba, 320
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 171–74 on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 89–90, 92,
Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee 96, 99, 101
(JAEIC), 217n, 401, 579n on South Vietnam, 176
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 126, 143, 319, 460 Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n
on Berlin, 135 Kearsage, USS, 360
Cuban missile crisis and, 407, 420n, 425, 428, Keating, Kenneth:
435–37, 440, 445, 448–49, 463, 512–13, Cuban missile crisis and, 414–15, 421, 556,
516, 526, 528, 530, 578–99, 605–6, 608, 560
614 on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20,
JFK’s meetings with, 578–99 391–92, 396
in military contingency planning on Cuba, Keeny, Spurgeon, xxxv
393n, 395 Kefauver, Estes, 386
on naval blockade of Cuba, 513, 579, 585, Kennedy, Caroline, 397
588, 593, 595, 598 Kennedy, Edward M., xix–xx
Index 627
Kennedy, Jacqueline, xix, 142n, 155, 177, 232, on German unification, 205
263–65 Gore’s conversation with, 365–68
Kennedy, John F.: Graham’s meeting with, 114–18
on ABM system, 108–9 Gromyko’s meeting with, 572–73, 576, 594
Abrams’s conversation with, 312–13 on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 47, 50,
assassination of, xviii, xxii 57–58, 80
Barnett’s conversations with, 232–36, on Hallstein Doctrine, 190
239–47, 252, 288–90, 306–9, 314–15, illnesses of, 360
351 Indonesia and, 157, 174–76
Berlin and, xxiv, 13, 22, 110–12, 119, 127, on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–63,
129, 135, 137–46, 161–62, 183, 185–86, 386–87
191–97, 200–207, 219, 221, 265, 335, invited to summit by Khrushchev, 263–65
380, 391, 394, 469–98, 532–33, 538–40, on Japan, 163–64
581–83, 585, 589–90, 592–93, 598, 609 JCS meetings of, 578–99
Billings’s conversation with, 238–39 Keogh’s conversation with, 388
and briefing of congressional leadership on Kirwan’s conversation with, 379–80
Cuba, 32–33, 50, 52n, 53–54, 56–57, 59, on Laos, 176, 178–81
61–64, 67–72 late-night meeting summarized by, 572,
on budget and tax cuts, 317, 321–51, 355–56, 576–77
365–66, 368–78, 499–511 on Latin America, 116
on buildup of conventional forces in Europe, on leaks of classified information, 153–54
145 McCormack’s conversations with, 150–52,
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 51–52, 357–59
73–76, 78, 80–81, 146–47, 150–53, 199 MacDonald’s conversation with, 247–49
on Cambodia, 171–72 Mansfield’s conversations with, 362–64,
on China, 160–61, 163 378–80
on Common Market, 132 midterm election campaigning of, 155, 178,
Congress’s relations with, 319–20 182–83, 321, 361–62, 369, 376n, 383n,
Cox’s conversation with, 316–17 390, 395–96, 499, 560–62, 577–78, 599
and crisis at University of Mississippi, xxiv, on military aid, 163–64, 171, 343
222–23, 225–30, 232–47, 249–58, on missiles in Far East, 158
260–82, 284–88, 290–93, 295, 297–98, on missiles in Turkey, 63–64
301–2, 305–10, 312–19, 351–57, Morgan’s conversation with, 150–52
383–85, 388–90, 579 on NATO, 118–19, 125, 129, 137–40, 144
and Cuban aggression in Latin America, 23, on naval blockade of Cuba, 22, 45, 62, 83–84,
31 533–34, 541–43, 557, 574–77, 579,
Cuban missile crisis and, xxiii–xxiv, 582–83, 593, 598, 601, 605–6, 609–12,
397–400, 402–4, 406–10, 412–27, 614
429–31, 433–36, 438–61, 469–72, on Norstad, 124, 126–28, 130
512–15, 517–21, 523, 525–43, 545–53, on nuclear weapons, 12–13, 82–83, 85–109,
555–64, 571–614 119, 124, 128–30, 135, 140–42, 144,
on Cuban missile sites, 3, 47–48, 61–62, 67, 160–62, 182–85, 188, 198, 207–11,
69, 71–72, 134 213–21, 218–19, 364, 485, 487, 489, 492,
on Cuban trade, 61–62, 320 495, 497, 573, 612, 613n
Cuba press statement and, 24–26, 28–48, O’Brien’s conversation with, 357, 359–60
50–52, 71–72, 83, 149 O’Donnell’s conversation with, 351–52,
on Drummond spy case, 231–32 354–55
Eisenhower’s meeting with, 111–12, 114–16, on proposed invasion of Cuba, 47–48, 62,
118–33, 143–44 70–72, 391
on foreign aid, 111, 147–48, 159n, 320, on racial composition of troops at University
356–60, 364, 378 of Mississippi, 388–90
on French-West German relations, 125, 129, and reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 16,
494–97 48–50, 134, 364, 380–81, 395
628 INDEX
Kennedy, John F. (continued) Dobrynin’s meeting with, 12, 33–34

reelection campaign of, 321–22 on Drummond spy case, 230–32
on Rio Pact, 37–39, 61 on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 47
Schroeder’s meeting with, 469, 472–98 JFK-Barnett conversations and, 232–36,
secret recordings by, xii–xiii, xvii–xxiv 239n, 240–47
on Self-employed Pension Bill, 112–14, on JFK’s relationship with Eisenhower, 118
365–68, 382–83, 387–88 JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii–xix
Smathers’s conversation with, 382–88 on naval blockade of Cuba, 25, 27, 533–35,
Sorensen’s conversation with, 237 543, 565, 568–69, 574–75, 600–602,
on South Vietnam, 165–70 607, 611
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, nuclear weapons negotiations and, 12–13, 34,
xxiii–xxiv, 3–4, 16, 19n, 20–37, 40–43, 182, 184
50, 59, 71, 74, 80–81, 153, 207, 320, Operation Mongoose and, 428
381, 391–93, 395–96, 573, 588, 612 on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 134, 395
on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 35–36, on Rio Pact, 38–39
69–70, 80 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n, 20,
on Soviet military presence in West Berlin, 25–27, 29, 32–34, 392, 396
65–66 on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 36
space program and, 83, 86–87, 93, 96, 103–5, on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
149, 329–30, 333–34, 336, 343, 347–49, Union, 4n, 7, 12–14
505 Vance’s conversation with, 299
Taylor and, 119, 124, 155–56, 347 Kennedy Tapes, The: Inside the White House during
Thorneycroft meeting and, 142, 146 the Cuban Missile Crisis (Zelikow and
and University of Arkansas Schola Cantorum May), xiii, xxii
choir, 17–19, 54 Kennefick, Mary, xxi
on U.S.-West German relations, 470, 498 Keogh, Eugene J., xxxv
and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet on Communications Satellite Act, 388
Union, 3–15, 81 JFK’s conversation with, 388
Vance’s conversations with, 317–19, 351, Self-employed Pension Bill and, 112
353–57 Keogh-Smathers Bill, see Self-employed Pension
Vinson’s conversation with, 150–53 Bill
on West German defense budget, 120, Kerr, Robert S., 133, 363–64, 379
125–26 on Self-employed Pension Bill, 366–67
Kennedy, Robert F., xxxv, 51, 133–34, 155, 380 Kevu, Benjamin, 155
Abrams’s conversation with, 310–11 Keyhole document, 154
assassination of, xix Khrushchev, Nikita S., xxxv, 20, 181–83, 189n,
Berlin and, 13 300, 393–94
and briefing of congressional leadership on Berlin and, xxiv, 64n, 110–12, 129–30, 147,
Cuba, 32 183, 185–87, 190, 193–98, 201–6, 219,
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 181, 265, 394, 411, 439n, 449, 451, 469–72,
222n, 223–25, 227, 229, 232–36, 239n, 485–86, 489–92, 497, 513, 535, 538n,
240–47, 249–50, 251n, 252–82, 284, 539–40, 544, 548, 553, 581, 590, 598,
286–88, 290–99, 301–6, 310–13, 357 611n
Cuban missile crisis and, xviii–xix, 397n, and call-up of reserve and guard units, 73–74
416–18, 421, 424, 426, 427n, on Cuba, 190–92, 197–98, 207–8, 394, 469
428, 442, 445, 450, 452, 454–58, Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 410–11, 423,
512n–13n, 514, 515n, 526, 531, 533–36, 433, 436, 438–39, 449–52, 454–55, 457,
540–41, 543, 546–47, 550–60, 565, 465, 467, 469, 470, 512–15, 523, 525,
568–70, 574–76, 595, 599–602, 606–7, 528, 530–35, 536–40, 542–49, 551–57,
610–11, 614 562, 573, 586–87, 590, 598, 604, 608,
on Cuban missile sites, 134 614
Cuba press statement and, 25–27, 29, 32–36, on German unification, 205
38–39, 41–42, 44, 46–47 Indonesia and, 175
Index 629
JFK-Dobrynin meeting and, 34 Kuril Isles, nuclear weapons negotiations on,

JFK invited to summit by, 263–65 212–13
JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 485–86, 489–92, Kusterer (translator), 469n
497 see also Schroeder, Gerhard
and naval blockade of Cuba, 535, 540, Kuznetsov, Vasiliy, 206
543–44, 557 Kwajalein, 108
nuclear weapons negotiations and, 34,
182–84, 188, 207, 210n, 213–14, 218, Labor Department, U.S., 178, 373
492, 497 Lafayette, USS, 330n
U.S. communications with, 182, 531, 537, laissez-faire, 500
552–53 Laloy, Jean, 186
and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet Land, Edwin, xxxv
Union, 6, 9, 11 Landsdale, Edward, 134, 199
Killian, James R., xxxv Laos, 173, 450
King, Coretta Scott, 266n JFK on, 176, 178–81
King, J. C., xxxv meeting on, 178–81
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 266n neutralizing of, 178–79, 458
KINGFISH test, 95–98, 100–101, 103–8, 110 Soviet Union and, 178, 180, 202, 458
Kirkpatrick, Lyman B., Jr., xxxv Latin America, 116
Kirwan, Mike “Big Mike,” xxxv and briefing of congressional leadership on
on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–64, 379, Cuba, 57–59, 61, 63–65, 67n, 68–69
386–87 Cuban aggression in, 22–23, 31
JFK’s conversation with, 379–80 Cuban missile crisis and, 428, 434, 442–44,
Knebel, Fletcher, 272n 451, 529, 539, 561n, 580n, 586, 588,
Kohler, Foy D., xxxv, 51, 191 606–8
on Berlin, 471 Cuba press statement and, 29n, 30, 40–42, 44
Cuban missile crisis and, 439, 537, 552–53, Graham on, 114–16
556 Monroe Doctrine and, 30
nuclear weapons negotiations and, 188, 492 and naval blockade of Cuba, 565, 580n, 606
on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 63–64,
Union, 4n, 8 320
Komar-type missile-launching motor torpedo see also Caribbean
boats, 55–57 Lawford, Peter, 258
Komer, Robert: Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 90, 98
on Cambodia, 171 Lebanon, 585
on South Vietnam, 167–71 Leddy, John M., xxxv–xxxvi
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 166n, LeMay, Curtis E., xxxvi, 67
167–70 and briefing of congressional leadership on
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of (North Cuba, 50, 52n, 57, 62, 70–71
Korea), 207, 587 on Cuban missile crisis, 578n, 579, 582–85,
Cuban missile crisis and, 522 588–89, 591–92, 594–98
Korean War and, 523 on Cuban missile sites, 47–49, 70
Taylor on, 159–63 Cuba press statement and, 34, 47–48
Korea, Republic of (South Korea), 156, 467, on invasion of Cuba, 47–48, 70–72
587 on naval blockade of Cuba, 583–84
Cuban missile crisis and, 522 on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 48–49
Taylor on, 158–59, 161, 163–64, 174 Lemnitzer, Lyman, xxxvi, 124, 146–48, 285
and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet awards and honors of, 317, 318n, 319
Union, 9 on Berlin, 135n, 137–39, 141, 143–47
Korean War, 469, 504, 523, 584 on call-up of reserve and guard units, 73n,
Korth, Fred, 133 78–79, 146–47
Kreer, Robert G., xxxv on Laos, 178n
Kuchel, Thomas H., xxxv, 52n on missiles in Far East, 158
630 INDEX
Lemnitzer, Lyman (continued) 425–26, 440–41, 460, 468–69, 512n,

on NATO, 137–39, 141, 160 513–14, 516, 520–21, 527, 531–32,
as Norstad’s replacement, 119, 122, 126–28 535–37, 544, 549, 554–56, 560–61, 572,
on nuclear weapons, 160 599, 601–2, 606–9, 614
on South Vietnam and Cambodia, 171 and leaks of classified information, 154
Taylor as replacement of, 156 on naval blockade of Cuba, 544, 601–2, 608
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 158, on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 361–62,
160, 162 364, 394–95
Lenin, Vladimir, 200 on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 381–82,
Leningrad, Soviet ABM system and, 109 392–95, 440–41, 609
Life, 226 and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
Lightner, Allan E., Jr., 355 Union, 14, 16n
Lincoln, Evelyn, xiv, xxxvi, 16–19, 78–79, 115n, McCormack, John W., xxxvi
247, 266–67, 269, 359, 468, 511, 574 and briefing of congressional leadership on
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 227, Cuba, 52–53
229–30, 258, 260, 273, 276–78, 280–81, on call-up of reserve and guard units, 53,
283, 287, 291–94, 297, 304, 312, 316, 150–51
353 on foreign aid, 357–60
JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii, xx–xxi JFK’s conversations with, 150–52, 357–59
and University of Arkansas Schola Cantorum McDermott, Edward A., 354–55
choir, 17–18 McDonald, David, xxxvi
Little Rock Central High School, desegregation MacDonald, Torbert, xxxvi, 229
of, 181, 226, 237, 250, 316n JFK’s conversation with, 247–49
Live Oak operations, 139, 494–95 McDonnell Douglas, 149
Lleras Camargo, Alberto, 116 McDonnell RF-101 Voodoo photoreconnais-
Lockheed C-130 Hercules transport planes, sance planes, 49–50, 403n
348n McGhee, George, 155
Loeb, James, xxxvi McMahon Act, 215
London Daily Sketch, 298n Macmillan, M. Harold, xxxvi–xxxvii, 131n
Long, Franklin, xxxvi on Berlin, 187, 204–5
Long, Russell, 113n Cuban missile crisis and, 443–44
Look, xxxix McNamara, Pat, 113n
Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, 98, 109 McNamara, Robert S., xxxiii, xxxvi–xxxvii,
Lovett, Robert A., xxxvi 50–51, 81, 132–33
Cuban missile crisis and, 553, 564, 572–76 on ABM system, 108–9
on naval blockade of Cuba, 574–75 on Berlin, 135n, 138, 140–41, 145–47, 201,
Lucy, Autherine, 269–70 203, 469, 493
Lundahl, Arthur C., xxxvi, 395 and briefing of congressional leadership on
Cuban missile crisis and, 397–403, 512n, Cuba, 50–52, 58, 71
516–21, 601n, 603 on call-up of reserve and guard units, 24,
Luxembourg, 122n 51–53, 73, 73–79, 146–47, 152
on Cambodia, 171
MAAG, see Military Assistance Advisory on China, 161
Group and crisis at University of Mississippi,
MacArthur, Douglas, xxxvi 318–19
McCarthy, Eugene J., 113n Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 399–403,
McCloy, John J., xxxvi 407–12, 414, 416–20, 423, 425–31, 433,
McConaughy, Walter P., 177 435–40, 442–44, 446–50, 453–55,
McCone, John A., xxxvi, 20, 54, 154–55, 177, 459–68, 512n, 513, 516, 520–21,
380–81, 467–69 525–31, 537–41, 545, 547, 551–52, 555,
Bay of Pigs prisoners and, 364, 381 557–60, 563–72, 576, 578n, 579–92,
on Berlin, 535 595–97, 599–601, 603n, 604–8, 611, 613
Cuban missile crisis and, 410–11, 420n, Cuba press statement and, 29, 31, 34n
Index 631
on foreign aid, 147–48 JFK-Sorensen conversation and, 237

on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 50, 58 JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii–xx
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 332, Marshall, George C., xxxviii
347 Marshall Plan, 128
on Korea, 161–63 Marshall Space Flight Center, 149
on Laos, 178n, 179 Martin, Colonel, 228
and leaks of classified information, 154 Martin, Edwin M., xxxvi, 380
on military aid, 160–63, 171, 177 Cuban missile crisis and, 427n, 428, 433–34,
in military contingency planning on Cuba, 442–43, 445, 449, 458, 461–62, 465–66,
393n, 395 512n–13n, 514, 524, 534, 543, 561,
on NATO, 138, 140 565–68, 576, 600
on naval blockade of Cuba, 22, 76, 84, Cuba press statement and, 34, 37–38, 41–42,
464–66, 557, 563, 565–69, 595–96, 600, 44–45
604–5, 611, 613 on naval blockade of Cuba, 465, 514, 534,
on nuclear weapons, 82n, 94–95, 97, 543, 565, 567, 600
100–103, 106–8, 161, 163 Martin, William McChesney, xxxvi
on reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 49 Marxism-Leninism, see Communists, commu-
Skybolt and, 345n nism
on South Vietnam, 166–68 mass transit, 337–38, 343, 503
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n, Matsu, 156, 158, 161, 591n
21–23, 26–29, 31, 400–401 May, Ernest, xiii, xxii, 599n
on space program, 106–7 Meany, George, xxxvii, 178
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 159–63, media, see press
166–68, 171, 173 Medicare and Medicaid, 371n
on Thorneycroft meeting, 145–46 Meeker, Leonard, 575
on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet Menzies, Robert G., 155
Union, 4n, 7, 13 Meo, 180
on West German defense budget, 126 Mercury space program, 149, 508n
McShane, James, 224–25, 257, 281 nuclear weapons testing and, 83, 93–94, 96,
McSweeney, John M., 15 103–4, 106–7, 110
Maine, USS, 452 Meredith, James H., xxxvii, 579
Malaya, crop destruction in, 167 false voter registration conviction of, 235n
Mallon, Henry Neil, 341 JFK’s conversations on, 233, 239–41, 245,
Malraux, André, 218 383, 384n, 385, 388–90
Manhattan Project, 330n on racial composition of troops at University
Manning, Robert J., 13–14 of Mississippi, 389
Mansfield, Michael J., xxxvi and rioting at University of Mississippi, 281,
briefing on Cuba for, 52, 71–72 283, 287–92, 294n, 295–96, 297n, 298
and call-up of reserve and guard units, 110 University of Mississippi application of,
Cuba press statement and, 71 222–24
on foreign aid, 378 University of Mississippi registration of, 181,
on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–64, 379 224–26, 239–42, 245–47, 250–52, 273
JFK’s conversations with, 362–64, 378–80 Messmer, Pierre, 497
on Self-employed Pension Bill, 366–68 Mexico, 509
Marine Corps, U.S., 579 and briefing of congressional leadership on
Cuban missile crisis and, 418, 551–52 Cuba, 59, 61, 68–69
Markham, Dean P., 255–56, 259, 261, 288, Cuban aid to, 22
303–4 Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 434
Marshall, Burke, xxxvi on naval blockade of Cuba, 543
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 222n, MiGs:
224, 227, 237, 246, 247n, 251n, 252–63, Berlin incidents with, 81, 188–89
265–77, 279–87, 292, 296–98, 300–302, and briefing of congressional leadership on
304–6, 313 Cuba, 62
632 INDEX
MiGs (continued) 395, 397–98, 403, 411–12, 414, 428, 431,

in Cuba, 21, 26–27, 56, 62, 70–71 433, 438, 440, 441n, 443, 451, 513,
Cuban missile crisis and, 406, 410, 420, 515–17, 519, 521, 524–26, 529–30,
435–37, 440, 460, 462, 512, 526, 533n, 536, 558, 578, 583n, 585, 591,
529–30, 583–84, 588, 612 602–3
military aid, 177 Minuteman, 109
for France, 214–21 Mobile Minuteman, 332
JFK on, 163–64, 171, 343 Nike, 80
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156, 159–64, Nike Ajax, 55
171 Nike Hercules, 55, 93, 100–102, 106, 108–9,
see also foreign aid 158
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG): Nike-X, 108n
Cambodian-South Vietnamese relations and, Nike Zeus, 108–9
172–73 nuclear weapons negotiations and, 213
in Laos, 176 in nuclear weapons testing, 85–86, 93, 95n,
“Military Buildup in Cuba, The,” 440n 100–102, 106, 108, 398n
Miller, Chester, xviii Polaris, 215, 330, 538, 549, 613
Mills, Wilbur D., xxxvii SA-2, 55
on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, short-range, 409, 518
321–22, 324, 328 Skybolt, 332, 344–45
Minneapolis Grain Exchange, 342n of Soviet Union, 55, 198, 202, 399, 578, 583n
Minnesota, University of, 378n SS-3, 399
missile boats, 55–57, 513 SS-4, 578, 583n
missiles, missile sites: SS-5, 578, 583n
antiballistic (ABMs), 82–83, 108–9 surface-to-air (SAMs), 3, 20–25, 27, 43,
Berlin and, 138–39, 144, 202–3 47–48, 51, 55, 57, 61–62, 67n, 71, 74,
and briefing of congressional leadership on 80, 132, 134, 138–39, 158, 320, 361, 381,
Cuba, 51, 55–57, 61–62, 64, 66–67, 393, 395, 403, 406, 413, 416, 437, 441,
69–72 445–47, 449, 460, 462, 513, 519–20,
and call-up of reserve and guard units, 74, 80 527, 588, 590, 595, 598
Chinese-Soviet relations and, 198 surface-to-surface, 25–29, 40, 63, 66, 72, 80,
cruise-type, 441, 513, 518–19, 588 320, 332, 395, 433, 519, 521, 589
in Cuba, xxiii–xxiv, 3–4, 16, 19–34, 39–40, Taylor on, 158–59
42–43, 47–49, 51, 55–57, 61–62, 64, Thor, 95n, 451n
66–67, 69–72, 74, 80, 132, 134, 153, Titan III, 348
320, 361–62, 364, 381, 391–95, in Turkey, 63–64, 410, 451, 532, 534, 538–39,
397–416, 418–20, 422–23, 428–38, 545, 549–50, 554–55, 567–69, 600, 604,
443–52, 455, 460–62, 466–69, 471–72, 609–13
512–20, 524–34, 536–37, 539, 541, 543, water-to-water, 56–57
545–50, 552, 555–56, 558–59, 565, see also Cuban missile crisis; nuclear weapons
568–69, 576–95, 598, 600–606, 608–14 Mississippi, University of (Ole Miss), crisis at,
Cuba press statement and, 24–25, 71 xxiv, xxxvii, 222–30, 232–47, 249–319,
Eisenhower on, 123, 128, 130, 613n 351–57
Hawk, 158 Abrams-JFK conversation on, 312–13
intercontinental ballistic (ICBMs), 198, 202, Abrams-RFK conversation on, 310–11
409, 441, 451, 586, 588, 590 Air Force and, 319
intermediate-range ballistic (IRBMs), 392, Barnett-JFK conversations on, 232–36,
395, 440n–41n, 516–17, 521, 529–30, 239–47, 252, 288–90, 306–9, 314–15, 351
533n, 576, 578–79, 582, 583n, 585, Cox-JFK conversation on, 316–17
602–3, 613 and Meredith’s registration, 181, 224–26,
Jupiter, 410, 451n, 538 239–42, 245–47, 250–52, 273
leaks of classified information on, 154 O’Donnell-JFK conversation on, 351–52,
medium-range ballistic (MRBMs), 120, 144, 354–55
Index 633
presidential investigation of, 357 National Aquarium, 362–63, 379

racial composition of troops in, 388–90 National Archives, xv, xviii–xix, xxi
riots in, 252–53, 255, 262–63, 267–68, National Association for the Advancement of
270–71, 276–78, 280–81, 283–84, Colored People (NAACP), 223
286–98, 302–13, 316n, 317–18, 354, National Day of Prayer, 498–99
385n, 579 national debt, 369
Smathers-JFK conversation on, 383–85 National Guard, U.S.:
Sorensen-JKF conversation on, 237 call-up of, 24, 51–53, 73–81, 110, 146–47,
Vance-JFK conversations on, 317–19, 351, 149–53, 199, 221
353–57 of Mississippi, 225–27, 249, 253, 256, 267n,
Vance-RFK conversation on, 299 270n, 275, 279, 281, 282n, 284–85, 293,
Mississippi National Guard, 225–27, 249, 253, 298, 300, 302, 310, 319, 351–52
256, 267n, 270n, 275, 279, 281, 282n, national income and product accounts, 322–23,
284–85, 293, 298, 300, 302, 310, 319, 340n, 341, 342n, 349, 509n–10n, 510
351–52 National Institutes of Health (NIH), 337
MLF (multilateral nuclear force), 144n, 611n, National Photographic Intelligence Center
613n (NPIC), 395, 397, 401n, 516, 578, 579n,
Mongoose, Operation, 391, 428 603n
Monroe, James, 29n, 151 National Reconnaissance Office, 597
Monroe, Marilyn, xix National Security Council (NSC), 181, 354n
Monroe Doctrine: Executive Committee of, 601n
and briefing of congressional leadership on meeting on Cuban missile crisis of, 601–14
Cuba, 61, 69 on nuclear weapons testing, 85, 109–10
and call-up of reserve and guard units, 152n National Theater, 177
Cuba press statement and, 25, 29–30, 36–38 NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 25, Naval Photographic Intelligence Center, 401
29–30, 36–37 Navy, U.S., 579
Montagnards, 165–66, 168 and call-up of reserve and guard units, 75–76
Morgan, Thomas E. “Doc,” xxxvii, 52n Cuban missile crisis and, 420n, 435, 518, 551,
JFK’s conversation with, 150–52 591, 596
Morgan Guaranty Trust, xxxi Drummond spy case and, 230
Morgenthau, Robert, 178 and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 330
Morse, Wayne, 113n Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 163–64
on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–64, 379, Ness, Norman, 342
386 Netherlands, 122n
Moscoso, Teodoro, xxxvii Berlin and, 490–91
Motley, Constance Baker, 223 Cuban missile crisis and, 406
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 178 NATO and, 138
Mr. President, 177 Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156–57,
multilateral nuclear force (MLF), 144n, 611n, 174–76
613n Neustadt, Richard E., xxxi, 332n
Murrow, Edward R., xxxvii New Deal, 362
New Economics, 500
NAC (North Atlantic Council), 128, 135–36, New York Times, 5n, 152n, 493–94
141, 143 and crisis at University of Mississippi, 352
Nasser, Gamal Abdul, xxxvii Cuban missile crisis and, 405
Nasution, Abdul, 174 and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 349–50
(NASA), 149 and leaks of classified information, 153–54
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, on proposed JFK-Khrushchev summit,
329–30, 333–34, 336, 348–49 263–64
nuclear weapons testing and, 83, 87, 94, on racial composition of troops at University
103–4 of Mississippi, 389n
634 INDEX
New York Times (continued) NPIC, see National Photographic Intelligence

on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 396 Center
Ngo Dinh Diem, 166, 172 NSC, see National Security Council
Nguyen Dinh Thuan, 155, 165n nuclear weapons, 28, 81–83, 118–19, 128–30,
NIH (National Institutes of Health), 337 192
Nikolayev, Andrian, 86n agreement on transfer of, 12–13
Nitze, Paul H., xxxvii, 50–51, 148 all-fusion, 92
on Berlin, 135n, 136–44, 146 Berlin and, xxiv, 119, 129–30, 135–36,
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 73n, 140–44, 186, 485, 487, 489, 495
78–79 Bohlen on, 203
Cuban missile crisis and, 513n, 570, 613 Cuban missile crisis and, 399–401, 409–13,
Cuba press statement and, 34n, 43 420, 428, 430, 435–37, 440, 447–48,
on NATO, 137–42 451, 457–58, 460, 465, 512, 525–26, 528,
on naval blockade of Cuba, 613 533–34, 538, 541, 547, 555, 558–59, 569,
on nuclear weapons, 142 578–79, 581–82, 584, 587, 593–94,
Nixon, Richard, 6, 115 602–3, 605–6, 609–10
secret recordings by, xii–xiii, xix Eisenhower on, 128, 130, 613n
Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., 173 France and, 124, 128, 214–21, 611n, 612,
nontransfer of nuclear weapons agreement, 613n
12–13 Japan and, 163n, 164
Norodom Sihanouk, Prince, 156, 170–72 and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 330,
Norstad, Lauris, xxxvii, 130, 421n 332–33, 344–45, 348
Berlin and, 127, 135–36, 139n, 143–45, 189, JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 485, 487, 489,
495n 495
on buildup of conventional forces in Europe, on MiGs, 21
145 NATO and, 12n, 119–20, 143
on nuclear weapons, 143 ripple, 88–90, 94–95, 102–3, 109, 110n
relief of, 119–20, 122, 124, 126–28 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 153, 391,
North Atlantic Council (NAC), 128, 135–36, 393–94
141, 143 Taylor on, 122n, 123–24, 156, 159–63
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), see also missiles, missile sites
55, 128, 205–6, 216n, 410n, 420n–21n nuclear weapons testing, 82–83, 85–110, 142,
Berlin and, 119, 135–44, 149, 196, 471, 360, 364, 398n
483–84, 487, 494–95 airdrop, 94–95, 96n, 103–4, 110n
and briefing of congressional leadership on atmospheric, 183n, 184
Cuba, 59–60 ban on, 34, 83, 102n, 105, 182–85, 188, 193,
change in direction of, 119–20, 122 198, 207–14, 217n, 218–19, 492, 497,
Cuban missile crisis and, 412, 422, 434, 443, 537, 573
554–55, 613 high-altitude, 82–83, 85–110, 360, 364
France and, 119, 125, 129, 139–40 on-site inspection of, 13
JFK on, 118–19, 125, 129, 137–40, 144 underground, 34, 90–92, 95n, 182–84,
JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 483–84, 487, 208–14, 218–19
494–95
nuclear weapons and, 12n, 119–20, 143 OAS, see Organization of American States
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 50 Oberdorfer, Louis F., 246, 277n, 280–81
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 157, 160 O’Brien, Lawrence F., xxxvii
West Germany and, 120, 125, 139–40 and crisis at University of Mississippi, 251n,
Norway, 60, 131n 254–55, 257, 263, 268, 271–72, 275–76,
NOUGAT series, 91n, 95n 281–87, 291–98, 300–303
Novaya Zemlya, Soviet nuclear weapons testing on foreign aid, 357–60
in, 85–86 and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 368,
Novello, Angie, xviii, 246n–47n 371
Index 635
JFK’s conversation with, 357, 359–60 380–81, 394–95, 397–405, 408–9, 414,
occupational safety legislation, 372–73 419, 420n, 421, 423–24, 427–31, 434,
O’Donnell, Kenneth, xxxvii, 153n 436–37, 443, 446–47, 453, 463–65,
and briefing of congressional leadership on 516–21, 527, 529–32, 535, 537, 545,
Cuba, 52n 556, 558–59, 566, 571, 574–75, 578–79,
at budget and tax cut meetings, 368 583, 588, 592, 594–97, 602–3, 606, 611
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 251n, see also U-2 reconnaissance flights
253–54, 257, 268, 282–85, 287–88, 291, Pigott, Paul, 425n–26n, 426
293–94, 299–300, 302–3, 351–52, Pittman, Steuart, xxxvii
354–55 Plumley, H. Ladd, 341
Drummond spy case and, 232 Point Reyes seashore, 149
JFK’s conversation with, 351–52, 354–55 Poland, 206–7
JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii Berlin and, 490–91
on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 396 Policy Planning Council, 368
Office of Emergency Planning, 354n Poltava, 603
Office of Legal Counsel, 249 Portugal, 60, 82
Okinawa, 411 Post Office, U.S., 505–6
Okun, Arthur, xxxvii, 321n Powers, Dave, xviii–xix
Okun’s law, 321n Powers, Francis Gary, 4, 6n, 364, 395, 398n
Old Age Survivors Insurance, 505 Prado y Ugarteche, Manuel, xxxvii
Operation Mongoose, 391, 428 “Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the
Operation STORAX, 91n Berlin Conflict,” 135
Organization of American States (OAS), 23n, President’s Committee to Appraise
63, 65 Employment and Unemployment
and briefing of congressional leadership on Statistics, 178
Cuba, 59, 67–68 President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Cuban missile crisis and, 405, 412, 415, 422, Board (PFIAB), 153
542–43, 566–67, 600 press, 125
Cuba press statement and, 30n and Bay of Pigs prisoners, 381
and naval blockade of Cuba, 542–43, 600 Berlin and, 111, 394, 469
Ormsby-Gore, Sir David, xxxvii, 145, 155 and call-up of reserve and guard units, 74,
80–81, 152n
Pace, Frank, Jr., 342 CIA investigation of, xxiv, 134, 154
Pakistan, 64, 170, 177n, 535 and crisis at University of Mississippi,
Panofsky, Wolfgang, 97 250–51, 286, 298–99, 303, 305, 352, 354
Paraguay, 115n on Cuba, 394, 396, 411, 414, 424, 438–39,
Paris Summit, 183, 548 441, 456–58, 547, 556, 558, 561, 571,
Passman, Otto, 357–60 576, 592, 611
Pathet Lao, 179 on French-West German relations, 494
“Pay Bill,” 329, 333, 339, 344, 506–7 and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal,
Peace Corps, 371 349–51, 506, 510
Pearl Harbor attack, 515, 523, 539, 545–46, 607 and leaks of classified information, 153–54
Pearson, Drew, 383, 386 on proposed JFK-Khrushchev summit,
Penkovsky, Oleg, 395, 432n, 578 263–65
Penney, Sir William, 208–9 on racial composition of troops at University
Pentagon, see Defense Department, U.S. of Mississippi, 389n
Pérez Godoy, Ricardo Pío, xxxvii on Self-employed Pension Bill, 383
Peru, 115n and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 20,
PFIAB (President’s Foreign Intelligence 24–52, 71–72, 83, 149, 391
Advisory Board), 153 on U.S.-West German relations, 470
photoreconnaissance of Cuba, 3, 6, 13, 16, 20, on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
48–50, 67n, 110, 134, 320, 361–62, 364, Union, 11, 13–15, 81
636 INDEX
Princeton University, xxxii, 274 and briefing of congressional leadership on

Public Health Service, 355 Cuba, 61
public opinion: Cuban missile crisis and, 405, 524, 542,
on Berlin, 477, 483–86 554–55
on Cuban missile crisis, 412–13, 417, 523–24, Cuba press statement and, 37–39, 41
528–29, 539, 548, 555, 558, 561, and naval blockade of Cuba, 542
586–87, 611 ripple nuclear weapons, 88–90, 94–95, 102–3,
in Soviet Union, 197 109, 110n
public works: Ripple II experiment, 90, 95, 102–3, 109, 110n
Interior Appropriations Bill and, 362–64, Ripple III experiment, 90, 99, 103, 109
379, 386–87 Rockefeller Foundation, 197
JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 507 Rogers, Paul G., 385
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Rome, Treaty of, 121n–22n, 131n
Affairs, 185, 208n, 209–11, 219 Roosa, Robert V., xxxvii
Punta del Este Conference, 23, 59, 63, 65 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 129n, 349n, 501n
Eisenhower on, 130–31
Quemoy, 156, 158, 161, 591 secret recordings by, xii–xiii
Roosevelt, Theodore, 29n
RAINIER test, 91n Rosenthal, Jack, 298n
Ray, Manuel, 406 Rosenthal, Jacob, xxxviii
Rayburn, Sam, 500–501 Rostow, Walt W., xxxviii, 3
REA (Rural Electrification Administration), Rural Electrification Administration (REA),
371 371
Reber, James, 134, 402n Rusk, Dean, xxxviii, 50–51, 81, 126n, 132–34,
recession, 325–26, 328 508, 576n
Records Administration, xxi on Berlin, 13, 135–38, 140, 142–45, 148–49,
recreational land purchase program, 503 190n, 361, 469, 471, 491n, 498
repayable loans, 340–41 and briefing of congressional leadership on
Report to JFK: the Skybolt Crisis in Perspective Cuba, 52n, 58–63, 65–69, 72
(Neustadt), xxxi on buildup of conventional forces in Europe,
Republic, 79n 145
Republican National Convention, 378n on call-up of reserve and guard units, 24, 73n,
Republicans, Republican party, 266 76, 147
Berlin and, 394 on Castro, 66
and call-up of reserve and guard units, 110, and Cuban aggression in Latin America,
152n–53n 22–23
and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 334, Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 400–402,
339, 349n, 500 404–7, 409–12, 414, 417, 421–22,
midterm election campaigning of, 369 425–28, 431–36, 438–40, 455, 461, 468,
on Self-employed Pension Bill, 367 512n–13n, 514–16, 521–25, 528, 531,
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 3, 23–24, 534–36, 538, 541–44, 546–56, 558–67,
391–93 570, 572–75, 599–600, 602, 603n,
Reston, James, 263–65, 349n 605–14
Reuters, 11 on Cuban missile sites, 48, 134
Reuther, Walter, xxxvii, 110 on Cuban trade, 60–61
Reynolds, John, 82 Cuba press statement and, 25, 29–32, 34–47
Rice, E. E., 168 on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 58, 71
Rickover, Hyman G., 220 on JFK-Eisenhower letter to Adenauer, 133
Ridgway, Matthew, 127 Khrushchev on, 197
Riley, Herbert D., 460 on Laos, 180
Rio Pact (Rio Treaty of 1947) (Inter-American on NATO, 137–38, 140, 142–43, 149
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance), 30 on naval blockade of Cuba, 22, 27, 83–84,
Index 637
542–43, 565–67, 574, 599, 602, 605–6, SAMOS satellite, 4–5

608–9, 611–12 Samuelson, Paul A., xxxviii
on nuclear weapons for France, 216n, 220, Sarit, Thanarat, 156, 170–72
612 Sato, Eisaku, 572
and nuclear weapons for West Germany, 218 Schaetzel, J. Robert, xxxviii
nuclear weapons negotiations and, 12–13 Schirra, Walter M. “Wally,” 360, 364, 396, 508n
on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 87, 90, nuclear weapons testing and, 83, 93, 96,
95–98, 102, 104, 107 103–4, 110
and reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 16, Schlei, Norbert, 249–50
134, 394–95 Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., xxxviii, 604n
on Rio Pact, 30, 37–38, 542, 554–55 and crisis at University of Mississippi,
Schroeder’s meetings with, 471, 497 229–30
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n, JFK-Barnett conversations and, 232
21–22, 24–32, 35, 40, 50, 59, 65, 67–68, Schroeder, Gerhard, xxxviii, 455, 467
395 Berlin and, 459, 469, 472–98
on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 35–36, Cuban missile crisis and, 459–60, 472
65–66, 70 on French-West German relations, 494–97
on Soviet submarines, 58 JFK’s meeting with, 469, 472–98
on space program, 95–96, 102 Rusk’s meetings with, 471, 497
on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet Schultze, Charles L., xxxviii
Union, 4n, 5–16 at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n, 324,
Russell, Richard B., xxxviii, 4n, 71–73, 383–84 326–28, 338, 340, 342, 345–46, 350,
briefing on Cuba for, 52–54, 56–58, 61, 65, 369n
67–69, 71–72 Seaborg, Glenn T., xxxviii
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 73n, 75, on ABM system, 108
77–78, 147 and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 330,
on Castro, 66 347
on Cuban missile sites, 67, 69 nuclear weapons testing and, 82n, 85–92,
on Cuban trade, 61 95–100, 105–6, 108–9, 110n
on Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, 57–58 Seamans, Robert, 82n, 93
on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 69–70 SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization),
on Soviet military presence in West Berlin, 555
66 “Seattle: The Mood of the Country and
“Russians Scorn U-2 Note; Call the Flight President Kennedy” (Reston), 349n
Aggressive,” 81n Secret Service, U.S.:
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 249
SAC, see Strategic Air Command JFK’s secret recordings and, xvii, xx, xxii
SACEUR, see Supreme Allied Commander, Selden, Armistead, 52n, 63
Europe Self-employed Pension Bill, 111–14
St. Matthew’s Cathedral, National Day of Gore on, 112n–13n, 365–68, 387
Prayer at, 498–99 Smathers on, 112, 365, 382–83, 387–88
Salinger, Pierre E. G., xxxviii Semipalatinsk, 212
Berlin and, 110–11 Senate, U.S., xviii–xix, 178, 192, 383n–84n
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 80 Armed Services Committee of, 23, 81, 123n
Cuba press statement and, 24, 33, 47n on call-up of reserve and guard units, 110,
on proposed invasion of Cuba, 391 146–47, 151, 152n–53n
and University of Arkansas Schola Cantorum Cuban missile crisis and, 414–15, 422–23
choir, 17 Finance Committee of, 133, 321, 328n, 363n,
and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet 365, 366n, 370n, 375, 506n
Union, 14–15 on foreign aid, 192, 320, 356, 358, 378
Saltonstall, Leverett, xxxviii, 52n Foreign Relations Committee of, 23, 153n
Same, Graham E., 286n on Interior Appropriations Bill, 362–63
638 INDEX
Senate, U.S. (continued) on nuclear weapons testing, 82n

on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 321, proposed JFK-Khrushchev summit and,
339, 356, 375 264–65
Judiciary Committee of, xix and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19n
on Self-employed Pension Bill, 112–13, South America, see Latin America
365–68, 382 Southeast Asia, 26, 129, 181
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 23, and briefing of congressional leadership on
391–92 Cuba, 62
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 159 and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24,
see also Congress, U.S. 53
Seven Days in May (Knebel), 272 Cuba press statement and, 42
Shapley, Willis, 333 partition nature of, 172
Shoup, David M., xxviii Taylor on, 158–59, 165, 172–73
on Cuban missile crisis, 578n, 579, 586–87, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),
589–91, 594, 597–98 555
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, 156, 170–72 Souvanna Phouma, 180
Sikes, Robert L. F., 385 Soviet Union, xxxii, 118, 360, 583n
Skipjack nuclear submarine, 215–17, 220n ABM system of, 108–9
Skybolt missiles, 332, 344–45 Adenauer on, 123
Sloan, Frank K., xxxviii arms shipments to Cuba from, xxiii–xxiv,
Smathers, George A., xxxviii, 52n 3–4, 16, 19–52, 54–56, 59, 62–65,
on crisis at University of Mississippi, 383–85 67–68, 70–72, 74, 80–81, 83, 149, 153,
on Cuba, 382–84 156, 207, 320, 361, 381–82, 391–96,
on Interior Appropriations Bill, 386–87 400–401, 411, 415–16, 420n, 440–41,
JFK’s conversation with, 382–88 455, 457, 462, 464, 513, 528, 530, 536,
on Self-employed Pension Bill, 112, 365, 543–54, 573, 588, 602–3, 606–7, 609,
382–83, 387–88 612
Smith, Bromley, 601n, 603, 608 Berlin and, 62, 65–66, 81, 129–30, 131n,
Smith, Joseph, 130 138–39, 141n–42n, 148–49, 183,
Smith, Steven, xix 185–90, 194, 200–202, 361, 391, 394,
SNIEs, see Special National Intelligence 433, 441, 449, 456, 458, 469–94, 497,
Estimates 535, 540–41, 544, 548, 573, 576–77,
Social Security, 323n, 371, 510n 581–82, 584–85, 593–94, 609
Solow, Robert M., xxxviii Bohlen on, 4n, 6–7, 9–15, 19–20, 192,
Sorensen, Theodore C., xxxviii, 133 197–98, 208, 515, 525, 604
Berlin and, 110–11 and briefing of congressional leadership on
at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n, 323, Cuba, 54–56, 58–64, 66–67, 69, 72
326, 335–36, 339, 343, 346, 350, 368, and call-up of reserve and guard units, 24, 74,
369n, 372–74, 376–78, 499n, 504–5, 76, 80, 149, 199
507–8 Castro’s support from, 63, 66, 69, 192–93
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 80 Chinese relations with, 198
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 229, Cuban missile crisis and, 398–400, 403n–4n,
237, 249, 251n, 253–55, 257–59, 267–74, 409–12, 415–16, 418, 420–21, 428,
278, 280, 282–86, 291–92, 294–96, 430–34, 436–59, 462, 465, 467–69, 471,
300–301, 303 513–15, 517, 520–23, 525, 528–40,
Cuban missile crisis and, 400, 427n, 448–49, 542–45, 547–50, 552–56, 559, 563–64,
453–56, 512n–13n, 514–15, 527, 567–69, 572–78, 581, 584–87, 589–90,
547–49, 554–56, 560, 562, 569–71, 576, 593–94, 599–600, 602, 604–9, 612
599–600, 601n, 602, 604, 606, 608, 610 Cuban trade with, 60–61
Cuba press statement and, 32, 34n Cuba press statement and, 24–32, 34–37,
JFK’s conversation with, 237 39–43, 45–46, 149
JFK’s secret recordings and, xviii Drummond spy case and, 230–32
on naval blockade of Cuba, 569, 602, 610 East Germany as surrogate for, 487n
Index 639
Hungary invaded by, 72, 208, 411, 545, 549, Cuban missile crisis and, 407, 417, 422,
554, 581, 589 427–28, 441n, 450, 454, 461–63, 468,
Indonesian relations with, 157, 174–75 514, 533, 563, 572, 575, 599–600, 611n
JFK-Schroeder meeting on, 472–93, 498 Cuba press statement and, 3
JFK’s meeting with Soviet experts on, and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 371,
182–221 503, 505, 508
Laos and, 178, 180, 202, 458 in military contingency planning on Cuba,
leaks of classified information on, 154 393
military presence of, in Cuba, 35–36, 55–56, on naval blockade of Cuba, 599–600
64–66, 69–70, 80, 549, 552, 569, 606–7, on nuclear weapons for France, 215, 217
609 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 20–21,
and naval blockade of Cuba, 22, 62, 84, 450, 396
532, 534–35, 540, 543–44, 564–65, 567, on Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 70
575, 577, 584, 602, 606–10 Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 165–66
nuclear weapons negotiations and, 12–13, 83, on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
182–85, 188, 193, 198, 207–14, 492, 497 Union, 3–4, 9, 13n, 14
nuclear weapons testing of, 82, 85–89, 91n, State Department Bulletin, 415
93–94, 101–2, 103n, 104, 106–7, 398n State Mutual Life Assurance Company of
public opinion in, 197 America, 341n
and reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 395 steel industry, 325–27, 349n
space program of, 86n, 108, 451n Stennis, John, 229
Taylor on, 157 Stevenson, Adlai E., xxxi–xxxii, xxxix, 82
and U.S. nuclear aid for France, 217, 220–21 Cuban missile crisis and, 428, 512, 553, 604n,
U-2 reconnaissance flights over, 3–16, 19–20, 610, 613
81, 88n, 134, 364, 395, 398–99, 548 on naval blockade of Cuba, 610
see also U.S.-Soviet relations on Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 392
soybeans, 371 Stikker, Dirk, 205
Spaak, Paul-Henri, 216n Stimson, Henry, xxxii
space, space program, 508n stock market, 326–27, 349n, 350
JFK and, 83, 86–87, 93, 96, 103–5, 149, STORAX, Operation, 91n
329–30, 333–34, 336, 343, 347–49, 505 Strategic Air Command (SAC), 129, 394, 579
military use of, 105 Cuban missile crisis and, 401, 414, 428, 438
moon landing in, 149 and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
nuclear weapons testing and, 83, 86–87, Union, 5n
93–96, 102–8, 110, 360 Strauss, Franz Josef, 120, 493–95, 497
Spain, 452n, 610 Strong, Robert C., xxxix
Spanish-American War, 452n Subandrio, 174–75
Sparkman, John, 52n submarines, 590
Special Group, 16 and briefing of congressional leadership on
Special Group-Augmented, 454 Cuba, 58
Special National Intelligence Estimates Cuban missile crisis and, 409, 450, 534, 538,
(SNIEs), 393, 440n, 441, 537n, 604 594
Sproul, Alan, xxxviii Polaris missile-firing, 215, 330, 538, 613
Sputnik, 451n Skipjack nuclear, 215–17, 220n
Staats, Elmer B., xxxviii, 317 Suez crisis, 72, 411, 434–35, 522, 545n, 581
at budget and tax cut meetings, 321n, Sukarno, Achmed, 156–57, 174
322–23, 325–27, 330, 332–33, 337, 346, Sullivan, William H., xxxix
369n, 371, 376–77 on Indonesia, 174
Stalin, Joseph, 131, 187, 555 Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 156n, 164
STARFISH test, 83, 97, 98n, 105 supersonic jet transports, 331–32
State Department, U.S., 144n, 368, 460–63, Supplemental Appropriations Bill, 387
576n Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
on Berlin, 135, 189, 190n, 194n, 204 (SACEUR), 119–20, 122n, 127n
640 INDEX
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe on naval blockade of Cuba, 534, 544, 565–66,
(SACEUR) (continued) 579–80, 588, 600, 606, 608
on Berlin, 135–36, 139n Teague, Olin E. “Tiger,” 373–74
Cuban missile crisis and, 421 Texas Christian University (TCU), 255–56
Supreme Court, U.S., 224 Thailand:
Goldberg’s swearing in at, 315, 316n, 317 Cambodian relations with, 170n, 171–72
Sweden, 131n Laotian relations with, 178, 181
Sweeney, Walter C., xxxix military aid to, 163, 171
Cuban missile crisis and, 446–47, 463, 558 Taylor’s visit to, 156, 170–74
Switzerland, 131n Thant, U, xxxix, 149, 172, 411
Syria, 43 Thirteen Days (R. Kennedy), xviii–xix
Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr., xxxix, 51n,
Taber, John, xxxix 191–94, 207–8, 576n
Tactical Air Command (TAC), 428, 446n on Berlin, 187–90, 193–98, 200, 202–4, 206,
Taiwan (Nationalist China), 72, 458n 219, 491n, 513, 535, 540, 544, 548, 552
China’s threats to invade, 591n Cuban missile crisis and, 422, 428, 459,
military aid to, 163 461–62, 468–69, 512n, 513–14, 515n,
Taylor on, 158–59, 164 531–38, 540, 543–45, 547–50, 552–54,
and U-2 reconnaissance flights over China, 561, 563, 565–66, 568–70, 572–75,
16, 110, 134, 395 600–602, 610, 614
Talbot, Phillips, xxxix on German unification, 205–6
Tarawa, battle of, 579 Khrushchev and, 182–83, 187, 189n, 191n,
Task Force Alpha, 254n, 262n, 267n, 279n, 282n, 193–94, 196–97, 203–5, 207, 513, 553
284n, 287n, 293, 296n, 298, 305n, 310, on naval blockade of Cuba, 514, 532–36, 550,
312 565, 568, 574, 600–602, 610
TASS statement, 191n on nuclear weapons for France, 216
Cuban missile crisis and, 411, 439, 441, nuclear weapons negotiations and, 182–83,
457–58, 547 185, 193, 213–14
Tax Cut bill, 321n on Soviet Union, 198, 531–35, 540, 543, 548,
taxes: 552–53, 575
JFK’s proposal on, 317, 321–51, 355–56, on U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
365–66, 368–78, 499–511 Union, 11
meetings on, 321–51, 369–78 Thompson, William “Bill,” 386
Self-employed Pension Bill and, 112–13, Thorneycroft, Peter, 142n, 145–46
365–66 Thuan, Nguyen Dinh, 155, 165n
Taylor, Maxwell D., xxxix, 181, 380 THUMBELINA nuclear device test, 96,
Cuban missile crisis and, 397n, 400, 407–10, 99–100, 105, 109, 110n
413–14, 417–20, 424, 426–27, 429, 433, TIGHTROPE test, 110n
435–37, 439–50, 452–53, 458–59, 469, Tobin, James, xxxix, 341n
512n, 513–14, 516, 520, 527–30, 533–34, Tolstoy, Leo, 394
536–37, 540–41, 544–47, 550–52, trade:
554–56, 558–60, 564–66, 568–71, 576, Berlin and, 483–84
578n, 579–80, 582–83, 585, 588–97, of Cuba, 60–62, 320
599–601, 605–8, 610, 612–14 Trade Bill, 390
Cuba press statement and, 34n Trading with the Enemy Act, 60
Eisenhower on, 122–24, 126 Treasury Department, U.S.:
Far Eastern trip of, 155–76 and JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 328,
JCS chairmanship appointment of, 119, 122, 336, 344, 346, 350, 369
123n, 156 on Self-employed Pension Bill, 113, 365
JCS chairmanship swearing in of, 319 Tretick, Stanley, xxxix
JFK and, 119, 124, 155–76, 347 Troutman, Robert, xxxix
on Laos, 178n, 179 Truman, Harry S., xxxii, 120, 127–28
Index 641
secret recordings by, xii–xiii U.S.-Soviet relations, 81

trust funds, 323n, 342, 510n and briefing of congressional leadership on
Tshombe, Moise Kapenda, xxxix Cuba, 60
Tuchman, Barbara, 523n Cuba press statement and, 24–32, 34, 41
Tucker, Ralph, 18 Laos and, 178
Tucker and Baker, 367n nuclear weapons testing and, 106–7
Turkey, 28, 63–64, 72, 208 and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 19–34,
Cuban missile crisis and, 410–11, 416, 451, 393
467, 512, 525, 532–35, 538–39, 545, and U-2 reconnaissance flights over Soviet
549–50, 554–55, 567–69, 600, 604, Union, 3–16, 19–20
609–13 U.S. Steel Corporation, xxxii, 325n–27n
Turner, Robert C., xxxix U Thant, xxxix, 149, 172, 411
Tyler, William R., xxxix U-2 reconnaissance flights, 3–20
Tyuratam missile test range, 85–86, 398n over China, 110, 134, 395
over Cuba, 3, 13, 16, 20, 48–50, 67n, 110, 134,
Udall, Stewart L., 110–11, 147, 192n, 204, 264, 320, 361–62, 364, 380–81, 394–95,
394, 506n 397–405, 408–9, 414, 419, 423–24,
Ulbricht, Walter, 206 427–31, 434, 436–37, 443, 446–47, 453,
U.N. Bond Act, 320 463–65, 516–21, 527, 529–32, 535, 537,
Uncertain Trumpet, The (Taylor), 122n, 123 545, 556, 558–59, 571, 578–79, 588, 592,
underground nuclear weapons testing, 34, 597, 602–3, 606, 611
90–92, 95n, 182–84, 208–14, 218–19 meeting on, 4–20
United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria nuclear weapons testing and, 88n
(U.A.R.), 43, 585n over Soviet Union, 3–16, 19–20, 81, 88n, 134,
United Auto Workers (UAW), xxxvii, 110 364, 395, 398–99, 548
United Nations (U.N.), 127n, 190, 512, 555, 573, see also photoreconnaissance of Cuba
585
and briefing of congressional leadership on Van Allen, James A., 97
Cuba, 67, 71 Van Allen radiation belt, 97, 98n, 100n
Charter of, 39n Vance, Cyrus R., xxxix, 360
and Cuban aggression in Latin America, 22 and crisis at University of Mississippi, 228,
Cuban missile crisis and, 405, 450, 457, 548, 256, 260, 267, 280–82, 284–86, 293–94,
604, 610, 612 298–99, 317–19, 351, 353–57, 389–90
Cuba press statement and, 30n JFK’s conversations with, 317–19, 351, 353–57
Drummond spy case and, 230–32 on racial composition of troops at University
and Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West of Mississippi, 389–90
Irian, 157 RFK’s conversation with, 299
General Assembly of, 30n, 67, 149, 191n, Vaught, John H., 255–56, 259, 273, 275, 277
439n Veatch, Ellis H., 333
on Japan, 164 Venezuela:
Korean War and, 523 and briefing of congressional leadership on
and naval blockade of Cuba, 575, 600 Cuba, 68–69
on South Vietnam and Cambodia, 171–72 Cuban aid to, 22–23
and Soviet arms shipments to Cuba, 30n, 392 Cuban missile crisis and, 434, 442
Taylor’s Far Eastern trip and, 162 Veterans Administration, 373–74
United States Information Agency (USIA), 371 Vienna Summit, 64n, 73, 538n
United States Intelligence Board (USIB), 179, Vietcong:
401n–2n, 432n Cambodia and, 171
Urban Renewal program, 337 crop destruction program and, 166, 168–69
URRACA tests, 95–97, 98n, 99, 104–5, 107, 109 on Laos, 180
Uruguay, 115n Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North
U.S. News and World Report, 506 Vietnam), 178–80, 207
642 INDEX
Vietnam, Republic of (South Vietnam), 155, on ripple concept, 88–89

176, 207, 587 Wehrley, Roy, xxxix
Cambodian relations with, 170n, welfare programs, 505
171–73 Western European Union, see Common Market
crop destruction program in, 165n, 166–69 West Irian, Dutch-Indonesian dispute over,
Laos and, 178, 180 156–57, 174–76
Taylor’s visit to, 165–73 Wheeler, Earle G., xxxix, 360
Vinson, Carl, xxxix and crisis at University of Mississippi, 353,
briefing on Cuba for, 52n, 67 357, 390
on call-up of reserve and guard units, 73n, 75, on Cuban missile crisis, 578–79, 585–86,
78, 150, 152–53 593–94, 596–98, 614
JFK’s conversation with, 150–53 on naval blockade of Cuba, 598
Virginia, University of, Miller Center of Public White, Lincoln, xl, 396
Affairs at, xiii–xv, xviii, xxii White House Conference on Narcotics and
Drug Abuse, 262n
Wagner, Aubrey, xxxix White House Office of Science and Technology,
on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n, 86n
507 Whitten, Jamie, 383n–84n
Walker, Edwin A.: Wiesner, Jerome B., xl
arrest of, 316n on ABM system, 108–9
and crisis at University of Mississippi, on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n,
270–72, 277–78, 284–86, 296, 315–16 505
Little Rock crisis and, 316n on nuclear weapons for France, 216, 218
Wall Street Journal, 350 nuclear weapons negotiations and, 182n,
Warsaw Pact, 208, 586 183–84, 208–14, 218–19
Berlin and, 141n on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 85–86, 92,
Cuban application to, 192–93, 531 94–95, 98–103, 105–9, 364
Washington Ambassadorial Group, 135, 146, Wiley, Alexander, 73
148, 492, 498 briefing on Cuba for, 52n, 53, 61–63
“Washington Merry-Go-Round, The: Sen. on Cuban missile sites, 61
Smathers Puts Up Roadblock” on naval blockade of Cuba, 62
(Pearson), 383n, 386n Williams, G. Mennen, xl
Washington Post, 199–200, 383n, 386n, 396 Wilson, Donald M., xl
Watergate hearings, xii–xiii Winnebago County Labor Day picnic, 77
Watkins, Thomas H.: Wirtz, W. Willard, xl, 155
and crisis at University of Mississippi, 225, World War I, 122n, 523n
234–36, 239–40, 242–43, 246, 267n, World War II, xxxvii, 128, 155, 523, 555, 573,
270, 273–74, 296, 305 579
JFK-Barnett conversations on, 234–36,
239–40, 242–43, 246 Yani, 174
Watkins and Eager, 236 Yarborough, Ralph, 366
Watson, Albert, 421n Young, Kenneth T., 173–74
Weatherly, 155 Yugoslavia, 61
Webb, James E., xxxix
on JFK’s budget and tax cuts proposal, 499n, Zablocki, Clement J., 221
505, 508 Zelikow, Philip, xiii, xxii, 599n
on nuclear weapons testing, 82n, 87–89, Zorin, Valerian A., xl
93–94, 104 Zuckert, Eugene M., xl

The PRESIDENTIAL RECORDINGS JOHN F. KENNEDY

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SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 21, 1962

Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow

Philip Zelikow and Ernest May

All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

John F. Kennedy : the great crises.

Editorial Advisory Board

The Presidential Recordings Project

Preface to John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, Volumes 1–3

Editors’ Acknowledgments xxv

Areas of Specialization for Research Scholars xxvii

A Note on Sources xxix

Meeting Participants and Other

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1962 3

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1962 81

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 1962 110

12:40–1:02 P.M. Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower 118

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1962 149

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1962 154

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1962 178

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1962 181

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 30–MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962 250

MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1962 314

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1962 319

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1962 355

MONDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1962 361

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1962 378

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1962 381

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1962 391

WEDNESDAY, October 17, 1962 468

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 18, 1962 499

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1962 578

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1962 599

eye. Action-focused individuals ordinarily take in more of what is said to

The Watergate hearings brought an end to secret taping. Afterward,

one or two scholars painstakingly produce a primary draft, including the

ever transcripts existed and almost certainly listened to tapes. Passages

of their work. Dalton has refused to discuss what he did. Senator

digitally, not literally, and remain intact on the library’s preservation

The most plausible explanation for Kennedy’s making secret tape

States. He feared that, if he did not insist on removal of the missiles,

These initial volumes of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Recordings

Jill Colley Kastner

CD-ROM DEVELOPER AND MULTIMEDIA COORDINATOR

Brett Avery Bush

In addition to the various memoirs and other writings cited as sources in

Abrams, Creighton W., Colonel, U.S. Army; Assistant Deputy Chief of

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1961 (Chairman from May

Goldberg, Arthur J., Secretary of Labor, 1961–1962; Associate Justice,

A senior career Foreign Service officer, most recently Ambassador to Thailand;

April 1961; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, April 1961–June

aging, no-nonsense—and also no-pomposity—rationalist; his adherence to

Rosenthal, Jacob, Executive Assistant to the U.S. Under Secretary of

Strong, Robert C., Director, Office of Near East Affairs, Department of

Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,

Tuesday, September 4, 1962

The President’s Labor Day holiday in Newport, Rhode Island, ended

sional leadership to be prepared for an afternoon White House briefing

11:30 –11:50 A.M.

[W]e don’t owe him the whole truth . . .

Meeting on U-2 Incident2

Rusk: It was at night.

President Kennedy: Well, would he?