2017

3. G.R. No. 221071 Jan. 18, 2017

EDDIE E. DIZON, Petitioner
vs.
YOLANDA VIDA P. BELTRAN, Respondent.

FACTS
Eddie and Verona Juana Pascua got married on March 8, 1995. Verona was a housewife.
She and her mother, together with Bryan and James, resided in the house erected on a
240-square-meter lot (disputed property) at No. 42 Mahogany Street, Nova Tierra
Subdivision, Lanang, Davao City. The disputed property was covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-351707 issued in 2002. The registered owners were
"Verona, married to Eddie."

In 2008, Verona filed before the RTC of Davao City a petition for the issuance of
Temporary and Permanent Protection Orders against Eddie and James. It took a while
before Eddie's employer finally permitted him to go home. Verona was already buried
before Eddie's arrival on December 21, 2009. Thereafter, a copy of a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated December 1, 2009 was shown to Eddie. Its subject was the disputed property
conveyed to herein respondent, Yolanda Vida P. Beltran for P1,500,000.00. Eddie
alleged that the Deed was falsified, and his and Verona's signatures thereat were
forgeries.

In January 2010, Eddie filed two complaints against Vida. He also caused the
annotation of a notice of lis pendens upon TCT No. T-351707. On April 6, 2010, TCT No.
T-351707 was cancelled, and in its place, TCT No. T-146-2010002236 was issued in
Vida's name. Eddie belatedly discovered about the foregoing fact some time in May 2010
after Davao Light and Power Company cut off the electrical connection purportedly
upon the advice of the new owner of the disputed property.

In June 2010, Vida filed before the MTCC of Davao City an action for unlawful detainer
against the petitioners, James and their unnamed relatives, house helpers and
acquaintances residing in the disputed property. Vida alleged that she is the registered
owner of the disputed property. While the Deed evidencing the conveyance in her favor
was executed on December 1, 2009, Eddie pre-signed the same on April 9, 2008 before
he left to work abroad. The Spouses Dizon's respective lawyers witnessed the signing.
After Verona's death, Vida tolerated the petitioners' stay in the disputed property. On
May 18, 2010, Vida sent a formal letter requiring the petitioners to vacate the disputed
property, but to no avail. On November 11, 2011, the MTCC rendered a Decision
directing the petitioners and their co-defendants to turn over to Vida the possession of
the disputed property, and pay P1,000.00 monthly rent from July 12, 2010 until the said
property is vacated, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and cost of suit. Vida was, however,
ordered to pay therein defendants P414,459.78 as remaining balance relative to the sale.
The petitioners filed an appeal before the RTC. During its pendency, Vida filed a motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution. On June 13, 2012, the RTC reversed the MTCC
ruling, dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer and denied Vida's motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution. Vida assailed the foregoing via a petition for review,
which the CA granted in the herein assailed decision and resolution.

ISSUE
Whether or not RTC correctly ruled that in an unlawful detainer case, the MTCC can
resolve the issue of ownership.
HELD
By analogy, in the unlawful detainer case from which the instant petition arose, Eddie
was originally a co-owner of the disputed property, and he remains in possession
thereof. Vida, on the other, is not even a resident of Davao City.
Moreover, prior to Vida's filing of the unlawful detainer case, Eddie had already
instituted actions for nullification of the Deed and falsification of public documents. The
Office of the Davao City Prosecutor had likewise made a preliminary determination of
probable cause that forgery was committed. Eddie, thus, insists that no valid conveyance
was made by Verona to Vida. In the mind of the Court, the foregoing are persuasive
reasons justifying the non-immediate execution of the MTCC judgment despite the
petitioners' belated posting of the supersedeas bond. Hence, the CA erred in declaring
that the RTC improperly denied Vida's motion for the issuance of a writ of execution
pending appeal.
4. G.R. No. 211010
VICTORIA SEGOVIA, RUEL LAGO, CLARIESSE JAMI CHAN, REPRESENTING THE
CARLESS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; GABRIEL ANASTACIO, REPRESENTED
BY HIS MOTHER GRACE ANASTACIO, DENNIS ORLANDOSANGALANG,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER MAY ALILI SANGALANG, MARIA PAULINA
CASTANEDA, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHERATRICIAANN CASTANEDA,
REPRESENTING THE CHILDREN OF THE PHILIPPINES AND CHILDREN OF THE
FUTURE; AND RENATO PINEDA, JR., ARON KERR MENGUITO, MAY ALILI
SANGALANG, AND GLYNDA BATHAN BATERINA, REPRESENTING CAROWNERS
WHO WOULD RATHER NOT HA VE CARS IF GOOD PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
WERE SAFE, CONVENIENT, ACCESSIBLE AND RELIABLE, Petitioners
vs
THE CLIMATE CHANGE COMMISSION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, HIS
EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, AND ITS COMMISSIONERS MARY ANN
LUCILLE SERING, HEHERSON ALVAREZANDNADAREV SANO; DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC) REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY, HONORABLE JOSEPH ABAYA; DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH) AND THE ROAD BOARD, REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY, HONORABLE ROGELIO SINGSON; DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT (DILG), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE
MANUEL ROXAS; DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
(DENR), REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE RAMON PAJE;
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM), REPRESENTED BY ITS
SECRETARY, HONORABLE FLORENCIO ABAD; METROPOLITAN MANILA
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MMDA), REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN,
FRANCIS TOLENTINO; DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DA), REPRESENTED BY
ITS SECRETARY, HONORABLE PROCESO ALCALA; AND JOHN DOES,
REPRESENTING AS YET UNNAMED LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS AND THEIR
RESPECTIVE LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE, JURIDICAL ENTITIES, AND NATURAL
PERSONS WHO FAIL OR REFUSE TO IMPLEMENT THE LAW OR COOPERATE IN
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW, Respondents

FACTS
This is a petition for the issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus to
compel the implementation of the following environmental laws and executive issuances
– RA No. 9279 (Climate Change Act), RA 8749 (Clean Air Act), EO No. 774 (BO 774),
AO 254 s. 2009 (AO 254), and AO No. 171 s. 2007.

In gist, petitioners contend that respondents’ failure to implement the foregoing laws
and executive issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly
in Metro Manila, in violation of the petitioners’ constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology, and may even be tantamount to deprivation of life and of life sources
or “land, water, and air” by the government without due process of law.

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assert that petitioners are not
entitled to a writ of Kalikasan because they failed to show that the public respondents
are guilty of an unlawful act or omission; state the environmental law/s violated; show
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that non-implementation of Road Sharing
Principle will cause environmental damage.

ISSUE
Whether or not a Writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should be issued.

RULING
No.For a Writ of Kalikasan to issue, the following requisites must concur:
 1. There is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced
and healthful ecology;
2. The actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and
3. The actual or threatened violation arises involves or will lead to an environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

It is well settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan
has to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. In this case,
apart from repeated invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced
and healthful ecology and bare allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners
failed to show that public respondents are guilty of any unlawful act or omission that
constitutes a violation of the petitioners’ right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

Similarly, the Writ of Continuing Mandamus cannot issue.

Mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in
nature, not those that are discretionary, and the official can only be directed by
Mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. At its core, what the petitioners are
seeking to compel is not the performance of a ministerial act but a discretionary act –
the manner of implementation of the Road Sharing Principle. Clearly, petitioners’
preferred specific course of action (i.e. the bifurcation of roads to devote for all-weather
sidewalk and bicycling and Filipino-made transport vehicles) to implement the Road
Sharing Principle finds no textual basis in law or executive issuances for it to be
considered an act enjoined by law as a duty, leading to the necessary conclusion that the
continuing mandamus prayed for seeks not the implementation of an environmental
law, rule or regulation, but to control the exercise of discretion of the executive as to how
the principle enunciated in an executive issuance relating to the environment is best
implemented . Hence, the continuing mandamus cannot issue.
5. G.R. No. 217617
CARMELITA T. BORLONGAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BANCO DE ORO (formerly EQUITABLE PCI BANK), Respondent.

FACTS
Eliseo Borlongan, Jr. and his wife Carmelita, acquired a real property.
Later, they went to the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to obtain a copy of the TCT in
preparation for a prospective sale of the subject property. To their surprise, the title
contained an annotation that the property covered thereby was the subject of an
execution sale in a Civil Case pending before the RTC.
Petitioner found out that respondent Banco de Oro (BDO), filed a complaint for sum of
money against Tancho Corporation, the principal debtor of loan obligations obtained
from the bank. Likewise impleaded were several persons, including Carmelita, who
supposedly signed four (4) security agreements.
Following the discovery of the sale of their property, Eliseo executed an affidavit of
adverse claim and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Surety Agreements, Notice of
Levy on Attachment, Auction Sale and Other Documents with the Regional Trial Court.
BDO filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, asserting that the Pasig RTC has no
jurisdiction to hear Eliseo's complaint and the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The Pasig RTC dismissed the case citing lack of jurisdiction and held that it could not
pass upon matters already brought before the RTC Makati and, citing Spouses Ching v.
Court of Appeals, the husband of a judgment debtor is not a stranger to a case who can
file a separate and independent action to determine the validity of the levy and sale of a
property.

ISSUE
Whether or not Pasig RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide a case filed by the non-
debtor husband to annul the levy and execution sale of the subject property ordered by
the Makati RTC against his wife.

HELD
Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows third-party claimants of properties
under execution to vindicate their claims to the property in a separate action with
another court. The officer shall not be liable for damages for the taking or keeping of the
property, to any third-party claimant if such bond is filed. Nothing shall prevent such
claimant or any third person from vindicating his claim to the property in a separate
action or prevent the judgment obligee from claiming damages in the same or a separate
action against a third-party claimant who filed a frivolous or plainly spurious claim. The
availability of the remedy provided under the foregoing provision requires only that that
the claim is a third-party or a "stranger" to the case. The poser then is this: is the
husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property was executed on
account of the other spouse's debt, a "stranger" to the suit? In Buado v. Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify that, to resolve the issue, it
must first be determined whether the debt had redounded to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership or not. In the negative, the spouse is a stranger to the suit who can file an
independent separate action, distinct from the action in which the writ was issued. A
third-party claim must be filed [by] a person other than the judgment debtor or his
agent. In other words, only a stranger to the case may file a third-party claim.
6. G.R. No. 186717
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL, Petitioners
vs.
JOCELYN I. BOLANTE, OWEN VINCENT D. BOLANTE, MA. CAROL D. BOLANTE,
ALEJO LAMERA, CARMEN LAMERA, EDNA CONSTANTINO, ARIEL C.
PANGANIBAN, KATHERINE G. BOMBEO, SAMUEL S. BOMBEO, MOLUGAN
FOUNDATION, SAMUEL G. BOMBEO, JR., and NATIONAL LIVELIHOOD
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (Formerly Livelihood Corporation), Respondents

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 190357

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING

COUNCIL, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. WINLOVE M. DUMAYAS, Presiding Judge of Branch 59, Regional Trial Court in
Makati City, JOCELYN I. BOLANTE, ARIEL C. PANGANIBAN, DONNIE RAY G.
PANGANIBAN, EARL WALTER G. PANGANIBAN, DARRYL G. PANGANIBAN,
GAVINA G. PANGANIBAN, JAYPEE G. PANGANIBAN, SAMUEL S. BOMBEO, KA
THERINE G. BOMBEO, SAMUEL G. BOMBEO, JR., NATIONAL LIVELIHOOD
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (FORMERLY LIVELIHOOD CORPORATION),
MOLUGAN FOUNDATION, ASSEMBLY OF GRACIOUS SAMARITANS
FOUNDATION, INC., ONE ACCORD CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY ENDEAVOR FOR
SALVATION & SUCCESS THROUGH POVERTY ALLEVIATION, INC., SOCIETY'S
MULTI-PURPOSE FOUNDATION, INC., ALLIANCE FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
ENVIRONMENT OF PANGASINAN, INC., AND STA. LUCIA EDUCATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF BULACAN, INC., Respondents.

FACTS
The Philippine National Bank (PNB) submitted to the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC) a series of suspicious transaction reports involving the accounts of Livelihood
Corporation (LIVECOR), Molugan Foundation (Molugan), and Assembly of Gracious
Samaritans, Inc. (AGS).
The transactions were reported '"suspicious" because they had no underlying legal or
trade obligation, purpose or economic justification; nor were they commensurate to the
business or financial capacity of Molugan and AGS, which were both lowly capitalized at
P50, 000 each.
The AMLC issued Resolution No.75 finding probable cause to believe that the accounts
of LIVECOR, Molugan and AGS - the subjects of the suspicious transaction reports
submitted by PNB. Thus, the AMLC authorized the filing of a petition for the issuance of
an order allowing an inquiry into the six accounts 18 of LIVECOR, Molugan, AGS,
Samuel S. Bombeo and Ariel Panganiban.
In view of this development, the AMLC issued Resolution No. 40.27 It authorized the
filing of a petition for the issuance of a freeze order against the 70 accounts found to be
related to the fertilizer fund scam.
The CA issued a freeze order effective for 20 days. The freeze order required the covered
institutions of the 70 accounts to desist from and not allow any transaction involving the
identified monetary instruments. It also asked the covered institutions to submit a
detailed written return to the CA within 24 hours from receipt of the freeze order.
Finding that there existed probable cause that the funds transferred to and juggled by
LIVECOR, Molugan, and AGS formed pati of the ₱728 million fertilizer fund, the CA
extended the effectivity of the freeze order for another four months, or until 20
December 2008. The extension covered only 31 accounts, which showed an existing
balance based on the returns of the covered institutions.
In the meantime, the Republic filed an Ex Parte Application docketed as AMLC Case No.
07-001 before the RTC. Drawing on the authority provided by the AMLC through
Resolution No. 90, the ex parte application sought the issuance of an order allowing an
inquiry into the 70 accounts.
The RTC found probable cause and issued the Order prayed for. It allowed the AMLC to
inquire into and examine the 70 bank deposits or investments and the related web of
accounts.
Hence, the Republic filed an Urgent Ex Parte Petition docketed as CA-G.R. AMLC No.
00024 before the CA seeking the issuance of a freeze order against the 24 accounts.

ISSUE
Whether the Republic committed forum shopping in filing CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024
before the CA.

HELD
Yes. Forum shopping is committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the
same cause of action and with the same prayer, where the previous case has not yet been
resolved (the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on
the same cause of action and with the same prayer, where the previous case has finally
been resolved (the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases
based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of
action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata).

While it is true that a previous freeze order was issued in CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00014
covering some of the accounts subject of CA-G.R. AMLC No. 00024, CA-G.R. AAILC No.
00014 had already attained finality when the second petition was filed, neither
petitioner nor any of the respondents interposed an appeal therefrom, pursuant to
Section 57 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil F0rfeiture, etc.

We are not even sure where the Republic got the notion that the CA found "that the
filing of the second petition for freeze order constitutes forum shopping on the ground
of litis pendentia. In its assailed Resolution, the appellate court aptly cited Quinsay v.
CA, stating that "forum shopping concurs not only when a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another, but also where the elements of litis pendentia are
present."
7. G.R. No. 189881
BACLARAN MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO C. NIEVA and MAMERTO SIBULO, JR., Respondents

FACTS
Herein petitioner Baclaran Marketing Corporation owns a 10-wheeler truck which
collided with the car owned by herein respondent Mamerto Sibulo Jr.
A civil case was filed which respondent won on the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The decision became final thus Sibulo filed a motion to implement the Writ of Execution
against the real properties of BMC.
The Deputy Sheriff levied BMC’s property and sold the property to Fernando C. Nieva.

BMC failed to redeem the property within one year from the sale and Nieva was
consolidated ownership over said land was and issued a new TCT.
A Writ of Possession and Notice to Vacate was issued against BMC.
BMC filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment before the CA alleging the its counsel
Atty. Isagani B. Rizon committed acts of gross and inexcusable negligence constituting
extrinsic fraud, which deprived it of due process and an opportunity to present its side.
It discovered the fraud when its representatives tried to pay the real estate tax on the
property, only to learn that the title to it had already been transferred to Nieva.

ISSUE
Whether or not the remedy of Petition for Annulment of Judgment is proper.

HELD
Under Rule 47 of Rules of Court, Petition for Annulment of Judgment can only be
availed after complying with all of its requisites. (1) The remedy is available only when
the petitioner can no longer resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief or other appropriate remedies through no fault of the petitioner; (2) The
grounds for the action of annulment of judgment are limited to either extrinsic fraud or
lack of jurisdiction; (3) The action must be filed within four years from the discovery of
the extrinsic fraud; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is
barred by laches or estoppel; and (4) The petition must be verified, and should allege
with particularity the facts and the law relied upon for annulment, as well as those
supporting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case
may be.

In the present case, BMC was not able to comply with the first and second requisite.
Hence, BMC cannot avail the remedy of Petition for Annulment of Judgment.
8. G.R. No. 213948
KNIGHTS OF RIZAL, Petitioner.
vs.
DMCI HOMES, INC., DMCI PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., CITY OF MANILA,
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR CULTURE AND THE ARTS, NATIONAL
HISTORICAL COMMISSION OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS
Herein respondent DMCI Project Developers (DMCI-PDI ), Inc. acquired a lot which was
earmarked for the construction of a condominium project. After having acquired all the
necessary permits and documents, the DMCI-PDI was ready to commence the intended
project. However, the City Council issued a resolution to temporarily suspend the
Building Permit until such time that issues had been cleared. Consultations after
consultations had he been initiated both by the City and DMCI-PDI. Finally, City
Council issued another resolution ratifying and confirming all previously issued permits,
licenses and approvals issued by the City for the condominium project.

Knights of Rizal (KOR), on the other hand, filed a petition for injunction seeking TRO,
and later a permanent injunction, against the construction of the project. The KOR
argued that the building, if completed, would be a sore to the view of the monument, an
endangerment to the nation’s cultural heritage, and a construction borne out of bad
faith.

ISSUE
Whether or not the court may issue a writ of mandamus against the City Officials to stop
the construction of such condominium project.

HELD
The SC ruled that there was no law prohibiting the construction of the project.
It was not even considered as contrary to morals, customs and public order.
The project was way well from the Park where the monument was located.
The SC ruled further that a mandamus did not lie against the City of Manila.
It is categorically clear that “a mandamus is issued when there is a clear legal duty
imposed upon the office or the officer sought to be compelled to perform an act, and the
party seeking mandamus has a clear legal right to the performance of such act.” In the
case at bar, such factors were wanting. Nowhere was it found in the ordinance, or in any
Law or rule that the construction of such building outside the Rizal Park was prohibited
if the building was within the background sightline or vision of the Rizal Monument.
Thus, the petition was lacking of merit and, thus dismissed.