Analysis
Change Management: Deciding who is in
Summary: Turkey recently passed
an important threshold in the great
power shift from the military to civil-
ian authorities that started at the
beginning of the decade. Rooted in
Turkey’s social and political trans-
formation, but strongly aided and
secured by the EU accession pro-
cess, this power shift reconfigures
the politics of the Republic. Whether
this deepening civilianization will
lead, as expected, to a rule-based
democratic consolidation and finally
finish the “second transition” from
democratic government to demo-
cratic regime remains to be seen.
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Charge in Turkey
by Soli Ozel*
July 15, 2009
Turkey recently passed an important
threshold in the great power shift from the
military to civilian authorities that started
at the beginning of the decade. Rooted in
Turkey’s social and political transformation,
but strongly aided and secured by the EU
accession process, this power shift reconfig-
ures the politics of the Republic. Whether
this deepening civilianization will lead,
as expected, to a rule-based democratic
consolidation and finally finish the “second
transition” from democratic government to
democratic regime remains to be seen.
With this shift, the military is grudgingly
emptying the political space it occupied
for a long time and that should not have
belonged to it in a democratic regime. As
a result of their inability to correctly assess
the political environment, their unwilling-
ness to accept the new realities both of the
country and Turkey’s alliances, and their
resistance in adjusting to a diminished
profile, the military have squandered much
of their prestige. The armed forces’ extraju-
dicial interventions in the political process,
particularly since the advent of the AKP
government, helped exacerbate their crisis
of legitimacy.
Undoubtedly, there are those within the
military who understand the rhythm of the
times and who would be willing to retreat
from the political arena in order to preserve
much of the privileged status of the institu-
tion. In fact, General Hilmi Özkök, former
*
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of International Relations and Political Science and is a columnist for the
Turkish daily Haberturk. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF).
chief of staff, has frequently expressed the
need to do so and has presented himself as
a committed democrat to justify his non-
interventionist style. We now know that
General Özkök, a sophisticated intellectual
and arguably a wise strategist aiming to
preserve the prestige of the army, managed
to block two attempted coups in 2003 and
2004. He was therefore despised by many
of his peers, mostly retired generals, for his
principled pro-democratic positions.
One of General Özkök’s closest collabora-
tors who helped to keep the military within
their barracks was General İlker Başbuğ,
the current chief of staff. General Başbuğ is
very different from his former commander
in style and in sophistication, but he is
equally cognizant of the need to manage
an orderly retreat from the political arena.
Hence his strongly worded statements that
the Turkish Armed Forces are committed to
democracy and that those who act against
this principle would not be tolerated within
the institution. It was therefore ironic that
a major row erupted because of allegations
that yet another attempt to destabilize the
government was concocted at the General
Staff headquarters.
The convulsions of recent weeks started
with the leaking of a document from the
Ergenekon files to the daily Taraf. The
document (or “this piece of paper” accord-
ing to General Başbuğ), whose authenticity
could not be verified at the time of writing,
Analysis
was entitled “Action Plan to fight against religious retrogression”. In
public, the document was commonly known as a plan to weaken
and eliminate the ruling AKP and the Fethullah Gülen movement.
The latter, an Islamic communal network, had been identified in all
but name by General Başbuğ on numerous occasions, as an insidi-
ous force that engaged in asymmetric psychological warfare against
the military using its overwhelming presence within the police
apparatus. The chief of staff committed himself to fighting back,
although it is unclear how he proposes to do so while his institution
is on the defensive.
The details of the debate on the document – on who prepared it,
whether the military as a body was responsible for it, and (if they
were) whether or not the top echelons knew about it – are still
murky. It is entirely plausible, based on past events, that elements
within the military engaged in such activities without authoriza-
tion. This would prove that they have not learned anything from
the lessons on civil-military relations that the past few years had
provided. But General Başbuğ’s claim that the document is a forg-
ery cannot be dismissed either. Whereas a military court ruled that
the document was false, the civilian prosecutors in charge of the
“Ergenekon” case arrested and then released the colonel who alleg-
edly prepared it.
The importance of the incident rests on raising a debate in full
force on two matters. The first issue is the debate on the proper role
of the military in a democratic system. Will the military be forced
to retreat from zones of privilege that were accumulated since their
first intervention in 1960, and will the immunity it enjoys when
it unconstitutionally intervenes in politics finally come to an end?
The other issue is the growing power of the Gülen movement.
The movement is believed to have many well-placed adherents in
Turkey’s civilian security forces and is alleged to have been behind a
flood of leaks that originated from the Ergenekon investigation. In
time, the controversy over the document subsided and segued into
a discussion on the role of the military in Turkey’s politics. During
this period, it became quite clear that the Turkish public does not
favor the military’s involvement in the political process. Such inter-
ventions no longer have a legitimate basis and the civilianization of
politics has unqualified support from society.
It was in that context that the government took a critical step
toward the civilianization of politics, but without prior debate, as it
is wont to do. It is also questionable that the move stemmed from a
principled strategy of democratization devised by the government.
Parliament passed a law that blocked military tribunals from trying
civilians and opened the way for the prosecution of military per-
2
“The clear intent of the law was first
and foremost to put an end to the
abnormal status of military courts...
It did away with the practical immu-
nity of military personnel for crimi-
nal acts that are not connected to
their professional status.”
sonnel in civilian courts. In signing the measure into law, President
Gül asked the government to make sure that it takes the necessary
steps to reassure those who expressed reservations about the law
and its compatibility with the Constitution.
This issue of compatibility with a constitution that was written by
and for the military during the dictatorship of 1980-83, was not the
only issue raised by the critics of the law. Many commentators also
criticized the rushed nature of the move, although CHP parliamen-
tarians were present in Parliament and voted for the motion. The
clear intent of the law was first and foremost to put an end to the
abnormal status of military courts, compared to their counterparts
in western democracies. It did away with the practical immunity of
military personnel for criminal acts that are not connected to their
professional status. This could take the form of plans to overthrow
the elected government of the country, or to control the course of
political developments, or to have power over decisions that belong
to the civilian realm.
Rightly, the government wishes any such plotters to be tried in civil-
ian courts if they plan to overthrow the constitutional order. The
military, on the other hand, argues that such conspiracies should be
considered “military crimes” and therefore be handled by military
courts. With no trace of irony, the military also objected to the law
on the grounds that it would politicize the armed forces.
There were concerns expressed by the military and circles close to
the General Staff, that the law could provide an opportunity for
civilian courts to declare open season on the military, and par-
ticularly the chief of staff. Turkey’s former justice in the European
Analysis
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) argued that the law contradicted
the decisions and the philosophy of the ECHR. The main opposi-
tion party, CHP, is more militarist than even the military itself and
characteristically decided to apply to the Constitutional Court in
order to annul the law.
As is the fate of all such matters in Turkey, the fine points of the law
and the proper relationship between procedure and substance went
by the wayside. The importance of the move was in its political
significance. Yet, however justified this approach may be, it can also
prove either shortsighted or misleading.
Indeed, the military have long abused their power and thwarted
democratic openings in the country. They resisted all efforts to
make the institution accountable and transparent. Unwilling to
cede any power, they wield enormous discretion in domestic securi-
ty through the gendarmes. They have yet to offer any regrets about
past infringements, not to mention long-term damages to Turkey’s
social peace. Injustices inflicted on countless citizens whose human
rights have been trampled upon are an open wound that requires
an effort at reconciliation.
Still, it is also imperative to question the assumption that civil-
ianization is a sufficient condition for democratization. Turkey’s
civilian politicians have not, in the past, distinguished themselves
for being committed democrats who act on principle rather than
expediency. They have rarely gone beyond paying lip service to
human rights and more often than not have shown stark intoler-
ance for dissent. They have never called to question the record of
the military rule periods or did any soul searching about their own
responsibilities in the perpetuation of a state-centered authoritarian
political culture.
In fact, Turkey’s politicians so far proved unable or unwilling to
draft a new constitution. The much-amended current constitution
is a product of the cold war and a militarist mentality. Its continu-
ing existence speaks volumes about the civilian leadership’s own
commitment to a constitution that would help consolidate the rule
of law and separation of powers. After all, hearing the prime min-
ister call the police force “the guarantor of the regime” is not very
comforting for those who thrive for the establishment of a bona
fide democracy in Turkey.
What is now required is a convincing project of democratization
that can allay fears that this is a power struggle only marginally re-
lated to the deepening of democratization. Turkey’s civilian leaders
3
have a duty to prove to an expectant public that they will commit
themselves to firmly establishing rule of law and the institutions of
a democratic regime.
Otherwise, the following observations of journalist Sezin Öney
may prove to be prophetic: “Politicians with a militarist mentality
and politically meddlesome soldiers are personality traits that grow
naturally in the flora and fauna of Turkey’s politics. In that sense,
I doubt that the inclination of our ideologies toward fascism and
our politics toward authoritarianism will cease that easily, once the
military’s involvement in politics finally comes to an end.”
That would certainly be tragic.
Soli Ozel, Lecturer, Bilgi University; Columnist, Haberturk
Soli Ozel teaches at Istanbul Bilgi University’s Department of Interna-
tional Relations and Political Science. He is a columnist for the national
daily Haberturk and is senior advisor to the chairman of the Turkish
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association. Additionally, he is the
editor of TUSIAD’s magazine Private View.
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