KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San
Carlos City Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.

Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of
the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros
Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the
requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for the
legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the
questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration,
the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2

On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a
reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50 was
remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision,
and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for
reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed
orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was denied
"with FINALITY." 4

Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano
a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the
Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as
complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or
ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5 The complaint
was signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B.
Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and
intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President,
which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove,
Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show cause
why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper
conduct. 7 On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite
For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8

In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned,
as Respondents (sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the
Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents
in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no more jurisdiction to
give such order."10 Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of
the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be
punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11

Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds the
various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the
President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read
as follows:

VI

That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most
Honorable Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file this
Administrative Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and determined
to phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos Appointees and Loyalists) still in your
administration without bloodshed but by honest and just investigations, which the
accused-complainant concurs to such procedure and principle, or otherwise, he
could have by now a rebel with the undersigned with a cause for
being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied of Equal Justice to be heard by our
Justices designated to the Highest and most Honorable Court of the Land
(Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)

VII

That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being
Constitutionally created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic), being
bias (sic), playing ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust
Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned and believed by him in good
faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose common intention is to
sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from innocent Filipino people the
genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they will be left in confusion and turmoil
to their advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved President's honest, firm
and determined Decision to bring back the real Justice in all our Courts, for the
happiness, contentment and progress of your people and the only country which
God has given us. — PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)

VIII

That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice,
yet they refused to grant to the poor and innocent accused-complainant, so to save
their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado, . . . 14

IX

. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the
Justices of the Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was based
 more of money reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our very Breath of
Life to every Filipino, who is brave to face the malicious acts of the Justices of
the Second Division, Supreme Court. By reason of fear for the truth Respondents
ignore the equal right of the poor and innocent-accused (complainant) to be heard
against the rich and high-ranking person in our Judiciary to be heard in equal
justice in our Honorable Court, for the respondents is too expensive and can't be
reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein are inconsiderate, extremely
strict and meticulous to the common tao and hereby grossly violate their Oath of
Office and our Constitution "to give all possible help and means to give equal
Justice to any man, regardless of ranks and status in life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)

xxx xxx xxx

5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his appeal
by complying (sic) all the requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the
respondents denied just the same which legally hurt the undersigned in the name
of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were so strict or inhumane and
so inconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine justice was too far and
beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as proved by
records of both cases mentioned above. 16

xxx xxx xxx

D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by

Judges and Justices, against practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino
people in general for no Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court
Records were cited for contempt by any presiding Judge. That this weapon if
maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a righteous and innocent
complainant and to favor any person with close relation. 17

scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did
so "to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and
that the dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his insinuation that the
Court maintains a double standard in dispensing justice — one set for the rich and
another for the poor — went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not
relevant to the cause of his client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's
integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies brought before it.
Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in resolving complaints yields only to the
records before it and not to any extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates.

It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to
fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious
disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective January 1, 1989,
after due publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for
reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate
original copy of the assailed trial court's decision, 19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date
he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular
No. 1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of
the other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the
explanation given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as
indicated in our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality his motion for
reconsideration, "no valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the
reconsideration sought." Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that
"(S)ubsequent compliance with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the
order of dismissal unless it be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons."

It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly
ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable
negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his
deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately,
the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper.
As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of
the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a
"lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost
earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance,
intimidation, and innuendo."22

To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the
criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever
mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all
such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this regard, it is precisely provided under Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility that:

CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE

RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND
SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

xxx xxx xxx

RULE 11.03 — A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing

language or behavior before the courts.

RULE 11.04 — A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by
the record or have materiality to the case.

xxx xxx xxx

We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division,
even the most basic tenet of our government system — the separation of powers between the
judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has — been lost on Atty. Castellano. We
therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is
supreme — the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial
power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department
or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" 24 Consequently, and owing to
the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment
on any of the Court's acts.

Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to
correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as
Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible
accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to
question his act of having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a
contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however,
reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty.
Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second
Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and

IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby
ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of
One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail
of Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED
from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution
becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt
with more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges
of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.

In re the complaint against Attorney ANACLETO FILART.

Acting Attorney-General Feria for the Government.

The respondent in his own behalf.

MALCOLM, J.:

These proceedings were instituted at the instance of thirty-seven residents of Asingan,

Pangasinan, who filed a complaint against attorney Anacleto Filart for malpractice, alleging in
substance:

1. That while Filart was deputy fiscal of Pangasinan he received of them the sum of P111 as fees
for drafting a memorandum in connection with Registration Case No. 3, Record No. 8540;
2. That Filart was guilty of fraud and negligence in prosecuting the appeal to the Supreme Court,
he having practically abandoned the case.

In connection with point No. 1, even admitting that Filart while deputy fiscal received such a
sum of complainants, which respondent denies, Filart seems to have had a legal right to receive
compensation as an attorney, the office of deputy provincial fiscal not being specifically included
in section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 1702, as an official who
shall not engage in private practice. It is also to be noted that Filart did not take up the case of his
own volition but was ordered by the court to defend the rights of petitioners because the attorney
they formerly retained was almost always in a state of intoxication.

In connection with point No. 2, the following facts are important:

1. That having resigned as deputy fiscal, and having engaged in the practice of law, complainants
asked Filart to prosecute the appeal of their case;

2. That Filart received from complainants sums of money, P780 according to complainants, and
P160 according to respondent;

3. That the complainants were driven from their lands, and their houses were destroyed, by order
of the court.

The facts which support the allegation of fraud and negligence on the part of respondent are:

1. The lapse of fifty-one days between the receipt of notice of denial of motion for a new trial
(March 7, 1917) until the filing of the bill of exceptions (April 27, 1917) when the statutory
period is only thirty days (Act No. 2347), sec. 26);

2. Failure to perfect a satisfactory bill of exceptions after repeated amendments and re-
amendments;

3. Failure to file a bond in order to prevent execution;

4. Assurances made by respondent that all was right.

1. This is explained by the fact that the record was not in the clerk's office. The date when the
answers to Filart's questions from the Land Registration Office reached Filart, which were to be
made a part of the bill of exceptions, does not appear in the record. Filart also alleges he made an
oral motion to extend the period fixed by law for the filing of the bill of exceptions, but that
motion appears to have been overlooked by the judge;

2. The parties are agreed that the bills of exceptions are voluminous. Respondent further pleads
pressure of work in his law office;

3. Respondent says that he believed execution would not be valid until after certiorari
proceedings were decided;
4. The exact nature of the assurances do not clearly appear in the record — possibly they are no
more than what an attorney fairly confident of success would make to a client.

The Acting Attorney-General believes that the facts are not sufficient to support the complaint,
and recommends dismissal of the case. We agree to the extent that such gross misconduct or
negligence has not been shown as warrants disbarment or suspension pursuant to sections 21 and
22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. "That part of the profession," said Lord Mansfield in Pitt vs.
Yalden, ([1767], 4 Burr., 2060), "which is carried on by attorneys is liberal and reputable, as well
as useful to the public, when they conduct themselves with honor and integrity; and they ought to
be protected when they act to the best of their skill and knowledge. But every man is liable to
error; and I should be very sorry that it should be taken for granted that an attorney is answerable
for every error or mistake. . . . A counsel may mistake as well as an attorney. . . . Yet no one will
say that a counsel who has been mistaken shall be charged. . . . Not only counsel but judges may
differ, or doubt, or take time to consider. Therefore, an attorney ought not to be liable in case of
reasonable doubt." "No attorney," said Chief Justice Abbott, "is bound to know all the law; God
forbid that it should be imagined that an attorney or a counsel, or even a judge, is bound to know
all the law." (Montorious vs. Jeffreys, 2 Car. & P., 113.)

The court, having in mind the many appeals which have been dismissed because of the lack of
diligence of counsel, cannot let the occurrence pass without expressing a strong disapproval of
such criminal carelessness. While we would not wish to assume a harsh and uncompromising
attitude towards attorneys-at-law, we would wish for them to know that by indulging in such
unprofessional tactics they become unworthy of the trust which the law reposes in them. The
lack of due care is a breach of the attorney's undertaking with his client, and is indicative of a
disregard of the attorney's duties to the court. We bring to the notice of clients whose rights have
been prejudiced by the failure or by the delay of an attorney in preparing or filing pleadings
necessary in the proper conduct of a cause, and in taking such steps as may be required in the
progress of the case, that the client who has suffered damages as the result of his attorney's
negligence or misconduct may recover therefor. In Drais vs. Hoggan ([1875], 50 Cal., 121),
although many other cases might be cited, it was held that "if a judgment is obtained against a
party upon a complaint which is radically defective, and he desires to appeal, and procures
bondsmen, but his attorney neglects to do so until the time for appeal expires, the attorney is
guilty of gross negligence, and is liable for the loss sustained by the client."

Without, therefore, desiring especially to overemphasize the dereliction of Attorney Anacleto

Filart for, sad to relate, he is only one of a class, it does become our solemn duty to reprimand
him for carelessness and misconduct in attending to the cause of poor clients. Let a copy of this
order be furnished to the respondent for his information with a warning that a more severe
punishment will be meted out to him in case of a repetition of similar acts and omissions; and let
a copy hereof be filed with his personal papers in this court. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street and Avanceña, JJ., concur.

CESARIO ADARNE, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DAMIAN V. ALDABA, respondent.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:

Administrative action against the respondent attorney for gross negligence and misconduct, for
failure to give his entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the . maintenance and
defense of his rights, and exertion of his utmost learning and ability in the prosecution and
defense of his client, and for not taking steps to protect the interests of his client in the face of an
adverse decision.

The record shows that sometime in 1958, Raymunda Cumpio and her husband, Rufo Cumpio,
filed an action for forcible entry against herein complaint Cesario Adarne, Aning Arante, and
Miguel Inokando with the Justice of the Peace of Alang-alang Leyte. The case was docketed in
the said court as Civil Case No. 96. Atty. Isauro Marmita represented the defendants who raised
the issue of ownership of the land in question. After hearing the parties, the Justice of the Peace
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the plaintiffs therein appealed to
the Court of First Instance of Leyte and the case was assigned to Branch VI of Carigara, where it
was docketed as Civil Case No. 556. Resolving the issue interposed by the appellants, the Judge
of the Court of First Instance found that the Justice of the Peace Court has jurisdiction over the
case and returned the same to the lower court for trial on the merits. After trial on the merits, the
Justice of the Peace again dismissed the case and the plaintiffs again appealed to the Court of
First Instance of Leyte where the case was docketed anew as Civil Case No, 632. Attys. Arturo
Mirales and Generoso Casimpan filed the answer for the defendants. 1

At the hearing of the case on August 7, 1961, the herein complainant Cesario Adarne, one of the
defendants in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 632, noting that his attorneys had not yet
arrived, prevailed upon the respondent Atty. Damian Aldaba, who was then present in court to
attend the trial of an electoral case, to appear as counsel for them and ask for the Postponement
of the trial. The respondent, who is a third degree cousin of the complainant, agreed, and entered
a special appearance. Upon noticing that the plaintiffs and their counsel were not also present in
court, the respondent, instead of asking for a postponement, moved for the dismissal of the case.
"is motion was granted and the case was again dismissed. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the order, 2 to which the respondent filed an opposition in behalf of the
defendants, 3 and the motion was denied. 4Whereupon, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Appeals. After appropriate. proceedings, the appellee court set aside the order of dismissal and
remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.

At the hearing of the case on October 23, 1964 before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, the
respondent was again prevailed upon by the complainant to appear in his behalf. The respondent
entered a "special appearance" for the complainant and thereafter argued that the interest of
justice would best be served of the defendants were allowed to file an action for quieting of title
and the case heard jointly with the pending action for forcible entry. Finding merit in the
argument, the court ordered the defendant Cesario Adarne to file an action for quieting of title
within one (1) week and the plaintiffs to answer the same within the reglementary period, after
which both cases would be tried jointly. The hearing was deferred until after the filing of the
action for quieting of title. 5

On June 17, 1965, the court declared the defendants in default for their failure to appeal at the
hearing set for that day and directed the plaintiffs to present evidence to support their
claim. 6 On September 17, 1965, the court rendered a decision and a writ of execution was
issued thereafter. 7

Because of this, Cesario Adarne filed the present complaint against the respondent Atty. Damian
V. Aldaba on August 3, 1967, praying:

Dahil dito, isinusumbong ko po ang aking Abogado ng "Mal practice" pabaya at pahamak sa
kliente at sinisingil ko po siya ng pinsala katumbas sa sinisingil sa kin ng akin kalaban. O kaya
lakarin niya na mapigil and decision ng Hukom sa C.F.I. at ulitin and hearing sa Forcible Entry.
Kung hindi niya magagawa ito, ipinauubaya ko na po sa kataas taasan Hukoman and paglapat ng
parusa. Sapagkat kung hindi p susugpo-in and masamang gawa naito ng mga ibang abogado na
nabibili, — lalala and sakit naito sa profession ng mga abogado, at lilikha ng maraming api, at
habang naghahari and pang-aapi, lalaganap and kriminalidad ng walang tigil, at walang
katahimikan ang ating Demukrasya, at kung magkakagayon ang mga mamamayan at — sapilitan
sa kumunista sasamba.

The respondent denied that he ever had any agreement with the complainant with respect to the
handling of the latter's case in the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Carigara Branch, except for
the "special appearance" that he entered for the complainant on August 7, 1961 and October 23,
1964, in view of the non-availability of the complainant's lawyers on said dates.

The case referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation, 8 after
which a complaint for the disbarment of the respondent attorney was filed. 9

The judgment by default rendered against the complainant cannot be attributed to the respondent
attorney. The blame lies with the complainant for having engaged the services of several lawyers
to handle his case without formally withdrawing the authority he had given to them to appear in
his behalf as to place the responsibility upon the respondent. To add to the confusion, the
complainant had also requested the clerk of court of the Court of First Instance of Leyte that he
(complainant) be furnished with summons and subpoena accorded to him. 10 He also filed a
motion by himself, 11 thus implying that he was handling his case personally.

It appears that there have been three changes made of the attorneys for the complainant in the
forcible entry case. The complainant was originally represented by Atty. Isauro Marmita who,
upon his appointment to the Department of Labor, engaged Atty. de Veyra to take his
place. 12 Then came Atty. Arturo Mirales and later, Atty. Generoso Casimpan. However, no
formalities whatever were observed in those changes such that the respondent entered a "special
appearance" for the complainant in order that he could ask for the dismissal of the case for the
failure of the adverse party to prosecute. The rule followed on matters of substitution of attorneys
as laid down by this Court is that no substitution of attorneys will be allowed unless there be
filed: (1) a written application for such substitution; (2) the written consent of the client; (3) the
written consent of the attorney substituted; and (4) in case such written consent can not be
secured, there must be filed with the application proof of service of notice of such motion upon
the attorney to be substituted, in the manner prescribed by the rules. Unless the foregoing
formalities are complied with, substitution will not be permitted, and the attorney who properly
appeared last in the cause, before such application for substitution, will be regarded as the
attorney of record and will be held responsible for the proper conduct of the cause. 13

Besides, the respondent honestly believed that he had appeared for the complainant only for a
special purpose and that the complainant had agreed to contact his attorney of record to handle
his case after the hearing of October 23, 1964, so that he did nothing more about it. 14 It was
neither gross negligence nor omission to have entertained such belief. An attorney is not bound
to exercise extraordinary diligence, but only a reasonable degree of care and skill, having
reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Prone to err like any other human
being, he is not answerable for every error or mistake, and will be protected as long as he acts
honestly and in good faith to the best of his skill and knowledge.

It is well settled that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant
and for the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent attorney
must be established by convincing proof. In the instant case, there is no sufficient proof to
warrant the disbarment of the respondent attorney. Neither is there culpable malpractice to justify
his suspension.

WHEREFORE, the present administrative complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

VISITACION N. PAJARILLO, petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(VINZONS PILOT HIGH SCHOOL, DIVISION OF CAMARINES NORTE, BUREAU
OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS), and PROVINCE OF CAMARINES NORTE, respondents.

James B. Pajares for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J:

Petition for review of the October 9, 1975 decision of the respondent Commission, reversing the
August 26.1974 award of the Chief Referee in R06-WC Case No. 12502 filed by petitioner with
the Workmen's Compensation Unit, Regional Office No. VI, Department of Labor, Naga City.
Petitioner, after serving the government as a school teacher for more than 28 years, retired on
July 1, 1973 on which date she also filed with the respondent Commission a claim for
compensation by reason of her illnesses of chronic cataract (both eyes) and diabetes mellitus.
She made both the Republic of the Philippines and the Province of Camarines Norte as
respondents for the reason that the province shouldered two-thirds of her annual salary and the
National Government, the remaining one-third. While her retirement was effective July 1, 1973,
she actually stopped working on June 4, 1973 when she went on sick leave by reason of her
aforesaid illnesses.

Numerous documents were submitted by petitioner to the commission in support of her

compensation claim, the most significant and relevant of which are the

(1) Physician's Report of accident or sickness, dated April 21, 1973, signed by
petitioner's attending physician, Dr. Romeo B. Rufino, EENT specialist of Daet,
Camarines Norte;

(2) Medical Certificate [C.S. Form 41] dated June 26, 1973 accomplished and
signed by the same physician, stating that he had been treating petitioner for her
chronic cataract of both eyes and diabetes mellitus from October 11,
1963 continuously up to April 16, 1973;

(3) Application for leave [C.S. Form No. 6] of petitioner for 27 days from June 4
to 30, 1973 by reason of her aforesaid illnesses, duly approved by Division
Superintendent F. Burgos;

(4) A medical certification issued on September 10, 1973 by aforesaid petitioner's

physician, stating that examination cannot be done any more on petitioner because
of the maturity of her cataract on both eyes; and

(5) Result of the blood sedimentation or laboratory examination of petitioner's

blood by the Regional Health Laboratory [RO4], Naga City, showing that
claimant's blood sugar is 300 mgs%, dated September 7, 1973.

On August 24, 1974, the Chief Referee issued an award on the bases of his findings that the
illnesses were contracted by petitioner in the long course of her employment and/or aggravated
by the nature of her employment, and that furthermore, the claim was uncontroverted, thus:

It is worthy to note that Division Superintendent Burgos at the outset manifested

controversion over the present claim as may be gleaned from his submitted
employer's report of sickness dated August 31, 1973 but such controversion is
belated for Supt. Burgos admitted the fact that claimant's illnesses were
contracted as early as October 11, 1963 and her disability began on April 14, 1973
(Items 19, 20 and 21 of the same report). Also Supt. Burgos admitted that
Principal Emma P. Ferrer was notified by claimant regarding her ailments as early
as October 11, 1963. Lastly, he admitted that claimant was injured or contracted
her ailments in the performance of her regular occupation (Item 17 of said report).
Principal Ferrer's controversion although seasonable cannot be considered valid
controversion for being "pro-forma" and contrary to the ruling laid down by the
Supreme Court in WC case General Textile Inc. vs. Teofilo Taa, L-29348,
November 29, 1971.

On October 23, 1973, Dr. Vicente Ramirez, Compensation Rating Medical

Officer of the Regional Office, conducted physical examination on claimant (and)
for which she was granted one [1] temporary total disability for labor under
Section 14 of Act and stamped his approval of the 80% loss of vision of both eyes
as evaluated by EENT specialist, Dr. Romeo B. Rufino (Physician's Report of
sickness of April 21, 1973, attached to records).

On the basis of all the foregoing facts and circumstances, we feel and so hold that
claimant contracted the aforesaid ailments in the long course of her employment
and/or the same could have been aggravated by the nature of employment. Our
conclusion finds support in the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court, to wit:

While we do not discount the possibility that factors other than the
employment of the claimant may also have contributed to the cause
or acceleration of claimant's illness, this circumstance alone cannot
affect the compensability of this case. Under the law, it is not
required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth,
development or acceleration of his illness to entitle him to the
benefits provided therein It is enough if his employment had
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development or
acceleration of the disease(MRR vs. WCC & Crispin Pineda, G.R.
No. L-19773, promulgated on May 30, 1964).

Finally, we hold that the instant claim is (hereby declared an) uncontroverted
(case) and award may be issued under Section 1, Rule 11 of the New Rules of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. Award issued under this Section is final
and unappealable.

Under Section 17 of the WC Act, as amended, claimant is entitled to receive full

compensation computed as follows: based on her annual salary of P4,404.00
divided by 52 weeks P84.69; 50% of P84.69 = P42.34 and for 160 weeks (80%
N.S.D. for loss of vision of both eyes) would be P6,774.40, reduced to P6,000.00
maximum compensation allowable by law.

Under Section 14 of the said Act, no compensation benefits can be granted in

favor of claimant for obvious reasons.

Since her ailments continue to subsist even after her retirement she is still entitled
to receive further medical services until the same are medically pronounced cured
by competent physician or physicians (pp. 38-37. WCC rec.; emphasis supplied).
A copy of the aforesaid award was received on September 16, 1974 by the Solicitor General (p.
43, WCC rec.), who filed on October 3, 1974 a motion for extension of ten [10] days from
October 1, 1974 to file his motion for reconsideration (pp. 4445, WCC rec.), and the same was
granted by the Chief Referee on December 2, 1974 [p. 46, WCC rec.].

On December 4, 1974, the Solicitor General filed his motion to set aside award on the grounds
that there was denial of due process as his Office and respondent employer were never served
with notice of hearing of the claim; and that the claim was not compensable (pp. 73-74, WCC
rec.).

Acting upon the aforesaid motion, the Chief Referee denied the same in an order dated January
8, 1975 (p. 75, WCC rec.); but directed the elevation of the entire records of the case to the
respondent Commission for its review.

On October 9, 1975, the respondent Commission reversed the award, thus:

The respondent Republic of the Philippines appeals. from the award thus entered
on the principal ground that 'the claim itself is not compensable.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that the claimant, during her employment with the respondents, had
contracted cataract of both eyes and that she was suffering from diabetes mellitus.
But her service record (p. 45 of the rec.) does not show that the claimant was ever
prevented from performing her work on account of these illnesses. It was only
natural for the claimant to suffer or contract cataract on account of her age, she
being 64 years old already. Cataract, medically speaking, is brought about by the
process of degeneration. As to claimant's diabetes, the same has no causal relation
with her employment. Diabetes mellitus, as rightly opined by respondent's
medical staff, is caused by a metabolic disorder due to inadequate production of
insulin. This ailment is not job-connected and, therefore, is not traceable to
claimant's work as such public school teacher. Besides that, she was not disabled
to work by reason thereof.

The claimant had retired because she was qualified under the law to do so on the
basis of her age and length of service, but definitely not on account of her cataract
and/or her diabetes.

The causal and preliminary connection of claimant's ailment and her work is not
obtaining in this case (pp. 82-81, WCC rec.).

After receipt on October 31, 1975 (p. 85, WCC rec.) of the October 9, 1975 order of reversal,
petitioner filed on November 3, 1975 (p. 86, WCC rec.) a motion for reconsideration with
respondent Commission. Thereafter, (date of receipt not disclosed by petitioner nor by the
records) petitioner received a notice dated December 1, 1975 from the Workmen's Compensation
Commission informing her that "pursuant to Letter of Instruction No. 190 dated June 3, 1974, as
implemented by Department Order No. 3 dated July 17, 1974 of the Secretary of Labor, any
decision or order on the merit of the Commission En Banc shall become final and executory if no
appeal is taken to the Supreme Court within ten (10) days from notice in accordance with law.
Obviously, your motion is addressed to the wrong forum. You are, therefore, advised to avail
yourself of the remedy provided under the aforestated Department Order No. 3."

On December 12, 1975, petitioner thus filed this petition.

On January 1, 1976, the Court denied the petition for lack of (a) payment of the legal fees; and
(2) statement of material dates to determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition [P. 27,
rec.]. Upon a motion for reconsideration filed on February 1, 1976 by petitioner's counsel, the
Court resolved on February 20, 1976 to require petitioner to pay the docket fee and the legal
research fund fee; and counsel for petitioner to show cause why he should not be subjected to
administrative action for ignorance of the basic rules for docketing petitions through payment of
corresponding fees and thereby prejudicing the orderly administration of justice and the cause of
his client (p. 32, rec.).

On February 23, 1976, petitioner paid to the Court the total amount of fifty-three pesos (P53.00)
under O.R. Nos. 6191184 and 1390166 [p. 33, rec.].

On March 8, 1976, the Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on the petition (p.
34, rec.).

On March 24, 1976, the Court received petitioner's compliance with the February 20, 1976
resolution of the Court (posted on March 6, 1976), remitting the sum of forty-eight pesos
[P48.00], in money order form, for docket fee and another sum of five pesos (P5.00), in money
order form, for legal research fund fee, all payable to the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court
[O.R. Nos. 6192592 and 1392592 were issued by the Court's cashier] (pp. 39-41, rec.).
Petitioner's counsel explains the late payment of docketing fee in this wise:

The undersigned counsel was misled to believe that the Petition for Review must
first be given due course before payment of legal fees could be made within three
(3) days from notice by the clerk of court. pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 7,
Rule 43, Rules of Court.

Besides, your petitioner-appellant was in the hospital at the time of the filing of
the Petition for Review undergoing operation, and she needs all her money for her
medical treatment and considering that there was very limited time to file the
same, the undersigned counsel deemed it wise to forward the pleadings despite
lack of corresponding fees. With all humility and candor, there was no intention
on the part of the undersigned counsel to prejudice the orderly administration of
justice nor the cause of his client. In short, what was done was the best under the
circumstances.

and below counsel's signature appears petitioner's apologies for her failure to pay docket fees on
time (pp. 39-41, rec.).
Petitioner's counsel's above compliance was noted in Our resolution of March 31, 1976 (p. 44,
rec.).

On May 25, 1976, the Solicitor General filed his comment on the petition pointing out, inter alia,
that the petition was filed out of time; hence, subject decision of the respondent Commission has
become final and executory (pp. 53-60, rec.).

On June 7, 1976, the Court resolved to treat the petition for review as a special civil action and
required both parties to submit simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice.

With the submission by the parties of the required memoranda, the case was submitted for
decision.

We deal first with the procedural issue.

1. Any question on the timeliness of the instant petition has been foreclosed by Our June 7, 1976
resolution treating the petition, motu proprio, as a special civil action (p. 62, rec.). the insistence
of the Solicitor General that despite the aforesaid resolution, the petition is still without merit as
the decision subject thereof had become final by reason of the belated appeal of petitioner which
cannot be cured by availing of the remedy of special civil action, overlooks the significant fact
that the aforesaid June 7, 1976 resolution was issued by US precisely by reason of the nullity of
the questioned decision of the respondent Commission which was, as will be shown hereinafter,
issued without jurisdiction. Consequently, as the proper remedy of petitioner under the premises
is a special civil action, WE treated his petition for review as such. Thus, in Malijan vs. WCC,
which was jointly decided with Soliven vs. WCC (77 SCRA 518, 522), We declared as of no
moment the fact that herein petitioner filed her petition almost a year after she was notified of the
Commission's decision of reversal since "said decision was null and void as the commission had
no jurisdiction to set aside the referee's decision that had already tong become final and
executory. Petitioner ... could properly come to this Court by way of special civil action of
certiorari within the prescriptive period ... to have the commission's decision set aside as null and
void for lack of jurisdiction to render the same.

II

Consequently, the issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent Commission gravely abused
its discretion when it reversed the award of the Chief Referee.

WE rule in the affirmative.

Respondent Commission was on October 9, 1975 already without jurisdiction to pass upon and
reverse the August 26, 1974 award of the Chief Referee, for the reason that the same had become
final and executory; because of the failure of the Solicitor General to interpose an appeal (motion
for reconsideration) therefrom or to timely file a motion to set aside the award.
1. The records reveal that the Solicitor General received a copy of the award on September 16,
1974. Hence, when he filed on October 3, 1974 (the 17th day from receipt of the copy of the
award), his motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of the August 26,
1974 award, the 15-day period for filing said motion for reconsideration had already elapsed
(Sec. 1, Rule 19, Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission), thus rendering the
subject award final and executory. The order of the Chief Referee issued on December 2, 1974
granting the extension prayed for did not cure the lapse as the 15-day period for filing the said
motion for reconsideration can only be extended if the motion for extension were filed before the
lapse of the period sought to be extended. Thus, the pertinent portion of Section 49 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, commands that "such petition must be filed within
fifteen days after the entry of any referee's order or award of the Commissioner unless further
time is granted by the referee or the Commissioner within said fifteen days (emphasis supplied).
Hence, as aforestated, the August 26, 1974 award was already beyond review by reason of the
lapse of the reglementary period of 15 days without any motion for reconsideration/appeal filed
within said period.

2. Besides, the Solicitor General did not file the motion for reconsideration, subject of his belated
motion for extension; but instead filed on December 4, 1974, or after a period of 99 days from
receipt on September 16, 1974 of the August 26, 1974 award, a motion to set aside award. Again,
said motion to set aside award was clearly filed out of time as such motion (properly a petition
for relief from judgment) must be filed within thirty (30) days after the aggrieved party learns of
the award sought to be set aside and not more than three [3] months after such award was
entered (Sec. 3, Rule 22, Rules of the Workmen's Compensation Commission).

It is therefore clear that the Chief Referee had no more authority after denying on January 8,
1975 the aforesaid motion to set aside award to still order the elevation of the records of the
claim to the respondent Commission; or that the latter had no authority, as it was already without
jurisdiction, to review the August 26, 1974 award for the reason that, as aforestated, the award
had already passed into finality (Ramos vs. Republic, 69 SCRA 576, 579-581 [1976]).

In Soliven vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (77 SCRA 518-519, 521-522 [1977]), We
restated the principles herein applicable, thus:

In Carreon vs. WCC and Regala vs. WCC, WE reaffirmed the settled doctrine that
'(t)he basic rule of finality of judgments is applicable indiscriminately to one and
all regardless of whether respondent employer be a public or private employer,
since the rule is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy and
sound practice at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and award of
quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law.

WE again stressed therein that '(i)t is of course beyond question that the
perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is mandatory
and jurisdictional and that failure to so perfect an appeal renders final and
executory the questioned decision and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction
to entertain the appeal. The lapse of an appeal period deprives the courts of
jurisdiction to alter the final judgment.
 As to the exception or last chance of a timely petition for relief from judgment
within the reglementary period (within 30 days from knowledge notice of the
decision-award and within three [3] months from entry thereof) first granted
expressly in workmen's compensation cases by the 1973 Commission Rules, the
Court stated in Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. Reyes, prescinding from the validity
or non-validity of the justification advanced for seeking such relief, that
considering the underlying purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act to
promote expeditious disposition of workmen's compensation claims, the grace
period granted for seeking relief from judgment must be taken as
"absolutely fixed, inextendible, never interrupted and cannot be subjected to any
condition or contingency. Because the period fixed is itself devised to meet a
condition or contingency, the equitable remedy is an act of grace, as it were,
designed to give the aggrieved party another and last chance and reaffirmed the
established rule that failure to avail of such last chance within the grace period
fixed is fatal".

It is therefore patent that the respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
October 9, 1975 decision reversing the already final and executory August 26. 1974 award of the
Chief Referee.

III

Even on the issue of the compensability of the ailment of petitioner, respondent employer's
negative stand as sustained be the respondent Commission in its questioned October 9, 1975
decision, openly disregarded, as it is patently contrary to, the established jurisprudence on the
matter.

It is unquestionable that even at this late state of the proceeding, respondent employers have not
successfully discharged their burden of overthrowing the presumption of compensability enjoyed
by petitioner arising from the incontrovertible fact that petitioner's ailment and consequence
disability all supervened in the course of her employment. Hence, said presumption was thereby
rendered conclusive.

Moreover, the right of petitioner to compensation was not effectively controverted by respondent
employers. It is now well-settled that such failure is fatal to any defense that respondent
employers can interpose against the claim; hence, its compensability, as well as its
reasonableness and validity is placed beyond challenge. Neither can the respondent employers
under such a situation, complain that they were denied their day in court, because an award can
be issued in an uncontroverted claim without the necessity of a formal hearing. Thus, it has been
said that the language of Section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, on
controversion, may appear very sweeping and perhaps arbitrary to those who do not get the Idea
behind it. The provision proceeds from the assumption that as the employer has all the facilities
which enable him, better than the injured, to determine whether a claim against him would lie
under the circumstances attending any accident or ailment be falling the worker, it is his
obligation to apprise the Commission of his determination, whether to contest or not the injured
worker's right to receive the benefits of the Act. If he sleeps on his right, he cannot subsequently
be heard to complain that the law is hard against him (De los Santos vs. WCC, 88 SCRA,
134,142 [1979]).

Finally, it must be noted that the "Report of the Division of Camarines Norte Committee on
Workmen's Compensation Cases" which was concurred in by the Division Superintendent of
Schools (p. 21, WCC rec.), contained the following findings and recommendation, thus:

Mrs. Visitacion N. Pajarillo was a permanent Provincial Secondary School

Teacher of Vinzons High School, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, for more than 28
years until July 1, 1973 when she was forced to retire at age 64 due to blurring of
vision. The medical certificate issued by her attending physician, Dr. Romeo
Rufino showed that the said teacher contracted Cataract Senile Bilateral while she
was still in the service.

Upon careful evaluation, the commit believes that the client's ailment was
aggravated by the nature of her work as a classroom teacher. The instant claim of
the teacher referred to above is, therefore, meritorious and justifiable.

Even before her retirement on July 1, 1973, she was already disabled by reason of her illnesses
as she went on sick leave from June 4 to 30, 1973 or for a period of twenty-seven days.

Indeed, in Reynaldo vs. Republic (71 SCRA 650, 653 [1976]), We treated as occupational
therein petitioner's eye ailment diagnosed as "aphakia bilateral" for the reason that when she " ...
entered the service of the respondent as a public school teacher she was in perfect health. It was
only later when it was discovered that she was suffering from the illness abovementioned. It must
be borne in mind that the very nature of her work which requires most of the time the use of her
eyes in reading, checking test papers and preparing lesson plans predisposes her to the ailment
of the eyes It is not surprising that she would succumb to the illness that has befallen her in the
course of employment ..." (emphasis supplied). Relatedly, it must be stated that the Magna
Charta for Public School Teachers mandates that "the effects of the physical and nervous strain
on the teacher's health shall be recognized as a compensable occupational disease in accordance
with existing laws" (Sec. 23, R.A. 4670).

IV

With respect to petitioner's counsel's compliance with Our February 20, 1976 resolution, We find
the same satisfactory. However, counsel is hereby reminded to exercise reasonable care, skill and
diligence in the prosecution of his cases so as to avoid prejudicing the orderly administration of
justice and the cause of his client. Indeed, "(t)he lawyer owes it to his dents to exercise his
utmost learning and ability in maintaining causes. A license to practice law is a guarantee by the
courts to the public that the licensee possesses sufficient skill and knowledge to manage their
causes" (Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics 102 [11th ed.]). That portion of his profferred
explanation that he " ... was misled to believe that the petition for review must first be given due
course before payment of legal fees could be made within three (3) days from notice by the clerk
of court, pursuant to the provisions of Section 7, Rule 43, Rules of Court, ... " betrays his lack of
usual diligence commonly possessed and exercised by legal practitioners of ordinary skill and
capacity. The aforesaid section clearly refers to costs; not docketing fee, which under Section 5
of the same Rule must be paid to the clerk of court "upon the filing of the petition.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF' THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS HEREBY

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND RESPONDENT' EMPLOYERS ARE HEREBY
ORDERED

1. TO PAY PETITIONER

A. THE AMOUNT OF' SIX 'THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS AS DISABILITY

BENEFITS;

B. HER MEDICAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS;

AND

C. ATTORNEY'S FEES EQUIVALENT TO FIVE (5) PERCENT * OF THE

TOTAL, AWARD AND

2. TO PAY THE SUCCESSOR OF THE DEFUNCT RESPONDENT COMMISSION

ADMINISTRATIVE FEES.

SO ORDERED.