This article was downloaded by: [McGill University Library]

On: 03 February 2015, At: 03:23

Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Psychological Inquiry: An International Journal for the

Advancement of Psychological Theory
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hpli20

Deeper Into Attachment Theory

Cindy Hazan & Philip R. Shaver
Published online: 10 Dec 2009.

To cite this article: Cindy Hazan & Philip R. Shaver (1994) Deeper Into Attachment Theory, Psychological Inquiry: An
International Journal for the Advancement of Psychological Theory, 5:1, 68-79, DOI: 10.1207/s15327965pli0501_15

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0501_15

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained
in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the
Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and
are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and
should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for
any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of
the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
 Psychological Inquiry
1994, Vol. 5, No. 1,68-79
AUTHORS' RESPONSE
Deeper Into Attachment Theory
Cindy Hazan
Cornell University
Phillip R. Shaver
University of California, Davis
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
One of the explicit goals of our target article was
to provoke the kind of integrative thinking and con-
ceptual debate that can help advance the science of
relationships. Surely that goal was achieved! We
were challenged and inspired by what many of the
commentators wrote in response to o w proposed
theoretical framework. For this and for the time and
thought they put into their commentaries, we thank
them. They highlighted the strengths and limitations
of attachment theory and our extensions of it and
forced consideration of some very complex issues
that must be settled if research on adult attachment
is to proceed in fruitful directions. Their insights and
even their criticisms made it easier for us to see just
how to proceed.
Most of the criticisms fall into one of two major
categories. On the one hand are concerns about the
validity and utility of attachment theory itself. On the
other hand are concerns about our application of the
theory to adult relationship phenomena. An import-
ant caveat to be stated at the outset is that our article
should not be seen as providing a complete explica-
tion of attachment theory. Bowlby required well
more than a thousand pages for his initial presenta-
tion of it, whereas the present format allowed only a
sketch of the key concepts. T o respond t o
commentators' concerns about the theory necessi-
tates a detailed discussion of some of its neglected
features, all directly or indirectly tied to three ques-
tions raised repeatedly in the commentaries:
1. If individuals form multiple attachments, and if
these attachments vary in quality, then what does it
mean to refer to an individual as being of a particular
attachment type?
2. Is attachment best conceptualized as a character-
istic of an individual or of a relationship between two
individuals?
3. If individual differences exist, when do they be-
come stabilized and just how stable are they?
Copyright 1994 by
Lawrence Erlbaurn Associates, Inc.
These questions are not only of theoretical interest;
they have obvious implications for operationalization
and measurement and, therefore, are relevant to
commentators' concerns about our extensions and ap-
plications of the theory. For example, what is the nature
and form of attachment behavior in adulthood, and how
should individual differences be conceptualized and
measured? Last, several questions posed by the com-
mentators pertain specifically to the study of adult
relationships. Is an integrated theory of close relation-
ships desirable or possible? Does attachment theory
provide an adequate framework for such an integra-
tion? We see these as the major questions, to which we
respond in turn.
Theoretical Issues
Are Attachments Singular or Multiple?
Attachment researchers agree that, given the oppor-
tunity, all normal human infants become attached to
their primary caregiver, typically within the first 8
months of life. Whether secondary attachments to other
people are formed simultaneously or only after a pri-
mary attachmenthas been established is open to debate,
but there is no doubt that infants and children do form
multiple attachments. Bonds that satisfy the criteria for
being attachments-that is, that include proximity
maintenance and safe-haven and secure-base behav-
i o r s a r e commonly developed with other adults as
well as with older siblings. But, are these relationships
of equal importance to the attached infant or child?
Empirical evidence strongly suggests not. Although a
plurality of attachmentfigures is the norm, these figures
are not treatedequivalently. Infants show clear discrim-
ination and consistent preferences (Colin, 1985,1987;
Cummings, 1980; Farran & Ramey, 1977). If several
caregivers are available, infants reliably seek and main-
tain proximity to one, especially if tired or ill (Ains-
 AUTHORS'RESPONSE
worth, 1967,1982). This is the case even in polymatric
settings. Infants exhibit more intense protest on being
left by the primary attachment figure as compared to
others (Schaffer & Emerson, 1964). In unfamiliar set-
tings, they are more reassured by the presence of the
primary figure than by others (Ricciuti, 1974; Shill,
Solyom, & Biven, 1984). Bowlby (196911982)referred
to this tendency of a child to form a special attachment
to one figure as monotropy.
Multiple attachments are hypothesized to be hier-
archically arranged. At the top of this hierarchy is the
primary attachment figure. For good or ill, this figure
is usually the infant's mother. Although we share
Lewis's concerns regarding attachment researchers'
focus on the mother, we must stress that there is
nothing in attachment theory requiring that mother
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
be the primary attachment figure. Infants form a
primary attachment to the person who most consis-
tently provides care and responds to their distress
signals. Theoretically, this could be almost anyone
in the infant's environment. In actuality, it tends to
be the mother, but there are exceptions. In one inves-
tigation, 24% of the studied infants directed more or
stronger attachment behavior to their fathers than to
their mothers (Colin, 1987). In almost every case,
these special fathers had spent substantial time with
their infants and had participated actively in their
routine care. What might be seen as a "dangerously
narrow" focus on mothers, then, is more a result of
societal organization than of attachment theory.
Over the course of development, many changes may
occur in the content and structure of an individual's
attachment hierarchy. According to Bowlby, parental
figures tend to be permanent members of the hierarchy,
but their positions naturally change as a child matures.
Others are added to or dropped from the hierarchy.
Eventually, with the formation of a pair bond in adult-
hood, a peer-usually a sexual partner-assumes the
position of primary attachment figure and ascends to
the top of the hierarchy. In an interview study of more
than 100 adults---nearly all with extensive social net-
works-80% of subjects who had been involved in a
romantic relationship for at least 2 years were primarily
attached to their partners (Hazan, 1992). Most of the
rest were still primarily attached to a parent. This is not
to say that their attachment needs were not distributed
across multiple relationship figures. In fact, for the
majority, they were. All could name other people who
were important sources of comfort and support. How-
ever, the overwhelming majority reported clear prefer-
ences for a single other. That Bowlby, along with other
attachment theorists and researchers, frequently re-
ferred to the attachment figure should not be taken to
mean the only attachment figure, but rather theprimary
one. Subsidiary attachment figures are sought only if
the primary attachment figure is either unavailable or
unable to provide sufficient reassurance. As Crowell
and Waters put it, "any port will do in a storm."
We agree with Lewis that "adults have needs other
than attachment and security." And, we might add,
children have other needs too. Bowlby clearly stated
that there exist a multiplicity of needs for which multi-
ple social relationships are required. His postulation of
distinct behavioral systems is an explicit acknowledg-
ment of this fact (e.g., he distinguishesattachmentfrom
affiliation). Lewis makes reference to "the idea that
these needs are all to be satisfied by a single significant
other in our adult life." Neither we nor Bowlby claimed
that the primary attachmentfigure is expected to satisfy
all needs. In fact, the attachment figure may not even
satisfy needs for security, despite being preferred over
other sources. Some needs are best satisfied through
social relationships, and these are regulated by what H.
F. Harlow and M. K. Harlow (1965) called the affective
systems. R. S . Weiss (1974) specified a total of six
relational provisions and corresponding needs, not all
of which are likely to be handled by any single person
or relationship. In all such formulations, including
Bowlby's, attachment is just one of many needs.
The needs and the systems that regulate them, how-
ever, may not be as independent as Lewis implies.
Indeed, in infants, activation of the attachment system
overrides the activation of systems such as affilitation
and exploration (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall,
1978; H. F. Harlow, 1961). This suggests that needs
may be better conceptualizedas hierarchically ordered,
rather than as columns in the kind of person x needs
matrix proposed by Lewis. Some needs are hypothe-
sized to be naturally directed toward the same individ-
ual--as may be the case with security and sexual needs
in adulthood. Regardless of their arrangement, there is
no doubt that the needs and their potential satisfiers are
multiple. That attachment theory deals primarily with
attachment-relatedneeds might be judged a limitation.
In our view, however, this focus makes it ideally suited
for the study of close relationships. The closest of close
relationships are those between parents and children
and between adult lovers. In both, the provision of
security and comfort are of central importance.
Are Attachment Patterns Properties of
Individuals or of Relationships?
According to Lewis, if we reject the notion of singu-
larity (i.e., that one relationshipsatisfiesall needs), then
"attachment cannot be a trait." Duck and the Hendricks
express similar opinions. We do reject the notion of
singularity but still argue that attachment patterns
(types or styles) can be and are trait-like. And, in
 HAZAN & SHAVER
response to Kobak, we argue that attachment patterns,
in addition to characterizing individuals, are also rela-
tionship constructs. How can this be? Sroufe and Flee-
son (1986) proposed a model of relationships that
integrates these two aspects of attachment. Considerthe
case in which an infant develops an avoidant attach-
ment to its primary caregiver. Avoidant, in this case,
describes the quality of the relationship between the
two. However, some key features of the relationship
and associated experiences eventually come to be rep-
resented in the mind of, and habitually woven into the
behavior of, the infant. The mental representationis one
of an avoidant attachment relationship in which the
infant's bids for closeness and comfort have been fairly
consistently rebuffed by the caregiver. The representa-
tion, which resides in the infant, is then carriedforward
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
into new relationships in which it may influence per-
ceptions, feelings, and behaviors. In other words, the
avoidant attachment has become a characteristic of the
individual infant, even though it began as a feature of
a dyadic relationship. How subsequent relationships
unfold-whether they too become avoidant-will be a
joint function of the biases of the child (perhaps to
expect rejection and to avoid contact) and the behavior
of new relationship partners. Experiences in subse-
quent relationships will either confirm the child's
model of relationships and thereby reinforce avoidant
expectations and tendencies or disconfirm the preexist-
ing model and perhaps cause a revision of the model.
The resultant reinforced or revised model will then be
carried into subsequent relationships, in which it may
be further elaborated, reinforce4 or modified. At any
point in the individual's development, it would be
possible to classify the quality of a current attachment
relationship and also the individual's representational
biases. Bowlby (1988) presented attachment theory as
a theory of personality development within close rela-
tionships. To ask whether attachment is a trait or a
relationship construct is to imply a false disjunction.
Of the many attachments that an individual forms,
which are the most influential in the construction of a
core internal working model of relationship? Research
indicates that the relationship with the primary attach-
ment figure has the greatest and most lasting impact on
later development and functioning. In a study of attach-
ment among 6-year-olds, for example, Main, Kaplan,
and Cassidy (1985) found that the attachment relatian-
ship established by a child during infancy with his or
her mother (who was assumed to be the primary attach-
ment figure) influenced the child's representational
models of self and others more than attachment to the
father did. Consistent with these findings, Bowlby
(1980) reported that loss of the mother before age 11
predicts much greater vulnerability to depression than
does loss of the father. Feeney and Noller (1990) found
that avoidant adolescents were more likely than secure
or ambivalent adolescents to report childhood separa-
tions from their mothers, but not their fathers. Although
these results do not provide conclusive evidence, they
strongly suggest that the traitlike aspects of attachment
develop mainly out of relationships with primary at-
tachment figures.
When Do Attachment Types Become
Stable, and How Stable Are They?
One of the most common misconceptions about at-
tachment theory is that it predicts 100% stability from
infancy to adulthood. In its most simplistic form, "the
way the infant attaches at 1year of age mostly deter-
mines the way the adult attaches at age 21" (Hendricks
& Hendricks). To our knowledge, Bowlby never made
such a claim; we have never made such a claim, and
any responsible researcher apprised of the evidence
would not make such a claim either. Such claims serve
as a convenient "straw person" for critics who presume
that the theory predicts perfect continuity of individual
differences and, because there is abundant evidence
that continuity is not perfect, conclude that the theory
must be wrong. Bowlby (1973) explicitly stated, in a
passage we have quoted frequently in our writings, that
working models of attachment are gradually con-
structed out of experiences throughout infancy, child-
hood, and adolescence. Only then do they become
relatively resistant to, but still not impervious to,
change. Our view is that they are sufficiently stable to
warrant consideration and study.
Stabilityof attachmentclassificationsduring infancy
depends, not surprisingly,on the stability of the infant's
environment. In stable environments, rates of stability
over a 6-month period have ranged from 81% (Connell,
1976) to 96% (Waters, 1978). In unstable environ-
ments, stability rates tend to be lower, as would be
expected if they depend largely on the quality of inter-
actions with caregivers (and not, incidentally, if they
depend primarily on innate temperament). Even in an
unstable environment, however, Egeland and Farber
(1984) found 60% stability in attachment classifica-
tions. In one longitudinal study, subjects were classi-
fied in infancy and then reassessed at age 6; high
stability rates were found (Main et al,, 1985). The study
was replicated in Germany, with similar results (Wart-
ner, 1986). In another longitudinal investigation, sig-
nificant (although far from perfect) continuity was
found over the 10-year period following classifications
at 12 months (Elicker, Englund, & Sroufe, 1992).
All these studies were conducted with infant or child
subjects. If Bowlby was correct in his view that models
do not become stable until adolescence, studies exam-
 AUTHORS'
ining stability from adolescence through adulthood
might provide more accurate estimates. More work is
clearly needed before any firm conclusions about sta-
bility can be drawn, and such work is underway. The
Hendricks say that "it would ...be asking too much to
require the kind of longitudinal studies necessary to
assess attachment over the developmental span from
infancy to adulthood." Actually, Alan Sroufe and his
colleagues have already followed a group of subjects
from infancy to adolescence, and Stuart Hauser and his
collaborators have followed a group of adolescents into
early adulthood Thus, the kind of longitudinal data
needed to answer questions about stability and change
across the life course will soon be available. For now,
we can say that there is evidence for both continuity and
change, and researchers have begun to identify the
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
conditions under which each outcome is most likely.
Estimating stability of attachment styles in adult-
hood is rendered more difficult by a lack of consensus
about how such styles should be measured. (More on
this later.) But it is possible to speculate about the
underlying mechanisms that might be expected to pro-
mote stability. In an elegant and detailed account of
personality across the life course, Caspi and Bem
(1990) operated on the assumption that both continuity
and change in traits occur as a result of person-envi-
ronment interactions. Caspi and Bem identified three
interaction types that appear to be particularly import-
ant. Reactive interaction refers to the well-documented
finding that mental representations of the self and oth-
ers determine in large part what people select to attend
to and how they interpret it. Adults seem to be particu-
larly attentive to information that confirms their expec-
tations about the world and matches their views of
themselves (Markus, 1977). Individuals with avoidant
working models who, by definition, believe that others
are unreliable providers of support should be particu-
larly attentive to information indicative of a lack of
trustworthiness. When such information is ambiguous,
as social information tends to be, an avoidant bias could
easily lead to a conclusion that is expectation confirm-
ing. In an anxiety-provoking experimental setting,
avoidant females were less likely than secure or ambiv-
alent females to seek emotional support from their
partners (Simpson, Rholes, & Nelligan, 1992). Evoca-
tive interaction refers to the finding that individuals
evoke different responses from their environments. In
the Simpson et al. (1992) experiment, avoidant subjects
did not communicate their anxiety or seek support. As
a consequence, they evoked less supportive behavior
from their partners, which could then be interpreted as
confirming expectations of nonsupport.
As children mature and social networks are extended
beyond the family to the peer group, there is ample
opportunity forproactive interactions in which individ-
uals select and sometimes create their own environ-
ments. Kirkpatrick and Davis (in press) suggested that
partners are either chosen or retained for their tendency
to confirm attachment models. The data are equally
compatiblewith the interpretation that model-confirm-
ing styles emerged within the context of the relation-
ships, rather than operating as factors in partner
selection. However, Caspi and Herbener's (1990) re-
sults indicate that assortative mating of spouses on
personality characteristics promotes personality conti-
nuity and that the continuity is not attributable to pre-
existing stability tendencies. Swann, Hixon, and De La
Ronde's (1992) study, cited in our target article, pro-
vides further evidence that partners who confirm self-
models, even if negative, are preferred over partners
whose feedback does not fulfill expectations.
Given Bowlby's original formulation of attachment
theory and the empirical evidence that has accrued in
its support, it wouldbe inaccurate to say that singularity
of attachment relationships is either predicted or ex-
pected. Humans normally became attached to multiple
individuals and even to inanimate objects. However,
these attachmentsare equivalent neither in their import-
ance nor in their effects on developmental outcomes.
We accept that Lewis is attached to his pipe, but we
suspect that, in his hierarchy of attachments, the pipe
ranks somewhere below his wife and children. When
attachment researchers speak of an individual's attach-
ment type, they refer to a mental representation--corn-
plete with experience-based beliefs, expectations,
emotions, and action tendencies-that is probably in-
fluenced, to some degree, by all important relationships
the individual has been involved in, but especially by
attachment relationships that can be called primary.
Our views of the social world are no doubt multiply
determined, but the experiences we have with the per-
son on whom we most depend for comfort and security
will form the foundation of our model of the world as
a place in which comfort and security can be reliably
counted on or not. To the degree that this model is
repeatedly confirmed through theprocess of interaction
with the environment, it should be stable. Disconfirm-
ing experiences, however, can occur and can produce
change (Hazan & Hutt, 1991). Behavior in all domains,
including close relationships, is assumed to be guided
by dispositional factors (e.g., attachment style) and
contextual factors (e.g., the actual behavior of the part-
ner). As with the singularity of attachments, perfect
stability is neither predicted nor expected. It is an unfair
characterization of attachment theory to say that it
assumes either, On the basis of empirical evidence and
logical argument, it would be all too easy to dismiss any
theory that did.
This brings us to two additional and closely related
questions: Is primary caregiver responsiveness the
 IIAZAN& SHAVER
most influential determinant of mental models of at-
tachment? If so, how responsive does a caregiver need
to be in order for an infant to construct a secure model?
The Hendricks "wonder whether any parent approaches
100% consistency in either response or nonresponse."
Duck reminds us of how "extremely wearing" infants
can be and goes on to ask on whose perceptions-
parents' or infant's--an attachment model is based. On
the infant's, of course. The mental representation that
an individual constructs is necessarily based on that
individual's perceptions of his or her own experiences.
The perceptions may be similar to those of the social
partner or depart dramatically from them. Bowlby
(1973) argued that the models would be "tolerably
acccurate reflections of the experiences those individ-
uals have actually had" @. 235), and so far there is no
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
reason to doubt this.
The question of how responsive a caregiver needs
to be for his or her infant to learn to expect respon-
siveness is, of course, an empirical question. Never-
theless, for the very reasons Duck and the Hendricks
suggest, it is unlikely that 100% responsiveness is
required. If perfect consistency were necessary, we
doubt that the majority of infants would develop
secure attachments to their caregivers, as scores of
studies, beginning with Ainsworth's, indicate they
do. We also suspect that the absolute frequency of
response is less important that the context in which
the response occurs or fails to occur.
With full recognition of the limitations of analo-
gies, we offer one here. Imagine you are the owner
of a car that, on most days, starts when you turn the
key and delivers you to your destination without
incident. Imagine that this same car, on occasion, has
broken down. Both the frequency of breakdown and
the circumstances under which breakdown occurs
can be expected to influence your evaluation of the
car as reliable or unreliable. If, for example, it breaks
down only once-but while you are racing to the
airport on your way to deliver an invited address-
you might decide that the car is unreliable. However,
if it breaks down more than once-but never under
pressing circumstances-you might be better able to
maintain the view that it is reliable. If it breaks down
often or most of the time, you would consider it
generally unreliable. Although acknowledging that
models of our attachment figures differ in important
ways from models of our cars, both are cognitive
representations that develop from concrete experi-
ences. Models of attachment figures as responsive,
unresponsive, or unpredictable are assumed to be
based on the frequency of contingent tesponding as
well as on the context in which a response is desired.
In a very careful and detailed analysis of mother-in-
fant interactions, Isabella, Belsky, and von Eye
(1989) found strong evidence for the importance of
contingent responding. What matters most in the long
term is not only how a caregiver responds, but under
what circumstances. Most mothers interact frequently
and positively with their infants, but what seems to
determine infants' internal working models is whether
and how the caregiver responds to distress.
Does anyone who has ever come into contact with
human infants really believe that the way they are
treated by the people on whom they are utterly depen-
dent for survival has no implications for their subse-
quent development or view of the world?
Parenting or Temperament?
How important is caregiver responsiveness com-
pared to other factors, such as temperament? The Hen-
dricks state that "temperament of the infant does make
some difference," implying that this fact somehow
negates the caregiver-responsiveness hypothesis. Of
course temperament matters; it is likely to have effects
that are both direct and indirect. Anything that influ-
ences the quality of the caregiver's response, as infant
temperament surely does, can be expected to influence
the quality of the attachment between them. Despite
good evidence for differences among newborns on
temperament dimensions such as irritability, sociabil-
ity, and threshold for fear, security of attachment can-
not (yet) be reliably predicted from such differences. In
contrast, it can be predicted from caregiver behavior.
Belsky and Rovine (1987) proposed a model of how
temperament influences attachment classification.
Basedon their own and others' data, Belsky and Rovine
concluded that, although temperament is somewhat
predictive of the pattern of security or insecurity (i.e.,
the secure or insecure subtype) exhibited by an infant,
it is not predictive of whether the attachment will be
secure or insecure. The Fox, Kimmerly, and Schafer
(1991) meta-analysis cited by the Hendricks also
showed that security is not predictable from tempera-
ment variables. In a dramatic demonstration of the
contribution of caregiver behavior to attachment clas-
sification when temperament is controlled, van den
Boom (1990) identified 100 babies who had been la-
beled temperamentally difficultand randomly assigned
them to an experimental or control group. When the
infants were 6 to 9 months old, mothers in the experi-
mental group received three individualized training
sessions in sensitive responding. At 12months, 68%of
the infants whose mothers had been trained to be re-
sponsive were securely attached, compared with only
28% of those in the control group.
We think that infants would be better served if re-
searchers, rather than resisting theory and evidence that
 AUTHORS' RESPONSE
underscore the importance of caregiver behavior for
social and personality development, would focus on the
factors that facilitateand foster optimal care. More than
one such factor has already been identified-for exam-
ple, sensitivity training (van den Boom, 1990), close
bodily contact (Anisfeld, Casper, Nozyce, & Cuming-
ham, 1990; Main, 1990), and social support for car-
egivers (Crockenberg, 1981).
The Hendricks outline seven assumptions one is
"asked to accept" before accepting attachment theory.
They summarize these assumptions by saying that
"there is continuity of attachment patterns and that
adult modes of attaching and loving are largely deter-
mined by the type and degree of maternal responsive-
ness in infancy." They go on to state that, if attachment
theory is to work as a framework for the study of adult
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
relationships, "these assumptions must hold true." As
should be clear by now, their assumptions are based on
a mistaken conception of attachment theory and so, of
course, need not hold true. Perhaps the many inaccura-
cies in the Hendricks' analysis are due to their nearly
total reliance on a 10-year-old, secondary account of
the theory--a thought-provoking but now outdated
summary and critique by Camps, Barrett, Lamb,
Goldsmith, and Stenberg (1983). The tone of the
Hendricks' commentary is curious from start to finish.
They say they "wanted to believe in attachment the-
ory." Why would two researchersworking on their own
very different approach to adult love "want" to "believe
in" a rival theory? Belief in strikes us as an odd phrase
in this context in any case. Why would a scientist want
to "believe in" or accept any theory on blind faith? The
Hendricks say the invitation to comment on our article
finally prompted them to investigate attachment the-
ory and that, when they did, "previously unknown
controversies" were made apparent. The controver-
sies to which they refer were discussed in some detail
in our first article on the topic (Hazan & Shaver,
1987); in that article, we cited the Camps et al.
(1983) critique on which the Hendricks base the bulk
of their comments. More recent research compendi-
ums (e.g., Belsky & Nezworski, 1988; Greenberg,
Cicchetti, & Cummings, 1990; Parkes, Stevenson-
Hinde, & Marris, 1991) have indicated that many of
the so-called controversiesof a decade ago have been
empirically addressed, and many of the criticisms
have been reformulated or laid to rest.
Research Issues
The theoretical and substantive issues discussed so
far have obvious and important implications for the
measurement of adult attachment. Several commentar-
ies focus on measurement-related issues (e.g.,
Bartholomew, Noller & Feeney) or mention measure-
ment as a concern (e.g., Crowell & Waters, Duck,
Stevenson-Hinde, R. S. Weiss). How should individual
differences be conceptualized? How should they be
measured? How do the various existing measures relate
to one another? These important questions must be
satisfactorily answered if the field of adult attachment
research is to make further contributions to our under-
standing of close relationships.
For goodreasons,social scientists are rarely satisfied
with the quality of their measures, and we are not
exceptions. When we composed our simple three-cate-
gory measure in 1985,we thought of it as a first attempt
to capture what appeared to be distinct patterns of
individual differences that kept cropping up in studies
of relationshipphenomena. We started with Ainsworth
et al.'s (1978) three infant categories, not because we
believed that adult differences were direct results of
relationship experiences in infancy and not because we
thought that adult patterns would necessarily be the
same as those identified in studies of infants, but be-
cause we had to start somewhere and because it seemed
possible to translate Ainsworth's categories into adult
language. The types also had intuitive appeal and,
based on an examination of the literature on relation-
ships, seemed to capture many of the reported differ-
ences in the way adults think, feel, and behave in close
relationships. The volume of informative studies and
the coherence of results from investigations around the
world (reviewed by Shaver & Hazan, 1993) indicate
that our measure was a good first step.
When the measure was first published (Hazan &
Shaver, 1987), and we began to receive requests for
copies, we responded with encouragement to modify,
expand, and test it. Whenever we gave talks about our
work, we urged researchers to use attachment theory
and not our measure as their starting point. From the
outset, we expressed concern that researchers would
accept our simple self-report measure of attachment
style as the defining or only measure of the construct.
For these reasons, we are puzzled by Noller and
Feeney's claims that the adoption of our model by some
researchers has "hampered attempts to look at crucial
issues" and "[created] a research environment marked
by a reluctance to question and explore the basic tenets
of the model." Noller and Feeney go on to say that it is
now "crucial for researchers to start from basic theoret-
ical principles rather than from the perspective of a
given typology." We couldn't agree more. This is ex-
actly what we have encouraged all along, and we have
not noticed the "reluctance" to which Noller and
Feeney refer. For example, Bartholomew (1990) ex-
panded our typology to four categories. Callins and
Read (1990) and Simpson (1990) broke the measure
into parts, added new pieces to incorporate more of
 HAZAN& SHAVER
the theory, and created factor-based dimensional mea-
sures. If there is any reluctance to deconstruct, probe,
and reconstruct our model and measure, we haven't
noticed it.
Measurement
We agree with Noller and Feeney that better mea-
sures and methods are needed in the area of adult
attachment, and we agree with Bartholomew's point
that theory and measurement are inextricably linked.
As noted in the target article, debates about measure-
ment have taken many forms, including a focus on
whether individual differences are best conceptualized
in terms of dimensions or types. The dimensional ap-
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
proach (e.g., Feeney, Noller, & Callan, in press; Kobak,
Cole, Ferenz-Gillies, & Fleming, 1993) seems most
promising for several reasons. For one, it potentially
makes measurement more precise. Few human person-
ality differences are truly categorical (although think-
ing in terms of categories may be useful when
theorizing and generating dynamic hypotheses). For
another, a dimensional approach facilitates compari-
sons between measures and combinations of measures
(through methods such as factor analysis). As Noller
and Feeney suggest, if there are several dimensions to
be considered, it is possible to use various kinds of
profile analysis, which should be more precise than our
three-category scheme. In addition, dimensionalscores
may reveal small changes in attachment that might be
either masked or exaggerated by categorical measures.
Fortunately, it is always possible to recapture types
from dimensions if one desires qualitative categories
for some reason.
The trick, of course, is to figure out which dimen-
sions to include. This phase of measurement develop-
ment should, in our opinion, be theory driven. It would
be a mistake to think that the "right" number of types
or dimensions can be discovered through empirical
means alone. We agree with Noller and Feeney that
factor analysis can be helpful in resolving some of these
substantive issues, but it is important to remember, as
always, that factors reflect the variables that go into an
analysis. Factor analysis cannot tell us whether the most
important aspects of attachment have been included or
left out. If the measures of adult attachment are to be
used to validate and test Bowlby's theory, at least one
essential dimension must be i n c l u d e ~ o n f i d e n c e
in the availability and responsiveness of attachment
figures.
As Bartholomew notes, current models of individual
differences in adult attachment are based on very dif-
ferent conceptual analyses and underlying dimensions.
Our model (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) is based on percep-
tions of attachment figures' responsiveness;
Sperling's model is based on the interaction of affil-
iation and aggression (Sperling & Berman, 1991);
Bartholomew's model is based on models of self and
other (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991); and Main's
model (e.g., Main et al., 1985) is based in part on
patterns of defensiveness revealed in face-to-face
talk. How do we decide which, if any, of these is
correct? What does correct mean? The ideal, we
think, is to derive relevant dimensions from the
theory while remaining open to empirically based
changes in the theory.
A separate but related issue concerns the notion of
types. Although Ainsworth et al. (1978) identifiedthree
major patterns of attachment, they also delineated eight
subtypes. Distinguishing between subtypes is not sim-
ply a statistical problem but also a conceptual one. Are
Bartholomew's dismissing-avoidantand fearful-avoid-
ant categories really two separate types or simply sub-
types of a more general avoidant pattern? So-called A1
infants in Ainsworth's classification scheme cry less
than A2 infants and exhibit less conflict, but both are
classified as avoidant because both avoid their car-
egiver during Strange Situation reunion episodes.
Adult fearful avoidants are more conscious of their
fears of intimacy (or at least are more willing to express
such fears) than are dismissing avoidants, but the out-
come is often the same-avoidance of intimacy. Theo-
retically, it should be possible to identify different
subtypes of ambivalence as well; Ainsworth noticed
two such subtypes, one more passive than the other. At
the adult level, it is not difficult to imagine different
strategies for keeping others close. One such strategy
might be to master the art of caregiving and try to make
oneself an indispensable source of support. Another
might be to make oneself appear vulnerable and in need
of constant care. Bowlby (1979) labeled these compul-
sive caregiving and compulsive careseeking, respec-
tively. There may be other ways for a person who fears
abandonment to reduce the chances of its happening.
Noller and Feeney propose that there may be multiple
ways of expressinginsecurity but only one way of being
secure. Even among infants, however, security takes at
least four reliably coded forms (Ainsworth et al., 1978),
varying in terms of proximity seeking, contact mainte-
nance, crying, and strength of greeting on reunion. It
would be surprising if adults were any less variable.
Stevenson-Hinde also comments on the issue of
measurement, but she is interested primarily in behav-
ioral indicators. (Crowell & Waters and R. S. Weiss
also raise this issue.) Stevenson-Hinde says that, to her
knowledge, "there are no observational studies of at-
tachment behavior and a correspondingattachment be-
havior system in adults, as there are in infancy and early
childhood." We think several studies qualify as inves-
 AUTHORS' RESPONSE
tigations of attachment behavior in adults. For example,
Mikulincer and Nachshon's (1991) studies of self-dis-
closure, Simpson et al.'s (1992) investigation of s u p
port seeking in an anxiety-provoking situation, and
Kobak and Hazan's (1991) study of caregiving and
joint problem-solving in marital couples all count as
observational studies of adult attachment. Moreover,
there are many studies of couple communication and
interaction (reviewedby R. L. Weiss & Heyman, 1990)
and reactions to loss of a partner (reviewed by Hazan
& Shaver, 1992) that were not necessarily inspired by
attachment theory but are nevertheless clearly relevant
to it. Bowlby constructed his theory on the foundation
of a creative and integrative review of studies already
lodged in the literature, most of which were not in-
formed by his ideas. Surely the same thing can and
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
should be done with respect to adolescent and adult
attachment.
However, it is important to stress that, when study-
ing adolescents and adults, we need not limit our-
selves to behavior. Main et al. (1985) noted that the
attachment system begins to include cognitive and
affective "representations" at least by age 6. The
theory itself is as much about the role of internal
working models as it is about observable behavior
(Bretherton, 1990). Bowlby acknowledged the im-
portance of representations by including, in his the-
oretical integration, studies of depression and grief
based on interviews and questionnaires.
We all share Stevenson-Hinde's wish for "such
golden tools [as the Strange Situation] in adulthood."
We think the Simpson et al. (1992) paradigm is a good
first step in this direction. However, we do not wish for
a single silver bullet. In fact, the infant attachment
research area has been frequently criticized for over-
reliance on a single assessment procedure. It seems
likely that the adult attachment research area will es-
cape this criticism. Adult attachment includes thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors--all of which can and should
be measured.
Fellow Travelers
Several commentators (e.g., Belsky & Cassidy,
Crowell & Waters, Kobak, R. S. Weiss) offer very
useful suggestions for how to proceed with the exten-
sion of attachment theory to the study of adult relation-
ships. Belsky and Cassidy recast our core questions in
terms of individual differences and thereby pose some
intriguing questions and put forward some promising
hypotheses. There are already data relevant to some of
these. For instance, the speculation that avoidant indi-
viduals would be most satisfied with a partner who
demands little care was tested and supported by Kunce
and Shaver (in press). Belsky and Cassidy's hypothesis
that avoidant adults might express relatively little dis-
tress at the termination of a romantic relationship was
confirmed by Simpson (1990). Their predictions about
the role of attachment differences in the workplace are
consistent with the results of a study we conducted on
the links between love and work (Hazan & Shaver,
1990).
We agree with Belsky and Cassidy's claim than an
individual-differences framework can do as much to
advance the theory and its application to adult relation-
ships as the normative framework we proposed in our
target article. Our deliberate emphasis on the norma-
tive aspects of the theory was intended to redress
what we see as a dangerous imbalance in adult at-
tachment research. Personality and social psycholo-
gists who follow up our work tend to adopt our
individual-differences measure or one of the several
adaptations of it and then proceed to conduct re-
search without studying the theory very extensively.
(Noller & Feeney make this point.) We worried that
this exclusive focus on individual differences meant
that people were failing to see the universal aspects
of the theory and were thinking of it strictly as a
theory of types. (Lewis goes so far as to say that, if
it's not a theory of types, then it's not a very compel-
ling theory--a position with which we disagree.)
Crowell and Waters also build on our proposed
framework by filling in some of the gaps we left open,
and, like Belsky and Cassidy, they specify interesting
hypotheses that can be tested. As Crowell and Waters
rightly note, our description of the phases in our model
of attachment formation and transfer were too brief and
lacking in detail. We appreciatetheir insightfulanalysis
and their compelling argument about why-in the
transfer of primary attachments from parents to peers
and in the formation of reciprocal peer attachments in
adulthood-the safe-haven function should precede the
secure-base function. One of us (Hazan) recently com-
pleted a study of children, adolescents, and adults that
supports this argument.
Crowell and Waters (along with Simpson) question
our separation of caregiving and attachment. We think
the separation of these two behavioral systems is justi-
fied both logically andempirically. Infants form attach-
ments long before they become eapable of serving as
attachment figures, so the systems emerge at different
points in development. Adult partners may intermingle
attachment and caregiving behaviors, whereas typi-
cally only the caregiving system is active In relation to
infants and children. It is quite plausible that the two
systemsco-evolvedand that, inpair-bond relatiomhips
(to use Simpson's favored term), they are likely to be
intimately interconnected As Stevenson-Hinde states,
"To the extent that caregiving involves reaching out-
 HAZAN & SHAVER
ward, it is likely that a caregiving behavior system also
would be deactivated by arousal of an attachment be-
havior system." If she is right (and we think she is), the
ability of one system to preempt the other can be taken
as strong support for conceptualizing them as separate
(but interrelated) systems.
Crowell and Waters note that the intensity of grief
and mourning reactions is similar for caregivers who
have lost a child and children who have lost a caregiver.
Although we call both reactions grieving, the cognitive
and emotional action-tendency components are proba-
bly not entirely the same. A person who is attached
experiences fear and a loss of security, whereas a care-
giver experiences a sense of deep sadness and an urge
to continue providing care to the lost loved one. Adults
who lose a partner to whom they were attached and for
whom they also provided care may experience grief as
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
a mixture of these emotions. This is a good topic for
future research.
R. S. Weiss makes additional suggestions about is-
sues deserving further study and, in so doing, exhibits
the creativity that has marked his own use of attachment
theory in the study of loss and loneliness. He says that
"adults rarely see their spouses as awesomely superior
in the same way [that children view their caregivers]."
This is probably true, but it isn't clear that an adult has
to see his or her partner as "awesomely superior," just
"stronger and wiser" in the moment of need. If adults
did not depend strongly on their partners for safety (safe
haven) and emotional support, they presumably would
not grieve their loss so deeply. The partner is as much
an "irreplaceable figure" as the caregiver in the eyes of
the individual who is attached. A partner is likely to
understand one's needs and be able to help and comfort
one in ways that no other person can. A partner is
"superior" in at least this important way.
R. S. Weiss says that children's security depends on
fairly frequent reassurance of the attentive presence of
their attachment figure but that, in pair-bonds, it is
"much more muted." Nevertheless, adults do need at-
tention and reassurance from their partners. Most want
to talk about their day, like to be hugged or touched on
a regular basis, and maintain regular contact by tele-
phone or mail during separations. Even in adulthood,
frequent, prolonged, or unexpected separations from
one" primary attachment figure tend to be distressing
(Vormbrock, 1993).
Additional Criticisms
Some commentators note our injudicious uses of the
terms behavioral system and function (Stevenson-
Hinde), need (R. S. Weiss), and felt security (Kobak).
We aren't sure we completely agree with every recom-
mendation, but we appreciate the clarifications. Others
76
(e.g., Duck, Levinger) criticize us for leaving out top-
ics, issues, and theories that they believe are essential
ingredients of any comprehensive framework for re-
search on close relationships. For example, Duck notes
that we left out sociology and communication theories
and failed to specify the level of the theory we are
proposing. That is partly because we are both psychol-
ogists, but also because attachmenttheory is not limited
to a single level. Marris (1991), a sociologist who has
long worked within a broad attachment framework,
wrote that "attachment theory powerfully links the
social and psychological aspects of human behavior.
John Bowlby's contribution will, I believe, be seen to
be as central to the development of sociology as it has
been to psychology" @. 77). As for communication,
some of the most interesting aspects of the Adult At-
tachment Interview have to do with coding dimensions
labeled coherence of discourse and coherence of mind.
We think Main's discovery that coherence of mind, as
reflected in coherent discourse, is a major hallmark of
secure attachment is one of the most important contri-
butions to attachment theory since Ainsworth's pio-
neering studies. Attachment theory, as it has evolved in
response to solid empirical evidence, is a communica-
tion theory (as well as an ethological theory, a psycho-
logical theory, a sociological theory, etc.)-perhaps
one of the most important communication theories
around (Bretherton, 1990). Finally, Duck asks whether
attachment theory can explain the "dark side" of rela-
tionships. Two of the volumes in Bowlby's attachment
trilogy deal in detail with anxiety, depression, and
anger.
Levinger (along with Noller & Feeney) expresses
doubts that something as complex as human relation-
ships can ever be explained by a single theoretical
framework. We are unsure but cautiously optimistic.
Rather than shy away from theorizing about the com-
plexities of close relationships, we work toward the
creation of more comprehensive and complex theories.
By pointing out some of the limitations of attachment
theory and drawing attention to other theories that
might fill some of the gaps, Levinger has helped us see
what a sufficiently complex theory might look like.
Do We Need a Comprehensive Theory
of Close Relationships?
Our argument that the field of close relationships is
in need of a comprehensive theory was based more on
intuition and experience with the field than on careful
analysis. Peterson's survey of the field's premier jour-
nal provides empirical support for our position. His
review of the Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology turned up 22 of 65 articles (33.8% of the total)
"[offering] relatively straightforward empirical de-
 AUTHORS' RESPONSE
scription but no clear implications for general theory."
This is compatible with our point that there are data
lying around detached from theory. Ten of the 65
studies (another 15.3%) were "intended to clarify major
relational concepts." Fine, but most of those articles
were divorced ftom a comprehensive theory of rela-
tionships. For example, Fehr7s (1988) methodologi-
cally and descriptively useful research on everyday
conceptions of love (cited by Peterson) was largely
guided by Rosch's (1978) theory of the nature of cog-
nitive categories, not by a theory of love itself. This
means that at least 49.2% of the relationship research
that Peterson examined is largely atheoretical in the
sense we care about. Eleven of 65 studies (another
16.9%) "tested relatively specific relational hypothe-
ses." It was our impression that many of these hypoth-
eses would make more sense in the context of a larger
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
theory. Thus, 66.2% of the relationship work he sur-
veyed was not guided by a comprehensive relationship
theory. Even among the remaining third, which Peter-
son refers to as being "directly linked with compre-
hensive theoreticalformulations," we think it likely that
some could be fruitfully combined. For example, what
Peterson calls the "Darwinian theory of mate selection"
might be productively and parsimoniously combined
with attachment theory, perhaps along the lines sug-
gested in Simpson's commentary.
We agree with Peterson that attachment theory is
potentially important not only to abstract social science
but also to the solution of some of society's pressing
problems, such as child abuse, domestic violence, di-
vorce, delinquency, drug abuse, depression, and teen
pregnancy. A field of developmental psychopathology
is emerging (e.g., Cicchetti, 1984, Sameroff & Emde,
1989; Sroufe & Rutter, 1984), and attachment theory is
influential within it. We certainly hope that our exten-
sions of attachment theory will eventually have clinical
and policy implications.
Conclusion
If, as Peterson puts it, we are to build better theo-
retical buildings in the close relationships field, we
need to have a solid foundation. We think the foun-
dation must consist of a theory concerning the most
basic and universal aspects of human relationships.
Regardless of whether the field ever arrives at a
comprehensive theory or whether the eventual
framework is based on Bowlby's formulations, we
contend that any theory that fails to acknowledge that
human beings are biological creatures whose rela-
tionship behavior has been influenced by evolution-
ary processes-any theory that is adevelopmental or
that fails to explain both normative aspects and the
origins and nature of relationship-relevantindividual
differences--will be incomplete at best. We hope that
the conversation begun here, for which we owe the
commentators a great debt of gratitude, will continue
and will affect the field's construction plans.
Note
Cindy Hazan, Department of Human Development
and Family Studies, Van Rensselaer Hall, Cornell Uni-
versity, Ithaca, NY 14853-4401.
References
Ainsworth, M. D. S. (1%7). Infancy in Uganda:Infant care and the
growth of nttnchment Baltimore: J o b Hopkins University
Press.
Ainsworth, M. D. S. (1982). Attachment: Retrospectand prospect. In
C.M.Parkes & J. Stevenson-Hinde (Eds.), Theplace of attach-
ment in human behavior @p. 3-30). New York: Basic.
Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978).
Patterns of attachment: Assessed in the Strange Situation and
at home Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Anisfeld, E., Casper, V., Nozyce, M., & Cunningham, N. (1990).
Does infant carrying promote attachment? An experimental
study of the effects of increased physical contact on the devel-
opment of attachment. ChildDevelopment, 61,1617-1627.
Bartholomew, K. (1990). Avoidance of intimacy: An attachment
perspective. Journal of Social and Personal R e k a t k h i p , 7,
147-178.
Bartholomew, K, & Horowitz, L. M. (1991). Attachment styles
among young adults: A test of a four-category model. Journal
of Personaliw and Social Psychology, 61,226-244.
Belsky, J., & Nezworski, T. (Eds.). (1988). Clinical implications of
attachment theory. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence ErIbaum Associ-
ates, Inc.
Belsky, J., & Rovine, M. J. (1987). Temperament and attachment
security in the Strange Situation: An empirical rapprochement.
Child Development, 58,787-795.
Bowlby, J. (1973).Attachmentandloss: Vol. 2. Separation:Anviely
and anger. New York: Basic.
Bowlby, J. (1979). The making and breaking of affectional bondr.
London: Tavistock.
Bowlby, J. (1980). Attachment and loss: VoL 3. Loss: Sadness and
depression New York: Basic.
Bowlby, J. (1982). Attachment and loss: Vol. 1. Attachment. New
York: Basic. (Original work published 1969)
Bowlby, J. (1988). A secure base: Parent-child attachment and
healthy human development. New York: Basic.
Bretherton, I. (1990). Open communication and internal working
models: Their role in the development of attachment relation-
ships. In R. A Thompson (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on
Mothution (Vol. 36, pp. 57-113). Lincoln: University of Ne-
braska Press.
Camps, J. J., Barrett, K, Lamb, M. E., Goldsmith, H. H., &
Stenberg, C. (1983). Socioemotional development. In P. H.
Mussen (Ed.), Handbwk of childpsychol~gy:Vol. 2. Infancy
and developmental pcychobiology @p. 783-915). New York:
Wiley.
Caspi, A, & Bem, D. J. (1990). Personality coatinuity and change
acros the life course. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of
personality: Theory and reswrch @p. 54S575). New York:
Guilford.
Caspi, A, & Herbener, E. S. (1990). Continuity and change: Assor-
tative marriage and the consistencyof personality in adulthood.
 HAZAN & SHAVER
Journal of Personality andSocia1Psychology, 58,250-258.
Cicchetti,D. (1984). The emergenceof developmental psychopathol-
ogy. Child Development, 55,l-7.
Colin, V. (1985). Hierarchies andpatterns of infants' attachmentsto
parents and day caregivers:An erploration Unpublished doc-
toral dissertation, University of Virginia, Charloffesville.
Colin, V. (1987, April). Infant'spreferences betweenparents before
andajier moderate stressactivates behavior. Paper presented at
the meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development,
Baltimore.
Collins, N. L., & Read, S. J. (1990). Adult attachment, working
models, and relationship quality in dating couples. Journal of
Personali@andsocial Psychology, 58,644663.
Connell, D. B. (1976). Individual differences in attachment: An
investigatwn into stability, implications and relationships to
struc&e of early langua& de~lopment. unpublished douoral
dissertation, University of Syracuse.
Crockenberg, S. B. (1981). infancir~itabiiit~, mother responsiveness,
and social support influences on the security of infant-mother
attachment. ChildDevelopment, 5 2 , 8 5 7 4 9 .
Cummings, E. M. (1980). Caregiver stability andattachmentin infant
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
day care. Developmental Psychology, 16,31-37.
Egeland, B., & Farber, E. A (1984). Infant-mother attachment:
Factors related to its developmentand changes over time. Child
Development, 55,753-771.
Elicker, J., Englund, M., & Sroufe, L. A. (1992). Predicting peer
competence and peer relationships in chiidhood from early
parent-child relationships. In R. Parke & G. Ladd (Eds.), Fam-
ily-peerrelatwns: Modes of linkage@p.77-106). Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Farran, D. C., & Ramey, C. T. (1977). Infant day care and attachment
behavior towards mothersand teachers. ChifdDevelopment,48,
112-116.
Feeney, J. A, & Noller, P. (1990). Attachment style as a predictor of
adult romantic relationships. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology,58,281-291.
Feeney, J. A., Noller, P., & Callan, V. J. (in press). Attachment style,
communication and satisfactionin the early years of marriage.
In K. Bartholomew & D. L. Perlman (Eds.), Advances in per-
sonal relationships: VoL 5. A h l t attachment relationship.
London: Jessica Kingsley.
Fehr, B. (1988). Prototype analysis of the concepts of love and
commitment.Journal ofPersonalityandSocialPsychology 55,
557-579.
Fox, N. A, Kimmerly, N. L., & Schafer, W. D. (1991). Attachment
to motherlattachment to father: A meta-analysis. Child Devel-
opment, 62,210-225.
Greenberg, M . T., Cicchetti, D., & Cummings, M. E. (Eds.). (1990).
Attachment in thepreschoolyears: Theory, research, andinter-
vention. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Harlow, H. F. (1961). The development of affectional patterns in
infant monkeys. In B. M. Foss (Ed.), Determinants of infnnt
behavior(Vol.1). New York: Wiley.
Harlow, H. F., & Harlow, M. K. (1965). The affectional systems.
In A. M. Schrier, H. F. Harlow, & F. Stollnitz (Eds.), Behavior
of nonhuman primates p o l . 11, pp. 287-334). New York:
Academic.
Hazan, C. (1992, July). Transitions and transformations in attach-
ment. Paper presented at the meeting of the International Society
for the Study of Personal Relationships, Orono, ME.
&an, C., & Hutt, M. J. (1991). Continuity and chanae in internal
working models of a&hhent. unpublished m&uscriPt, Cor-
nell University, Department of Human Development and Fam-
ily Studies.
Hazan, C., & Shaver, P. R. (1987). Romantic love conceptualized as
an attachment process. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
c h a m , 52,511-524.
Hazan, C., & Shaver, P. R. (1990). Love and work: An attachment-
theoretical pers~ve.Jour~~ofPersona~~andSocin[Psy-Sperling, M. B., & Berman, W. H. (1991). An attachment
chology, 59,270-280.
Hazan, C., & Shaver, P. R. (1992). Broken attachments. In T. L.
Orbuch (Ed),Close relationship loss: Theoretical approaches
@p. 90-108). New York: Springer-Verlag.
Isabella, R. A, Belsky, J., & von Eye, A. (1989). Origins of infant-
mother attachment: An examination of interactional synchrony
during the infant's first year. Developmental Psychology, 25,
12-21.
Kirkpatrick, L. A., & Davis, K E. (in press). Attachment style,
gender, and relationship stability: A longitudinal analysis.Jour-
MI of Personality and Social Psychology.
Kobak, R., Cole, H., Ferenz-Gillies, R., & Fleming, W. (1993).
Attachment and emotion regulation during mother-teen prob-
lem-solving. Child Development, 64,231-245.
Kobak, R. R., & Hazan, C. (1991). Attachment in mamage: The
effects of security and accuracy of working models. Journal of
Personality andSocial Pschology, 60,861-869.
Kunce, L. J., & Shaver, P. R. (in press). An attachment-theoretical
approach to caregiving in romantic relationships. In K.
Bartholomew & D. L. Perlman (Eds.), Advances in personal
relationships: Vol.5. London: Jessica Kingsley.
Main, M. (1990). Parental aversion to infant-initiated contact is
correlated with theparent'sown rejection during childhood: The
effects of experience on signals of security with respect to
attachment. In K. E. Barnard & T. B. Brazelton (Eds.), Touch:
The foundation of esperience @p. 461495). Madison, CT:
International Universities Press.
Main, M., Kaplan, N., & Cassidy, J. (1985). Security in infancy,
childhood, and adulthood: Amove to the level of representation.
Monographs of the Societyfor Research in ChildDevelopment,
50(1-2, Serial No. 209), 66-104.
Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about
the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35,
63-78.
Manis, P. (1991). The social construction of uncertainty. In C. M.
Parkes, J. Stevenson-Hinde, & P. Manis (Eds.), Attachment
a c m s the life cycle @p. 77-90). London: TavistocWRoutledge.
Mikulincer, M., & Nachshon, 0. (1991). Attachment styles and
patterns of self-disc1osure. Journal of Personality and Sociol
Psychology, 61,321-331.
Parkes, C. M., Stevenson-Hinde, J., & Marris, P. (Eds.). (1991).
Attachment across the life cycle. London: TavistocWRoutledge.
Ricciuti, H. N. (1974). Fear and the development of social attach-
ments in the first year of life. In M. Lewis & L. Rosenblum
(Eds.), Origins of fear @p. 73-104). New York: Wiley.
Rosch, E. (1978). Principles of categorization. In E. Rosch & B. B.
Lloyd (Eds.), Cognition and categorization (pp. 27-48).
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Sameroff, A. J., & Emde, R. N. (1989). Relationshipdisturbances in
early 1ife:A developmental approach. New York: Basic.
Schaffer, H. R., &Emerson, P. E. (1964). The development of social
attachments in infancy. Monographs of the SocietyforResearch
in Child Development, 29(3).
Shaver, P. R, & Hazan, C. (1993). Adult romanticattachment: Theory
and evidence. In W. H. Jones & D. Perlman (Eds.),Advancesin
personal relationship (Vol. 4, pp. 29-70). London: Jessica
Kingsley.
Shill, M. A, Solyom, P., & Biven, C. (1984). Parent preference in
the attachment exploration balance in infancy: An experimental
psychoanalytic approach. Child Psychiatry and Human Devel-
o l ~ t ~ n15.34-48.
t.
simpson,J. k (1990). Theinfluenceof attachment styles on romantic
relationships.Journa1 ofPersonalityandsocial Psychology, 59,
971-980.
Simpson,1.A, Rholes, W. S., &NeUigan, J. S. (1992). Support-seek-
ing and support-giving within couple members in an anxiety-
provoking situation: The role of attachment styles. Journal of
Pwsonality andsocial Psychology, 62,434-446.
 AUTHORS' RESPONSE
classification of desperate love. Journal of Personality As-
sessment, 56,4555.
Sroufe, L.A, & Fleeson, J.(1986). Attachment and the construction
of relationships. In W. W. Hartup & Z. Rubii (Eds.) Relation-
s h i p and development @p. 51-72). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Sroufe, L. A, & Rutter, M. (1984). The domain of developmental
psychopathology. Child Development, 48,1184-1 199.
Swann, W. B., Jr., %on, J. G., & De La Ronde, C. (1992). Embrae
ing the bitter '%uth2': Negative self-concepts and marital com-
mitment. PsychologiurlScience, 3,118-121.
van den Boom, D. (1990). Preventive intervention and the quality
of mother-infant interaction and infant exploration in initable
infants. In W. Koops, H. J. G. Soppe, J. L.van der Linden, P.
C. M. Molenaar, & J. J. F. Schroots (Eds.), Developmental
psychology behind the dikes: An outline of developmental
psychology research in The Netherlands. The Netherlands:
Downloaded by [McGill University Library] at 03:23 03 February 2015
Uitgeverij Eburon.
Vormbrock, J.K (1993). Attachment theory as applied to war time
and job-related marital separation. PsychologicnlBulletin, 114,
122-144.
W a e r , V. G. (1986). Attachment in infancy and at age sir, and
children's self-concept:A follow-up of a German longitudinal
shuty. Unpublisheddoctoraldissertation, University of Virginia,
Charlottesvifle.
Waters, E. (1978). The reliability and stability of individual differ-
ences in infant-mother attachment. Child Development, 49,
483-494.
Weiss, R L,& Heyman, R. E. (1990). O b ~ e ~ a t i oofn marital
interaction. In F. D. Fincham & T. N. Bradbury (Eds.), The
psychology of marriage @p. 87-117). New York: Guilford
Weiss, R S. (1974). The provisions of social relationships. In Z
Rubin (Ed.), Doing unto others. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Pren-
tice-Hall.