US vs ANG TANG HO holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
43 Phil 1 extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale
Doctrine of Separation of Powers
RATIO:
Allocation of governmental powers. - The doctrine declares that
governmental powers are divided among the three (3) departments of
government, the legislative, executive, and judicial, and broadly
operates to confine legislative powers to the legislature, executive
powers to the executive department, and judicial powers to the
judiciary, precluding one branch of the government from exercising or
invading the powers of another.
The fundamental question involved in this case is the right of the
people of the Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican
form of government. We make the broad statement that no state or
nation, living under republican form of government, under the terms
and conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law
delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should
be sold. That power can never be delegated under a republican
form of government.
Here the rice sold was the personal and private property of the
defendant, who sold it to one of his customers. The government had
not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have any interest in
it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private
property of the defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the
interest of the public, but the members of this court have taken on
solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not
to be construed to meet the changing winds or emergency conditions.
Again, we say that no state or nation under a republican form of
government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive, under the
conditions states, to fix the price at which a price person would sell
his own rice, and make the broad statement that no decision of any
court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be found which sustains
the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in
question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to
constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws
is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a
direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the
question here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to
fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold
in the manner power in violation of the organic law.
FACTS: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature
passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and
thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of
the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations
therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material
provisions of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for
any cause, conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the
price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate, with the consent
of the Council of State, temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purpose of this Act.
Section 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the
regulations, orders and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith
shall be punished by a fine of not more than five thousands pesos, or
by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
Pursuant thereto, on August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a
proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold and
penalizing the violation thereof.
On August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang
Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five
months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he
appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding
Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in
finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the
sentence.
The defendant questions the validity of the proclamation by the
Governor-General pursuant to Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes
the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation fixing the price at which rice
should be sold confers an unconstitutional delegation of powers
RULING: Yes. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules
and emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-
General.
The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under
what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue
the proclamation, but says that it may be issued "for any cause,"
and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion of
the Governor-General.

The Legislature does not specify or define what is "an

extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." That is also
left to the discretion of the Governor-General. It does not specify
or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how
long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in
force and effect, or when they shall take effect.

All these are left to the sole judgment and discretion of the
Governor-General. The law is thus incomplete as a legislation.

It is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General

which constitutes the crime. Before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at
any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a
crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the
sale of it at any price would not be a crime.

That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to

sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant
committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime
to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it
at any price was not a crime.

The Governor-General cannot, by proclamation, determine what act

shall constitute a crime or not. That is essentially a legislative task.
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS vs. THE
BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS (1916)
G.R. L-11216
Ruling:
Requisites for Valid Delegation:
1. Sufficient Standard Test
2. Completeness Test
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be
complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative
branch of the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment
of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details, in presenti,
but which may be left to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Facts:
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS is a foreign
corporation organized under the laws of Spain and engaged in
business in the Philippine Islands as a common carrier of passengers
and merchandise by water: On June 7, 1915, the Board of Public
Utility Commissioners issued and caused to be served an order to
show cause why they should not be required to present detailed
annual reports respecting its finances and operations respecting the
vessels owned and operated by it, in the form and containing the
matters indicated by the model attached to the petition.
They are ordered to present annually on or before March first of each
year a detailed report of finances and operations of such vessels as
are operated by it as a common carrier within the Philippine Islands,
in the form and containing the matters indicated in the model of
annual report which accompanied the order to show cause herein.
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS denied the
authority of the board to require the report asked for on the ground
that the provision of Act No. 2307 relied on by said board as
authority for such requirement was, if construed as conferring such
power, invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of the
Legislature to delegate legislative power to the board. It is
cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that the preparation of the
same would entail an immense amount of clerical work.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is constitutional to require COMPANIA GENERAL
DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS to pass a detailed report to the Board of
Public Utility Commissioners of the Philippine Islands?
Whether the power to require the detailed report is strictly legislative,
or administrative, or merely relates to the execution of the law?
RULING:
The order appealed from is set aside and the cause is returned to the
Board of Public Utility Commissioners with instructions to dismiss
the proceeding.
The section of Act No. 2307 under which the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners relies for its authority, so far as pertinent to the case
at hand, reads as follows:
Sec. 16. The Board shall have power, after hearing, upon notice, by
order in writing, to require every public utility as herein defined: (e)
To furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in
such form and containing such matters as the Board may from time
to time by order prescribe.
The statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners
to require detailed reports from public utilities, leaving the nature of
the report, the contents thereof, the general lines which it shall
follow, the principle upon which it shall proceed, indeed, all other
matters whatsoever, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not
expressing its own will or the will of the State with respect to the
public utilities to which it refers.
Such a provision does not declare, or set out, or indicate what
information the State requires, what is valuable to it, what it needs
in order to impose correct and just taxation, supervision or control,
or the facts which the State must have in order to deal justly and
equitably with such public utilities and to require them to deal justly
and equitably with the State. The Legislature seems simply to have
authorized the Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require what
information the board wants. It would seem that the Legislature, by
the provision in question, delegated to the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners all of its powers over a given subject-matter in a
manner almost absolute, and without laying down a rule or even
making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or
applied.
The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made.

The Supreme Court held that there was no delegation of

legislative power, it said:

The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a

commission, but, having laid down the general rules of action under
which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that commission
the application of such rules to particular situations and the
investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular
matter within the rules laid down by the Congress.

In section 20 (of the Commerce Act), Congress has authorized the

commission to require annual reports. The act itself prescribes in
detail what those reports shall contain. In other words, Congress
has laid down general rules for the guidance of the Commission,
leaving to it merely the carrying out of details in the exercise of
the power so conferred. This, we think, is not a delegation of
legislative authority.

In the case at bar the provision complained of does not lay “down
the general rules of action under which the commission shall
proceed.” nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports
shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and
discretion of the Board of Public Utility Commissioners, which is
unrestrained as to when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act,
to what extent it shall act, or what it shall act upon.

The Legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its

powers and functions in favor of the Board of Public Utility
Commissioners with respect to the matters therein referred to, and
that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
The Legislature, by the provision referred to, has not asked for the
information which the State wants but has authorized and board to
obtain the information which the board wants.
LOVINA vs MORENO
9 SCRA 557
Restriction on Grant of Judicial Power
RATIO:
The judicial power which may be exercised by administrative
agencies is a restricted one, limited to what is incidental and
reasonably necessary to the proper and efficient
administration of the statutes that are committed to them for
administration.
Arbitrary powers or uncontrolled discretion may not be conferred
upon administrative agencies either in the exercise of rule-
making or adjuticatory functions.
Atty. Bacatan:
There is valid delegation in this case. The requisites are:
1. Ascertainment of facts (clearing of obstruction)
2. Filling in of details
3. Administrative/ Quasi-legislative power
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Manila enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications from causing the removal of certain dams
and dikes in a fishpond owned by Primitivo and Nelly Lovina in
the Municipality of Macabebe Province of Pampanga.
The cause started by a petition of numerous residents of the
said municipality to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, complaining that appellees had blocked the
"Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in Macabebe, Pampanga,
and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and
hearing to the parties, the said Secretary found the
constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters, and,
in his decision dated 11 August 1959, ordered the land
owners, spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of Sapang
Bulati; otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at
the expense of the respondent. After receipt of the decision, the
respondent filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision.
The trial court, after due hearing, granted a permanent
injunction, which is now the subject of the present appeal.
The position of the plaintiffs-appellees in the court below was
that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it
invests the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable
authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or
stream is public and navigable, whether a dam encroaches
upon such waters and is constitutive as a public nuisance, and
whether the law applies to the state of facts, thereby
Constituting an alleged unlawful delegation of judicial
power to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the objections to the unconstitutionality of
Republic Act No. 2056, not only as an undue delegation of
judicial power to the Secretary of Public Works but also for
being unreasonable and arbitrary, tenable
RULING:
No. It will be noted that the Act (R.A. 2056) merely
empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments upon public streams,
constructions that no private person was anyway entitled
to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public
property, and ownership thereof is not acquirable by
adverse possession.
It is true that the exercise of the Secretary's power under
the Act necessarily involves the determination of some
questions of fact (ascertainment of facts), such as the
existence of the stream and its previous navigable character;
but these functions, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are
merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by
law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that
they are, validly conferable upon executive officials provided
the party affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is
expressly required by Republic Act No. 2056, section 2.

Appellees invoke American rulings that abatement as

nuisances of properties of great value can not be done except
through court proceedings; but these rulings refer to summary
abatements without previous hearing, and are inapplicable to
the case before us where the law provides, and the
investigator actually held, a hearing with notice to the
complainants and the, appellees, who appeared therein. It is
noteworthy that Republic Act 2605 authorizes removal of the
unauthorized dikes either as "public nuisances or as
prohibited constructions" on public navigable streams, and
those of appellees clearly are in the latter class.

Considering the well-established rule that findings of fact in

executive decisions in matters within their jurisdiction are
entitled to respect from the courts in the absence of fraud,
collusion, or grave abuse of discretion, none of which has been
shown to exist in this case, we agree with appellant that the
court below erred in rejecting the findings of fact of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner, vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
15 SCRA 569 – Political Law – Sufficient Standard Test and
Completeness Test
FACTS:
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders
E.O nos. 93 to 121,124 and 126 to 129 creating 33
municipalities – this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code which provides in part:
The President may by executive order define the boundary… of
any… municipality… and may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require…
The then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer,
filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from
disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities.
Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said that
Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3
of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not be created or
their boundaries altered nor their names changed” except by
Act of Congress. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this
new law, cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?”
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and
that only barrios were barred from being created by the
President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that a
municipality can be created without creating barrios. He
further maintains that through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress
has delegated such power to create municipalities to the
President.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create
barrios to the President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD:
No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may
delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration
of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself —
it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out
or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix a standard —
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
— to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions.
One of the exceptions to the Principle of Non-delegation of
legislative powers:
5) Delegation to the Administrative Bodies
In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed,
without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in
effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of
every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty,
whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of
his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause “as
the public welfare may require” – which would mean that the
President may exercise such power as the public welfare may
require – is present, still, such will not replace the standard
needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what
the phrase “as the public welfare may require” qualifies is the
text which immediately precedes hence, the proper
interpretation is “the President may change the seat of
government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require.” Only the seat of government
may be changed by the President when public welfare so
requires and NOT the creation of municipality.
The Supreme Court declared that the power to create
municipalities is essentially and eminently legislative in
character not administrative (not executive).

Pelaez vs Auditor General 15 SCRA 569
Facts:
The President of the Phil., pursuant to section 68 of the
Revised Administrative code, issued E.O nos. 93 to 121,124
and 126 to 129 creating municipalities. However, Emmanuel
Pelaez, as Vice President of the Phil and as a taxpayer
instituted a writ of prohibition with prelim injunction against
the Auditor general from passing in audit any public funds.
The petitioner alleges that executive orders are null and void,
upon the ground Sec. 68 has been impliedly repealed by R.A
no 2370 and constitutes undue delegation of legislative power
He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council
has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a
duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the
corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary
action therefor. Neither may he veto, set aside or annul an
ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its
jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may
not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality
or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal
from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.

Issue:
Whether or not the E.O nos issued constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power.

Held:
Yes, the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. Although congress may
delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill
in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration
of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the separation
of powers, the said law: a. be complete in itself- it must set
forth the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate; b. fix a standard- the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate of determinable

The power of control under this provision implies the right of

the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as
may be vested by law in the officers of the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government,
as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments
are concerned. With respect to the latter, the fundamental law
permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform
their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the
President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as
the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.
LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land
Transportation Commissioner
Generally Accepted Principles of International Law – Police
Power
FACTS:
Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is
assailing the validity of Letter of Instruction No 229 which
requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices
particularly to equip them with a pair of “reflectorized
triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that this
order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to
the motoring public. Cars are already equipped with blinking
lights which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a
set of reflectorized early warning devices is redundant and
would only make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD:
Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive
redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose cars are
already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of
said motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside
motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized tapes on front and rear
bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum
lamps (the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the
signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna Conventions, and
visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least
400 meters, any motorist from this country or from any part of
the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular early warning
device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled
portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there is a motor
vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs
or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist
who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning
devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get
adequate advance warning because he will still think what that
blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a
law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or
uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase,
rather than decrease, the danger of collision.
On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise
of the police power. That is conceded by petitioner and is the
main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it
has offended against the due process and equal protection
safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of
the police power which was originally identified by Chief
Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision, as “nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty” was stressed in the
aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in
the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force,
Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be
subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.
Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso
reiterated the doctrine, such a competence being referred to as
‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative
terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as
‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it
to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare
of society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as
noted by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of
legislative power. It is in the above sense the greatest and most
powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice
Malcolm anew, ‘the most essential, insistent, and at least
illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed
out ‘to all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to
meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future
where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient
and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice
Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may
be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation.
What is critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police
power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government
limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to
obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good
order, and welfare.”

It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin,

compounded by the fact that the particular police power
measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public
safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to
invalidate a legislative or executive act of that character. None
has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-
existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained
the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment conceived with
the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing
objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: “To
promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on roads and
streets designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact,
the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the
1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner
failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative
demands of public safety.