"Truth can never be t o l d so as t o b e u n d o ~

stood, and not be believed."

C H A P T E R I

SUBJECTIVE. NOT OBJECTIVE. TRUTH

1. Subjective and Objective Truths

The f i r s t move, the starting point o f Kierkegaard's religious

epistemology, i s that t r u t h i s a function of subjectivity meaning thereby

that the crucial concern of the knower about the t r u t h i s the knower's

relationship to truth. Kierkegaard was not concerned w i t h the theory

of knowledge as such, but h i s basic Inquiry was: What i s the good

of purely objective t r u t h i f it i s not appropriated into the l i f e o f

the knower? He writes i n h i s Journals:

What I r e a l l y lack i s to be clear i n my mind what I am

to do, not what I am to know, except insofar as a certaln
understanding must precede every action... the thing i s
to f i n d a t r u t h which i s true f o r me, to f i n d the &
&
for which I can l i v e and die.

The questions to be considered i n the l i g h t of subjective vis-k-vls

objective t r u t h are:

What can the so-called objective t r u t h provide? What

would be the use o f discovering the so-called objective
truth, o f working through a l l the systems of philosophy...
to construct a world ig. w h k h I do not live, but only h o l d
up f o r the view o f others... I am l e f t standing l i k e a
man who has rented , a house and gathered a l l the furni-
ture and household things together, but has not y e t found
the beloved w i t h whom to share the joys and sorrows of
h i s life.2
 Ordinarily, the term "subjectu in philosophy means the

-
knower, and "subjectivityu would, thus. mean the nature o r the state

of the knower. But i n Klerkegaard's view, s u b / e c t l v l t y does not

mean t h i s abstract nature o r the state of knower; r a t h e r ,It means

the self-consciousiy existing concrete subject, the individual. Again,

subjectivity f o r Kierkegaard i s not Introspection o f inner mental states

l i k e memory, imagination, etc. for, such an introspection i s also

, a k i n d o f objective attitude w i t h the difference t h a t the objects per-

ceived i n these cases are internal. Subjectivity conslsts i n concen-

trating and intensifying one's life's ideals. Kierkegaard's subject

i s not a cognitive entity, but an ethico-religious category.

The heart of Kierkegaard's philosophical work rests in

his Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript,

which are connected w i t h the common pseudonymous author Johannes

Climacus, who would henceforth be referred t o as Climacus. Both

these books are polemically directed against speculative philosophy

of Hegel, the dominant philosophy of h i s day. Climacus' r e v o l t was

against Hegel's basic tenets:

1.Truth i s a comprehensive whole, meaning no t r u t h i s

obtainable apart from a completely coherent system,
which i n turn meant that no indlvidual could attain
the truth.

2.Truth as objective, meaning t h a t t r u t h b y definition

i s independent of the i n d i v i d u a l ' s relationship to It.
Hegei termed i t as the scientific study o f the r e a l i t y .
 Climacus demonstrates that, In both the above posltlons

h e l d b y Hegel, the individual i s eliminated from t h e knowlng process

by doing away w i t h the need f o r commitment on the knower's part.

Hegei i s said to have raised philosophy to the l e v e l o f "sciencen

b y making i t systematic. Hence, i n the universe o f the Hegelian

discourse "philosophy," " s y ~ t e m . ~and "science" are considered syn-

onyms.

Kierkegaard's position is exactly the reverse o f t h a t o f

Hegel's. Hence Climacus, expresses h i s opinion c l e a r l y b y designating

one of h i s books as "Fragments" and the other as "Unscientific," mean-

ing that t r u t h i s always fragmentary (philosophical b i t s ) as opposed

to systematic and hence unscientific. The term "unscientific" here

does not indicate any reference to natural science, b u t merely indicates

that the contents are unsystematic.

Further, Hegel's treatment of religion i n general and of

Christianity i n particular, which he c a l l s the "Absolute1' or "God"

or "Truth," aroused Climacus to revolt. For Hegel, truth cannot

be expressed i n propositions which must be e i t h e r true o r false.

It cannot be grasped b y simply affirming o r negating such propositions,

but through a process, which i s generally termed Hegel's dialectical

method, i.e. t r u t h i n a sense b o t h "annuls" and "preserves" the oppo-

sing statements (equivalent German v e r b aufhaben); and t h i s process

i s called mediation b y Climacus. Therefore, t o t a l l y adequate truth,

according to Hegel, emerges through the dialectical process as a whole

i n the sense that truth lies i n the whole and requires systematic.

thinking. Climacus understands t h i s as implying t h a t through simple

f a i t h an ordinary believer cannot attain the religious truth, b u t through

the process of speculation a philosopher seeks a more adequate expre-

ssion o f the truth. Hence, h e feels that i n Hegel's system f a i t h

i s treated as a "superseded movement." It i s t h i s w h i c h makes h i m

r e v o l t against speculation i n religious truth. Moreover, Hegel argues

that art, religion, and philosophy together formed the philosophy

o f the Absolute S p i r i t , w, wherein only philosophy occupied the

highest stage o r rather expressed the Absolute more accurately through

reason and reflection.

The essential object of art, religion, and philosophy, accor-

ding to Hegel, i s the same, c.Cod; but t h e i r modes of expression

are different. i n a r t the awareness o f the Absolute i s i n the sensuous

mode; i n religion the Absolute i s grasped through legends and stories;

and i n phiiosophy the Absolute i s reflected upon, a purely conceptual

attitude. Climacus combats t h i s view o f Hegel's vehemently, because

he holds that Hegel places reason and intellectual analysis on a h i g h e r

plane than simple faith, meaning t h a t f a i t h i s child-like, an unreflec-

ted attitude, which can b e superseded b y refiection and inteilectuali-

zation. According to Hegel. philosophy i s superior t o the other two,

-
viz. a r t and religion, because it can go beyond b l i n d f a i t h and r a i s e

the Absolute t o reason and scientific analysis. Faith i s alright for

ordinary people, but the educated can go further and reason it out.

Considering these views of ~ s g e l l s , Climacus projects himself as a

c,ritic o f reason. not attempting t o destroy reason. but t o subjucate

reason to f a i t h in the realm o f essential truth.

2. Classical Theories o f Truth and T h e i r Limitations

Climacus begins the chapter on "Subjective Truth" i n the

Concluding Unscientific Postscript by brlnging i n different classical

approaches to truth.

Whether t r u t h i s defined more empirically as the agree-

ment of thinking w i t h being o r more idealistically as the
agreement of being w i t h thinking, the point in each case
i s t o pay scrupulous attention to what i s understood b y
being.. 3.

Climacus discusses the two classical philosophical analysis

of the concept of truth. which i s similar to the classical correspon-

dence and coherence theories of truth. These two theories are called,

by Climacus, the empirical theory, which defines truth empirically

as the agreement of thought w i t h being, i.e. t r u t h as "the conformity

of thought w i t h beings," and the idealistic theory, which defines t r u t h

as the agreement of being w i t h thought, i.e. t r u t h as "the conformity

of being w i t h thought."

The correspondence theory of truth, which i s generally asso-

ciated with realism, considers the reality or existing situation as

given and that t r u t h as the idea o r thought which corresponds t o the

given reality. The realists t h i n k of, t r u t h as having a logical relation-

s h i p between the propositions o r statements uttered about r e a l i t y and

reality. Thus, t r u t h h e r e means an idea t h a t expresses a one-to-one

correspondence between a proposition and a fact.

The i d e a l i s t i c theory, w h i c h i s no o t h e r than t h e ckasslcal

coherence theory, h o l d s t h a t t h e ultimate essence o f r e a l i t y o r being

i s thought, and t h a t r e a l i t y o r being, thus, conforms t o thought itself.

Hence, t h e t e s t o f t r u t h i s t h e t e s t of reason, meaning t h e r e b y t h a t

rational coherence i s t h e essence o f t r u t h .

Considering the above two theories of t r u t h , Climacus is

of t h e opinion t h a t i n b o t h t h e cases t h e r e i s an involvement o f "doub-

ling" o r "reduplication." I n b o t h t h e d e f i n i t i o n s t h e r e i s an agreement

between being and thought w i t h t h e difference i n direction, i.e. either

being corresponds t o thought o r thought corresponds t o being. It w l l l

be h e l p f u l t o f o l l o w t h e elucidation o f t h e concept o f "reduplication"

as given b y Gregor Malantschuk. Reduplication, according t o Kierke-

gaard, means a fusion of two different qualities or categories Into

a synthesis, meaning t h e doubleness o f a relationship, i.e. two d i f f e r -

ent q u a l i t i e s a r e l i n k e d t o each other. F o r instance, a teacher pro-

poses a doctrine while at t h e same time reduplicates t h i s doctrine

in his or her life. This reduplication constitutes a doubling, for

i t embodies two different elements t h a t now merge to form a synthesis

-the teacher's original a t t i t u d e and t h e requirement exacted o f h l s l h e r

b y the d o ~ t r i n e . ~

Regardless o f w h i c h d e f i n i t i o n o f t r u t h one prefers, realistic

or idealistic, Climacus h o l d s t h a t one must f i r s t ascertain what one

means b y baing, for I n e i t h e r case the crucial concern i s about being..

He makes a distinction between being i n the ideal sense and being

as concrete, empirical actuality. The empirlcal being i s In a process,

a constant becoming and, hence, the t r u t h about such an empirlcai

being i s also subject to change. I f we are speaking o f empiricai

being, the t r u t h about such an empirical being w i l l remain an approxi-

mation, because empirical being i s constantly undergoing change.

If, i n the two definitions given, being i s understood as

empirical being, then t r u t h i t s e l f i s transformed into
a desideratum (something wanted) and everything i s placed
i n the process of becoming (vorden), because the empiricai
object i s not finished, and the existing knowing s p i r i t
i s i t s e l f i n the process o f becoming. Thus t r u t h i s an
approximation whose beginning cannot be established abso-
lutely, because there i s no conclusion that has retroactive
power. 5

Climacus gives two reasons f o r h i s claims. F i r s t of a l l ,

the object of our knowledge i s constantly undergoing change. Secondly,

the knower himself i s i n the process of becoming. Since both are

unfinished, no human idea can claim to have final t r u t h about it.

A l l human cognition i n the empiricai realm i s subject t o correction

and improvement. Hence, a t r u t h which i s subject to such a correc-

tion and improvement cannot be the final truth, but only an approxi-

mation to it. However, Climacus makes an exception t o t h i s w i t h

regard to God. Since Cod i s eternal and sees from an eternal view-

point, t r u t h about the empirical r e a l i t y would be perfect f o r him.

Therefore, it i s only f o r God t h a t the existential r e a l i t y forms a

system.

7
 As soon as the being of t r u t h becomes empirically concrete,
t r u t h i t s e l f i s i n the process of becoming and i s l n d s t d
i n turn, b y intimation, the agreement between thinking
and being, and i s indeed actually that way f o r God, but
it i s not that way f o r any existing s p i r i t , because t h i s
s p i r i t , i t s e l f existing, i s i n the process o f becoming.6

Hence, Ciimacus argues that f o r an Individual it i s possible to construct

a formal or logical system o f truth, but not an existential truth.

However, Climacus' aim here i s not to b e l i t t l e , but to show us the

nature of, empirical knowiedge.

What about t r u t h i n the ideai sense? Climacus says that,

i f we take the idealistic approach to t r u t h we end up w i t h a tauto-

logy.

Truth i s the f i r s t , but t r u t h ' s other, that it is, i s the

same as the f i r s t ; this, i t s being, i s the abstract form
of t r u t h ...7

But if being i s understood i n t h i s way, the formula i s a

tautology; that is, thinking and being signify one and the same, and

the agreement spoken of is only an abstract identity with itself.

When one speaks of t r u t h i n the idealistic sense, one i s not talking

about actua!, concrete, empiricai truth, but about the ideal which

that t r u t h attempts to approximate. By t r u t h here we mean conceptual

t r u t h o r the analyticalla p r i o r i truth, which merely depends on rela-

tions between concepts. i n t h i s case the conformity of thought w i t h

being simply means the ideai relationship between reason and ideal

being, which i s the object of thought and which emerges when thought

abstracts being from the concrete, empirical world. For instance,

a mathematician does not consider three pears and three apples w h i l e

calculating, b u t merely the abstract number "three." The mathema-

tician's aim i s a conceptual ideal; and such a conceptual ideal, there-

fore, i s always finished and complete in a way no empirical object

is. Hence, Climacus holds that, when we are dealing w i t h a p u r e l y

conceptual being, the terms "thought" and "being" mean the same and

that we get nowhere at all, ending up w i t h a tautology.

Climacus does not deny the value of such abstract truths.

However, he claims that they cannot grasp the existential situation,

for abstract truths are complete in themselves, while empirical truths

are constantly changing. He says that such abstract t r u t h does f i t

into the classical definition of truth, p a r t i c u l a r l y the coherence theory

of t r u t h - abstract thought corresponding w i t h abstract being. In

any case, i n such claims there i s no genuine "doubling" o r "redupli-

cation" because thought and being refer to the same thing. It does

not touch the question of t r u t h about actual entities.

Having found the limitations of the above two theories o f

truth, Climacus suggests a t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y . In the event of a t r u t h

that i s essential f o r an existing s p i r i t , the t r u t h should be defined

nat as something objective to the exister, but as a process o f assimi-

lation, inwardness o r subjectivity. Here, the task o f the individual

consists i n appropriating truth. Climacus i s of the view t h a t t h i s

is the perspective to which the. speculative philosophers have not

paid much attention.

 To objectlve reflectlon. t r u t h becomes something objectlve,
an oblect, and the point i s to disregard the subject.
To Subjective reflection, t r u t h becomes appropriation, inward-
ness, subjectivlty. and the point i s to immerse oneself,
existing, In subjectivity.8

3. Relationship between the Truth and the Exister

The question Climacus i s r e a l l y concerned-with here is: What

is the relationship between t r u t h and the individual who pursues it?

Climacus writes:

Consequently, it i s an existing s p i r i t who asks about truth,

presumably because he wants to exist i n it, but i n any
case the questioner i s C O O S C ~ O U S o f being an existing indi-
vidual human being. 9

Climacus does not deny the fact that human beings possess abstract

ideas. Human existence does contain such ideas essentially. However,

this i s only one aspect of existence, o r rather it i s only h a l f truth.

The f u l l t r u t h lies i n reduplication of such eternal ideas i n life, In

actuality. Thought, i n t h i s sense, i s only one aspect of existence.

Hence, i n no way does it mean that existence should be reduced to

thought. Climacus strongly Insists on t h i s point on the ground that

human existence has a tendency to forget the fact that the thlnker

is f i r s t and foremost an exister, and hence f a i l s to b u i l d correct reia-

tionship between abstract thought and real existence. Human being's

relation to abstract thought possesses significant existential as well

as religlous truth. He quotes a few ciasrlcal thinkers i n Postscript

to elucidate t h i s point. Socrates was one of the r a r e classlcel phlloS0-

 phers who sought conceptual understanding w i t h religious significance..

On the other hand, Plato, h i s pupil, considers the ultimate o r essen-

t i a l t r u t h as "forms" and t h a t the eternal can b e reached i n thought.

Similarly, Hegel claimed that reason i s the most adequate means t o

grasp the r e a l i t y o r Absolute - "the r e a l i s rational and the rational

i s real." Climacus feels that, f o r these thinkers, i t i s the abstract

thought which paves the way f o r salvation. He observes t h a t these

,thinkers, however, d i d have religious concern i n t h e i r epistemological

or metaphysical approach to truth, unlike the contemporary logical

theorists and epistemologists. Hence, when t h e i r concern i s about

the religious truth, Climacus suggests t h a t they must pursue the

r i g h t k i n d o f truth. Without questioning the value o f t r u t h and the

duty towards t h a t truth, one cannot seek a saving truth. Stephen

Evans r i g h t l y puts it thus:

Is man's teios qua man the acquisitions of intellectual

u n d e r s t a n d i n g ! Does t h a t mean a person who f a i l s to
know something she could know i s less human than she
could be? T h i s seems implausibie.l0

Ciimacus wonders a t man's a b i l i t y to t h i n k abstractly such

that universal concepts and propositions become a p a r t o f an i n d i v i -

dual's temporal existence. Hence, he says t h a t human existence i s

a paradox, a synthesis o f the eternal and the temporal. Existence

is a double movement wherein an i n d i v i d u a l conceives o f ideas and

reduplicates it i n h i s existence. Once she ignores to reduplicate

it, she only remains i n abstract thought and then she loses herself

i n the ideas, bracketing h e r existence.

 Cllmacus brings I n a humourous analogy o f madness t o elu-

cidate subjective and o b j e c t i v e a ~ p r o a c h e sto truth. I n a purely sub-

jective definition of t r u t h one cannot distinguish between t r u t h and

error, for subjectivity rests on passion. Hence. an insane. person

i s said to lack objective reflection. and d w e l l i n a madness which

i s linked w i t h the passion of inwardness.

In a solely subjective definition o f , truth, lunacy and

t r u t h are ultimately indistinguishable, because they may
b o t h have inwardness. 11

Climacus argues t h a t s u b j e c t i v i t y i s one form o f madness,

which the objective thinking avoids and i s out o f such a danger.

He points out t h a t there i s another form o f madness which arises

due to the lack of inwardness o r passion, and i t i s called "parrotlng

lunacy ."
But when inwardness i s absent "parroting lunacy" sets
in, which i s just as comic... when the insanity i s a
delirium of inwardness, the tragic and t h e comic are
that.. .
pertains t o the unfortunate person.. that pertains.
to no one else. But when the insanity i s the absence
of inwardness... t r u t h t h a t pertains t o the whole human
race but does not i n the least pertain to the h i g h l y hono-
ured parroter.12

Hence, for Climacus, o b j e c t i v i t y i s no guarantee o f sanity, f o r here

one goes around repeating the t r u t h without finding a meaningful rela-

tion to i t and w i t h lack of passion and interest.

It is now obvious why Climacus i s concerned about the

basic question: What k i n d of t r u t h should one seek? By way of ans-

wering t h i s question he distlnguishes nonessentiallaccidental t r u t h frm

the essential one.

What k i n d o f t r u t h i s the saving t r u t h 1 How can a t r u t h

i t s e l f be realized i n existence? By way o f answering these questions,

Climacus makes a clear-cut distinction between essential and accidental

truths.

A l l essential knowing pertains t o existence o r only the

knowing whose relation t o existence i s essential i s essen-
t i a l knowlng. Essentially viewed the knowing t h a t does
not inwardly i n the reflection o f inwardness pertain to
existence i s accidental knowing, and i t s degree and scope,
essentially viewed, are a matter of indifference.13

Truth here simply means the t r u t h w i t h w h i c h an exister

can lead a meaningful life; and Ciimacus identifies i t w i t h the quest

for ethico-religious knowledge. Hence, h e says,

Therefore, only ethical and ethioa-religious knowing I s

essential knowing. But a l l ethical and ethico-religious
knowing i s essentially a relating t o the existing of the
knower. 14

It i s important t o note here t h a t Climacus' definition o f

t r u t h as s u b j e c t i v i t y i s intended to a p p l y t o t h i s essential truth. He

c l a r i f i e s t h i s point i n a footnote thus:

The reader w i l l note t h a t what i s being discussed here

i s essential truth. o r t h e t r u t h t h a t i s related essentially
 t o existence, and t h a t it i s s p e c l f l c a l l y i n o r d e r to
c l a r i f y i t as inwardness o r as s u b j e c t i v i t y t h a t the
contrast i s pointed out. 1 5

Thus, Climacus makes it c l e a r t h a t b y such a d e f i n i t i o n o f t r u t h he

does not intend t o a p p l y it t o science, logic, mathematics, history,

and other areas where t h e t r u t h concerned does not d i r e c t l y bear on

the i n d i v i d u a l ' s existence. And, it i s because o f t h e fact t h a t one

can lack such knowledge and y e t lead a meaningful and valuable l i f e .

Hence, C Iirnacus characterizes such knowledge as accidental knowledge.

Having made clear the point t h a t essential truth i s that

which relates truth to existence, Climacus makes an examination of

the nature o f existence. He says t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l i s a synthesis

of t h e temporal and eternal. In The Sickness unto Death, t h e pseudony-

mous author, Anti-Climacus, describes the self as a composition o f

t h e i n f i n i t e and t h e f i n i t e , w h i c h i s viewed as b i p o l a r tension r a t h e r

than two d i f f e r e n t elements i n t h e self. It i s characterized as b i p o l a r

tension because t h e i n f i n i t e aspect o f t h e self, i.e. the possibilities

w h i c h a r e t h e d i f f e r e n t ways o f looking a t t h e expansive and future-

oriented goal forms t h e ideal p o l e i n t h e self. The finitude, necessity,

and t e m p o r a l i t y form t h e l i m i t e d and contingent aspects i n t h e self.

Therefore, human existence contains a double movement. The first

movement i s from t h e a c t u a l i t y t o the p o s s i b i l i t y , i.e. the possibili-

ties contained b y t h e actual self, and t h e second movement from possi-

b i l i t y to actuality, i.e. these p o s s i b i l i t i e s t o b e actualized b y passion-

ately identifying oneself with the possibilities. This involves two

phenomena, action and reflection - reflection being the f i r s t move

conceptual ideals), and action being the second move (Ideals actual ized)

As against the contemporary philosophers who claim t h a t

only a proposition can be true o r false on the ground that they agree

with, o r correspond to, the r e a l i t y , Climacus posits such a corres-

pondence in human exlstence too. Human existence i s capable of model-

ling r e a l i t y . The ideal t r u t h gets actualized b y living. When the

truth is existentially realized t h i s way, the exister is i n truth,

and h e r existence can be described as true exlstence.

Climacus, here, brings i n two p o s s i b i l i t i e s of an individual

l i v i n g i n truth. One i s t h a t the individual i s i n t r u t h i f she knows

objectively the ethico-religious ideals. The other i s t h a t the i n d i v i -

dual i s said t o be i n t r u t h i f she relates herself to what she con-

siders to be the t r u t h and thus actualizes the t r u t h i n l i f e .

w e n the question about t r u t h i s asked objectively, t r u t h

i s reflected upon objectively as an object to which the
knower relates himself. What I s reflected upon Is not
the relation but t h a t what he relates himself to I s the
truth, the true. I f o r t h a t t o w h i c h h e relates him-
self i s the truth, the true, then the subject i s i n the
truth. When the question about t r u t h i s asked subjecti-
vely, the i n d i v i d u a l ' s relation i s reflected upon subjecti-
vely. I f only the how o f t h i s relation i s i n truth, the
individual i s i n t r u t h , even if he i n t h i s way were to
relate himself to untruth. 16

The point Climacus holds here I s that, when an individual makes

an objective inquiry, one attaches importance to what one says, where-

as, if one inquires subjectively, one places emphasis on = one

says what one says. He elucidates t h i s p o i n t b y means o f t h e example,

o f t h e knowledge o f Cod.

Objectively, what i s r e f l e c t e d upon i s t h a t t h i s i s t h e

t r u e Cod. Subjectively t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l relates him-
s e l f t o a something i n such a way t h a t h i s r e l a t i o n i s
i n t r u t h a ~od-relation."

Therefore, when t h e question o f t r u t h i s raised objectively, "what"

here r e f e r s t o t h e question whether t h e r e i s any such eternal t r u t h ,

God, as f a i t h a f f i r m s . To t h i s question, Climacus f e e l s t h a t t h e r e

can b e no answer at all; rather such a question should never be

asked. When t h i s question o f t r u t h i s r a i s e d s u b j e c t i v e l y , then it

w i l l be, "Is what my f a i t h a f f i r m s t r u e ? " Here, one a f f i r m s one's

f a i t h and hence one is in truth. Hence h e i s o f t h e v i e w t h a t an

individual i s t r u l y existing i n believing i t to b e so even i f it i s

not. The p o i n t o f t h e whole discussion o f t r u t h as s u b j e c t i v i t y i s

to recommend t h i s change of reference. Therefore, objectively the

interest i s focused on t h e thought content, b u t s u b j e c t i v e l y , on appro-

priation.

Climacus asks t h e question: "Now, on w h i c h side i s the

truth?"la He, however, suggests an a l t e r n a t i v e t o d r i v e home h i s

point.

Alas, must we n o t a t t h i s p o i n t r e s o r t t o mediation and

say: It i s on n e i t h e r side; it i s i n t h e medlation?19

He a f f i r m s that there i s no such mediation between o b j e c t i v i t y and

s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t r u t h because t r u t h l i e s i n t h e inwardness. The e x i s -

ting person who chooses the objective way alone approximates the'

knowledge o f Cod. A person who chooses the subjective way does

not want to waste time i n finding God objectively, but b y v i r t u e

of i n f i n i t e passion of inwardness t r i e s to strengthen h i s God-relation-

ship. Here, for the subjective thinker, God, indeed, becomes a

postulate (an assumption t h a t is considered to be true), for this

is the only way through which a person can enter into a relationship

w i t h Cod.

I f one, who l i v e s i n the midst o f Christianity, goes into

Cod's house... w i t h the true concept of God i n h i s - know-
ledge, and now prays, but prays i n untruth; and when
another l i v e s i n an heathen land but p r a y s w i t h the whole
passion o f i n f i n i t y , though h i s eyes r e s t on the image
of an i d o l : where i s there then the most t r u t h ? The
one prays i n t r u t h to Cod, though he worships an idol;
the other prays i n untruth to the true God and therefore
t r u l y worships an idol.*O

It is important to note here that Climacus b y no means

i s asserting any absurd thesis t h a t a false proposition such as 3+3

= 5 can b e made true i f an individual believes t h a t way. In such

cases the b e l i e f remains false, no matter however passionately one

believes i t . This i s because such claims have only objective v a l i d i t y .

Here, what i s spoken about i s a certain objective fact, while Cli-

macus' concern i s about existential truth, a knowledge through which

an individual makes l i f e meaningful.

An important question which Clirnacus raises here is: does

subjective t r u t h exclude objective t r u t h ? Climacus does not say t h a t

objective truth is unimportant or that the individual should not

,care whether t h e r e r e a l l y i s a God as w e l l as such a thing as immor-

tality. He r a t h e r argues t h a t t r u t h about such questions i s gained

not through detached theoretical inquiry, b u t through t h e process of

existing itself. Hence, p r o p e r o b j e c t i v e b e l i e f without s u b j e c t i v i t y

i s worthless, though s u b j e c t i v i t y without o b j e c t i v e b e l i e f s i s possible.

The e x i s t i n g person who chooses t h e o b j e c t i v e way enters

now into t h e whole approximating r e f l e c t i o n process, w h i c h
wishes to b r i n g God t o l i g h t o b j e c t i v e l y , w h i c h cannot
be achieved i n a l l e t e r n i t y , because God i s a subject,
and therefore i s only f o r s u b j e c t i v i t y i n i n ~ a r d n e s s . ~ '

i n t h i s connection, Climacus discusses t h e Socratic position,

distinguishing Socrates from Plato, and characterizing t h e former as

a philosopher who wanted t o e x i s t , w h i l e t h e l a t t e r as one who was

interested i n speculation. He writes:

The Socratic ignorance was thus t h e expression, f i r m l y

maintained w i t h a l l the passion o f inwardness, o f the re-
lation of t h e eternal t r u t h t o an e x i s t i n g person...22

Climacus compares Socrates to a g i r l who possesses t h e sweetness of

being i n love although w i t h a weak hope o f being l o v e d b y t h e be-

loved, because she staked h e r love on t h e weak hope. Hence, he

claims:

O b j e c t i v e l y t h e emphasis i s no what i s said; subjectively

t h e emphasis i s on how i t i s said-
 5. Passion as the Foundation o f Subjegivity

Climacus defines subiective t r u t h thus:

An objective uncertainity, h e l d fast through appropriation

w i t h t h e most passionate inwardness, i s t h e truth, the
highest t r u t h there i s f o r an existing person.14

The definition o f t r u t h stated above i s a paraphrasing o f faith, for

there is no f a i t h without risk. F a i t h i s the contradiction between

passion o f inwardness and objective certainty. Hence Climacus observes:

At the point where the road swings off, objective knowledge

i s suspended. Objectively he then has only uncertainty,
b u t t h i s i s precisely what intensifies the i n f i n i t e passion
of inwardness, and t r u t h i s p r e c i s e l y t h e daring venture
of choosing the objective uncertainty w i t h the passion of
the i n f i n i t e . 2 5

Climacus further elucidates this point by bringing i n the

apprehension of Cod. I f one were to apprehend God through reflec-

tion, one does not have faith; and because it i s not possible, one

must have f a i t h . Moreover, if one wants to be in faith, then, one

must h o l d on to objective uncertainty. He says: "... i n t h e objective

uncertainty I am 'out on 70,000 fathoms o f water' and s t i l l have faith.'Iz6

Passion i s t h e content o f inwardness f o r it i s passion which

provides t h e impetus to t h e e x i s t e r ' s l i f e . It i s t h e passion which

leads a person from reflection to action. I f t h e process o f redupli-

cation i s true, then i t follows t h a t t r u t h w i l l be a function o f passion,

as passion i s the source of a l l actions.

 In "The Interlude" of the Fragments, Climacus makes it clear

that even the approximative t r u t h (empirical o r probable t r u t h ) is

grounded i n s u b j e c t i v i t y to a certain extent. He holds that a l l ex-

isting events are contingent and that our cognition, therefore,' involves

uncertainty. For example, h i s t o r i c a l knowledge o r knowledge of mat-

ters of fact cannot be grounded p u r e l y on objective data, as it inclu-

des an element o f uncertainty which i s negated b y the historian o r

the e m p i r i c i s t b y clinging to a certain amount of belief. This k i n d

of faith, declares Climacus, is faith i n a "direct, ordinary" sense

as sgainst f a i t h i n the "eminent" sense, which i s d i s t i n c t l y religious.

The significance of personal passion in objective reflection i s to em-

phasize the point t h a t one should not take refuge i n objective reflec-

tion neglecting s u b j e c t i v i t y .

But, why is faith, or being subjectively i n the truth,

the highest t r u t h f o r the existing individual? Climacus gives two

reasons b y way of answer to t h i s question:

1. F i r s t of a l l , the "leap o f f a i t h " intensifies passion.

The objective uncertainty thrusts upon the individual
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to decide f o r o r against the eternal
truth. This becomes the supreme expression of the
i n d i v i d u a l ' s choice; and an individual who exists
i n such a state i s actually existing;

2. Secondly, t h i s brings the individual into r i g h t rela-

tionship w i t h truth.
 6. Can Subjective Truth Be Learnt?

I n chapter one of the Philosophical Fragments, Climacus

begins h i s project b y i n q u i r i n g i n t o t h e method o f acquiring t h e

knowledgge of essential li.e. eternal o r saving) truth. The p r o j e c t

i s to see whether t h e r e i s any a l t e r n a t i v e t o what h e c a l l s t h e So-

c r a t i c view o f t r u t h and how t h e t r u t h i s learnt. He c a l l s the So-

c r a t i c v i e w as "A" hypothesis, and t h e hypothesis w h i c h h e formu-

lates as "B" hypothesis.

According t o t h e Socratic view, i.e. 'A' hypothesis, t r u t h

i s a l r e a d y present w i t h i n each person so t h a t i t o n l y needs to be

recollected. Socrates i n t h e Meno c a l l s attention t o t h e "pugnacious

proposition" ( t r i c k y argument):

... a person cannot p o s s i b l y seek what h e knows, and

just as impossibly, he cannot seek what h e does not know,
for what h e knows h e cannot seek, since he knows It,
and what h e does not know he c a ~ n o tseek, because, a f t e r
all, h e does not even know what h e i s supposed to seek.27

Therefore, according to Socrates, every individual is t h e midpoint;

and the whole world focuses on h i m because h i s self-knowledge is

God-knowledge. Here, truth is not introduced from outside, b u t it

is immanent i n him. T r u t h i s t h e eternal possession o f t h e Soul.

It i s w i t h t h i s idea t h a t Socrates established t h e i m m o r t a l i t y of t h e

soul o r t h e pre-existence of t h e soul. Thus, it follows t h a t t h e tea-

cher has no significant role, f o r t h e teacher w i l l o n l y b e an occasion,

a midwife, who h e l p s t h e learner d i s c o v e r h e r t r u t h . Also, the mo-

m n t of r e a l i z i n g t h i s t r u t h has vanishing s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the reasob

t h a t t h e mment one acquires t h i s t r u t h , one i s a l s o m a r e o f the f a c t

t h a t one has not i n f a c t acquired it. b u t has always possessed it.

With these baselines, Cl imacus formulates an alternative

view, ' 0 ' hypothesis. according to which:

1. t h e learner lacks t h e truth;

2. i t i s brought t o h i m l h e r b y a teacher no less than

God, who b r i n g s t h e t r u t h as w e l l as p r o v i d e s the
learner w i t h the condition necessary t o perceive t h e
truth;

3. and t h a t such a moment i s a l l important as i t forms

t h e turning p o i n t i n t h e learner's l i f e .

The justification given by Climacus for t h e above points

i s w o r t h considering. The learner not merely lacks t h e essential t r u t h

as something w h i c h she may acquire a t a l a t e r stage, b u t h e r nature

i s such t h a t it i s impossible f o r h e r to acquire t h i s t r u t h b y h e r

own efforts, because b a s i c a l l y she i s i n e r r o r . How i s i t t h a t the

learner i s i n such a state? Climacus a t t r i b u t e s t h e learner's condi-

tion o f e r r o r to t h e learner himself f o r a t one p o i n t t h e learner must

have had the capacity t o understand t h e t r u t h . Otherwise, he would

have been merely an animal. The teacher gives h i m t h e t r u t h along w i t h

the a b i l i t y to understand it and makes h i m human f o r t h e f i r s t time.

Moreover, Climacus p o s i t s t h r e e possible reasons f o r t h e learner to

lack t h e p o t e n t i a l i t y to learn and thus b e i n e r r o r .

 1. E i t h e r Cod h i m s e l f took away such a capacity;

2. or, i t was lost through accidental circumstances;

3. or, i t was lost through t h e misuse o f freedom b y

t h e learner.

The f i r s t p o s s i b i l i t y i s rejected on t h e ground t h a t Cod,

being t h e incarnate o f goodness, can never do such a damage t o t h e

human b y destroying t h e humanness. The second p o s s i b i l i t y i s rejec-

ted on t h e ground t h a t t h e condition being i n t e g r a l l y l i n k e d w i t h any

human being cannot be l o s t through mere accident. Therefore, by

the process of elimination, only the t h i r d possibility, c.t h a t the

problem i s due to i n d i v i d u a l ' s misuse o f h i s own freedom, h o l d s good.

... he [ i n d i v i d u a l J h i m s e l f has f o r f e i t e d and i s f o r f e i t i n g

t h e condition. The teacher, then, i s t h e Cod himself,
who acting as t h e occasion, prompts t h e learner t o be
reminded t h a t h e i s u n t r u t h and i s t h a t through h i s own
fault. But t h i s state - t o b e u n t r u t h and to b e t h a t through
one's own f a u l t
,in 28
- what can we c a l l i t ? L e t us c a l l it

One can have a serious doubt here. If my loss o f condi-

tion i s due t o my own fault, then I must b e a b l e t o remedy t h e da-

mage too. Clirnacus defends h i s position b y explicating t h e charac-

t e r i s t i c s o f human freedom. Human beings do have freedom, but they

do not have freedom t o undo t h e freedom w h i c h they have mis-

used. He illustrates t h i s b y means o f an example. If a c h i l d who

has received the g i f t o f a l i t t l e money enough to be able to

buy e i t h e r a good book o r a toy, for b o t h cost t h e same - and

b u y s the toy, can h e use the same money to buy the book? By n o

means, f o r now the money has already been spent. But he may go

to the book-seller and ask h i m if he would exchange the book f o r

the toy. Suppose the book-seller answers: "My dear child, your

toy i s worthless; i t i s certainly true that when you s t i l l had the

money you could have bought the book just as well as toy, but

the awkward thing about a toy i s that once i t i s purchased, it has

lost a l l i t s value. This is very strange, indeed. In the same

way, a human being could e i t h e r buy freedom o r unfreedom f o r the

same price, the p r i c e being the free choice of the soul and the surren-

der of the choice.

Cl imacus justifies his second position that the teacher

i s no less than a God thus: i f the teacher must bring to the indi-

vidual the truth, as well as the condition f o r acquiring t h i s truth,

which amounts to a radical transformation of the individual, then

i t i s impossible f o r any human to do t h i s . It must be done b y God

himself.

But the one who not only gives the learner the t r u t h
b u t provides the condition i s not a teacher... [ h e ] trans-
forms b u t not reforms the learner... no human being i s
capable o f this; i f i t i s to take place, it must be done
b y the God himself.29

Primarily, a teacher serves as "an occasion" f o r the lear-

ner t o know that he i s i n untruth. This i s similar to the Socratic

view which says t h a t a teacher i s merely an occasion f o r a learner

to recollect the truth. Climacus finds the Socratic p r i n c i p l e necessary

here, because the individual is unaware o f h i s natural state, i.e.

untruth; though he i s reminded, y e t h e has t o discover it b y him-

self. I n t h e words o f Climacus:

I can d i s c o v e r me only b y myself, because o n l y when I

discover it, i s It discovered, not before, even though
t h e whole w o r l d knew it. 30

Since a teacher also provides him w i t h t h e condition f o r

understanding this truth, Climacus calls such a teacher, who gives

th'e condition and the truth, a saviour, for he does, indeed, save

the learner from u n t r u t h and lead h i m from unfreedom t o freedom.

He i s also c a l l e d t h e d e l i v e r e r f o r h e d e l i v e r s t h e person, who h a d

imprisoned himself, from u n t r u t h t o t r u t h . A t r a n s i t i o n takes place

in t h e learner. T h i s t r a n s i t i o n Climacus c a l l s "rebirth," which is

different from baptism, for individuals can be baptized en masse,

but not r e b o r n en masse. Such a being who i s reborn owes nothing

to human, b u t e v e r y t h i n g to God.

Coming t o the third position, Clirnacus says t h a t the So-

cratic teacher has only a vanishing significance because h e serves

only as a m i d w i f e who h e l p s t h e learner t o d i s c o v e r t h e t r u t h which

i s Immanent i n himself. But w i t h regard t o "BU hypothesis, t h e situe-

tion i s d i f f e r e n t since t h e learner w i l l never b e able t o forget such

a teacher who transforms the learner. Climacus gives an important

reason for such a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h . t h e teacher. He t h i n k s t h a t t h e

learner does not acquire t h e condition t o understand t h e t r u t h once

and for all, b u t acquires i t b y continuous relationship with

Cod. Now, t h i s event i n time has a d e c i s i v e significance, for at nd

moment t h e learner w i l l forget t h i s fact. Thus, the moment of reve-

lation o f t r u t h acquires significance. Though t h e learner i s i n truth,

nevertheless he i s a human; and a f t e r he receives t h e condition as

w e l l as t h e truth, he becomes a new person. But a f t e r becoming a

new person, he just does not forget h i s e a r l i e r state. However, the

individual takes leave o f h i s earlier state, i.e. untruth, b y being

sorrowful o f h i s existence, w h i c h Ci imacus cal I s repentance.

... f o r what else i s repentance, w h i c h does indeed look

back, b u t nevertheless i n such a way t h a t p r e ' r e l y there-
b y it quickens i t s pace toward what l i e s ahead. 9

F o r Climacus, existential t r u t h lies i n the individual's r i g h t

r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e t r u t h r a t h e r than t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s mere acquisition

of r i g h t t r u t h . But, one may ask: i s an i n d i v i d u a l capable of being i n

such a t r u t h through h i s own e f f o r t ? I t i s h e r e t h e C h r i s t i a n pers-

p e c t i v e d i f f e r s from others w h i c h c l a i m t h a t t r u t h i s immanent i n t h e

person.

Therefore s u b j e c t i v i t y , inwardness, i s t h e truth; can t h e r e

now be given a more i n w a r d expression f o r t h i s ? Yes, i f t h e
statement "Subjectivity, inwardness t h e t r u t h " begins
l i k e t h i s : U S u b j e c t i v i t y i s untruth." j2is

However, the Christian view r e q u i r e s b o t h t h e statements.

Climacus says t h a t t h e h i g h e r expression o f s u b j e c t i v i t y i s t h a t t r u t h

begins b y considering s u b j e c t i v i t y as untruth. T h i s i s because Chris-

tianity always demands transcendence from human self-sufficiency.

'It i s t h i s which secures Christianity from any k i n d o f category reduc-.

tion.

Climacus' discussion o f s u b j e c t i v i t y as t r u t h rests on the

commentary on John 14.6: "1 am the way, the truth, and the l i f e ...It

Jesus not merely claims t o b r i n g the t r u t h t o men, b u t also t o be

the truth. i n the words of Stephen Evans:

I f we may, f o r a moment, go behind the pseudonym, i t

i s a t least v e r y probable that Kierkegaard's own reason
f o r having Climacus discuss t h i s issue bears on Christ's
statement i n John. 33

It is this idea i n C h r i s t i a n i t y which i s d i f f e r e n t from what other

religions h o l d and which attracted Kierkegaard the most.