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Contents
2.0 Objectives
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Life and Works
2.3 Early Wittgenstein
2.4 Picture Theory of Meaning
2.5 Wittgenstein’s Silence
2.6 Later Wittgenstein
2.7 Tool-Use Model of Language
2.8 Language Games
2.9 Rule Following
2.10 Private Language
2.11 Family Resemblance
2.12 Stream of Life
2.13 Let Us Sum Up
2.14 Key Words
2.15 Further Readings and References
2.16 Answers to Check Your Progress
2.0 OBJECTIVES
The objective of this Unit is to introduce Ludwig Wittgenstein, the leading figure
of twentieth century analytic and linguistic philosophy. By the end of this Unit you
should be able:
to have a basic knowledge of the life and works of Wittgenstein;
to have a critical view of his earlier philosophy as propounded in the Tractatus;
to understand the key concepts as given in the Philosophical Investigations;
to have a critical understanding of his earlier and later thoughts on philosophy
and philosophizing.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Contemporary Western Philosophy is characterised by a logical and linguistic turn
and Ludwig Wittgenstein played a significant role in the development of various
contemporary philosophical traditions like Analytic Philosophy, Logical Positivism,
16 and Ordinary Language Philosophy. He continues to influence the Hermeneutic
and Postmodern trends in philosophy today. His works are immensely challenging, Wittgenstein
2.3 EARLYWITTGENSTEIN
Coming out of the Notebooks, written in 1914-16, and showing Schopenhauerian
and other cultural influences, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is a continuation
of and reaction to Frege and Russell’s conceptions of logic and language. Despite
their differences in style and content, they share the goals of (1) repudiating
traditional metaphysics, (2) reducing language to a series of elementary propositions
that would represent facts, and (3) developing a theory of language that would
establish the boundaries of meaning. Running less than eighty pages in length,
Tractatus consists of a series of short, numbered statements and its structure
purports to show its internal essence. It is constructed around seven basic
propositions, numbered by the natural numbers 1-7, with the rest of the text
numbered by decimal figures as numbers of separate propositions indicating the
logical importance of the propositions. For example, 1.1 is a comment on
proposition 1, 1.22 is a comment on 1.2, and so on. The last part of the book
is characterised by oracular and mystical utterances. Wittgenstein was setting the
limits of thought and language, in this work. He holds that whatever can be
thought can be spoken, and the limits of thought can be set out by determining
the limits of language which in turn gives us the limits of what can be said with
sense. The book can be summed up, in his words: ‘What can be said at all can
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be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent’ (T Wittgenstein
Preface).
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Wittgenstein
Check Your Progress I
Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.
b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.
1) What is philosophy according to Tractatus?
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2) How does Wittgenstein interpret ethical and spiritual values?
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2.8 LANGUAGE-GAMES
In order to address the variety of language uses, and their being ‘part of an
activity’, Wittgenstein introduces an investigational tool, ‘language-game’.
Wittgenstein’s choice of ‘game’ is based on the over-all analogy between language
and game. As he was watching a game, he thought that in language we are playing
with words. Wittgenstein asks the following question concerning games: ‘What
is common to them all?—Don’t say: “There must be something common, or they
would not be called ‘games’—but look and see whether there is anything common
to all.—For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all,
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but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that’ (PI 66). Similar
to the diversity of games, our multiple ways of language use do not conform to Wittgenstein
2.9 RULE-FOLLOWING
The analogy of language-game also points to the fact that both language and
games are rule-governed activity. Like games, language has constitutive rules; they
determine what is normative in a language/game. A rule is not an abstract entity,
transcending all of its particular applications; knowing the rule is not grasping that
abstract entity and thereby knowing how to use it. Wittgenstein begins his exposition
with an example: ‘… we get [a] pupil to continue a series (say + 2) beyond 1000
— and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012’ (PI 185). The teacher corrects his 23
Analytical Philosophy mistakes explaining that he is not doing rightly. According to the pupil, however,
he continued in the same way. The pupil exhibited how he grasped the rule, and
what he wrote was in accord with his understanding. Wittgenstein proceeds further
to clarify how rule following is fundamental to language game. His investigations
free one from the bewitchment of Platonic, Augustinian and Cartesian picture of
language use. He wants to show that we need not posit any sort of external or
internal authority beyond the actual applications of the rule. These considerations
lead to PI 201, often considered the climax of the issue: ‘This was our paradox:
no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of
action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything
can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict
with it.And so there would be neither accord nor conflict.’Wittgenstein’s formulation
of the problem was wrongly interpreted as a sceptical problem concerning meaning,
understanding and using of a language.
According to Wittgenstein, ‘‘Obeying a rule’ is a practice’ (PI 202) and involves
objectivity, regularity and normativity. First of all, rule-following is something that
an agent actually does, not merely something that seems so to the agent. It is only
in the actual use of a rule, that is, in the actual practice, a rule is revealed,
understood and followed. Secondly, rule-following is a repeatable procedure. It
is repeatable over time and across persons. It can be taught and learned. Thirdly,
there is normativity; meaning, regularity is subject to standards of correctness. The
distinction between is and ought is kept; there is a correct way of following a rule.
Rule-following actions are not just regularities of behaviour but regularities that
have normative force, ways one ought to act. ‘Following a rule is analogous to
obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular
way’ (PI 206). As a practice there is no gap between a rule and an action
following a rule; they are distinct but inseparable.
sensation, one presupposes what needs establishing: that there was such an
independent correlation to be remembered. Fallibility of memory, even of memory
of meaning, is neither here nor there: there has to be the right sort of occurrence
in the first place to be a candidate for being remembered; and if there is not, no
memory is going to create it. If, alternatively, we do not suppose that there is
something to be remembered which is independent of the memory, then ‘what
seems right to me is right’, that is, there is nothing right or wrong about it. It is
impossible, thus, for a private linguist to establish and maintain a rule for the use
of an expression. Only operating in a world independent of one’s impressions of
it, in which one’s operations are in principle available for normative criteria, can
there be correlations of signs with objects and consistency in the usage of those
signs. The nature of mental phenomena is grasped not by introspection but by
examining ‘language and the actions into which it is woven’, an objective and
normative practice of using words: with pain, this involves crying, complaining,
comforting, administering analgesics and so on (PI 7).
Wittgenstein has, thus, shown that if sensations are metaphysically (only I can
have it) and epistemologically (only I know it) private, one cannot have a language
about sensations. A language in principle unintelligible to anyone but its user would
necessarily be unintelligible to the user also, because no meanings could be
established for its signs. The proposed language is not a useful language; for
words can only be correctly or incorrectly applied if there are objective criteria
for using them correctly. Rules of grammar determine whether a particular language
use is correct or not. Private linguist cannot build up grammar for a private
language. The signs in language can only function when there is a possibility of
judging the correctness of their use, ‘so the use of [a] word stands in need of a
justification which everybody understands’ (PI 261). Even apparently the most
self-guaranteeing of all sensations, pain, derives its identity only from a sharable
practice of expression, reaction and use of language. Agreement in human behaviour
is fundamental to language use. The common behaviour of human beings and the
very general facts of nature make particular concepts and customs, including
those about sensations, possible and useful. Like any practice, language use must
have objective and normative standards.
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