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COMELEC, then, issued Resolution No. 07-0407, maintaining the status quo with
SEMA vs. COMELEC Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao. It provides:

Facts: The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two

Considering the foregoing, the Commission resolved, as it hereby
legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao.
resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department that
pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain
The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.
the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM),
Legislative District of Maguindanao.
which was created under its Organic Act, R.A. No. 6734, as amended by R.A. No.
9054.
Subsequently, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, which is the subject of
these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407, by renaming the legislative
Having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in a plebiscite held in November
district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly
1989, Cotabato City no longer forms part of the ARMM, even though under the
First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).
Ordinance Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district.
However, in preparation for the May 2007 elections, COMELEC promulgated
Subsequently, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising
Resolution No. 7845, stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is
its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted the
composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act No. 201.
Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201, creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Sema, who was running for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato
It provides:
City in the May 2007 elections, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution
No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for
The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan,
that office. She contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative
Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby
in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC
distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902.
as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contended that:
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11.
(1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC
Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second
Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the
legislative district. However, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district,
exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power; and
Cotabato City is no longer part of the Province of Maguindanao. The voters of
(2) Sema’s prayer for the writ of prohibition became moot with the
Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan creation in a plebiscite held on 2006.
proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen as representative of
the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City.
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Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning the assailed

resolution because in her certificate of candidacy, Sema indicated that she was SARANGANI vs. COMELEC
seeking election as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City.
Respondent Dilangalen added that the assailed resolution is constitutional
Facts: After a petition for annulment of several precincts and book of voters in
because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan, or
Madalum, Lanao del Sur was filed with COMELEC, of then incumbent mayor of
reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao. As it merely renamed
Madalum, Usman Sarangani, filed an “Answer in Opposition” claiming that
Maguindanao’s first legislative district. Dilangalen further claimed that COMELEC
abolishing the questioned election precincts was only for the purpose of
could not reapportion Maguindanao’s first legislative district to make Cotabato City
diminishing his bailiwicks in Lanao del Sur.
its sole component unit, as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies
exclusively with Congress. Also, that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum
Thus, COMELEC issued an order for appropriate investigation, directing Atty.
population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the
Muslemin Tahir, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marawi City, to conduct a
creation of a legislative district within a city.
rigorous incisive investigation on the alleged “ghost precincts”. Thus, a Task Force
Investigation Team directing Election Officers to conduct ocular inspection on the
Issue: W/N the ARMM Regional Assembly can create the Province of Shariff
alleged twelve (12) ghost barangays in Madalum was created.
Kabunsuan.

Upon inspection, it was found that Barangay Padian-Torogan only had two
Held: NO. The Supreme Court reiterated that nothing in the Constitution
structures: a concrete house with no roof, and a wooden structure without walls
authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion
and roof. Added to that, while they were at the peak of the inspection in another
legislative districts for Congress.
Barangay, Barangay Rakutan, the Madalum Chief of Police, armed with UZI
pistolized machine guns, who arrived boarding an orange Mitsubishi car with four
Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces
armed bodyguards, angrily insisted to stop the inspection.
and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only
Congress can exercise under the Constitution and the Ordinance appended to the
Through the inspection, it was concluded that both Barangays were both inhabited.
Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a
Through this, the COMELEC issued an order finding Barangays Padian Torogan
legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall
and Rakutan both as ghost precincts. Thus, having now former Municipal Mayor
have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact
Usman Sarangani, incumbent Mayor Soraida Sarangani, and Vice-Mayor Hadji
a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress
Nor Hassan, file a petition for certiorari and mandamus urging to nullify the order
because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only
issued by COMELEC for grave abuse of discretion. Thus, this petition.
within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in the Constitution.
Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership,
Issue: W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian
or in its incumbent membership, through the creation of legislative districts must
Torogan as a ghost precinct.
be embodied in a national law, and only Congress can enact such a law. It would
be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion
Held: YES. The Supreme Court clarified that it was erroneous for the COMELEC
legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative
to consider Padian Torogan as a ghost precinct.
body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the
superior legislative body.

The petition only states that precinct No. 27A, which is located in Barangay Padian
Torogan, was the only one declared as a ghost precinct by the COMELEC. But,
the assailed order did not mention any specific precinct as it only declared
Barangay Padian Torogan as such. Also, it must be noted that the determination
of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not, or whether voters in
said precincts are real voters, is a factual matter. To reiterate, it is not impossible
for a certain Barangay to not have inhabitants simply because people migrate. A
Barangay may officially exist on record, and the fact that nobody resides in such
Barangay, does not result in its automatic cessation as a local government unit.
The abolition of a local government unit may be done by Congress in the case of
a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision. While in case of a
barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may
be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglungsod
concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite conducted for the
purpose in the political units affected. Thus, the petition is hereby dismissed.
PADILLA vs. COMELEC
Facts: Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
2312 which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991
creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines
Norte to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio,
Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and
Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.
In the plebiscite held throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored
its creation while 3,439 voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-
Lupa. The day after, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and
disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.
Petitioner, the Governor of Camarines Norte, sought to set aside the plebiscite
conducted and prayed that a new plebiscite be undertaken. Padilla contended that
it was invalid because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No.
2312, should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected.
Petitioner stressed that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area
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of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo. Further, the petitioner argued that
with the approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution, particularly Article X,
Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v. COMELEC, which was relied on by
COMELEC, is now passé. Thus, reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive
Secretary, which held that where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit,
only the voters of the unit to be segregated should be included in the plebiscite.
Issue: W/N the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality
of Labo is valid.
Held: YES. The Supreme Court stated that when the law states that the plebiscite
shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents
of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation have
a right to vote in said plebiscite.
Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is
the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically,
those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays
of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
TOBIAS vs. ABALOS
Facts: The petitioners in this case assailed the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7675,
otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong
and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April
10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the
conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
provided under R.A. No. 7675. However, he turnout at the plebiscite was only
14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas
7,911 voted "no."
By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Thus, the petitioners contend on the following:
(1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 contravenes from the "one
subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects
in the bill namely:
a. The conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and
b. The division of the congressional district of San Juan or
Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional
districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase
in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided
in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
(3) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution
stating that “within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on
the standard provided in this section. The said division was not made
pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have
attained the minimum population requirements.
(4) That the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their
legislative district.
Thus, this petition.
Issue: W/N R.A. No. 7675 is unconstitutional.
Held: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of
the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution, stating that each city
with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative".
Contrary to the assertion of the petitioners, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from
the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, but is a natural and logical
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. As to the contention
that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as
set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the
phrase "unless otherwise provided by law."
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As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right
of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which
drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49
thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Also, petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to
participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in
their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject
involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary
thereto.
Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite
as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
TATEL vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC
Facts: The residents of Barrio Sta. Elena complained of the disturbance caused
by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of herein
petitioner. It was stated that it affected the peace and tranquility of the
neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the said
machine.
Thus, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate
the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with
narrow roads and the surroundings residential houses, so much so that an
accidental fire within the warehouse of petitioner occasioned by a continuance of
the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created
a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood.
Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal Council of Virac, declaring
the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the
purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. Respondent municipal officials
contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No.
13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of
houses either in the Poblacion or Barrios without maintaining the necessary
distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and
properties by accidental fire.

But the petitioner contended that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the
due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for
not having been passed in accordance with law.
Issue: W/N Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is
unconstitutional and void.
Held: NO. The Supreme Court reiterated that Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952,
was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power.
It is settled in law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the
promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such, are endowed
with police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared
objects of their creation.
Added to that, for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law. Also, it must be in consonance with certain well
established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require
that a municipal ordinance:
(1) Must not contravene the Constitution or any statue;
(2) Must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) Must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) Must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) Must not be unreasonable.
And Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952 meets all these criteria.
The purpose of the assailed Ordinance is well within the objectives of sound
government. No undue restraint is placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to
engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the
warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people
residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better
policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government.
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MASIKIP vs. CITY OF PASIG
Facts: Petitioner Lourdes dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of the disputed
parcel of land which the City of Pasig wants to expropriate to be used for the sports
development and recreational activities of the residents of Barangay Caniogan
pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993.
The Respondent wrote another letter to the petitioner, in line with the program of
the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors
of our community. But, Masikip replied stating that the intended expropriation of
her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is
neither sufficient nor suitable. The City of Pasig filed a complaint for expropriation
with the trial court, and prayed to issue an order for the condemnation of the
property, that commissioners be appointed to determine just compensation, and
that judgment be rendered based on the reports of the commissioners. Masikip
filed a motion to dismiss such, but the trial court, however, denied on the ground
that there is genuine necessity to expropriate. Masikip filed a motion for
reconsideration, but was denied as well. Thus, this petition.
Issue: W/N there was genuine necessity to expropriate the property.
Held: NO. The Supreme Court reiterated that it is the power of the State or its
instrumentalities to take private property for public use and is inseparable from
sovereignty and inherent in government. This power is lodged in the legislative
branch of government. It delegates the power thereof to the LGUs, other public
entities and public utility corporations, subject only to constitutional limitations.
LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when
expressly authorized by statute.
Sec. 19 of the Local Government Code states that a LGU may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
domain for public use, purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and landless,
upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
and pertinent laws. Provided:
(1) Power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner and such offer was
not accepted;
(2) LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
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court of at least 15% fair market value of the property based on the current
tax declaration; and
(3) Amount to be paid for expropriated property shall be determined by the
proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of
the property.

Added to that, there is already an established sports development and recreational

activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City.

Thus, there is no “genuine necessity” to justify the expropriation. The records also
show that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council which
became the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 4, authorizing the
expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound
Homeowner’s Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan.