AGRITO, CHARLENE L.

2-B
NAT RES

CHAVEZ VS. NHA

Facts:
Former Solicitor General Frank Chavez filed a case against BHA for
prohibition to enjoin the NHA from implementing the Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA) entered into by NHA with R-II Builders for the
reclamation and development of the Smokey Mountain area in Tondo.
Chavez imputes certain constitutional infirmities against the JVA, for
instance that the NHA had no authority to order reclamation, the DENR’s
approval was not secured. Chavez also filed for Mandamus for the
disclosure of papers and documents related to the project.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prohibition is proper

RULING:
No. It was not shown that the NHA exercises quasi-judicial or
judicial functions I relation to the project. It must be noted that under the
ROC, among the entities mentioned are quasi-judicial or judicial agencies.

It was not shown that there is no plain, adequate or speedy remedy in

the ordinary course of law. It appears that Chavez could have filed
administrative remedies against the NHA.

Lastly, prohibition does not lie against acts which are already fait
accompli. Note that the project has already been partially completed.
 GMMSWM VS. JANCOM

FACTS:
After bidding for a waste management project with the MMDA,
JANCOM won a contract for the MMDA’s San Mateo waste management
project. A BOT contract for the waste to energy project was signed on
December 19, 1997, between JANCOM and the Philippine Government,
represented by the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management
through DENR Secretary Victor Ramos, CORD-NCR chair Dionisio dela
Serna, and MMDA chair Prospero Oreta.

The contract, however, was never signed by President Ramos as it was

too close to the end of his term. He endorsed it to President Estrada, but
Estrada refused to sign it due to the passage of RA 8749, or the Clean Air
Act of 1999 and the clamor of San Mateo residents for the closure of the
dumpsite.

When the MMDA published another call for proposals for solid waste
management projects for Metro Manila, JANCOM filed a petition with the
Pasig RTC asking the court to declare as void the resolution of the Greater
Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding the
BOT contract with JANCOM, and the call for bids for a new waste
management contract.

On May 29, 2000, the lower court decided in favor of JANCOM.

Instead of appealing, the MMDA filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and a TRO. When the CA dismissed the petition, the MMDA
went to the Supreme Court, arguing that the contract with JANCOM was
not binding because it was not signed by the President, the conditions
precedent to the contract were not complied with, and there was no valid
notice of award.

The Supreme Court ruled that MMDA should have filed a motion for
appeal instead of for certiorari, because a certiorari would only apply in
cases where there was grave abuse of jurisdiction, something which the
petition did not allege. Correction may be obtained only by an appeal from
the final decision. Since the decision was not appeal, the Court said it has
become final and “gone beyond the reach of any court to modify in any
substantive aspect.”
 Though saying it was unnecessary to discuss the substantive issues,
the court took it up just the same, “if only to put the petitioner’s mind to
rest.” The contract with Jancom is valid, citing Article 1305, 1315 and 1319
of the Civil Code.

In asserting that there was no valid and binding contract, MMDA can
only allege that there was no valid notice of award; the contract does not
bear the signature of the President; the conditions precedent specified in
the contract were not complied with.

ISSUE:
Whether there was a perfected contract between the government and
JANCOM.

RULING:
The Court of Appeals did not err when it declared the existence of a
valid and perfected contract between the Republic of the Philippines and
JANCOM. The MMDA cannot revoke or renounce the same without the
consent of the other. Although the contract is a perfected one, it is still
ineffective or unimplementable until and unless it is approved by the
President.
 HENARES VS. LTFRB

FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus
commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before
us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to
use CNG as alternative fuel?

RULING:
(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring
their case before this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a party's
standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the
exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of
the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the
principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if
these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

(2) NO. Plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by

petitioners, a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require
PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the
doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law
that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of
motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one
branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by
herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
 SJS V ATIENZA

FACTS:
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following day.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial
to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
These were the Pandacan oil depots of Shell and Caltex.

But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only
scaled down the property covered by the depots and did not stop their
operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU
was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. It was
extended to 2003.

Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement

Ordinance 8027. Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has
been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the MOU was
more of a guideline to 8027.

ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it
can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027

RULING:
Yes to both, Petition granted.

Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be filed
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station. The petitioner should have a well-
defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it
must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required
to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance
with a duty, which is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists.
Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.
When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to
compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the
laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not show any
specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of manila and thus have a direct
interest in the ordinances.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon

respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is Ordinance No. 8027.
As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by
the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an

alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is
obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these
officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of
statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not
judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from
the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.

Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with

Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding
on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April
30, 2003.