Case Title: People vs Wong Cheng, 46
Phil 729
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code
Facts: The appellant, in representation of the
Attorney General, filed an appeal that urges
the revocation of a demurrer sustained by the
Court of First Instance of Manila presented
by the defendant. The defendant, accused of
having illegally smoked opium aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while the said vessel was
anchored in Manila Bay, two and a half miles
from the shores of the city. In the said
demurrer, the defendant contended the lack
of jurisdiction of the lower court of the said
crime, which resulted to the dismissal of the
case.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts
have jurisdiction over the crime committed
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our
jurisdictional waters.
Held: Yes. The crime in the case at bar was
committed in our internal waters thus the
Philippine courts have a right of jurisdiction
over the said offense. The Court said that
having the opium smoked within our
territorial waters even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship is a breach of the
public order because it causes such drugs to
produce pernicious effects within our
territory. Therefore, the demurrer is revoked
and the Court ordered further proceedings.
Case Title: US vs Look Chow, 18 Phil 573
Subject Matter: Applicability of the
provisions of Art 2 of the Revised Penal
Code
Facts: Between 11 and 12 o'clock a.m. in
August 19, 1909, the Port of Cebu and
internal revenue agent of Cebu, respectively,
went aboard the steamship Erroll to inspect
and search its cargo, and found two sacks
containing opium. The defendant stated
freely and voluntarily that he had bought
these sacks of opium in Hong Kong with the
intention of selling them as contraband in
Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that as his hold had
already been searched several times for
opium he ordered two other chinamen to
keep the sack. All the evidence found
properly constitutes corpus delicti.
It was established that the steamship Erroll
was of English nationality, that it came from
Hong Kong, and that it was bound for
Mexico, via the call ports in Manila and Cebu.
Issue: Whether or not courts of local state
can exercise its jurisdiction over foreign
vessels stationed in its port.
Held: Yes. The Philippine courts have
jurisdiction over the matter. The mere
possession of a thing of prohibited use in
these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in
transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a
general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of this country, on account of such
vessel being considered as an extension of
its own nationality. However, the same rule
does not apply when the article, whose use
is prohibited within the Philippines, in the
present case, a can of opium, is landed from
the vessel upon the Philippine soil, thus
committing an open violation of the penal law
in force at the place of the commission of the
crime. Only the court established in the said
place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the
absence of an agreement under an
international treaty.
Case Title: US vs Ah Sing, 36 Phil 978
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of
the Revised Penal Code
Facts: Ah Sing is a fireman at the steamship
Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which arrived
in the port of Cebu from Saigon. He bought 8
cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on
board and had them in his possession during
the said trip. The 8 cans of opium were found
in the ashes below the boiler of the steamer's
engine by authorities who made a search
upon anchoring on the port of Cebu. The
defendant confessed that he was the owner
of the opium and that he had purchased it in
Saigon. He dis not confess, however, as to
his purpose in buying the opium. He did not
say that it was his intention to import the
prohibited drug.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of illegal
importation of opium into the Philippine
Islands is criminally liable in the Philippines.
Held: Yes. As stated in the Opium Law, we
expressly hold that any person who
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
prohibited drug is found under this person's
control on a vessel which has come direct
from a foreign country and is within the
jurisdiction limits of the Philippines, is guilty
of the crime of illegal importation of opium,
unless contrary circumstances exist or the
defense proves otherwise.
Padilla V. Dizon
Facts: This is an administrative complaint,
dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then
Commissioner of Customs, Alexander
Padilla, against respondent Baltazar R.
Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City,
for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision
due, at the very least, to gross incompetence
and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal
Case No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting
said accused of the offense charged, i.e.,
smuggling of foreign currency out of the
country.
The case in which the respondent rendered
a decision of acquittal involved a tourist, Lo
Chi Fai, who was caught by a Customs guard
at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and
foreign exchange instruments out of the
country. Lo Chi Fai, was apprehended by a
customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers
on July 9, 1986, while on board Flight PR 300
of the Philippine Air Lines bound for
Hongkong. At the time of his apprehension,
he was found carrying with him foreign
currency and foreign exchange instruments
(380 pieces) amounting to US$ 355,349.57,
in various currency denominations, to wit:
Japanese Yen, Swiss Franc, Australian
Dollar, Singapore Dollar, HFL Guilder,
French Franc, U.S. Dollar, English Pound,
Malaysian Dollar, Deutsche Mark, Canadian
Dollar and Hongkong Dollar, without any
authority as provided by law. At the time the
accused was apprehended, he was able to
exhibit two currency declarations which he
was supposed to have accomplished upon
his arrival in Manila in previous trips, namely,
CB Currency Declaration No. 05048, dated
May 4, 1986 for US$39,600.00 and
Japanese Yen 4,000,000.00, and CB
Currency Declaration No. 06346, dated June
29, 1986 for Japanese Yen 6,600,000.00.
The case, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 86-10126-P, was subsequently
raffled to Branch 113, presided by herein
respondent Judge Baltazar A. Dizon.
Section 6 of Circular No. 960 of the Central
Bank provides as follows:
Sec. 6. Export, import of foreign exchange;
exceptions. — No person shall take out or
transmit or attempt to take out or transmit
foreign exchange in any form, out of the
Philippines directly, through other persons,
through the mails or through international
carriers except when specifically authorized
by the Central Bank or allowed under existing
international agreements or Central Bank
regulations.
Tourists and non-resident visitors may take
out or send out from the Philippine foreign
exchange in amounts not exceeding such
amounts of foreign exchange brought in by
them. For purposes of establishing the
amount of foreign exchange brought in or out
of the Philippines, tourists and non-resident
temporary visitors bringing with them more
than US$3,000.00 or its equivalent in other
foreign currencies shall declare their foreign
exchange in the form prescribed by the
Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival
in the Philippines.
The penal sanction is provided by Section 1,
P.D. No. 1883, which reads as follows:
Section 1. Blackmarketing of Foreign
Exchange .— That any person who shall
engage in the trading or purchase and sale
of foreign currency in violation of existing
laws or rules and regulations of the Central
Bank shall be guilty of the crime of
blackmarketing of foreign exchange and
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal,
(minimum of 12 years and I day and
maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no less
than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent judge
is guilty of gross incompetence or gross
ignorance of the law in rendering the decision
in question.
Held: The respondent-judge has shown
gross incompetence or gross ignorance of
the law in holding that to convict the accused
for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960,
the prosecution must establish that the
accused had the criminal intent to violate the
law. The respondent ought to know that proof
of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is
not essential in offenses punished by special
laws, which are mala prohibita. In requiring
proof of malice, the respondent has by his
gross ignorance allowed the accused to go
scot free. The accused at the time of his
apprehension at the Manila International
Airport had in his possession the amount of
US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign
currencies and foreign exchange
instruments (380 pieces), without any
specific authority from the Central Bank as
required by law. At the time of his
apprehension, he was able to exhibit only
two foreign currency declarations in his
possession. These were old declarations
made by him on the occasion of his previous
trips to the Philippines.
Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent
Regional Trial Court Judge, Baltazar R.
Dizon, guilty of gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law and grave and serious
misconduct affecting his integrity and
efficiency, and consistent with the
responsibility of this Court for the just and
proper administration of justice and for the
attainment of the objective of maintaining the
people's faith in the judiciary (People vs.
Valenzuela, 135 SCRA 712), it is hereby
ordered that the Respondent Judge be
DISMISSED from the service. All leave and
retirement benefits and privileges to which he
may be entitled are hereby forfeited with
prejudice to his being reinstated in any
branch of government service, including
government-owned and/or controlled
agencies or corporations.
This resolution is immediately executory. SO
ORDERED.
People vs. Oanis July 27, 1943 (74 Phil
257)
FACTS: Antonio Oanis and Alberto Galanta
were instructed to arrest a notorious criminal
and escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, and
if overpowered, to get him dead or alive.
They went to the suspected house then
proceeded to the room where they saw the
supposedly Balagtas sleeping with his back
towards the door. Oanis and Galanta
simultaneously or successively fired at him
which resulted to the victim’s death. The
supposedly Balagtas turned out to be
Serepio Tecson, an innocent man.
ISSUE: 1. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no
liability due to innocent mistake of fact in the
honest performance of their official duties.
2. WON Oanis and Galanta incur no criminal
liability in the performance of their duty.
HELD:1. No. Innocent mistake of fact does
not apply to the case at bar. “Ignorance facti
excusat” applies only when the mistake is
committed without fault or carelessness. The
fact that the supposedly suspect was
sleeping, Oanis and Galanta could have
checked whether it is the real Balagtas.
2. No. Oanis and Galanta are criminally
liable. A person incurs no criminal liability
when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office. There
are 2 requisites to justify this: (1) the offender
acted in teh perfomance of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office, (2) that the
injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or
office. In this case,
Ah Chong 15 Phil. 488
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.
Lesson: mistake of fact, definition of
felony
Laws: Article 1 RPC, Art 3 RPC
FACTS:
• August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong,
a cook was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room. He
sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is
there?" He heard no answer and was
convinced by the noise at the door that it was
being pushed open by someone bent upon
forcing his way into the room. The
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called
out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At
that moment he was struck just above the
knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be
an unlawful aggression) which had been
placed against the door. Seizing a common
kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow,
the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder
who, it afterwards turned out, was his
roommate, Pascual who is a house boy or
muchacho who in the spirit of mischief was
playing a trick on him
• Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he
called to his employers and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual's wounds.
• There had been several robberies not long
prior to the date of the incident, one of which
took place in a house where he was
employed as cook so he kept a knife under
his pillow for his personal protection.
• trial court held it as simple homicide
ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a
mistake as to the facts, does an act for which
he would be exempt from criminal liability if
the facts were as he supposed them to be,
but which would constitute the crime of
homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time
when he committed the act.
HELD: trial court should be reversed, and
the defendant acquitted of the crime
NO.
• GR: acts constituting the crime or offense
must be committed with malice or with
criminal intent in order that the actor may be
held criminally liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from
liability under one or other of the express
provisions of article 8 of the code
• Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code is as
follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts
and ommissions punished by law.
o A person voluntarily committing a crime
or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability,
even though the wrongful act committed be
different from that which he had intended to
commit.
o voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and
intentional act
o "malice" signifying the intent
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea -
"the act itself does not make man guilty
unless his intention were so
o “ Actus me incito factus non est meus
actus” - an act done by me against my will is
not my act
• GR: courts have recognized the power of
the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of
cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make
their commission criminal WITHOUT regard
to the intent of the doer
• EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the
commission of certain acts criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer is clear and
beyond question the statute will not be so
construed
• ignorantia facti excusat applies only when
the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness
• defendant at the time, he acted in good
faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the
belief that he was doing no more than
exercising his legitimate right of self-defense;
that had the facts been as he believed them
to be he would have been wholly exempt
from criminal liability on account of his act;
and that he can not be said to have been
guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to
the facts, or in the means adopted by him to
defend himself from the imminent danger
which he believe threatened his person and
his property and the property under his
charge.only the first requisite is present.
US vs. Valdez
FACTS:At about noon, on November 29,
1919, while the interisland steamer Vigan
was anchored in the Pasig River a short
distance from the lighthouse and not far from
where the river debouches into the Manila
Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the
anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the
accused, Calixto Valdez y Quiri, and six
others among whom was the deceased,
Venancio Gargantel. The accused was in
charge of the men and stood at the stern of
the boat, acting as helmsman, while
Venancio Gargantel was at the bow.
The work raising the anchor seems to have
proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused,
and he accordingly began to abuse the men
with offensive epithets. Upon this Venancio
Gargantel remonstrated, saying that it would
be better, and they would work better, if he
would not insult them. The accused took this
remonstrance as a display of
insubordination; and rising in rage he moved
towards Venancio, with a big knife in hand,
threatening to stab him. At the instant when
the accused had attained to within a few feet
of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing
himself in great and immediate peril, threw
himself into the water and disappeared
beneath its surface to be seen no more.
ISSUE: WON the accused is liable for the
death of Venancio?
Held: As to the criminal responsibility of the
accused for the death thus occasioned the
likewise can be no doubt; for it is obvious that
the deceased, in throwing himself in the river,
acted solely in obedience to the instinct of
self-preservation and was in no sense legally
responsible for his own death. As to him it
was but the exercise of a choice between two
evils, and any reasonable person under the
same circumstances might have done the
same. As was once said by a British court, "If
a man creates in another man's mind an
immediate sense of dander which causes
such person to try to escape, and in so doing
he injuries himself, the person who creates
such a state of mind is responsible for the
injuries which result." (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61
L. T. Rep. [N.S.], 701. The accused is the
author of the death of Venancio.
People V. Almonte
Facts: Until a week before the crime, the
accused lived maritally with the Chinaman
Felix Te Sue who was a married man.
Because one Miguela Dawal, with whom he
had also lived maritally, threatened to bring
suit against him unless he rejoined her, the
Chinaman and the accused voluntarily
agreed to separate. From that time on Te
Sue lived in the barrio of Guinlajon,
municipality of Sorsogon, Province of
Sorsogon, together with the said Miguela
Dawal. On the morning of October 1, 1930,
the accused visited her former paramour and
on entering the house, found him with
Miguela. When Te Sue saw her, he
approached and told her to go away at once
because her new paramour might get jealous
and do her harm. The accused insisted upon
remaining, and on being pushed by Te Sue
and Miguela, feeling that she was being
unjustly treated, took hold of a small penknife
she carried and stabbed the man in the
abdomen. Horrified, perhaps, at her deed,
she fled to the street, leaving the blade
sticking in her victim's abdomen, and, taking
the first bus that chanced to pass, finally went
home. The injured man was at once taken to
the provincial hospital where he was given
first aid treatment, and Doctor Ortega
performed a slight operation upon him,
cleaning and sewing up his wound. It was not
serious, according to the doctor, and might
be healed in a week; but on the sixth day the
patient succumbed to complications which
we shall treat of later on. The relatives of the
deceased paid a little over P200 for the
hospital treatment and the expenses of his
last illness.
ISSUE: WON the accused responsible for
the death of the offended party as the direct
and immediate consequence of the wound
inflicted by the accused
HELD: At this juncture it is well to remember
that, as we stated in the beginning, the
patient's nervous condition when the
complication or internal hemorrhage which
caused death set in, was an inherent
physiological condition produced by the
wound in the abdomen. It goes without
saying that if he had not been wounded he
would not have undergone that extraordinary
state and condition, nor have had to leave his
bed during the critical stage of his illness.
Lastly, in United States vs. Zamora (32 Phil.,
218), we held that "One who performs a
criminal act should be held to liability for the
act and for all of its consequences, although
both were inflicted upon a person other than
the one whom the felon intended to injure."
People Vs. Toling
Facts: The twin Antonio and Jose Toling
were riding a train; and stabbed other
passengers in such train; as a result 8
persons had been dead and one person
wounded. The twins are charged with 8
counts of murder and one attempted murder.
Issue: WON the Toling twins guilty of 8
counts of murder and one attempted
murder.
Held: Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that "criminal liability shall be
incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended". The
presumption is that "a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary act"
(Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another
man's mind an immediate sense of danger
which causes such person to try to escape,
and in so doing he injures himself, the person
who creates such a state of mind is
responsible for the injuries which result"
(Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701,
cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).

Following that rule, is was held that "if a

person against whom a criminal assault is
directed reasonably believes himself to be in
danger of death or great bodily harm and in
order to escape jumps into the water,
impelled by the instinct of self-preservation,
the assailant is responsible for homicide in
case death results by drowning" (Syllabus,
U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs.
Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).