Discussion Paper Series -2009/02

TEMPORALITY, CYPRUS PROBLEM AND

TURKEY-EU RELATIONSHIP

Atila Eralp
Executive Board Member of EDAM Professor, Director of
Center for European Studies and Jean Monnet Center of
Excellence,
Middle East Technical University.

JULY 2009

EDAM Discussion Paper Series is supported by the German Marshall Fund of

United States (GMF). The views expressed here are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of GMF.
Introduction

The Turkey-EU relationship is at another critical juncture. The relationship will be

reviewed at the EU Summit at the end of 2009, based on the implementation of the
Additional Protocol and the normalization of relations with the Republic of Cyprus. The
possibility of a “train wreck” in the Turkey-EU relationship was averted at the final
moment during the Finnish Presidency three years ago when the EU summit decided to
freeze negotiations on eight chapters and not even provisionally close any chapters, until
the Turkish government met its commitments regarding the Additional Protocol.1
Unfortunately all the actors involved have lost valuable time in the last three years. There
have been too few efforts to reduce the impact of the Cyprus problem on the Turkey-EU
relationship much less to solve it. As such, there is renewed talk of possible “train wreck”
in the relationship at the end of 2009. In this rather gloomy context, the present
negotiations on the island offer an important opportunity, probably the last chance, to
solve the problem.2 The repetition of the same pattern in the long-lasting Turkey-EU
relationship over recent years clearly shows that the Turkey-EU relationship is
increasingly linked to the settlement of the Cyprus problem, Cyprus has become a factor
which not only slows down Turkey-EU ties as attested by the freezing of substantial
number of chapters, but it also poisons relations by feeding loss of confidence on all
sides.

I have previously argued that temporality (the time factor) has been an important
dimension of the Turkey-EU relationship.3 The convergence in time frames has been
rather exceptional; the dominant pattern has been one of divergence. This paper will
develop this argument by showing that the Cyprus problem has been an important factor
affecting the patterns of convergence and divergence of the time frames of Turkey and
the EC/EU. I will show that the Turkey-EU relationship was able to proceed more
smoothly when the Cyprus problem did not affect the relationship negatively.
Concomitantly, the negative turn in the Turkey-EU relationship coincided with periods in
which the Cyprus problem became more visible. In the long-lasting Turkey-EU
relationship the ups and downs of the relationships seems to be remarkably associated
with the Cyprus problem.

I will first briefly examine the two historical periods of Turkey-EU relationship, the
periods from 1959 to 1970 and from 1970 to 1999 in order to show the role of the Cyprus
problem in the Turkey-EU relationship. I will then focus on the more recent period after
the Helsinki Summit of 1999 to show how the Cyprus problem affected Turkey-EU
relationship differently from 1999 to 2004 on one hand, and after 2004 on the other. The

1
See K. Hughes, “Turkey and the EU-Four Scenarios : From Train Crash to Full Stream Ahead” (A
Friends of Europe Report in association with Chatham House and the European Institute of the London
School of Economics, September 2006), http : // www.chatham-
house.org.uk/publications/papers/view/./id/386/ and Council of the European Union, Brussels, European
Council 14-15 December 2006, Presidency Conclusions.
2
International Crisis Group, “Reunifying Cyprus : The Best Chance Yet” (Europe Report, 2008).
3
A. Eralp “The Role of Temporality and Interaction in the Turkey-EU Relationship”.(New Perspectives on
Turkey, no. 40, Spring 2009) pp.147-168. This present paper draws largely on the analysis provided in my
earlier paper
paper will conclude by looking at the implications of the situation in Cyprus today for the
Turkey-EU relationship in a changing international context.

FROM HARMONY TO DISCORD IN THE RELATIONSHIP

The initial period in the Turkey-EU relationship (1959 to 1970) was a quite exceptional
period in terms of the time factor: there was a remarkable convergence in the dynamics of
European integration and developments in the Turkish context. Turkey’s application to
the emerging EEC in July of 1959 was warmly welcomed by the EEC policy-makers and
the Turkish application was treated equally with the Greek application made two months
earlier. The Turkish associate membership in 1963 followed the Greek one, being one of
the two associate memberships in the newly-created Community. Both of these early
associate memberships were quite different from later association agreements in terms of
the positive treatment by the EEC, as it extended possibilities of full membership in the
long term to both countries.

Likewise, the implementation of the associate membership, that is the Ankara

Agreement, was carried out in a favourable domestic context, with the support of both the
government and opposition, not to mention also by economic elites.4 In this climate,
Ankara implemented the first preparatory phase of the Agreement in accord with the time
tables and the calendar set forth in the agreement. In effect, the government in Ankara
was considerably more effective in this respect than the one in Athens during this period.

This period witnessed an even-handed attitude on the part of the EEC both to Turkey and
Greece which was reflected in their equal treatment within the framework of association
agreements. At this time, Cyprus also became a partnership-republic and gained its
independence in 1960 through the London-Zurich Accords. The Accords were based on a
compromise solution predicated on political equality and administrative partnership
between the two communities. The even handed attitude of the EEC towards Turkey and
Greece and the compromise solution on the island thus contributed to a conducive
environment for the Turkey-EEC relationship during this period.

Unfortunately, tranquil relations ended with the 1970s, when the international context
and processes of European integration underwent important changes.5 In this period,
there was a growing divergence between the dynamics of European integration and
domestic developments in Turkey marked by the disintegration of the earlier consensus
on Turkey’s European vocation.

4
For a more comprehensive analysisi of Turkey-EC relationship during the Cold War, see İ. Tekeli and S.
İlkin, Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu, Vol. I (Ankara : Ümit Yayıncılık 1993), M. A: Birand, Türkiye’nin
Avrupa Macerası: 1989-1993 (İstanbul : Milliyet 2001), A. Eralp, “Soğuk Savaştan Günümüze Türkiye-
Avrupa İlişkileri’ in Türkiye ve Avrupa, ed. A. Eralp(Ankara : İmge, 1997) pp.86-120. For the domestic
debates during the Cold War, see E. Çayhan, Dünden Bugüne Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri ve Siyasal
Partilerin Konuya Bakışı (İstanbul : Boyut, 1997).
5
For an examination of economic and political problems of the 1970s and 1980s, see D.P. Calleo, Beyond
American Hegemony (Brighton : WhoatoheafBooks, 1987 and A. Grosser, The Western Alliance :
European American Relations since 1945 (London: Macmillan, 1980) pp.216-232
Increasingly, economic strains put pressure on Turkish economic elites to challenge the
agenda to implement a Customs Union which was envisaged by the Association
Agreement. These tensions were epitomized by the political slogans of parties both on the
left and the right of the spectrum: “They are the partners, we are the market.”
Additionally, there were rising political problems between Turkey and its Western allies
during the period. The 1974 Sampson coup in Cyprus and Turkey’s subsequent
intervention on the island affected Turkey’s relationship with the West rather
dramatically. The difficulties in solving the Cyprus dispute and the prolongation of the
problem created major frictions in the Turkey-EEC relationship. The military
intervention in September 1980 further increased the divergence in the relationship
between Turkey and the EEC.

Turkey thus entered an authoritarian phase with the military regime after September 1980
at a time when Turkey’s Mediterranean neighbors, Greece, Spain, and Portugal, were
struggling to transform their authoritarian regimes into democracies during the 1970s and
1980s. The political leaders in Greece, Spain, and Portugal were able to converge with
the dynamics of European integration thanks in no small measure to the EEC policy of
supporting nascent democratic regimes in the Mediterranean region . These countries
seized the time factor, so to speak, and began to work on concrete time tables for the
process of their accession to the European Community.

While the Mediterranean countries were undergoing democratic transformation, Turkey’s

relations with the Union stumbled due to economic friction over the prospect of
implementing a Customs Union, and political difficulties due to the Cyprus dispute, as
well as the fallout from the military intervention. The divergence in the relationship
created by the military regime and the resulting authoritarian structure reached such an
extent that the membership application in 1987 and the Customs Union relationship
which came into being in 1995 were not able to change the problematic nature of the
relationship.6

In the 1980s and 1990s, the economic relationship between Turkey and the Community
improved, but major political frictions continued to affect the relationship. In particular,
the Cyprus problem started to affect the relationship more visibly during this period. For,
with Greek acquisition of full membership of the EC in 1981, Cyprus became an
important internal matter for EC/EU members.7 This period accordingly witnessed both a
decline in equal treatment of Turkey and Greece by the EC, and a heightened salience of
the Cyprus problem in affecting the Turkey-EU relationship. Within this changing
climate, Turkey found itself increasingly distanced from Europe which was engaged in
redefining its identity and boundaries. As there was a divergence in the time frames of the

6
For an examination of Turkey-EU relationship in the 1980s and 1990s in addition to the reference in
footnote 5, see M. Müftüler Baç, Turkey’s Relations in a Changing Europe (Manchester : Manchester
University Press, 1997) and A. Eralp ‘ Turkey and the European in the Aftermath of the Cold War Context”
in the Political Economy of Turkey in the Post –Soviet Era, ed. L. Rittenberg (West Part, Connecticut :
7
See for a detailed account of how Cyprus became an internal matter for the EC/EU members, M.Müftüler
Baç and A. Güney “The European Union and the Cyprus Problem 1961-2003”, Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol. 41, no.2, pp.281-293
EC and Turkey, Turkish elites became less sensitive on the concrete timetables of even
the association agreement.

THE HELSINKI TURN

The gloomy tones in the relationship started to change at the end of 1990s with major
changes in the international climate and the European context. The continuity problems
in the Balkans and the Kosovo crisis showed the necessity of a more geopolitical
understanding of the Balkans and created a more positive attitude towards Turkey.8
However, it would have been difficult to foster a more inclusionary attitude towards
Turkey without important changes in Germany and Greece. The coalition government
between social democrats and greens created after the 1998 elections in Germany allowed
for a more inclusionary policy on the question of Turkish accession. The new approach
emphasized the significance of political and economic criteria in the process, rather than
the religious and cultural factors underlined by the previous Christian Democrat
government. In addition to the German attitude, Greek policy towards Turkey changed
dramatically after the “Öcalan episode” which brought about critical changes in the
Greek government. Yorgo Papandreou replaced Theodore Pangalos, an anti-Turkish
Minister of Foreign Affairs, causing a shift in Greek policy towards Turkey. With
Papandreou, Greece became a strong supporter of Turkish accession to the EU, with a
new understanding that Turkish-Greek disputes as well as the Cyprus problem could be
solved much easier in the broader context of European integration, rather than within the
framework of a bilateral contest between Greece and Turkey.9 These changes at the
international and European levels were reinforced by domestic developments in Turkey
especially in the wake of the economic crisis of March 2001. This made it clear that both
big business and small and medium sized firms needed an “EU anchor” to solve Turkey’s
persistent economic problems. These concerns found sympathetic political elites on the
EU side, giving positive momentum to the Turkey-EU relationship.

Thus, in the changing international European and Turkish contexts there was a gradual
convergence in the time frames of the EU and Turkey after a long period of problematic
ties. Turkey was defined as a candidate country after the Helsinki summit of 1999 and
offered a pre-accession strategy. The reform process which began during the coalition
government of DSP (Democratic Left Party), ANAP (Motherland party) and MHP
(Nationalist Action Party) accelerated after the 2002 elections with the rise to power of
the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government. Turkey entered a reform period in

8
For a comprehensive analysis of the Helsinki turning point, see Z. Öniş, “Domestic Politics, International
Norms and Challenges to the State : Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era” in Turkey and the
European Union, ed A.Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (London : Frank Cass, 2003), pp.9-34 and E.F.Keyman
and Z. Öniş, Turkish Politics in a Changing World, (İstanbul Bilgi University Publications, 2007) and K.
Derviş, M. Emerson, D. Gross, S. Ülgen, The European Transformation of Modern Turkey, (Brussels:
CEPS, 2004).
9
G.T. Allison and K. Nicolaidis, eds. Yunan Paradoksu (İstanbul : Doğan Kitap, 1999) and K. Nicolaidis,
“Europe’s Tainted Mirror : Reflection on Turkey’s Candidate Status after Helsinki” in Greek-Turkish
Relations in the Era of Globalisation, ed. D. Keridis and D. Tricatophyllou (Dulles : Brassey’S, 2001)
which the Parliament, displaying cooperation across party lines, passed several important
packages in a short span of time.10

The post Helsinki period also witnessed a breakthrough in the involvement of civil
society actors in the process. The support for accession to the EU reached its highest
domestic levels of over 75 percent, with increasing public participation in the process.11
This was a remarkable period of transformation in Turkey, with the Westernization
reform drive increasingly turning into a more concrete process of Europeanization,
focusing on critical issues of democratization.12

Along with a positive turn in the Greek attitude towards Turkey’s membership, Helsinki
also provided a major turning point in the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle. Helsinki
stipulated the resolution of conflicts with Greece as a precondition for Turkey’s
accession. More importantly it solidified the linkage developed between Cyprus problem
and Turkey’s relationship with the EU, as the EU committed itself to the accession of
Cyprus independent of the Cyprus dispute in return for Turkey’s candidacy at the
Summit. As a result of these decisions the EU increasingly became an actor in the Cyprus
dispute, an actor which was characterized as potentially being able to catalyze a peaceful
solution on the island.13 According to these analysts, the EU had hoped that the incentive
of EU membership both in Turkey and Cyprus would work to catalyst a solution. While
the EU process certainly had a decisive effect on the political changes both in Turkey and
Northern Cyprus in this period, it is difficult to state the same about the Greek Cypriot
side. With historical hindsight one could say that this development was to a great extent
related to the imbalanced structure of incentives/conditionality provided to Turkey and
the Turkish Cypriots on one hand, and the Greek Cypriots. For while there was a strong
element of conditionality in the Turkish context linking Turkish accession to the solution
of the Cyprus problem, the same linkage did not exist for the Greek Cypriots, since the
resolution of the conflict was no longer a precondition for their accession.

In the post–Helsinki climate the urgency of resolving the Cyprus problem prior to the
accession of Cyprus brought the relevant actors to the negotiating table. After prolonged
negotiations between the leaders of both communities, the UN Secretary General
presented his successive plans creating links between the settlement of the problem and
the emerging EU framework on the island.14 The incentives in the plan both in terms of
the settlement of the dispute and inclusion of Northern Cypriots within the planned

10
Avrupa Birliği Uyum Yasa Paketleri (Ankara : T.C. Başbakanlık Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği,
2007)
11
A. Çarkoğlu, “Who Wants Full Membership ? Characterisation of Turkish Public Support for EU
Membership”, in Turkey and the European Union, ed. A. Çarkoğlu and B. Rubin (London : Frank Cass,
2003),
12
A. Eralp, “The EU Accession Process and Europeanisation in Turkey” in Turkey and the European
Union : Experiences and Expectations (Stockholm : Sieps, 2006).
13
On the discussion of the catalytic role of the EU, see C. Brewin, The European Union and Cyprus
(Huntington: Kathen, 2000), T. Diez (ed.) The Euroepan Union and the Cyprus Conflict (Manchester :
Manchester University Press, 2002), N. Tocci, EU Accession, Dynamics and Conflict Resolution :
Catalysing Peace and Consolidating Partition in Cyprus ? (London : Ashgate, 2004)
14
M. Emerson and N. Tocci, Cyprus as Lighthouse of the East Mediterranean, (Brussels : CEPS, 2002)
“United Cyprus” in the EU framework led to important changes both on the Turkish
Cypriot side and Turkey. After losing a lot of valuable time, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot
leaders belatedly realized in 2003 and 2004 that the settlement of Cyprus problem was
linked to Turkey’s membership aspirations, the solution of the problem would make
Turkish Cypriots members of the EU as well as create a more conducive environment in
the process of accession of Turkey. Both Turkish and Turkish Cypriots leaders took a
decisive turn in 2003 and 2004 and strongly supported the UN Plan. However, the Greek
Cypriots believed that time was on their side; they could become members of the EU
without the settlement of the problem. As one close analyst clearly put, they had an
attractive best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA)15. In this context, the
Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan with an overwhelming majority (75.83 %), while
Turkish Cypriots accepted the settlement of the Cyprus problem as well as the possibility
of joining the EU with a clear majority (64.91 %).

THE NEGATIVE TURN IN THE RELATIONSHIP AFTER 2004

In addition to the negative developments in Cyprus, an unfortunate downturn occurred in

the process of European integration as Turkey was getting ready to start negotiations after
a long waiting period in 2005. The EU was immersed in prolonged institutional
problems, augmented by the non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in the referenda
in France and the Netherlands. The negative outlook on the Constitutional Treaty and the
continuing stalemate on institutional problems deeply affected the process of enlargement
and led to the questioning of one of the most successful policies of the EU. In this
climate, enlargement policy became the scapegoat and victim of the EU’s institutional
problem. As attention was turned to the enlargement issue, Turkey became an easy target,
as it was one of the remaining two countries and the more problematic one at the
negotiating table. These developments reinforced sceptical attitudes towards Turkey’s
accession in Europe which had been previously dormant, resulting in a negative
interaction between the EU and Turkey. Thus, after 2004, there was a contextual shift in
the Turkey-EU relationship and it became difficult to sustain the more conducive
environment that had shaped the relationship both in Europe and Turkey after 1999.
Unfortunately, this time the EU’s timetable did not converge with Turkey’s timetable. As
the EU became immersed in its own problems, it became difficult to focus on Turkey’s
accession process, and rather than accelerating, negotiations slowed down further.

The membership of Cyprus in 2004 without settlement of the problem and the continuity
of the Cyprus dispute aggravated the already difficult relationship. Unable to solve the
Cyprus problem, the EU started to approach the problem from a legalistic point of view
and underlined the Additional Protocol which extended Turkey’s customs union with the
EU to the newly acceding members including the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish
government retaliated for the EU’s approach with a declaration and the EU issued a

15
N. Tocci, “EU Accession, Dynamics and Conflict Resolution : Catalysing Peace and Consolidating
Partition in Cyprus ? (London : Ashgate, 2004)
counter-declaration in 2005.16 In these statements, the EU asked for the opening of
airports and seaports to the vessels of the Republic of Cyprus, while the Turkish
government insisted on the simultaneous lifting of all restrictions on Cyprus, including
the movement of goods, services and people from the Northern part of the island. As the
Turkish government criticized the EU for not meeting its promises and commitments
regarding the implementation of trade and aid protocols to Turkish Cypriots, the EU
focused its attention on the legal commitment of Turkey regarding the implementation of
the Additional Protocol. The dispute regarding the interpretation of the implementation of
the Additional Protocol between the EU and Turkey reached such levels that there was
an increasing possibility of a “train crash” in the relationship. The Finnish Presidency in
the second half of 2006 worked hard to overcome this possibility. It was finally overcome
at the EU Summit of December 2006 when it was decided to freeze negotiations on eight
chapters and not even provisionally close any chapter until the Turkish government met
its commitments regarding the Additional Protocol. The state of affairs was to be
reviewed annually until the end of 2009. While the decision prevented a potential `train
crash`, it further slowed down the already slow negotiating process and put a deadline on
the Turkish government in meeting its commitments regarding the implementation of the
Additional Protocol.

The contextual shift at the European level and the developments regarding the Cyprus
problem affected the pro-reform coalition in Turkey and led to the disintegration of the
emerging consensus on the European vocation. This was fuelled by the rise of a more
sceptical coalition of forces. Thus, ironically, just as Turkey began negotiations, the EU
came to be seen less as a transformative power and enthusiasm for the accession process
declined sharply. As conditionality rather than incentives were perceived to dominate the
negotiation process and as the membership perspective became blurred, the accession
process lost its attractiveness for both Turkish elites and the public.17 With this
development, the political cost of supporting the process increased, which led to a
dramatic decline in the domestic ownership of the project.

The developments regarding the Cyprus problem were quite decisive in the decline of the
ownership of the EU project both within the governing party and in the opposition
parties. The membership of the Greek Cypriots in the EU who rejected the UN Plan
which had been strongly endorsed by the EU increased resentment towards the EU. The
Cyprus policy of the EU was perceived as a clear case of ‘double-standards’ on the part
the EU: a country that had said ‘no’ to the Annan Plan in a referendum was a member of
the EU and would have veto power over Turkey’s accession process. The Enlargement
Commissioner Gunter Verheugen’s strong statement18 right after the referenda in Cyprus

16
For the original document of the EU Summit see http://europa.eu/rapid/press. For the declaration of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey see http://www.mfa.gov.tr/declaraion -by-Turkey-on
Cyprus-29 July 2005.en.mfa.
17
A.T. Esen and H.T. Bölükbaşı, “Attitudes of Key Stakeholders in Turkey Towards EU-Turkey Relations:
Consensual Discard or Contentous Accord” in Talking Turkey in Europe : Towards a Differentiated
Communication Strategy, ed. N. Tocci (Roma : Instituto Affari Internationali)
18
“I am going to be very undiplomatic now; I feel cheated by the Greek Cypriot. We had a clear agreement
on this point. Mr. Papadopoulos must respect his part of the deal, which was under no circumstances was a
did not curtail the resentment towards EU policy but showed the discriminatory nature of
the EU outlook. As the EU was unable to implement the promised trade and aid protocols
to Turkish Cypriots, negative sentiments became even more heightened. These
developments increased the already existing imbalance between conditionality and
incentives offered to Turkey by the EU, at least as the process is perceived by Turkish
elites. As the divergence between the dynamics of European integration and
developments in Turkey increased, Turkey started to lose valuable time in the reform
process. The government announced 2008 as a reform year, but the record showed a poor
rate of achievement. There was a similar pattern in 2006 and 2007. In this climate, it
became politically unfeasible to implement the Additional Protocol as it acquired
political symbolism. The Turkey- EU relationship entered another challenging moment in
which the relationship will be reviewed by the EU Summit at the end of 2009 based on
the implementation of the Additional Protocol.

PROSPECTS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP

Two factors could affect the Turkey-EU relationship and change the rather dismal context
of the relationship. The first factor is the dramatic change in the USA with the election of
Barack Obama as the president of the USA. With this change there is a growing
expectation both in the USA and Europe that the new American administration will focus
on multilateral mechanisms and policies and foster a better relationship with Europe.
Under the Bush administration, as a result of the militaristic unilateralist policies of the
USA, transatlantic relations experienced major frictions which also led to differences in
approaching turbulent regional issues. The real possibility of change in the transatlantic
relationship as well as the renewed emphasis on multilateralism now could bring a shared
transatlantic focus on sensitive international issues such as Afghanistan, Iraq and the
Middle East in general which all require not only cooperation between the USA and
Europe but also increasing collaboration between NATO and ESDP. The changing
international context and the emerging new agenda will require closer cooperation with
Turkey in turbulent regional issues, as the American administration has clearly flagged.
That said, as much as Turkey’s potential for contribution to the turbulent problems
increases, this potential is as of yet unrealized due to both the heightened ambivalence in
the Turkey-EU relationship and because of the non-settlement of the Cyprus problem. As
succinctly pointed by a close observer of these developments, the membership of Cyprus
in the EU without the settlement of the the Cyprus problem has created a new set of
problems not only in the Turkey-EU relationship, but also for the EU-NATO relationship,
especially in the field of strategic cooperation which is badly needed in sensitive areas
such as Afghanistan.19 In the changing international context, the NATO-EU relationship
needs to be reinvigorated, but because of the membership of Cyprus to the EU and the
non-settlement of the Cyprus problem, the bilateral problems between Cyprus and Turkey

resolution of the conflict to fail as result of opposition from the Greek Cypriot authorities” Cyprus Mail,
April 22, 2004.
19
S. Ülgen, The Evolving EU, NATO and Turkey Relationship : Implications for Transatlantic Security,
(EDAM : Discussion Paper Series-2008/02)
are transferred both to the EU-Turkey and EU-NATO agendas.20 The non-settlement of
the Cyprus problem in the changing international climate, therefore affects not only the
Turkey-EU relationship and Turkey-Greece relationship but wider international issues
such as the relationship between NATO and the EU. It seems, it will be difficult to
reinvigorate the NATO-EU relationship without the settlement of the Cyprus problem. As
the Cyprus problem becomes a systemic problem, the new American administration
could help the settlement of the problem by focusing on a new incentive/cost mixture in
the ongoing negotiations. This new scheme could focus on providing more incentives to
those who work for the settlement of the problem and devise cost inflicting measures on
the actors who are blocking the settlement.21 In addition to the Cyprus problem, the new
American administration could help the revitalization of the accession process of Turkey
to the EU. During the Bush administration, US support became increasingly counter
productive. With a positive turn in the transatlantic relationship, Washington’s support
for Turkey’s accession to the EU could be more effective. If the Obama administration
continues to support Turkey's accession, which is expected, it could find a more positive
response within the EU. However it is probable that the Obama administration will also
focus on the issue of democratic reforms in Turkey in line with its political preferences,
in addition to the security concerns which have been emphasized by successive American
administrations. If that happens, it may be possible to expect a shared transatlantic focus
on the issue of political reforms in Turkey.

In addition to the "Obama factor" the continuing negotiations in Cyprus provide another
opportunity to solve the long lasting Cyprus problem and for moving ahead on the long
lasting Cyprus problem. A change of leadership on the Greek Cypriot side has brought to
the table two leaders who had a long personal relationship and derived important lessons
from past failures are unable to solve the problem. If they fail, it will be difficult to try
again. The two leaders have met more than thirty times on the island and their teams are
working hard on the settlement of the Cyprus problem. Reports indicate that there is
substantial progress in the negotiations. The main parameters of the settlement are well-
known, what is needed is the political commitment of involved and international actors
such as the USA and the EU and a sense of timing.

The time is ripe as the changing international context creates a more conducive
environment for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Recent public surveys on the island
also show that there is still a conducive environment for a compromise solution, but these
surveys also indicate that there are strong tendencies towards a two-state solution in the
North and a unitary state in the South.22 Therefore, while there is still a possibility for a
solution, time is running short for a settlement on the island. All actors should realize at
this point that time is not on their side, instead they need to focus more wisely on the time
factor and not waste it again. In the words of a close observer, time needs to be used with
20
S. Ülgen, In Search of Lost Time : Turkey-US Relations After Bush, (Center on the United States and
Europe at Brookings : US-Europe Analysis Series, Feb. 19, 2009)
21
Ibid.
22
E. Kaymak, A. Lordos, N. Tocci, Building Confidence in Peace : Public Opinion and the Cyprus Peace
Process (Brussels : CEPS, 2008),A. Lordos, E. Kaymak, N. Tocci, A People’s Peace in Cyprus (Brussels :
CEPS, 2009),A. Gitmez, A. Eralp, C. Balkır, G. Yalman and K. Ulusoy, Avrupalılaşma Sürecinde Kıbrıs’ta
Değişim, TÜBİTAK, Proje No. 105K263
a sense of proportion and compromise.23 The Turkish Cypriot leadership is quite keen on
the time factor and realizes that time is not on their side, i.e., that the problem needs to be
solved this year. Ankara also realizes that non-settlement of the Cyprus problem is a
major impediment to its aspirations of EU membership as well as complicates its
relationship both with NATO and ESDP. The present USA administration likewise wants
the conflict to be resolved in order to build a more multilateral order. In this context, the
solution of the Cyprus problem will gain urgency as the need for NATO-EU
collaboration becomes more salient. Within the EU, there are increasing EU member
states which realize that a divided Cyprus within the EU harms the process of European
integration. There is also the growing feeling that the EU needs a success story, as the
European integration process has faced major institutional problems, economic crisis, and
a falling sense of solidarity which has led to the loss of the EU’s powers of attraction in
the wider Europe and the turbulent international system. The settlement of the Cyprus
problem could provide the EU with such a success story and help to revitalize the process
of European integration in one of the turbulent regions of the world, that is, the Eastern
Mediterranean. Time is opportune also in terms of the EU Presidency. The Swedish
Presidency is committed both to the settlement of the Cyprus problem and to the
improvement of the Turkey-EU relationship. Among all the concerned actors, the Greek
Cypriot leadership and public may think that time is on their side. However, they should
also realize that they would live in a divided island, with an increasing risk of two-state
solution. They could also be ostracized in the changing international system, if they are
made to bear the “cost” of the non-settlement.

If there is a movement in the negotiations and the solution of the Cyprus problem
becomes possible, such a development will certainly have positive repercussions for the
Turkey-EU relationship. It may create an environment conducive to the reform drive in
Turkey. The changes in the transatlantic relationship and the new possibilities in the
negotiations in Cyprus are two important factors to watch in order to observe a potential
positive turn in the Turkey-EU relationship to create a better climate for interaction and
help along the convergence of the time frames of the EU and Turkey.

23
D. Hanney, Cyprus, Turkey and the EU : Time for a Sense of Proportion and Compromise (London :
Centre for European Reform, July 2006)