Privacy Protection Algorithm Based on Expected

Phantom Source Node in Wireless Sensor Network

Leqiang Bai, Ling Li and Shiguang Qian Shihong Zhang

Information & Control Engineering Faculty Product Development Department
Shenyang Jianzhu University Allwin Telecommunication Company
Shenyang, Liaoning Province, China Shenyang, Liaoning Province, China
baileqiang@sjzu.edu.cn kengreenI987@I63.com

Abstract-For the problem that the existing source-location results show the algorithm can protect source-location privacy
privacy protection algorithms have lower safety periods, source­ effectively.
location privacy protection algorithm based on expected
phantom source node is proposed. With coordinates of source
II. NETWORK MODEL
node and sink node, the algorithm establishes an ellipse and
selects a node randomly on the ellipse as expected phantom
source node which providing direction for phantom source node. A. System Model
By selecting dispersive expected phantom source nodes, The system of wireless sensor network is similar to Panda­
transmission paths of adjacent packets are dispersive. Hunter Game [8, 9] is a six tuple (N, B, P, H, M, A), where:
Theoretical analysis shows that the algorithm can increase the
probability of packet away from source node and sink node 1) N is the set of nodes. Nodes are stationary[II].
during transmission procedure. The experimental results show 2) B is base station, sink. Adversary cannot read position
that the algorithm can enhance safety period. of the source node from packet. Location of B is public.
3) P is the panda monitored by WSN. The node closest
Keywords-wireless sensor network; privacy protection; source­
panda will become source node and report data to sink.
location; expected phantom source node
4) H is adversary, namely, illegal hunter. H locates
source-location and capture panda. H has the characters:
I. INTRODUCTION
passive, initial location is near sink. Hearing radius is litimed.
Wireless sensor network (WSN) is used in many fields. H can analyze the signal reached.
Wireless sensor network rely on wireless communications 5) M is the attack mode, trace back. For n hops fixed path,
which is vulnerable to attack [1]. Privacy protection is divided H can locate source-location after listening n packets [11].
into content and location [2]. Anonymous is used to conduct
6) A is privacy protection algorithm to resist the attack M
content privacy protection. Location privacy protection is to
protect location [3]. Random walk is used to conduct location B. Coordinates of Source and Sink based Ellipse Model
privacy protection. According monitor range, adversaries are As shown in Fig 1, two-dimensional coordinates of node
divided into global and local adversary [4]. Global adversary positioning in network initialization is XOY, B is the origin of
achieves traffic analysis [5]. The monitor radius of local XOY, coordinate is (0,0) . The coordinate of S is (xs, ys).
adversary is limited, similar to sensor communication radius.
According to attack mode, the adversaries can be divided into
active and passive adversaries. Active adversary controls
network nodes. Passive adversary traces packets [6].
Source-location privacy protection in wireless sensor x
network gets more attention in recent years [7]. Ozturk put
forward the Panda-Hunter Game and phantom flooding
algorithm [8]. Pandurang Kamat put forward phantom single­
path routing algorithm [9]. Juan Chen proposed source-based
restricted flooding protocol (PUSBRF) [10], making packet
away from source node. Yun Li proposed the privacy
protection algorithm using network hybrid ring, protecting the
source-location privacy effectively [11].
To protect source-location privacy in wireless sensor
network, the paper proposed source-location privacy protection
algorithm based on expected phantom source node (ABEPSN). Figure I. Coordinates and ellipse model
With node information, selects expect phantom source node.
Based on the Panda-Hunter Game, conducts experiment, The distance of source node S to base station B is dBs :

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(I)
The mid-point of S and B is 0'. The direction of S and B is
U axis. The perpendicular bisector of line S to B is V axis. dBs
is used to construct an equilateral triangle. Constructing an
ellipse which focuses are S and B and pass the third point of
the triangle. The equation of ellipse is:
A. Sink Initialization Phase
Each node gets its coordinate by location algorithm, sets the
hops to sink is +=. Sink node generates Sink_Init packet [10],
broadcasts it. Sink Init = {sink_broadcast, sender_ID,
sender coordinate, sink_hop, sink_coordinate}. The
sink_broadcast is message type; sender_ID is ID of sender
node; sender_coordinate is the coordinate of sender; sink_hop
is the hop from sender node to sink which initial value is O.
sink coordinate is the coordinate of sink node.

U2 4v2 1 Q received packet deals with it as following:

-
+ = --
(2)
dBS2 3d�s 1) Node Q reads Sinkjnit packet. If the sender_ID is in
the neighbor list, updates hops from the neighbor node to B;
otherwise, stores sender_ID, sender_coordinate and sink_hop
in the neighbor list. Node Q stores sink_coordinate when the
Q is not B and receives the Sink_Init packet firstly.
 2) Node Q judge hop. If sink_hop<hQIl, updates
 xo, = i (3)
hQ_B=sink_hop+l, updates the sender_ID of Sink_Init as the
 ID of node Q, sender_coordinate as coordinate of node Q and
 = Ys sink_hop as h<LB. Then Q forwards Sink_Init packet, the
Y 0' 2 procedure of node Q ends; otherwise, node Q discards
Sink_Init packet, the procedure of node Q ends.
The coordinate Q(xQ, YQ) is:

XQ = UQ x cos(arctan(Yo'))-
xo'

Va x sin(arctan(Yo
')) + Xs
- 2
xo'
(4)

VQ x cos(arctan(Yo')) + Ys
xo' 2
Figure 2. An example of ABEPSN

III. PROCUDURE OF ABEPSN

ABEPSN algorithm is divides into four phases. An example B. Source Node Initialization Phase
of it is shown in Fig 2. The main symbols used frequently are The initialization steps of source node S as following:
listed in Tab I.
1) S establishes ellipse in UO'V according to (2).
2) S calculates epected phantom source node (XESP, YESP)
TABLE!. THE MAIN SYMBOLS IN THE PAPER
and h1eas,.
Symbol Definition a) Constructing safe zone. As shown in Fig 2, in order
ho B The minimal hops to the sink from Q, Q is random node
to select an effective expected phantom source node ESP(UESP,
Expect phantom source node on ellipse which provides
ESP
direction for selecting SP
VESP), constructs safe zone which B and S are the centers and
SP Phantom source node which S selects actually through ESP Rsa/e is radius respectively, and adjusts the selection interval of
The theoretical minimum hops which S sends packet to ESP, UESP to [up, ug].
h'easl its value is the ratio of communication radius to the distance
b) The [up, uJ is divided into a series of sub-intervals.
from S to expected phantom source node after rounding up
In order to disperse the transmission path adjacent data
The selection interval of abscissa of expected phantom source
[up, ug] packets, excludes the last selected sub-interval, selects
node ESP
Positive integer greater than one, which determines the radius
randomly a sub-interval from other sub-intervals every time,
k
Rsafe of the safe zone, k=2, 3, 4, ...... , +00
selects a random value in the sub-interval as UESP. Taking UESP
Rsafe The radius of the safe zone, RsaJe = dBS / k to (2) and calculating the VESP which is positive or negative

986
 ESP YESP).
randomly. According to (4), obtains expected phantom source
node ESP( X ,
c) S calculates h'eas,' h'eas, = rthe distance of S to
expected phantom source node ESP / communication radius 1-
3) S sets hops count is O.
C. Select the Phantom Source Node Phase
Q stands for source node S and the nodes received packet.
The steps ofQ deals with the packet are as following:
1) Node Qjudges whether itself is source node S. IfQ is S,
turns to 2); otherwise, Q adds the hops count of the packet by
one, then turns to 2).
2) Node Q calculates the distance to expected phantom
source node. If the distance less than communication radius,
turns to 6); otherwise, turns to 3).
3) Node Q calculates the distance of each neighbor nodes
to expected phantom source node. If the minimal distance less
than the distance of Q to ESP, turns to 5); otherwise, turns to
4).
4) Node Q compares the hops count of packet and h'eas,' If
hops count less than h'eas" turns to 5); otherwise, turns to 6).
5) Forwarding the packet. Forwarding the packet to the
neighbor node which has the minimal distance to expected
phantom source node, the procedure of Q dealing with packet
ends.
6) Step 6: Node Q becomes SP, the procedure of Q
dealing with packet ends.
D. Phantom Source Node Sends Packet to Sink Phase
It assumes that Q stands for SP and the nodes received
packets. The steps ofQ deals with the packet as following:
1) If Q is B, the procedure of Q dealing with packet ends;
otherwise turns to 2).
2) Node Q checks neighbor list. Q sends packet to the
neighbor node which has minimal hops to B, the end.
IV. PERFORMANCE AND SIMULATION ANALYSIS
A. Performance Analysis
As shown in Fig 2, if the expected phantom source node
was selected on whole ellipse, it may close to the intersection n.
The probability of packet passing B increases during the
procedure of S sending packet to SP.
In order to decrease the probability of packets go through B
during the procedure of S sending packets to SP. As shown in
Fig 2, constructs safe zone which B is the centers and Rsafe is
ESP, corresponding to the V-axis, UESP
radius respectively, exclude arc fnh in the selection range of
less than ug•
1) only relies on dBs and Rsa/e.
u
g
Proof: As shown in Fig 2, makes tangent line of safe zone
from S, e is tangent point, f and h are intersection points with
ellipse. Making vertical line from f, g is intersection with X­
axis. In 6SeB, dBe = Rsa/e. The length of side Se is:
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Rsa/e
dSe = dBS X cos(arcsin(--)) (5)
dss
According to Fig 2 and (5), the length of ef is:
(6)
6SeBV) 6Sgf, ug is dsg - c:
ug =- � + (�dB/ -Rfa/e +
(2xdBS -�dB/ -R;a/e)2 -R;a/e x�dB/ -R;a/e
xdBS -2x"dI BS - Rsa/e ) dBS
4
2 2
(7)
Similarly, as shown in Fig 2, up relies on dBs and Rsa/e'
2) Communication overhead is as twice as big than hs_B.
Proof: The minimum hops between nodes is path length
in large-scale nodes uniformly distributed WSN [10]. The
SP
ABEPSN does not introduce flooding. Communication
overhead is transmission delay: hs + hsp B. It assumes that
SP closes to ellipse. Because the sum of distance of any point
on the ellipse to two focuses is 2a, communication overhead
is transmission delay: 2a = 2dB_s "'" 2hs_B.
B. Simulating Analysis
Experiments were conducted by Matlab to simulate
phantom single-path routing, PVSBRF and ABEPSN in
safety period and communication overhead. Safety period is
the number of packets sent by S before it was found by H;
communication overhead is the hops of a packet sent to B by
S. Configure of wireless sensor network is similar to [9, 10].
10,000 nodes were uniformly randomly distributed over a
6,000 m X 6,000 m network which divided into 1OOx 100 grids.
The initial position of each node is grid center, with
disturbance, ensuring that there is only one node in each grid
and the relative position is different. The communication
radius of sensor node is 100 m. The hearing radius of
adversary is also 100 m. The average number of neighbors is
8.72. Sink was in the center of the network and S was selected
randomly. ABEPSN algorithm parameters k = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, +00. The Sub-interval of [up, ug] is shown in Tab II:
TABLEl!. THE METHOD OF DIVIDING SUB-INTERVAL
Symbol
Interval-l
Sub-interval
(uD, ue)
Interval-2 (up,O), (0,Ug)
Interval-3 (Up, 0), (0,dBs / 2) and (dBs / 2,uR)
Interval-4 (up, -dBS / 2), (-dBS / 2,dBS / 2) and (dBS / 2,u")
Interval-5 (up, -dBS / 2), (-dBS / 2,0) and (0,Ug)
Interval-6 (up, -dBs / 3), (-dBs / 3,dBs / 3) and (dBs / 3,uR)
Interval-7 (up, -dBs / 2), (-dBs / 2,0), (0,dBs / 2) and (dBs / 2,ug)
1) Safety period
 When the parameter k is 6, 7 or 8, the safety period is
higher. When k = 6, the effect of different dividing methods to
safety period was shown in Fig 3. The safety period is higher
when Interval-4, Interval-5 and Interval-6.
:::;;�'::�;::':;;�::��:�:�:�:���-++-Jnterval-4
900
.
1
�800
700
�
0.600
500
!i.400
,i300
rJ5200
L-�1�0----�20�--�30�--�4�0-----5�0�
100
0 and sets safe zone, resisting the adversary's local attack
The hops of source node to sink
Figure 3. Effect of different dividing methods to safety period
Safety periods of three algorithms were shown in Fig 4. hs
is random walk hops. With hS_B increases, safety period of
three algorithms are improved. This is because as hS_B
increase, the adversary needs to track more hops. When k is 6,
7 or 8, safety period is higher. This is because ABEPSN
selects phantom source node according to the coordinate on
the ellipse, disperses transmission paths of adjacent packets.
Adversary cannot continuously monitor the packets.
Figure 4. The change of safety period (fnterval-4)
2) Communication Overhead
Communication overheads are increased with the increase
of hS_B as shown in Fig 5. Communication overhead of single­
path routing is smallest as it selects phantom source node
randomly completely; the each hop of PUSBRF is be away
from S, which increases communication overhead compared
with single-path routing. When the hop from S to B is less
than 17, ABEPSN algorithm has the minimal communication
overhead. With the increase of hS_B' the increasing trend is
obvious. When hS_B is larger, ABEPSN has maximum.
Through above analysis, it can be known that the
communication overhead of ABEPSN is linear to hS_B•
Figure 5. The change of communication overhead (transmission delay)
With the increase of hs B, communication overhead and
safety period all increased. ABEPSN achieved higher safety
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period. For the Panda-Hunter Game, panda is unchanged [8].
The paper ignores the communication overhead of flooding in
PUSBRF. When WSN is used to monitor moving target, the
communication overhead of flooding cannot be ignored.
ABEPSN has a broader applicability.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The paper proposed source-location privacy protection
algorithm in wireless sensor network based on except phantom
source node (ABEPSN). ABEPSN adjusts the selection range
of expected phantom source node to disperse transmission path
effectively. Theoretical analysis shows the algorithm can
determine selection range of expect phantom source node by
the distance from source node to sink and radius of safe zone,
decreases the probability of packet passing the source node and
sink. Experiment results show ABEPSN algorithm can achieve
higher safety period, effectively mislead the adversary be away
from true path to improve the source-location privacy.
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