Civil Law Cases – Art.
11 – Trece Martires and Friends
People v Manaban - Art. 11 Self Defense (Unlawful
aggression)
FACTS: Ramonito Manaban was found guilty of the crim of
homicide by the RTC and CA.
On Oct. 11, 1996, at around 1:25 in the morning, Joselito
Bautista, a father and a member of UP Police Force, took his
daughter, Frinzi, who complained of difficulty in breathing,
the the UP Health Center. There, the doctors prescribed
certain medicines to be purchased. Bautista who had taken
alcoholic drinks earlier, went to the BPI Kalayaan Branch to
withdraw some money from its ATM.
Bautista failed to withdraw the money and he started kicking
and pounding on the machine. The security guard, Ramonito
Manaban, approached and asked him what the problem was.
Bautista complained that his ATM card was retrieved by the
machine and that no money came out of it. Manaban
checked the receipt and he found that Bautista entered a
wrong PIN and he advised Bautista to return the next
morning. This angered Bautista and he continue pounding on
the machine. When Manaban could no longer pacify him, he
fired a warning shot. That diverted the attention of Bautista.
Instead of venting his ire against the machine, he confronted
Manaban. After some exchange of words, a shot rang out
fatally hitting Bautista.
As Manaban's defense, he claimed Bautista was about to
draw his gun when he placed his right hand on his waist after
he "bumalikwas" or he turned his back. Fearing for his life, he
pulled the trigger and shot Manaban. Then the police came,
Manaban surrendered himself to the police.
According to the autopsy, the point of entry of the bullet was
at the back, on the right side of the body.
Also, Bautista’s gun was still locked at the holster and tucked
on his waist.
Issue: W/O Manaban is guilty of Homicide after claiming that
his life is in danger that's why he fired as a self defense.
Held: YES. Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code, the three requisites to prove self-defense as a justifying
circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal
liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the accused or the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite of self-
defense. Self-defense is founded on the necessity on the part
of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression. Thus, without prior unlawful and unprovoked
Page 1 of 16
attack by the victim, there can be no complete or incomplete
self-defense.
In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the back as evidenced
by the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was
shot, his gun was still inside a locked holster and tucked in his
right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban,
Manaban was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista
The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw
his gun when he turned his back at Manaban is mere
speculation. Besides, Manaban was already aiming his loaded
firearm at Bautista when the latter turned his back. In that
situation, it was Bautista whose life was in danger considering
that Manaban, who had already fired a warning shot, was
pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista, who was a
policeman, would have realized this danger to his life and
would not have attempted to draw his gun which was still
inside a locked holster tucked in his waist. Furthermore, if
Manaban really feared that Bautista was about to draw his
gun to shoot him, Manaban could have easily disabled
Bautista by shooting his arm or leg considering that
Manaban’s firearm was already aimed at Bautista.
People v Alconga - Art 11. Self Defense (Unlawful Aggresion)
FACTS: The deceased Silverio Barion was the banker in the
game of black jack and upon invitation of Maria de Raposo,
the accused Dioscoro Alconga joined her as a partner, each of
them contributing the sum of P5 to a common fund. Maria
played while the said accused posted himself behind the
deceased and communicating by signs to his partner. The
deceased appears to have suffered losses in the game then
upon discovering what the said accused had been doing, the
deceased became indignant and expressed his anger at the
former. In a fit of anger, the deceased left the house but not
before telling the accused Alconga, "tomorrow morning I will
give you a breakfast", which expression would seem to signify
an intent to inflict bodily harm when uttered under such
circumstances.
2 days later, while Dioscoro Alconga was alone in the guard
house performing his duties as guard or 'ronda' in barrio
Santol, the deceased Silverio Barion passed by with a
'pingahan.' That was the first time the deceased and the
accused Alconga had met since that eventful night of May
27th in the gambling house of Gepes. Upon seeing the
accused Algonga, who was then seated in the guard house,
the deceased cried: 'Coroy, this is now the breakfast!' These
words of warning were immediately followed by two
formidable swings of the 'pingahan' directed at the accused
Alconga which failed to hit him. Alconga was able to avoid the
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
blows by falling to the ground and crawling on his abdomen
until he was outside the guardhouse. The deceased followed
him and while in the act of delivering the third blow, Dioscoro
Alconga fired at him with his revolver thereby stopping the
blow in mid-air. The deceased fell to the ground momentarily
and upon rising to his feet, he drew forth a dagger. The
accused Alconga resorted to his bolo and both persons being
armed, a hand-to-hand fight followed. The deceased having
sustained several wounds from the hands of Alconga, ran
away with the latter close to his heels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense
HELD: No. The court find appellant guilty of homicide. Upon
the foregoing facts, we hold that appellant's guilt of the crime
of homicide has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
The learned trial court appreciated in his favor two mitigating
circumstances: voluntary surrender and provocation on the
part of the deceased.
It will be observed that there were two stages in the fight
between appellant and the deceased. The initial stage
commenced when the deceased assaulted appellant without
sufficient provocation on the part of the latter. Resisting the
aggression, appellant managed to have the upper hand in the
fight, inflicting several wounds upon the deceased, on
account of which the latter fled in retreat. From that moment
there was no longer any danger to the life of appellant who,
being virtually unscathed, could have chosen to remain
where he was. Resolving all doubts in his favor, and
considering that in the first stage the deceased was the
unlawful aggressor and defendant had not given sufficient
provocation, and considering further that when the deceased
was about to deliver the third blow, appellant was still in a
crawling position and, on that account, could not have
effectively wielded his bolo and therefore had to use his
"paltik" revolver—his only remaining weapon—; we hold that
said appellant was then acting in self-defense.
But when he pursued the deceased, he was no longer acting
in self-defense, there being then no more aggression to
defend against, the same having ceased from the moment
the deceased took to his heels. During the second stage of
the fight appellant inflicted many additional wounds upon the
deceased. That the deceased was not fatally wounded in the
first encounter is amply shown by the fact that he was still
able to run a distance of some 200 meters before being
overtaken by appellant. Under such circumstances,
appellant's plea of self-defense in the second stage of the
fight cannot be sustained. There can be no defense where
there is no aggression.
Page 2 of 16
"Although the defendant was not the aggressor, he is not
exempt from criminal liability for the reason that it is shown
that he struck several blows, among them the fatal one, after
the necessity for defending himself had ceased, his assailant
being then in retreat. Therefore one of the essential
ingredients of self-defense specified in No. 4, Article 8 of the
Penal Code is wanting" (now Article 11, Case No. 1, Revised
Penal Code). (United States vs. Dimitillo, 7 Phil., 475, 476)
As thus modified, the judgment appealed from is hereby
affirmed.
People v Genosa - Art 11. Self Defense (Unlawful Aggresion)
Facts: That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15
November1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant she did
not provoke her husband when she got home that night it
was her husband who began the provocation. The Appellant
said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and
she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.
In fact, The Appellant had to be admitted later at the Rizal
Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and
hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on
December 1, 1995.
The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried
to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben
would always follow her and they would reconcile. The
reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that
night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend,
Lulu Rubillos.
The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been
shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome. The
appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of
her husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was
attacked while asleep.
Issue: Whether or not (i) Marivic Genosa be granted the
Justifying circumstance of Self-defense; and (ii) can she be
held liable for the aggravating circumstance of treachery.
Held: No. Since self-defense since the existence of Battered
woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be
suffering in the relationship does not in itself establish the
legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence
must still be considered in the context of self-defense.
Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense.
And absence of aggression does not warrant complete or
incomplete self-defense.
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
No. treachery is present when one commits any of the crimes
against persons by employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the
defense that the offended party might make.
The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is
hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her
commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
[1] After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A.
9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women and
their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law
provides that "Victim-survivors who are found by the courts
to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of
any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-
defense under the Revised Penal Code."
Senoja v People - Art. 11 Self Defense (Test of Real and
Imminent Peril)
FACTS: First incident : Senoja and his companions were
having a drinking session. Later, Leon, armed with a bolo,
arrived in the hut of Crisanto, looking for his brother Miguel
whom he was angry at. The victim hacked the wall of the
house in anger. Leon attempted to hack Senoja when the
latter tried to pacify him; nevertheless, the latter embraced
and managed to pacify the former. Forthwith, a certain Jose
took the bolo of the victim and threw it away. The second
incident: the Leon demanded that Calica return his bolo as he
wanted to go home already. Because he had thrown away the
victims bolo,Calica was, thus, impelled to give his own. The
victim then warned the petitioner three times, May
mangyayari sa iyo, kung hindi ngayon, bukas, and left the
hut. When the victim had already gone about ten meters
from the hut, the petitioner followed the victim. The victim
turned around and told the petitioner, Kung hindi lang kita
inaanak. Senoya alleged that Leon hacked him, hitting the
latter on the left side of his head and thigh. Believing that the
victim would attack him anew, the petitioner stabbed the
victim frontally several times.] He also stabbed the victim on
the left buttock. Leon died on the spot with five fatal wounds
in chest and 1 stabwound on his buttocks. Senoya admitted
that he killed Leon, but only because of self-defense.
ISSUE: WON the crime made by Senoja was justified for
having done it in self-defense?
Page 3 of 16
HELD: NO. Art. 11- Circumstances/ requisites of self-defense
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a condition
sine qua non to self-defense. it is essential to self-defense
that it should be a defense against a present, actual or
imminent unlawful attack, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. An assault on his person, he cannot
punish when the danger or peril is over. When the danger is
over, the right of self-defense ceases. His right is defense, not
retribution. This is not present in the case at bar. First, The SC
agrees with the findings of CA that: It is clear that at that
point when the victim was simply walking toward his home;
he had stopped being an aggressor. Hence, the threat had
ceased. It was the appellant who left the hut and wanted a
confrontation. Senoja was now the unlawful aggressor in this
second phase of their confrontation.. It bears mentioning that
appellant also contradicted himself with respect for (sic) the
reason why he left the hut. First, it was to pacify Leon and the
second reason was that he was going home. The petitioner
was aware of the peril to his life if he followed the victim.If he
is really threatened by the words of Leon, then he should not
have left the hut immediately knowing that Leon was just 10
meters away. Second, As gleaned from Leon’s statement,
Kung hindi lang kita inaanak, the victim was not disposed,
much less determined to assault the petitioner.
People v. Razon - Art. 11 Self Defense (Reasonable
Necessity)
Facts: Razon, a taxicab driver, was held up by the group of
Gonzalo. While on his way, Razon stopped when he saw a
police officer, PO1 Chopchopen, and report the incident. The
Police Officer accompanied him, hesitant at first but
eventually went, on the place of the incident to check if the
persons who held him up was still there. On the area, the
police officer saw a man soaked in blood and was hardly
breathing with a cane of the side (Gonzalo, polio victim,
pronounced dead on arrival). He then asked Razon if he was
one of the men who held him up but answered no. During the
police investigation, Razon admitted he stabbed Gonzalo, one
one of the hold-uppers, and the death of The latter was only
a result of self-defense by the former. The RTC convicted
Razon for the crime of homicide without mitigating or
aggravating circumstances.
Issue: WON, the act committed by Razon was only self-
defense.
Held: No, to escape criminal liability, the person claiming self
defense must show by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that : (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression
amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb
of the person claiming self-defense; (2) there was reasonable
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) there was lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense
or at least any provocation executed by the person claiming
self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of
the victim's aggression (Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code).
There can be no self-defense unless the victim committed
unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense (People v. Tagana, G.R. No. 133027). Petitioner
claims that Gonzalo, who was seated behind him in the
taxicab, declared a hold-up and poked a knife at the base of
his neck, there was, indeed unlawful aggression. But, when
Razon, in a Herculean feat, was able to grab the knife from
Gonzalo and freed his right hand from the hold of Gonzalo's
two companions, the aggression no longer existed. He went
after Gonzalo and his two companions and started swinging
the knife he grabbed from Gonzalo, Razon became the
aggressor. It is settled that the moment the first aggressor
runs away, unlawful aggression on the part of the first
aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful aggression
ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound
the former aggressor; otherwise,retaliation and not self-
defense is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-
defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the
injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him,
while in self-defense the aggression was still existing when
the aggressor was injured by the accused. The defense
employed by petitioner also cannot be said to be reasonable.
The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must
be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack
sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to
prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. Thus, the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision the the court a quo with
modifications in the indemnity of civil damages.
People vs De la Cruz - Article 11 (Reasonable Necessity)
Facts: This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, finding the defendant guilty of
homicide. On the evening of February 18, 1934.
About nine o'clock the defendant and her friends started
home from a wake of one Sion and was followed 5 minutes
later by Francisco Rivera, who had been playing cards in the
house where the wake was held. At that time the members of
the defendant's party were walking in single file, the
defendant was the hindmost.
The defendant narrated that after they had passed a fork in
the trail and reached a narrow part a man suddenly threw his
arms around her from behind, caught hold of her breasts and
kissed her, and seized her in her private parts; that she tried
to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down;
Page 4 of 16
that when she felt weak and could do nothing more against
the strength of the man, she got a knife from her pocket,
opened it, and stabbed him in defence of her honour. She
further testified that the man who attacked her did not say
anything; that she asked him who he was but he did not
answer; that when she was assaulted she cried for help,
saying "Madre mia; Dios mio"; that when she was seized, she
was about two brazas behind her nearest companion; that
when she was face to face with her assailant during the
struggle she could scarcely recognize his face in the darkness
and could not be sure that it was Francisco Rivera. The
defendant had started back towards the house of mourning,
when the defendant reached the house she struck the knife
into a table and said that she stabbed Francisco Rivera
because he embraced her. Francisco Rivera was taken to the
hospital, where he died due to incurred stabbed under his
right breast.
Issue: WON the defendant acts of self-defense was justified?
Held: Yes. An attempt to rape a woman constitutes an
aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate
defense inasmuch as a woman’s honor cannot but be
esteemed as a right as precious, if not more than her very
existence. The accused was acquitted.
A use of the knife in repelling what she believed to be an
attack upon her honor since she had no other means of
defending herself. The woman thus imperilled may kill her
offender if that is the only meansleft for her to protect her
honor from so grave an ourtrage.
People vs. Luague - Art. 11 Self Defense (Reasonable
Necessity)
FACTS: One morning, the accused Natividad Luague was in
her house with her three children, while her husband and co-
accused Wenceslao Alcansare was grinding corn in Juan
Garing’s house several kilometers away. Paulino Disuasido
came and began to make love with Luague, drew and opened
a knife and threatening her with death. Paulino began to
embrace and touch Natividad’s breast and in preparing to lie
with her, he left the knife on the floor.
The accused, taking advantage of the situation, picked up the
weapon and stabbed him in the abdomen; and that Paulino,
feeling himself wounded, ran away jumping through the
window and falling on some stones, while the accused set
forth immediately for the Poblacion to surrender herself to
authorities and report the incident.
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
Paulino Disuadido had a different version. He said that
Alcansare was jealous of him and decided to get rid of him.
Disuasido claimed that in the morning of the crime, Paulino
passed through the couples’ house and the latter invited
Disuasido, along with his companion, inside. He lend his knife
to Natividad to cut her nails. Thereafter, she slashed him in
the abdomen. Paulino tried to return the blow but the
accused husband picked up a stone and struck him in the
forehead. Paulino fled. This version of Paulino Disuadido was
considered unsubstantial by the court.
ISSUE: WON the accused couples acted in legitimate self-
defense.
HELD: We hereby hold that the accused Natividad Luague in
wounding Paulino Disuasido to death, acted in legitimate self-
defense, and that the other accused Wenceslao Alcansare
had no participation in said act; wherefore, reversing the
appealed judgement, we hereby acquit both accused.
Luague’s act in mortally wounding Paulino Disuasido, unaided
by her husband and co-accused Wenceslao Alcansare,
constitutes exempting circumstance denned in Article 11,
subsection 1 of RPC because “aside from right to life which
rests the legitimate defense of our person, we have the right
to property acquired by us, and the right to honor which is
not the least prized of man’s ‘patrimony’.” (1 Viada, 172, 173,
5th edition).
People v Jaurigue - Art. 11 Self Defense (Reasonable
Necessity)
FACTS: Amado Capina, deceased victim, went to the chapel to
attend religious services and sat at the front bench facing the
altar. Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the
arrival of her father for the same purpose and sat on the
bench next to the last one nearest the door.Upon seeing
Avelina, Amado went and sat by Avelina’s right side from his
seat on the other side of the chapel, and without saying a
word, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.
Avelina Jaurigue, therafter, pulled out with her right hand the
fan knife which she had in a pocket of her dress with the
intention of punishing Amado’s offending hand. Amado
seized her right hand but she quickly grabbed the knife on her
left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side
of the neck inflicting upon him a wound. Amado Capina died
a few minutes after. Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue
were prosecuted in the Court for the crime of murder, of
which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina
Jaurigue was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seven years, four months
and one day of prision mayor to thirteen years, nine months
and eleven days of reclusion temporal, with the accessory
Page 5 of 16
penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Amando Capina, in the sum of P2,000, and to pay
one-half of the costs. She was also credited with one-half of
the period of preventive imprisonment suffered by her. From
said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue
appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern Luzon, and in
her brief filed therein on June 10, 1944. Establishing the
following facts of mitigating circumstances before the said
murder.
ISSUE: WON the defendant should be completely absolved of
all criminal responsibility because she is justified inhaving
acted in the legitimate defense.
HELD: NO. In the mind of the court, there is not the least
doubt that, in stabbing to death the deceased Amado Capina,
in the manner and form and under the circumstances above
indicated, the defendant and appellant committed the crime
of homicide, with no aggravating circumstance whatsoever,
but with at least three mitigating circumstances of a qualified
character to be considered in her favor; and, in accordance
with the provisions of article 69 of the Revised Penal Code,
she is entitled to a reduction by one or two degrees in the
penalty to be imposed upon her. And considering the
circumstances of the instant case, the defendant and
appellant should be accorded the most liberal consideration
possible under the law.
In this case, There was a reasonable necessity to stop the
deceased from doing the same thing or more. But there was
no necessity to use a knife because there was no danger to
her chastity or honor. To be entitled to a complete self-
defense of chastity, there must be an attempt to rape.
People v. Apolinar - Article 11 Self Defense (Defense of
Property)
FACTS: HONTIVEROS, J., Defendant and appellant, Anastacio
Apolinar alias Atong armed with a shotgun in a parcel of land,
where he was occupying, was overlooking a land when he
saw a man carrying a bundle of palay on his shoulder. He
called the attention of the man but he was ignored so he
fired at the air and then at the man for who he who believed
was a thief. After the incident he surrendered to the
authorities right after the incident wherein he gave a sworn
statement before the Justice of Peace of Umingan. ISSUES:
Whether or not defendant-appellant was acting on defense
of property as justifying circumstance of the crime
committed.
HELD: No. The defense of property can only be invoked when
it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted
with said property. In the case at bar, defendant-appellant
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
has not encountered any attack against him when he was
overlooking the parcel of land. It has been justified based on
the sworn statement that he has given when he surrendered
to the authorities immediately.
People v Oriente – Art. 11 Self Defense (Sufficient
Provocation)
FACTS: Arnel Tanael was on his way to the house of Romulo
Cario y Vallo(Deceased).He passed in front of the house of
[petitioner] Manuel Oriente and saw the latter and his
companions having a drinking spree at the terrace of the
house. He arrived at Romulos house where the latter was
drinking beer alone. Thereafter, Romulo went out of the
house to buy cigarette. While watching television in the
house of Romulo, Arnel Tanael heard two gunshots. Hence,
he rushed outside. He saw Romulo Cario, [petitioner] Manuel
Oriente, the latters daughter Marilou Lopez and the latters
husband, Paul Lopez and one Rogelio Gascon arguing along
the alley beside the concrete fence in front of Manuel
Orientes house where there was a lighted fluorescent light.
He heard Paul Lopez telling Romulo Cario,Ikaw Cario, and liit-
liit mo, and yabang mo! Then Arnel Tanael saw Marilou
coming out from their house with a lead pipe and handed it
over to Paul. Paul then hit Romulo with a lead pipe at his right
arm. Accused-appellant got the lead pipe from Paul and hit
Romulo on his left eyebrow. Romulo reeled and fell down.
Arnel brought Romulo to hospital but 2 hours later he died
due to Traumatic Head Injury. The petitioner has his own
version of the story and he insisted that Romulo threatened
them with a gun. The deceased told them that he will fire
them if they come near to him. And before that they had an
intense argument.
ISSUE: WON the accused be granted an opportunity of
mitigating circumstance, due to the premise that there was
lack of intent and that there was sufficient provocation of the
deceased?
HELD: Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper
conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting,
inciting, or irritating anyone. In order to be mitigating,
provocation must be sufficient and should immediately
precede the act. Provocation is sufficient if it is adequate to
excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly
be proportionate in gravity. That the provocation must
immediately precede the act means that there should not be
any interval of time between the provocation by the offended
party and the commission of the crime by the person
provoked. The fact that a heated or intense argument
preceded the incident is not by itself the sufficient
provocation on the part of the offended party as
Page 6 of 16
contemplated by law. Moreover, petitioner failed to establish
by competent evidence that the victim had a gun and used it
to threaten petitioner. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.The petitioner is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of an indeterminate sentence
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum
to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, as
maximum. The petitioner is further ordered to pay the heirs
of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as death indemnity
and P41,500.00 as actual damages.
People vs. Bumanglag – Art. 11 Self Defense (Defense of
Property)
Facts: On the night of January 2, 1909, Rafael Bumanglag, an
inhabitant of the pueblo of San Nicolas, Province of Ilocos
Norte, missed 4 baares or 40 bundles of palay which were
kept in his granary, , he found them in an inclosed filed which
was planted with sugar cane, for the purpose of ascertaining
who had done it, he left the palay there, and that night,
accompanied by Gregorio Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and
Saturnino Tumamao, he waited near the said field for the
person who might return to get the palay. A man, who turned
out to be Guillermo Ribis, made his appearance and
approaching the palay, attempted to carry it away with him,
but at that instant Bumanglag, Bundoc, and Ribao assaulted
the presumed thief with sticks and cutting and stabbing
weapons; as a result of the struggle which ensued the person
attacked fell down and died instantly, Bumanglag and his
companions believing that Guillermo Ribis was the author of
several robberies and thefts that had occurred in the place.
In view of the foregoing, the provincial fiscal filed a complaint
on January 15, 1909, charging Rafael Bumanglag, Gregorio
Bundoc, and Antonio Ribao with the crime of homicide, and
the trial judge, on February 5 of the present year, rendered
judgment in the case, sentencing the three accused persons
to the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of
reclusión temporal, with the accessories, and to the payment
of an indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and
the costs in equal parts, from which decision only Gregorio
Bundoc appealed. From the facts above mentioned, fully
proven in this case, the commission of the crime of homicide,
defined and punished by article 404 of the Penal Code, is
inferred, inasmuch as Guillermo Ribis was violently deprived
of his life in consequence of serious wounds and bruises,
some of them of a mortal nature, as appears from a
certificate issued by a physician who examined the body of
the deceased, and who ratified said certificate at the trial
under oath.
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
The accused Bundoc, the only appellant, pleaded not guilty,
but, in the absence of justification, and his exculpatory
allegation being unreasonable, it is not proper to hold that he
assaulted and killed the deceased, with the help of his
codefendants, in order to defend himself from an attack
made by the former with a bolo.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant, co-accused guilty of the
crime charged?
Held: Yes, however the judgment appealed from being
reversed with respect to Gregorio Bundoc only, the latter
should be, and is hereby, sentenced to the penalty of six
years and one day of prisión mayor, to the accessories of
article 61 of the code, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
jointly or severally with his co-defendants, in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay one-third the costs of both instances.
Article 11( justifying circumstances) of the same code should
be also considered in favor of the accused, in view of the
erroneous and quite general belief that it is legal to punish,
even to excess the thief who, in defiance of law and justice,
while refusing to work, devotes himself to depriving his
neighbors of the fruits of their arduous labors .
People Vs Narvaez, 121 SCRA 339
Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder of
David Fleisher and Flaviano Rubia. The crime transpired in
South Cotabato in 1968, during the time when the two
deceased were constructing a fence that would prevent
Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. One
afternoon, the appellant suddenly woke up from his rest
when he heard noises from the construction and saw the
fence being made. He tried to negotiate with Rubia and asked
them to stop the construction and talk things over first.
Fleisher refused and instructed his men to continue. After this
appellant grabbed his shotgun and fired at Fleisher, resulting
to the latter’s death. Then he shot Rubia; whom he saw
running towards the jeep where a gun is placed.
Prior to this incident, Fleischer’s company is involved in a
legal battle against the land settlers in Cotobato, including
the appellant. The case was still on going at the time of the
shooting and the said disputed property has no legal owners
yet. However, the appellant agreed to pay lease to Fleischer
in order to avoid trouble. Not being able to pay, he was given
6 months to vacate the property but the deceased conducted
the fencing barely two months since the notice. Appellant
was found guilty of murder by the trial court. Narvaez averred
that he should not be convicted as he committed the crime in
defense of his rights and property.
Page 7 of 16
Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the
appellant although he acted in defense of his rights and
property
Held: Yes. Defense of a person’s rights and properties is
treated as a justifying circumstance in Art. 11, Par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code given that: (1) there is unlawful
aggression, (2) there is a reasonable necessity of the means
employed and (3), there is lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the person defending himself. In the case at bar,
the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to the
appellant’s house as this amounts to unlawful aggression. The
owner of the property has the right to repel an unlawful
physical invasion. Moreover, the court finds that there is no
provocation at all on the part of the appellant as he was
sleeping at first when the fencing started and even pleaded
the deceased and their men to stop. However, the second
element for justification is absent as the reasonableness of
the means employed (firing of shotgun from the window) for
the resistance was disproportionate to the attack on his
property.
Since not all of the elements for justification are present, the
appellant’s act in killing is not justifiable. Narvaez was
convicted with two counts of homicide and not murder, as
treachery is absent and the crime was proven to be not
premeditated.
People v Chua Hiong (CA) – Art 11. Self Defense (Libel)
FACTS: The appellant being attacked by his nephews, and
another man, assumes full authorship on the alleged libelous
publication that contains explanation/ information about the
defamation that his nephew, Gocheco, and a certain Solipco,
have done to him. Thus, the fiscal decided that the appellant
meant and intended to convey false and malicious
implications, declaring him guilty of the crime libel. Thus, the
appellant appealed, stating that what he published was an act
of self-defense against the defamation of Gocheco and
Solipco. With the evidences, the appellant argued that the
former should be the one to be accused of libel.
ISSUE: WON the appellant was justified when he gave the
alleged libelous matter for publication.
HELD: The court ruled that the publication that the appellant
published was not libelous since it was intended to
counteract the accusations of the other party. Clearly,
referring to the Article 11 of the RPC, the act that Hiong have
done is just a self-defense against the threat of Gocheco and
Soplico.
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
People v Pelayo – Art 11. Self Defense (Libel)
FACTS: Appeal from a judgment convicting the accused-
appellant, Pantaleon V. Pelayo Jr. of the crime light oral
defamation and sentencing him to suffer an imprisonment of
twenty days of arresto menor; to indemnify the offended
party in the concept of nominal damages for injury to
reputation in the sum of PHP 1,000.00, and in case of
insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment which shall, however, not exceed one third of
the principal penalty; and to pay the costs” In the office of
Atty. Clapano, Pelayo told the latter, within the hearing of
Francisco Bañez, Rafael Mascariñas and Prisco Parmisano,
that while making one of his rounds to investigate the
existence of gambling in the community, Lim Peng (Chinese
operator) told him that the Gov. Almendras used to receive
from the Chinese PHP 500.00 protection money. Thus Pelayo
told Clapano:
“Another operator whom I be friended, confided to me that he
used to give Almendras PHP 500.00 monthly. The governor
was not satisfied and instead demanded that amount to be
hiked to PHP 1000.00 a month but because I could no longer
afford that amount I gave to Almendras my watch costing
PHP 250.00. Failure to give PHP 1,000.00 a month, Gov.
Almendras raided my place”, and other of similar import.
On the following day, Pelayo delivered a privileged speech
during the regular session of the City Council of Davao City
wherein, although without directly mentioning the governor
as receiving “tongs”, the reference to the latter after a series
of interpellations and answers during the speech, became
obvious. Appellant does not deny but even admits having
uttered these words and phrases to Clapano. However, he
offered as defences the following:
1. That he uttered those words and phrases in confidence to
Clapano and that they are covered by the urge on privileged
communication;
2. That since the crime as charged which is for serious slander
is different from, and not included in, the crime as proved
which is intriguing against honor, the conviction id illegal;
3. That he uttered these words and phrases in self-defense to
what then Gov. Almendras in the latter’s speech had stated of
him in another place a few days before;
4. The award for nominal damages should have been set iff
by what he was also entitled to as a result to slander made to
him by Gov. Almendras on a previous occasion.
ISSUE: W/N accused is liable of the crime light oral
defamation.
Page 8 of 16
HELD: YES. In appropriate cases, self-defense in libel, as well
as in slander, may be invoked as a legitimate defense. But the
situation obtaining in the instant case is not one of those
whose that defense can be validly invoked.
* For self-defense to exist, the accused should not retaliate
with scurrilous words that are entirely independent of, and
apart from, the alleged imputation made to him by the
complainant, or should not go beyond explaining what was
previously said of him for the purpose of repairing or
minimizing if not entirely removing the effect of the damage
caused to him, unless, by explaining he must of necessity
have to use slanderous remarks.
Tan v Standard Vacuum Oil Co., - Art. 11 Justifying
Circumstances (State of Necessity)
FACTS: The Standard Vacuum Oil Company ordered the
delivery of gasoline to the Rural Transit Company at its garage
at Rizal Avenue Extension, Manila.
The gasoline tank-truck trailer was driven by Julito Sto.
Domingo, with Igmidio Rico. While being discharged to the
underground tank, the gasoline caught fire. And so, Sto.
Domingo drove the truck across Rizal Avenue Extension and
abandoned it upon reaching the middle of the street. This
burned and destroyed the buildings on the opposite side of
the street. Anita Tan (plaintiff) was among those affected.
The driver and his helper were charged with arson through
reckless imprudence but were acquitted. The plaintiff,
brought the action against Standard Vacuum Oil Company
and the Rural Transit Company instead, to recover the
damages she has suffered for the destruction of her house.
ISSUE: Whether or not Julito Sto. Domingo and Igmidio Rico
were criminally liable to the crime charged.
HELD: No. The ruling made was that the two were not
criminally liable and responsible for the fire that destroyed
the house of the plaintiff. As per the court's decision, the fire
was due to a fortuitous event for which the accused were not
to blame. The defendants had only taken such damage,
because if the action made was not taken, a bigger
conflagration and several deaths would have occurred in Rizal
Avenue Extension.
The case at bar justifies Article 11 of Revised Penal Code,
"Any person, who in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an
act which causes damage to another, provided that the
following requisites are present: First, that the evil sought to
be avoided actually exists; Second, that the injury feared be
greater than that done to avoid it; Third, that there be no
other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
Soplete v People - Art. 11 Self Defense (additional case)
FACTS: Rogelio and his first cousin Nicanor Soplete were
jointly charged with frustrated homicide for wounding of
Eduardo Leyson VI and with Homicide for killing of Joel
Notarte. The incident took place during a fiesta, the
respondents claimed that it was the Soplete cousins that was
looking for a trouble during that night and their witnesses
says that Rogelio stabbed Leyson and Nicanor stabbed
Notarte, Notarte died because of that incident.
On the other hand, Rogelio admitted that he stabbed both
Leyson and Notarte, and he claimed that he only did that to
defend himself.
Another witness named Joy Malig-on said that she even
talked to Rogelio and she was informed that Leyson and his
group is harassing and provoking Nicanor but they did not
mind Leyson's group.
Elena Cafi (Bukay) asked her cousins Rogelio and Nicanor to
accompany her in looking for her children who was also
watched the singing contest, after Bukay found her children
they all headed home. While on their way home, Rogelio
suddenly found himself surrounded by 10 persons led by
Ledson. He shouted Nicanor to run and Nicanor fled. Leyson
drew his gun and fired at Rogelio but he was able to parry
Leyson's grip to the gun, then he stabbed Leyson once.
After stabbing Leyson, Notarte started mauling Rogelio, to
protect himself, he stabbed Notarte, which caused his death.
Nicanor was acquitted on both cases, while Rogelio was only
acquitted against the case that was filed by Leyson.
Rogelio was found guilty by the RTC and CA of Homicide
because of the death of Notarte.
Issue: WON there is a complete self defense on Rogelio's side
when he stabbed Notarte.
Held: Yes. As concluded by the trial court, the Soplente
cousins were surrounded by Leyson and his companions,
some of whom were armed. Leyson had drawn first and fired
first. At this juncture, Rogelio had every reason to believe
that it was not only Leyson who meant him harm, but that
Leyson’s companions were of the same mindset. The fact that
Leysons aggression had already been repelled did not
eliminate the threat to Rogelios well-being in the hands of
Leyson’s companions. The kicks employed by Notarte did
nothing but remind Rogelio that the threats to his life or limb
had not ceased (Unlawful Agression), even if those from
Leysons had.
Page 9 of 16
The second element which is reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression
was likewise present in the case at bar. The knife Rogelio
habitually carried was the only weapon he had in his person.
It was but logical that the knife would be the only thing he
could use against his attackers since the latter were
collectively armed with canes and a handgun.
The third element of self-defense, there was no evidence to
show that Rogelio had provoked Notarte into a fight. The
lower courts finding on this point is backed by the evidence
on record. As the lower court held, it is a fact that Rogelio had
not done anything to provoke the victim prior to or at the
time of the fatal encounter.
All the elements of self-defense having been established
through the uncontradicted testimony of Rogelio. Under
Article 11 of RPC, a person does not incur any criminal
liability if the act committed is in defense of his person.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and
appellant Rogelio Soplente is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
PEOPLE V. TANGAN – Article 11 (Self Defense)
G.R. No. 103613, February 23, 2001
Facts: Generoso Miranda was driving his car with his uncle,
Manuel Miranda, when firecrackers were thrown in
Generoso’s way causing him to swerve and cut Navy Captain
Eladio C. Tangan’s path. The accelerated and overtook
Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed
and kept blocking Generoso’s lane. Generoso passed him,
pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle with Tangan
doing the same. Both parties exchanged expletives. With this,
Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the
front seat.
The subsequent events per account of the parties' respective
witnesses were conflicting for the prosecution witnesses,
including Manuel Miranda, claimed that Tangan shot the
victim point-blank in the stomach at a distance of about one
foot. On the other hand, Tangan and his witness, alleged that
when he grappled with Generoso and Manuel Miranda for
possession of the gun, it fell to the ground and accidentally
fired, hitting the victim.
The trial court charged Tangan with homicide and with llegal
possession of unlicensed firearm but he was acquitted of
illegal possession of firearm, but convicted of homicide. The
privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense
and the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient
provocation on the part of the offended party and of passion
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
and obfuscation were appreciated in his favor; Tangan was
released from detention after the promulgation of judgment
and was allowed bail in the homicide case.
Subsequently, Tangan appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court to find that the
shooting was not accidental, increasing the award of civil
indemnity to P50,000.00. Then, Tangan appealed to this
court.
Issue: Whether or not the accused acted in self-defense
Held: No. The court ruled that the accused did not act in self-
defense because not all the elements of justifying
circumstances are present.
Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the following do
not incur any criminal liability: Anyone who acts in defense of
his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur: (a) Unlawful aggression, (b)
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it and (c) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of
the person defending himself.
In this case, the exchange of insulting words and invectives
between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how
objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful
aggression, except when coupled with physical assault.
The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person defending himself is not supported by
evidence. By repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandas for
almost five times, Tangan was in effect the one who
provoked the former. The repeated blowing of horns,
assuming it was done by Generoso, may be irritating to an
impatient driver but it certainly could not be considered as
creating so powerful an inducement as to incite provocation
for the other party to act violently.
It may be said that Tangan had no intention of killing the
victim but simply to retain possession of his gun. However,
the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result of the
gunshot wound, though the shooter may not have the
intention to kill, does not absolve him from culpability.
Therefore, having caused the fatal wound, Tangan is
responsible for all the consequences of his felonious act. He
brought out the gun, wrestled with the Mirandas but
anticipating that the gun may be taken from him, he fired and
fled.
WHEREFORE, the accused is GUILTY of Homicide and the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED with modifications.
Page 10 of 16
People v Narvaez Apr 20, 1983 (Defense of Property)
FACTS: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder
(qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia.
On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during
the time the two were constructing a fence that would
prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The
defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of
construction and found fence being made. He addressed the
group and asked them to stop destroying his house and
asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with
"No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his
"equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also
shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the
deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer
and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a
legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of
Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the
shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment
(settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to
be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased
his property from Fleisher (though case pending and
ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant
received letter terminating contract because he allegedly
didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house
from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and
property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both
murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in convicting
defendant-appellant although he acted in defense of his
rights.
HELD: Yes. However, the argument of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense is applicable only if the 3
requirements are fulfilled (See Article 11 par. 1 of the Revised
Penal Code). Defendant guilty of homicide but w/ mitigating
circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense. Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to
indemnify each group of heirs 4,000 w/o subsidiary
imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages. Appellant
has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release
is ordered.
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
People v. Fernandez Art. 11 (Defense of strangers)
G.R. Nos. L-32322-23
FACTS: There was a location shooting of the motion picture
"Ako Ang Sasagupa" somewhere in Quezon City. Accused
Eduardo Fernandez was playing the leading man's role,
Rosanna Ortiz starring as the leading lady.
Renato Pangilinan (the deceased) together with his driver
Apolinario Lopez and another companion, Hilario Sigua,
arrived at the place purportedly to see Rosanna. As
Fernandez and Labra were then drinking they invited
Pangilinan and Sigua to join them, which the latter two did.
Fernandez, voiced his resentment about Rosanna's having
caused delay in their location shooting that day.
Later that day, two policemen arrived by reason of some
information that there are people carrying guns in that
location. Pangilinan and Sigua admitted but claimed that their
guns were licensed. Nonetheless they were invited in the
police station. Ortiz and Fernandez, together with some crew,
rode a jeep and followed them. Pangilinan and Sigua’s guns
were cleared on the same day.
However, when Rosana saw that Pangilinan and his group
were already coming out of the precinct, she did not go back
to the jeep but instead went to ride in Pangilinan' s car and
instead of proceeding towards the scene of the location
shooting, the car turned right heading for Manila. Fernandez
and his companions followed them. When the car came to a
full stop because of traffic jam, Fernandez and Antido, armed
with firearms, approached Pangilinan's car. Fernandez
warned them not to move if they do not want to get hurt and
berated Rosanna for taking French leave and not going back
to their work. Pangilinan said "Talagang asar and tarantadong
ito. Sige, Totoy, tirahin mo na." And ready as he was, Sigua
shot Fernandez. Antido fired at Pangilinan and Lopez to avoid
them from joining Sigua's assault upon his master Fernandez.
It was proved that Fernandez also fired his gun however it
does not appear that he had hit anyone. Pangilinan died.
ISSUE: WON the acts of Antido are justified by reason of
defense of strangers
HELD: NO. The requisite of lack of sufficient provocation is
absent. The acts of Fernandez and Antido Fernandez and
Antido, both of them brandishing their respective firearms,
having approached Pangilinan's car, and with Fernandez
berating Ortiz, constituted sufficient provocation for
Pangilinan and his companions to react.
There was sufficient provocation on the part of Fernandez
and Antido. But there was unlawful aggression on the part
of Sigua. The court appreciated the mitigating circumstance
Page 11 of 16
of having acted in incomplete defense of Fernandez. He only
reacted to the assault upon Fernandez by Sigua, sensing
evidently that Pangilinan and Lopez might join Sigua.
Inasmuch as the provocation came principally from
Fernandez and it is satisfactorily proven that he also fired his
gun, he must also be liable for the death and injuries that
resulted from his acts, even if it does not appear that he
himself hit Pangilinan and Lopez. As in the case of Antido, he
tried to repeal an aggression with means which cannot be
said to be unreasonably uncalled for in the premises.
FERNANDEZ AND ANTIDO BOTH GUILTY OF HOMICIDE AND
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
People v. Boholst – Caballero (Self Defense – Defense of
Relative)
Facts: Convicted for having killed her husband, Cunigunda
Boholst-Caballero, accused-appellant, seeks a reversal of the
judgment of the Court of First Instance. The accused was
married to Francisco Caballero. Their marriage was not a
happy one because the couple separated. The accused was
then lived with her parents together with their child. One
night, after the accused was gone for a caroling, she met her
drunk husband. Francisco held her collar then asked, “Where
have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch.”
Afterwards, Francisco held her by the hair and slapped her
until her nose bled then pushed her towards the ground.
When she fell to the ground, Francisco knelt over, her held
her neck, and choked her saying. "Now is the time I can do
whatever I want. I will kill you". With no other recourse, the
accused pulled the knife of her husband and thrust it at him.
In the morning after the incident, the accused then
surrendered herself to the police and gave her statement.
Francisco died after being taken to the hospital. Thus, this
case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for the penalty
imposed was Reclusion Perpetua.
Issue: WON, the accused-appellant acted in self-defense of
her person.
Held: Yes, the SC ruled that all the requisites of self-defense
were present with the case at bar. (1) The element of
unlawful aggression has been clearly established by the acts
committed by her husband; (2) reasonable necessity for the
means employed is likewise present. Here we have a woman
who being strangled and choked by a furious aggressor and
rendered almost unconscious by the strong pressure on her
throat had no other recourse but to get hold of any weapon
within her reach to save herself from impending death.
Reasonable necessity of the means employed in self-defense
does not depend upon the harm done but rests upon the
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
imminent danger of such injury. (U.S. vs. Paras, 1907, 9 Phil.
367, citing Decision of Dec. 22, 1887) And so the fact that
there was no visible injury caused on the body of the
appellant which necessitated medical attention, a
circumstance noted by the trial court, is no ground for
discrediting self-defense; what is vital is that there was
imminent peril to appellant's life caused by the unlawful
aggression of her husband. The knife tucked in her husband's
belt afforded appellant the only reasonable means with
which she could free and save herself from being strangled
and choked to death. Equally relevant is the time-honored
principle: Necessitas Non habet legem. Necessity knows no
law; (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. Undoubtedly appellant herein did
not give sufficient provocation to warrant the aggression or
attack on her person by her husband, Francisco. All that
appellant did was to provoke an imaginary commission of a
wrong in the mind of her husband, which is not a sufficient
provocation under the law of self-defense. Thus, the Supreme
Court acquitted the accused-appellant.
People vs Toring G.R. No. L-56358 October 26, 1990
Facts: Samuel Augusto (victim/deceased) with his family
attended a benefit dance to support her daughter in the
town's pageant. As the tipsy victim stepped out of the
dancing area to answer the call of nature, he was stabbed in
the abdomen by Luis Toring, accompanied by Carmelo Berdin
and Diosdado Berdon. A barangay tanod, Felix Berdin saw
what happened and tried to catch the three but failed.
Augusto died of massive hemorrhage secondary to the stab
wound on the abdomen. The death weapon used was a
kitchen knife, later recovered from Toring's house. The three
were charged of conspiracy in killing the victim in a
treacherous manner. It was alleged that Berdon supplied the
weapon and Berdin concealed the weapon to prevent its
discovery by the police. The three pleaded not guilty. Toring
testified that he did not intend to kill the victim and only
reacted such way to defend his cousin because Samuel thrust
his shotgun on his cousin's chin. Toring contends that the act
made was justifiable by Article 11 (3) of RPC. Lower court
ruled out the existence of conspiracy. It was held that the
three have different liabilities for Samuel's death. Appellants
seek the reversal of Circuit Criminal Court where in Luis
Toring, Diosdado Berdon, and Camelo Berdin was charged of
murder, with treachery as qualifying circumstance.
Issue: Whether or not the act done by defendants are
justified by defense of stranger.
Held: Lower court's decision is AFFIRMED. The Court convicts
Luis Toring as principal in the murder of Samuel Augusto and
Page 12 of 16
Diosdado Berdon as an accomplice in the crime performed.
Carmelo Berdin, however, was acquitted. It was found that
Toring was the "aggressor acting in retaliation or revenge by
reason of a running feud or long-standing grudge" between
his gang and the group of Samuel. It was also mentioned that
a year before the incident, Toring was shot by Edgar Augusto
(Samuel's brother) and hence, in his desire to avenge himself,
Toring, needed but a little excuse to do away with the object
of his hatred. Thus, he was motivated by revenge,
resentment or evil motive.
Ty vs. People - State of Necessity
FACTS: Vicky Ty’s mother and sister were confined at Manila
Doctor’s Hospital with total hospital bills amounting to P
1,075,592.95. Ty executed a promissory note wherein she
assumed payment of the obligation in installments. To assure
payment of the obligation, she drew several postdated checks
against Metrobank payable to the hospital. These seven
checks were all dishonored by the drawee bank and returned
unpaid to the hospital due to insufficiency of funds, with the
“Account Closed” advice. Ty was charged violating Batas
Pambansa (BP) 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks
Law.
For here defense, Ty claimed that she issued the checks
because of “an uncontrollable fear or greater injury.” She
averred that she was forced to issue the checks to obtain
release for her mother whom the hospital inhumanely and
harshly treated and would not discharge unless the hospital
bills are paid. She said that her mother’s deprivation of room
facilities (aircon refrigerator and television) and
inconveniences (cutting of telephone line, late delivery of
food and refusal to change gown and bedsheets) affected her
mother’s mental, psychological and physical health that the
latter contemplated suicide if she would not be discharged
from the hospital.
ISSUE: WON the justifying circumstance of state of necessity
under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find
application in this case.
HELD: The Court do not agree. The law prescribes that three
requisites to exempt the actor from liability under this
paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually
exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater that the one done
to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and less
harmful means of preventing it.
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely
expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is
merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future,
this defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her
own admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other
forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure her
obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing,
the greater injury feared should not have been brought about
by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction
of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced checks
was brought about by Ty’s own failure to pay her mother’s
hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the
exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the
justifying circumstance of state of necessity to absolve her of
liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty been
able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was
done without her full volition. Under the circumstances,
however, it is quite clear that neither uncontrollable fear nor
avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance of
the bounced checks.
People vs Oanis – Art. 11 Fulfillment of Duties
Fact: Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio
Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta,
chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine
Constabulary, respectively, were, after due trial, found guilty
by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence.
Received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor:
"Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with
bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive."
Serapio Tecson, paramour of Irene Requinea was sleeping in
his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta,
on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively that
causes the victim’s death, believing him to be Anselmo
Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable
inquiry as to his identity.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant acts of fulfillment of
duties were justified?
Held: No. The accused exceeded in the fulfillment of their
duty when they killed a sleeping person whom they believed
to be the wanted criminal without making any previous
inquiry to his death. The doctrine is restated in the new Rules
of Court thus:
"No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in
making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be
subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his
detention."
Page 13 of 16
In case at bar, the appellants, found no circumstances
whatsoever which would press them to immediate action.
The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had
ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without
hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless
arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as
the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea.
BAXINELA V. PEOPLE – Art. 11 FULFILLMENT OF DUTIES
FACTS: Petitioner SPO2 Eduardo Baxinela was in a PUB
drinking with two other policemen on October 18, 1986.
There was a minor altercation between the deceased Lajo
and another customer at the pub but eventually the two
were able to patch things up. From behind, Baxinela held
Lajo's left arm and asked why he was carrying a gun.
Thereafter, an explosion coming from Baxinela's gun was
heard. Lajo, still standing, Took two steps and then fell down.
ISSUE: Whether or not fulfillment of duty may validly be
invoked by the petitioner.
HELD: NO. SPO2 Baxinela's duty is to investigate the reason
why Lajo had a gun, By firing upon Lajo who was not resisting
at all the officer already exceeded his duty. The decision of
the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED. The conviction of
appellant Eduardo Baxinela for the crime of HOMICIDE is
AFFIRMED but his sentence is reduced to an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prison
correccional medium, as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prison mayor minumum, as maximum. The awards of
damages are affirmed. No costs.
POMOY vs. People – Art. 11 (Fulfilment of Duty)
FACTS: Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the
Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries in Concepcion,
Iloilo. He was arrested by police officer allegedly in
connection on a Robbery case. Balboa was taken to the
Headquarters of the already defunct 321st Philippine
Constabulary Company at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He
was detained in jail. Later that day, about a little past 2 oclock
in the afternoon, petitioner, who is a police sergeant, went
near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained and
directed the latter to come out, purportedly for tactical
interrogation at the investigation room, as he told Balboa:
Let’s go to the investigation room. The investigation room is
at the main building of the compound where the jail is
located. The jail guard on duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened
the jail door and walked towards the investigation room. At
that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in
a holster which was hanging by the side of his belt. The gun
was fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle of the
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
gun protruding from the holster. When petitioner and Balboa
reached the main building and were near the investigation
room, two (2) gunshots were heard. When the source of the
shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .45
caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood,
about two (2) feet away. The witnesses (Erna Basa, Eden
Legaspi) heard some noise and exchange of words which
were not clear, but it seemed there was growing trouble;
Erna opened the door to verify and saw Roweno Pomoy and
Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of the gun; she
was inside the room and one meter away from the door;
Pomoy and Balboa while grappling were two to three meters
away from the door; the grappling happened so fast and the
gun of Pomoy was suddenly pulled out from its holster and
then there was explosion. Balboa died.
ISSUE: WON Self defense exists as the accused acted in
fulfilment of his duty as a police officer and the act is lawful?
HELD: YES. Petitioner is ACQUITTED. It was in the lawful
performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner
tried to defend his possession of the weapon when the victim
suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of
the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching
of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a detained
person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to
facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity,
including petitioner himself. Petitioner cannot be faulted for
negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to
prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to
others. As he so assiduously maintained, he had kept his
service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its
holster at all times, especially within the premises of his
working area. Petitioner advanced self-defense as an
alternative. Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot
Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from
real and immediate danger. Self-defense is inconsistent with
the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no
intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily
contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defend
oneself from imminent danger.
Angcaco vs. People - G.R. No. 146664 - February 28, 2002
FACTS: Petitioner John Angcaco and his co-accused in the trial
court, namely, Ramon Decosto,Protacio Edep, Lydio Lota, and
Mario Felizarte, were members of the Integrated National
Police of Taytay, Palawan. At the time of the incident, they
were serving a warrant of arrest issued by the Municipal Trial
Court of Taytay on Restituto Bergante, who was wanted in
connection with a robbery case. Edep was acting station
commander, while Restituto Bergante was the barangay
captain of Bato, Taytay, Palawan. Prosecution presented
Page 14 of 16
witnesses stating that Edep fired his carbine looking for
Bergante but was informed by Noel, son of Bergante, that his
father was not in the house for he went to Puerto Princesa.
Afterwards, they were ordered by Edep to go down and they
were flanked by Angcaco ob the right and Decosto on the left
side. Noel and Freddie Ganancial, their cousin, joined Noel.
Protacio Edep approached Freddie saying, You are tough, and
pushed him. Then, shots rang out from the armalite and short
firearm of Decosto and Edep, as a result of which Freddie
Ganancial turned around and dropped to the ground face
down. Decosto was around three meters away from Freddie.
On the other hand, defense stated that when they reached
the house, Edep and his men took positions as they had been
warned that Restituto Bergante might resist arrest. Decosto
and Angcaco were each armed with armalites, Lota had a
carbine, Felizarte a revolver, and Edep a carbine and a
revolver. Decosto was on the left side of Edep, around seven
to 10 meters from the latter. Angcaco, on the other hand,
was on right side of Edep, around four to seven meters from
the latter. Edep called Restituto Bergante to come out of the
house as he (Edep) had a warrant for his arrest. Restitutos
wife replied that her husband was not in the house, having
gone to Puerto Princesa .A commotion then took place inside
the house and, shortly after, petitioner saw a man coming
down the house. They fired warning shots to stop the man,
but petitioner saw another person with a bolo near Edep. He
shouted, Sarge, this is the man who tried to hack you!, and
shot the unidentified man, who fell to the ground face up. At
the time of the incident, Decosto was on the left side of Edep,
while petitioner, Felizarte, and Lota were on the right side of
Edep. They later learned that the person killed was Freddie
Ganancial.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA)
found Angcaco guilty of murder hence; a petition for review
on certiorari was filed.
ISSUES: Whether or not Angcaco is exempted from criminal
liability under the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty.
HELD: NO. No evidence was presented to prove that
Ganancial attempted to prevent petitioner and his fellow
officers from arresting Restituto Bergante. There was in fact
no clear evidence as to how Freddie Ganancial was shot.
Indeed, as already stated, any attempt by the victim to arrest
the wanted person was pointless as Restituto Bergante was
not in his house. As regards the second requisite of Par. 5,
Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code, there can be no question
that the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessary
consequence of the arrest to be made on Restituto Bergante.
Moreover, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
Freddie Ganancial. It was only contented that the victim,
armed with bolo, approached Sgt. Protacio Edep menacingly.
But there was no other competent evidence to support this
self-serving claim. This only means that the first requisite of
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code has not been
insufficiently proven by the accused. The court has AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION the petition.
People vs Beronilla Art. 11 (Lawful Order)
Facts: Accused Manuel Beronilla, along with his co-accused
Paculdo, Velasco and Adriatico was indicted for the crime of
murder after sentencing Arsenio Borjal to death by hanging,
upon instruction from a military superior, one Lt. Col. RH
Arnold of the 15th Infantry USAFIP. Beronilla, then a military
mayor, tried and sentenced Borjal, after finding the latter
guilty of war crimes. Arsenio Borjal was a former town mayor
of La Paz, Abra and responsible for the torture and capture of
guerilla and American soldier during Japanese occupation.
Beronilla was sentenced by a court of first instance to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of 17 yrs and 4 months. The
same was appealed to a high Court.
Issue: Whether or not the accused guilty of the crime of
murder under a lawful order?
Held: No, the accused-appellant was acquitted by the Court.
Under the law, any person who acts in the obedience to an
order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose incurred
no criminal liability under the doctrine of justifying
circumstances.(article 11, par 6 RPC)
That the accused-appellant in this case merely acted base on
the instruction given to him by his superior to administer the
function of his office, for a subordinate cannot question his
superior’s order. That he only acted in good faith, without
being aware of the illegality, without any fault or negligence
on his part, he is not criminally liable.
People Vs Barroga – Art. 11 (Lawful Order)
Facts: The Defendant Luciano Barroga is convicted by the trial
court of falsification of a private document. The defendant
admitted that he prepared the falsified documents with full
knowledge of its falsity; but he alleged that he did so from
data furnished by his immediate chief, the now deceased
Baldomero Fernandez, and only in obedience to instructions
from him.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant is liable for the crime of
falsification of a private document.
Page 15 of 16
Held: Yes. The decision of the trial court was affirmed. The
court is not convinced that the defendant committed the acts
charged against him in obedience to the instructions of his
superior. It has been sufficiently proven that the data were
not supplied by Fernandez, but by the head of the pressmen.
Even supposing that Fernandez gave the instructions, this
does not relieve the defendant of criminal liability as the
latter’s obedience was not legally due. Par. 6 of Art 11 of the
Revised Penal Code states that any person who acts in
obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose shall not incur criminal liability. To invoke this as a
justifying circumstance, the act must be: (1) an order that has
been issued by the superior; (2) that such an order must be
for some lawful purpose, and (3) that the means used by the
subordinate to carry out said order is lawful. In the case at
bar, the defendant was aware of the illegality of the order
and still pursued with the act. Therefore, the third requisite
of Par. 6 Article 11 is not present and this renders his defense
of obedience to an order for a lawful purpose invalid.
Tabuena VS. Sandiganbayan – Art11. (Obedience to an
Order)
FACTS: The accused, Luis Tabuena, was the General Manager
of Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). During his
term, Tabuena, together with Gerardo Dabao (Assistant
General Manager), caused the released of Php 55 million of
MIAA funds by means of 3 withdrawals. This was done as
obedience to the instruction of then President Marcos
through verbal and memorandum means stating that
Tabuena was directed to pay immediately to the Philippine
National Construction Corporation (PNCC). Despite of the
disbursement, which was paid in cash, the PNCC affirmed
that there were no payments made by MIAA. On the defense
of Tabuena, he was acting in good faith when he disbursed
the money and stated that he was only complying to the
Marcos memorandum which ordered him to forward
immediately to the Office of the President P55 Million in cash
as partial payment of MIAA’s obligations to PNCC, and that he
(Tabuena) was of the belief that MIAA indeed had liabilities to
PNCC. However, the Sandiganbayan rejected their defense
which results to his conviction with the crime charged of
intentional malversation. Thus, the accused appeal the
Sandiganbayan decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused should be liable despite of
his defense that he acted in good faith, obeying the
instruction of President Marcos.
HELD: NO. The court decided to ACQUIT the accused.
According to Article 11, “the subordinate is not liable for
carrying out an illegal order of his subordinate, if he is not
aware of the illegality of the order and he is not negligent.” In
Civil Law Cases – Art. 11 – Trece Martires and Friends
the case at bar, it was proved that the Tabuena acted in good
faith by following the command of the President. Also, the
subordinate-superior relationship between Tabuena and
Marcos is clear since Tabuena was working on a government-
owned agency, which was also under the command of the
highest official (Marcos). Thus, on the belief that MIAA had
liabilities on PNCC, it is justifiable that the disbursement
made by Tabuena was without evil intent.

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