RABADILLA V CA, G.R. NO.

113725

FACTS
A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee to a 511, 855
hectare land. A condition was however imposed to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime of said Maria
Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall continue delivering
the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey the said land to the
estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply with the terms of the will; that
since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the land was mortgaged to the Philippine
National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near
descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near
descendants at the time of his death, no one can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the
fruits of the devised land.

ISSUE
Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is obliged to comply with the terms of the Will left by Aleja Belleza.

HELD
YES. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The “near descendants” being referred to in
the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised property was already transferred to
Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died, ownership over the same property
was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person,
not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of the Will were
transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death
also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Will on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear
therefore, that Johnny should have continued complying with the terms of the Will. His failure to do so
shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey the property to the estate of Aleja.
MONTINOLA VS HERBOSA CA, REP 2ND 377

FACTS
Montinola filed an action against the heirs of Dr. Jose Rizal for recovery of possession of personal property
(the RIZAL RELICS) allegedly sold to him by Doña Trinidad Rizal. The trial court held that neither party is
entitled to the possession of such property, relying principally on the fact that in Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios,
there is a line where Rizal bequeathed all his property to the Filipino people. The court argued that the
handwritten work of Rizal constitutes a holographic will giving the State all his property.

ISSUE
Does Mi Ultimo Adios constitute a last will?

HELD
NO. An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a thought or advice but does not contain a
disposition of property, and executed without Animus Standi cannot be legally considered a will. Rizal's
Mi Ultimo Adios is but a literary piece of work, and was so intended. It may be considered a will in a
grammatical sense but not in a legal or juridical sense. Moreover, it also lacks the requirements of a
holographic will such as a statement of the year month and day of its execution and his signature.
TESTATE ESTATE OF CARLOS GIL v. PILAR GIL VDA. DE MURCTANO, GR No. L-3362

FACTS
Carlos Gil executed a last will and testament. However, this will was destroyed and needed to be
reconstituted. The parties submitted a stipulation of facts agreeing that the will as transcribed in the
record of appeal in another case is “a true and correct copy." The oppositors contend that the will is invalid
since the attestation clause did not state that the testator signed the will; it declared only that it was
signed by the witnesses.

ISSUE
Whether there is testamentary succession.

HELD
NO. The right to dispose of property by will is not natural but statutory, and statutory requirements should
be satisfied. There is no reason why wills should not be executed by complying substantially with the clear
requisites of the law, leaving it to the courts to supply essential elements.
DY YIENG SEANGIO v. AMOR A. REYES, GR NOS. 140371-72

FACTS
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of
the late Segundo Seangio and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D. Seangio-Santos
as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. In view of the
purported holographic will, they averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically... suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the
probate of the will.

ISSUE
1. Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.
2. Whether there is preterition.

HELD
1. YES. Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the
hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter's property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in
the absence of Alfredo.
It is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and within
the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of construction
are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is
contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo's holographic will, and that the law favors testacy
over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides
that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court.

2. NO. The Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will.
MARINA DIZON-RIVERA v. ESTELA DIZON, GR No. L-24561

FACTS
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was
survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon,
Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a
legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a
pre-deceased legi-timate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina
Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect.
Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other
legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera,
Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez and Laureano Tiamzon.
In her will, the testatrix "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance with her testamentary
disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising practically the entire
bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren.

ISSUE
Whether or not the testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix' will are in the nature of devises
imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore subject to reduction.

HELD
YES. Testatrix' testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. The testator's
wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments.
The Court stressed that "the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and
fulfillment, must be settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise." This was properly complied
with in the executrix-appellee's project of partition
TESTATE ESTATE OF LATE REVEREND FATHER PASCUAL RIGOR. PARISH PRIEST OF ROMAN CATHOLIC
CHURCH OF VICTORIA v. BELINA RIGOR, GR No. L-22036

FACTS
Father Pascual Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a will executed
on October 29, 1933. A devise was made for ricelands located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of
around forty-four hectares in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.
Named as devisees in the will were the testator's nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia
Rigor-Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his
cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
About thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, or on February 19, 1954, the parish
priest of Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the appointment of a new
administrator. The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered with a petition praying that the bequest be
declared inoperative and that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said ricelands

ISSUE
Whether the device of ricelands is efficacious or enforceable.

HELD
NO. The Court held that the said bequest refers to the testator's nearest male relative living at the time
of his death and not to any indefinite time thereafter. Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any
nephew who became a priest, the unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual
or inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of Victoria, as envisaged
in the will, was likewise inoperative.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the old Civil Code, now
article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should be inoperative, it shall be merged
into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists"

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960(2), which provides that
legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all that belongs to the testator". There
being no substitution nor accretion as... to the said ricelands, the same should be distributed among the
testator's legal heirs. The effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly testate, or that there may be
mixed succession. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate succession as
to the property covered by the said legacy (Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
DELFIN YAMBAO v. ANGELINA GONZALES, GR No. L-10763

FACTS
On August 10, 1942, Maria Gonzales executed a will bequeathing to appellees all her properties situated
in Sta. Rosa, Laguna. The will was probated in 1948. Immediately, thereafter, appellant went to appellees
to request that he be placed as tenant of the riceland which, by an express provision of said will, they
were directed to give to him for cultivation as tenant, and when they refused alleging that they had
already given it to another tenant he filed the present action.

ISSUE
Whether Yambao should be the tenant of the land.

HELD
YES. The trial court has not properly interpreted the real import of the wish of the testatrix.
The words "dapat TUNGKULIN O GAMPANAN" means to do or to carry out as a... mandate or directive,
and having reference to the word "pahihintulutan", can convey no other meaning than to impose a duty
upon appellees. To follow the interpretations given by the trial court would be to devoid the wish of the
testatrix of its real and true meaning.
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA v. DELFIN N. JUICO, GR No. L-15737

FACTS
On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in
Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno,
one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his wife Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. The latter was appointed judicial administratrix.
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a second marriage, and
without having begotten any child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. The defendant Delfin N. Juico duly
appointed and qualified as judicial administrator.
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator of the estate of the widow
Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became
vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to
clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause.

ISSUE
Whether action of the plaintiff has merits.

HELD
YES. Appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva as Reversionary Legatee is declared entitled to the
ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the
death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno.
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions contained in clause 7 of his
testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which
are ever the primary source in ascertaining his intent. Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the
Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the following:
"ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear
intention to use them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained.
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a
contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and
that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)"
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil.,
233, that the intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed
law of interpretation, and all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the testator's words, unless it
clearly appears that his intention was otherwise.