Labor Law 2 Case Digest GURTIZA

LABOR LAW 2 CASE DIGEST By: Vanessa Yvonne A.
Gurtiza
DOMONDON vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 154376, September 30, 2005
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL and JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITER ON TRANSFER OF CAR-OWNERSHIP
FACTS:
Domondon (PET) was hired by Van Melle Phils. Inc (VMPI) as a Materials Manager through its President
and General Manager Victor M. Endaya. However, Endaya was transferred to China and he was replaced by
Niels Have (RESP) who is a Dutch national. From this, Have (RESP) requested Domondon (PET) to resign
because he wanted to reorganize and put his people in management. However, Domondon (PET) refused to
resign.
Niels Have (RESP) questioned Domondon (PET)’s refusal and was subjected to verbal abuse. His
competence was undermined by baseless and derogatory memos, which lay the bases for his removal from
the company. He also did not receive his 14th month pay. Niels Have (RESP) even informed Domondon (PET)
that things would get more difficult for him if he does not resign. He also threw a veiled threat at Domondon
(PET) to the effect that a dignified resignation would be better than being fired for a fabricated lawful cause.
He also offered financial assistance if Domondon (PET) would leave peacefully, but the offer must be accepted
immediately or it would be withdrawn. Thus, Domondon (PET) signed a "ready-made" resignation letter
without deliberation and evaluation of the consequences. And upon giving his resignation letter, VMPI posted
a memorandum with information of his replacement and Have (P.RESP) gave him a portion of the offered
financial package.
Domondon (PET) filed a complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch against VMPI and Niels Have
(P.RESP) for illegal dismissal.
However, on the side of Van Melle Phils., Inc. (VMPI), they admitted that they hired Domondon (PET)
but they contended that they did not illegally dismiss him. They alleged that they did not coerced and
intimidated Domondon (PET) into resigning, and that Domondon (PET) was the one one who voluntarily
resigned to embark on management consultancy in the field of strategic planning and import/export.
Domondon (PET) even informed them about his intention to resign and requested a P300,000 financial
support due him upon resignation. Domondon (PET) proposed the transfer of ownership of the car assigned to
him in lieu of the financial assistance from the company. Since company policy prohibits disposition of assets
without valuable consideration, the parties agreed that Domondon (PET) shall pay for the car with the
₱300,000.00 "soft landing" financial assistance from private respondent VMPI. However, Domondon (PET) did
not use the P300,000 finnacial assistance to pay for the car as agreed upon.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the private respondents due to lack of merit of the complaint. It
was also affirmed by NLRC. Domondon (PET) filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but it was also denied.
Hence, Domondon (PET) filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC and contended that the
CA fails to apply the rules in termination of employment that the employer has the burden of proof by
substantial evidence that the employee was removed for lawful or authorized cause. He also contended that
the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the issue on the transfer of car ownership since it is the regular court
who has jurisdiction over it.
LABOR LAW 2 CASE DIGEST By: Vanessa Yvonne A. Gurtiza
ISSUE:
1. WON Domondon (PET) was illegally dismissed.

2. WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide the question on the transfer of ownership
of the car assigned to Domondon (PET).
RULING:
1. No. Domondon was not illegally dismissed because Domondon (PET)’s letter of
resignation, his educational attainment, and the circumstances antecedent and contemporaneous to
the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are substantial proof of Domondon (PET)’s voluntary
resignation.
First, Domondon (PET)’s letter of resignation was categorical that he was resigning "to embark on
management consultancy in the field of strategic planning and import/export." He was holding a managerial
position at VMPI and he was previously Vice-President for strategic planning at LG Collins Electronics. Thus,
"management consultancy in the field of strategic planning" was a logical reason for his resignation.
Second, it is impossible that Domondon (PET) was coerced and intimidated in signing the resignation
letter since Domondon (PET) is not an ordinary employee with limited educational background.
Third, resignation is a formal pronouncement of relinquishment of an office. It is made with the

intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by an act of relinquishment.
In this case, Domondon (PET) relinquished his position when he submitted his letter of resignation. His
subsequent act of receiving and keeping his requested "soft landing" financial assistance of ₱300,000.00, and
his retention and use of the car subject of his arrangement with private respondents showed his resolve to
relinquish his post.
Thus, Domondon (PET) was not illegally dismissed.
2. Yes. The issue falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
Under the paragraph 6 of Article 217(a) of the New Civil Code, except claims for Employees
Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims, arising from employer-
employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement
shall be under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
In this case, the transfer of the ownership of the company car to Domondon (PET) is connected with his
resignation and arose out of the parties’ employer-employee relationship. It is shown that both of the parties
agreed that the P300,000 financial support shall be used to pay the subject car. However, Domondon (PET)
failed to pay it and also did not return the car.
Thus, private respondents’ claim for damages falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
MARC II MARKETING, INC. vs. JOSON

G.R. No. 171993, December 12, 2011
JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITER
FACTS:
Before Marc II Marketing Inc (PET) was officially incorporated, Alfredo Joson (RESP) was hired by Lucila
Joson (PET), in her capacity as President of Marc Marketing, Inc., to work as the General Manager of Marc II
Marketing Inc (PET). For occupying the said position, Alfredo Joson (RESP) was considered as its corporate
officers by the express provision of Section 1, Article IV of its by-laws which provides that “its corporate
officers are as follows: Chairman, President, one or more Vice-President(s), Treasurer and Secretary. Its Board
of Directors, however, may, from time to time, appoint such other officers as it may determine to be
necessary or proper.”
Thereafter, on August 15, 1994, Marc II Marketing Inc (PET) was officially incorporated and registered
with the SEC. Alfredo Joson (RESP) was appointed by the corporation’s Board of Directors as one of its
corporate officers with the title of General Manager and continued to discharge his duties as General
Manager.
However, on June 30, 1997, Marc II Marketing Inc (PET) decided to stop and cease its operations due to
poor sales collection aggravated by the inefficient management of its affairs which leads to the termination of
Alfredo Joson (RESP) as General Manager since his services are no longer be necessary for the winding up of its
affairs.
Alfredo Joson (RESP) filed a complaint against Marc II Marketing Inc (PET) and Lucila Joson (PET) before
the Labor Arbiter on the ground of illegal dismissal and alleged that Lucila Joson (PET) dismissed him due to
the feeling of hatred she harbored towards his family since Lucila Joson (PET) wanted to nullify her marriage
with his brother who was the estranged husband of Lucila Joson (PET).
However, Marc II Marketing Inc (PET) and Lucila Joson (PET) files a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
Labor Arbiter’s lack of jurisdiction because the case involved an intra-corporate controversy, which jurisdiction
belongs to the SEC [now with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)]. The Labor Arbiter deferred the said motion until
the final termination of the case.
The Labor Arbiter renders judgement in favour of Alfredo Joson (RESP) that he was illegally dismissed
because the records revealed that Marc II Marketing Inc (PET) and Lucila Joson (PET) failed to present any
evidence to justify Alfredo Joson (RESP)’s dismissal. Thus, he is entitled for reinstatement, payment of unpaid
wages, payment of full backwages and payment on moral damages and attorney’s fees.
The Labor Arbiter also denies the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of merit since Marc II
Marketing Inc (PET) and Lucila Joson (PET) failed to present evidence to prove that the present case involved
an intra-corporate controversy. Also, Alfredo Joson (RESP)’s money claim did not arise from his being a
director or stockholder of Marc II Marketing Inc (PET) but from his position as being its General Manager.
Moreover, Alfredo Joson (RESP) was not a corporate officer under Marc II Marketing Inc (PET)’s by-laws. As
such, Alfredo Joson (RESP)’s complaint clearly arose from an employer-employee relationship, thus, subject to
the Labor Arbiter’s jurisdiction.
Marc II Marketing Inc (PET) and Lucila Joson (PET) filed an appeal before the NLRC.
The NLRC ruled in favor of Marc II Marketing Inc (PET) and Lucila Joson (PET) by giving credence to the
Secretary’s Certificate, which served as an evidenced that Alfredo Joson (RESP) was appointed as its corporate
officer with designation as General Manager upon the approval of the corporation’s Board of Director. Since
Alfredo Joson (RESP) was a corporate officer, thus his dismissal involved a purely intra-corporate controversy.
Alfredo Joson (RESP) filed a petition for certiorari before the CA on the ground that NLRC committed a
grave abuse of discretion.
CA rendered judgement that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the present controversy since
Alfredo Joson (RESP) was not an officer but a mere employee of Marc II Marketing Inc (PET), this the issue is
not an intra-corporate controversy and that Alfredo Joson (RESP) has been illegally dismissed from
employment without valid cause and without due process. Nevertheless, it ordered the records of the case
remanded to the NLRC for the determination of the appropriate amount of monetary awards to be given to
Alfredo Joson (RESP).
Marc II Marketing Inc (PET) and Lucila Joson (PET) filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC
and contended that the CA has faulted in sustaining the Labor Arbiter’s finding that Alfredo Joson (RESP) was
not a corporate officer under petitioner corporation’s by-laws. They asserted that the resolution issued by
petitioner corporation’s Board of Directors appointing Lucila Joson (PET) as General Manager made him its
corporate officer. Moreover, Alfredo Joson (RESP)’s position is a corporate office sanctioned by the
Corporation Code and the doctrines previously laid down by this Court. Thus, Alfredo Joson (RESP)‘s removal
as General Manager involved a purely intra-corporate controversy over which the RTC has jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over Alfredo Joson (RESP)’s dismissal as a General Manager
of the Marc II Marketing Inc (PET).
RULING:
Yes. The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over Alfredo Joson (RESP)’s dismissal as a General Manager of
the Marc II Marketing Inc (PET) because Alfredo Joson (RESP) is not a corporate officer. Thus, his dismissal is
not an intra-corporate controversy. Hence, it falls under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, not on the RTC.
While Article 217(a) 229 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that it is the Labor Arbiter who has
the original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving termination or dismissal of workers when the
person dismissed or terminated is a corporate officer, the case automatically falls within the province of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The dismissal of a corporate officer is always regarded as a corporate act and/or an
intra-corporate controversy.
In conformity with Section 25 of the Corporation Code, whoever are the corporate officers enumerated
in the by-laws are the exclusive officers of the corporation and the Board has no power to create other officers
without amending first the corporate by-laws. However, the Board may create appointive positions other than
the positions of the corporate officers, but the persons occupying such positions are not considered as
corporate officers within the meaning of Section 25 of the Corporation Code and are not empowered to
exercise the functions of the corporate officers, except those functions lawfully delegated to them. Their
functioning and duties are to be determined by the Board of Directors/Trustees.
In this case, the Alfredo Joson (RESP) was not a corporate officer of Petitioner Corporation because his
position as General Manager was not specifically mentioned in the roster of corporate officers in its corporate
by-laws. Thus Alfredo Joson (RESP), can only be regarded as its employee or subordinate official. Accordingly,
Alfredo Joson (RESP)'s dismissal as General Manager did not amount to an intra-corporate controversy.
Therefore, the jurisdiction properly belongs with the Labor Arbiter and not with the RTC.
DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES vs. MOJICA

G.R. No. 166365, September 30, 2005
JURISDICTION OF NLRC
FACTS:
The Discipline Committee of Duty Free Phils. (PET) rendered a decision finding Rossano Mojica (RESP)
guilty of Neglect of Duty by causing considerable damage to or loss of materials, assets and property of Duty
Free. Thus, Mojica was considered forcibly resigned from the service with forfeiture of all benefits, except his
salary and the monetary value of the accrued leave credits.
On Jan. 14, 1998, Mojica (RESP) was informed of his forced resignation. From this, Mojica (RESP) filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment of full back wages, damages, and
attorney’s fees, against Duty Free Phils. (PET) before the NLRC.
Labor Arbiter Leda rendered a decision finding that Mojica (RESP) was illegally dismissed.
However, the NLRC reversed Labor Arbiter’s decision and rendered that the dismissal was valid and
with just cause.
Mojica (RESP)’s motion for reconsideration was denied, hence Mojica (RESP) filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA.
The CA affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision that Mojica (RESP) was not guilty of gross or habitual
negligence that would warrant his dismissal since there was no convincing evidence to prove that Mojica
(RESP) connived with other personnel in pilfering the stocks of Duty Free Phils. (PET).
Hence, the Duty Free Phils. (PET) files a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
WON NLRC has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case of Mojica (RESP) against the Duty Free
Phils. (PET).
RULING:
No. NLRC has no jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case of Mojica (RESP) against the Duty Free
Phils. (PET) because Mojica (RESP) is a civil service employee. Therefore, jurisdiction is lodged not with the
NLRC, but with the Civil Service Commission.
Duty Free Phils. (PET) was created under EO No. 468 to augment the service facilities for tourists and
to generate foreign exchange and revenue for the government. In order for the government to exercise direct
and effective control and regulation over the tax and duty free shops, their establishment and operation was
vested in the Department of Tourism (DOT), through the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
Under PD No. 564, Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) is a corporate body attached to the Department
of Tourism (DOT).
As an attached agency, the recruitment, transfer, promotion and dismissal of all its personnel was
governed by a merit system established in accordance with the civil service rules. In fact, all PTA officials and
employees are subject to the Civil Service rules and regulations.
Since Duty Free Phils. (PET) is under the exclusive authority of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA),
it follows that its officials and employees are likewise subject to the Civil Service rules and regulations. Clearly
then, Mojica’s recourse to the Labor Arbiter was not proper. The procedure laid down in DFP’s merit system
and the Civil Service rules and regulations should be followed.
Thus, CSC has jurisdiction over Mojica’s case and not the NLRC.
LACANILAO vs. DE LEON

G.R. No. 76532, January 26, 1987
SECURITY OF TENURE
FACTS:
Dr. Flor Lacanilao (PET) was nominated by the Minister of Agriculture and Food as Chief of the
Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC and such recommendation was immediately transmitted to the
Secretary-General of SEAFDEC. On April 8, 1986, the Secretary-General of SEAFDEC acknowledged the receipt
of the Dr. Lacanilao (PET)’s nomination and requested Dr. Lacanilao (PET) to serve as Officer-in-charge for
Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC and was authorized to take necessary actions to ensure orderly transfer
of power in both administration and finance during the pendency of the Council’s approval of his nomination.
On April 11, 1986, the Secretary General informed Dr. Lacanilao (PET) that majority of the members of
the Council have voted for him and that his as AQD Chief had been approved by SEAFDEC Council under Article
7 (2) of the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC.
On November 21, 1986, while Dr. Lacanilao (PET) was in Tokyo, Japan attending the annual SEAFDEC
Council meeting, Capt. Juan De Leon (RESP), attended by groups of retainers and assistants, entered and took
physical possession of the different offices of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC and instantly undertook
to exercise the functions of the Department-Chief, and immediately terminated the services of all consultants
of the Department and put his own followers in charge of the various sections and agencies of the
Department.
Dr. Lacanilao (PET) and other previously appointed or designated Aquaculture Department Officers and
employees protested and have opposed Capt. De Leon (RESP)’s assertion of power and physical occupation of
the Aquaculture Department and his followers who have refused to vacate the offices and stations they have
physically occupied.
From this, Dr. Lacanilao (PET) filed a petition for quo warranto and asserted that he is the lawful holder
of the position of Chief of the SEAFDEC — Aquaculture Department, and seeks to prevent Capt. De Leon
(RESP) from usurping and taking over or occupying the said office and from exercising the functions and
responsibilities of such office. Dr. Lacanilao (PET) also filed a TRO and stated that he had been served with
summons issued by Judge Migrinio of the RTC of Pasig to restrain him from discharging the functions and
exercising the privileges as the Chief of the Aquaculture Department of SEAFDEC.
On November 27, 1986, the SC issued a TRO enjoining Judge Migrinio from proceeding with the civil
case against Dr. Lacanilao (PET) and restraining Capt. De Leon (RESP) from assuming to exercise the functions
of the office of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC.
On the otherhand, Capt. De Leon (RESP) claims that he is entitled to the office of Chief of the
Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC, by reason of a recommendation in his favor embodied in a letter signed
by the Vice President and Minister for Foreign Affairs and addressed to the Secretary-General of SEAFDEC.
However, the SEAFDEC Council responded that the the President of the Philippines nor the Minister of
Agriculture and Food have not withdrawn their support for Dr. Lacanilao (PET) as Chief of AQD. Thus, it implies
that the SEAFDEC Council of Directors has not approved the nomination of Capt. De Leon (RESP) as chief of the
Aquaculture Department.
ISSUE:
1. WON Dr. Lacanilao (PET) is entitled to the position of Chief of the Aquaculture Department,
SEAFDEC, for the duration of his term or until that term is otherwise ended conformably with
applicable law, including applicable regulations of the SEAFDEC.
RULING:
1. Yes. Dr. Lacanilao (PET) is entitled to the position of Chief of the Aquaculture Department, SEAFDEC,
for the duration of his term or until that term is otherwise ended conformably with applicable law,
including applicable regulations of the SEAFDEC.
Dr. Lacanilao was lawfully entitled to hold the position of the Chief of the Aquaculture Department,
SEAFDEC, as of 21 November 1986 when the respondent and his assistants and retainers introjected
themselves in the offices of the Aquaculture Department. Until the tenure of the petitioner is lawfully
terminated in accordance with the laws and regulations governing such tenure, no nomination for the same
position can be approved and given effect It is clear that the nomination of the respondent for a position then
lawfully filled in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the SEAFDEC, did not have the
effect of removing or otherwise terminating the two-year term of the petitioner.
PetitionerSoutheast Asian Fisheries Development Center-AquacultureDepartment (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an

international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC. "It was established by
theGovernments of Burma, Kingdom of Cambodia, Republic of Indonesia,Japan, Kingdom of Laos, Malaysia,
Republic of the Philippines,Republic of Singapore, Kingdom of Thailand and Republic of Vietnam .. . "The
Republic of the Philippines became a signatory to the Agreement establishing SEAFDEC on January 16, 1968.
The purpose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion of the fisheriesdevelopment in Southeast Asia by
mutual co-operation among themember governments of the Center.
MANEJA vs. NLRC and MANILA MIDTOWN HOTEL

G.R. No. 124013, June 5, 1998
JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITER OVER ILLEGAL DISMISSAL CASE
AND ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
FACTS:
Maneja (PET) worked as a telephone operator in Manila Midtown Hotel. She was also a member of the
Union (NUWHRAIN) with a CBA.
On Feb. 13, 1990, a fellow telephone operator named Lelong received a Request for Long Distance Call
and a deposit from a guest named Hiota Ieda. The call was unanswered and the P500 deposit was forwarded
to the cashier. Ieda made a second call and another P500 was deposit but the call was also unanswered.
Loleng passed on the Request for Long Distance Call to Maneja (PET) for follow up. Maneja (PET)monitored
the call. On Feb. 15, 1990, a hotel cashier inquired about the P1,000.00 deposit made by Ieda. After a search,
Loleng found the first deposit in the guest folio and the second in the folder for cancelled calls. Finding that
the second call was stamped with the wrong date, Maneja (PET) changed it from Feb. 15 to Feb 13, 1990.
Loleng then delivered the Request for Long Distance Call and money to the cashier.
On Mar.7, 1990, the chief telephone operator issued a memorandum directing Maneja (PET) and
Loleng to explain the incident and recommended that they be subject to disciplinary action for forging
falsifying official documents and culpable carelessness for failure to follow specific instruction or established
procedure. Later on, Maneja (PET) was served with a notice of dismissal. She refused to signed it wrote
“under protest”.
From this, Maneja (PET) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the Manila Midtown Hotel (RESP)
before the Labor Arbiter.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favour of Maneja (PET) that she was illegally dismissed,
however the Labor Arbiter held that the complaint was on its face within the juridical ambit of the grievance
procedure under the CBA and if unresolved one for proper voluntary arbitration because of the fact that
Maneja (PET) claims that she is a member of NUWRAIN with an existing CBA with respondent hotel. But the
Labor Arbiter still still assumed jurisdiction "since Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the same Labor Code, are
conferred original and exclusive jurisdiction of all termination case(sic.)."
The Manila Midtown Hotel (RESP) appealed to the NLRC on the ground that Labor Arbiter has lack of
jurisdiction as the case should have been filed with the proper grievance procedure or voluntary arbitration.
The NLRC (RESP) dismissed the illegal dismissal case for lack of Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because
the case should have been subjected to voluntary arbitration.
Maneja (PET)’s MR was denied, hence she filed a petition for certiorari before the SC and contended
that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case. Termination cases arising from the interpretation or
enforcement policies pertaining to violations of Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Actions (OSDA), are under the
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator, only if these are unresolved in the plant-level grievance machinery. She
also insists that her termination is not an unresolved grievance as there has been no grievance meeting
between the NUWHRAIN union and the management because it has been a company practice that
termination cases are not anymore referred to the grievance machinery but directly to the labor arbiter.
The Manila Midtown Hotel (RESP) filed a comment that the Labor Arbiter should have dismissed the
illegal dismissal case outright after finding that it is within the jurisdictional ambit of the grievance procedure.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.
2. WON Maneja (PET) was illegally dismissed.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the illegal dismissal case.
Termination cases fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter as
contemplated in Art 217 of the Labor Code but it should be read in conjunction with Art. 261 of the Labor
Code which grants to voluntary arbitrators original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved
grievances arising from the interpretation of CBA or of enforcement of personnel policies.
In the case at bar, the termination of petitioner is not an unresolved grievance.
In the Sanyo case, the Solicitor General stated that where the dispute is just in interpretation of the
CBA, they could resort to the grievance mechanism, but when there was actual termination, it was already
cognizable by the Labor Arbiter. In this case, there has been an actual termination. Since there has been an
actual termination, the matter falls within the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
The dismissal of Maneja (PET) does not call for the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies but is a termination dispute which comes under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
It should be explained that company personnel policies are guiding principles stated in broad, long
range terms express the philosophy or beliefs of an organisation’s top authority regarding personnel matters.
They deal with matters affecting efficiency and well-being of employees and include among others the
procedure in the administration of wages, benefits, promotions, transfer and other personnel movements
which are usually not spelled out in the collective agreement. The usual source of grievances, however, are
the rules and regulations governing disciplinary actions.
Moreover, the dismissal of Maneja (PET) does not fall within the phrase "grievance arising from the
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreement and those arising from the interpretation
or enforcement of company personel policies”.
The LA does have jurisdiction under Art 217 of the Labor Code, otherwise an employee who was on
AWOL or committed offenses would no longer be able to file illegal dismissal cases because the discharge
would be premised on the interpretation enforcement of company policies. The Hotel also voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
Thus, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Yes. Maneja (PET) was illegally dismissed.

Because first, Maneja (PET)’s actions were not contrary to company practice and there is also no basis
for personal appropriation based on the facts. Given the factual circumstances, there was no dishonesty. The
money was all eventually found and the date was a correction, not falsification.
Second, the examination of the record reveals that no hearing whatsoever was ever conducted by the
Manila Midtown Hotel (RESP) before Maneja (PET)was dismissed. While it may be true that the petitioner
submitted a written explanation, no hearing was actually conducted before she was terminated.
The requisites of a valid dismissal are (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in the
Article 282 of the Labor Code, and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself. The substantive and procedural laws must be strictly complied with before a worker can be dismissed
from his employment because what is at stake is not only the employee's position but his livelihood.
Well-settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process in the dismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule in our jurisdiction that the employer
must furnish the employee with two written notice before the termination of employment can be effected: (a)
the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and, (b)
the second informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing, on
the other hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an
actual hearing was conducted.
A worker's employment is properly in the constitutional sense. He cannot be deprived of his work
without due process of law. Substantive due process mandates that an employee can only be dismissed based
on just or authorized causes. Procedural due process requires further that he can only be dismissed after he
has been given an opportunity to be heard. The import of due process necessitates the compliance of these
two aspects.
Since there was no just cause and due process was not observed, it is concluded that Maneja (PET) was
illegally dismissed.
UNICOL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. vs. MALIPOT

G.R. No. 206562, January 21, 2015
WHEN IS DEATH COMPENSABLE AND
NLRC’s POWER TO ADMIT EVIDENCE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN APPEAL
FACTS:
Seaman Glicerio was hired by Unicol Management Services (PET) acting for and in behalf of its
principal, Link Marine Pte. Ltd. (PET) for the vessel Heredia Sea as Chief Engineer Officer for a contract
duration of 4 months.
Seaman Glicerio wanted to end his contract and go home, however, the Port Captain did allow Seaman
Glicerio to leave the vessel. The Port Captain also allegedly threatened seaman Glicerio by telling him that
once he leaves and sets his feet on Philippine soil, he will immediately be arrested and will never be employed
by any vessel ever again, and he will be made to pay for all the expenses of his deployment.
Because of this, seaman Glicerio became depressed and soon became ill and experienced chest pains
and palpitations. Later on, he was diagnosed with Muscoskeletal pain and Emotional trauma/illness. Despite
this, seaman Glicerio was not repatriated even when his 4-month contract expired on December 18, 2008.
Therefafter, seaman Glicerio committed suicide by hanging in the store room of the vessel.
From this, Delia Malipot (RESP), who is the surviving spouse of deceased seaman Glicerio Malipot, with
whom the latter has two minor children, filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter claiming death
compensation under Glicerio’s POEA contract. She stressed that his death was compensable because his
emotional trauma was caused by the conditions of his job and aggravated by the acts of the Port Captain.
However, Unicol Management Services (PET) and Marine Pte. Ltd. (PET) alleged that seaman Glicerio
committed suicide by hanging in the store room of the Heredia Sea. This report was confirmed by the
Certification of the Philippine Consulate General at Dubai, and the accompanying documents, namely: Medico
Legal Report issued by the Ministry of Justice of the United Arab Emirates and the Death Certificate issued by
the Ministry of Healthof the United Arab Emirates.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision awarding death compensation and finding that Unicol
Management Services (PET) and Marine Pte. Ltd. (PET) failed to satisfactorily prove by substantial evidence
that seaman Glicerio committed suicide.
Unicol Management Services (PET) and Marine Pte. Ltd. (PET) filed an appeal to NLRC. The NLRC
reversed and set aside the decision of the LA, holding that Unicol Management Services (PET) and Marine Pte.
Ltd. (PET) have clearly shown that Glicerio’s death was due to suicide and that the same is not compensable
under the POEA Employment Contract.
Delia Malipot (RESP) filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA reversed the NLRC ruling and
awarded death benefits, holding that Unicol Management Services (PET) and Marine Pte. Ltd. (PET) failed to
prove the cause or circumstances which lead to Glicerio’s suicide. Moreover, the CA held that the Investigation
Report, log book extracts, and Master’s Report that were submitted for the first time on appeal to the NLRC,
and thus, should not have been admitted by the NLRC.
Unicol Management Services (PET) and Marine Pte. Ltd. (PET) filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the SC and averred that the CA erred in not considering the Medico-Legal Report as well as the Death
Certificate submitted by the parties on the ground that the same are only evidence of the cause of death, but
not the circumstances surrounding seaman Glicerio’s suicide. Petitioners also lament the fact that the CA did
not consider the Investigation Report, log book extracts, and Master’s Report which detailed the events that
transpired before seaman Glicerio committed suicide. They contend that the CA erred in disregarding these
pieces of evidence which convincingly rule out suspicions of foul play.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the CA decision and reinstated the NLRC decision, finding
that Glicerio’s death was directly attributable to his deliberate act of hanging himself and that his death,
therefore, is not compensable.
ISSUE:
1. WON the death of Glicerio is compensable.

2. WON the CA is correct in holding that NLRC must not admitted evidence submitted for the first
time on appeal.
RULING:
1. No. The Death of Glicerio is not compensable.
Clearly, the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is
established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. However, the employer may be
exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman’s death was caused by an injury directly
attributable to his deliberate or willful act. Thus, since Unicol Management Services (PET) and Marine Pte. Ltd.
(PET) were able to substantially prove that seaman Glicerio’s death is directly attributable to his deliberate act
of hanging himself, therefore, his death is not compensable and his heirs are not entitled to any compensation
or benefits.
2. No. CA is not correct correct in holding that NLRC must not admitted evidence submitted for the first
time on appeal.
The SC held that NLRC may receive evidence submitted for the first time on appeal on the ground that
it may ascertain facts objectively and speedily without regard to technicalities of law in the interest of
substantial justice.
In Sasan, Sr. v. NLRC Division, the SC ruled allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before
the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional
evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure considering that rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and Labor Arbiters are
directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively,
without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with
this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits,
submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal.
Moreover, among the powers of the Commission as provided in Section 218 of the Labor Code is that
the Commission may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production
of such books, papers, contracts, records, statement of accounts, agreements, and others. In addition, the
Commission may, among other things, conduct investigation for the determination of a question, matter or
controversy within its jurisdiction, proceed to hear and determine the disputes in the absence of any party
thereto who has been summoned or served with notice to appear, conduct its proceedings or any part thereof
in public or in private, adjourn its hearings to any time and place, refer technical matters or accounts to an
expert and to accept his report as evidence after hearing of the parties upon due notice. From the foregoing, it
can be inferred that the NLRC can receive evidence on cases appealed before the Commission, otherwise, its
factual conclusions would not have been given great respect, much weight, and relevancewhen an adverse
party assails the decision of the NLRC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA and then to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45.
Accordingly, taking into consideration the Investigation Report, log book extracts and Master’s Report
submitted by petitioners, the same all strongly point out that seaman Glicerio died because he committed
suicide.
REPUBLIC CEMENT CORPORATION vs. GUINMAPANG

G.R. No. 168910 August 24, 2009
ONE DAY DELAY IN FILING AN APPEAL BEFORE THE NLRC
FACTS:
Guinmapang (RESP) was an employee of Republic Cement Corp. (PET) with a monthly salary
of P13,100. Republic Cement Corp. (PET) issued a general circular announcing the implementation of a
retrenchment program. Guinmapang (RESP) received a notice from Republic Cement Corp. (PET) that his
services were being terminated effective pursuant to the retrenchment program. On the same date, Republic
Cement also sent the required notice to the DOLE. However, Guinmapang (RESP) refused to receive the
separation package offered by Republic Cement Corp (PET).
Thereafter, Guinmapang (RESP) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other money claims against
Republic Cement Corp. (PET).
On May 30 2003, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of Republic Cement Corp. (PET). It dismissed the
complaint due to lack of merit and ordered Republic Cement to pay the complainant his separation pay in the
amount of 78,600. The Labor Arbiter said that retrenchment to prevent losses is an authorized cause to
terminate the employer-employee relationship. Republic Cement Corp. (PET) was able to prove that it
sustained losses from. As to the procedural requirements, Republic Cement Corp. (PET) complied with the
notice requirement.
On June 23, 2003, Guinmapang’s counsel received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s May 30 Decision.
However, Guinmapang’s counsel filed his appeal with the NLRC only on July 4 2003, one day beyond the 10-
day reglementary period to file an appeal. NLRC dismissed Guinmapang’s appeal because it has been filed
after the reglementary period. The NLRC said that the 10-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal is
mandatory and jurisdictional in nature. It added that Guinmapang’s failure to file the appeal within the
reglementary period rendered the LA’s decision final and executory and deprived the NLRC of jurisdiction to
alter the judgment, much less to entertain the appeal.
Guinmapang (RESP) filed an MR which the NLRC denied.
Thereafter, Guinmapang (RESP) filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Guinmapang alleged that
the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when, in affirming the LA’s
Decision, it held that Guinmapang’s retrenchment was legal and that Guinmapang was not entitled to
damages, attorney’s fees and litigation costs.
CA granted Guinmapang’s petition. It noted that, in their pleadings, both parties discussed the merits
of the case. However, since the NLRC’s January 29 2004 Order dealt only with the dismissal of the case for
having been filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period, the CA did not rule on the merits of the case. The
CA limited its discussion of the case to the procedural issue.
CA started by declaring that in labor cases, the rules of procedure are not to be strictly adhered to. CA
said that technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the
rights and obligations of the parties. The Court gave credence to Guinmapang’s explanation that the appeal
was filed one day late because Guinmapang’s counsel suffered from an asthma attack a few days before the
last day for the filing of the appeal. The CA added that the delay of one day was not deliberate. Moreover, CA
found that Guinmapang’s Memorandum of Appeal before the NLRC raised valid and meritorious arguments.
Therefore, in the interest of justice, CA ruled that the NLRC should have taken cognizance of Guinmapang’s
appeal even if it was filed out of time.
Hence, Republic Cement Corp. (PET) filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC. Republic
Cement insists that, in the settlement of labor disputes, delays cannot be countenanced.
On the other hand, Guinmapang (RESP) argues that in labor cases, the technical rules of procedure are
not to be strictly applied. Guinmapang explains that his counsel presented a medical certificate showing that
he suffered from "mild resistant asthma" on the last day of filing. Thus, that the one day delay was not a gross
violation of the rules on filing an appeal.
ISSUE:
WON NLRC should have taken cognizance of Guinmapang’s appeal even if it was filed out of time.
RULING:
Yes. NLRC should have taken cognizance of Guinmapang’s appeal even if it was filed out of time.
Article 223 of the Labor Code, the governing law on the timeliness of an appeal from the decisions,
awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter, provides that the aggrieved party has 10 calendar days from receipt
thereof to appeal to the NLRC.
Section 1 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of the NLRC implements the said provision of the Labor
Code. Section 1 provides:
Section 1. Periods of Appeal. - Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter shall be final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days
from receipt thereof x x x.
There is no dispute that Guinmapang received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision on 23 June 2003.
Thus, pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 1, Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of the NLRC,
Guinmapang had only until 3 July 2003, the 10th calendar day from 23 June 2003, within which to file an
appeal. However, due to the asthma attack suffered by Guinmapang’s counsel, Guinmapang’s appeal was filed
on 4 July 2003, a day late.
The general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by
law is, not only mandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment
sought to be reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception, unintended lapses are disregarded so as
to give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period on the basis of strong and compelling
reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof. The purpose behind
the limitation of the period of appeal is to avoid an unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to
put an end to controversies.
The SC agreed with the Court of Appeals that since no intent to delay the administration of justice
could be attributed to Guinmapang, a one day delay does not justify the appeal’s denial. More importantly,
the Court of Appeals declared that Guinmapang’s appeal, on its face, appears to be impressed with merit. The
constitutional mandate to accord full protection to labor and to safeguard the employee’s means of livelihood
should be given proper attention and sanction. A greater injustice may occur if said appeal is not given due
course than if the reglementary period to appeal were strictly followed. In this case, the SC is inclined to
excuse the one day delay in order to fully settle the merits of the case. This is in line with the policy to
encourage full adjudication of the merits of an appeal.
GARCIA, et.al. vs. KJ COMMERCIAL and QUE

G.R. No. 196830 February 29, 2012
LABOR ARBITER’S DECISION BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY
AND MOTION TO REDUCE BOND STOPPED THE RUNNING OF THE PERIOD TO APPEAL
FACTS:
KJ Commercial (RESP) is a sole proprietorship. It owns trucks and engages in the business of distributing
cement products.
On different dates, KJ Commercial (RESP) employed as truck drivers and truck helpers Cesar V. Garcia,
Carlos Razon, Alberto De Guzman, Tomas Razon, Omer E. Palo, Rizal de Valencia, Allan Basa, Jessie Garcia,
Juanito Paras, Alejandro Orag, Rommel Pangan, Ruel Soliman, and Cenen Canlapan (PET) .
On January 2, 2006, petitioners demanded for a P40 daily salary increase. To pressure KJ Commercial
(RESP) to grant their demand, they stopped working and abandoned their trucks at the Northern Cement Plant
Station in Sison, Pangasinan. They also blocked other workers from reporting to work.
On February 3, 2006, petitioners filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of salary and non-payment of service incentive leave and thirteenth month pay. The
petitioners asserted that they were illegally dismissed from their employment without due process, and that
they did not abandoned their work.
However, KJ Commercial (RESP) alleged that the petitioners were not terminated from their
employment but they were the one who abandoned their work by staging strike and refused to perform their
work as drivers of the trucks owned by KJ Commercial (RESP).
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners that they were illegally dismissed from their work.
The Labor Arbiter held that the acts of these complainants in filing the case a month after they were
terminated from their work is more than sufficient evidence to prove and show that they do not have the
intention of abandoning their work. The fact that these complainants were illegally terminated and prevented
from performing their work as truck drivers of the respondents and that there was no compliance with the
substantive and procedural due process of terminating an employee, KJ Commercial (RESP) subsequent offer
to return to work will not cure the defect that there was already illegal dismissal committed against these
complainants.
KJ Commercial (RESP) filed an appeal with motion to reduce before the NLRC. However, NLRC denied
KJ’s appeal with motion to reduce the bond and presenting a partial bond of PHP 50,000 because the motion
is not founded on a meritorious ground and that KJ Commercial (RESP) failed to perfect an appeal for failure to
post the required bond.
KJ Commercial (RESP) filed a motion for reconsideration and posted a ₱2,562,930 surety bond. The
NLRC granted the motion and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s October 30, 2008 Decision since there was an
honest effort by the KJ Commercial (RESP) to comply with putting up the full amount of the required appeal
bond. Moreover, the paramount interest of justice is better served in the resolution of this case.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. However, the NLRC denied the motion due to lack
of merit.
The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and contended that they were unlawfully
terminated from their employment.
CA rendered a decision in favor of KJ Commercial (RESP) since the petitioners failed to present
substantial evidence to prove that they were no longer allowed to perform their duties as truck drivers or they
were prevented from entering KJ Commercial’s premises. There must first be substantial evidence to prove
that indeed there was illegal dismissal before the employer bears the burden to prove the contrary.
The petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC and claimed that the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision on Oct. 30, 2008 became final and executory; thus, the NLRC’s Resolutions on Feb. 8 and
June 25, 2010 and the Court of Appeals’ Decision on Apr. 29, 2011 are void for lack of jurisdiction. Moreover,
petitioners also claim that KJ Commercial (PET) failed to perfect an appeal since the motion to reduce bond
did not stop the running of the period to appeal.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Labor Arbiter’s October 30, 2008 Decision became final and executory.
2. WON the filing KJ Commercial on the motion to reduce bond stopped the running of the period
to appeal.
RULING:
1. No. The Labor Arbiter’s October 30, 2008 Decision did not become final and executory.
KJ Commercial’s filing of a motion to reduce bond and delayed posting of the P2,562,930 surety bond
did not render the Labor Arbiter’s October 30, 2008 Decision final and executory.
2. Yes. The filing KJ Commercial on the motion to reduce bond stopped the running of the period to
appeal.
The Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows the filing of a motion to reduce bond subject to two
conditions: (1) there is meritorious ground, and (2) a bond in a reasonable amount is posted. As a rule, the
filing of a motion to reduce bond and compliance with the two conditions stop the running of the period to
perfect an appeal
The NLRC has full discretion to grant or deny the motion to reduce bond, and it may rule on the motion
beyond the 10-day period within which to perfect an appeal. Obviously, at the time of the filing of the motion
to reduce bond and posting of a bond in a reasonable amount, there is no assurance whether the appellant’s
motion is indeed based on meritorious ground and whether the bond he or she posted is of a reasonable
amount. Thus, the appellant always runs the risk of failing to perfect an appeal.
Section 2, Article I of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC states that, These Rules shall be liberally
construed to carry out the objectives of the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines and other relevant
legislations, and to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive resolution and settlement
of labor disputes. In order to give full effect to the provisions on motion to reduce bond, the appellant must be
allowed to wait for the ruling of the NLRC on the motion even beyond the 10-day period to perfect an appeal.
If the NLRC grants the motion and rules that there is indeed meritorious ground and that the amount of the
bond posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the motion, the appellant may still
file a motion for reconsideration as provided under Section 15, Rule VII of the Rules. If the NLRC grants the
motion for reconsideration and rules that there is indeed meritorious ground and that the amount of the bond
posted is reasonable, then the appeal is perfected. If the NLRC denies the motion, then the decision of the
labor arbiter becomes final and executory.
In this case, KJ Commercial (RESP) filed a motion to reduce bond and posted a P50,000 cash bond.
When the NLRC denied its motion, KJ Commercial filed a motion for reconsideration and posted the full
P2,562,930 surety bond. The NLRC then granted the motion for reconsideration. In any case, the rule that the
filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal is not absolute.
KJ Commercial showed willingness to post a partial bond. In fact, it posted a P50,000 cash bond. Aside from
posting a partial bond, KJ Commercial immediately posted the full amount of the bond when it filed its motion
for reconsideration of the NLRCs Decision.
In any case, the rule that the filing of a motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period
to perfect an appeal is not absolute. The Court may relax the rule. Jurisprudence tells us that in labor cases, an
appeal from a decision involving a monetary award may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond. The Court, however, has relaxed this requirement under certain exceptional circumstances in order to
resolve controversies on their merits. These circumstances include: (1) fundamental consideration of
substantial justice; (2) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment; and (3) special
circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits, and the amount and the issue involved.
Some of these cases include: “(a) counsel’s reliance on the footnote of the notice of the decision of the
labor arbiter that the aggrieved party may appeal within ten (10) working days; (b) fundamental consideration
of substantial justice; (c) prevention of miscarriage of justice or of unjust enrichment, as where the tardy
appeal is from a decision granting separation pay which was already granted in an earlier final decision; and
(d) special circumstances of the case combined with its legal merits or the amount and the issue involved."
MONTAÑO vs. VERCELES

G.R. No. 168583, July 26, 2010
JURISDICTION OF BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
FACTS:
Atty. Montaño (PET) was a legal assistant of the FFW Legal Center. He was later nominated for the
position of National Vice President. However, the FFW COMELEC sent him a letter stating that he was not
qualified for the position as his candidacy violated the the 1998 FFW Constitution and By-Laws, particularly
Section 76 of Article XIX and Section 25 (a) of Article VIII, both in Chapter II thereof. Atty. Montaño (PET) filed
an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration praying that his name be included in the official list of candidates.
During the election, pending Montaño’s MR and despite opposition from Verceles, the convention
delegates allowed his candidacy. Montaño won the election as National VP.
Atty. Verceles (RESP) filed a Petition for the nullification of Montaño’s election before the BLR and
claimed that Atty. Montaño (PET) is not qualified to run for the position because Section 76 of Article XIX of the
FFW Constitution and By-Laws prohibits federation employees from sitting in its Governing Board. Claiming
that Atty. Montaño’s premature assumption of duties and formal induction as vice-president will cause serious
damage, Atty. Verceles (RESP) likewise prayed for injunctive relief.
On the other hand, Atty. Montaño (PET) filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the grounds that the
Regional Director of DOLE and not the BLR has jurisdiction over the case; that the filing of the petition was
premature due to the pending and unresolved protest before the FFW COMELEC; and that, Atty. Verceles
(RESP) has no legal standing to initiate the petition not being the real party in interest.
However, the BLR did not give due course to Atty. Montaño’s Motion to Dismiss.
The BLR dismissed the Petition for lack of merit. The BLR ruled that there were no grounds to hold Atty.
Montaño (PET) unqualified to run for National Vice-President of FFW. It held that the applicable provision in
the FFW Constitution and By-Laws to determine whether one is qualified to run for office is not Section 76 of
Article XIX19 but Section 26 of Article VIII20 thereof. The BLR opined that there was sufficient compliance with
the requirements laid down by this applicable provision and, besides, the convention delegates unanimously
decided that Atty. Montaño was qualified to run for the position of National Vice-President.
Atty. Verceles (RESP) filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA arguing that the Convention
had no authority under the FFW Constitution and By-Laws to overrule and set aside the FFW COMELEC’s
Decision rendered pursuant to the latter’s power to screen candidates.
The CA granted the petition and nullified the election of Atty. Montaño (PET) as FFW National Vice-
President for violation of Art. VIII, Sec. 26 of the FFW CBL. Atty. Montaño (PET) did not possess the
qualification requirement under paragraph (d) of Section 26 that candidates must be an officer or member of a
legitimate labor organization. Since Atty. Montaño (PET), as legal assistant employed by FFW, is considered as
confidential employee, consequently, he is ineligible to join FFW Staff Association, the rank-and-file union of
FFW.
Hence, Atty. Montaño (PET) filed a Petition for Review on certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the BLR has jurisdiction over intra-union disputes involving a federation.
RULING:
Yes. The BLR has jurisdiction over intra-union disputes involving a federation.
Art. 226 of the Labor Code clearly provides that the BLR and the Regional Directors of DOLE have
concurrent jurisdiction over inter-union and intra-union disputes. Such disputes include the conduct or
nullification of election of union and workers’ association officers.
There is, thus, no doubt as to the BLR’s jurisdiction over the instant dispute involving member-unions
of a federation arising from disagreement over the provisions of the federation’s constitution and by-laws.
Rule XVI lays down the decentralized intra-union dispute settlement mechanism.
Section 1 states that any complaint in this regard ‘shall be filed in the Regional Office where the union
is domiciled.’ The concept of domicile in labor relations regulation is equivalent to the place where the union
seeks to operate or has established a geographical presence for purposes of collective bargaining or for dealing
with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment.
The matter of venue becomes problematic when the intra-union dispute involves a federation, because
the geographical presence of a federation may encompass more than one administrative region. Pursuant to
its authority under Article 226, the BLR exercises original jurisdiction over intra-union disputes involving
federations. It is well-settled that FFW, having local unions all over the country, operates in more than one
administrative region. Therefore, the BLR maintains original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising
from any violation of or disagreement over any provision of its constitution and by-laws.
The SC upheld the CA’s decision but on the ground that Montaño was barred from sitting in the
Governing Board while he was employed as a staff of the FFW (the same ground used by the FFW COMELEC).
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) vs. FERRER-CALLEJA

G.R. No. 82260 July 19, 1989
CERTIFICATION ELECTION
FACTS:
Associated Labor Unions (PET) had a collective bargaining agreement with Soriano Fruits Corporation
which expired on September 30,1987. Prior to the said date, Associated Labor Unions (PET) and Soriano Fruits
Corporation signed a collective bargaining agreement which was to take effect on September 1, 1987 until
August 31, 1990 and it was unanimously approved and ratified by the members of the bargaining unit.
However, National Federation of Labor (NFL) (RESP) filed a petition for certification election
questioning the majority status of the incumbent union, pursuant to Executive Order 111 and its
Implementing Rules, since more than majority of its members have expressed doubts on the sincerity of the
incumbent union.
The Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election on the ground of failure to prosecute.
National Federation of Labor (NFL) (RESP) filed an appeal before the BLR.
The BLR held that the Med-Arbiter erred in dismissing the petition for certification election.
Associated Labor Unions (PET) filed a petition for certiorari before the SC and alleged that the BLR
missed the legal intent of article 257 as amended by executive order 111.
ISSUE:
1. WON Art. 257 of the Labor Code should be applied in the case. (WON the petition for
certification election is supported by twenty percent (20%) of the bargaining unit)
2. WON a hearing is necessary in order to exercise the right of the members of the bargaining unit
to choose which union should represent them.
3. WON the ratification of the collective bargaining agreement renders the certification election
moot and academic.
RULING:
1. No. Art. 257 of the Labor Code should not be applied in the case because it applies to
unorganized establishments. For the said provision to apply, the establishment concerned must
have no certified bargaining agent.
Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments. In any establishment where there is no certified
bargaining agent, the petition for certification election filed by a legitimate labor organization shall be
supported by the written consent of at least twenty (20%) percent of all the employees in the
bargaining unit. Upon receipt and verification of such petition, the Med-Arbiter shall automatically
order the conduct of a certification election.
However in this case, there was a collective bargaining agreement entered into by the management of
the Soriano Fruits Corporation and ALU, the petitioner, which was then the bargaining agent.
Instead of Art 257, Article 256 as amended by Executive Order 111 must be considered in the the
present petition.
Article 256. Representation Issues in Organized Establishments. In organized establishments, when a

petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the
Ministry within the sixty (60) day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement,
the Med- Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot to ascertain the will of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the petition for certification election filed by NFL on August 10, 1987 was well within the
prescribed sixty (60) day freedom period.
Hence, the issue of whether or not the petition for certification election is supported by twenty
percent (20%) of the bargaining unit concerned is immaterial to the case at bar. What is essential is that the
petition was filed during the sixty-day freedom period.
2. No. A hearing is not necessary in order to exercise the right of the members of the bargaining
unit to choose which union should represent them.
The provision of Article 256 which provides that the Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an
election is clear and leaves no room for further interpretation. The mere filing of a petition for certification
election within the freedom period is sufficient basis for the respondent Director to order the holding of a
certification election.
The fact that NFL did not appear during the hearings set by the Med-Arbiter is of no moment.
There is no prohibition on the conduct of hearings by the Med-Arbiter on the competing stands of the
unions. The law does not require that hearings to be held whereby the absence or presence therefrom of any
union representative would affect the petition for certification election. In fact, it is the denial of the petition
for certification election grounded solely on the absence of NFL in the scheduled hearings which is frowned
upon by the law. This is consistent with the principle in labor legislation that "certification proceedings is not a
litigation in the sense in which the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of non-adversary and
fact finding character. As such, it is not bound by technical rules of evidence."
3. No. The ratification of the collective bargaining agreement does not renders the certification
election moot and academic.
The records show that the old collective bargaining agreement of the petitioner with Soriano Fruits
Corporation was to expire on August 31, 1987. However, three (3) months and eight (8) days before its expiry
date, or on June 22, 1987, the petitioner renewed the same with the consent and collaboration of
management. The renewed agreement was then ratified by the members of the bargaining unit and was
thereafter sent to the Bureau of Labor Relations for certification. In the meantime, on August 10, 1987 (21
days before the expiration of the old collective bargaining agreement on August 31, 1987) a petition for
certification election was filed by respondent union, NFL. From the foregoing facts, it is quite obvious that the
renewed agreement cannot constitute a bar to the instant petition for certification election for the very
reason that the renewed agreement was not yet in existence when the petition for certification election was
filed on August 10, 1987 inasmuch as the same was to take effect only on September 1, 1987, after the old
agreement expires on August 31, 1987.
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard vs. Bureau of Labor Relations

G.R. No. 211145 October 14, 2015
THE RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO FORM A UNION
AND CHANGING THE NAME OF THE LABOR ORGANIZATION HAS NO ABRIDGEMENT
ON THE RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION
FACTS:
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard (PET), through its representative, Alfie F. Alipio, filed an
application for registration of its name "Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" with the DOLE.
The application stated that the association had a total of 120 members.
The DOLE Regional Office of City of San Fernando, Pampanga (DOLE-Pampanga), issued the
corresponding certificate of registration in favor of Samahan (PET).
Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines (RESP), filed a petition for cancellation of
registration of Samahan with the Dole Regional office on the ground that its members did not fall under any of
the types of workers enumerated in the second sentence of Article 243 (now 249). Hanjin alleged that only
ambulant, intermittent, itinerant, rural workers, self-employed, and those without definite employers may
form a workers' association. It further posited that one third (1/3) of the members of the association had
definite employers and the continued existence and registration of the association would prejudice the
company's goodwill.
Hanjin (RESP) submitted a supplemental petition stating that the workers committed
misrepresentation by making it appear that its members were all qualified to become members of the
workers' association.
DOLE Regional Director Ernesto Bihis ruled in favor of Hanjin (RESP) and he found that the preamble, as
stated in the Constitution and ByLaws of Samahan, was an admission on its part that all of its members were
employees of Hanjin.
Samahan (PET) filed an appeal before the BLR, arguing that Hanjin had no right to petition for the
cancellation of its registration. Samahan pointed out that the words "Hanjin Shipyard," as used in its
application for registration, referred to a workplace and not as employer or company. Further, the remaining
63 members either are working or had work at Hanjin.
The BLR granted Samahan's appeal and reversed the ruling of the Regional Director. It stated that the
law clearly afforded the right to self-organization to all workers including those without definite employers. As
an expression of the right to self-organization, industrial, commercial and self-employed workers could form a
workers' association if they so desired but subject to the limitation that it was only for mutual aid and
protection. Nowhere could it be found that to form a workers' association was prohibited or that the exercise
of a workers' right to self-organization was limited to collective bargaining.
Hanjin (RESP) filed an MR. BLR affirmed, but ordered Samahan to remove the words “Hanjin Shipyard”
from its name.
Hanjin (RESP) filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
CA ruled that:
a. the registration of Samahan as a legitimate workers' association was contrary to the provisions of
Article 243 of the Labor Code.
b. the phrase in the preamble of Samahan's Constitution and Bylaws, "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa
Hanjin Shipyard" created an impression that all its members were employees of HHIC. Such unqualified
manifestation which was used in its application for registration, was a clear proof of misrepresentation
which warranted the cancellation of Samahan's registration.
c. It also stated that the members of Samahan could not register it as a legitimate worker's association
because the place where Hanjin's industry was located was not a rural area. Neither was there any
evidence to show that the members of the association were ambulant, intermittent or itinerant
workers.
d. dropping the words "Hanjin Shipyard" from the association name would not prejudice or impair its
right to self-organization because it could adopt other appropriate names.
Samahan (PET) then filed a petition for review on certiorrai to the SC.
ISSUE:
1. WON Samahan can form a worker’s association.

2. WON the words “Hanjin Shipyard” should be removed from their name.
RULING:
1. Yes. Right to self-organization includes right to form a union, workers' association and labor
management councils.
More often than not, the right to self-organization connotes unionism. Workers, however, can also
form and join a workers' association as well as labor-management councils (LMC). Expressed in the highest law
of the land is the right of all workers to self-organization. (Sec 3, Article XIII of 1987 Constitution).
As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides, the right to self-organization includes the right to
form, join or assist labor organizations for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of
their own choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for the same purpose for their mutual aid and
protection. This is in line with the policy of the State to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong
and united labor movement as well as to make sure that workers participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights, duties and welfare.
The right to form a union or association or to selforganization comprehends two notions, to wit: (a) the
liberty or freedom, that is, the absence of restraint which guarantees that the employee may act for himself
without being prevented by law; and (b) the power, by virtue of which an employee may, as he pleases, join or
refrain from joining an association.
The existence of employer-employee relationship is not mandatory in the formation of workers'

association. What the law simply requires is that the members of the workers' association, at the very least,
share the same interest. The very definition of a workers' association speaks of "mutual aid and protection."
The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from
exercising the said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted
by law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. Also inherent in the right to
self-organization is the right to choose whether to form a union for purposes of collective bargaining or a
workers' association for purposes of providing mutual aid and protection.
The right to self-organization, however, is subject to certain limitations as provided by law.
Hanjin posits that the members of Samahan have definite employers, hence, they should have formed
a union instead of a workers' association. The Court disagrees. There is no provision in the Labor Code that
states that employees with definite employers may form, join or assist unions only.
Article 243 should be read together with Rule 2 of Department Order (D.O.) No. 40-03, Series of 2003.
Clearly, there is nothing in the foregoing implementing rules which provides that workers, with definite
employers, cannot form or join a workers' association for mutual aid and protection. Section 2 thereof even
broadens the coverage of workers who can form or join a workers' association.
Thus, the Court agrees with Samahan's argument that the right to form a workers' association is not
exclusive to ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers. The option to form or join a union or a workers'
association lies with the workers themselves, and whether they have definite employers or not.
2. Yes. No misrepresentation on the part of Samahan to warrant cancellation of registration. "Hanjin

Shipyard" must be removed in the name of the association.
Based on the Corporation Code, the use of a name deceptively similar is not allowed.
For the same reason, it would be misleading for the members of Samahan to use "Hanjin Shipyard" in
its name as it could give the wrong impression that all of its members are employed by Hanjin.
Section 9, Rule IV of D.O. No. 40-03, Series of 2003 explicitly states: The change of name of a labor
organization shall not affect its legal personality. All the rights and obligations of a labor organization under its
old name shall continue to be exercised by the labor organization under its new name.
Thus, in the directive of the BLR removing the words "Hanjin Shipyard," no abridgement of Samahan's
right to self-organization was committed.
REYES, et. al. vs. TRAJANO

G.R. No. 84433 June 2, 1992
THE RIGHT TO FORM OR JOIN A LABOR ORGANIZATION NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE RIGHT TO REFUSE OR
REFRAIN FROM EXERCISING SAID RIGHT
FACTS:
The Bureau of Labor Relations conducted a certification election among employees of Tri-Union
Industries Corporation. The competing unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor Association
in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services
(TUPAS).
Of the 348 workers initially deemed to be qualified voters, only 240 actually took part in the election.
The final tally of the votes showed the following results:
TUPAS 1 TUEU-OLALIA 95 NO UNION 1 SPOILED 1 CHALLENGED 141
However, the “CHALLENGED” votes of 141 Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) members were segregated and
excluded because they are not members of any union and refused to participate in the previous certification
elections.
From this, INK members filed a petition to cancel the election alleging that it was not fair and the result
thereof did not reflect the true sentiments of the majority of the employees.
Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-
OLALIA) opposed the petition contending that the INK members (PET) do not have legal personality to protest
the results of the election, because they are not members of either contending unit, but . . . of the INK which
prohibits its followers, on religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization . . . .”
Med-Arbiter saw no merit on the petition because INK members (PET) do not possess any legal
personality to institute this present cause of action since they were not parties to the petition for certification
election.
INK members appealed to Bureau of Labor Relations and argued that the Med-Arbiter had "practically
disenfranchised petitioners who had an overwhelming majority," and "the Tri-Union Employees Union-
Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA) certified union cannot be legally
said to have been the result of a valid election where at least fifty-one percent of all eligible voters in the
appropriate bargaining unit shall have cast their votes."
Bureau of Labor Relations denied the appeal on the ground that INK members are lacking of legal
personality to protest their alleged disenfrachisement" since they "are not constituted into a duly organized
labor union, hence, not one of the unions which vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining
representative." He also pointed out that the Ink members "did not participate in previous certification
elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not allow them to form, join or assist
labor organizations."
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the INK members have the right to vote in the certification election.
RULING:
YES. The INK members have the right to vote in the certification election (for labor union).
Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the "right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist
labor rganizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining.
Art 243 (now 249) of Labor Code provides that All persons employed in commercial, industrial and
agricultural enterprises and in religious, charitable, medical, or educational institutions whether operating for
profit or not, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their
own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers, self-
employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for
their mutual aid and protection.
Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among others, to "interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to "restrain or coerce
employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization.
The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from
exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by
law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has opted
to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such
membership.
The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of
the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and
in the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that
the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected,
and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit in
dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The
minority employees — who wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining — can do nothing
but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be
different. They may not and should not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority — who do
not desire to have a union certified as the exclusive workers’ benefit in the bargaining unit — upon the plea
that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining.
In this case, The Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor Association in Line Industries and
Agriculture (TUEU-OLALIA)’s argument that INK members (PET) are disqualified to vote because they “are not
constituted into a duly organized labor union” — “but members of the INK which prohibits its followers, on
religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization” — and “hence, not one of the unions which
vied for certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative,” is specious.
No law, administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor
organization may take part in a certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of
the law is to grant the right to vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are
members of a labor organization or not.
Moreover, the contention that INK members (PET) should be denied the right to vote because they
“did not participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs
do not allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations,” persuade acceptance. No law, administrative
rule or precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past
certification elections.
The right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign from a labor
organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to maintain membership
therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from
exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by
law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right.
T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN CORPORATION vs. T & H SHOPFITTERS

CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN WORKERS UNION, et. al.
G.R. No. 191714, February 26, 2014
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
FACTS:
The workers union (RESP) filed their complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) by way of union busting,
and Illegal Lockout against T & H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET) before the Labor Arbiter.
In their desire to improve their working conditions, workers union (RESP) and other employees of T &
H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET) held their first formal meeting to discuss the formation of a
union. The following day, 17 employees were barred from entering T & H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen
Corp (PET) factory premises and ordered to transfer to T&H Shopfitters warehouse at Subic Bay Freeport
purportedly because of its expansion. Afterwards, the said 17 employees were repeatedly ordered to go on
forced leave due to the unavailability of work.
The workers union (RESP) contended that the affected employees were not given regular work
assignments, while subcontractors were continuously hired to perform their functions. Moreover, they also
contended that T & H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET) never complied the agreement made by T &
H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET) during mediation that they will give priority to regular
employees in the distribution of work assignments.
The workers union (RESP) filed a petition for certification election. An order was issued to hold the
certification election in both T & H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET).
A day preceding the certification election, T & H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET) sponsored
a field trip to Iba, Zambales, for its employees. The officers and members of the workers union (RESP) were
purportedly excluded from the field trip. In the evening of the field trip, a sales officer of T & H Shopfitters
(PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET), campaigned against the union in the forthcoming certification election.
The following day, the employees were escorted from the field trip to the polling center to cast their
votes. Due to the heavy pressure exerted by T & H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET), the votes for
“no union” prevailed.
From this, the workers union (RESP) filed its protest with respect to the certification election
proceedings.
In its defense, Gin Queen (PET), claiming that it is a corporation separate and distinct from T&H
Shopfitters, stressed that workers union were all employees. Due to the decrease in orders from its
customers, they had to resort to cost cutting measures to avoid anticipated financial losses. Thus, it assigned
work on a rotational basis. It was of the impression that the employees, who opposed its economic measures,
were merely motivated by spite in filing the complaint for ULP against it. In addition, Gin Queen explained that
its transfer from Castillejos, Zambales to Cabangan, Zambales was a result of the expiration of its lease
agreement with Myra D. Lumibao (Myra), its lessor. Since the Cabangan site was bare and still required
construction, Gin Queen offered work, to employees who opted to stay, on rotation as well.
LA dismissed workers union (RESP) complaint and all their money claims for lack of merit. Moreover,
none of these 17 workers is a complainant in these cases. Further, there was no showing that the transfer of
these 17 workers is considered an unfair labor practice of the respondents considering that their transfer was
effected long before the union was organized.
The workers union (RESP) appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC ruled in favor of workers union (RESP) by reasoned that the T & H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin
Queen Corp (PET) committed ULP acts consisting in interfering with the exercise of the employees’ right to
self-organization (specifically sponsoring a field trip on the day preceding the certification election, warning
the employees of dire consequences should the union prevail, and escorting them to the polling center) and
discriminating in regard to conditions of employment in order to discourage union membership (assigning
union officers and active union members as grass cutters on rotation basis).
T & H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET) filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
The CA sustained the NLRC ruling.
Hence, the T & H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET) filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the SC.
ISSUE:
WON T & H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET) committed an ULP acts against the workers
union (RESP).
RULING:
Yes. T & H Shopfitters (PET) and Gin Queen Corp (PET) committed an ULP acts against the workers
union
The acts of petitioners that are considered as ULP are as follows:

1) sponsoring a field trip to Zambales for its employees, to the exclusion of union members, before the
scheduled certification election;
2) the active campaign by the sales officer of petitioners against the union prevailing as a bargaining
agent during the field trip;
3) escorting its employees after the field trip to the polling center;
4) the continuous hiring of subcontractors performing respondents’ functions;
5) assigning union members to the Cabangan site to work as grass cutters; and
6) the enforcement of work on a rotational basis for union members, all reek of interference on the
part of petitioners.
Such various acts of petitioners, taken together, reasonably support an inference that, indeed, such
were all orchestrated to restrict respondents’ free exercise of their right to self-organization. The Court is of
the considered view that petitioners’ undisputed actions prior and immediately before the scheduled
certification election, while seemingly innocuous, unduly meddled in the affairs of its employees in selecting
their exclusive bargaining representative.
Certification election is the sole concern of the workers, save when the employer itself has to file the
petition, but even after such filing, its role in the certification process ceases and becames merely a bystander.
Petitioner-companies had no business persuading and/or assisting its employees in their legally protected
independent process of selecting their exclusive bargaining representative. To interfere on it is considered as a
ULP.
DEL PILAR ACADEMY vs. DEL PILAR ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION

G.R. No. 170112, April 30, 2008
AGENCY FEE TO BE DEDUCTED FROM NON-UNION MEMBERS
WHO RECEIVES BENEFITS FROM THE CBA
FACTS:
Del Pilar Academy (PET) and the Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (RESP) entered into a collective
bargaining agreement where it was agreed that:
a. the employees, teaching and non-teaching staff, shall have a salary increase;
b. the teaching staff shall have a maximum load of 23 hours per week in teaching;
c. any overload shall be paid extra;
d. there shall be an increase in the longevity pay;
e. teaching staff who have rendered service for 6 consecutive semester are entitled to receive pay
during summer breaks;
f. non-union members who have rendered at least 1 year of service shall be entitled to 15 days leave
with pay.
Since the new CBA benefits non-union members, the Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (RESP) asked
Del Pilar Academy (PET) to deduct agency fees from the salaries of non-union members. However, Del Pilar
Academy (PET) refused to do so unless the provision regarding entitlement to two (2) months summer
vacation leave with pay will be amended by limiting the same to teachers, who have rendered at least three
(3) consecutive academic years of satisfactory service. The Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (RESP)
objected to the proposal claiming diminution of benefits.
Del Pilar Academy (PET) refused to sign the CBA, resulting in a deadlock.
The Del Pilar Academy Employees Union (RESP) requested Del Pilar Academy (PET) to submit the case
for voluntary arbitration, but the Del Pilar Academy (PET) allegedly refused.
Thus, Del Pilar Academy (PET) filed a case for unfair labor practice against Del Pilar Academy (PET)
before the Labor Arbiter.
In its defense, Del Pilar Academy (PET) denied committing unfair labor practices against the UNION and
avers that it cannot collect agency fees because the non-union members refused to provide Del Pilar a check
off authorization to make deductions from their salaries; and that further, the non-union members are not
benefited because regardless of the CBA, employees are going to be given a salary increase pursuant to a
program by the DECS’ Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.which mandates all private schools to provide
for salary increase based on tuition profits.
ISSUE:
WON the UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union members.
RULING:
Yes. The UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union members.
This is pursuant to Article 248 of the Labor Code which provides:

“Employees of an appropriate collective bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized
collective bargaining agency may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees
paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agreement… xxx”
This is also an exception to the rule that any deductions comprising of special assessments or
extraordinary fees (Art. 241, Labor Code) made by the employer from an employees salary must be authorized
by the employee.
It may be true that the salary increase provision may not have benefited the non-union members at all
because of the existing DECS regulation but it is also undeniable that the CBA also provides for other
provisions which benefits non-union members such as the grant of 15 paid leaves, the limitation of workloads,
and premiums for overloads. All these surely benefited even non-union employees. These provisions in the
CBA surely benefited the non-union employees, justifying the collection of, and the UNION’s entitlement to,
agency fees.
No requirement of written authorization from the non-union employees is needed to effect a valid
check off. Article 248(e) makes it explicit that Article 241, paragraph (o), requiring written authorization is
inapplicable to non-union members, esp. in this case where the non-union employees receive several benefits
under the CBA.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. QUISUMBING AND

MERALCO EMPLOYEES AND WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA)
G.R. No. 127598, August 1, 2000
SECRETARY OF DOLE PLENARY AND DISCRETIONARY POWER TO DETERMINE
THE EFFECTIVITY OF ARBITRAL AWARD AND RETROACTICE EFFECT OF CBA
FACTS:
On February 22, 2000, the SC promulgated a Resolution granting the motion for reconsideration and
modified the decision in which:
1. the arbitral award shall retroact from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997; and
2. the award of wage is increased from the original amount of One Thousand Nine Hundred Pesos
(P1,900.00) to Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for the years 1995 and 1996.
The SC ruled that CBA arbitral awards granted after six months from the expiration of the last CBA shall
retroact to such time agreed upon by both employer and the employees or their union. Absent such an
agreement as to retroactivity, the award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the
expiration of the last day of the CBA should there be one. In the absence of a CBA, the Secretary’s
determination of the date of retroactivity as part of his discretionary powers over arbitral awards shall control.
The Manila Electric Company (PET) filed a Motion for Partial Modification on Feb 22, 200 Resolution
issued by the SC on the grounds that the SC ruling on the retroactivity issue:
1. fails to account for previous rulings of the Court on the same issue;
2. fails to indicate the reasons for reversing the original ruling in this case on the retroactivity issue;
and
3. is internally inconsistent.
The Manila Electric Company (PET) assails that the foregoing portion of the Resolution is logically
flawed, because of the following reasons:
1. While it alludes to the Secretary’s discretionary powers only in the absence of a CBA, Article 253-A
of the Labor Code always presupposes the existence of a prior or subsisting CBA; hence the
exercise by the Secretary of his discretionary powers will never come to pass;
2. The Resolution contravenes the jurisprudential rule laid down in the cases of Union of Filipro
Employees v. NLRC,1Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services v. Roldan-Confesor2 and St. Luke’ s
Medical Center v. Torres;
3. The the SC erred in holding that the effectivity of CBA provisions are automatically retroactive.
4. The petitioner assigns as error this Court’s interpretation of certain acts of petitioner as consent to
the retroactive application of the arbitral award; and
5. The Resolution is internally flawed because when it held that the award shall retroact to the first
day after the six-month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA, the reckoning
date should have been June 1, 1996, not December 1, 1995, which is the last day of the three-year
lifetime of the economic provisions of the CBA.
The Manila Electric Company (PET) invokes the ruling in Union of Filipro Employees6 , wherein it upheld
the NLRC’s act of giving prospective effect to the CBA, and argues that the two-year arbitral award in the case
at bar should likewise be applied prospectively, counted from December 28, 1996 to December 27, 1998.
Petitioner maintains that there is nothing in Article 253-A of the Labor Code which states that arbitral awards
or renewals of a collective bargaining agreement shall always have retroactive effect.
Moreover, Manila Electric Company (PET) proposes that the collective bargaining agreement shall take
effect only upon its signing and shall remain in full force and effect for a period of five years.
On the other hand, MEWA (RESP) invokes the ruling in St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. v. Torres,9 which
held that in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral
awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary of Labor
has plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity of arbitral awards. Thus, respondent
maintains that the arbitral award in this case should be made effective from December 1, 1995 to November
30, 1997.
Moreover, MEWA (RESP) proposes that the agreement shall take effect retroactive to March 15, 1989,
the expiration date of the old CBA.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Secretary of Labor is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to
determine the effectivity of arbitral award.
2. WON the collective bargaining agreement shall take effect only upon its signing and shall remain
in full force and effect for a period of five years.
3. WON the award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the expiration
of the last day of the CBA.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Secretary of Labor is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to
determine the effectivity of arbitral award.
The provision of law invoked by the Hospital, Article 253-A of the Labor Code, speaks of agreements by
and between the parties, and not arbitral awards.
Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting retroactivity of the effectivity of
arbitral awards issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, such as herein
involved, the Secretary of Labor is deemed vested with plenary and discretionary powers to determine the
effectivity thereof.
2. No. The collective bargaining agreement shall not take effect only upon its signing and shall not
remain in full force and effect for a period of five years.
The SC affirmed with MEWA (RESP) that the agreement shall take effect retroactive to March 15, 1989,
the expiration date of the old CBA. It is the observation of this Arbitrator that in almost subsequent CBAs, the
effectivity of the renegotiated CBA, usually and most often is made effective retroactive to the date when the
immediately preceding CBA expires so as to give a semblance of continuity. Hence, for this particular case, it is
believed that there is nothing wrong adopting the stand of the union, that is that this CBA be made retroactive
effective March 15, 1989.
3. Yes. The award shall retroact to the first day after the six-month period following the expiration
of the last day of the CBA.
The SC took into account the fact that petitioner belongs to an industry imbued with public interest. As
such, this Court can not ignore the enormous cost that petitioner will have to bear as a consequence of the full
retroaction of the arbitral award to the date of expiry of the CBA, and the inevitable effect that it would have
on the national economy. On the other hand, under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward
to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in
life should have more in law.15 Balancing these two contrasting interests, this Court turned to the dictates of
fairness and equitable justice and thus arrived at a formula that would address the concerns of both sides.
Hence, this Court held that the arbitral award in this case be made to retroact to the first day after the six-
month period following the expiration of the last day of the CBA, i.e., from June 1, 1996 to May 31, 1998.
During the interregnum between the expiration of the economic provisions of the CBA and the date of
effectivity of the arbitral award, it is understood that the hold-over principle shall govern, viz:
"It shall be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force and effect the
terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day freedom period and/or until a new
agreement is reached by the parties." Despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still
considers the same as continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed.
Thus, the two-year effectivity period must start from June 1, 1996 up to May 31, 1998, not December
1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.
TABIGUE, et. al vs. INTERNATIONAL COPRA EXPORT CORPORATION (INTERCO)

G.R. No. 183335, December 23, 2009
WORKERS, WITHOUT THE UNION, CANNOT SUBMIT ISSUES TO VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION
FACTS:
Juanito Tabigue (PET) and his 19 co-petitioners, all employees of International Copra Export
Corporation (INTERCO) (RESP), filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation with the Department of Labor and
Employment – National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) Davao against INTERCO for violation of
Collective Bargaining Agreement and failure to sit on the grievance conference/meeting.
As the parties failed to reach a settlement before the NCMB, Tabigue and his co-petitioners (PET)
requested to elevate the case to voluntary arbitration. The NCMB thus set a date for the parties to agree on a
Voluntary Arbitrator.
Before the parties could finally meet, INTERCO presented a letter from the Union president, Mr. Tan
saying that the Tabigue and his co-petitioners (PET) are not duly authorized by Union board to represent the
Union.
The parties having failed to arrive at a settlement, NCMB Director Yosores wrote petitioner and plant
manager of the lack of willingness of both parties to submit to voluntary arbitration, which willingness is a pre-
requisite to submit the case thereto; and that under the CBA forged by the parties, the union is an
indispensable party to a voluntary arbitration but that since Tan informed respondent that the union had not
authorized petitioners to represent it, it would be absurd to bring the case to voluntary arbitration. He ruled
that the demand of to submit the issues to voluntary arbitration CAN NOT BE GRANTED. He thus advised
petitioners to avail of the compulsory arbitration process to enforce their rights.
Tabigue and his co-petitioners (PET) filed an MR before the NCMB. NCMB ruled that NCMB “has no
rule-making power to decide on issues, NCMB only facilitates settlement among the parties to labor disputes.”
Tabigue and his co-petitioners (PET) appealed with the CA which was dismissed, ruling that there is
nonpayment of docket, fees, lack of verification, incomplete signatures in the verification, non-attachment of
the assailed decision and that NCMB is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions but
merely a conciliatory body for the purpose of facilitating settlement of disputes between parties, its decisions
or that of its authorized officer cannot be appealed either through a petition for review under Rule 43 or
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Tabigue and his co-petitioners (PET) filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC.
ISSUE:
WON the workers, without the union, may submit issues to voluntary arbitration.
RULING:
NO. The workers, without the union, may not submit issues to voluntary arbitration.
As per CBA, in case of any dispute arising from the interpretation or implementation of CBA Agreement
or any matter affecting the relations of Labor and Management, the UNION and the COMPANY agree to
exhaust all possibilities of conciliation through the grievance machinery. The committee shall resolve all
problems submitted to it within fifteen days after the problems have been discussed by the members. If the
dispute or grievance cannot be settled by the Committee, or if the committee failed to act on the matter
within the period of fifteen days, the UNION and the COMPANY agree to submit the issue to Voluntary
Arbitration.
However in this case, Tabigue and his co-petitioners (PET) have not been duly authorized to represent
the union.
In Atlas Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,26) viz: x x x
Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective
representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall
automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA.
Consequently only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance
machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate
collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose
of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer.” But the right of any employee or group of employees to, at any
time, present grievances to the employer does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.
LABOR LAW 2 CASE DIGEST By: VANESSA YVONNE GURTIZA
NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and BAGONG
NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS SA NISSAN MOTOR PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. Nos. 158190-91, June 21, 2006
BARGAINING DEADLOCK
EFECT OF ILLEGALITY OF STRIKES
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
We have held that the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than
that of the members and, the
We have held that the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an illegal strike, is greater than
that of the members and, therefore, limiting the penalty of dismissal only for the former for participation in
an illegal strike is in order.
43
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., vs. PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR ASSOCIATION (PILA), et. al.
G.R. No. 170830, August 11, 2010
ILLEGAL STRIKE AND ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
FACTS:
PHIMCO (PET) is a corporation engaged in the production of matches. PHIMCO Industries Labor
Association (PILA) (RESP) is the SEBA of PHIMCO’s daily-paid workers. The 47 individually named respondents
are PILA’s officers and members.
The CBA between PHIMCO (PET) and PILA (RESP) was about to expire so both negotiated for its
renewal. However, it resulted in a deadlock on economic issues due to salary increases, benefits.
On March 9, 1995, PILA (RESP) filed with the NCMB a Notice of Strike on grounds of bargaining
deadlock. 7 days later, it conducted a strike vote where majority of PILA members voted for strike. After a day,
the results were filed with NCMB. On April 21, 1995 (35 days later), PILA (RESP) staged a strike.
PHIMCO (PET) filed with NLRC a petition for preliminary injuction and TRO to enjoin PILA from
preventing ingress and egress of non-striking EEs, which was granted. The TRO was effective for 20 days from
May 15-June 5, 1995.
On June 23, 1995, PHIMCO (PET) sent a letter to 36 union members to explain why they should not be
dismissed for committing illegal acts during the strike. Then, 3 days later, they were dismissed.
On July 6, PILA (RESP) then filed a complaint for ULP and Illegal dismissal with NLRC and it was raffled
to Labor Arbiter.
On July 7, Acting Labor Secretary Brillantes assumed jurisdiction and issued a return to work order.
PILA (RESP) on the same day, ended its strike.
PHIMCO (PET) filed a petition to declare the strike illegal, plus dismissal of officers and members who
knowingly participated therein and claimed that the strikers prevented ingress to and egress from PHIMCO
compound paralyzing PHIMCO’s ops.
The Labor Arbiter Mayor ruled that the strike was illegal and that the PILA (RESP) committed
prohibited acts during the strike by blocking the ingress to and egress from PHIMCO’s premises and preventing
the non-striking employees from reporting for work. Thus, PILA (RESP) employees, PILA officers and members,
have lost their employment status.
The NLRC relied on PILA’s evidence and set aside LA’s decision and ruled that PILA (RESP) picketed
peacefully and did not obstruct points of entry and exit to PHIMCO’s compound and held that the employees
were not given ample opportunity to explain themselves.
44
The CA affirmed NLRC’s decision and ruled that the picket was peaceful and that PHIMCO’s evidence
failed to show that the picket constituted an illegal blockade or that it obstructed the points of entry to and
exit from the company premises, were supported by substantial evidence.
ISSUE:
1. WON the strike was LEGAL.

2. WON PILA’s members were illegally dismissed.
RULING:
1. No. The strike was not LEGAL.
Despite validity of purpose of strike and compliance with procedural requirements a strike may be held
illegal if MEANS EMPLOYED are ILLEGAL.
A strike is the most powerful weapon of workers in their struggle to set the terms and conditions of
their employment with management. A strike must be exercised responsibly and always rest on rational basis.
Since a strike affects not only the relationship between labor and management but also general peace and
progress of society, law provided limitations on right to strike.
Procedurally, a strike must comply with Art 269 of the Labor Code to be valid:
1. Notice of strike to DOLE 30 days before strike (15 if ULP) - Cooling off period to amicably resolve the
dispute;
2. Strike vote (majority of total union membership in Bargaining unit); and
3. Notice of results to DOLE at least 7 days before strike (7 day strike ban) - To give DOLE opportunity to
verify is strike carries imprimatur of the majority of union members
Said requirements are mandatory, and union’s failure to comply renders the strike illegal.
In the present case, PILA (RESP) fully satisfied the legal procedure requirements. However Art 270(e)
provides that no person picketing shall commit any act of violence coercion, or intimidation or obstruct the
free ingress to or egress from er’s premises for lawful purposes or obstruct public thoroughfares.
In this case, the SC found that under the evidence presented, strikers did effectively obstruct entry/exit
points of the company premises on various occasions.
While the strike was not marred by actual violence and patent intimidation the picketing PILA
undertook as part of their strike BLOCKED the free ingress and egress from PHIMCO’s premises preventing
non-striking EE’s and company vehicles from entering the compound.
That the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by violence may not free it from taints
of illegality if it effectively blocked the entry/exit of the premises.
45
Testimony during the arbitration hearings showed that a coaster or bus attempted to enter PHIMCO
premises but was refused entry by the moving picket. Even when NLRC issued a TRO, still entry was not
allowed. Picketers held hands and moved to block the entry. Photos taken during the strike/picket showed
that the picket was moving and was maintained SO CLOSE to the company gates IT VIRTUALLY CONSTITUTED
OBSTRUCTION, especially when the strikers held hands, moved in circles, hand-to-shoulder. It was a VIRTUAL
HUMAN BLOCKADE, with real physical obstructions (benches, makeshift structures both INSIDE AND OUTSIDE
THE GATES.
In the present case, the way the strike was conducted created such an INTIMIDATING ATMOSPHERE to
the non-strikers, and even company vehicles are not cross the picket line w/o police intervention.
2. YES. PILA’s members were illegally dismissed because PHIMCO failed to observe due process.
Despite the acts being illegal, PHIMCO violated due process requirements when it dismissed
respondent union officers and members. (Twin notice).
As to union officers, it does not appear from evidence that the were specifically informed of the
charges and given a chance to explain and present their side.
As to the members, hen PHIMCO sent the letters to the 36 members, they were informed of the
charges but where not given ample chance to explain because 3 days later, they were fired.
Applying Agabon v NLRC, the employer must pay nominal damages at P30,000 for violation of EE’s right
to statutory due process.
46
JACKBILT INDUSTRIES, INC. vs. JACKBILT EMPLOYEES WORKERS UNION-NAFLU-KMU

G.R. Nos. 171618-19, March 20, 2009
ILLEGAL STRIKE
FACTS:
Due to economic crisis on construction industry, Jackbilt Industries (PET) decided to temporarily stop
its business of producing concrete hollow blocks compelling most of its employees to go on leave for six
months. Jackbilt Industries Employees Workers Union (RESP) protested the temporary shutdown and later on
went on strike.
Jackbilt Industries (PET) filed a petition for injunction with prayer for the issuance of TRO in NLRC which
NLRC issued. Reports of both the implementing officers and Labor Arbiter revealed that Jackbilt Industries
Employees Workers Union (RESP) violated the TRO. Respondent wrote letters to respondent participated in
strike to explain why they should not be dismissed for committing illegal acts in the course of a strike. Failure
of respondent to comply despite the extensions granted, petitioner dismissed the concerned employees.
Hence, Jackbilt Industries Employees Workers Union (RESP) filed a complaint for illegal lockout,
runaway shop and damages.
LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. However, because the petition did not declare the strike
illegal before terminating some employees, the company is found guilty of illegal dismissal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the decision of LA and held that petitioner should be held liable for
monetary awards granted to respondent. Petitioner appeal before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition but
modified the NLRC decision and held that the temporary shutdown was moved by anti-union sentiments.
Petitioner was guilty therefore of unfair labor practice.
ISSUE:
WON the filing of a petition to declare a strike illegal is a condition sine quanon for the valid
termination of employees who commit an illegal act in the course of strike.
RULING:
No. The filing of a petition to declare a strike illegal is not a condition sine quanon for the valid
termination of employees who commit an illegal act in the course of strike.
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code prohibits any person engaged in picketing from obstructing the free
ingress to and egress from the employer’s premises. Since respondent was found in the July 17, 1998 decision
of the NLRC to have prevented the free entry into and exit of vehicles from petitioner’s compound,
respondent’s officers and employees clearly committed illegal acts in the course of the March 9, 1998 strike.
The use of unlawful means in the course of a strike renders such strike illegal. Therefore, pursuant to
the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the March 9, 1998 strike was ipso facto illegal. The filing of a
petition to declare the strike illegal was thus unnecessary.
47
Consequently, the SC upholds the legality of the dismissal of respondent. Article 264 of the Labor Code
further provides that an employer may terminate employees found to have committed illegal acts in the
course of a strike. Petitioner clearly had the legal right to terminate respondent.
The petitioner is granted.
48
STANDARD ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. STANDARD ELECTRIC

EMPLOYEES UNION-NAFLU- KMU and ROGELIO JAVIER
G.R. No. 166111 August 25, 2005
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
FACTS:
Rogelio Javier (RESP) was employed by the Standard Electric Manufacturing Corporation (SEMC) (PET)
on January 15, 1973 as radial spot machine operator in its Production Department. On July 31, 1995, Javier
failed to report for work. He failed to notify the SEMC (PET) of the reason for his absences.
On August 9, 1995, he was arrested and detained for the charge of rape upon complaint of his
neighbor, Genalyn Barotilla. After the requisite preliminary investigation, an Information for rape was filed in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig.
On January 13, 1996, the SEMC (PET) received a letter from Javier informing the SEMC (PET) that Javier
was detained for the charge of rape and for that reason failed to report for work. He requested the SEMC
(PET) to defer the implementation of its intention to dismiss him. The SEMC (PET) denied Javier (RESP)’s
request and issued a Memorandum terminating his employment for having been absent without leave for
more than fifteen days from July 31, 1995; and for committing rape.
On May 17, 1996, the RTC issued an Order granting Javier’s demurrer to evidence and ordered his
release from jail. Shortly thereafter, Javier (RESP) reported for work, but the SEMC (PET) refused to accept him
back. A grievance meeting between the Union, Javier (RESP) and the SEMC (PET) was held, but SEMC (PET)
refused to re-admit Javier.
On August 2, 1996, the Union and Javier (RESP) filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against the SEMC
(PET) before the NLRC. He averred that since the reason for his detention for rape was non-existent, the
termination of his employment was illegal.
For its part, the SEMC (PET) averred that Javier’s prolonged absences caused irreparable damages to its
orderly operation; he had to be replaced so that the continuity and flow of production would not be
jeopardized. It could not afford to wait for Javier’s indefinite return from detention, if at all. The SEMC (PET)
insisted that conformably with its Rules and Regulations, it was justified in dismissing Javier for being absent
without leave for fifteen days or so.
ISSUE:
WON Javier was illegally dismissed.
RULING:
Yes. Javier was illegally dismissed.
The SC held that respondent Javier’s absence from August 9, 1995 cannot be deemed as an
abandonment of his work. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be inferred or legally
presumed from certain equivocal acts. To constitute as such, two requisites must concur: first, the employee
49
must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and second,
there must have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee
relationship as manifested by some overt acts, with the second element being the more determinative factor.
Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal requires clear, willful, deliberate, and unjustified refusal of the
employee to resume his employment. Mere absence or failure to report for work, even after notice to return,
is not tantamount to abandonment.
Moreover, Javier’s acquittal for rape makes it more compelling to view the illegality of his dismissal.
The trial court dismissed the case for “insufficiency of evidence,” and such ruling is tantamount to an acquittal
of the crime charged, and proof that respondent Javier’s arrest and detention were without factual and legal
basis in the first place.
Moreover, the petitioner did not accord respondent Javier an opportunity to explain his absences from
July 31, 1995. The petitioner’s reliance on the alleged Letter dated August 17, 1995 is misplaced. There is no
evidence on record that respondent Javier received such letter, and its sudden presence is highly suspect. The
Court agrees with respondent Javier’s observation that the letter was not mentioned nor annexed in the
petitioner’s Position Paper, Rejoinder and even in its Opposition to the Appeal. The letter surfaced only on a
much later date, in 1999, when it was formally offered in evidence[26] and referred to in the petitioner’s
Memorandum before the Labor Arbiter – a clear inference that the said letter was but an afterthought to
justify petitioner’s termination of respondent Javier’s employment.
Further, the due process requirement relative to the dismissal of respondent Javier was not duly
complied with.
In the case at bar, the SEMC (PET) did not conduct any investigation whatsoever prior to his
termination, despite being informed of respondent Javier’s predicament by the latter’s siblings, his Union and
his counsel. The meetings held pursuant to the grievance machinery provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement were only done after his dismissal had already taken effect on February 5, 1996.
Clearly, well-meaning these conferences might be, they can not cure an otherwise unlawful
termination. It bears stressing that for a dismissal to be validly effected, the twin requirements of due process
– notice and hearing – must be observed. In dismissing an employee, an employer has the burden of proving
that the former worker has been served two notices: (1) one to apprise him of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the other to inform him of his employer’s decision to dismiss him. As
to the requirement of a hearing, the essence of due process lies in an opportunity to be heard, and not always
and indispensably in an actual hearing.
50
TRIAD SECURITY & ALLIED SERVICES, INC vs. ORTEGA, JR.,et. al.
G.R. No. 160871, February 6, 2006
BACKWAGES AND SEPARATION PAY
FACTS:
On 25 March 1999, Ortega Jr., et. al. (RESP) filed a complaint against Triad Security and Allied
Services (PET) and a certain Javier D. Carbonell for underpayment or nonpayment of salaries, overtime pay,
premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay, and attorney’s fees. The
complaint was amended to include the charges of illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, underpayment or
nonpayment of allowance, separation pay, and claims for 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages as
well as night shift differential.
According to Ortega Jr., et. al. (RESP), during the time that they were in the employ of Triad
Security and Allied Services (PET), they were receiving compensation which was below the minimum wage
fixed by law. They were also made to render services everyday for 12 hours but were not paid the requisite
overtime pay, nightshift differential, and holiday pay. They also lamented the fact that Triad Security and
Allied Services (PET) failed to provide them with weekly rest period, service incentive leave pay, and 13th
month pay. As a result of these perceived unfairness, respondents filed a complaint before the Labor
Standards Enforcement Division of the Department of Labor on 6 January 1999. Upon learning of the
complaint, respondents’ services were terminated without the benefit of notice and hearing.
For their part, Triad Security and Allied Services (PET) denied respondents’ claim of illegal dismissal.
Petitioners explained that management policies dictate that the security guards be rotated to different
assignments to avoid fraternization and that they be required to take refresher courses at their headquarters.
Respondents allegedly refused to comply with these policies and instead went on leave or simply refused to
report at their headquarters. As for respondents’ money claims, petitioners insisted that respondents worked
for only eight hours a day, six days a week and that they received their premium pays for services rendered
during holidays and rest day. The service incentive leave of respondents was allegedly made payable as soon
as respondents applied for said benefit.
ISSUE:
WON CA erred when it declared that the remedy adopted by the petitioners is erroneous.
RULING:
No. The CA did not erred when it declared that the remedy adopted by the petitioners is
erroneous.
Petitioners contend that based on the rules of procedure of the NLRC, the order granting the
issuance of the 2nd alias writ of execution could not have been the proper subject of an appeal before the
NLRC neither could petitioners have sought the remedy of certiorari from the NLRC. Petitioners argue that the
rules of procedure of the NLRC do not provide for any remedy or procedure for challenging the order granting
a writ of execution; hence, the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court should apply which in this
case is Section 1 of Rule 41.
51
It is a basic tenet of procedural rules that for a special civil action for a petition for certiorari to
prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In this case, petitioners insist that the NLRC is bereft of authority to rule on a matter involving grave
abuse of discretion that may be committed by a labor arbiter. Such conclusion, however, proceeds from a
limited understanding of the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 223 of the Labor Code.
ART. 223. APPEAL
Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions,
awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter.
Given the foregoing, the SC held that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for
certiorari brought before it. Notwithstanding this procedural defect committed by petitioners, in the interest
of substantial justice.
he Supreme Court still orderedthe payment of backwages for the period whenthe employees should have
been reinstated byorder of the Labor Arbiter. In this case, thedecision of the Labor Arbiter ordering
thereinstatement of the respondent-employeesand the payment of their backwages until theiractual
reinstatement and in case reinstatement is no longer viable, the payment of separationpay, became final
and executory due to thefailure of the petitioner-employer toseasonably appeal the same. On the issue
ofwhether backwages should continue to runeven after the payment of separation pay, theSupreme Court
ruled in the affirmative. Itshould be pointed out that an order ofreinstatement by the labor arbiter is not
thesame as actual reinstatement of a dismissedor separated employee. Thus, until theemployer
continuously fails to actuallyimplement the reinstatement aspect of thedecision of the Labor Arbiter, their
obligation tothe dismissed employees, insofar as accruedbackwages and other benefits are
concerned,continues to accumulate. It is only when theillegally dismissed employee receives theseparation
pay that it could be claimed withcertainty that the employer-employeerelationship has formally ceased
therebyprecluding the possibility of reinstatement. Inthe meantime, the illegally dismissedemployee’s
entitlement to backwages, 13thmonth pay, and other benefits subsists. Untilthe payment of separation pay
is carried out,the employer should not be allowed to remainunpunished for the delay, if not outrightrefusal,
to immediately execute thereinstatement aspect of the labor arbiter’sdecision.Employment elsewhere does
not affectreinstatement order and obligation to paybackwages.In the same case of Triad Security [supra],
thepetitioners claimed that they could notreinstate respondents as the latter had alreadyfound jobs
elsewhere. In not giving credenceto this claim, the High Court declared thatrespondents herein were
minimum wageearners who were left with no choice after theywere illegally dismissed from their
employmentbut to seek new employment in order to earn adecent living. Surely, they could not be
52
faultedfor their perseverance in looking for andeventually securing new employmentopportunities instead
of remaining idle andawaiting the outcome of this case.Reinstatement in case of two successivedismissals.
53
HYATT TAXI SERVICES INC. vs. CATINOY

G.R. No. 143204, June 26, 2001
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL
FACTS:
Both Catinoy (RESP) and Saturnino are employees of Hyatt Taxi Services Inc (PET). They are also officers
of the legitimate labor organization/association of the petitioner. Both of them had a fist fight. After securing
medical treatment, complainant on the same day filed a criminal complaint for physical injuries with the
fiscal’s Office and Saturnino was arrested by the police for investigation.
On August 25, Jaime Dublin, Chairman of the Board of the Association, issued a memorandum to the
Operation Manager of the petitioner company, Mr. H. Caraig recommending the indefinite suspension of
Catinoy (RESP) and Saturnino. On August 26, 1995, the Asst. Vice-President of the petitioner company Melchor
Acosta, Jr. issued a memorandum preventively suspending for 30 days the services of the respondent and
Saturnino pending investigation in response to the recommendation of the Chairman of the Board of the
Association.
Catinoy (RESP) filed a complaint for illegal suspension, unpaid wages, and damages against both the
association-union and management on August 28, 1995 before the NLRC
After the lapse of his 30 days preventive suspension, Catinoy (RESP) reported for work but he was not
allowed to resume his duties as a taxi driver allegedly, since he is pursuing the criminal complainant for
physical injuries against Saturnino, the associations’ President and the complaint for the illegal suspension
with the NLRC.
On October 12, 1995, since there was no response from Hyatt Taxi Services Inc (PET)., Catinoy (RESP)
decided to amend his complaint to include constructive dismissal as an additional cause of action since he was
not allowed to resume his employment after the lapse of his preventive suspension.
ISSUE:
WON Catinoy (RESP) was constructively dismissed.
RULING:
No. Catinoy (RESP) was not constructively dismissed.
Clearly, constructive dismissal had already set in when the suspension went beyond the maximum
period allowed by law. Section 4, Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules provides that preventive suspension
cannot be more than the maximum period of 30 days. Hence, we have ruled that after the 30-day period of
suspension, the employee must be reinstated to his former position because suspension beyond this
maximum period amounts to constructive dismissal.
54
The SC ruled that there was illegal dismissal, not merely constructive dismissal. There was no
justification for the deletion of the award of back wages. The factual findings of the LA, which the NLRC
initially adopted, show that respondent was not taken back after the 30 days suspension. The LA appreciated
the events as badges of constructive dismissal. Constructive dismissal is when the employee wants to work but
cannot due to the prevailing conditions. But here, what made it impossible or unacceptable for respondent to
resume work was an insistence that he first desist from filing his complaints before he be allowed to return.
He refused and amended his complaint to include constructive dismissal. His refusal to yield is understandable
for he has every right not to bargain away his right to prosecute his complaints in exchange for the
employment to which he was in the first place rightfully entitled.
55
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. vs. CABILES

G.R. No. 170139, August 5, 2014
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
FACTS:
Joy C. Cabiles (RESP) submitted her application to Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. (PET) for a
quality control job in Taiwan, and signed with a one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of
NT$15,360.00.The agency required her to pay a placement fee of 70,000.00 when she signed the employment
contract. Cabiles (RESP) was deployed to work in Taiwan for Wacoal, but was given a position as a cutter.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. (PET) claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal informed Cabiles (RESP), without prior notice, that she was terminated and that she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport. She was asked to prepare for immediate
repatriation.
Cabiles (RESP) claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila. Cabiles (RESP)
filed a filed a complaint against petitioner and Wacoal for illegal dismissal before the NLRC.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. (PET) defended that Cabiles (RESP)’s termination was due to
her inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her failure to comply with the work requirements of her foreign
employer. The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of NT$70,000.00. It also added that
Wacoal’s accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management
Services, Inc. (Aug. 06, 1997) thus, obligation is substituted with Pacific, which the latter denied.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint is based on mere allegations
and ruled that there is no excess payment of placement fees, based on the official receipt presented by
petitioner and the ransfer of obligation to Pacific is immaterial.
NLRC ruled that Cabiles (RESP) was illegally dismissed and reiterated the doctrine that the burden of
proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer. It found that
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for termination. There was no
sufficient proof to show that respondent was inefficient in her work and that she failed to comply with
company requirements. Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed in terminating respondent.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. (PET) filed for MR but NLRC dismissed. Later on it filed for
petition for certiorari at CA.
The CA affirmed NLRC with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the
equivalent of three months worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s
fees.
ISSUE:
WON Cabiles (RESP) was illegally dismissed.
RULLING:
56
Yes. Cabiles (RESP) was illegally dismissed because there was no just cause for her termination and
due process was not observed.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s
dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work. They
may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards. Failure to
comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the services
of an employee who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer. While the law
acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not “authorize the oppression or self-destruction
of the employer.” Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence.This prerogative,
however, should not be abused. It is “tempered with the employee’s right to security of tenure. Workers are
entitled to substantive and procedural due process before termination. They may not be removed from
employment without a valid or just cause as determined by law and without going through the proper
procedure.Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:
Art. 282. Termination by employer.
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work;(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or
willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives;(e) Other
causes analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties may,
therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to prove
it.The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.” Failure to show
that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that:
1. the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be
judged;
2. the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and
3. the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance
assessment.
Petitioner failed to comply with the due process requirement.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal. The
employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before termination. One of the
written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal. The other
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notice must “[inform] the employee of the employer’s decision.” Aside from the notice requirement, the
employee must also be given “an opportunity to be heard.”
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ELVIRA ABASOLO, ET AL vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 118475, November 29, 2000
SEASONAL WORKERS
FACTS:
The Abasolo et. al (PET) worked in La Union Tobacco (Lutorco) (RESP) but work was interrupted when
Tabacalera took over the Lutorco (RESP) operations due to alleged losses. Abasolo et. al (PET) filed a complaint
against private respondent LUTORCO on the ground that there was a termination of their employment due to
the closure of LUTORCO as a result of the sale and turnover to TABACALERA. The Lutorco (RESP) raised as a
defense that it is exempt from payment of separation pay and denied that there was termination of
employees' services. It also contended that it stopped its operations due to the absence of capital and
operating funds caused by losses incurred from 1990 to 1992 and absence of operating funds for 1993,
coupled with adverse financial conditions and downfall of prices. Respondent corporation also contends that
the employees are seasonal worker, thus not entitled for separation pay.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and held that the Abasolo et. al (PET) are not entitled to
separation benefits since Lutorco ceased operations due to serious business losses. The NLRC affirmed said
ruling.
ISSUE:
1. WON Abasolo et. al (PET)are seasonal workers
RULING:
1. No. Abasolo et. al (PET) are not seasonal workers.
Abasolo et. al (PET) are considered regular employees because they performed services necessary and
indispensable to Lutorco's business. The nature of one's employment does not depend solely on the will or
word of the employer nor on the procedure of hiring and manner of designating the employee but on the
nature of the activity to be performed considering the employer's nature of business and the duration and
scope of work to be done.
As held in previous decisions, seasonal workers are those who are called to work from time to time and
are temporarily laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period but merely considered
on-leave until re-employed.
The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular employment is the reasonable connection
between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of the work performed and its
relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also if the employee has been
performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the
law deems repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
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indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only with
respect to such activity, and while such activity exists.
In the case at bar, while it may appear that the work of petitioners is seasonal, inasmuch as petitioners
have served the company for many years, some for over 20 years, performing services necessary and
indispensable to LUTORCO’s business, serve as badges of regular employment. Moreover, the fact that
petitioners do not work continuously for one whole year but only for the duration of the tobacco season does
not detract from considering them in regular employment since in a litany of cases this Court has already
settled that seasonal workers who are called to work from time to time and are temporarily laid off during off-
season are not separated from service in said period, but are merely considered on leave until re-employed.
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CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS vs. MARIN

G.R. No. 148931, September 12, 2006
PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT
FACTS:
Philip Marin (RESP) was an employee of Cathay Pacific Airways as a Reservation Officer, starting April.
During his probationary employment period, he has been apprehended several times for violating the
company rules on breaks, personal calls, and office discipline (he was always chatting noisily with co-workers).
Cathay Pacific Airways (PET) chose not to continue his employment after six months (on October).
Marin (RESP) filed for illegal dismissal before the NLRC and claimed that he was dismissed from
employment without cause, and that the same was arbitrary and capricious. He was still entitled to security of
tenure even if he was a probationary employee. He also asserted that he never received any letters or
documents informing him of Cathay’s employment standards and was never briefed regarding his duties and
functions as reservation officer and started working without knowing Cathay’s rules and regulations.
Moreover, he also contended that the infractions he allegedly incurred were mere fabrications by Gozun and
Montallana.
On the other hand, Cathay Pacific Airways (PET) contended that Marin’s performance was below than
what was expected of him as reservation officer during the first three months and that upon instruction of
Foster and as mandated in the October 14, 1991 Memorandum of M.A. Canizares, she briefed Marin on the
standards and expectations of Cathay for probationary employees, as well as its rules and regulations. In
August 1992, Marin was found taking his coffee break at the telesales area which was used exclusively for
receiving and entertaining calls from the public. He was again found chatting noisily with his co- employees, in
fine disrupting their work; and even received personal calls from the telesales area on September 18, 1992,
thus, blocking customers’ calls. In view of his infractions and the recommendation in the assessments, Cathay
decided not to extend regular employment to Marin. Leviste suggested that Marin had the option to
voluntarily resign.
The NLRC held that Marin’s employment was not terminated during his probationary employment
period, Cathay only chose not to extend his probationary employment to regular due to his unsatisfactory
work performance.
The LA dismissed the complaint because of his knowledge of the rules and the unsatisfactory staff
assessment submitted by the supervisors.
The CA reversed the LA and NLRC because the two-notice requirement was not complied with before
terminating Marin’s employment and Marin was not briefed on the company rules, and the standards to be
complied with in order to become a regular employee.
ISSUE:
WON Marin (RESP)’s employment was terminated during his probationary employment period.
RULING:
NO. Marin (RESP)’s employment was not terminated during his probationary employment period.
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Cathay Pacific Airways (PET) chose not to extend his probationary employment to regular due to his
unsatisfactory perfomance.
Article 280 provides for definition and period of probationary employment.
Art. 280 - Probationary employment.—Probationary employment shall not exceed six months from the
date the employee started working, unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a
longer period. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement.
An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee.
It is settled that a probationary employee enjoys only a temporary employment status, not a
permanent status. In general terms, he is terminable anytime as long as such termination is made before the
expiration of the six-month probationary period.
The employment of a probationary employee may only be terminated either (1) for a just cause; or (2)
when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with the reasonable standards made
known to him by the employer at the start of his employment.
The power of the employer to terminate an employee on probation is thus subject to the following
conditions: (1) it must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract; (2) the
dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in good faith, not prejudicial so as to violate the
contract or the law; and (3) there must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal. The burden of proving
just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer.
Cathay's decision not to extend any regular or permanent employment to Marin was based on findings
that his work performance during the six-month probationary period was unsatisfactory, based on the staff
assessment reports of Gozun and Montallana dated July 6, 1992 and September 30, 1992, respectively. He was
noisy and was always talking with the staff even if there were a lot of calls. He took his coffee breaks in the
work area; he disrupted his colleagues who were at work during lunch breaks; he was restless and could not
stay in the work area during work hours; he needed maturity in tackling his daily tasks, and needed
“improvement on some CX entries to facilitate his daily transactions in Cupid Mare practice and in Abacus.
Despite several reminders from his supervisor, he still continue to commit the infractions. He could not be
relied upon to carry the obligation of his position.
Marin failed to realize that, in a working environment, conduct is very important as part of a related
field. Respondent had to improve on the functionalities and techniques of his work which his former job did
not emphasize on. In fine, respondent’s conduct violated Rules II(c) (No breaks in the work area), IV (Taking of
personal calls using the company phone and in the work area) and V (Order and Discipline in the work area) of
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House Rules of the Reservation Department. He was aware of these rules, thus, he was bound to comply with
and follow them.
Even though Marin was not furnished with the pink-colored set of regulations of petitioner Cathay and
with copies of the staff assessment reports, nevertheless, Marin was briefed by Montallana on their contents.
He cannot expect his employment to be regularized simply because he was not furnished with a copy of the
document containing the standards promulgated by it. It was common knowledge that his behavior is not
acceptable in any work place.
Finally, Marin could not validly claim that he was denied due process because he was not given the
copy of the Staff Assessment Report. The evidence on record shows that Leviste briefed him on the staff
assessments and petitioner’s decision not to regularize his employment upon the expiry of the probationary
period, including the basis of said decision.
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CERVANTES vs. PAL MARITIME CORPORATION

G.R. No. 175209, January 16, 2013
RESIGNATION
FACTS:
Rolando Cervantes (Cervantes) was hired as Master on board the vessel M/V Themistocles by
respondent PAL Maritime Corporation, the manning agent of respondent Western Shipping Agencies, PTE.,
LTD., (Western Shipping) for a 10-month period. In less than a month on-board, a telex message was sent to
Cervantes enumerating several complaints against him received from Colonial Shipping, the owner of the
vessel.
On the following day, petitioner sent a telex message and imputed ill-motive on the part of the foreign
inspectors who were making false accusations against Filipino crew members. In the same message, petitioner
addressed all the complaints raised against him. Cervantes sent another telex message informing Western
Shipping of the unbearable situation on board. In response to said message, Western Shipping sent a letter
informing the former that the owners have decided to relieve him upon passing Panama Canal or next
convenient port and that the pre-mature ending of contract is mutually agreed and for the benefits of the
parties. Cervantes replied that he had no choice but to accept the decision and thanked them for relieving
him. Petitioner was, then, repatriated to Manila.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal. He prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages
plus attorney’s fees. In their Answer, respondents alleged that petitioner voluntarily and freely pre-terminated
his own contract.
ISSUE:
WON Cervantes resigned from his employment.
RULING:
Yes. Cervantes resigned from his employment.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that
personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, such that he has no other choice
but to disassociate himself from his employment. This is precisely what obtained in this case.
The statements of petitioner were simple and straightforward. There is no merit to his claim that he
was forced to resign due to extreme pressure. Only two (2) days had elapsed from the time petitioner
received a copy of the complaint from the owners of the vessel until his letter demanding his relief. The telex
message outlining numerous complaints against petitioner probably bruised his ego, causing petitioner to
react impulsively by resigning. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he and the Filipino crew
members were being subjected to racial discrimination on board. Petitioner presented a letter-petition against
a Greek technician who allegedly maltreated Filipino crew members. However, there was no showing that the
Greek technician spearheaded nor had any participation in the complaint of Colonial Shipping against
petitioner.
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NACAGUE vs. SULPICIO LINES, INC

G.R. No. 172589, August 8, 2010
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
FACTS:
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (RESP) hired Nacague (PET) as "hepe de viaje" or the representative of Sulpicio Lines
on board its vessel M/V Princess of the World. Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (RESP) received an anonymous letter
reporting the use of illegal drugs on board the ship.
Ceasar T. Chico, a housekeeper on the ship, submitted a report regarding the drug paraphernalia found
inside the Mopalla Suite Room and the threat on his life made by Nacague (PET) and Chief Mate Reynaldo
Doroon after he found the drug paraphernalia. Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (RESP) sent a notice of investigation to
Nacague informing him of the charges against him for use of illegal drugs and threatening a co-employee.
When the ship docked in the port of Manila on, some crew members of the ship, together with
Nacague (PET), were subjected to a random drug test. They were taken to S.M. Lazo Medical Clinic and were
required to submit urine samples. Nacague (PET) was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.
Sulpicio Lines (RESP) subjected Nacague (PET) to a formal investigation. Nacague denied using illegal
drugs. 5 days after the random drug testing, Nacague (PET) went to Chong Hua Hospital in Cebu City to
undergo a voluntary drug test. The drug test with Chong Hua Hospital yielded a negative result. Nacague (PET)
submitted this test result to Sulpicio Lines (RESP). However, Sulpicio Lines (RESP) still terminated him from the
service for the reason of finding him culpable of grave misconduct and loss of trust and confidence due to his
positive drug result.
Nacague (PET) filed a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and for reinstatement with
backwages.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Nacague and declared that Sulpicio Lines illegally
dismissed Nacague (PET) by reason that the drug test result from S.M. Lazo Clinic was questionable because
the clinic is not accredited by the Dangerous Drug Board and not under its supervision.
However, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision on the reason that Nacague (PET), who was
performing a task involving trust and confidence, was found positive for using illegal drugs, he was guilty of
serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
CA affirmed NLRC’s decision on the reason that Sulpicio Lines complied with both the procedural and
substantive requirements of the law when it terminated the employment of Nacague.
ISSUE:
WON the termination was valid.

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RULING:
NO. The termination was not valid.
Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. The lack of
accreditation of S.M. Lazo Clinic made its drug test results doubtful.
Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165 provides that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing
centers. Moreover, Section 36 also prescribes that drug testing shall consist of both the screening test and the
confirmatory test.
The law is clear that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing centers.
In this case, Sulpicio Lines failed to prove that S.M. Lazo Clinic is an accredited drug testing center.
Sulpicio Lines did not even deny Nacague’s allegation that S.M. Lazo Clinic was not accredited. Also, only a
screening test was conducted to determine if Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. Sulpicio Lines did not
confirm the positive result of the screening test with a confirmatory test. Sulpicio Lines failed to indubitably
prove that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs amounting to serious misconduct and loss of trust and
confidence. Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that it had a valid and legal cause for terminating Nacague’s
employment. When the alleged valid cause for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this
case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.
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ZAFRA and ECARMA vs. CA

G.R. No. 139013, September 17, 2002
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL AND TRANSFER OF AN EMPLOYEE
AS A MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE
FACTS:
Zafra and Ecarma (PET) were hired by PLDT as Operations Analyst and were assigned at the PLDT
Center in Cebu. Thereafter they undertook a training program in Germany and stayed there for almost three
months. Upon their return from Germany, they were informed that they will be transferred to Sampaloc,
Manila effective January, next year. Zafra and Ecarma (PET) were unwilling to transfer to Manila so they went
to the PLDT Head Office in Mandaluyong to air their grievance. However, their appeal fell on deaf ears so they
tendered their resignation. Zafra and Ecarma (PET) then filed a complaint for constructive dismissal before the
NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch. The presiding Labor Arbiter referred the complaint to the NCMB for
appropriate action. The parties then agreed to designate Atty. Lim as their voluntary arbitrator. Atty. Lim then
declared that petitioners were illegally dismissed by reason of the forced resignation or constructive discharge
from their employment. The CA however, reversed such decision.
ISSUE:
1. WON Zafra and Ecarma (PET) were constructively dismissed.
2. WON the Zafra and Ecarma (PET) transfer is an absolute right for the employers.
RULING:
1. Yes. Zafra and Ecarma (PET) were constructively dismissed.
The transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of management prerogatives. However, a
transfer amounts to constructive dismissal when it is unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the
employee and involves a demotion in rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges.
In this case, petitioners were unceremoniously transferred necessitating their relocation of their
families from Cebu to Manila. This act of the Management appears to be arbitrary without the usual notice
that should have been done even prior to the petitioner’s training abroad. From the employees’ viewpoint,
such action affecting their families is burdensome, economically and emotionally. Their forced transfer is not
only inconvenient, unreasonable and prejudicial but also in defiance of basic due process and fair play in
employment relations.
2. Yes. The Zafra and Ecarma (PET) transfer is an absolute right for the employers.
The fact that petitioners, in their application for employment, agreed to be transferred or assigned to
any branch should not be taken in isolation, but rather in conjunction with the established company practice
in PLDT. The standard operating procedure in PLDT is to inform personnel regarding the nature and location of
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their future assignments after training abroad. The need for the dissemination of notice of transfer to
employees before sending them abroad for training should be deemed necessary and later to have ripened
into a company practice or policy that could no longer be peremptorily withdrawn, discontinued, or
eliminated by the employer.
Needless to say, had they known about their pre-planned reassignments, petitioners could have
declined the foreign training intended for personnel assigned to the Manila office. The lure of a foreign trip is
fleeting while a reassignment from Cebu to Manila entails major and permanent readjustments for petitioners
and their families.
Thw transfer of an employee ordinarily lies within the ambit of management prerogatives.
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PAZ MARTIN JO and CESAR JO vs. NLRC

G.R. No. 121605, February 2, 2000
ABANDONMENT OF WORK
FACTS:
Peter Mejila was a barber employed by a barbershop. The owners of the shop attempted to mediate in
the incessant squabbling between Mejila and a fellow employee. Mejila then unilaterally demanded his
separation pay and other benefits, despite his employers’ assurance that he was not being dismissed. He then
turned over the duplicate keys of the shop (which he held as caretaker) to the cashier and took all his personal
belongings from his workplace, and found similar employment in another shop. He then filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.
Private respondent Peter Mejila worked as barber in a barbershop owned by Dina Tan who
subsequently sold the same to petitioners Paz Martin Jo and Cesar Jo. All the employees were absorbed by the
new owners. Jo designated Mejila as caretaker. Thereafter, Mejila had an altercation with his co-barber, Jorge
Tinoy. The bickerings, characterized by constant exchange of personal insults during working hours, became
serious so that Mejila reported the matter to Atty. Macaraya of the labor department. Macaraya summoned
Mejila and petitioners to a conference and found out that the dispute was not between Mejila and petitioners
but between Mejila and Tinoy. During the mediation meeting Mejila demanded payment for separation pay
and other monetary benefits although he was not being dismissed. Mejila continued reporting for work at the
barbershop but after some time he began working as a regular barber at a different barbershop leaving the
keys and getting his belongings from the old barbershop. Mejila then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for payment of separation pay, other monetary benefits, attorney’s fees and damages. Significantly,
the complaint did not seek reinstatement as a positive relief. In its decision, Labor Arbiter found that Mejila
was an employee of petitioners, and that he was not dismissed but had left his job voluntarily because of his
misunderstanding with his co-worker. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, but ordered petitioners to
pay Mejila his 13th month pay and attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed to the NLRC who in turn set aside
the labor arbiter’s judgment, sustaining the labor arbiter’s finding as to the existence of employer-employee
relationship, but it ruled that Mejila was illegally dismissed. Hence, the petitioners were ordered to reinstate
Mejila and pay the latter’s backwages, 13th month pay, separation pay and attorney’s fees for failure to
observe due process before dismissing the complaint. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied in a
Resolution, petitioners filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON Mejila was dismissed.
RULING:
No. Mejila was not dismissed. He abandoned his work.
This was manifested by: His having bragged to fellow workers his intention to quit his work in the shop;
his surrender of the shop’s keys and his taking all of his personal belongings from the said place; his failure to
report from work and not giving any valid reason for such; he acquired employment in another shop
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immediately, despite reassurances that he could stay in his old place of work; and finally, his complaint for
illegal dismissal did not include a prayer for reinstatement. All of these show concurrence of the intent to
abandon his work and over acts that show his lack of interest in continuing his work.
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ALILING vs. FELICIANO, et.al.

G.R. No. 185829, April 25, 2012
REGULAR EMPLOYEE AND ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
FACTS:
Respondent Wide Wide World Express Corporation (WWWEC) offered to employ petitioner Armando
Aliling (Aliling) on June 2, 2004 as “Account Executive (Seafreight Sales),” with a compensation package of a
monthly salary of PhP 13,000, transportation allowance of PhP 3,000, clothing allowance of PhP 800, cost of
living allowance of PhP 500, each payable on a per month basis and a 14th month pay depending on the
profitability and availability of financial resources of the company. The offer came with a six (6)-month
probation period condition with this express caveat: “Performance during probationary period shall be made
as basis for confirmation to Regular or Permanent Status.”.
On June 11, 2004, Aliling and WWWEC inked an Employment Contract under the terms of conversion
to regular status shall be determined on the basis of work performance; and employment services may, at any
time, be terminated for just cause or in accordance with the standards defined at the time of engagement.
However, instead of a Seafreight Sale assignment, WWWEC asked Aliling to handle Ground Express
(GX), a new company product launched on June 18, 2004 involving domestic cargo forwarding service for
Luzon. Marketing this product and finding daily contracts for it formed the core of Aliling’s new assignment.
A month after, Manuel F. San Mateo III (San Mateo), WWWEC Sales and Marketing Director, emailed
Aliling to express dissatisfaction with the latter’s performance.
On September 25, 2004, Joseph R. Lariosa (Lariosa), Human Resources Manager of WWWEC, asked
Aliling to report to the Human Resources Department to explain his absence taken without leave from
September 20, 2004.
Aliling responded two days later. He denied being absent on the days in question, attaching to his
reply-letter a copy of his timesheet which showed that he worked from September 20 to 24, 2004. Aliling’s
explanation came with a query regarding the withholding of his salary corresponding to September 11 to 25,
2004.
On October 15, 2004, Aliling tendered his resignation to San Mateo. While WWWEC took no action on
his tender, Aliling nonetheless demanded reinstatement and a written apology, claiming in a subsequent letter
dated October 1, 2004 to management that San Mateo had forced him to resign.
Lariosa’s response-letter of October 1, 2004, informed Aliling that his case was still in the process of
being evaluated. On October 6, 2004, Lariosa again wrote, this time to advise Aliling of the termination of his
services effective as of that date owing to his “non-satisfactory performance” during his probationary period.
Records show that Aliling, for the period indicated, was paid his outstanding salary. However, or on October 4,
2004, Aliling filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal due to forced resignation, nonpayment of salaries as well as
damages with the NLRC against WWWEC. Appended to the complaint was Aliling’s Affidavit dated November
12, 2004, in which he stated: “. At the time of my engagement, respondents did not make known to me the
standards under which I will qualify as a regular employee.”
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Refuting Aliling’s basic posture, WWWEC stated that in the letter offer and employment contract
adverted to, WWWEC and Aliling have signed a letter of appointment on June 11, 2004 containing the terms
of engagement.
WWWEC also attached to its Position Paper a memo dated September 20, 2004 in which San Mateo
asked Aliling to explain why he should not be terminated for failure to meet the expected job performance,
considering that the load factor for the GX Shuttles for the period July to September was only 0.18% as
opposed to the allegedly agreed upon load of 80% targeted for August 5, 2004. According to WWWEC, Aliling,
instead of explaining himself, simply submitted a resignation letter.
On April 25, 2006, the Labor Arbiter issued a decision declaring that the grounds upon which
complainant’s dismissal was based did not conform not only the standard but also the compliance required
under Article 281 of the Labor Code, Necessarily, complainant’s termination is not justified for failure to
comply with the mandate the law requires. Respondents should be ordered to pay salaries corresponding to
the unexpired portion of the contract of employment and all other benefits amounting to a total of
P35,811.00 covering the period from October 6 to December 7, 2004.
The Labor Arbiter explained that Aliling cannot be validly terminated for noncompliance with thw
quota threshold absent a prior advisory of the reasonable standards upon which his performance would be
evaluated. Both parties appealed the decision to the NLRC, which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The separate motions for reconsideration were also denied by the NLRC. The CA anchored its assailed action
on the strength of the following premises: (a) respondents failed to prove that Aliling’s dismal performance
constituted gross and habitual neglect necessary to justify his dismissal; (b) not having been informed at the
time of his engagement of the reasonable standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee, Aliling
was deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee; and (c) the strained relationship existing
between the parties argues against the propriety of reinstatement. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioner is a regular employee.

2. WON petitioner was illegally dismissed or his right to security of tenure was violated.
3. WON Aliling’s right to procedural due process was violated.
4. WON Aliling is entitled to backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
RULING:
1. Yes. The petitioner is a regular employee.
Petitioner was regularized from the time of the execution of the employment contract on June 11,
2004, although respondent company had arbitrarily shortened his tenure. As pointed out, respondent
company did not make known the reasonable standards under which he will qualify as a regular employee at
the time of his engagement. Hence, he was deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular employee.
2. Yes. The petitioner was illegally dismissed or his right to security of tenure was violated.
To justify fully the dismissal of an employee, the employer must, as a rule, prove that the dismissal was
for a just cause and that the employee was afforded due process prior to dismissal. As a complementary
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principle, the employer has the onus of proving with clear, accurate, consistent, and convincing evidence the
validity of the dismissal.
The attendant circumstances in the instant case aptly show that the issue of petitioner’s alleged failure
to achieve his quota, as a ground for terminating employment, strikes the Court as a mere afterthought on the
part of WWWEC. Consider: Lariosa’s letter of September 25, 2004 already betrayed management’s intention
to dismiss the petitioner for alleged unauthorized absences. Aliling was in fact made to explain and he did so
satisfactorily. But, lo and behold, WWWEC nonetheless proceeded with its plan to dismiss the petitioner for
nonsatisfactory performance, although the corresponding termination letter dated October 6, 2004 did not
even specifically state Aliling’s “non-satisfactory performance,” or that Aliling’s termination was by reason of
his failure to achieve his set quota.
Employees must be reminded that while probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status, they
enjoy the constitutional protection of security of tenure. They can only be terminated for cause or when they
otherwise fail to meet the reasonable standards made known to them by the employer at the time of their
engagement. Respondent WWWEC miserably failed to prove the termination of petitioner was for a just cause
nor was there substantial evidence to demonstrate the standards were made known to the latter at the time
of his engagement. Hence, petitioner’s right to security of tenure was breached.
3. Yes. Aliling’s right to procedural due process was violated.
To effect a legal dismissal, the employer must show not only a valid ground therefor, but also that
procedural due process has properly been observed. When the Labor Code speaks of procedural due process,
the reference is usually to the two (2)-written notice rule envisaged in Section 2 (III), Rule XXIII, Book V of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
MGG Marine Services, Inc. v. NLRC tersely described the mechanics of what may be considered a two-part
due process requirement which includes the two-notice rule, “x x x one, of the intention to dismiss, indicating
therein his acts or omissions complained against, and two, notice of the decision to dismiss; and an
opportunity to answer and rebut the charges against him, in between such notices.”
King of Kings Transport, Inc. v. Mamac expounded on this procedural requirement in this manner: a. first
written notice, b. hearing or conference, and c. written notice of termination. WWWEC did not comply with
the first notice requirement. Neither was there compliance with the imperatives of a hearing or conference.
The Court need not dwell at length on this particular breach of the due procedural requirement. Suffice it to
point out that the record is devoid of any showing of a hearing or conference having been conducted. On the
contrary, in its October 1, 2004 letter to Aliling, or barely five (5) days after it served the notice of termination,
WWWEC acknowledged that it was still evaluating his case. And the written notice of termination itself did not
indicate all the circumstances involving the charge to justify severance of employment.
4. Yes. Aliling is entitled to backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
As of that date June 11, 2004, Aliling became part of the WWWEC organization as a regular employee
of the company without a fixed term of employment. Thus, he is entitled to backwages reckoned from the
time he was illegally dismissed on October 6, 2004, with a PhP 17,300.00 monthly salary, until the finality of
this Decision.
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Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 34 of Republic Act 6715 instructs:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. - In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time
of his actual reinstatement.
The law intends the award of backwages and similar benefits to accumulate past the date of the Labor
Arbiter’s decision until the dismissed employee is actually reinstated. But if, as in this case, reinstatement is no
longer possible, this Court has consistently ruled that backwages shall be computed from the time of illegal
dismissal until the date the decision becomes final.
Additionally, Aliling is entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement on the ground of strained
relationship.
The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the award of separation pay.
Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is no longer advisable because of strained relations between
the employee and the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been earned but were
not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for computing backwages is usually the length of the
employee's service while that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully
prevented from working.
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Ocean East Agency, et al. vs. Lopez

G.R. No. 194410 , October 14, 2015
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
FACTS:
On March 7, 1988, respondent Allan I. Lopez was employed as Documentation Officer assigned to
Ocean East's Operations Department. In a letter dated February 5, 2001, Ocean East served notice to Lopez
that effective thirty (30) days later, or on March 6, 2001, his services will be terminated on the ground of
redundancy, as his position as Documentation Officer is but a duplication of those occupied by its two (2)
other personnel who were also exercising similar duties and functions.
On February 7, 2001, Lopez received his separation pay and was issued a Certificate of Service.
On May 23, 2001, Lopez filed an Amended Complaint for illegal dismissal, damages and attorney's fees
against petitioners Ocean East, Carmen and Skinitis. Lopez alleged that Skinitis falsely accused him of making
money from the crew to be deployed abroad, maligned his physical handicap as a polio victim, and ordered his
removal from his job.
LA ruled in favor of Ocean East citing the employer's management prerogative to abolish a position
which it deems no longer necessary. NLRC affirmed LA, stating that there was no malice shown by Ocean East
in the exercise of its management prerogative. CA reversed NLRC. CA found that Ocean East failed to discharge
the burden of proving the validity of Lopez' dismissal due to redundancy.
There is nothing in the records that shows that indeed a study was conducted which led to the
termination of Lopez' services on the ground that his position has become redundant. Neither was there any
proof that Oceaneast had a concrete redundancy program. Moreover, Oceaneast committed a fatal error
when it failed to give written notice to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) as required under
Article 283 of the Labor Code. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found the absence of written notice of
termination to the DOLE but opined that there was substantial compliance on the notice requirement as Lopez
himself was duly informed and consented to his termination by receiving his separation pay. But such lack of
notice is frowned upon by law.
Ocean East argued that there was no need to serve notice to DOLE since Lopez’ acceptance of
separation pay is deemed an acknowledgment by the employee of the valid cause of termination.
ISSUE:
WON there was an illegal dismissal.
RULING:
Yes. There was an illegal dismissal.
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For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must comply with these
requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment at
least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at
least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; (3) good faith in
abolishing the redundant positions; and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be
declared redundant and accordingly abolished.
The Court finds that petitioners failed to establish compliance with the first, third and fourth requisites
for a valid implementation of a redundancy program, thereby making Ocean East liable for illegal dismissal.
It is undisputed that Ocean East failed to comply with the first requisite of service of a written notice of
termination to the DOLE. CA is correct in pointing out that Lopez had no choice but to accept the separation
pay because he was a family man with five (5) children to support 30 and Ocean East's letter clearly stated that
he was being terminated due to redundancy.
Above all, there is no merit in petitioners' contention that notice to the DOLE may already be
dispensed with since there was no more useful purpose for it, and he was already adequately compensated as
required by law. Indeed, to dispense with such notice would not only disregard a clear labor law provision that
affords protection to an employee, but also defeats its very purpose which is to give the DOLE the opportunity
to ascertain the veracity of the alleged authorized cause of termination.
In this case, petitioners were able to establish through Ocean East's Quality Procedures Manual that
Lopez' position as a Documentation Officer was redundant because its duties and functions were similar to
those of the Documentation Clerks in its operations department. However, they failed to prove by substantial
evidence their observance of the fair and reasonable criteria of seniority and efficiency in ascertaining the
redundancy of the position of Documentation Officer, as well as good faith on their part in abolishing such
position. Petitioners were unable to justify why it was more efficient to terminate Lopez rather than its two
other Documentation Clerks, Reynolds and Hing. Also, while Reynolds was supposedly retained for being more
senior than Lopez, petitioners were silent on why they chose to retain Hing who was hired in 1996, instead of
Lopez who was hired about eight (8) years earlier in 1988.
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PEÑAFRANCIA TOURS AND TRAVEL TRANSPORT, INC vs. SARMIENTO and CATIMBANG
G.R. No. 178397, October 20, 2010
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
FACTS:
Bus drivers Respondents ABC and DEF were told by their employer Petitioner XYZ that the company is
now sold to RST. Respondents were given separation pay and other benefits. Later, respondents learned that
it was still XYZ operating the company. Respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed the case. NLRC reversed. CA affirmed NLRC Decision. XYZ filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Supreme Court
ISSUE:
WON there illegal dismissal.
RULING:
Yes, there was illegal dismissal.
The alleged sale or transfer of ownership was done in bad faith. The sale or disposition must be
motivated by good faith as a condition for exemption from liability. Thus, where the change of ownership is
done in bad faith, or is used to defeat the rights of labor, the successor-employer is deemed to have absorbed
the employees and is held liable for the transgressions of his or her predecessor.
The verbatim ruling of the SC follows:
The petition is bereft of merit.
Closure of business is the reversal of fortune of the employer whereby there is a complete cessation of
business operations and/or an actual locking-up of the doors of the establishment, usually due to financial
losses. Closure of business, as an authorized cause for termination of employment, aims to prevent further
financial drain upon an employer who can no longer pay his employees since business has already stopped.
Closure or cessation of operation of the establishment is an authorized cause for terminating an

employee, as provided in Article 283 of the Labor Code, to wit:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. — The employer may also terminate the
employment of any employee due to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy,
retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or
undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by
serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof. x x x. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases
of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business
losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or to at least
one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered one (1) whole year.
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On this ground, petitioner terminated the employment of respondents. However, what petitioner
apparently made was a transfer of ownership. It is true that, as invoked by petitioner, in Manlimos, et al. v.
NLRC, et al.,[we held that a change of ownership in a business concern is not proscribed by law. Lest petitioner
forget, however, we also held therein that the sale or disposition must be motivated by good faith as a
condition for exemption from liability. Thus, where the charge of ownership is done in bad faith, or is used to
defeat the rights of labor, the successor-employer is deemed to have absorbed the employees and is held
liable for the transgressions of his or her predecessor.
But, in this case, there is no successor-employer because there was no actual change of ownership. We
sustain the uniform factual finding of both the NLRC and the CA that no actual sale transpired and, as such,
there is no closure or cessation of business that can serve as an authorized cause for the dismissal of
respondents. Notable in this regard are the following observations of the CA:
Petitioner PTTTI sent notices of termination to private respondents Sarmiento and Catimbang on the
alleged ground that it would cease operations effective 30 October 2002 due to business reverses and it would
eventually sell the same to another company. (Id. at p. 77) However, the records explicitly show that it (PTTTI)
failed to establish its allegation that it was suffering from business reverses. Neither was there proof that
indeed a sale was made and executed on 01 October 2002 involving the company’s assets in favor of ALPS
Transportation owned by the Perez family. It did not present any documentary evidence to support its claim
that it sold the same to ALPS Transportation. On the contrary, it (PTTTI) continuously operates under the same
name, franchises and routes and under the same circumstances as before the alleged sale. It (PTTTI) tried to
convince us that it is under a new management, by presenting series of memoranda where the signatory
thereon is Edelberto E. Perez, VP-Finance/Operations (Id. at pp. 78-83). To us, the series of memoranda do not
conclusively show that there had been a sale in favor of ALPS Transportation. And considering that there was
no sale which transpired, we also find no basis for the rescission thereof. The letter dated 19 March 2003
addressed to its employees, informing the latter that it had rescinded its sale to ALPS Transportation and thus,
there is a change of management, ownership and operation of the company and it (PTTTI) is intending to sell
the company to Southern Comfort Bus Co., Inc. headed by Mr. Willy D. Deterala (Id. at p. 89) could not
convince us that there was actually a rescission of sale. If indeed there was sale and a consequent rescission
thereof which transpired, why is it that the ALPS Transportation did not give much a fight when the contract of
sale was unilaterally rescinded by Bonifacio Cu who signed as President/General Manager of petitioner PTTTI
in a letter dated 28 February 2003. It is quite unconceivable for a company like ALPS Transportation which had
already parted a considerable sum not to question the rescission undertaken by petitioner PTTTI. This only
confirms the public respondent NLRC’s finding, that the sale was indeed a sham, designed to circumvent the
law on the rights of the workers. There is thus, no basis for us to believe that there was a consequent
rescission of the alleged sale made by petitioner PTTTI in favor of ALPS Transportation.
Corollarily, we opine that the alleged second sale made by petitioner PTTTI, this time in favor of
Southern Comfort Bus Co., Inc. represented by one Willy D. Deter[a]la is also simulated considering that the
ten million pesos consideration is unbelievably too small for thirty five (35) aircon buses including its franchise
and facilities thereon. It is quite an illogical move for the company to have allegedly rescinded the previous
sale involving a higher consideration of sixty million pesos (P60,000,000.00) made in favor of ALPS
Transportation and to resell the same, this time just for a measly amount of ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00). Additionally, the observation of private respondents Sarmiento and Catimbang is quite
impressive when they claimed that the Southern Comfort Bus Co., Inc., presided by one Willy D. Deterala is a
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dummy corporation since it has not operated any single bus under its name, even prior to the sale and up to
the present. In fact, its principal business office at No. 4 Cathedral St., Ateneo Avenue 4400 Naga City is not
even known. Suffice it to stress, these private respondents’ allegations/observations have not at all been
refuted nor controverted by petitioner PTTTI.
It is likewise evident that, even in the petition before this Court, Bonifacio Bryan Cu signed the
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping[7][24] and Antonio Cu signed the Secretary’s
Certificate.[8][25] The fact remains that the Cu family continues to operate petitioner’s business. Despite the
alleged recent sale to SCBC, represented by Willy Deterala, petitioner failed to refute the allegations of
respondents that the Cu family still continues to own and operate petitioner, or even to show that Willy
Deterala is actually in charge of petitioner’s business. Petitioner did not confront this issue head-on, and its
failure to do so is fatal to its cause. Petitioner having failed to discharge its burden of submitting sufficient and
convincing evidence required by law, we hold that respondents were illegally dismissed. Finally, the CA
affirmed the ruling of the NLRC and adopted as its own the latter’s factual findings. Long-established is the
doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are accorded respect, even finality, if
supported by substantial evidence. When passed upon and upheld by the CA, they are binding and conclusive
upon this Court and will not normally be disturbed. Though this doctrine is not without exceptions, the Court
finds that none are applicable to the present case.
All told, we find no reversible error to justify disturbing, much less, reversing the assailed CA Decision.
79
PADILLO,vs., RURAL BANK OF NABUNTURAN, INC.

G.R. No. 199338, January 21, 2013
TERMINATION ON THE GROUND OF DISEASE
FACTS:
Petitioner, the late Eleazar Padillo (Padillo), was an employee of respondent Rural Bank of Nabunturan,
Inc. (Bank) as its SA Bookkeeper. Due to liquidity problems in 2003, the Bank took out retirement/insurance
plans with Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company (Philam Life) for all its employees in
anticipation of its possible closure and the concomitant severance of its personnel. Respondent Mark Oropeza
is the president and major stockholder of the bank.
Padillo suffered a mild stroke due to hypertension which consequently impaired his ability to
effectively pursue his work. He wrote a letter addressed to Oropeza expressing his intention to avail of an
early retirement package. Despite several follow-ups, his request remained unheeded. Not having received his
claimed retirement benefits, Padillo filed with the NLRC a complaint for the recovery of unpaid retirement
benefits.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed Padillos complaint on the ground that the latter did not qualify to receive
any benefits under Article 300 of the Labor Code as he was only fifty-five (55) years old when he resigned,
while the law specifically provides for an optional retirement age of sixty (60) and compulsory retirement age
of sixty-five (65).
Padillo elevated the matter to the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters ruling. Aggrieved,
Oropeza and the Bank filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA reversed the NLRCs ruling but with
modification. It directed the respondents to pay Padillo the amount of P50,000.00 as financial assistance
exclusive of the P100,000.00 Philam Life Plan benefit.
Displeased with the CAs ruling, Padillo (now substituted by his legal heirs due to his death) filed the
instant petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
WON Padillo is entitled to claim for separation and retirement benefits under the Labor Code.
RULING:
At the outset, it must be maintained that the Labor Code provision on termination on the ground of
disease under Article 297 does not apply in this case, considering that it was Padillo and not the Bank who
severed the employment relations. A plain reading of the Article 297 of the Labor Code clearly presupposes
that it is the employer who terminates the services of the employee found to be suffering from any disease
and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of
his co-employees. It does not contemplate a situation where it is the employee who severs his or her
employment ties.
What remains applicable, however, is the Labor Code provision on retirement. In the absence of any
applicable agreement, an employee must (1) retire when he is at least sixty (60) years of age and (2) serve at
least (5) years in the company to entitle him/her to a retirement benefit of at least one-half (1/2) month salary
for every year of service, with a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
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Notably, these age and tenure requirements are cumulative and noncompliance with one negates the
employees entitlement to the retirement benefits under Article 300 of the Labor Code altogether.
In this case, it is undisputed that there exists no retirement plan, collective bargaining agreement or
any other equivalent contract between the parties which set out the terms and condition for the retirement of
employees, with the sole exception of the Philam Life Plan which premiums had already been paid by the
Bank.
Unfortunately, while Padillo was able to comply with the five (5) year tenure requirement as he served
for twenty-nine (29) years he, however, fell short with respect to the sixty (60) year age requirement given
that he was only fifty-five (55) years old when he retired. Therefore, without prejudice to the proceeds due
under the Philam Life Plan, petitioners claim for retirement benefits must be denied.
Nevertheless, the Court concurs with the CA that financial assistance should be awarded but at an
increased amount. With a veritable understanding that the award of financial assistance is usually the final
refuge of the laborer, considering as well the supervening length of time which had sadly overtaken the point
of Padillos death an employee who had devoted twenty-nine (29) years of dedicated service to the Bank the
Court, in light of the dictates of social justice, holds that the CAs financial assistance award should be
increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, still exclusive of the P100,000.00 benefit receivable by the
petitioners under the Philam Life Plan which remains undisputed.
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PERPETUAL HELP CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC.,vs. FABURADA, et.al.

G.R. No. 121948, October 8, 2001
REGULAR EMPLOYEES
FACTS:
Private respondents Faburada et. al. filed a complaint against PHCCI for illegal dismissal, premium pay,
separation pay, wage differential, moral damages and attorney’s fees.
PHCCI filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that noemployer-employee relationship exists since
privaterespondents are all members and co-owners of thecooperative. Also, private respondents have not
exhausted the remedies provided in the coop by laws.
PHCCI also filed a supplemental motion to dismiss alledging that RA 6939, the Cooperative
Development Authority Law, requires conciliation or mediation within the cooperative before a resort to
judicial proceeding.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the private respondents, holding that the case is impressed with
employer-employee relationship and that the laws on cooperatives is subservient to the Labor Code.
The NLRC affirmed.
ISSUE:
WON private respondents were regular employees.
RULING:
Yes. They were regular employees.
Elements in determining existence of employer-employee relationship:

1) Selection and engagement of the worker or the power to hire
2) The power to dismiss
3) Payment of wages by whatever means
4) Power to control the worker’s conduct
The above elements are present here.
PHCCI through its Manager Mr. Edilberto Lantaca, Jr. hired respondents as Computer programmer and
clerks. They worked regular working hours, were assigned specific duties, were paid regular wages, and made
to accomplish regular time records, and worked under the supervision of the manager.
Art. 280, Labor Code comprehends 3 kinds of employees:
1)REGULAR EMPLOYEES or those whose work is necessary or desirable to the usual business of the
employer
2)PROJECT EMPLOYEES or those whose employment has been fixed for a specificproject or undertaking
the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the
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employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season
3)CASUAL EMPLOYEES or those who are neither regular nor project employees
There are 2 separate instances whereby it can be determined that an employment is regular:
1)If the particular activity performed by the employee is necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer
2)If the employee has been performing the job for at least a year
Private respondents were rendering services necessary to the day-to-day operations of PHCCI. This
alone qualified them as regular employees. Moreover, all of them except one worked with PHCCI for more
than 1 year. That Faburada worked only on a part-time basis does not mean that he is not a regular employee
.Regularity of employment is not determined by the number of hours one works but by the nature and length
of time one has been in that particular job.
83
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., et. al. vs.THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., et. al.
G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
FACTS:s
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association - NATU, FGU Insurance Group Workers and
Employees Association - NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association - NATU (herein referred to as
the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective
bargaining agreements with the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., and the FGU Insurance Group (herein referred
to as the Companies).
Two of the lawyers and officers of the Unions namely Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia, tried to dissuade
the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), to no
avail. Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the
Department of Justice and were thereafter hired by the companies - Garcia as assistant corporate secretary
and legal assistant, and Enaje as personnel manager and chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies
in the collective bargaining with the Unions.
On October 1957, negotiations for the collective bargaining was conducted but resulted to a deadlock.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory results
due to the stalemate on the matter of salary increases. This prompted the Unions to declare a strike in protest
against what they considered the Companies’ unfair labor practices. On May 20, 1958, the Unions went on
strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life Building at Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, Jose M. Olbes, the acting manager and president, sent individual letters to the striking
employees urging them to abandon their strike with a promise of free coffee, movies, overtime pay, and
accommodations. He also warned the strikers if they fail to return to work by a certain date, they might be
replaced in their jobs. Further, the Companies hired men to break into the picket lines resulting in violence,
and the filing of criminal charges against some union officers and members. When eventually, the strikers
called off their strike to return to their jobs, they were subjected to a screening process by a management
committee, among the members were Garcia and Enaje. After screening, eighty-three (83) strikers were
rejected due to pending criminal charges, and adamantly refused readmission of thirty-four (34) officials and
members of the Unions who were most active in the strike.
The CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the Companies, specifically (1)
interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted action; and (2)
discriminating against the members of the Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis
of their union membership and degree of participation in the strike. After the trial, the Court of Industrial
Relations dismissed the Unions’ complaint for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice when they sent individual letters to the
strikers with the promise of additional benefits, and notifying them to either return to work, or
lose their jobs; and
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2. WON the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the striking
members of the Unions in readmission of employees after the strike.
3.
RULING:
1. Yes. The Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice when they sent individual letters to the
strikers.
It is an act of interference with the right to collective bargaining through dealing with the strikers
individually instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. Although the Unions are on strike,
the employer is still obligated to bargain with the union as the employees’ bargaining representative. Further,
it is also an act of interference for the employer to send individual letters to the employees notifying them to
return to their jobs, otherwise, they would be replaced. Individual solicitation of the employees urging them
to cease union activity or cease striking consists of unfair labor practice. Furthermore, when the Companies
offered to “bribe” the strikers with “comfortable cots, free coffee, and movies, overtime work pay” so they
would abandon their strike and return to work, it was guilty of strike-breaking and/or union busting which
constitute unfair labor practice.
4. Yes. The Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the striking
members of the Unions in readmission of employees after the strike.
Some of the members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal
charges. However, despite the fact they were able to secure clearances, 34 officials and members were still
refused readmission on the alleged ground that they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It should be
noted, however, that non-strikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal’s office,
arising from the same incidents whence against the criminal charges against the strikers are involved, were
readily readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is an act of discrimination practiced by the
Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of Sec. 4(a)(4) of the Industrial Peace Act.
The respondent Companies did not merely discriminate against all strikers in general since they
separated the active rom the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it, on the picket
lines. Discrimination exists where the record shows that the union activity of the rehired strikers has been less
prominent than that of the strikers who were denied reinstatement.
85
MARICALUM MINING CORPORATION vs. DECORION

G.R. No. 158637, April 12, 2006
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION
FACTS:
Decorion was a regular employee of Maricalum Mining who started out as a Mill Mechanic assigned to
the Concentrator Maintenance Department and was later promoted to Foreman I. On April 11, 1996, the
Concentrator Maintenance Supervisor called a meeting which Decorion failed to attend as he was then
supervising the workers under him. Because of his alleged insubordination for failure to attend the meeting,
he was placed under preventive suspension on the same day. He was also not allowed to report for work the
following day. A month after or on May 12, 1996, Decorion was served a Notice of Infraction and Proposed
Dismissal to enable him to present his side. On May 15, 1996, he submitted to the Personnel Department his
written reply to the notice. A grievance meeting was held upon Decorion’s request on June 5, 1996, during
which he manifested that he failed to attend the meeting on April 11, 1996 because he was then still assigning
work to his men. He maintained that he has not committed any offense and that his service record would
show his efficiency.On July 23, 1996, Decorion filed before the NLRC-RAB a complaint for illegal dismissal and
payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
In the meantime, the matter of Decorion’s suspension and proposed dismissal was referred to Atty.
Roman G. Pacia, Jr., Maricalum Mining’s Chief and Head of Legal and Industrial Relations, who issued a
memorandum on August 13, 1996, recommending that Decorion’s indefinite suspension be made definite
with a warning that a repetition of the same conduct would be punished with dismissal. Maricalum Mining’s
Resident Manager issued a memorandum on August 28, 1996, placing Decorion under definite disciplinary
suspension of six (6) months which would include the period of his preventive suspension which was made to
take effect retroactively from April 11, 1996 to October 9, 1996.
On September 4, 1996, Decorion was served a memorandum informing him of his temporary lay-off
due to Maricalum Mining’s temporary suspension of operations and shut down of its mining operations for six
(6) months, with the assurance that in the event of resumption of operations, he would be reinstated to his
former position without loss of seniority rights. Decorion, through counsel, wrote a letter to Maricalum Mining
on October 8, 1996, requesting that he be reinstated to his former position. The request was denied with the
explanation that priority for retention and inclusion in the skeleton force was given to employees who are
efficient and whose services are necessary during the shutdown.
Maricalum Mining insists that Decorion was not dismissed but merely preventively suspended on April
11, 1996. Petitioner contends that constructive dismissal occurs only after the lapse of more than six (6)
months from the time an employee is placed on a “floating status” as a result of temporary preventive
suspension from employment. Thus, it goes on to argue, since Decorion was suspended for less than six (6)
months, his suspension was legal.
Decorion, on the other hand, maintained that he was dismissed from employment on April 11, 1996 as
he was then prevented from reporting for work. He avers that had the intention of Maricalum Mining been to
merely suspend him, it could have manifested this intention by at least informing him of his suspension. As it
happened, he was not served with any notice relative to why he was disallowed to report for work. The
86
grievance meeting conducted on June 5, 1996 was allegedly called only after he had repeatedly requested
reconsideration of his dismissal.
ISSUE:
WON Decorion was not dismissed but merely preventively suspended.
RULING:
No. Decorion was dismissed.
The SC held that sections 8 and 9 of Rule XXIII, Book V of the Implementing Rules are explicit that
preventive suspension is justified where the employee’s continued employment poses a serious and imminent
threat to the life or property of the employer or of the employee’s co-workers. Without this kind of threat,
preventive suspension is not proper.
In this case, Decorion was suspended only because he failed to attend a meeting called by his
supervisor. There is no evidence to indicate that his failure to attend the meeting prejudiced his employer or
that his presence in the company’s premises posed a serious threat to his employer and co-workers. The
preventive suspension was clearly unjustified. What is more, Decorion’s suspension persisted beyond the 30-
day period allowed by the Implementing Rules. Preventive suspension which lasts beyond the maximum
period allowed by the Implementing Rules amounts to constructive dismissal.
Similarly, from the time Decorion was placed under preventive suspension on April 11, 1996 up to the
time a grievance meeting was conducted on June 5, 1996, 55 days had already passed. Another 48 days went
by before he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on July 23, 1996. Thus, at the time Decorion filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, he had already been suspended for a total of 103 days.
Maricalum Mining’s contention that there was as yet no illegal dismissal at the time of the filing of the
complaint is evidently unmeritorious. Decorion’s preventive suspension had already ripened into constructive
dismissal at that time. While actual dismissal and constructive dismissal do take place in different fashion, the
legal consequences they generate are identical. Decorion’s employment may not have been actually
terminated in the sense that he was not served walking papers but there is no doubt that he was
constructively dismissed as he was forced to quit because continued employment was rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely by Maricalum Mining’s act of preventing him from reporting for work.
Petition is denied.
87
MANARPIIS vs. TEXAN PHILIPPINES, INC.

G.R. No. 197011, January 28, 2015
ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
FACTS:
Texan Philippines, Inc. (TPI) is engaged in the importation, distribution and marketing of imported
fragrances and aroma and other specialized products and services. It hired Essencia Q. Manarpiis (petitioner)
as Sales and Marketing Manager. She was later dismissed on July 25, 2000 when she received a notice of
termination on the ground of dishonesty, loss of confidence based on alleged collusion in defrauding the
company financed. Another ground was also for abandonment of work.
Claiming insurmountable losses, respondents served a written notice addressed to all their employees that TPI
will cease operations by August 31, 2000.
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, unexpired vacation leave and 13th month pay and with prayer for moral and actual
damages.
Respondent asserted that the requisite notices of business closure to government authorities and to
their employees were complied with, and notwithstanding that TPI has in fact continued its operations,
petitioner was found to have committed infractions resulting in loss of confidence which was the ground for
the termination of her employment.
ISSUE:
WON Petitioner was illegally dismissed.
RULING:
Yes. Petitioner was dismissed without just or authorized cause, and that the announced cessation of
business operations was a mere subterfuge for getting rid of petitioner.
The CA’s finding of serious business losses is not borne by the evidence on record. The financial
statements supposedly bearing the stamp mark of BIR were not signed by an independent auditor. Besides,
the non-compliance with the requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code, as amended, gains relevance
in this case not for the purpose of proving the illegality of the company closure or cessation of business, which
did not materialize, but as an indication of bad faith on the part of respondents in hastily terminating
petitioner’s employment.
Under the circumstances, the subsequent investigation and termination of petitioner on grounds of
dishonesty, loss of confidence and abandonment of work, clearly appears as an afterthought as it was done
only after petitioner had filed an illegal dismissal case and respondents have been summoned for hearing
before the LA.
The court laid down the two elements which must concur for a valid abandonment:
(1) the failure to report to work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and
88
(2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the
more determinative factor being manifested by some overt acts.
Abandonment as a just ground for dismissal requires the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the
employee to perform his employment responsibilities. Mere absence or failure to work, even after notice to
return, is not tantamount to abandonment. Furthermore, it is well-settled that the filing by an employee of a
complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement is proof enough of his desire to return to work,
thus, negating the employer’s charge of abandonment. An employee who takes steps to protest his dismissal
cannot logically be said to have abandoned his work.
On the issue of loss of confidence, an employer has its own interest to protect, and pursuant thereto, it
may terminate a managerial employee for a just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay off an employee
must be exercised without abuse of discretion. Indeed, the consistent rule is that if doubts exist between the
evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the
latter. The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for
justifiable cause. Thus, when the breach of trust or loss of confidence alleged is not borne by clearly
established facts, as in this case, such dismissal on the cited grounds cannot be allowed.
89

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LABOR LAW 2 CASE DIGEST By: Vanessa Yvonne A.

DOMONDON vs. NLRC

1. WON Domondon (PET) was illegally dismissed.

Third, resignation is a formal pronouncement of relinquishment of an office. It is made with the

Thus, Domondon (PET) was not illegally dismissed.

MARC II MARKETING, INC. vs. JOSON

DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES vs. MOJICA

LACANILAO vs. DE LEON

PetitionerSoutheast Asian Fisheries Development Center-AquacultureDepartment (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an

MANEJA vs. NLRC and MANILA MIDTOWN HOTEL

In the case at bar, the termination of petitioner is not an unresolved grievance.

Thus, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case.

2. Yes. Maneja (PET) was illegally dismissed.

UNICOL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. vs. MALIPOT

1. WON the death of Glicerio is compensable.

1. No. The Death of Glicerio is not compensable.

REPUBLIC CEMENT CORPORATION vs. GUINMAPANG

GARCIA, et.al. vs. KJ COMMERCIAL and QUE

MONTAÑO vs. VERCELES

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU) vs. FERRER-CALLEJA

Article 256. Representation Issues in Organized Establishments. In organized establishments, when a

Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard vs. Bureau of Labor Relations

Hanjin (RESP) filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA.

1. WON Samahan can form a worker’s association.

The existence of employer-employee relationship is not mandatory in the formation of workers'

The right to self-organization, however, is subject to certain limitations as provided by law.

2. Yes. No misrepresentation on the part of Samahan to warrant cancellation of registration. "Hanjin

REYES, et. al. vs. TRAJANO

The final tally of the votes showed the following results:

TUPAS 1 TUEU-OLALIA 95 NO UNION 1 SPOILED 1 CHALLENGED 141

Hence, this petition.

T & H SHOPFITTERS CORPORATION/GIN QUEEN CORPORATION vs. T & H SHOPFITTERS

The workers union (RESP) appealed to the NLRC.

The CA sustained the NLRC ruling.

The acts of petitioners that are considered as ULP are as follows:

DEL PILAR ACADEMY vs. DEL PILAR ACADEMY EMPLOYEES UNION

This is pursuant to Article 248 of the Labor Code which provides:

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. QUISUMBING AND

TABIGUE, et. al vs. INTERNATIONAL COPRA EXPORT CORPORATION (INTERCO)

Hence, this petition.

1. WON the strike was LEGAL.

1. No. The strike was not LEGAL.

JACKBILT INDUSTRIES, INC. vs. JACKBILT EMPLOYEES WORKERS UNION-NAFLU-KMU

The petitioner is granted.

STANDARD ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. STANDARD ELECTRIC

WON Javier was illegally dismissed.

Yes. Javier was illegally dismissed.

ART. 223. APPEAL

HYATT TAXI SERVICES INC. vs. CATINOY

WON Catinoy (RESP) was constructively dismissed.

No. Catinoy (RESP) was not constructively dismissed.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. vs. CABILES

WON Cabiles (RESP) was illegally dismissed.

Art. 282. Termination by employer.

Petitioner failed to comply with the due process requirement.

ELVIRA ABASOLO, ET AL vs. NLRC

1. WON Abasolo et. al (PET)are seasonal workers

1. No. Abasolo et. al (PET) are not seasonal workers.

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS vs. MARIN

Article 280 provides for definition and period of probationary employment.

CERVANTES vs. PAL MARITIME CORPORATION

WON Cervantes resigned from his employment.

Yes. Cervantes resigned from his employment.

NACAGUE vs. SULPICIO LINES, INC