ANNOTATION

LIMITS IN THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

By

JORGE R. COQUIA*

_______________

§ 1. Introductory, p. 142

§ 2. The Nature of the Petition, p. 143

§ 3. The Power of Judicial Review in General, p. 144

§ 4. Requisites of Judicial Review, p. 145

§ 5. The Supreme Court Power of Judicial Review, p. 145

§ 6. The Executive and Legislative Branches Acknowledge the

Judicial Review of the Courts, p. 146

§ 7. Determination of the Constitutionality by Courts of Cases

Involving Political Issues, p. 146

§ 8. Doctrine of Separation of Powers Observed by the

Judiciary, p. 148

§ 9. Cases of Paramount Importance, p. 150

§ 10. Congress is the Best Judge to Decide on the Wisdom of the

Law, p. 151

_______________
§ 1. Introductory

Once again, the Supreme Court has been called upon to review the
constitutional validity of a statute which involves a legislative
policy on economy.

_______________

* Member, Board of Editorial Consultants, Supreme Court Reports

Annotated (SCRA).

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In Garcia vs. Executive Secretary of the Department of Energy, et

al., G.R. No. 157584, dated April 2, 2009, the Supreme Court
dismissed a petition for certiorari to declare a statute as invalid on
the ground that the law involves an economic policy determined by
the Congress.

With the broad powers granted to the Supreme Court by Article

VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and the very liberal recognition
of the locus standi of persons or entities, the Supreme Court has
been swamped with a number of petitions for certiorari questioning
the validity of statutes or acts of executive officials involving
economic policies or political matter. The ruling of the case under
annotation reiterating the limitation on the power of judicial
review.
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Philippine Constitution reads:

“The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in

such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the government.”

§ 2. The Nature of the Petition

Petitioner Congressman Enrique Garcia again sought to declare the

new oil deregulation law unconstitutional on the ground that it
violated Article XII of the Constitution. The petitioner specifically
objected to Section 19 of R.A. No. 8479 which, in essence,
prescribed the period for removal of price control on gasoline and
other finished petroleum products and set the time for the full
deregulation of the local downstream oil industry. The assailed
provision reads:

“SEC. 19. Start of Full Deregulation.—Full deregulation of the

Industry shall start five (5) months following the effectivity of this
Act: Provided, however, That when the public interest so re-
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quires, the President may accelerate the start of full deregulation
upon the recommendation of the DOE and the Department of
Finance (DOF) when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and the value of the
peso in relation to the US dollar is stable, taking into account
relevant trends and prospects: Provided, further, That the foregoing
provision notwithstanding, the five (5)-month Transition Phase
shall continue to apply to LPG, regular gasoline and kerosene as
socially-sensitive petroleum products and said petroleum products
shall be covered by the automatic pricing mechanism during the
said period.

Upon the implementation of full deregulation as provided herein,

the Transition Phase is deemed terminated and the following laws
are repealed:

a) Republic Act No. 6173, as amended;

b) Section 5 of Executive Order No. 172, as amended;

c) Letter of Instruction No. 1431, dated October 15, 1984;

d) Letter of Instruction No. 1441, dated November 20, 1984, as

amended;

e) Letter of Instruction No. 1460, dated May 9, 1985;

f) Presidential Decree No. 1889; and

g) Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order

No. 137:

Provided, however, That in case full deregulation is started by the

President in the exercise of the authority provided in this Section,
the foregoing laws shall continue to be in force and effect with
respect to LPG, regular gasoline and kerosene for the rest of the
five (5)-month period.

§ 3. The Power of Judicial Review in General

Judicial review is the power of the courts to test the validity of

executive and legislative acts for their conformity with the
Constitution. In asking the Court to declare Section 19 of R.A. No.
8479 as unconstitutional for contravening Section 19, Article XII
of the Constitution, petitioner Garcia invokes the exercise by this
Court of its power of judicial review, which power is expressly
recognized under Section 4(2), Arti-
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cle VIII of the Constitution. The power of judicial review is the

power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative
acts for their conformity with the Constitution. Through such
power, the judiciary enforces and upholds the supremacy of the
Constitution.

§ 4. Requisites of Judicial Review

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the

Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the
following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the existence
of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial
interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the
exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity;
and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
(Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81
[2000])

§ 5. The Supreme Court Power of Judicial Review

The court’s power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial

branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present
1987 Constitution: SECTION 1. The Judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. Such power of judicial review
was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P.
Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution whose
provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the
present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial
power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed: xxx In times of
social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely
obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the
proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
among the integral or constituent units thereof. (Francisco, Jr. vs.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Mana-nanggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., 415 SCRA 44 [2003])

§ 6. The Executive and Legislative Branches Acknowledge the

Judicial Review of the Courts

In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its

express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial
review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally
infirm acts, and as pointed out by noted political law professor and
former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, the executive
and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the
Civil Code, to wit: Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts
declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Francisco, Jr.
vs. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., 415 SCRA 44 [2003])

§ 7. Determination of the Constitutionality by Courts of Cases

Involving Political Issues

The reason why the courts will as much as possible avoid the
decision of a constitutional question can be traced to the doctrine
of separation of powers, which enjoins upon each department a
proper respect for the acts of the other department. In line with this
policy, courts indulge the presumption
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of constitutionality and go by the maxim that “to doubt is to

sustain.” The theory is that, as the join act of the legislative and
executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully
studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally
enacted. Hence, as long as there is some other basis that can be
used by the courts for its decision, the constitutionality of the
challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on
other available grounds.

As held in Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 (1990): “The Court

will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some
other ground such as the application of a statute or general law.”
The same ruling was laid down in Lalican v. Vergara, 276 SCRA
518 (1997).

In the case of Zandueta v. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 615, Justice Laurel

declared that such policy did not manifest a shirking of judicial
duties. In fact, he continued, if there should be no other ground
available to the court for the decision of the case, then would be
“the time to let the hammer all, and heavily.”

In this case, the petitioner, an incumbent judge, had accepted an ad

interim appointment to a new court created under a law that had
reorganized the judiciary by abolishing some judgeships and
creating others. When his appointment was bypassed, he returned
to his former court in Manila, but found that the respondent had
already been appointed thereto. Zandueta thereupon filed quo
warranto proceedings against De la Costa, arguing that he had not
abandoned his old court in Manila by his acceptance of the new
court in Palawan. His reason was that the law creating the latter
court was unconstitutional because it violated judicial security of
tenure.

Although the constitutional question had been raised squarely, the

Supreme Court did not find it necessary to resolve it. Its
justification was another ground available to it for its decision, to
wit, the common law principle of estoppel.
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Since under its rule a person cannot question the validity of a law
under which he had previously accepted benefits, the Supreme
Court held that Zandueta was estopped from impugning the
constitutionality of the judiciary reorganization law.

But when in 1955 a similar law was passed by Congress and was
later assailed on the ground that it violated judicial security of
tenure, the Supreme Court could not avoid ruling in the
constitutional question raised. The petitioners in this case, unlike
Zandueta, had not accepted new positions created by the law after
it has legislated them out of their former courts. The principle of
estoppel could therefore not be applied to them and the Supreme
Court consequently had to decide categorically whether or not the
challenged law was unconstitutional. Similar action was taken in
the later case of De la Llana v. Alba, 118 US 425. (cited in Cruz,
Constitutional Law, 2003 Ed. )

§ 8. Doctrine of Separation of Powers Observed by the Judiciary

In Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA

330 (1997), we declared that the fundamental principle espoused
by Section 19, Article XII of the Constitution is competition.
Congress, by enacting R.A. No. 8479, determined that this
objective is better realized by liberalizing the oil market, instead of
continuing with a highly regulated system enforced by means of
restrictive prior controls. This legislative determination was a
lawful exercise of Congress’ prerogative and one that his Court
must respect and uphold. Regardless of the individual opinions of
the Members of this Court, we cannot, acting as a body, question
the wisdom of a co-equal department’s acts. The courts do not
involve themselves with or delve into the policy or wisdom of a
statute; it sits, not to review or revise legislative action, but to
enforce the legislative will. For the Court to resolve a clearly non-
justiciable matter would be to debase the principle of separation of
pow-
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ers that has been tightly woven by the Constitution into our
republican system of government.

It is well-settled that all presumptions are indulged in favor of

constitutionality, such that one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. West Negros
College, Inc., 429 SCRA 50 [2004])

While legal scholars may continue to debate the wisdom and

reasoning of the decisions settling the issues surrounding the
effectivity of Proclamation 1081, the force and effectivity of the
1973 Constitution, and the former President’s legislative powers
under Martial Law and the 1973 Constitution, their objective
existence and historical impact on the Philippine legal system
cannot seriously be questioned. (Gonzales vs. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 429 SCRA 533 [2004])
Even with its expanded jurisdiction, it is beyond the powers of the
Supreme Court to re-write history. (Gonzales vs. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 429 SCRA 533 [2004])

The Supreme Court does not have exclusive original jurisdiction

over petitions assailing the constitutionality of a law or an
administrative regulation—the general rule is that this Court shall
exercise only appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the
constitutionality of a statute, treaty or regulation, except in
circumstances where the Court believes that resolving the issue of
constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance is of
paramount importance and immediately affects the social,
economic and moral well being of the people. (Moldex Realty, Inc.
vs. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, 525 SCRA 198
(2007).

The Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is

the very lis mota of the case.

An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final

determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined
either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of
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indispensable parties is mandatory—the absence of an

indispensable parties renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent
parties but even as to those present.
For reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of a law cannot
be attacked collaterally. (Rayo vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, 539 SCRA 571 [2007]).

It is settled that when questions of constitutional significance are

raised, the court can exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are present: (1) the existence of an actual
and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case. (John Hay
Peoples Alternative Coalition vs. Lim, 414 SCRA 356 [2003]).

§ 9. Cases of Paramount Importance

In cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional

questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed
and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct
injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
exercise of its discretion, the Supreme Court may brush aside these
technicalities and take cognizance of the petition considering the
importance to the public of the cases in keeping with the duty to
determine whether the other branches of the government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution. (Coconut Oil
Refiners Association, Inc. vs. Torres, 465 SCRA 47 [2005]).

Rewriting the law is a forbidden ground that only Congress may

tread upon. (Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1
[2005]).

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional

questions and presume the acts of the political departments
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are valid, absent clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary.

(Jumamil vs. Cafe, 470 SCRA 475 [2005])

Congress is the Best Judge to Decide on the Wisdom of the

Law

Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct its own

business expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. If a change
is desired in the practice, it must be sought in Congress since this
question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only
as internal rule of each house, even the expanded jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court cannot apply to questions regarding only the
internal operations of Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a
review of the internal proceedings of a co-equal branch of
government. (Abakada Guro Party List vs. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1
[2005])

The wisdom of the Legislature in the lawful exercise of its power

to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the Court—doing so
would be in derogation of the principle of separation of powers.
Between “is” and “ought” there is a far cry. (Beltran vs. Secretary
of Health, 476 SCRA 168 [2005])

——o0o——

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Limits in the Power of Judicial Review, 583 SCRA 142, April 2,
2009