Stonehill vs.
Diokno Court, denying the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction previously
Facts:
Upon application of the officers of the government, Special Prosecutors
Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal Jr. and Assistant Fiscal
Manases G. Reyes; Judge Amado Roan (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge
Roman Cansino (Municipal Court of Manila), Judge Hermogenes Caluag
(Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch), and Judge Damian
Jimenez (Municipal Court of Quezon City) issued, on different dates, a total
of 42 search warrants against Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, HJohn J.
Brooks, and Karl Beck, and/or the corporations of which they were officers,
directed to any peace officer, to search the said persons and/or the premises
of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit: "Books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers)" as
"the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the
offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal
Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Alleging that the search
warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, Stonehill, et. al. filed with the Supreme Court the original action for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction. On 22 March 1962, the
Supreme Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated 29 June 1962, the writ was partially
lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations are concerned; but, the injunction
was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al.
Issue: Whether Stonehill, et. al. can assail the legality of the contested
warrants that allowed seizure of documents, papers and other effects in the
corporate offices, and other places besides their residences.
Held: Stonehill, et. al. maintained that the search warrants are in the nature
of general warrants and that, accordingly, the seizures effected upon the
authority thereof are null and void. No warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision;
and the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of
these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. The
grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested
search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the
effects to be searched for and seized. The
warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of whether the
transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the corporate officers and the corporations, whatever their nature,
thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that
the things to be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. However, the
documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups,
namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations and (b)
those found seized in the residences of Stonehill, et. al. As regards the first
group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of action to assail the legality of the
contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of Stonehill, et. al., regardless of
the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said
corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is
well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not validly object to the use
in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from
the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right
to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to
the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked
by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual
capacity. With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the
residences of Stonehill, et. al., the 29 June 1962 Resolution of the Supreme
issued by the Court on the documents, papers and things seized in the
residences, in effect, restrained the prosecutors from using them in evidence
against Stonehill, et. al. Thus, the Court held that the warrants for the search
of 3 residences are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made
are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences is made permanent, that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar
as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the residences are
concerned; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the 29
places, offices and other premises.
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas
Facts:
On 3 June 1936, the chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of
the Department of Justice, presented to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then
presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging
that according to reliable information, Narciso Alvarez kept in his house in
Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers
used by him in connection with his activities as a moneylender, charging
usurious rates of interest in violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the
affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the
questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not
swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but
upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the
affidavit the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject
matter of the petition, ordering the search of the Alvarez's house at any time
of the day or night, the seizure of the books and documents and the
immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in accordance with the
law. With said warrant, several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered
Alvarez's store and residence at 7:00 p.m. of 4 June 1936, and seized and
took possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for the
years 1933 to 1936, 1 ledger, 2 journals, 2 cashbooks, 9 order books, 4
notebooks, 4 check stubs, 2 memorandums, 3 bankbooks, 2 contracts, 4
stubs, 48 stubs of purchases of copra, 2 inventories, 2 bundles of bills of
lading, 1 bundle of credit receipts, 1 bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, 2
packages of correspondence, 1 receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez, 14
bundles of invoices and other papers, many documents and loan contracts
with security and promissory notes, 504 chits, promissory notes and stubs of
used checks of the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC).
The search for and seizure of said articles were made with the opposition of
Alvarez who stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the
agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the articles had not
been brought immediately to the judge who issued the search warrant,
Alvarez, through his attorney, filed a motion on 8 June 1936, praying that
the agent Emilio L. Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to
deposit all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that said
agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed the order of the
court. On said date the court issued an order directing Siongco to deposit all
the articles seized within 24 hours from the receipt of notice thereof and
giving him a period of 5 days within which to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt of court. On 10 June, Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez,
representing the Anti-Usury Board, filed a motion praying that the order of
the 8th of said month be set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be
authorized to retain the articles seized for a period of 30 days for the
necessary investigation. On June 25, the court issued an order requiring agent
Siongco forthwith to file the search warrant and the affidavit in the court,
together with the proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory duly
verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2, the attorney for the
petitioner filed a petition alleging that the search warrant issued was illegal
and that it had not yet been returned to date together with the proceedings
taken in connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled,
that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles seized to
Alvarez, that the agent who seized them be declared guilty of contempt of
court, and that charges be filed against him for abuse of authority. On
September 10, the court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was
obtained and issued in accordance with the law, that it had been duly
complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled, and that agent
Siongco did not commit any contempt of court and must, therefore, be
exonerated, and ordering the chief of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to
show cause, if any, within the unextendible period of 2 days from the date of
notice of said order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory
should not be returned to Alvarez. The assistant chief of the Anti-Usury
Board of the Department of Justice filed a motion praying, for the reasons
stated therein, that the articles seized be ordered retained for the purpose of
conducting an investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law
committed by Alvarez. On October 10, said official again filed another
motion alleging that he needed 60 days to examine the documents and papers
seized, which are designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10,
16, 23, 25-27, 30-31 , 34, 36-43 and 45, and praying that he be granted said
period of 60 days. In an order of October 16, the court
granted him the period of 60 days to investigate said 19 documents. Alvarez,
herein, asks that the search warrant as well as the order authorizing the agents
of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and
set aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to him.
Issue: Whether the search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it
has been based upon the affidavit of agent Almeda in whose oath he declared
that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis
for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through
mere information secured from a person whom he considered reliable, and
that it is illegal as it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that
made by the applicant.
Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section
97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before
the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based
upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he
may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation
by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act
faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge
given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer
to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his
witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing
magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance
of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency
of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be
held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive
basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of
the
manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and
the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal.
Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least
the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge
who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the
affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the
deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor General Orders
58 provides that it is of imperative necessity to take the depositions of the
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the
affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of
depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the
existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his
knowledge of the facts
PEOPLE vs LAGUIO
FACTS:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public
Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local
Government arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain
Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the investigation of
the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were
identified as the source of the drug. The police operative planned an entrapment
proceeding. During the entrapment Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were
arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to SPO2 De
Dios. Questioned, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police
operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor in
Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang.
They disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the
following morning of 17 May 1996, and that their employer (Wang) could
be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police
operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug
activities. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men then proceeded to
Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance.
May 17 1996, Wang, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked
BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) the police officers approached
wang, introduced themselves to him as police officers, asked his name and,
upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and
asked him to open the back compartment of the car. When frisked, there was
found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an
unlicensed 9mm automatic Pistol. At the same time, the other members of
the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following
items:
(a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing shabu
(b) cash in the amount ofP650,000.00
(c) one electronic and one mechanical scales
(d) an unlicensed 9mm Pistol with magazine.
Wang was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended
Demurrer to Evidence. Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence,
praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him
for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the
prosecution’s evidence against him prosecution filed its Opposition alleging
that the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and
that it has proven its case. The respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S.
Laguio, Jr., issued the herein assailed Resolution granting Wang’s Demurrer
to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence.
ISSUE: W/N there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police
operatives in this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest
and/or a search warrant
HELD: NO. Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as
a special civil action of certiorari, which definitely this Court has the
power to do, when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the lower court, the i nstant petition will
nevertheless fail on the merits as the succeeding discussion will show
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless
arrest and the warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search
may be conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the
process cannot be reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct
lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is
currently committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in
flagrante delicto without need for a warrant of arrest. Finding that the
warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial
court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him
of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest
resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid
warrantless search. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of
Court, a peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment o r
temporarily confined while being transferred from one confinement
to another.
None of these circumstances were present when the accused was arrested.
The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was
about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and
frisked him and searched his car. The accused was not committing any
visible offense at the time of his arrest. Neither was there an indication that
he was about to commit a crime or that he had just committed an offense.
The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the
accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of
his pants. And the handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not
give an outward indication of a concealed gun if placed inside the pants side
pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting officers had no information
and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did
they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Regarding the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Pistol with
magazine that were found and seized from the car. The contraband
items in the car were not in plain view. The 32 bags of shabu wer e in
the trunk compartment, and the handgun was underneath the driver’s
seat of the car. The police officers had no information, or knowledge
that the banned articles were inside the car, or that the accused had
placed them there. The police officers searched the car on mere
suspicion that there was shabu therein
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his
person and the car were without probable cause and could not be licit. The
arrest of the accused did not fall under any of the exception to the
requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court) and
is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty.
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the
arrest preceded the search, and finding no basis to rule in fav or of a
lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is likewise unlawful.
Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are
inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for
lack of evidence.
PEOPLE VS. TABAR
FACTS:
Respondent-accused was charged, together with her nephew, for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act in an information which provided that: That on or
about the 8th day of February 1989, at about 3:00 PM. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each
other, with deliberate intent, did then and there sell and deliver, without
authority of law, Three (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, a (sic) prohibited
drugs, to a person who posted himself as a buyer, in Viol. of Sec. 4, Art. 11,
of RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Act of 1972.
The accused were then convicted of the offense charged against them in the
trial court. On appeal, respondent presented her argument that the lower
court erred in admitting the evidence against her when there wasn’t any
search warrant. Therefore, violating the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation against the constitutional guarantee of
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING:
The second assigned error is without merit. The evidence for the prosecution
discloses that the appellant placed the packs of marijuana sticks under the
rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the time she hurriedly left
her shanty after noticing the arrest of Rommel. When she was asked to spread
it out, which she voluntary did, the package containing the packs of
marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the member of the team.
A crime was thus committed in the presence of the policemen. Pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
she could lawfully be arrested and searched for anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of an offense without the corresponding arrest
and search warrants
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the search and seizure were without
a warrant, the appellant had effectively waived her constitutional right
relative thereto by voluntarily submitting to the search and seizure. In People
vs. Malasugui, 20 this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search and consent to have it made
of his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining
thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable seach may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or
impliedly.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
People v. Doria
FACTS
Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that
one “ Jun” [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to
entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked
him but did not find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed
that he left it at the house of his associate “ Neneth ” [Gaddao], so he led the
police team to her house.
The team found the door open and a woman inside the
house. “ Jun” identified her as “Neneth, ” and she was asked by SPO1 Badua
about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was
still outside the house]. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a
carton box under the dining table. One of the box’ s flaps was open, and
inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the
marijuana earlier sold to him by “ Jun. ” His suspicion aroused, so he entered
the house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10
bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered
the marked bills from “ Neneth ” and they arrested her. The bricks were
examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves.
Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of
RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration,
Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to
Section 21 [Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them.
ISSUE AND HOLDING
WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view,
making its warrantless seizure valid. NO
RATIO
Re: warrantless arrest
Gaddao ’s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on
the basis of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to
her as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left
the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao
conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the person
who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the
person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally
objectionable. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search
of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and
marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
“ Plain view ” issue
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position
to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and
may be introduced in evidence.
Requisites
a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area
b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent
c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes
may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure
An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the
object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain
view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. If the package is such
that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains
the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure
that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and
marked the said contents. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that
he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same
plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." Each of the ten bricks of
marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed
inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself
admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items
other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that
he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately
apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana; hence,
it was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant
was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous
tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court.
The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in
Gaddao ’s house Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty
of the crime charged.
In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the
submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and
the seller and the presentation of the drug as evidence in court.
 Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the
P1,600.00 he received, Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of
marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer
 Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accused-
appellant Doria in the sale of said drug
DORIA SENTENCED TO SUFFER RECLUSION PERPETUA + 500K
FINE
GADDAO ACQUITTED
____________________________________________________________
__________________
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT
Facts: In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael
Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for
violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. Accused Mikael
Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982
and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his
arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada
and stayed in that place for two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of
May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989),
Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional
Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set
up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information
was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same
morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in
coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the
designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all
vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front
going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner
riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and
when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4)
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the
officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out
to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before
he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags
from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the
bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the
teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same
which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had
opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the
investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were
found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the
hashish found among the personal effects of accused and the same were
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were
hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an
information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
ACCUSED’S DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his
defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his personal effects. He also
claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his
pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but
were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in
Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the
same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said
bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of
the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established
beyond reasonable doubt.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of
the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects
was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and, therefore,
the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are
not admissible as evidence against him.
Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore
the RTC ruling be reversed.
Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest,
there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs
(hashish). A crime was actually being committed by the accused and he
was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of
law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is
true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant
when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however,
under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for
said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonable, discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of the
personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana
emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, 10 or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee.
The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
PEOPLE VS. AMMINUDIN
Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984,
shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the
evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected
his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the
information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also
been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a
motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement
of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The
motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant,
who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the
marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of
a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated
without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to
force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting
him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the
blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know
what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying
that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not
sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained.
Issue: Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal.
Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante
delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of
his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had
just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore
could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and
furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.
Go vs. CA Case Digest
Facts:
Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost
had a collision with another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car,
shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off. An eyewitness of the
incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the
same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6
days after the shooting, petitioner presented himself in the police station,
accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently a criminal
charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed
the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary
investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to
preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that
petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section
5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations
of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails
such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary
investigation.
Issue:
Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.
Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary
investigation.
Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein
the Court upheld the warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from
actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted “continuing
crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There
was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because
the arresting officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they
had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were
derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.
Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he
neither expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty
of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary
investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause.
Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary
investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where the same is required
appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary
investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from
preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail
bond.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
Malacat v Court of Appeals
Facts: On August 29, 1990 at about 6:30 in the evening, allegedly in
response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the
Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National
Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three
other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group,
comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of “stop
and frisk,” where a “warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest” and “whose object is either to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information”; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a
notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court.
However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-
GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the
exception of “stop and frisk”.
Ruling: The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of
petitioner was akin to a “stop and frisk,” where a “warrant and seizure can
be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest” and “whose
object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police
officer seeks to obtain more information.” Probable cause was not required
as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation
called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause would have been
“premature.” The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions were
“confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence” and the officers “had to act in
haste,” as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously,
considering the time, place and “reported cases of bombing.” Further,
petitioner’s group suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the
arresting officers’ approach, thus “it is reasonable for an officer to conduct a
limited search, the purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence
of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of
violence.” The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from
petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner “later
voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the purpose of
bombing the Mercury Drug Store,” concluded that sufficient evidence
existed to establish petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
____________________________________________________________
_____________________-
PEOPLE VS MENGOTE Y TEJAS
People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Mengote y. TejasG.R. No. 8759, June
22, 1992
Facts: a telephone call was by Western Police district that here were three
suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay
Boulevard in Tondo Manila. A surveillanve team of plainclothesmen was
dispatch to the place. They saw two men “looking from side to side” one of
whom is holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were
unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The
suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused
was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets
in the chamber. His companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken
from them.
Issue: Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure is violated
Ruling: The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of
court requires that a person be arrested 1 After he has committed or while he
is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense 2 In the
presence of the arresting officer. These requirements have not been
established in the case at bar at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the
accused was merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”.
There was apparently no offense that has just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.
Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s no less stringent requirements have
not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of arrest
an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officer had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All
they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a
crime that had yet to be committed.
– ACQUITTE
UMIL VS. RAMOS
Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St.
Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential
information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man"
(NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot
wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5)
male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day
before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road
hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded
man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon,"
twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan,
Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded
man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was
transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security
reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.
Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.
Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense,
the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
People vs. Joselito del Rosario
FACTS: The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide
and sentenced to death. The conviction of the accused was based on the
testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one who
drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The
accused was then invited by the police for questioning and he pointed to the
location where he dropped off the suspects. When the police arrived at the
supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some
of the suspects.
After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precint where his
statement was taken on May 14, 1996. However, this was only subscribed
on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of detention
in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was
handcuffed through all this time upon orders of the fiscal and based on the
authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.
ISSUES
(1) Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were
violated.
(2) Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was
lawful.
HELD
(1) YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his
rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the
accused should always be apprised of his Miranda rights from the
moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed the start
of custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included
“invitations” by police officers in the scope of custodial
investigations.
It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accused-appellant to
the station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore,
the questions asked of him were no longer general inquiries into an unsolved
crime, but were intended to elicit information about his participation in the
crime.
However, the Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is
voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence of counsel.
Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such
a waiver.
(2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a
lawful warrantless arrest: (a) when the accused is caught in
flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made immediately after
the crime was committed; and © when the one to be arrested is
an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this case did not
fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted
immediately after the consummation of the crime; rather, it was
done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested
had committed the offense because they were not there when the
crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one
eyewitness.
Unfortunately, athough the warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not
affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this case because the accused still
submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he
waived his right to contest the legality of the warrantless arrest.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
People v. Ayangao
Facts:
- Policemen received an information that a woman would be traveling with
marijuana from Maountain Province to Pampanga.
- The informant went with them in the place pointed and he personally
identified the woman. They approached the woman. The policemen noticed
a protruding marijuana leaves from the sacks of sweet potatoes.
- The policemen identified themselves and asked the woman to put out the
contents of the sack. The sack contains sweet potato with a bricklike
substance packed with a masking tape. In plain view of the policemen it
was identified to be marijuana. She was arrested and was convicted in the
trial court.
- She argued that the marijuana is inadmissible since the warrantless search
is invalid, not having been pursuant to lawful arrest.
SC:
The Court finds that the arrest was lawful as appellant was actually
committing a crime when she was arrested — transporting marijuana, are
act prohibited by law. Since a lawful arrest was made, the resulting
warrantless search on appellant was also valid as the legitimate warrantless
arrest authorized the arresting police officers to validly search and seize
from the offender.
This Court has already ruled that tipped information is sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search. Although the apprehending officers
received the tip two weeks prior to the arrest, they could not be faulted for
not applying for a search warrant inasmuch as the exact date of appellant’s
arrival was not known by the informant. AFFIRMED.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
People v. Martinez
FACTS
On September 2, 2006 at around 1245 PM, PO1 Bernard Azarden was on
duty at the Police Community Precinct along Arellano St., Dagupan City
when a concerned citizen reported that a pot session was underway in the
house of accused Rafael Gonzales in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City.
PO1 Azardan, PO1 Alejandro dela Cruz and members of Special Weapons
and Tactics (SWAT) proceeded to aforesaid house. Upon inquiry from
people in the area, the houseof Gonzales was located. As the team entered
the house, accused Orlando Doria was arrested while coming out. Inside the
house were Gonzales, Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon, and Rezin Martinez.
Seized from the accused were open plastic sachets (containing shabu
residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used aluminum
foil. The accused were arrested and brought to police station, seized items
were sent to the Pangasinan Provincial Police Crime Laboratory. All
accused, except for Doria, were found positive for methylamphetamine
HCL.On February 13, 2008, RTC found Arnold Martinez, Edgar Dizon,
Rezin Martinez and Rafael Gonzales guilty beyond reasonable doubt under
Sec. 13 in relation to Sec. 11, Art. II of RA 9165and sentenced each to life
imprisonment and fined PHP 500,000 plus cost of suit. The CA supported
the findings of the lower court.
ISSUE
Was the guilt of the accused proven beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING
No, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt because (1) evidence against the accused
are inadmissible and (2) even if the evidence were admissible, the chain of
custody was not duly established. The evidence is inadmissible because of
the illegal arrest, search and seizure. Searches and seizures without a warrant
are valid in (1) incidence of lawful arrest, (2) “plain view” search
of evidence, (3) moving vehicle search, (4) consented search, (5) customs
search, (6) stop and frisk, (7)exigent and emergency cases. Under Rule 113,
Sec. 5 of RRCP warrantless arrest can only be done inin flagrante cases, hot
pursuit cases, and fugitive cases. The arrest of the accused-appellants was
based solely on the report of a concerned citizen, no surveillance of the place
was conducted. Under Rule 113, fugitive case does not apply. In flagrante
and hot pursuit case may apply only upon probable cause, which means
actual belief or reasonable ground of suspicion. It is reasonable ground of
suspicion when suspicion of a person to be arrested is probably guilty of the
offense based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances. In case at
bar, this is not the case since the entire arrest was based on uncorroborated
statement of a concerned citizen. The chain of custody as outlined in Sec. 21,
Art. II of RA 9165 was not observed as no proper inventory, photographing,
was done in the presence of the accused nor were there’re representatives
from the media, the DOJ and any popularly elected official present, although
in warrantless seizures, marking and photographing of evidence may be done
at the nearest police station. Court sets aside and reverses the decision of the
CA dated August 7, 2009, acquits the accused and orders their immediate
release.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
f. Warrantless Search
PEOPLE vs. Chua Ho San
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other
contraband, Chief of Police Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, La
Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted a radio call at
around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite of Barangay
Tammocalao requesting for police assistance regarding an unfamiliar
speedboat the latter had spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked
different from the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was
poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Cid and six of his men led by SPO1
Reynoso Badua, proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there
conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone
male passenger, who was later identified as Chua Ho San. When the speed
boat landed, the male passenger alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag,
and walked towards the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man
changed direction. Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him from fleeing.
They then introduced themselves as police officers; however, Chua did not
understand what they’re saying. And by resorting of “sign language”, Cid
motioned with his hands for the man to open his bag. The man acceded to
the request. The said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics
containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later identified to be
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Chua was then brought to
Bacnotan Police Station, where he was provided with an interpreter to inform
him of his constitutional rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and seizure conducted
by the Police Officers constitute a valid exemption from the warrant
requirement.
RULING: The Court held in the negative.
The Court explains that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person's
body, personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a valid
of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the Rules. However,
warrantless searches may be permitted in the following cases, to wit:
(1) search of moving vehicles,
(2) seizure in plain view,
(3) customs searches,
(4) waiver or consent searches,
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is required in cases of in flagrante delicto that the arresting officer
must have personal knowledge of such facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. Probable
cause means a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged. In the case at bar, there are no facts on record reasonably
suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in on going
criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from
conducting the obtrusive search. CHUA was not identified as a drug
courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that
ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area
did not automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an
offense. With these, the Court held that there was no probable cause to
justify a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
The Court likewise did not appreciate the contention of the Prosecution
that there was a waiver or consented search. If CHUA could not
understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he
understand the police's "sign language?" More importantly, it cannot
logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language"
that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right
against such an intrusive search.
Finally, being a forbidden fruit, the subject regulated substance was
held to be inadmissible in evidence.
Hence, the accused was acquitted as the evidence was not sufficient to
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
Manalili vs Court of Appeals
(October 9, 1997)Ponente: Panaganiban Nature: Petition for review on
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan City
Cemetery dueto reports of drug addicts roaming the area. They chanced upon a male (who turned
out to be petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon) who seemed to be ´highµ on drugs in front of the
cemetery. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner.
When Manalili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and
asked what he was holding in his hands. Manalili tried to resist, but the
policemen were persistent until he yielded his wallet which they examined
and found to contain crushed marijuana residue. Further examination by the
Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the findings. Trial court
convicted Manalili of violation of Section 8, Article II, of RA 6425. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.(In his
defense, Manalili claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a
tricycle until the three police men ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop
because the driver and passenger were allegedly under the influence
of marijuana. He claimed that he was searched and his pants were turned inside-out but nothing
was found. To some extent he implied that the marijuana sample found in his
entity was framed up by the policemen.)
Issue: WON the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk operation is
admissible.
Held:
Yes Ratio: The general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by
a previously secured judicial warrant. However, this is not absolute and
exceptions have been contemplated by the law:
1.Search incidental to a lawful rrest
2.Search of moving vehicles
3.Seizure in plain view
4.Customs search
5.Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable
search and seizure.In the cited cases, the search and seizure may be made
only with probable cause as essential requirement. Probable cause (in
relation to search and seizure): Existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item, article, or object sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is
in the place to be searched. A ´stop-and-friskµ operation is another exception
to the general rule. In this case, probable cause was established with
Manalili·s suspicious behaviour.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
Malacat vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats
reported seven days
earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force
of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was
on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along
Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza
Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each
group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner
of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with "their eyes moving very fast." Yu and his companions
positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about
30 minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then
fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with
and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch
as allegedly the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza
Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon
searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the
latter's "front waist line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered.
Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed
an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his
commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly
recovered from Malacat. On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with
violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866. At arraignment on 9 October
1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty.
Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in
Manila. However, several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with
benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found
on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. In its
decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the
trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin
to a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to
maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain
more information"; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a
notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court.
However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-
GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of
“stop and frisk.”
Held:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is
needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under
Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that
under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to
valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6)
a "stop and frisk." The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. These two types of
warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before
they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity
of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the
search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-
frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was
invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a
member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days earlier.
This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could
have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
"moving very fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m.,
thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at
the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was
at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of Malacat, and from
all indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge,
assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been
visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat's
rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the
Constitution.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
People vs. Valdez
Facts:
At around 10:15 a.m. of 24 September 1996, SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member
of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya, received a tip from an
unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly
owned by Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to Valdez's hut.
Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the
report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2
Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to
"uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same." At
approximately 5:00 a.m. the following day, said police team, accompanied
by their informer, left for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly
being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road,
the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The
police found Valdez alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look
around the area where Valdez had his kaingin and saw 7 five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from
Valdez's hut. PO2 Balut asked Valdez who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted
the 7 marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms. The police took
photos of Valdez standing beside the cannabis plants. Valdez was then
arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya
for analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic
analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found
cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for
marijuana. She next conducted a chemical examination, the results of which
confirmed her initial impressions. Valdez alleged otherwise. He claims that
at around 10:00 a.m., 25 September 1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm
in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does not
know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see something." This unknown
person then brought Valdez to the place where the marijuana plants were
found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. 5 armed policemen
were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was
then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he
denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told
him to admit ownership of the plants. Valdez was so nervous and afraid that
he admitted owning the marijuana. The police then took a photo of him
standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot
5 of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo was
taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. The
police team then brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On the way,
a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill,
accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against him,
because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging activities,
threatened him to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise be would "be put
in a bad situation." At the police headquarters, Valdez reiterated that he knew
nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police. Still, on 26
September 1996, Valdez was charged for the cultivation and culture of the 7
fully grown marijuana plants. On 15 November 1996, Valdez was arraigned
and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the
merits then ensued. On 18 February 1997, the Regional Trial Court of
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case 3105, found
Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659), and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. Hence, the
automatic review by the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the seizure of the marijuana plants was made pursuant to
warrantless search and seizure, based on the “plain view” doctrine.
Held:
The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must
be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and
seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an
unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Herein, there
was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the
existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers
themselves, it is clear that they had at least 1 day to obtain a warrant to search
Valdez's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place
where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the
information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there
was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not.
Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse
that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not
underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of
Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-
handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their
intentions. The Court finds no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's
contention that it should apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to
apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search. Herein, the police officers first
located the marijuana plants before Valdez was arrested without a warrant.
Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of
Valdez's premises. The police team was dispatched to Valdez's kaingin
precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of
evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across
an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was
not inadvertent. Also, upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around
the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized
marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was
needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or
"open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to
apply.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
People vs. Elamparo
Summary: A buy-bust operation led the pursuing officers of a drug runner
into the house of his alleged supplier/dealer. In the house, they witnessed
the alleged dealer repacking bricks of marijuana and arrested him.
Rule of Law: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person, when in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Facts: Joel Elamparo (D) has been convicted with Illegal Possession of
Drugs and penalized with reclusion perpetua. The case was raised for
automatic review.
Police Officer Baldonado of Caloocan City Police received a report from
an informant that "some people are selling shabu and marijuana somewhere
in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City." Thus, Baldonado organized a buy-bust
team and deployed at a known "market" for buyers of marijuana.
Thereafter, a runner approached the poseur-buyer to confirm an order. The
runner then left and returned with the marijuana. Gaviola, the poseur-buyer
and buy-bust team member, then handed over the marked money and
arrested the runner who freed himself and ran.
The buy-bust team pursued the runner, who ran inside a bungalow-type
house with steel gate. Having trapped the runner inside the house, the
police officers frisked him and recovered the marked money. The police
officers likewise found Joel Elamparo (D) repacking five bricks of
"marijuana" wrapped in a newspaper on top of the round table inside the
house. Elamparo (D) was then arrested.
Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid?
Ruling: Yes. Five generally accepted exceptions to the right against
warrantless searches and seizures have been judicially formulated: (1)
search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3)
seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused
themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.
This case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine. In People vs. Doria,
301 SCRA 668, 710-711 (1999), the Court held that—
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search
warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine
applies when the following requisites concur (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or
is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery
of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent
to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating
the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery
inadvertent.
When the runner wrenched himself free from the grasp of Gaviola, he
instinctively ran towards the house of Elamparo (D). The members of the
buy-bust team were justified in running after him and entering the house
without a search warrant for they were pursuing a fleeing criminal. Once
inside the house, the police officers cornered the runner and recovered the
buy-bust money from him. They also caught Elamparo (D) in flagrante
delicto repacking the marijuana bricks which were in full view on tap of a
table.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
People vs. Escano, Usana and Lopez
Facts:
On 5 April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of
the Makati Police, namely, PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3 Bernabe Nonato,
SPO4 Juan de los Santos, and Inspector Ernesto Guico, were manning a
checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon
Expressway (SLEX). They were checking the cars going to Pasay City,
stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop
on the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate
TBH 493. P03 Suba saw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the
passenger seat, who was later identified asVirgilio Usana. They asked the
driver, identified as Julian D. Escaño, to open the door. P03 Suba seized the
long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escaño, upon order of
the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were
searched for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which
they seized from Escaño. The three passengers were thereafter brought to the
police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching
the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de
los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escaño to open the
trunk. Escaño readily agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key.
They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escaño to open. The bag
contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by National
Bureau of Investigation Forensic Chemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found
positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms. Virgilio T. Usana and Jerry
C. Lopez, together with Julian D. Escaño, were charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 64, in Criminal Case 95-936 with
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425, as amended. Escaño
and Usana were also charged in Criminal Cases 95-937 and 95-938 with
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of Presidential
Decree 1866. The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. In its Decision
of 30 May 1997, which was promulgated on 17 June 1997, the trial court
convicted Escaño, Lopez and Usana in Criminal Case 95-936, Escaño in
Criminal Case 95-937, and Usana in Criminal Case 95-938. Escaño filed on
19 June 1997 a Notice of Appeal, but on 16 July 1997, he filed a
Manifestation and Withdrawal of Appeal, which was granted by the trial
court in its Order of 17 July 1997. Usana and Lopez filed a Notice of Appeal
on 30 June 1997, manifesting therein that they were appealing to the
Supreme Court and to the Court of Appeals. Considering the penalties
imposed, the decision in Criminal Case 95-936 was appealed to the Supreme
Court, while the Court of Appeals took cognizance of the appeal from
Criminal Case 95-938. In its Order of 30 June 1997, the trial court gave due
course to the appeal and ordered the transmittal of the record in Criminal
Case 95-936 to the Supreme Court and the record of Criminal Case 95-938
to the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, it is only the appeal from the judgment
in Criminal Case 95-936 that is before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the search conducted on Escano’s car is illegal, and whether the
evidence acquired therein
would be sufficient to convict Lopez and Usana for possession of illegal
drugs.
Held:
The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are
warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do
intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists' right to "free passage without
interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief
detention of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched
nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle
is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. In fact, these
routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. The
checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by
the COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if
its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would
also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend
to bring a gun during said period would know that they only need a car to be
able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. The facts adduced do not
constitute a ground for a violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely
stopping cars they deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are
heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best
they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop,
without opening the car's doors or subjecting its passengers to a body search.
There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands.
Despite the validity of the search, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of
Usana and Lopez for violation of RA 6425, as amended. The following facts
militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escaño; (2)
the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the
accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman
from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the car's trunk
was opened, with the permission of Escaño, without the presence of Usana
and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of
the car's trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police
authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish
found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escaño in the latter's
car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an
appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to
implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting the
prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew
of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same
before it was seized.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
PEOPLE VS. LEILA JOHNSON
Facts:
Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she was found to have in her
possession more than 500 grams of shabu when she was initially frisked by
a security personnel at a gate in the airport. The security personnel felt
something hard in respondent’s abdominal area and when asked she said that
she had to wear 2 girdles because of an operation. Unconvinced, the security
personnel went to her supervisor. Subsequently, after a thorough search on
respondent, packets of shabu were seized from her.
Accused (respondent) was subsequently convicted and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
In the present appeal, respondent contended that the search made upon her
was not valid and that her constitutional rights were infringed when such
search was conducted.
Issue: WON a valid search was made.
Held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never
placed under custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant
pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and…
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either
paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has
been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate.[18]
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the
routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport
security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause
by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggages as well as checked luggage are
routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the
presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine
what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject
to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that
ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained
through a valid warrantless search, they are admissible in evidence against
the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although
likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the
discovery and recovery of “shabu” in her person in flagrante delicto.
____________________________________________________________
__________________
People vs. Mendoza
Facts:
On November 11, 1988, Octavio Mendoza, his wife Cecilia and
their 10 yr. Old daughter Charmaine went to the birthday party of a relative
in McDonalds’, Harrison Plaza. During the party, Octavio left without telling
his wife and kid, and went to Kentucky Fried Chicken and Restaurant where
he had some beer. Since Cecilia and Charamaine couldn’t find him in the
party, they went home at #2 TRAMO ST. CAMELLA HOMES, PHASE III,
PAMPLONA, LAS PINAS. They arrived home at 7pm, and still Octavio
was not at home and Cecilia left again to go to her parents in Bacoor to bring
perfume. They got home around 9pm and saw Octavio’s car parked in the
garage of their neighbour. All the lights were opened but the front door was
locked. After a while, Octavio opened the back door and let them in. He was
drunk and told her daughter to get cold water and douse him. She followed
and was instructed to go to her room. She went and got ready for bed. She
heard her parents arguing about them leaving the party without Octavio.
Afterwards, she heard THREE GUNSHOTS, ran to their room and saw her
mom on the floor bleeding. She also saw her dad hide a gun under the bed.
Octavio called his brother-in-law Sgt. Antonio Gabac. When Gabac arrived,
they all brought him to Perpetual Help Hospital where Cecila was declared
dead on arrival. The policemen investigated Gabac and found a gun in his
waist. A .38 calibre revolver. He told them that Octavio handed it over to of marijuana, defined and penalized under Section 8, Article II of RA 6525,
him as soon as he arrived at the crime scene. Cecilia’s father, Alipio Eusebio as amended, and sentenced him to
learned of his daughter’s death and that valuable were being taken away from suffer the penalty of death and to pay a fine of P10,000,000.00. Hence, the
her house. He and his sons decided to go there and remove the rest of the automatic review.
property, including a memorandum receipt signed by Octavio and a mission
order authorizing him to carry such weapon. At court, Charmaine testified Issue: Whether the PASCOM has the authority to inspect luggages or hand-
that she saw her father hide the gun under the bed. On her second testimony, carried bags.
she said she saw no such act. Octavio also denied that he killed his wife and
that he owned that gun. He said that the memorandum receipt and mission Held: The Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) is the
order were illegally procured by Eusebio in violation of his right against implementing arm of the National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking
unreasonable search and seizure. (NACAH), which is a creation of Presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI)
399, dated 28 April 1976. On 18 February 1978, a Memorandum of
Issue: Understanding among the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretary of
Does the Constitutional right of Octavio Mendoza against Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the Secretary of Justice,
unreasonable searches and seizures have been violated when Eusebio took the Director General, National Intelligence and Security Authority and the
the memorandum receipt to the court? Secretary of Finance was signed. Under the said Memorandum of
Understanding the then AVSECOM (now PASCOM) shall have the
Held: following functions and responsibilities: (1) Secure all airports against
No, because the people’s Constitutional right against offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil aviation; (2) Undertake
unreasonable searches and seizure can only be invoke if there is interference aircraft anti-hijacking operations; (3) Exercise operational control and
from the Government and it these rights cannot be extended if the acts are supervision over all agencies involved in airport security operations; (4)
committed by private individuals. In this case, the memorandum receipt and Take all necessary preventive measures to maintain peace and order, and
other articles were discovered by Alipio, Cecilias’ father, a private individual provide other pertinent public safety services within the airports; xxx. Based
and handed it over to Eusibio. upon the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399, in
relation to RA 6235, the PASCOM had the legal authority to be at the
People vs. Suzuki Bacolod Airport, Bacolod City and to inspect luggages or hand-carried bags.
This is not the first time that the Court recognize a search conducted pursuant
Facts: Sometime in November 1993, the PNP Narcotics Command issued a to routine airport security procedure as an exception to the proscription
directive to all Chiefs of Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover all domestic against warrantless searches. In People vs. Canton, and People vs. Johnson,
airport terminals within their respective areas of responsibility, following the Court validated the search conducted on the departing passengers and the
reports that drug trafficking is prevalent in domestic airports; and to consequent seizure of the shabu found in their persons. Clearly, the
coordinate with local airport authorities and the PASCOM. In the morning PASCOM agents have the right under the law to conduct search of prohibited
of 12 April 1994, Hedishi Suzuki and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese materials or substances. To simply refuse passengers carrying suspected
nationals, entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal. illegal items to enter the pre-departure area is to deprive the authorities of
Suzuki was bound for Manila via flight 132 of the Philippine Airlines and their duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning impotence and ineffectivity of
was carrying a small traveling bag and a box marked “Bongbong’s piaya.” the law enforcers, to the detriment of society. It should be stressed, however,
At the pre-departure area, upon the advice of Corazon Sinosa, a civilian that whenever the right against unreasonable search and seizure is
personnel of the PASCOM, Suzuki proceeded to the “walk-through metal challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the constitutional
detector,” a machine which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search or seizure.
the presence of metallic substance or object. Thereupon, the red light Here, Suzuki voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the
switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of metallic PASCOM agents.
substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying. This prompted
PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao of the Police Aviation Security
Command (PASCOM) to frisk him bodily. Finding no metallic object in his
body, PO3 Poyugao picked up the box of piaya and passed it through the
machine. Again, the machine was activated. PO3 Poyugao then ordered
Suzuki to go to the hand-carried luggage inspection counter where several
PASCOM and NARCOM personnel were present. SPO1 Arturo Casugod,
Sr. requested Suzuki to open the box. He appeared tense and reluctant and
started to leave, but SPO1 Casugod called him. Eventually he consented,
saying in faltering English, “open, open.” SPO1 Casugod opened the box
and found therein 18 small packs, 17 of which were wrapped in aluminum
foil. SPO1 Casugod opened one pack. Inside were dried fruiting tops which
looked like marijuana. Upon seeing this, Suzuki ran outside the pre-departure
area but he was chased by PO3 Poyugao, SPO1 Gilbert Linda of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and Donato Barnezo of the PASCOM.
They apprehended Suzuki near the entrance of the terminal and brought him
to the PASCOM office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife, Lourdes
Linsangan, to the office, being suspects as conspirators with Suzuki in drug
trafficking. Lourdes asked permission to call Atty. Silvestre Tayson. When
he arrived, the police apprised Suzuki of his constitutional rights.
Meanwhile, SPO1 Casugod weighed the contents of the box and inventoried
the same. The total weight of the suspected marijuana fruiting tops was 1.9
kilograms or 1,900 grams. He then drafted a “confiscation receipt” which
Suzuki, upon the advice of Atty. Tayson, refused to acknowledge. SPO1
Casugod turned over Suzuki to SPO1 Linda for investigation. Subsequently,
Suzuki and his companions were brought to the prosecutor’s office for
inquest and placed under the custody of C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara at the
NARCOM office. The box with its contents was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory. P/Inspector Rea Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic chemist
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, conducted three
tests on the specimen samples which proved positive for marijuana. Suzuki
was charged with unlawful possession of marijuana, a prohibited drug, in
violation of the Dangerous Drug Act. Suzuki entered a plea of not guilty, and
trial followed thereafter. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City
in Criminal Case 94-16100 convicted Hedishi Suzuki of illegal possession