People v. Tee, G. R. Nos.

140546-47, January 20, 2003

The case involves an automatic review of judgment made against Tee who was convicted for illegal possession of marijuana
and sentenced to death. The defense assailed the decision of the court for taking admissible as evidence the marijuana
seized from the accused by virtue of allegedly general search warrant.
Ruling:
1. On the Validity of the Search Warrant; Its Obtention and Execution
Appellant initially contends that the warrant, which directed the peace officers to search for and seize "an undetermined amount of
marijuana," was too general and hence, void for vagueness. He insists that Abratique could already estimate the amount of marijuana
supposed to be found at appellant’s residence since Abratique helped to transport the same.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that a search warrant is issued if a judge finds probable cause that the
place to be searched contains prohibited drugs, and not that he believes the place contains a specific amount of it. The OSG points out
that, as the trial court observed, it is impossible beforehand to determine the exact amount of prohibited drugs that a person has on
himself.
Appellant avers that the phrase "an undetermined amount of marijuana" as used in the search warrant fails to satisfy the requirement of
Article III, Section 229 of the Constitution that the things to be seized must be particularly described. Appellant’s contention, in our view,
has no leg to stand on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily
meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from
seizing the wrong items;30 and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent
unreasonable searches and seizures.31 What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general characterization or
sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to an offense.32However, it is not required that technical precision of description be required,33 particularly,
where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the requirement of a technical description
would mean that no warrant could issue.34
Thus, it has been held that term "narcotics paraphernalia" is not so wanting in particularity as to create a general warrant. 35 Nor is the
description "any and all narcotics" and "all implements, paraphernalia, articles, papers and records pertaining to" the use, possession, or
sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs so broad as to be unconstitutional.36 A search warrant commanding peace officers to seize "a
quantity of loose heroin" has been held sufficiently particular.37
Tested against the foregoing precedents, the description "an undetermined amount of marijuana" must be held to satisfy the requirement
for particularity in a search warrant. Noteworthy, what is to be seized in the instant case is property of a specified character, i.e.,
marijuana, an illicit drug. By reason of its character and the circumstances under which it would be found, said article is illegal. A further
description would be unnecessary and ordinarily impossible, except as to such character, the place, and the circumstances. 38 Thus, this
Court has held that the description "illegally in possession of undetermined quantity/amount of dried marijuana leaves and
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) and sets of paraphernalia" particularizes the things to be seized.39
The search warrant in the present case, given its nearly similar wording, "undetermined amount of marijuana or Indian hemp," in our
view, has satisfied the Constitution’s requirements on particularity of description. The description therein is: (1) as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow; (2) expresses a conclusion of fact – not of law – by which the peace officers may be guided in
making the search and seizure; and (3) limits the things to be seized to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.40 Said warrant imposes a meaningful restriction upon the objects to be seized by the officers serving the warrant.
Thus, it prevents exploratory searches, which might be violative of the Bill of Rights.
Appellant next assails the warrant for merely stating that he should be searched, as he could be guilty of violation of Republic Act No.
6425. Appellant claims that this is a sweeping statement as said statute lists a number of offenses with respect to illegal drugs. Hence, he
contends, said warrant is a general warrant and is thus unconstitutional.
For the appellee, the OSG points out that the warrant clearly states that appellant has in his possession and control marijuana or Indian
hemp, in violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425.
We have carefully scrutinized Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98),41 and we find that it is captioned "For Violation of R.A. 6425, as
amended."42 It is clearly stated in the body of the warrant that "there is probable cause to believe that a case for violation of R.A. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as further amended by R.A. 7659 has been and is being committed by
one MODESTO TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE of Km. 6, Dontogan Bgy., Green Valley, Sto. Tomas, Baguio City by having in his possession
and control an UNDETERMINED AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA or INDIAN HEMP in violation of the aforementioned law."43 In an
earlier case, we held that though the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Law is not pinpointed, "there is no question at all of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable cause." 44Appellant’s averment is, therefore,
baseless. Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) appears clearly issued for one offense, namely, illegal possession of marijuana.
Appellant next faults the Judge who issued Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) for his failure to exhaustively examine the applicant and his
witness. Appellant points out that said magistrate should not have swallowed all of Abratique’s statements – – hook, line, and sinker. He
points out that since Abratique consented to assist in the transport of the marijuana, the examining judge should have elicited from
Abratique his participation in the crime and his motive for squealing on appellant. Appellant further points out that the evidence of the
NBI operative who applied for the warrant is merely hearsay and should not have been given credit at all by Judge Reyes.
Again, the lack of factual basis for appellant’s contention is apparent. The OSG points out that Abratique personally assisted appellant in
loading and transporting the marijuana to the latter’s house and to appellant’s rented room at No. 27 Dr. Cariño St., Baguio City.
Definitely, this indicates personal knowledge on Abratique’s part. Law enforcers cannot themselves be eyewitnesses to every crime; they
are allowed to present witnesses before an examining judge. In this case, witness Abratique personally saw and handled the marijuana.
Hence, the NBI did not rely on hearsay information in applying for a search warrant but on personal knowledge of the witness, Abratique.
Before a valid search warrant is issued, both the Constitution45 and the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure46 require that the
judge must personally examine the complainant and his witnesses under oath or affirmation. The personal examination must not be
merely routinary or pro forma, but must be probing and exhaustive.47 In the instant case, it is not disputed that Judge Antonio Reyes
personally examined NBI Special Investigator III Darwin A. Lising, the applicant for the search warrant as well as his witness, Danilo G.
Abratique. Notes of the proceedings were taken by Atty. Delilah Muñoz, Clerk of Court, RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61, whom Judge
Reyes had ordered to be summoned. In the letter of transmittal of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61 to Branch 6 of
said court, mention is made of "notes" at "pages 7-11."48 We have thoroughly perused the records of Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) and
nowhere find said "notes." The depositions of Lising and Abratique were not attached to Search Warrant No. 415 (7-98) as required by the
Rules of Court. We must stress, however, that the purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be taken is to satisfy the examining
magistrate as to the existence of probable cause.49 The Bill of Rights does not make it an imperative necessity that depositions be
attached to the records of an application for a search warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as long as there is evidence
on the record showing what testimony was presented.50 In the testimony of witness Abratique, Judge Reyes required Abratique to
confirm the contents of his affidavit;51 there were instances when Judge Reyes questioned him extensively.52 It is presumed that a
judicial function has been regularly performed,53 absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court,54 as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination.55 Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense
sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched.
On record, appellant never raised the want of adequate depositions to support Warrant No. 415 (7-98) in his motion to quash before the
trial court. Instead, his motion contained vague generalities that Judge Reyes failed to ask searching questions of the applicant and his
witness. Belatedly, however, he now claims that Judge Reyes perfunctorily examined said witness.56 But it is settled that when a motion
to quash a warrant is filed, all grounds and objections then available, existent or known, should be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they are deemed waived.57

Mata v. Bayona, G.R. No. L- 50720 March 26, 1984

Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by “selling illegal tickets known as Masiao Tickets”
without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai and amusement Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned.
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the
said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same,
so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts and to which inquiry respondent judge replied “it
is with the curt”. The judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached then to the records
ruling
The Supreme Court held that under the constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause
to be determined by the judge personally or such other responsible officer as may be authorized b law after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and any witnesses he may produce”.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining judge has to take
depositions in writing of the complainant and witnesses that he may produce and to attach then to the records.
Such written deposition is necessary in order that the judge may be able to properly determined the existence
and nonexistence of the probable cause, to hole liable for perjury the person giving It if it will be found later that
his declaration are false.
Deposition – any written statement certified under oath. – written testimony of a witness given in the
course of a judicial proceeding in advance of the trail or haring upon oral examination

The search warrant is illegal, the return of the thing seized cannot be ordered. Illegality of search warrant
does not call for the return of the thing seize, the possession of which is prohibited.

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, ET AL. vs. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO,et al

Nolasco, et al vs. Paño

G.R. No. L-69803

October 8, 1985
Facts:

The present case was subject for resolution.

Supreme Court held in a criminal case that the arrest of the petitioners was illegal, annulling the decision of

respondent Judge Paño, and that the seizure of the items by virtue of the warrant by the same respondent judge are

inadmissible as evidence in the Subversive Documents case. However the Court held that the items were to be

retained in case it would be used as evidence in a separate criminal case pending before the Special Military

Commission No.1, returning the rest which are determined irrelevant by petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the portion of the decision regarding the retention of the properties seized. One of the

petitioners also assailed the respondent’s claim that the search was incidental to her arrest for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:

Whether or not some of the properties seized may be introduced as evidence in a separate criminal case.

Held:

The Court ruled the propriety of the declaration of the arrest and search as null and void. It was held that the warrant

was one of a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate against unreasonable searches

and seizures. The Bill of rights also orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence: “Any evidence

obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding” (Sec. 4[2]).

All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of

the three petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30,

1985).

Since the search was not an incident of an arrest as it was in fact made under a void general warrant, the seizure of

documents could not be justified as an incident of an arrest

The Court ordered the return of all seized items to petitioners.

Roan v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 71410, November 25, 1986

A search warrant was issued by judge gonxzales . The issuance was filed by PC Capt. Quillosa.
Together with him were 2 witnesses, Morada and Tohilida. They presented their resspective affidavits taken by
the police investigator. Roans house was searched 2 days after the issuance of the search warrant.

Wether or not the search was valid

To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge or some
other authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. No less important,
there must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent arbitrary
and indiscriminate use of the warrant.5
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff 6 as referring to "such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to only one specific
offense.7
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce"
was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J. Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose was the strengthening of
the guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the condition did not appear in the corresponding provision of the
federa Constitution of the United States which served as our model it was then already embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Nevertheless, Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it
was thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the Convention
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, G.R. No. L-64261, December 26, 1984
 It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could not have provided sufficient
basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
20th Century Fox Film v. CA,

August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through counsel sought the National Bureau of
Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the latter's anti-film
piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro Manila
are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a
flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the Protection of Intellectual
Property).

Television sets, video cassette recorders, reminders and tape cleaners are articles which can be found in a
video tape store engaged in the legitimate business of lending or renting out betamax tapes. In short, these
articles and appliances are generally connected with, or related to a legitimate business not necessarily
involving piracy of intellectual property or infringement of copyright laws. Hence, including these articles without
specification and/or particularity that they were really instruments in violating an Anti-Piracy law makes The
search warrant too general which could result in the confiscation of all items found in any video store. In fact,
this actually happened in the instant case.

A careful review of the record of the case shows that the respondent Court did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the questioned orders. Grave abuse of discretion' implies such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words, where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act at all in contemplation of law.' But far from being despotic or arbitrary, the assailed orders were motivated by
a noble desire of rectifying an error, much so when the erroneous findings collided with the constitutional rights
of the private respondents. In fact, the petitioner did not even contest the righteousness and legality of the
questioned orders but instead concentrated on the alleged denial of due process of law." (pp. 44-45, Rollo)

1. Warrants of Arrest
Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
(1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them: (
We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section 1 of Rule 112 provides that a
preliminary investigation should determine " . . . whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." Section 3 of the same Rule outlines the procedure in conducting a
preliminary investigation, thus:
Sec. 3. Procedure. — Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:
(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the
official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to
administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss the same if he finds no
ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits
and other supporting documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and
other supporting documents. He shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.
(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall also be sworn to and certified as
prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies thereof shall be furnished by him to the complainant.
(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within the ten (10) day period,
the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
 (e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory
questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter
may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.
(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10)
days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient
ground to hold the respondent for trial.
Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the
resolution and corresponding information. He shall certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof . . ."
The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature . . ."20 An arrest without a probable cause is an
unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State.21 Probable
cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they are
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested.22Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable caution 23 or the
term ordinarily prudent and cautious man.24 The terms are legally synonymous and their reference is not to a person with
training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the street.25 It ought to be emphasized that in
determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our
technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all
reasonable men have an abundance.
Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel gravely abused its discretion when it found probable
cause against the petitioners. Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously
described petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement,
thus:26

Roberts v. CA, G.R. No. 113930,

Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest
without examining the records of the preliminary investigation.

Ruling
Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce.
Under existing laws, warrants of arrest may be issued (1) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs) except those in the National Capital
Region, Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in cases falling within their exclusive original
jurisdiction;59 in cases covered by the rule on summary procedure where the accused fails to appear when required; 60 and in cases filed
with them which are cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs);61 and (2) by the Metropolitan Trial Courts in the National Capital
Region (MeTCs-NCR) and the RTCs in cases filed with them after appropriate preliminary investigations conducted by officers
authorized to do so other than judges of MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs.62
As to the first, a warrant can issue only if the judge is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the
witnesses, in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.
Consented warrantless search

People v. Figueroa, G.R No. 134056, July 6, 2000

This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless
searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving
vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search), and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search
and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if
effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1)
arrest flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee, against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute, a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person involved
had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual
 intention to relinquish the right.[34] The third condition does not exist in the instant case. The fact is, Betty asked
for a search warrant, thus:

Q And of course, these NBI Special Investigators informed you of their purpose is that correct?

A Yes sir.

Q And of course believing that there was nothing in your house you acceded?

A No sir, I was asking for a search warrant.

Q And what was their reply?

A They did not have any but that Figueroa had led them to the property.[35]

Neither can the search be appreciated as a search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest of either Betty or
OBET as intimated by the trial court. First, Betty's arrest did not precede the search. Second, per the prosecution's
evidence OBET was not arrested for possession or sale of regulated or prohibited drugs as a consequence of the
buy-bust operation. He surrendered after taking hostage Estrella and her two children, although he was thereafter
held in custody for further questioning on illegal drugs.

Customs search; search of vessels

Roldan v. Arca, G.R. No. L-25434, July 25, 1975

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for violations of the customs laws have been the
traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant could be secured;
hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such search or seizure can be constitutionally effected
(Papa vs. Mago, L-27360, Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857, 871-74; Magoncia vs. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770, 774; Caroll vs.
U.S. 267, pp. 132, 149, 158; Justice Fernando, The Bill of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 225; Gonzales, Philippine
Constitutional Law, 1966 ed., p. 300).
The same exception should apply to seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with powerful
motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or Coast Guard.
Another exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant for a valid search and seizure, is a search or seizure as an incident
to a lawful arrest (Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637; Justice Fernando, The Bill of Rights, 1972 ed., p. 224). Under our Rules of Court, a
police officer or a private individual may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to
commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed an offense which has been actually committed; or
(c) who is a prisoner who has escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention during the pendency
of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, Revised Rules of Court). In the case at bar, the
members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus
their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment
and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.
The alleged compromise approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on September 13, 1965 (pp. 63-64, 158-159,
rec.) cannot be invoked by the respondents because the said compromise referred to about thirty violations of the fisheries law committed
by the private respondent from March 28, 1963 to March 11, 1964. The violations by the two vessels of private respondent by reason of
which these vessels were apprehended and detained by the Philippine Navy upon request of the Commissioner of Fisheries, were
committed on August 5 or 6, 1965.

People v. Musa, G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993

While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected,
exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon,36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most
important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest."37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful
arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a
search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest
may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of
the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " 38 Hence, in a buy-bust
operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the
person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found
nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. 40 Objects in the "plain view" of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.41

Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every individual against unreasonable
searches and seizures by providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid down in Stonehill v. Diokno, 34 declares
inadmissible, any evidence obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. 35
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this
rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon,36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most important exception to the necessity
for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest." 37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful
arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a
search upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest
may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of
the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " 38 Hence, in a buy-bust
operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the
person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his house but found
nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the
one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. 40 Objects in the "plain view" of an
officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence.41

In Ker v. California42 police officers, without securing a search warrant but having information that
the defendant husband was selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building
manager a passkey to defendants' apartment, and entered it. There they found the defendant
husband in the living room. The defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers,
after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of the kitchen, a small scale atop the
kitchen sink, upon which lay a brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance which he
recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used as evidence in prosecuting
defendants for violation of the Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged
before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it was not unreasonable for the
officer to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge
therefrom, that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer
merely saw what was placed before him in full view.43 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
warrantless seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and upheld
the admissibility of the seized drugs as part of the prosecution's evidence. 44
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to
extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object.45 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the
application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search
incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused — and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate
only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine
may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at
last emerges.46
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify
the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of the
object.47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the
marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house and found the plastic bag in
the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify
its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic
bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and
from which position he saw the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the
obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to
its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they
opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officer's
eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had
they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag
because it was within their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just the plastic
bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent
from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by
its distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are obvious to an observer. 48
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply and the
marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III,
Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other
pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II,
Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt.
Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the
guilt of the appellant of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; "STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT A MILITARY OR POLICE

CHECKPOINT, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WHICH HAS BEEN UPHELD, IS ONE OF THE
INSTANCES WHERE SEARCH AND SEIZURE CAN BE EFFECTED WITHOUT PRIOR ARREST OR
WARRANT. — There are indeed instances where search and seizure can be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest. An illustration would be the "stop-and-search" without a warrant at military or
police checkpoints, the constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this Court. Vehicles are
generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine inspection and answering a few
questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched it is because of some probable cause which
justifies a reasonable belief of those manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or
the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission of an offense. However, lest it
be misunderstood, this doctrine is not intended to do away with the general rule that no person shall be
subjected to search of his person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence except by virtue of a
search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. The case before Us is an incident to or an offshoot of
a lawful "stop-and-search" at a military or police checkpoint.
2. ID.; ID.; THE RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE MAY BE WAIVED, AS IN THIS
CASE. — Their submissive stance after the discovery of the bag of marijuana, as well as the absence of any protest on
their part when arrested, not only casts serious doubt on their professed innocence but also confirms their
acquiescence to the search. Clearly then, there was waiver of the right against unreasonable search and seizure. In one
case We held — ". . . When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises,
he is precluded from later complaining thereof (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 361). The right
to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made
either expressly or impliedly."
3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST MADE UPON DISCOVERY OF ACT OF
DISPATCHING IN TRANSIT OR TRANSPORTING MARIJUANA IN VIOLATION OF SEC. 4, ART. II, R.A.
6425, AS AMENDED, IS LAWFUL AND REQUIRES NO WARRANT; AN INSTANCE OF WARRANTLESS
ARREST UNDER SEC. 5, PAR. (A), RULE 113, 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AS AMENDED. —
The arrest of the three (3) accused was lawful because it was made upon the discovery of the prohibited drug in their
possession. There was no need for a warrant; the arrest was made while a crime was committed. This is one of the
situations envisioned by Sec. 5, par. (a), of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, when a
warrantless arrest may be made. The accused were caught in the act of dispatching in transit or transporting marijuana,
in violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended.
4. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT OF FACTUAL CONCLUSIONS BY TRIAL COURT RELATIVE TO CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES; CASE AT BAR. — Factual conclusions by the trial court relative to the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect and are generally sustained by the appellate court unless some material facts have been
overlooked or misconstrued as to affect the result. There is none in this case on appeal.
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; OBJECTION ON THE LEGALITY OF SEARCH AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
OBTAINED IN THE COURSE OF SEARCH IS WAIVED WHEN NOT RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT,
AND THE COURT IS BOUND TO ADMIT THE EVIDENCE. — We turn to the legal question on the admissibility
of the marijuana as evidence in the light of Bocalan's contention that it was seized without a valid search warrant.
Since the search was conducted prior to the arrest, Bocalan argues that it was not incident to a lawful arrest. This issue
was never raised in the proceedings below. Bocalan never objected to the admissibility of the evidence on the ground
that the same was obtained in a warrantless search. Consequently, he is deemed to have waived his objection on the
legality of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained in the course thereof. In view of such waiver, the
court is bound to admit evidence.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; MATERIALITY OF OWNERSHIP OF PROHIBITED DRUG IN A PROSECUTION FOR
VIOLATION OF SEC. 4, ART. II, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED. — Proof of ownership is immaterial where the
accused is charged with the unlawful transportation of marijuana. Section 4, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, as amended, does
not require that one be the owner of the prohibited drug before he can be prosecuted for dispatching in transit or
transporting a prohibited drug.
CRUZ, J., dissenting