Module 3 Liabilities of A Judge

EN BANC
GENARO SANTIAGO III, A.M. No. CA-09-47-J

[Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-
Complainant, 121-CA-J]
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
JUSTICE JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR. of the LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

Thirteenth [13th] Division, Court of BRION, and
Appeals,
PERALTA, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 13, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
1
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Ist Indorsement[1] dated January 3, 2008, the Court Administrator referred to this Courts Clerk of
Court for appropriate action the verified Complaint dated December 27, 2007,[2] with enclosures, of Genaro
Santiago III (complainant) against Court of Appeals Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. (respondent), for gross ignorance
of the law and jurisprudence and gross incompetence in connection with his rendering of alleged unjust
judgment in CA-GR CV No. 84167, Genaro C. Santiago III versus Republic of the Philippines, which was
promulgated on December 3, 2007.[3]
The antecedent facts of the case follow:
Complainant filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City a Petition for Reconstitution of
Lost/Destroyed Original Certificate of Title No. 56, registered in the name of Pantaleona Santiago and Blas
Fajardo.
By Decision of September 2, 2004, Branch 220 of the Quezon City RTC granted the petition. [4] The Republic of
the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals where
it was docketed as CA-GR CV No. 84167.
The case was raffled to Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison (Justice Gonzales-Sison) of the appellate
courts Thirteenth Division of which respondent was Chairperson. Completing the composition of the Division (of
three) was Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso (Justice Veloso).
On July 11, 2007, Justice Gonzales-Sison submitted her Report,[5] which was used as basis for the
Divisions consultation and deliberation.[6] By letter of July 18, 2007 addressed to Justices Gonzales-Sison and
Veloso, respondent expressed his dissent from the Report.[7] Justice Veloso, who originally concurred in the
Report, requested Justice Gonzales-Sison, by letter of July 19, 2007, to take a second look at respondents
Dissenting Opinion,[8] as the reasons [Justice Enriquez] gave are strong enough to be ignored by plain
technicality.[9]
2
In view of his dissent, respondent requested on August 23, 2007 the Raffle Committee of the Court of Appeals
to designate two associate justices to complete the composition of a Special Division of five.[10] The Raffle
Committee, by Special Order dated August 24, 2007, designated Justices Edgardo P. Cruz (Justice Cruz) and Lucas
P. Bersamin (Justice Bersamin) as additional members of the Special Division.[11]
Justice Veloso soon expressed his concurrence with respondents Dissenting Opinion.[12] Justice Bersamin
expressed his concurrence with the Report of Justice GonzalesSison,[13] while Justice Cruz expressed his
concurrence with respondents Dissenting Opinion.[14]
Respondents Dissenting Opinion thus became the majority opinion of the Special Division and the Report-
opinion of Justice Gonzales-Sison with which Justice Bersamin concurred became the Dissenting Opinion.
The Decision of the Special Division reversed and set aside the September 2, 2004 Decision of the
Quezon City RTC. Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was received by the appellate court
on December 20, 2007.[15] On December 27, 2008, complainant filed the present complaint.
On January 9, 2008, complainant filed a Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition [of respondent]
pursuant to Paragraph 2, Section 1, Rule 137[16] on the ground that he (complainant) had filed this administrative
complaint against respondent. The appellate court denied the motion by Resolution of April 20, 2008.[17]
In the present Complaint, complainant alleges, inter alia, that:
xxxx
. . . despite the overwhelming evidence of complainant, all corroborated by several

government agencies like the original duplicate certificate of OCT No. 56, certified copy of Decree
No. 1275, PC Crime Laboratory report, Bureau of Lands record, tracing cloth of survey plan, blue
print plan, certified technical description all approved by the Bureau of Lands, among others and
adduced and offered in evidence during trial, Associate Justice Enriquez deliberately twisted the
law and existing jurisprudence to grant the appeal, to the extreme prejudice of complainant. For
this reason, this administrative charge of GROSS IGNORANCE OF LAW/GROSS INCOMPETENCE is
3
now being filed against respondent Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. No one is above the
law.[18] (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
In compliance with this Courts Resolution of January 22, 2008,[19] respondent filed his
Comment,[20] branding the complaint as a mere nuisance, a dirty tactic in order to harass him for the purpose
of making him inhibit from handling the case the decision on which was pending consideration. He denies any
irregularities attendant to his arrival at the Decision which, he maintains, has factual and legal basis and is not
contrary to law and jurisprudence.
At any rate, respondent contends that the administrative complaint was filed prematurely considering
that complainants motion for reconsideration of the Decision was pending, and that assuming that the Decision
was indeed unjust and contrary to law, then Justices Cruz and Veloso, who concurred in his ponencia, should
also be charged.
Finally, and at all events, respondent contends that the administrative complaint is not the proper forum
for the determination of whether the Decision is erroneous or contrary to law and jurisprudence.
In compliance with the directive of the Court,[21] complainant filed a Reply dated 20, 2008 to respondents
Comment[22] in which he contends that the cases cited by respondent to support the Decision are not applicable.
The complaint is bereft of merit.
That cases cited to support a Decision are not applicable, and the appreciation of evidence and facts is
erroneous, do not necessarily warrant the filing of an administrative complaint against a judge, unless the
Decision is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or with deliberate intent to cause injustice. [23]
The remedy of the aggrieved party is not to file an administrative complaint against the
judge, but to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for review and
correction. An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is
4
still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless
the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty
The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of the
arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased and partial.
Thus, unless he is shown to have acted in bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an injustice,
not every error or mistake that a judge commits in the performance of his duties renders him
liableThe failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence presented does not
necessarily render a judge administratively liable.[24] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Assuming arguendo that respondents citation of cases in support of the Decision and his appreciation of
the facts and evidence were erroneous, since there is no showing that the Decision, reconsideration of which
was still pending at the time the present complaint was filed, is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty or was
rendered with deliberate intent to cause injustice, the complaint must be dismissed.
The principle of judicial immunity insulates judges, and even Justices of superior courts, from being held
to account criminally, civilly or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered in good faith. [25] To hold
otherwise would render judicial office untenable. No one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice could be infallible in his judgment.[26]
. . . A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts done by him in
the exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous. In the words of Alzua and Arnalot v.
Johnson, it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice
that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own
convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept of judicial
immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its purpose being to preserve the integrity
and independence of the judiciary. This principle is of universal application and applies to all
grades of judicial officers from the highest judge of the nation and to the lowest officer who sits
as a court.[27] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
5
It bears particular stress in the present case that the filing of charges against a single member of a division
of the appellate court is inappropriate. The Decision was not rendered by respondent in his individual capacity. It
was a product of the consultations and deliberations by the Special Division of five. Consider the following
pronouncement in Bautista v. Abdulwahid:[28]
It is also imperative to state that the Resolution dated May 31, 2004 was not rendered by
Justice Abdulwahid alone, in his individual capacity. The Court of Appeals is a collegiate
court whose members reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their
collective judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is unjust cannot
prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges against a single member of a division of the appellate
court is inappropriate. [29] (Underscoring supplied)
In fine, while this Court will not shirk from its responsibility to discipline members of the bench if they
err, it too will not hesitate to shield them if they are charged with unmeritorious charges that only serve to
disrupt, rather than promote, the orderly administration of justice.
WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
6
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
7
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
8
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC September 11, 2001
RE: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 140 OF THE RULES OF COURT RE: DISCIPLINE OF JUSTICES AND
JUDGES
The Court resolved to APPROVE the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court regarding the discipline of
Justices and Judges, so as to read as follows:
RULE 140
DISCIPLINE OF JUDGES OF REGULAR AND SPECIAL COURTS AND JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN
SECTION 1. How instituted. - Proceedings for the discipline of judges of regular and special courts and Justices of
the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon a
verified complaint, supported by affidavits of person who have personal knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by
documents which may substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by public records
of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions
constituting violations of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Court, or the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
SEC. 2. Action on the complaint. - If the complaint is sufficient in form and substance, a copy thereof shall be
served upon the respondent, and he shall be required to comment within ten (10) days from the date of service.
Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed.
SEC. 3. By whom complaint investigated. - Upon the filing of the respondent's comment, or upon the expiration of
the time for filing the same and unless other pleadings or documents are required, the Court shall refer the matter to
the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation or assign the case for investigation,
report, and recommendation to a retired member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent is a Justice of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge of a Regional
Trial Court or of a special court of equivalent rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial Court if the respondent is a
Judge of an inferior court.
SEC. 4. Hearing. - the investigating Justice or Judge shall set a day of the hearing and send notice thereof to both
parties. At such hearing the parties may present oral and documentary evidence. If, after due notice, the respondent
fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its
commencement or within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant.
SEC. 5. Report. - Within thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge
shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation. The report shall be
accompanied by the record containing the evidence and the pleadings filed by the parties. The report shall be
confidential and shall be for the exclusive use of the Court.
SEC. 6. Action. - The Court shall take such action on the report as the facts and the law may warrant.
SEC. 7. Classification of charges. - Administrative charges are classified as serious, less serious, or light.
9
SEC. 8. Serious charges. - Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A. No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate

proceeding;
5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.
SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges. - Less serious charges include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;
2. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;
3. Unauthorized practice of law;
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;
5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law;
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and
7. Simple Misconduct.
SEC. 10. Light Charges. - Light charges include:
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
2. Gambling in public;
3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court; and
4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:
10
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3)
months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure;
3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
SEC. 12. Confidentiality of proceedings. - Proceedings against Judges of regular and special courts and Justices
of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential, but a copy of the decision or
resolution of the court shall be attached to the record of the respondent in the Office of the Court Administrator.
These amendments to Rule 140 shall take effect on October 1, 2001 following their publication in two newspapers of
general circulation on or before September 15, 2001.
September 11, 2001, Manila.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
JOSUE N. BELLOSILLO JOSE A.R. MELO

REYNATO S. PUNO PUNO JOSE C. VITUG

SANTIAGO M. KAPUNAN VICENTE V. MENDOZA

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

BERNARDO P. PARDO ARTURO B. BUENA

MINERVA P. GONZAGA-REYES CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

11
SABINO R. DE LEON, JR. ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
En Banc
March 14, 2017
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant

vs
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, Respondent
x-----------------------x
A.M. N0.12-1-09-MeTC
RE: LETTER DATED 21 JULY 2011 OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE BIBIANO G. COLASITO AND THREE (3) OTHER
JUDGES OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, PASAY CITY, FOR THE SUSPENSION OR DETAIL TO
ANOTHER STATION OF JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, BRANCH 47, SAME COURT.
x-----------------------x
A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1836

(Formerly A.M. No. 11-11-115- MeTC)
RE: LETTER DATED MAY 2, 2011 OF HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY.
x-----------------------x
A.M. NO. MTJ-12-1815

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-2401- MTJ)
LEILANI A. TEJERO-LOPEZ, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, BRANCH 47, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, PASA Y CITY, Respondent.
12
x-----------------------x
OCA IPI NO. 11-2398-MTJ
JOSEFINA G. LABID, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
AMOR V. ABAD, FROILAN ROBERT L. TOMAS, ROMER H. A VILES, EMELINA J. SAN MIGUEL, NORMAN D.S.
GARCIA, MAXIMA SA YO and DENNIS ECHEGOYEN, Complainants,
vs.
HON. ELIZA B. YU, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY,Respondent.
x-----------------------x
EXECUTIVE JUDGE BIBIANO G. COLAS ITO, VICE EXECUTIVE JUDGE BONIFACIO S. PASCUA, JUDGE
RESTITUTO V. MANGALINDAN, JR., JUDGE CATHERINE P. MANODON, MIGUEL C. INFANTE (CLERK OF COURT
IV, OCC-METC), RACQUEL C. DIANO (CLERK OF COURT Ill, METC, BRANCH 45), EMMA ANNIE D. ARAFILES
(ASSISTANT CLERK OF COURT, OCC-METC), PEDRO C. DOCTOLERO, JR. (CLERK OF COURT Ill, METC,
BRANCH 44), LYDIA T. CASAS (CLERK OF COURT III, METC, BRANCH 46), ELEANOR N. BA YOG (LEGAL
RESEARCHER,METC,BRANCH 45), LEILANIE A. TEJERO (LEGAL RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 46), ANA
MARIA V. FRANCISCO (CASHIER I, OCCMETC), SOLEDAD J. BASSIG (CLERK III, OCC-METC), MARISSA
MASHHOOR RASTGOOY (RECORDS OFFICER, OCC-METC), MARIE LUZ M. OBIDA (ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER,
OCC-METC), VIRGINIA D. GALANG (RECORDS OFFICER I, OCC-METC), AUXENCIO JOSEPH CLEMENTE (CLERK
OF COURT III, METC, BRANCH 48), EVELYN P. DEPALOBOS (LEGAL RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 44), MA.
CECILIA GERTRUDES R. SALVADOR (LEGAL RESEARCHER, METC, BRANCH 48), JOSEPH B. PAMATMAT
(CLERK Ill, OCCMETC), ZENAIDA N. GERONIMO (COURT STENOGRAPHER, OCC-METC), BENJIE V. ORE
(PROCESS SERVER, OCC-METC), FORTUNATO E. DIEZMO (PROCESS SERVER, OCCMETC), NO MER B.
VILLANUEVA (UTILITY WORKER, OCC-METC), ELSA D. GARNET (CLERK Ill, OCCMETC), FATIMA V. ROJAS
(CLERK III, OCC-METC), EDUARDO E. EBREO (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 45), RONALYN T. ALMARVEZ
(COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 45), MA. VICTORIA C. OCAMPO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II,
METC, BRANCH 45), ELIZABETH LIPURA (CLERK III METC, BRANCH 45), MARY ANN J. CAYANAN (CLERK III,
METC, BRANCH 45), MANOLO MANUEL E. GARCIA (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 45), EDWINA A.
JUROK (UTILITY WORKER, OCC-METC), ARMINA B. ALMONTE (CLERK III, OCC-METC), ELIZABETH G.
VILLANUEVA (RECORDS OFFICER, METC, BRANCH 44), ERWIN RUSS B. RAGASA (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH
44), BIEN T. CAMBA (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 44), MARLON M. SULIGAN (COURT
STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 44), CHANDA B. TOLENTINO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH
44), FERDINAND R. MOLINA (COURT INTERPRETER, METC, BRANCH 44), PETRONILO C. PRIMACIO, JR.
(PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 45), EDWARD ERIC SANTOS (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 45),
EMILIO P. DOMINE (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 45), ARNOLD P. OBIAL (UTILITY WORKER, METC,
BRANCH 44), RICARDO E. LAMPITOC (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 46), JEROME H. A VILES (COURT
STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 46), ANA LEA M. ESTACIO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH
46), LANIE F. AGUINALDO (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 44), JASMINE L. LINDAIN (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 44),
RONALDO S. QUIJANO (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 44), DOMINGO H. HOCOSOL (UTILITY WORKER,
METC, BRANCH 48), EDWIN P. UBANA (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 48), MARVIN 0. BALICUATRO (COURT
STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 48), MA. LUZ D. DIONISIO (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 48),
MARIBEL A. MOLINA (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 48), CRISTINA E. LAMPITOC (COURT
STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 46), MELANIE DC. BEGASA (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 46), EV ANGELINE
M. CHING (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 46), LA WREN CE D. PEREZ (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 46),
EDMUNDO VERGARA (UTILITY WORKER, METC, BRANCH 46), AMOR V. ABAD (COURT INTERPRETER, METC,
BRANCH 47), ROMER H. A VILES (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 47), FROILAN ROBERT L.
TOMAS (COURT STENOGRAPHER II, METC, BRANCH 47), MAXIMA C. SAYO (PROCESS SERVER, BRANCH 47),
SEVILLA B. DEL CASTILLO (COURT INTERPRETER, METC, BRANCH 48), AIDA JOSEFINA IGNACIO (CLERK III,
METC, BRANCH 48), BENIGNO A. MARZAN (CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 48), KARLA MAE R. PACUNAYEN
13
(CLERK III, METC, BRANCH 48), IGNACIO M. GONZALES (PROCESS SERVER, METC, BRANCH 48), EMELINA J.
SAN MIGUEL (RECORDS OFFICER, OCC, DETAILED AT BRANCH 47), DENNIS M. ECHEGOYEN (SHERIFF III,
OCC-METC), NORMAN GARCIA (SHERIFF III, METC, BRANCH 47), NOEL G. LABID (UTILITY WORKER I, BRANCH
47), Complainant,
vs.
x-----------------------x
JUDGE BIBIANO G. COLASITO, JUDGE BONIFACIO S. PASCUA, JUDGE RESTITUTO V. MANGALINDAN, JR. and
CLERK OF COURT MIGUEL C. INFANTE, Complainants,
vs.
x-----------------------x
A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1821
JUDGE EMILY L. SAN GASPAR- GITO, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 20, MANILA,Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ELIZA B. YU, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 47, PASAY CITY, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
We hereby consider and resolve respondent Eliza B. Yu's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show
Cause Order filed vis-a-vis the decision promulgated on November 22, 2016 disposing against her as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU GUILTY of GROSS
INSUBORDINATION; GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW; GROSS MISCONDUCT; GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY;
OPPRESSION; and CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A JUDICIAL OFFICIAL; and, ACCORDINGLY, DISMISSES her from
the service EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY, with FORFEITURE OF ALL HER BENEFITS, except accrued leave credits, and
further DISQUALIFIES her from reinstatement or appointment to any public office or employment, including to one in any
government-owned or government-controlled corporations.
Respondent JUDGE ELIZA B. YU is directed to show cause in writing within ten (10) days from notice why she should not
be disbarred for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional
Ethics as outlined herein.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator for its information and guidance.
SO ORDERED. 1
In her motion, the respondent repeatedly denies committing all the administrative offenses for which she was held guilty,
and insists on the absence of proof to support the findings against her. She pleads that the Court reconsiders based on
the following:
1. Noncompliance with A.O. No. 19-2011
The complaint against her was premature because of the pendency of her protest against night court duty. A.O. No. 19-
2011 did not carry a penal provision, and was only directory because of the use of the permissive word may. In addition to
A.O. No. 19-2011 being noncompliant with the requirements of a valid administrative order, the requirement of night court
duty violated Section 5, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code, which limited
2
the working hours for government officials and employees. It was also not illegal to write to the Secretary of the
Department of Tourism (DOT) considering that he was the requesting authority regarding the rendering of the night court
14
duty. She did not publicly broadcast her disobedience to A.O. No. 19-2011 when she wrote the letter to the Secretary.
There was no law prohibiting her from writing the protest letters. At any rate, she had the right to do so under the Freedom
of Speech Clause. She did not refuse to obey A.O. No. 19-2011 because she actually allowed her staff to report for night
duty. She did not willfully and intentionally disobey because her protest had legal basis. She would also violate Section
3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) if she would comply with the patently illegal A.O. No.
3
19-2011. 4
2. Refusal to honor the appointments of Ms. Mariejoy P. Lagman and Ms. Leilani Tejero-Lopez
The respondent claims that she did not refuse to honor the appointment because rejection was different from protesting
the appointment. She merely exercised her statutory right as a judge to question the appointment of the branch clerk of
court assigned to her sala. Under Canon 2, Section 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, she was mandated to bring to the proper authorities the irregularities surrounding the appointments. Moreover,
5
the contents of the complaint letter and the protest could not be used against her pursuant to the constitutional right
against self-incrimination. She did not also commit any act of cruelty against Ms. Tejera-Lopez; on the contrary, it was Ms.
Tejero-Lopez who "went beyond the norms of decency by her persistent and annoying application in my court that it
actually became a harassment." Her opposition against the appointment of Ms. Lagman was meritorious. She only
employed the wrong choice of words with her choice of the term privileged communication that was viewed negatively.
There was no proof of the alleged verbal threats, abuse, misconduct or oppression committed against Ms. Tejero-Lopez.
It was not proper to penalize a judge based on a "letter with few words that other people find objectionable." 6
3. Show-cause order respondent issued against fellow judges
The respondent posits that the show-cause order she issued to her fellow judges had legal basis because "anything that
is legal cannot be an assumption of the role of a tyrant wielding power with unbridled breath." It was premature to rule
7
that she thereby abused and committed misconduct because she did not issue any ruling on the explanation by the other
judges. She did not violate Section 5, Canon 3 and Section 8, Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. What the other
8
judges should have done was to avail themselves of the appropriate remedy. 9
4. Refusal to sign the leave of absence of Mr. Noel Labid
The refusal to sign the application for leave of absence had factual and legal bases. Moreover, she should be presumed
10
to have acted in good faith if she misconstrued the rules on approval of application of leave.
11
5. Allowing on-the-job trainees
The respondent claims that she did not order the trainees to perform judicial tasks. She asserts that she could not
remember their affidavit. She had no personal knowledge that the trainees were made to serve as assistant court
stenographers. Based on what she heard, the trainees were only in the premises of her court for a few hours. She
reminds that she allowed the trainees to merely observe proceedings. OCA Circular No. 111-2005 was impliedly amended
when paralegals and law students were allowed to be trained under the Hustisyeah Project. 12
6. Designation of an officer-in-charge and ordering reception of evidence by a non-lawyer
The respondent denies having violated CSC Memorandum Circular No. 06-05 when she designated an officer-in-charge.
There was no proof showing that she willfully and deliberately intended to cause public damage. In fact, the OCA
recognized Mr. Ferdinand Santos as the OIC of her branch in several letters. There was no proof that she violated Section
9, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. The ex parte reception of evidence by a non-lawyer clerk of court was allowed under
the Rules of Court, as well as by Section 2l(e), Administrative Circular No. 35-2004, and Administrative Circular No. 37-
93.13
7. Allowing criminal proceedings to continue despite the absence of counsel
The respondent merely followed the Rules of Criminal Procedure in allowing criminal proceedings despite absence of
counsel. In so doing, she relied in good faith on the rulings in People v. Arcilla, Bravo v. Court of Appeals, and People v.
14 15
Malinao. Under Section l(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the accused may be allowed to defend himself
16
in person without the assistance of counsel.17
8. Sending of inappropriate email messages

15
The respondent maintains that the e-mail messages were hearsay because the certification by the SC-MISO was not
presented to her, depriving her of the opportunity to object. Her granting access by the MISO to her private e-mails was
conditional to prove tampering. Her
Lycos e-mail account was hacked. She did not completely waive her right to privacy. Considering that she did not
authenticate said e-mail messages, the same were inadmissible for being hearsay. The e-mail messages with her full
name written in capital letters as the sender did not emanate from her because her Yahoo! and MSN accounts carried her
name with only the first letters being capitalized. The e-mails reproduced in the decision were not the same messages
that she had requested Judge San Gaspar-Gito to delete. There were words that she did not write on the e-mail
messages pertaining to her demand for reimbursement of $10.00. Her writing style was different from what appeared in
the e-mail messages. She denies having opened the "Rudela San Gaspar" account. It was wrong to penalize her based
on assumptions and speculations. She did not commit electronic libel. Her funny and innocent comments were not
actionable documents. The certification by the SC MISO was not an authentication as to the truthfulness of the contents of
the e-mail messages and as to the identification of the sender or author of the messages. It was wrong and unjust to
impute wrongdoing to her when there was no proof that she had sent the inappropriate messages. The disclaimer in the
e-mails were not printed in the decision; hence, the messages were inadmissible. The presentation of the messages
without her consent as the sender was covered by the exclusionary rule. Letters and communications in writing were
guaranteed and protected by Sections 2, 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and Article 723 of the Civil
18 19
Code, Articles 226 and 228 of the Revised Penal Code, Section 2756 of the Revised Administrative Code, Sections
20 21 22 23
32 and 33 of the R.A. No. 8792. There was no proof that she had apologized through e-mail, and had sent messages
24 25
with sexual undertones and lewd graphics. Judge Gita had a dirty mind because nothing was wrong with the 69 image by
Felicien Raps. She (respondent) did not commit internet stalking. She had difficulty in remembering the private
communications, which were taken out of context. It was Judge Gita who must have a problem because she had kept the
trash messages. She (respondent) did not transgress any law. The allegations against her were hearsay. She submitted a
letter proposal for a "winwin" solution so that she would not pursue any criminal action against Judge Gito. She did not
violate Section 8, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct because it was one of her staff who had typed the letter
addressed to Atty. San Gaspar. To find her to have abused her power and committed impropriety was unwarranted. Her
absence from the investigation conducted by Justice Abdulwahid could not be taken against her and could not be
construed as her admission of wrong doing or as an evasion of truth. There was no proof that she had used the
phrase our court to advance her personal interest. 26
Ruling of the Court
We deny the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order for the following
reasons.
1.
The respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit
The submissions tendered in the respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause
Order were matters that the Court had already exhaustively considered and fully resolved in the decision of November 22,
2016. We deem it unnecessary to dwell at length on such submissions. We still hold and declare that the respondent
flagrantly and blatantly violated the Lawyer's Oath, and several canons and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Canon of Judicial Ethics and the New Judicial Code of Conduct.
Nonetheless, we propose to expound on some points for greater enlightenment on the issues and grounds taken into
consideration in removing the respondent from the Judiciary, and for purposes of providing the requisite predicate to the
ruling on the directive for her to show sufficient cause in writing why she should not also be disbarred from the Roll of
Attorneys.
The respondent insists that there was no proof to support the adverse findings of the Court. She is absolutely mistaken.
The records involved in these cases were voluminous, because they consisted of the affidavits and other evidence
submitted by the several complainants as well as her own pleadings and motions, most of which constituted proof of her
administrative wrongdoings. As the per curiam decision of November 22, 2016 indicated, her explanations vis-a-vis the
complaints often backfired against her, and all the more incriminated her by systematically exposing her personal and
professional ineptitude and stilted logic. In short, the evidence against her was too compelling to ignore, and sufficed to
warrant the supreme action of her removal from the Judiciary. She was more than aware that the quantum of evidence
required in administrative proceedings like these was substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 27
16
The respondent's argument that she was deprived of the guarantee against self-incrimination has no basis. As a judge,
she was quite aware that the constitutional guarantee only set the privilege of an individual to refuse to answer
incriminating questions that may directly or indirectly render her criminally liable. The constitutional guarantee simply
secures to a witness - whether a party or not - the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question. The 28
privilege did not prohibit legitimate inquiry in non-criminal matters. At any rate, the rule only finds application in case of
oral testimony and does not apply to object evidence. As the Court has pointed out in People v. Malimit: 29
[The right against self-incrimination], as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, "x x x is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him x x x" It is simply a prohibition against legal
process to extract from the [accused] 's own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It docs not apply to the instant
case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore,
discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal utterances, but also for
his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his
house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that
might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles - a
clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege, x x x
but testimonial compulsion. 30
The respondent's correspondences were outside the scope of the constitutional proscription against self-incrimination.
She had not been subjected to testimonial compulsion in which she could validly raise her right against self-incrimination.
Worthy to recall is that she had herself voluntarily waived her right to be present and to confront the complainant and her
witnesses and evidence during the administrative investigation conducted by CA Associate Justice Hakim Abdulwahid.
She was emphatically granted the opportunity to confront the complainant and her witnesses but the voluntary and
knowing waiver of her presence divested her of the right to insist on the right to confrontation, if any.
The respondent contends that she was not given the opportunity to raise her objection to the certification issued by the
SC-MISO. This contention is dismissed also because of the same voluntary waiver of her presence from the proceedings
held before Justice Abdulwahid.
At any rate, the respondent alternatively pleads for compassion and mercy, and vows not to repeat the same
transgressions. In this connection, she would have the Court consider in her favor the following mitigating circumstances
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil Service, which provides thus:
31
1. Medications on allergies as analogous circumstance to an unsubstantiated charge;
2. Good faith on each the unsubstantiated charge xxx;
3. First time offense of the unsubstantiated charge;
4. Lack of education or lack of experience on administrative matters as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated
charge;
5. Newness or short number in the judicial service as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
6. Very different work culture from previous employment as unsubstantiated charge;
7. Lack of prejudice to the public as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
8. Remorse for not listening to the unsolicited advices of Court Administrator Jose Midas Marquez and Assistant Court
Administrator Thelma Bahia as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
9. Lack of intent to commit any wrong as analogous circumstance to the unsubstantiated charge;
10. Previously received awards in the performance of his duties to the unsubstantiated charge; and
11. Outstanding court performance as to cases disposal for year to the unsubstantiated charge. 32
17
The respondent's pleading is unworthy of sympathy.
Firstly, the respondent does not thereby present any compelling argument on how her having medications for allergies
was analogous to physical illness under Section 48(a) of the Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in Civil
Service. Although the list of circumstances in Section 48 is not exclusive because the provision expressly
recognizes other analogous circumstances, she cannot simply state any situation without pointing out why it would be
analogous to the listed circumstances. The Court is unable to appreciate how her consumption of medications for allergies
could generate arrogance, insubordination, gross ignorance of laws, and offensive conduct that manifested themselves in
the periods material to the administrative complaints.
Secondly, the respondent's overall conduct negated her allegation of good faith. Good faith implies the lack of any
intention to commit a wrongdoing. Based on the totality of her acts and actuations, her claims of good faith and lack of
intent to commit a wrong cannot be probable. According to Civil Service Commission v. Maala, good faith as a defense in
33
administrative investigations has been discussed in this wise:
In common usage, the term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention,
and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all
information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious."
In short, good faith is actually a question of intention. Although this is something internal, we can ascertain a person's
intention by relying not on his own protestations of good faith, which is self-serving, but on evidence of his conduct
and outward acts. (bold emphasis supplied)
The respondent is reminded that her removal from the Judiciary by reason of her gross insubordination and gross
misconduct did not proceed only from her non-compliance with A.O. No. 19-2011. Other acts and actuations were also
efficient causes, namely: (1) her refusal to abide by the directive of MeTC Executive Judge Bibiano Colasito that resulted
in the disruption of orderliness in the other Pasay City MeTCs to the prejudice of the public service and public interest; (2)
her direct communications to the DOT Secretary and other agencies that seriously breached established protocols,
thereby opening an irregular avenue to publicly broadcast her defiance to the directive of the Court itself; and (3) her
willful disregard of the direct advice by the Court Administrator despite the latter being the official expressly authorized by
law to assist the Court in exercising administrative supervision over all lower courts and personnel. 34
Furthermore, we emphatically observed and pointed out in the decision of November 22, 2016 the following:
In all, Judge Yu exhibited an unbecoming arrogance in committing insubordination and gross misconduct. By her refusal
to adhere to and abide by A.O. No. 19-2011, she deliberately disregarded her duty to serve as the embodiment of the law
at all times. She thus held herself above the law by refusing to be bound by the issuance of the Court as the duly
constituted authority on court procedures and the supervision of the lower courts. To tolerate her insubordination and
gross misconduct is to abet lawlessness on her part. She deserved to be removed from the service because she thereby
revealed her unworthiness of being part of the Judiciary. (Bold emphasis supplied)
We have stated in the decision of November 22, 2016 that the respondent's recalcitrant streak did not end with her
unbecoming repudiation of and defiance to A.O. No. 19-2011. To recall, she also exhibited extreme arrogance in rejecting
the valid appointments of Ms. Lagman and Ms. Tejero-Lopez despite being fully aware that the appointing powers
pertained to and were being thereby exercised by the Court, and that she was bereft of any discretion to control or reject
the appointments. Under no circumstance could she be justified in draping herself with the mantle of good faith in regard
to her insubordination and arrogance.
We also reject the respondent's appeal for relief based on her supposed lack of experience as a neophyte judge, and her
previously received awards and outstanding court performance. Lack of experience had no relevance in determining her
administrative liabilities for acts and actuations fundamentally irregular or contrary to judicial ethical standards. We even
believe that her being a novice in the Judiciary, instead of mitigating her liability, could have aggravated her offense, for
her being a neophyte judge should have impelled her instead to practice greater prudence and caution in her daily
actuations and performance. But instead of pausing and hesitating, she acted rashly and imprudently by condescendingly
asserting herself over her peers, by flagrantly disobeying her superiors, including this Court, and by ignoring obvious
boundaries that should have kept her in check or reined her in. On the other hand, the awards for outstanding
performances as a professional and as a judge, far from accenting her good qualities as a person, rather highlighted her
unworthiness to remain on the Bench by showing that her misconduct and general bad attitude as a member thereof has
put the awards and recognitions in serious question.
18
2.
Disbarment is also to be imposed on the respondent
The respondent's accountability did not end with her removal from the Judiciary. In the decision of November 22, 2016,
we declared that her misdemeanor as a member of the Bench could also cause her expulsion from the Legal Profession
through disbarment. Consequently, we directed her to show good and sufficient cause why her actions and actuations
should not also be considered grounds for her disbarment, justifying our directive in the following manner, viz.:
The foregoing findings may already warrant Judge Yu's disbarment.
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC, dated September 17, 2002 and entitled Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases
Against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court
Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar, relevantly states:
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and
special courts; and court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary
action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons
of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds
for the discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against the
respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required
to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily
sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney may be disbarred on the ground of gross misconduct and
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court. Given her wanton defiance of the Court's own directives, her
open disrespect towards her fellow judges, her blatant abuse of the powers appurtenant to her judicial office, and her
penchant for threatening the defenseless with legal actions to make them submit to her will, we should also be imposing
the penalty of disbarment. The object of disbarment is not so much to punish the attorney herself as it is to safeguard the
1âw phi1
administration of justice, the courts and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court. Also, disbarment seeks to
remove from the Law Profession attorneys who have disregarded their Lawyer's Oath and thereby proved themselves
unfit to continue discharging the trust and respect given to them as members of the Bar.
The administrative charges against respondent Judge Yu based on grounds that were also grounds for disciplinary
actions against members of the Bar could easily be treated as justifiable disciplinary initiatives against her as a member of
the Bar. This treatment is explained by the fact that her membership in the Bar was an integral aspect of her qualification
for judgeship. Also, her moral and actual unfitness to remain as a Judge, as found in these cases, reflected her indelible
unfitness to remain as a member of the Bar. At the very least, a Judge like her who disobeyed the basic rules of judicial
conduct should not remain as a member of the Bar because she had thereby also violated her Lawyer's Oath.
Indeed, respondent Judge Yu's violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary would constitute a breach of the following canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE OF
THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
19
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
The Court does not take lightly the ramifications of Judge Yu's misbehavior and misconduct as a judicial officer. By
penalizing her with the supreme penalty of dismissal from the service, she should not anymore be allowed to remain a
member of the Law Profession.
However, this rule of fusing the dismissal of a Judge with disbarment does not in any way dispense with or set aside the
respondent's right to due process. As such, her disbarment as an offshoot of A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC without requiring her to
comment on the disbarment would be violative of her right to due process. To accord due process to her, therefore, she
should first be afforded the opportunity to defend her professional standing as a lawyer before the Court would determine
whether or not to disbar her.
In her comment, the respondent reiterates her submissions in the Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the
Show Cause Order. Considering that we have dismissed her pleadings altogether for the reasons given earlier, her
disbarment is now inevitable.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. - A member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of any lawful order by the Court
constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the respondent's case, she was herein found to have committed all of these
grounds for disbarment, warranting her immediate disbarment as a consequence.
We deem it worthwhile to remind that the penalty of disbarment being hereby imposed does not equate to stripping the respondent of
the source of her livelihood. Disbarment is intended to protect the administration of justice by ensuring that those taking part in it as
attorneys should be competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the clients they serve to rightly repose their confidence
in them.35
Once again, we express our disdain for judges and attorneys who undeservedly think too highly of themselves, their personal and
professional qualifications and qualities at the expense of the nobility of the Law Profession. It is well to remind the respondent that
membership in the Law Profession is not like that in any ordinary trade. The Law is a noble calling, and only the individuals who are
competent and fit according to the canons and standards set by this Court, the law and the Rules of Court may be bestowed the
privilege to practice it.
36
Lastly, every lawyer must pursue only the highest standards in the practice of his calling. The practice of law is a privilege, and only
those adjudged qualified are permitted to do so. The respondent has fallen short of this standard thus meriting her expulsion from the
37
profession.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration with Explanation for the Show Cause Order with FINALITY;
DISBARS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY respondent ELIZA B. YU pursuant to A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC for violation of the Lawyer's Oath,
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics; and
ORDERS the striking off of respondent ELIZA B. YU's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the
country for their information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to the respondent's personal record as a member of the Bar.
SO ORDERED.
20
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.
FRANCIS H. JARDELZA
CAGUIOA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES NOEL G. TIJAM

21
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC February 8, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas

Organization, seek reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated October
12, 2010 that dismissed their charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials,
and gross neglect against Justice Mariano Del Castillo in connection with the
decision he wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v.
Romulo.1
Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or
approved of the commission of plagiarism in the Philippines. This claim is
absurd. The Court, like everyone else, condemns plagiarism as the world in
general understands and uses the term.
Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common definition.

To plagiarize, says Webster, is "to steal and pass off as one’s own" the ideas
or words of another. Stealing implies malicious taking. Black’s Law Dictionary,
the world’s leading English law dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision,
defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing presentation of another
person's original ideas or creative expressions as one’s own."2 The
presentation of another person’s ideas as one’s own must be deliberate or
premeditated—a taking with ill intent.
There is no commonly-used dictionary in the world that embraces in the

meaning of plagiarism errors in attribution by mere accident or in good faith.
Certain educational institutions of course assume different norms in its

application. For instance, the Loyola Schools Code of Academic Integrity
ordains that "plagiarism is identified not through intent but through the act
itself. The objective act of falsely attributing to one’s self what is not one’s
work, whether intentional or out of neglect, is sufficient to conclude that
plagiarism has occurred. Students who plead ignorance or appeal to lack of
malice are not excused."3
But the Court’s decision in the present case does not set aside such norm.
The decision makes this clear, thus:
To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is

based on the originality of the writer’s thesis, the judicial system is based on
the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal
data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not
expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a
22
decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and
long held legal opinions it draws from.4
Original scholarship is highly valued in the academe and rightly so. A college
thesis, for instance, should contain dissertations embodying results of original
research, substantiating a specific view.5 This must be so since the writing is
intended to earn for the student an academic degree, honor, or distinction. He
earns no credit nor deserves it who takes the research of others, copies their
dissertations, and proclaims these as his own. There should be no question
that a cheat deserves neither reward nor sympathy.
But the policy adopted by schools of disregarding the element of malicious

intent found in dictionaries is evidently more in the nature of establishing what
evidence is sufficient to prove the commission of such dishonest conduct than
in rewriting the meaning of plagiarism. Since it would be easy enough for a
student to plead ignorance or lack of malice even as he has copied the work of
others, certain schools have adopted the policy of treating the mere presence
of such copied work in his paper sufficient objective evidence of plagiarism.
Surely, however, if on its face the student’s work shows as a whole that he has
but committed an obvious mistake or a clerical error in one of hundreds of
citations in his thesis, the school will not be so unreasonable as to cancel his
diploma.
In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or prize
as an original piece of work or art. Deciding disputes is a service rendered by
the government for the public good. Judges issue decisions to resolve
everyday conflicts involving people of flesh and blood who ache for speedy
justice or juridical beings which have rights and obligations in law that need to
be protected. The interest of society in written decisions is not that they are
originally crafted but that they are fair and correct in the context of the
particular disputes involved. Justice, not originality, form, and style, is the
object of every decision of a court of law.
There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts,

including the Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when
reinstating the laws involved in the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply
the laws as these are written. But laws include, under the doctrine of stare
decisis, judicial interpretations of such laws as are applied to specific
situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are "to stand by precedent and not to
disturb settled point." Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it
to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of
whether the parties or property are the same."6
And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are
quite often entangled in apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions,
prompting experts in the law to build up regarding such matters a large body of
commentaries or annotations that, in themselves, often become part of legal
writings upon which lawyers and judges draw materials for their theories or
solutions in particular cases. And, because of the need to be precise and
correct, judges and practitioners alike, by practice and tradition, usually lift
passages from such precedents and writings, at times omitting, without
malicious intent, attributions to the originators.
Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International Bar
Association puts it succinctly. When practicing lawyers (which include judges)
23
write about the law, they effectively place their ideas, their language, and their
work in the public domain, to be affirmed, adopted, criticized, or rejected.
Being in the public domain, other lawyers can thus freely use these without
fear of committing some wrong or incurring some liability. Thus:
The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of words is

everything. Legal disputes often centre round the way in which obligations
have been expressed in legal documents and how the facts of the real world fit
the meaning of the words in which the obligation is contained. This, in
conjunction with the risk-aversion of lawyers means that refuge will often be
sought in articulations that have been tried and tested. In a sense therefore the
community of lawyers have together contributed to this body of knowledge,
language, and expression which is common property and may be utilized,
developed and bettered by anyone.7
The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the
public domain is not unique to the Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno cites in her dissenting opinion, observed in her
Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:
A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted

from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review
article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a
party’s brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use
whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them,
without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to
decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more
importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result,
judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.8
If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past
decisions from the time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it
is likely to discover that it has not on occasion acknowledged the originators of
passages and views found in its decisions. These omissions are true for many
of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by
magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal
trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the judiciary’s more than 100
years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned as
plagiarism.
This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere copycats. They
are not. Their decisions analyze the often conflicting facts of each case and
sort out the relevant from the irrelevant. They identify and formulate the issue
or issues that need to be resolved and evaluate each of the laws, rulings,
principles, or authorities that the parties to the case invoke. The decisions then
draw their apt conclusions regarding whether or not such laws, rulings,
principles, or authorities apply to the particular cases before the Court. These
efforts, reduced in writing, are the product of the judges’ creativity. It is here—
actually the substance of their decisions—that their genius, originality, and
honest labor can be found, of which they should be proud.
In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by
the opposing sides in a way that no one has ever done. He identified and
formulated the core of the issues that the parties raised. And when he had
done this, he discussed the state of the law relevant to their resolution. It was
24
here that he drew materials from various sources, including the three foreign
authors cited in the charges against him. He compared the divergent views
these present as they developed in history. He then explained why the Court
must reject some views in light of the peculiar facts of the case and applied
those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his discussions of the facts
and the law the right solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole, his work
was original. He had but done an honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the
Philippines and elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the
decisions promulgated by its judges or expose them to charges of plagiarism
for honest work done.
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the
petitioners, like all lawyers handling cases before courts and administrative
tribunals, cannot object to this. Although as a rule they receive compensation
for every pleading or paper they file in court or for every opinion they render to
clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in their writings. They
should not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so long as
they do not depart, as officers of the court, from the objective of assisting the
Court in the administration of justice.
As Duncan Webb said:
In presenting legal argument most lawyers will have recourse to either

previous decisions of the courts, frequently lifting whole sections of a judge’s
words to lend weight to a particular point either with or without attribution. The
words of scholars are also sometimes given weight, depending on reputation.
Some encyclopaedic works are given particular authority. In England this place
is given to Halsbury’s Laws of England which is widely considered
authoritative. A lawyer can do little better than to frame an argument or claim
to fit with the articulation of the law in Halsbury’s. While in many cases the very
purpose of the citation is to claim the authority of the author, this is not always
the case. Frequently commentary or dicta of lesser standing will be adopted by
legal authors, largely without attribution.
xxxx
The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with skepticism. It is
only the arrogant fool or the truly gifted who will depart entirely from the
established template and reformulate an existing idea in the belief that in doing
so they will improve it. While over time incremental changes occur, the
wholesale abandonment of established expression is generally considered
foolhardy.9
The Court probably should not have entertained at all the charges of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, coming from the losing party. But it is a
case of first impression and petitioners, joined by some faculty members of the
University of the Philippines school of law, have unfairly maligned him with the
charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect for failing
to attribute lifted passages from three foreign authors. These charges as
already stated are false, applying the meaning of plagiarism as the world in
general knows it.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials that
he lifted from their works and used in writing the decision for the Court in the
25
Vinuya case. But, as the Court said, the evidence as found by its Ethics
Committee shows that the attribution to these authors appeared in the
beginning drafts of the decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly
qualified and experienced court-employed researcher, she accidentally deleted
the same at the time she was cleaning up the final draft. The Court believed
her since, among other reasons, she had no motive for omitting the attribution.
The foreign authors concerned, like the dozens of other sources she cited in
her research, had high reputations in international law. 1aw phi1
Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the controversial passages

found in their works to earlier writings by others. The authors concerned were
not themselves the originators. As it happened, although the ponencia of
Justice Del Castillo accidentally deleted the attribution to them, there remained
in the final draft of the decision attributions of the same passages to the earlier
writings from which those authors borrowed their ideas in the first place. In
short, with the remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-up, the
passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed on their
face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo but to others. He
did not pass them off as his own.
With our ruling, the Court need not dwell long on petitioners’ allegations that
Justice Del Castillo had also committed plagiarism in writing for the Court his
decision in another case, Ang Ladlad v. Commission on
Elections.10 Petitioners are nit-picking. Upon close examination and as Justice
Del Castillo amply demonstrated in his comment to the motion for
reconsideration, he in fact made attributions to passages in such decision that
he borrowed from his sources although they at times suffered in formatting
lapses.
Considering its above ruling, the Court sees no point in further passing upon
the motion of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for leave to file and admit
motion for reconsideration-in-intervention dated January 5, 2011 and Dr. Peter
Payoyo’s claim of other instances of alleged plagiarism in the Vinuya decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for

lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
MORALES
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, ANTONIO EDUARDO B.

JR. NACHURA
26
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
ARTURO D. BRION
CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

MARIA LOURDES P. A.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
SERENO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
27
SECOND DIVISION
ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119

Complainant, [Formerly A.M. O.C.A. IPI
No. 07-2709-RTJ]
- versus - Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, CARPIO MORALES,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH TINGA,
36, CALAMBA CITY, VELASCO, JR., and
Respondent. BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 30, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By letter-complaint dated May 19, 2006[1] which was received by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on May 26,
2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane (complainant) charged Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (respondent), Presiding Judge of Branch 36,
Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of demean[ing], humiliat[ing] and berat[ing] him during the hearing on February 27,
2006 of Civil Case No. 3514-2003-C, Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel Malabanan, et al in which he was counsel for
the plaintiff.
To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made by respondent in the course of the proceedings conducted
on February 27, 2006 as transcribed by stenographer Elenita C. de Guzman, viz:
COURT:
. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the University of the Philippines?
ATTY. MANE:
No[,] [Y]our Honor[,] from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.
COURT:
No, youre not from UP.
ATTY. MANE:
I am very proud of it.
COURT:
28
Then youre not from UP. Then you cannot equate yourself to me because there is a saying and I know
this, not all law students are created equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all lawyers are created
equal despite what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His form and
substance.[2] (Emphasis supplied)
Complainant further claimed that the entire proceedings were duly recorded in a tape recorder by stenographer de Guzman,
and despite his motion (filed on April 24, 2006) for respondent to direct her to furnish him with a copy of the tape recording,
the motion remained unacted as of the date he filed the present administrative complaint on May 26, 2006. He, however,
attached a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes taken on February 27, 2006.
In his Comments[3] dated June 14, 2006 on the complaint filed in compliance with the Ist Indorsement dated May 31,
2006[4] of the OCA, respondent alleged that complainant filed on December 15, 2005 an Urgent Motion to
Inhibit,[5] paragraph 3[6] of which was malicious and a direct assault to the integrity and dignity of the Court and of the
Presiding Judge as it succinctly implied that [he] issued the order dated 27 September 2005 for [a] consideration other than
the merits of the case. He thus could not simply sit idly and allow a direct assault on his honor and integrity.
On the unacted motion to direct the stenographer to furnish complainant with a copy of the unedited tape recording of the
proceedings, respondent quoted paragraphs 4 and 3[7] of the motion which, to him, implied that the trial court was illegally,
unethically and unlawfully engaged in editing the transcript of records to favor a party litigant against the interest of
[complainants] client.
Respondent thus claimed that it was on account of the two motions that he ordered complainant, by separate orders
dated June 5, 2006, to explain within 15 days[8] why he should not be cited for contempt.
Complainant later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September 4, 2006,[9] stating that it was a mere result of his
impulsiveness.
In its Report dated November 7, 2007,[10] the OCA came up with the following evaluation:
. . . The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from pursuing an administrative complaint does not
divest the Court of its disciplinary authority over court officials and personnel. Thus, the complainants
withdrawal of the instant complaint will not bar the continuity of the instant administrative proceeding
against respondent judge.
The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not the statements and actions made by the respondent
judge during the subject February 27, 2006 hearing constitute conduct unbecoming of a judge and a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
29
After a cursory evaluation of the complaint, the respondents comment and the documents at hand, we find
that there is no issue as to what actually transpired during the February 27th hearing as evidenced by the
stenographic notes. The happening of the incident complained of by herein complainant was never
denied by the respondent judge. If at all, respondent judge merely raised his justifications for his
complained actuations.
xxxx
. . . [A] judges official conduct and his behavior in the performance of judicial duties should be free from
the appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach. A judge must at all times be temperate in his
language. Respondent judges insulting statements which tend to question complainants capability
and credibility stemming from the fact that the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP Law school is
clearly unwarranted and inexcusable. When a judge indulges in intemperate language, the lawyer can
return the attack on his person and character, through an administrative case against the judge, as in the
instant case.
Although respondent judges use in intemperate language may be attributable to human frailty, the noble
position in the bench demands from him courteous speech in and out of the court. Judges are demanded to
be always temperate, patient and courteous both in conduct and language.
xxxx
Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should always observe courtesy and civility. In addressing
counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a controversial tone or a tone that creates
animosity.Judges should always be aware that disrespect to lawyers generates disrespect to them. There
must be mutual concession of respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket where the judge should be
respected but free to insult lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is an essential part of
dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding. If a judge desires not to be insulted,
he should start using temperate language himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm.
It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only did respondent judge make insulting and
demeaning remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary lecturing and debating. . .
xxxx
Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the motion to inhibit filed by complainant, but,
instead, he opted for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum
expected of a judge. If respondent judge felt that there is a need to admonish complainant Atty. Mane, he
should have called him in his chambers where he can advise him privately rather than battering him with
insulting remarks and embarrassing questions such as asking him from what school he came from publicly
in the courtroom and in the presence of his clients. Humiliating a lawyer is highly reprehensible. It betrays
the judges lack of patience and temperance. A highly temperamental judge could hardly make decisions
with equanimity.
Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from lecturing the counsels or debating with them
during court hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and integrity. While judges should possess
proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that
they should act and behave in such manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their
impartiality.[11] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct with
a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.[12]
30
By Resolution of January 21, 2008,[13] this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings already filed. Respondent complied on February 26, 2008,[14] manifesting
in the affirmative.
The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads:
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court. A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into
the attitude of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for the litigants.
An author explains the import of this rule:
Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge should be courteous to counsel, especially
to those who are young and inexperienced and also to all those others appearing or concerned in the
administration of justice in the court. He should be considerate of witnesses and others in attendance upon
his court. He should be courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to utter intemperate
language during the hearing of a case. In his conversation with counsel in court, a judge should be
studious to avoid controversies which are apt to obscure the merits of the dispute between litigants and lead
to its unjust disposition. He should not interrupt counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to
their positions. Nor should he be tempted to an unnecessary display of learning or premature
judgment.
A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the courts, to their clients and to the adverse party and his lawyer, so as to
enforce due diligence in the dispatch of business before the court. He may utilize his opportunities to
criticize and correct unprofessional conduct of attorneys, brought to his attention, but he may not do
so in an insulting manner.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, quoted verbatim, taken during the February 27, 2006 hearing
show that respondent made sarcastic and humiliating, even threatening and boastful remarks to complainant who is
admittedly still young, unnecessary lecturing and debating, as well as unnecessary display of learning:
COURT:
xxx
Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis?
ATTY. MANE:
Ah, with due respect your
31
COURT:
Tell me, what is your school?
ATTY. MANE:
I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University.
COURT:
Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of the principle of Stare Decisis and the interpretation of the
Supreme Court of the rules of procedure where it states that if there is already a decision by
the Supreme Court, when that decision shall be complied with by the Trial Court otherwise
non-compliance thereof shall subject the Courts to judicial sanction, and I quote the
decision. Thats why I quoted the decision of the Supreme Court Sir, because I know the problem
between the bank and the third party claimants and I state, The fair market value is the price at
which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who
is not compelled to buy. Sir, thats very clear, that is what fair market value and that is not
assessment value. In fact even you say assessment value, the Court further state, the assessed value
is the fair market value multiplied. Not mere the basic assesses value. Sir that is the decision of the
Supreme Court, am I just reading the decision or was I inventing it?
ATTY. MANE:
May I be allowed to proceed.
COURT:
Sir, you tell me. Was I inventing the Supreme Court decision which I quoted and which you should have
researched too or I was merely imagining the Supreme Court decision sir? Please answer it.
ATTY. MANE:
No your Honor.
COURT:
Please answer it.
xxxx
COURT:
Thats why. Sir second, and again I quote from your own pleadings, hale me to the Supreme Court otherwise
I will hale you to the bar. Prove to me that I am grossly ignorant or corrupt.
ATTY. MANE:
Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . .
COURT:
No, sir.
ATTY. MANE:
32
Yes your Honor . . .
COURT:
No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you to the IBP Because hindi naman ako ganon. I am
not that vindictive but if this remains. You cannot take cover from the instruction of your client
because even if the instruction of a client is secret. Upon consideration, the language of the pleader
must still conform with the decorum and respect to the Court. Sir, thats the rule of practice. In my
twenty (20) years of practice Ive never been haled by a judge to any question of integrity. Because
even if I believed that the Court committed error in judgment or decision or grave abuse of
discretion, I never imputed any malicious or unethical behavior to the judge because I know and I
believe that anyone can commit errors. Because no one is like God. Sir, I hope sir you understand
that this Court, this Judge is not God but this Judge is human when challenge on his integrity and
honor is lodged. No matter how simple it is because that is the only thing I have now.
Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my statement of assets and liabilities?
ATTY. MANE:
I think that is not necessary your Honor.
COURT:
No counsel because the imputations are there, thats why I want you to see. Show him my assets and
liabilities for the proud graduate of MLQU. Sir, look at it. Sir, I have stock holdings in
the U.S. before I joined the bench. And it was very clear to everyone, I would do everything not be
tempted to accept bribe but I said I have spent my fifteen (15) years and thats how much I have
worked in fifteen (15) years excluding my wifes assets which is more than what I have may be
triple of what I have. May be even four fold of what I have. And look at my assets. May be even
your bank can consider on cash to cash basis my personal assets. That is the reason I am telling you
Atty. Mane. Please, look at it. If you want I can show you even the Income Tax Return of my wife
and you will be surprised that my salary is not even her one-half month salary. Sir, she is the Chief
Executive Officer of a Multi-National Publishing Company. Thats why I have the guts to take this
job because doon po sa salary niya umaasa na lamang po ako sa aking asawa. Atty. Mane,
please you are still young. Other judges you would already be haled to the IBP. Take that as a
lesson. Now that you are saying that I was wrong in the three-day notice rule, again the Supreme
Court decision validates me, PNB vs. Court of Appeals, you want me to cite the quotation again
that any pleadings that do not conform with the three-day notice rule is considered as useless scrap
of paper and therefore not subject to any judicial cognizance. You know sir, you would say but I
was the one subject because the judge was belligerent. No sir, you can go on my record and you
will see that even prior to my rulings on your case I have already thrown out so many motion for
non-compliance of a three-day notice rule. If I will give you an exception because of this, then I
would be looked upon with suspicion. So sir again, please look again on the record and you will
see how many motions I threw out for non-compliance with the three-day notice rule. It is not only
your case sir, because sir you are a practitioner and a proud graduate of the MLQU which is
also the Alma Mater of my uncle. And I supposed you were taught in thought that the three-
day notice rule is almost sacrosanct in order to give the other party time to appear and
plead. In all books, Moran, Regalado and all other commentators state that non-compliance
with the three-day notice rule makes the pleading and motion a useless scrap of paper. If that
is a useless scrap of paper, sir, what would be my ground to grant exception to your
motion? Tell me.
xxxx
COURT:
33
Procedural due process. See. So please sir dont confuse the Court. Despite of being away for twenty years
from the college of law, still I can remember my rules, In your motion you said . . . imputing things
to the Court. Sir please read your rules. Familiarize yourself, understand the jurisprudence
before you be the Prince Valiant or a Sir Gallahad in Quest of the Holy Grail. Sir, ako po ay
mahirap na tao, karangalan ko lang po ang aking kayang ibigay sa aking mga anak at iyan po ay
hindi ko palalampasin maski kanino pa. Sir, have you ever heard of anything about me in this Court
for one year. Ask around, ask around. You know, if you act like a duck, walk like a duck, quack
like a duck, you are a duck. But have you ever heard anything against the court. Sir in a judicial
system, in a Court, one year is time enough for the practitioner to know whether a judge is what,
dishonest; 2), whether the judge is incompetent; and 3) whether the judge is just playing loco. And
I have sat hear for one year sir and please ask around before you charge into the windmill. I am a
proud product of a public school system from elementary to college. And my only, and my only,
the only way I can repay the taxpayers is a service beyond reproach without fear or favor to
anyone. Not even the executive, not even the one sitting in Malacanang, not even the Supreme
Court if you are right. Sir, sana po naman inyo ring igalang ang Hukuman kasi po kami, meron nga
po, tinatanggap ko, kung inyo pong mamarapatin, meron pong mga corrupt, maaari pong
nakahanap na kayo ng corrupt na Judge pero hindi po lahat kami ay corrupt. Maaari ko rin pong
tanggapin sa inyong abang lingcod na merong mga Hukom na tanga pero hindi po naman lahat
kami ay tanga. Ako po ay 8:30 or before ay nandito po ako sa husgado ko. Aalis po ako dito sa
hapon, babasahin ko lahat ang kaso ko para ko po malaman kung any po ang kaso, para po pagharap
ko sa inyo at sa publiko hindi po ako magmumukhang tanga. Sir, please have the decency, not the
respect, not to me but to the Court. Because if you are a lawyer who cannot respect the Court then
you have no business appearing before the Court because you dont believe in the Court
system. Thats why one of my classmates never appeared before Court because he doesnt believe in
that system. He would rather stay in their airconditioned room because they say going to Court is
useless. Then, to them I salute, I give compliment because in their own ways they know the futility
and they respect the Court, in that futility rather than be a hypocrite. Atty. Mane hindi mo ako
kilala, Ive never disrespect the courts and I can look into your eyes. Kaya po dito ko gusto kasi di
po ako dito nagpractice para po walang makalapit sa akin. Pero kung ako po naman ay inyong
babastusin ng ganyang handa po akong lumaban kahit saan, miski saan po. And you can quote me,
you can go there together to the Supreme Court. Because the only sir, the only treasure I have is
my name and my integrity. I could have easily let it go because it is the first time, but the second
time is too much too soon. Sir, masyado pong kwan yon, sinampal na po ninyo ako nung primero,
dinuran pa po ninyo ako ng pangalawa. Thats adding insult to the injury po. Hindi ko
po sana gagawin ito pero ayan po ang dami diyang abugado. I challenge anyone to file a case
against me for graft and corruption, for incompetence.
xxxx
COURT:
I will ask the lawyer to read the statement and if they believe that you are not imputing any wrong doing to
me I will apologize to you.
Atty. Hildawa please come over. The Senior, I respect the old practitioner, whose integrity is unchallenged.
Sir you said honest. Sir ganoon po ako. You still want to defend your position, so be it.
Atty. Hildawa I beg your indulgence, I am sorry but I know that you are an old practitioner hammered out
by years of practice and whose integrity by reputation precedes you. Please read what your younger
companero has written to this Honorable Court in pleading and see for yourself the implications he
hurled to the Court in his honest opinion. Remember he said honest. That implication is your honest
opinion of an implication sir.
34
Sir 1, 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. If that is your honest opinion. Remember the word you said honest
opinion.
Alam mo Atty. Mane I know when one has to be vigilant and vigorous in the pursue of pride. But if you
are vigilant and vigor, you should never crossed the line.
Sir, what is your interpretation to the first three paragraphs?
ATTY. HILDAWA:
There will be some . . .
COURT:
What sir?
ATTY. HILDAWA:
. . . indiscretion.
COURT:
Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that an old practitioner could say to the Court because
of respect.
Sir, salamat po.
xxxx
COURT:
Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang abogado. Indiscretion na lang. Now you say that is your honest
opinion and the old practitioner hammered through years of practice could only say indiscretion
committed by this judge. Much more I who sits in this bench?
Now is that your honest opinion?[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-taken.
An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations
which this Court administers, taking of the Lawyers oath, and signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be
competent to discharge his functions and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he obtained his
law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly
an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person of the counsel. If respondent felt that his integrity
and dignity were being assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why he should not be cited for
35
contempt. He went out of bounds, however, when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes
show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.
This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of boorish behavior from those they deal with, they
ought to conduct themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the court.[17]
Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified as a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by any of the following: (1) a fine of not
less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court imposes
upon him the penalty of reprimand.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
36, Calamba City, is found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge and is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
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Module 3 Liabilities of A Judge

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Module 3 Liabilities of A Judge

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EN BANC

GENARO SANTIAGO III, A.M. No. CA-09-47-J

JUSTICE JUAN Q. ENRIQUEZ, JR. of the LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

February 13, 2009

The antecedent facts of the case follow:

In the present Complaint, complainant alleges, inter alia, that:

. . . despite the overwhelming evidence of complainant, all corroborated by several

The complaint is bereft of merit.

WHEREFORE, the complaint is DISMISSED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES- SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

A.M. NO. 01-8-10-SC September 11, 2001

1. Bribery, direct or indirect;

3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;

4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a competent court in an appropriate

5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

6. Willful failure to pay a just debt;

9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;

10. Partisan political activities; and

11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.

SEC. 9. Less Serious Charges. - Less serious charges include:

1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records of a case;

2. Frequently and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;

3. Unauthorized practice of law;

4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;

5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized by law;

6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and

SEC. 10. Light Charges. - Light charges include:

1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;

4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00

2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

4. Admonition with warning.

September 11, 2001, Manila.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

JOSUE N. BELLOSILLO JOSE A.R. MELO

REYNATO S. PUNO PUNO JOSE C. VITUG

SANTIAGO M. KAPUNAN VICENTE V. MENDOZA

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

BERNARDO P. PARDO ARTURO B. BUENA

MINERVA P. GONZAGA-REYES CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

March 14, 2017

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant

A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1836

A.M. NO. MTJ-12-1815

LEILANI A. TEJERO-LOPEZ, Complainant,

OCA IPI NO. 11-2398-MTJ

JOSEFINA G. LABID, Complainant,

OCA IPI NO. 11-2399-MTJ

OCA IPI NO. 11-2378-MTJ

OCA IPI NO. 12-2456-MTJ

A.M. NO. MTJ-13-1821