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2017-09-15

The power of one


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Hamdy Faramawy, Relay Application Specialist
Agenda

Introduction
- Evolution continues .
- Application and system capability.
- Hardware description.
- Design principle for protection functions.
- Plant engineering and system configuration.
- Parameters setting.
- Options and special application

February 12, 2018 Slide 2


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Evolution continues
4th Genertaion
•REB500 V8.XX
3rd Generation •Based on ABB
Relion®.
2nd Generation • Configurator •Busbar protection
1st Generation Order Code
“sub cycle”
User Access
• Standardized • IEC61850-8-1 Management
Ed1 User Activity Log
Centralize Account
Management

•IEC61850-8-1 Ed1
and ED 2
•PRP

1995 2000 2005 2015

February 12, 2018 Slide 3


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Evolution continues -Performance

Standard testcase: IF/Ik=5, ohmic network

February 12, 2018 Slide 4


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Application and system Capability

Improved ingress protection class


§ 1 – 4 bus bars incl. transfer bus
§ 1 ½ breaker configuration
§ 60 bay units
§ 32 protections zones

February 12, 2018 Slide 5


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Application and system Capability

BBP : Busbar Protection


BFP :Breaker Failure Protection
DR : Disturbance Recording
ER= Event Recording
EFP = End Fault Protection
OC = Overcurrent Protection
PD = Pole discrepancy Protection
I0 = Neutral Current Detection
Com = Communication
HMI = Human Machine Interface

February 12, 2018 Slide 6


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Application and system Capability

– Time synchronization – SNTP


Time sync – IEC 60870-5-103
– IRIG-B serial interface

– IEC 61850-8-1
Communication – IEC 60870-5-103
– IEC 62439-3 Ed. 2 PRP

February 12, 2018 Slide 7


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Hardware general

– Few spare parts needed on module level


– Common module firmware
Platform based
– Easy future hardware addition possibilities
– Minimized cost for maintenance

– 10 analog inputs
– 1A or 5A on the same CT inputs (settable)
– Up to 220V on the VT inputs (settable)
I/O flexibility
– 21+12 binary inputs (BU)
– 19+6 binary outputs(BU)
– 9+9 binary inputs(CU)
– 19+8 binary outputs(CU)
– Binary input voltage 24-250 Vdc
(settable per OC Group )

February 12, 2018 Slide 8


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Hardware Central Unit

1. Communication & Processor Module, COM


2. Power supply Module redundant,
PSM red
3. Binary input/output Module, BIO
4. Binary output and PSM Module
5. Communication & Processor Module, COM
1 2 3 4 5
X0 X331 X336 X1005

X1
X347 X1001

X8
X1002

X9 X1010

X334 X339
X304 X1009

X349
X1008

X415 X450
X1000

February 12, 2018 Slide 9


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Hardware Central Unit- Communication and processor module 1
1. Alternative
Local HMI connection
(No other purpose)
6 2. REB500 Process bus
1 (via Ethernet switch)
2
3 F
R 3. not used
4 O
5 N
T

4. not used

5. not used)

6. Normal
Local HMI connection

February 12, 2018 Slide 10


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Hardware Central Unit- Communication and processor module 2

1. IEC 61850-8-1
PRP Line A
3
2. IEC 61850-8-1
PRP Line B
1 3. REB500 Process bus
2 (via Ethernet switch)

6 4. IRIG - B
5

5. IEC 60870-5-103

6. IRIG-B / PPS IN
(RX only)

February 12, 2018 Slide 11


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Hardware Central Unit- Power supply module - PSM02 / PSM03

1. Internal fail (IRF)


self-supervision contact
2. 9 binary outputs,
2

1
3
4, 5 3 Two LEDs
Battery and Ready

4,5 PSM02 48..125VDC


or
PSM03 110..250VDC
100..240VAC

February 12, 2018 Slide 12


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Hardware Central Unit- Binary input and output

X0 X331 X336 X1005

X1
X347 X1001

X8
X1002

X9 X1010

X334 X339
X30 4 X1009

X349
X1008

X41 5 X450
X1000

February 12, 2018 Slide 13


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Hardware Bay unit

1. Communication & Processor Module, COM


2. Power supply Module, PSM
3. Transformer Module, TRM
CT und VT (optional)
4. Binary input/output Module, BIO
5. Precise binary output Module, PBO

1 2 3 45

February 12, 2018 Slide 14


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Bay Unit- Communication and processor module

6
1
2
3 F
R
4 O
5 N
T

February 12, 2018 Slide 15


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Bay Unit-Power supply module - PSM02 / PSM03

1. Internal fail (IRF)


self-supervision contact
2. 9 binary outputs,

1
3 Two LEDs
3 Battery and Ready
4, 5
4,5 PSM02 48..125VDC
or
PSM03 110..250VDC
100..240VAC

February 12, 2018 Slide 16


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Bay Unit-Transformer Input Module.

– 9 analog inputs
• 4I + 5U(optional)
– CT short circuited when terminals are disconnected

February 12, 2018 Slide 17


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Bay Unit-Transformer Input Module.

– 9 analog inputs
• 4I + 5U(optional)
– CT short circuited when terminals are disconnected

February 12, 2018 Slide 18


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Bay Unit-Binary input and output.

February 12, 2018 Slide 19


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Bay Unit-Binary input and output.

February 12, 2018 Slide 20


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
System set up

– AFS 677 switch must be used


.

Ethernet SFPs with LC connectors

February 12, 2018 Slide 21


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
System Over view

§ 1 – 4 bus bars incl. transfer bus


§ 1 ½ breaker configuration
§ 60 bay units
§ 32 protections zones

February 12, 2018 Slide 22


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection . Internal fault
Through load

I2 I2

Like all unit protection ,measuring principle is

Protected objcet

Protected objcet
§ I1 I1
based on Kirchhoff’s 1st Law: Node Rule
I3 I3
§ For through load and external faults
conditions ,the node remains balanced i.e. the
summation of all current shall be close to
∑I=I1´+I2´+I3´=0
zero. ∑Idiff=I1´+I2´+I3´
87 87
§ For internal fault , the node will be
destabilized resulting in differential current .
External fault

I2
§ The above statements are true as long as the

Protected objcet
current measured by the protection relay I1

corresponds to the true primary fault current I3


i.e. all current transformers are error free and
saturation free.
∑I=I1´+I2´+I3´=0

87

February 12, 2018 Slide 23


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection -Normal through load .

• During balanced through load condition there will be


spill differential current as the CTs may have
different accuracy and due to the effect of
processing an calculation runs inside the device.

• The level of the spill differential current is


proportional to the load current through the bus bar
and the variety of CTs ratio used in the scheme.

• The level of spill diff current is normally very low and


represents no issue.

February 12, 2018 Slide 24


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection -External fault with CT saturation

• Faulted feeder current transformer is severely


saturated and hence the CT is not able to correctly
produce secondary current corresponds to fault
current.
• Current transformer saturation causes bus bar
protection schemes to measure false differential
current that does not exist in the power system and
therefore the proper measures must be in place in
order to prevent mal-operation
• As a result of CT saturation ,false differential current
is measured by the relay. The diff current for heavy
external fault can reach several multiple of the set
value.

February 12, 2018 Slide 25


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection -Internal fault with CT saturation

• The performance requirements for bus bar


protection scheme during internal faults are speed
and selectivity.
• Current transformer saturation during internal faults
does not have the same consequences as during
external fault.
• The influence of current transformer saturation
during internal fault is a loss of infeed from the bay
where the CT has saturated and consequently lower
measured value of the differential current.
• The principle applied on how to set the trip level for
bus bar protection scheme takes care of this
situation as the trip level has to be set around 50-
80% of the absolute minimum expected fault level

February 12, 2018 Slide 26


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection -Handling of CT saturation

• Low impedance bus bar protection scheme is based


on percentage-restrained differential methods
where the trip level is automatically adjusted based
on the amount of current that flows through the I1 = 5 kA I2 = 5 kA I3 = 10 kA
bus.
• The differential current Idiff is the geometric sum of
all the currents flowing towards and away from the I3* = 2 kA
bus bar.
• The restraint current IRest is the sum of the currents
of the various feeders.
• The stability factor k is derived from the restraint
and diff current . K=Idiff/IRest Relay current due to
CT saturation

February 12, 2018 Slide 27


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection -Handling of CT saturation

• Percentage-restrained differential methods where


the trip level is automatically adjusted based on the
amount of current that flows through the bus only
handles moderate CT saturation and hence all
• Bus bar protection schemes must have an additional
measures in order to handle cases where sever CT
saturation may produce differential current several
times higher than the trip level and the stability
factor k may not be effective in preventing mal
operation.
• The maximum prolongation principle is a method
patented by the ABB and used in REB500 in order to
secure the bus bar protection function performance
during CT saturation.

February 12, 2018 Slide 28


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection -Handling of CT saturation

• The maximum prolongation principle it uses the


maximum value detected in the sampling window
should a CT saturate.
• By prolonging the maximum value, the signal is
compensated such that the best possible
approximation of the phase-angle and amplitude of
the unsaturated signal is achieved.
• This method has an advantage compared to the CT
saturation blocking as the protection function will
continue to measure correctly throughout the enter
fault period.

February 12, 2018 Slide 29


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection -Handling of CT saturation

• Time t0 is the interval between the last zero


crossing before the maximum value is detected and
the end of the prolongation period.
• At a power system frequency of 50 Hz, this time is
12.5 ms ,(at 60 Hz, 10.4 ms).
• The rise time from the zero crossing to the
maximum value is defined as ta. The difference
between to and ta is time th, which is then the time
the maximum value in the sampling window is
prolonged. The longer time ta, the shorter the
maximum value is maximum value is prolonged
• No user defined setting is needed.

February 12, 2018 Slide 30


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection -Handling of CT saturation

February 12, 2018 Slide 31


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection -Handling of CT saturation

February 12, 2018 Slide 32


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection -Handling of CT saturation

• High stability in the presence of severe CT


saturation is further enhanced by an additional
measuring criteria based on phase comparison of
bays the current.
• For this second criterion of the REB500 bus bar
protection system ,the function compares the
phase-angles of the fundamental components of the
bays currents.
• The phase comparison principle responds to a
relative direction of the fault currents. This means
that a reference signal, such as a bus voltage, is not
required.
• normal operation or during a through-fault, on the
other hand, at least one of the currents is out of
phase with the others.
• The pick-up angle Δϕmax of 74° is a fixed setting.
.

February 12, 2018 Slide 33


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Bus bar protection -Tripping logic for bus bar protection

• Tripping only takes place if the differential current


and the stability factor are both above their pick-up
settings and the phase difference between the
currents is less than setting.

February 12, 2018 Slide 34


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Breaker failure protection.

• The function is based on the supervision of the


feeder current with settable overcurrent criteria
along with stating signal form the feeder protection.
Staring BFP due to bus bar protection tripping is
handled by the protection algorithm and do not
quire user defined configuration.
• The function also incudes dedicated measuring
element for earth fault allowing the user to apply
different pick up level for the current detector for
ground fault. The neural current BFP has also
dedicated start signal.
• The function also offer current bypass feature where
BFP runs independent of the current detector. To
enable this feature a dedicated binary input must be
configured _Ext start BFP must be configured.

February 12, 2018 Slide 35


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-End fault protection.

• End fault stands for faults placed the current


transformer and already opened CB. The function is
disabled when CB is closed.
• The measuring principle is based on simple over
current element that is released only when the CB is
opened.
• Trip command of EFP is handled based on the
station layout. For line side CT ,the trip command is
send to the remote end CB. For bus side CT ,the trip
command is distributed to the bus zone where the
bay is connected.
• REB500 handles the distribution of the trip
command based on the topology algorithm . No use
defined setting or configuration is needed.

February 12, 2018 Slide 36


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-End fault protection.

• End fault protection is not needed in case of single


and multi breaker arrangement with overlapping
CTs.
• The function is essential for the station with bus
side CTs.

February 12, 2018 Slide 37


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Station Topology

• The requirements on bus bar protection


performance is to clear all internal faults with
absolute selectivity. Hence Information about the
topology of the protected station is mandatory for
the assignment of current transformer to the
respective measuring zones and selective fault
clearance.
• REB500 Offers unique algorithm to handle the
station topology where all the connection and
elements included in the bus bar protection scheme
are checked and the correct topology information
are constructed .This algorithm do not require any
user define logic or setting.
• The topology information are continually monitored
and supervised.

February 12, 2018 Slide 38


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Station Topology

• BU acquire the position of CB/Isolating switch form the


respective bay and the information are processed in the
CU .

• Based on the station operating condition ,the algorithm


used to handle the station topology determine the
followings:
-Allocation of the CTs to the respective protection zone.
-Allocation of the CBs to the respective protection zone
-Which Lines/Transformers cannot be switched off
due to Breaker bypass.
.

February 12, 2018 Slide 39


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle-Station Topology

• The following protection function uses the information


generated by the station topology algorithm:
-Busbar Protection
-Breaker Failure Protection.
-End Fault Protection
-External Trip.
-Trip re-direction.

February 12, 2018 Slide 40


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle -Self supervision system

• The self-supervision system covers software and hardware and


includes in addition to the internal signals the monitoring of the
following external input signals:
-Current values (CT supervision)
-Positions of the auxiliary contacts on isolators and
circuit-breakers used for station topology.

February 12, 2018 Slide 41


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle -Self supervision system -Software supervision
• Supervising the applications: The diagnostic program can
control applications by detecting status changes (e.g.
initialization and stopping at the right instant).

• Supervision of data transfer via the process bus :All data


transferred via the process bus are subject to cyclic redundancy
checks as part of the Ethernet transmission.

• Supervision of the protection functions: The operation of every


application is synchronized and a time stamp is attached to all
analog signal samples and binary signals.
• Processing and supervising the binary inputs: Every binary input
is equipped with its own anti-bounce software and also
supervised with respect to oscillations

• Enabling binary outputs :every tripping command has an


associated enabling signal and should the diagnostics program
detect an HW or SW error, it suppresses the enabling signals for
the binary outputs

February 12, 2018 Slide 42


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle -Self supervision system -Plausibility check
• The supervision of all analog inputs runs in the bay unit is
complemented by a plausibility check carried out by the central
unit on the entire system which includes all the zones of the bus
bar protection application.
• The plausibility check is based on the fact that a change of Plausibility check releases BBP-TRIP
current (amplitude) caused by a bus bar fault must be present in
at least two bay units of a bus bar zone.
• plausibility check is bypassed, during the following situations:
-The protection zone comprises only a single bay unit, or
all other bay units of this protection zone are not
conducting any current (current below 0.075 x In).
Plausibility check blocks BBP-TRIP
- 400 ms after the number of current measurements
assigned to a protection zone has changed (change of
breaker/ isolator position or blocking of coupler
measurement.
-As long as REB500/REB500sys system is in the ”Test
mode”

Plausibility check is bypassed

February 12, 2018 Slide 43


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle -Self supervision system -Internal analogue measurement supervision
• The correct operation of the analogue inputs and the analog to
digital (A/D) converters is supervised by the internal
comparison of ‘IL1+IL2+IL3= - IL0’.

• The external wiring as shown in the diagram is mandatory for


the internal analogue measurement supervision

• This is not a CT supervision, because the internal analogue


supervision does not check the relation between phases.

• The supervision is bypassed As long as REB500/REB500sys


system is in the ”Test mode”

February 12, 2018 Slide 44


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle -Self supervision system -Differential current supervision
• Supervising the differential algorithm which detects the
following faults realted to CT secondary circuit:
- short-circuited CTs
- faulty CTs
-wrong CT ratios
- incorrectly wired CT (wrong current directions and
therefore phases)

• The supervision is based exclusively on monitoring the presence


of the differential current and hence, it will detect all
abnormalities in the CT secondary circuit

• As differential current also exist during internal bus bar fault,


the logic cannot distinguish between CT secondary failure
conditions and real internal fault and hence it must be time
delayed in order to prevent possible blocking during internal
fault.

February 12, 2018 Slide 45


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Design principle -Self supervision system -Supervising isolator and circuit-breaker statuses
• The supervision algorithm detects the following faults in the
isolator and circuit breaker
- Failure of the auxiliary supply in the return confirmation
circuits (e.g. tripped miniature circuit-breaker -
-Undefined status of the main isolator contacts (e.g.
mechanical defect).
• The supervision system cannot detect exchanged “CLOSED” and
“OPEN” signals. This condition may be detected by the
differential current supervision function .

Evaluating isolator and circuit-breaker statuses

February 12, 2018 Slide 46


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Plant Engineering and system configuration tools

February 12, 2018 Slide 47


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Plant Engineering and system configuration
• Critical task when engineering bus bar protection scheme is the
precise mapping of the station topology into the scheme in
order to guarantee correct performance under all conditions.

• Two concepts exist for how the Topley mapping depending on


product design:
-Logic based mapping where the use configure logic and
use this logic to decides for CT assignment, zone
allocation, selective tripping …etc.

-Topology based mapping where the user only engineer


the station SLD and the product takes the responsibility
for all other tasks.

• REB 500 uses the topology based and the user has access to
per-made data base with all type of station configuration.

February 12, 2018 Slide 48


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Plant Engineering and system configuration-Data base model

• The Bay Model : logical image representing the complete


configuration of a bay in a REB500. It contains the Bay Figure
and the Bay Unit Model.

• Bay Figure (BF) : contains the bus image of a bay ( including the
switchgear objects, connections and the bus bar
connectors…etc.

• Bay Unit Model (UM) : contains :


-The device type of the bay unit.
-The image of switchgear object (derived from the Bay
Figure)
-The licensed functions (pre-configured with basic
settings-
-The basic I/O configuration setting à to be worked over

February 12, 2018 Slide 49


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Plant Engineering and system configuration-Data base model
• A Bay Model can contain more than one Bay Figure (e.g. a feeder
bay + bus section isolators), while only one Bay Unit Model (one
bay unit) is used. This under the condition, that the following
limitations are not exceeded per bay unit :
-1 CB object
- 1 CT object ( Bay Unit 2 Bay Unit 3
Bay Unit 1

- 1 VT object (
Objects Objects Objects
• The number of isolators is not limited.

FUNCT. FUNCT. FUNCT.

I/O I/O I/O

February 12, 2018 Slide 50


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Plant Engineering and system configuration-Tools
• HMI 500 is used for both engineering and operation of the
system. The tool has to access level for different tasks related
to the system handling:

• Operator mode: This mode has no license attached to it. The


user can perform all tasks related to configuration ,setting DR
handling . The user will not have access to data base model .

• Configurator mode: This mode has a license key attached to it


otherwise will not be activated. In this mode the use has access
to data base model in order to build the station SLD. This mode
is used exclusively for engineering.

February 12, 2018 Slide 51


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Protection function parameter setting-Current transformer.

• Set CT primary rating acceding to the plant


data. Bay Name

CT marking on SLD
• Set CT secondary rating acceding to the
plant data 1 /5A. BU supports both 1 and 5A CT Primary rated
using the same hardware. Current

CT Primary rated
• CT orientation can be corrected by setting current for IN
CT orientation
the reference direction for induvial CTs. CT secondary rated current from/To object
Most important is to make sure that the
orientation reflect the flow of the primary
current in the correct way.

• CT input for neutral current must be set


correctly in order to guarantee the correct
performance of the internal analogue input
supervision.

February 12, 2018 Slide 52


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Protection function parameter setting-Voltage transformer.

Bay Name
• Set VT primary rating acceding to the plant
data. VT marking on SLD

• Set VT secondary rating acceding to the


plant data 100/200 V.

• Use VT correction factor is case the VT


secondary rating differs from 100 ,200V
VT Primary rated VT secondary rated VT ratio correction VT connection type
Voltage Voltage factor is needed.

February 12, 2018 Slide 53


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Protection function parameter setting-Bus bar protection.

• Pick up level for bus protection is entered in


primary A

• Default set value for stability factor k=0,8


shall be used unless there is need to change
the value. Pick current
Stability factor
• The standard range for k factor is 0.7-0.9
and in case lower set value is required then
the extended range option can be used. The
range will be in this case 0.6-0.9 Pick current for diff current supervision
Extended range for stability factor

• Diff current supervision is set as % of the


pick up level. Default values can be always Time delay for diff current supervision
used for both current level and time delay.

February 12, 2018 Slide 54


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Protection function parameter setting-Breaker failure protection .
• Define the source for I0.It can be dedicated
CT, Holmgreen connection of the phase CTs
or internally calculated form the three
phase inputs.
• Set t1 for both measuring system. T2 is
common for Both. Observe that the two
time set values are executed in sequence
with final time=T1+T1.
• If “Active for CB open” is disabled, the
timers t1 and t2 are not started when the
• circuit-breaker is open, i.e. the breaker
failure function is disabled.
• BFP L0 system will only be initiated by start
signals for the phase system if each of the
independent phase currents is below the
setting for the phase system.

February 12, 2018 Slide 55


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Protection function parameter setting-End fault protection .
• Time delay for EFP tripping is fixed to 36ms.

• The set value pick up time is a security


margin prior to releasing EFP. To avoid Bay Name
false tripping after the circuit-breaker has
opened, the delay for the end fault
protection must be set longer than the time
t1 of the breaker failure protection

• Close command for CB is a must for the


correct performance of EFP.
Time delay prior to EFP is
enabled

Pick up current

February 12, 2018 Slide 56


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Protection function parameter setting-System response .
• Recommended set value is to use selective
blocking for both diff current and isolator
alarm supervision. This will lead to the
blocking of the zones affected by the alarm
and keep the other zones running.

February 12, 2018 Slide 57


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Options and special application - Check Zone release criteria
• One overall zone covering the entire station.

• The check zone comprises all the outgoing feeders of the bus
bar, whereby the isolator positions are not considered.
Fundamentally the measurements of the couplings are not
included.

• Measuring principle is the same as the main zone.

• Used as release criteria for the main zones and has not power
to trip by itself.

• The stability factor k for the check zone needs to be set to lower
value .Typical values is 0.2

February 12, 2018 Slide 58


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Options and special application – Under voltage release criteria
• BU has a voltage release function that can be used to control the
tripping other protection function.

• For bus bar protection application ,it must be assured that every
measuring zones has a valid voltage measuring. This can be bus
VT or line VT.

• An enabling logic (matrix) provides facility for assigning the


enabling (release) signal to the respective functions.

• The enabling signal can be assigned to a feeder, a bus-tie


breaker or a protection zone.

February 12, 2018 Slide 59


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Options and special application – Over current release criteria
• BU has a over current release function that can be used to
control the tripping of other functions.

• It is used only the specification requires that for bus bar fault
only the bays that are capable of supplying fault current has to
be tripped .

• The overcurrent release (low current check feature) is used to


enable tripping and inter-tripping commands generated by the
BBP, BFP and EFP and/or trip redirection (configurable). If the
measured feeder current lies below the pick-up setting of the
overcurrent release, tripping of the particular feeder is
prevented.

February 12, 2018 Slide 60


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Options and special application – Trip re-direction.
• BU has special input that needs to be configured in order to
activate this function

• It is used in order to reduce the stress on the power network in


case there is definitive confirmation that circuit breaker is
unable to trip (e.g. air pressure too low), REB500 receives the
signal “Trip redirection”

• Over current release criteria can be configured for the trip


redirection function so that redirection only takes place when
the respective feeder is conducting a given current.
• When the input “Trip transferred” is active, the breaker failure
delays (t1 and t2) are reduced to their minimum (10 ms)

February 12, 2018 Slide 61


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Options and special application -Neutral Differential Current Measurement
• Unique measuring principle used to detect bus bar faults in high
impedance grounded system.

• The demands on bus bar ground fault protection differ greatly


between solidly grounded networks and impedance grounded
networks.

• In an impedance grounded network, the phase to ground short


circuit current is limited by the grounding resistance/impedance
and for this reason its value might be below the feeders normal
load current .

• Phase measuring elements of bus bar protection scheme may


not be dependable enough to detect ground faults in
impedance grounded system

February 12, 2018 Slide 62


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Options and special application -Neutral Differential Current Measurement
• Unique measuring principle used to detect bus bar faults in high
impedance grounded system.

• During the fault condition, the voltage in the faulty phase (L1)
equals to zero .However, due to the presence of the grounding
impedance, the phase .phase voltage triangle has remained
almost unchanged.

• As the phase-phase voltage triangle did not change, load current


has continued to flow out of the bus bar in all phases including
the faulty phase and hence this fault conditions hardly differs
from normal operation.

• The equalizing current has resulted in slight increase in the


healthy phases current.

• The fault current can be below the normal load current of the
bays.

February 12, 2018 Slide 63


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Options and special application -Neutral Differential Current Measurement

• As the phase-phase voltage triangle did not change, load current


has continued to flow out of the bus bar in all phases including
the faulty phase and hence this fault conditions hardly differs
from normal operation.

• The equalizing current has resulted in slight increase in the


healthy phases current.

• The fault current can be below the normal load current of the
bays.

February 12, 2018 Slide 64


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Options and special application -Neutral Differential Current Measurement

• The scheme uses one additional neutral measuring elements


designed to measure only the neutral current in all the
connected bay.
• The additional measuring element is independent form the
phase measuring element and is intended to be set sensitive
enough to detect ground faults.
• Contrary to phase based measuring scheme, all the measured
neutral current are having the same direction and hence
supplementary criteria like directional or phase comparison will
classify the fault as internal and hence releases the trip.

February 12, 2018 Slide 65


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Options and special application –Bay protection

February 12, 2018 Slide 66


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Options and special application – GOOSE Support
. • Used for breaker failure initiation through the station bus.

• Configuration is made using HMI500

February 12, 2018 Slide 67


Distributed Bus Bar Protection REB500 V 8.2
Options and special application – Communication
. • Station communication
-Optical Ethernet
-IEC 61850-8-1 Ed.1/Ed.2
-PRP
-IEC 103
-Remote HMIs
• Central Unit <> Bay Unit
-Optical Ethernet
-Up to 2000 Meter
-Separate Network
- ABB AFS677 Switch must be used.

February 12, 2018 Slide 68


Thank you

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