G.R. No.

174689 October 22, 2007

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male who feels trapped in a male
body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was successful –
he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his first name
(from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the petition before
the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among others, so that he can marry his American
fiancé.
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity; that
Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way
taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not make any basis for
opposition at this point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community
in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness
on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the
RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may be
changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existing
legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE
CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE
OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was
passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the
change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his first name
is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted
still because the ground upon which it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those provided for
by the law. Under the law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he
has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-assignment as the
basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for the local
civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with the civil registry
because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that the
entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s
sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by Silverio will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the
union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-
operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the
provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code
and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among
others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially
affected if Silverio’s petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to
enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.”
G.R. No. 166676 September 12,2008
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff
Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess
both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics.
To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition,
explained that “Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.” The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking
that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did
not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as
ruled by the lower court.
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because
it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is
not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil
registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or
processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is
substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court held that the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this
case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality”
which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a
gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have
biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of
the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male
or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the
evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is
male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate
entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his
sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent”
and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members
of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and
justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
G.R. No. 169202 March 5, 2010
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Facts:
Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine
passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed “Rallonza” as her surname, “Maria Virginia”
as her given name, and “Remo” as her middle name. While her marriage was still subsisting, she applied
for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.,
with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. When her
request was denied, she made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of
Foreign Affairs denied the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her
husband’s name, use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name has
not been used in previous application. The Secretary explained that under the implementing rules of
Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may revert to her
maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and death of the husband.

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretary’s ruling. The CA also
affirmed the ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Remo argued that RA
8239 (Philippine Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the
Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the
case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a District Court [311 Phil. 696, 707 (1995)]

Issues:

Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport, can revert to
the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

Held:

No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists.

Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Shari’a
District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husband’s
surname upon marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when
a woman marries, she does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with
this principle.

RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from
using her maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) allows a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden
name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt her husband’s surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husband’s surname or
continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husband’s surname in her new passport,
the DFA additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate.
Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not
prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not
revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA
8239: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remo’s marriage
to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise
stated, a married woman’s reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the
severance of the marriage.

Special law prevails over general law

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code
which is the general law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in statutory construction is that a special
law prevails over a general law.

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport

Remo consciously chose to use her husband’s surname in her previous passport application. If her
present request would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the
use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in a passport, which
is considered superior to all other official documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue
confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will arise.

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The law recognizes the passport applicant’s
constitutional right to travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and maintain the integrity
and credibility of the passport and travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport remains
at all times the property of the Government. The holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as
it is valid.
PALISOC v. BRILLANTES
G.R. No. L-29025 [October 4, 1971]
FACTS:
Deceased Dominador Palisoc and defendant Virgilio Daffon were automotive mechanics students at the
Manila Technical Institute (MTI). In the afternoon of March 10, 1966 during recess, an altercation
transpired between the deceased and the defendant. At the time of the incident, Dominador was
sixteen years old while Virgilio was already of age. Virgilio was working on a machine with Dominador
looking at them. The situation prompted Virgilio to remark that Dominador was acting like a foreman. As
a result, Dominador slapped Virgilio on the face. Virgilio retaliated by inflicting severe blows upon
Dominador’s stomach, which caused the latter to stumble upon an engine block and faint. The latter
died, the cause of death being “shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs”. The parents of Dominador
filed an action for damages against (1) Virgilio, (2) Valenton, the head/president of MTI, (3) Quibule who
was the teacher in charge at the time of the incident, and (4) Brillantes who is a member of the board of
directors and former sole proprietor of MTI.
The trial court held Virgilio liable but absolved the other defendants-officials. It stated that the clause
“so long as they remain in their custody” contained in Article 2180 of the Civil Code applies only where
the pupil lives and boards with the teachers, such that the control or influence on the pupil supersedes
those of the parents., and such control and responsibility for the pupil’s actions would pass from the
father and mother to the teachers. This legal conclusion was based on the dictum in Mercado v. CA,
which in turn based its decision in Exconde v. Capuno. The trial court held that Article 2180 was not
applicable in this case, as defendant Virgilio did not live with the defendants-officials at the time of the
incident. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Who must be held liable for damages for the death of Dominador together with the defendant?
HELD:
The head/president and teacher of MTI (Valenton and Quibule respectively) were held liable jointly and
severally with the Virgilio for damages. No liability attaches to Brillantes as a mere member of the MTI
board of directors. Similarly, MTI may not be held liable since it had not been properly impleaded as
party defendant.
The phrase used in Article 2180, “so long as the students remain in their custody” means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and
students for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in
the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortuous act
must live and board in the school. The dicta in the cases of Mercado as well as in Exconde v. Capuno on
which it relied are deemed to have been set aside. The rationale of such liability of school heads and
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that
they stand, in loco parentis to a certain extent to their pupils and students and are called upon to
“exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child.” In this case, The unfortunate death
resulting from the fight between the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said
defendants complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their students from harm. Since Valenton and Quibule failed
to prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage, they cannot
likewise avail of the exemption to the liability. The judgment of the appellate court was modified, while
claim for compensatory damages was increased in accordance with recent jurisprudence and the claim
for exemplary damages denied in the absence of gross negligence on the part of the said defendants.
G.R. No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
SPS. MOISES PALISOC & BRIGIDA PALISOC vs. ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES et. al.

FACTS:
In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and Desiderio Cruz
work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical Institute (a school of arts and
trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly
slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued between the two. Daffon delivered blows that eventually
killed Palisoc. The parents of Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the
instructor (Santiago Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit against
Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that Valenton,
Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are only liable “so long as they
[the students] remain in their custody.” And that this means, as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that
teachers or heads of establishments are only liable for the tortious acts of their students if the students
are living and boarding with the teacher or other officials of the school – which Daffon was not.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.
HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in the Exconde Case as
they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case. Valenton and Quibulue as president
and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of
Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between the students could have been avoided,
had said defendants but complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities
of the students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands of
fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they relieve themselves of
such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by “(proving) that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual
findings of the lower court’s decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.
The SC reiterated that there is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and
boarding with his teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for
the tortious acts of their students.
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
JOSE S. AMADORA et. al. vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et. al.
In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school
auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died.
Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the
school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school’s negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as
well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the
incident happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester
has already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his Physics subject.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article
2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de
San Jose-Recoletos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last paragraph of Article
2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to the changing
times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic schools. That
being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held liable under the said
provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not be held
directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly liable for
the tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in non-academic schools, the head of school
exercised a closer administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are
more hands on to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous
act of the students and not the dean or the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the
semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long
as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has
not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be
shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even
in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the
campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the
school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the
provisions of Article 2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary
liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no sufficient
evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers
because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiarily liable too.
G.R. Nos. 154994 and 156254 June 28, 2005
PABLO-GUALBERTO VS. GUALBERTO
Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son,
Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear despite
notice. A house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as she very
often goes out of the house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after
surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this time awarded the custody of
the child to the mother. Finding that the reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as
provided in Art 213 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to the mother.

Held: Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent des granted by the court. The court shall take into account all
relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.”
No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise,”
This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision
governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, w/c
reads:
“Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall
be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court
finds compelling reason for such measure.”
G.R. No. 168785 February 5, 2010
HERALD BLACK DACASIN v. SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN
FACTS:
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin
(respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born
on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court,
19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner.[3] In its
ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent
sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement[4])
for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order
relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial
court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent
exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction
because of the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondents motion and dismissed the
case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the
suit considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its
order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner
following the nationality rule prevailing in this jurisdiction;[5]and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code[6]prohibiting compromise agreements
on jurisdiction.[7]
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained
by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial courts exercise of jurisdiction over
the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the
case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity of the Agreement to justify
its enforcement by the trial court: (1) the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the
terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint;[8]or (2) the Agreement is independent of the
divorce decree obtained by respondent.

ISSUE:
HELD: