A.C. No.

7399 August 25, 2009

ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant,

vs.
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent.

FACTS:

 The Judicial Bar Council sent public invitations for nominations to the soon-to-
be vacated position of Chief Justice. Senator Miriam Defensor applied for the
position. However, the JBC then informed the applicants that only incumbent
justices of the Supreme Court could qualify for the position. For not being
qualified, Sen. Miriam delivered this speech on the Senate Floor.

o x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am

homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am
not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I
am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not
in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

 In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures,

Antero J. Pobre invited the Court’s attention to excerpts of Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor.

 To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the
speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members
of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly,

 Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken

against the lady senator.

 In her comment on the complaint, Senator Santiago, did not deny making the
statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered by the
constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she
delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee.
The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open
controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial
legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed "to be an
unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC].

 The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the

provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: "A
Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress
or in any committee thereof."
  In Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun: Parliamentary Immunity is to enable and encourage
a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success”. It is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of
speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every one.

 Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would

degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader,
or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s
speculation as to the motives.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the privilege speech of Senator Santiago was actionable criminally or in

a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court,

RULING:

AS TO CRIMINAL OR DISCIPLINARY LIABILITY

The Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the
institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the
Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the
Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently into every affair of
government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and
its citizens are being served.

Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they perform
their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the
member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of
the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such
abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the
complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her
privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under
the Rules of Court.

AS TO THE MATTERS OF CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

The court expressed its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member
of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good
professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were
intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating
that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court,” and calling the Court a “Supreme Court of idiots.”

In this case, Santiago clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,

use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others.

Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, is
duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect
due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith.

AS TO SECTION 5 (5) OF ART. VIII OF CONSTITUTION

Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides, the court may promulgate rules
to shield the judiciary, from the assaults that politics and self interest, and assist it to
maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence.

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or agency
to advance the ends of justice.” It been said of a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.

Santiago belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict
Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and
dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may
not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the
discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his/her oath as a lawyer.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on

Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter
disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. However, the Court
could not impose disciplinary sanctions upon the Senator because of her
Constitutional Privilege of Parliamentary Immunity. Doing such would result to
encroachment of powers of Legislative Body.

As such, The Supreme Court ONLY REMINDS that parliamentary

immunity as granted to members of Congress does not protect them against their
own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the
functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or
other forums outside the congressional hall.

THEREFORE, SC REFERRED the matter to Senate Ethics Committee

for appropriate disciplinary action because The Rules of the Senate contains a
provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that prevents a Senator from
using, under any circumstance, “offensive or improper language against another
Senator or against any public institution.” The lady senator clearly violated the
rules of her own chamber but it is unfortunate that the Senate President and her
peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty.

Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution,
DISMISSED.
 G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995

COMMISSIONER JOSE T. ALMONTE, VILLAMOR C. PEREZ, NERIO

ROGADO, and ELISA RIVERA, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE CONRADO M.
VASQUEZ and CONCERNED CITIZENS, respondents.

FACTS:

 This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena
duces tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman.

 This requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and
record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau
(EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988
and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988"
and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.
 Petitioner Jose T. Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Villamor C.
Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division.

 The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his
investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to
have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was addressed
to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman.

Summary of the contents of the letter

The following are the things observed by the sender of the letter:

o The EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division who
is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost agents"
or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA). The Commissioner of
EIIB has a biggest share on this.
o The Chief Budget Division possesses high caliber firearms such as a
mini UZI, Armalite rifle and two (2) 45 cal. pistol issued to him by the
Assistant Commissioner wherein he is not an agent of EIIB and
authorized.
o Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time smuggler
syndicate monthly and brokers every week for them not to be
apprehended.
o The commissioner allocates funds coming from the intelligence funds to
the media to sustain their good image of the bureau.

 In his comment on the letter-complaint, Petitioner Almonte denied the allegations.

 Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces
tecum.
 In his Order dated June 15, 1990, respondent Ombudsman granted the motion to quash
the subpoena in view of the fact that there were no affidavits filed against petitioners.
But he denied their motion to quash the subpoena duces tecum.
 He ruled that petitioners were not being forced to produce evidence against
themselves, since the subpoena duces tecum was directed to the Chief Accountant,
petitioner Nerio Rogado.
 In addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records a Section of the EIIB,
petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all documents relating to
Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the
whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."

ISSUE/S:

WON petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services

and salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified.

RULING:

AS TO GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGE

Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state

secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based
upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the
individual interests of a private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the
plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.

In addition, in the litigation over the Watergate tape subpoena in 1973, the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized the right of the President to the confidentiality of his
conversations and correspondence, which it likened to "the claim of confidentiality of
judicial deliberations." Said the Court in United States v. Nixon: 11

The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations

and correspondence, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for
example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all
citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public
interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so
in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of the
government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution. . . .

Thus, the Court for the first time gave executive privilege a constitutional status
and a new name, although not necessarily a new birth.

In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed
by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is
the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal
activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic
sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that
there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters
without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on
other considerations.

Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged,
this decision would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their
nonproduction. However, as concession to the nature of the functions of the EIIB and
just to be sure no information of a confidential character is disclosed, the examination
of records in this case should be made in strict confidence by the Ombudsman himself.
Reference may be made to the documents in any decision or order which the
Ombudsman may render or issue but only to the extent that it will not reveal covert
activities of the agency. Above all, there must be a scrupulous protection of the
documents delivered.

AS TO ART. XI, § 13(4) OF THE CONSTITUTION

Petitioners contend that under Art. XI, § 13(4) the Ombudsman can act only "in any
appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" and that
because the complaint in this case is unsigned and unverified, the case is not an
appropriate one. This contention lacks merit. As already stated, the Constitution
expressly enjoins the Ombudsman to act on any complaint filed "in any form or
manner" concerning official acts or omissions. Thus, Art. XI, § 12 provides:

The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or
employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations and shall
inappropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result
thereof.

Similarly, the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (Rep. Act No. 6770) provides in § 26(2):

The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in
whatever form concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the
complaint immediately and if it finds the same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss
the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal citing the reasons
therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first
furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the
complaint and require him to submit a written answer within seventy-two hours
from receipt thereof. If the answer is found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the
case.

Rather than referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the phrase "in an appropriate
case" in Art. XI, § 12 means any case concerning official act or omission which is
alleged to be "illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."

The phrase "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law" refers to such
limitations as may be provided by Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such
limitations as may be imposed by the courts. Such limitations may well include a
requirement that the investigation be concluded in camera, with the public excluded, as
exception to the general nature of the proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman. A
reconciliation is thereby made between the demands of national security and the
requirement of accountability enshrined in the Constitution.

What has been said above disposes of petitioners' contention that the anonymous
letter- complaint against them is nothing but a vexatious prosecution. It only
remains to say that the general investigation in the Ombudsman' s office is
precisely for the purpose of protecting those against whom a complaint is filed
against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecution as much as securing the
State from useless and expensive trials. There may also be benefit resulting from
such limited in camera inspection in terms of increased public confidence that the
privilege is not being abused and increased likelihood that no abuse is in fact
occurring.

AS TO EQUAL PROTECTION

There is no violation of petitioner's right to the equal protection of the laws.

Petitioners complain that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can
only hale respondents via their verified complaints or sworn statements with their
identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman
anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the first place, there can be no
objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the
second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and
in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known
reticence of the people which keep them from complaining against official
wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is
different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official
pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.
On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who
cannot afford to hire lawyers.

AS TO PETITIONERS' RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are
public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are
government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover,
if, as petitioners claim the disbursement by the EIIB of funds for personal service has
already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the
examination of the documents by respondent Ombudsman.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection

of subpoenaed documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and
with all the safeguards outlined in this decision.
 G.R. No. 212426

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, FRANCISCO "DODONG"

NEMENZO, JR., SR. MARY JOHN MANANZAN, PACIFICO A. AGABIN, ESTEBAN
"STEVE" SALONGA, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., EVALYN G. URSUA, EDRE U.
OLALIA, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, DR. ROLAND SIMBULAN, AND
TEDDY CASIÑO, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE SECRETARY VOLTAIRE GAZMIN, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERT DEL ROSARIO, JR., DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO ABAD, AND ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF GENERAL EMMANUEL T. BAUTISTA, Respondents.

FACTS:

 The petitions before this Court question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
1

Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United
States of America (U.S.).

 Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with
the U.S., claiming that the instrument violated multiple constitutional provisions.

 In reply, respondents argue that petitioners lack standing to bring the suit. To support the
legality of their actions, respondents invoke the 1987 Constitution, treaties, and judicial
precedents.

 EDCA (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement) is an agreement entered into by

the executive department with the US and ratified on June 6, 2014. Under the EDCA,
the PH shall provide the US forces the access and use of portions of PH territory,
which are called Agreed Locations. Aside from the right to access and to use the
Agreed Locations, the US may undertake the following types of activities within the
Agreed Locations: security cooperation exercises; joint and combined training
activities; humanitarian and disaster relief activities; and such other activities that as
may be agreed upon by the parties.

 Mainly, petitioners posit that the use of executive agreement as medium of agreement
with US violated the constitutional requirement of Art XVIII, Sec 25 since the EDCA
involves foreign military bases, troops and facilities whose entry into the country
should be covered by a treaty concurred in by the Senate. The Senate, through Senate
Resolution 105, also expressed its position that EDCA needs congressional ratification.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the essential requisites for judicial review are present.

2. Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign

military bases, troops, or facilities.

3. Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well
as with existing laws and treaties
RULING:

AS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

An exhaustive evaluation of the memoranda of the parties, together with the oral
arguments, shows that petitioners have presented serious constitutional issues that
provide ample justification for the Court to set aside the rule on standing.

The transcendental importance of the issues presented here is rooted in the Constitution
itself. Section 25, Article XVIII thereof, cannot be any clearer: there is a much stricter
mechanism required before foreign military troops, facilities, or bases may be allowed in
the country. The DFA has already confirmed to the U.S. Embassy that "all internal
requirements of the Philippines x x x have already been complied with."

It behooves the Court in this instance to take a liberal stance towards the rule on standing and
to determine forthwith whether there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the