CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS Same; Same; Same; The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in

confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of the public
1. PALOMO v COURT OF APPEALS, 266 SCRA 392
domain.—Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were readily issued,
the lands are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be
the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to
Natural Resources; Land Registration; Land Titles; Regalian Doctrine; Before the Treaty alienable lands of the public domain.
of Paris on April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under
the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown, hence, private ownership of
land could only be acquired through royal concessions.—The Philippines passed to the
Same; Same; Same; It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest
Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th century. Before the Treaty of Paris
land cannot be owned by private persons.—It is elementary in the law governing natural
in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under the
resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. It is not registrable and
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. Hence, private ownership of
possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property,
land could only be acquired through royal concessions which were documented in
unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal Grant,” (2) Concesion Especial or Special
Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by Purchase; and, (4) Informacion Posesoria or
Possessory Information title obtained under the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the
Same; Same; Same; Tax declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land
Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
registration cases.—Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove
ownership of the parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax
declarations are not conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.
Same; Same; Same; Laches; It is a trifle late at this point to argue that the government
had no right to include certain properties in a reservation for provincial park purposes
when the question should have been raised 83 years ago.—Moreover, despite claims by
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of the
the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous
government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification for
possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, the
petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lot.—Having disposed
lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the very same year they were acquired by
of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the forfeiture of
Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February 1913 or 10 months before the lands were
improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that Executive Order
surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had already surveyed the area in
No. 40 was already in force at the time the lands in question were surveyed for Diego
preparation for its reservation for provincial park purposes. If the petitioners’
Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands were covered under
predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a number of years
the reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the lost original
prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly known about the
certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number 21781 of
inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is a trifle late at this
Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique Altavas in
point to argue that the government had no right to include these properties in the
1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the Bureau of
reservation when the question should have been raised 83 years ago.
Lands dated September 11, 1948 contains the following note, “in conflict with provincial
reservation.” In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law and the failure of
the government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is no justification
Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; The principle of estoppel does not operate against the
for the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on the lots.
Government for the acts of its agents.—As regards the petitioners’ contention that
inasmuch as they obtained the titles without government opposition, the government
is now estopped from questioning the validity of the certificates of title which were
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
granted. As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of
estoppel does not operate against the Government for the act of its agents.
1
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alfredo E. Kallos for petitioners.
ROMERO, J.:
The issue in the case at bar pertains to ownership of 15 parcels of land in Tiwi, Albay
which form part of the “Tiwi Hot Spring National Park.” The facts of the case are as
follows:
On June 13, 1913, then Governor General of the Philippine Islands, William Cameron
Forbes issued Executive Order No. 40 which reserved for provincial park purposes some
440,530 square meters of land situated in Barrio Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of
Albay pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the Philippine Commission.
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District, United
States of America, ordered the registration of 15 parcels of land covered by Executive
Order No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on December 9, 1916;2 December 28, 1916;3
and January 17, 1917.4 Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land consisting of
74,872 square meters which were allegedly covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos.
513, 169, 176 and 1735 to his heirs, herein petitioners, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo two
months before his death in April 1937.6
Claiming that the aforesaid original certificates of title were lost during the Japanese
occupation, Ignacio Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the Court of First
Instance of Albay on May 30, 1950.7 The Register of Deeds of Albay issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 3911, 3912,3913 and 3914 sometime in October 1953.8
On July 10, 1954 President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 47 converting
the area embraced by Executive Order No. 40 into the “Tiwi Hot Spring National Park,”
under the control, management, protection and administration of the defunct
Commission of Parks and Wildlife, now a division of the Bureau of Forest Development.
The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of the public domain
and, therefore, is neither susceptible to disposition under the provisions of the Public
Land Law (CA 141) nor registrable under the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496).
The Palomos, however, continued in possession of the property, paid real estate taxes
thereon9 and introduced improvements by planting rice, bananas, pandan and
coconuts. On April 8, 1971, petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses
Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual mortgaged the parcels of land covered by TCT
3911, 3912, 3913 and 3914 to guarantee a loan of P200,000 from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands.
In May 7, 1974 petitioner Carmen vda. de Buenaventura and spouses Ignacio Palomo
and Trinidad Pascual filed Civil Case No. T-143 before the then Court of First Instance
of Albay for Injunction with damages against private respondents Faustino J. Perfecto,
Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe and other Does who are all
employees of the Bureau of Forest Development who entered the land covered by TCT
No. 3913 and/or TCT 3914 and cut down bamboos thereat, totally leveling no less than
4 groves worth not less than P2,000.00.
On October 11, 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed Civil Case No. T-176 for
annulment and cancellation of Certificates of Title involving the 15 parcels of land
registered in the name of the petitioners and subject of Civil Case T-143. Impleaded
with the petitioners as defendants were the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Legazpi
Branch and the Register of Deeds of Albay.
The case against the Bank of Philippine Islands was dismissed because the loan of
P200,000 with the Bank was already paid and the mortgage in its favor cancelled.
A joint trial of Civil Case T-143 and T-176 was conducted upon agreement of the parties
and on July 31, 1986, the trial court rendered the following decision:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
IN CIVIL CASE No. T-143, in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs, dismissing
the complaint for injunction and damages, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
2
Costs against the plaintiffs.
In CIVIL CASE No. T-176, in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants:
(1) Declaring null and void and no force and effect the Order dated September 14, 1953,
as well as the Original Certificate of Titles Nos. 153,10 169, 173 and 176 and Transfer
Certificates of Titles Nos. 3911, T-3912, T-3913, and T-3914, all of the Register of Deeds
of Albay and all transactions based on said titles.
(2) Forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any and all improvements on the lands
in question that are found therein and introduced by the defendants; (3) Declaring Lot
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12, Plan II-9299 and Lots 1, 21,11 3 and 4 of Plan
II-9205 as part of the Tiwi Hot Spring National Park;
(4) and Finally, the Register of Deeds of Albay is hereby ordered to cancel the alleged
Original Certificates of Titles Nos. 513, 169, 173 and 176, Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. T-3911, T-3912, T-3913 and T-3914.
Costs against the defendants.
So Ordered.”12
The court a quo in ruling for the Republic found no sufficient proof that the Palomos
have established property rights over the parcels of land in question before the Treaty
of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at the end of the century. The court
further stated that assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance of Albay
were really issued, the Palomos obtained no right at all over the properties because
these were issued only when Executive Order No. 40 was already in force. At this point,
we take note that although the Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands appointed as
one of the Commissioners in the relocation survey of the properties stated in his
reamended report that of the 3,384 square meters covered by Lot 2, Plan II-9205, only
1,976, square meters fall within the reservation area,13 the RTC ordered TCT 3913
covering the entire Lot 21 (sic) Plan II-9205 cancelled.
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the findings of
the lower Court; hence this petition raising the following issues:
1. The respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming
in toto the decision of the lower court.
2. The declaration of nullity of the original certificates of title and subsequent transfer
certificates of titles of the petitioners over the properties in question is contrary to law
and jurisprudence on the matter.
3. The forfeiture of all improvements introduced by the petitioners in the premises in
favor of the government is against our existing law and jurisprudence.
The issues raised essentially boil down to whether or not the alleged original certificate
of titles issued pursuant to the order of the Court of First Instance in 1916-1917 and
the subsequent TCTs issued in 1953 pursuant to the petition for reconstitution are valid.
Petitioners contend that the Treaty of Paris which ended the Spanish-American War at
the end of the 19th century recognized the property rights of Spanish and Filipino
citizens and the American government had no inherent power to confiscate properties
of private citizens and declare them part of any kind of government reservation. They
allege that their predecessors in interest have been in open, adverse and continuous
possession of the subject lands for 20-50 years prior to their registration in 1916-1917.
Hence, the reservation of the lands for provincial purposes in 1913 by then Governor-
General Forbes was tantamount to deprivation of private property without due process
of law.
In support of their claim, the petitioners presented copies of a number of decisions of
the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th Judicial District of the United States of America
which state that the predecessors in interest of the petitioners’ father Diego Palomo,
were in continuous, open and adverse possession of the lands from 20 to 50 years at
the time of their registration in 1916.
We are not convinced.
The Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown by discovery and conquest in the 16th
century. Before the Treaty of Paris in April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural,
mineral or forest were under the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish
Crown. Hence, private ownership of land could only be acquired through royal
concessions which were documented in various forms, such as (1) Titulo Real or Royal
Grant,” (2) Concesion Especial or Special Grant, (3) Titulo de Compra or Title by
3
Purchase; and, (4) Informacion Posesoria or Possessory Information title obtained under
the Spanish Mortgage Law or under the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889.
Unfortunately, no proof was presented that the petitioners’ predecessors in interest
derived title from an old Spanish grant. Petitioners placed much reliance upon the
declarations in Expediente No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record Decision No. 9820, dated January 17,
1917; Expediente No. 6, G.L.R.O. Record No. 9821, dated December 28, 1916;
Expediente No. 7, G.L.R.O Record No. 9822, dated December 9, 1916; Expediente No. 8,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 9823, dated December 28, 1916 and Expediente No. 10, G.L.R.O.
Record No. 9868, dated December 9, 1916 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, 15th
Judicial District of the United States of America presided by Judge Isidro Paredes that
their predecessors in interest were in open, adverse and continuous possession of the
subject lands for 20-50 years.14 The aforesaid “decisions” of the Court of First Instance,
however, were not signed by the judge but were merely certified copies of notification
to Diego Palomo bearing the signature of the clerk of court.
Moreover, despite claims by the petitioners that their predecessors in interest were in
open, adverse and continuous possession of the lands for 20 to 50 years prior to their
registration in 1916-1917, the lands were surveyed only in December 1913, the very
same year they were acquired by Diego Palomo. Curiously, in February 1913 or 10
months before the lands were surveyed for Diego Palomo, the government had already
surveyed the area in preparation for its reservation for provincial park purposes. If the
petitioners’ predecessors in interest were indeed in possession of the lands for a
number of years prior to their registration in 1916-1917, they would have undoubtedly
known about the inclusion of these properties in the reservation in 1913. It certainly is
a trifle late at this point to argue that the government had no right to include these
properties in the reservation when the question should have been raised 83 years ago.
As regards the petitioners’ contention that inasmuch as they obtained the titles without
government opposition, the government is now estopped from questioning the validity
of the certificates of title which were granted. As correctly pointed out by the
respondent Court of Appeals, the principle of estoppel does not operate against the
Government for the act of its agents.15
Assuming that the decrees of the Court of First Instance were readily issued, the lands
are still not capable of appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis
of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands
of the public domain.
There is no question that the lands in the case at bar were not alienable lands of the
public domain. As testified by the District Forester, records in the Bureau of Forestry
show that the subject lands were never declared as alienable and disposable and
subject to private alienation prior to 1913 up to the present.16 Moreover, as part of the
reservation for provincial park purposes, they form part of the forest zone.
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned
by private persons. It is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot convert it into private property,17 unless such lands are reclassified and
considered disposable and alienable.
Neither do the tax receipts which were presented in evidence prove ownership of the
parcels of land inasmuch as the weight of authority is that tax declarations are not
conclusive proof of ownership in land registration cases.18
Having disposed of the issue of ownership, we now come to the matter regarding the
forfeiture of improvements introduced on the subject lands. It bears emphasis that
Executive Order No. 40 was already in force at the time the lands in question were
surveyed for Diego Palomo. Petitioners also apparently knew that the subject lands
were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for reconstitution of the
lost original certificates of title inasmuch as the blueprint of Survey Work Order Number
21781 of Plan II-9299 approved by the Chief of the Land Registration Office Enrique
Altavas in 1953 as a true and correct copy of the Original Plan No. II-9299 filed in the
Bureau of Lands dated September 11, 194819 contains the following note, “in conflict
with provincial reservation.”20 In any case, petitioners are presumed to know the law
and the failure of the government to oppose the registration of the lands in question is
no justification for the petitioners to plead good faith in introducing improvements on
the lots.
Finally, since 1,976 square meters of the 3,384 square meters covered by TCT 3913 fall
within the reservation, TCT 3913 should be annulled only with respect to the aforesaid
area. Inasmuch as the bamboo groves leveled in TCT 3913 and subject of Civil Case T-
4
143,21 were within the perimeter of the national park,22 no pronouncement as to
damages is in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that TCT 3913 be annulled with respect to the 1,976 square meter area
falling within the reservation zone.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed with modification.

Notes.—It matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in possession of the
subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal requirements for
confirmation of title has been complied by his predecessor-in-interest, the said period
being tacked to his possession. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 567 [1994])

Aliens are disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines. (Ong Ching Po vs. Court
of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341 [1994])

All mineral lands, as part of the country’s natural resources, belong to the Philippine
State. (Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 261 SCRA
528 [1996]) Palomo vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 392, G.R. No. 95608 January 21,
1997

5
REPUBLIC vs CANDY MAKER INC., 492 SCRA 272
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CANDY MAKER, INC., as represented by
its President, ONG YEE SEE,** respondent.
Natural Resources; Regalian Doctrine; Public Lands; Land Registration; Confirmation of
Imperfect Titles; Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State—applicants for
confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that the land forms
part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and, (b) that
they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since
June 12, 1945; The rationale for the period “since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945”
lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the
occupants or possessor claim an interest thereon only by virtue of their imperfect title as
continuous, open and notorious possession.—Applicants for confirmation of imperfect
title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable
and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12,
1945. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. The presumption is that lands
of whatever classification belong to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part
of the inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The statute of limitations with regard
to public agricultural lands does not operate against the State unless the occupant
proves possession and occupation of the same after a claim of ownership for the
required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. No public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant from the government, whether express
or implied. It is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the State. The
rationale for the period “since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945” lies in the
presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants or
possessor claim an interest thereon only by virtue of their imperfect title as continuous,
open and notorious possession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A certification of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
stating that the landsubject of an application is found to be within the alienable and
disposable site per a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real
character of the land subject of the application.—To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, or administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply. A certification of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources stating that
the land subject of an application is found to be within the alienable and disposable
site per a land classification project map is sufficient evidence to show the real character
of the land subject of the application.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership—such possession is
not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.—The
applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the
claim over the land. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own property. A mere
casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute sufficient
basis for a claim of ownership; such possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give
rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA); Under R.A.
No. 4850, approved on July 18, 1966, lands located at and below the maximum lake level
of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are public lands which form part of the bed of said
lake—such lands denominated as lakeshore areas are linear strips of open space
designed to separate incompatible element or uses, or to control pollution/nuisance,
and for identifying and defining development areas or zone, and have environmental
ecological significance and actual potential economic benefits.—In this case, the
evidence on record shows that the property is alienable agricultural land. Romeo
Cadano of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo Rizal,
certified that the property “falls within the Alienable and Disposable zone, under Land
Classification Project No. 5-A, per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released on March 11,
1927.” However, under R.A. No. 4850 which was approved on July 18, 1966, lands
located at and below the maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de Bay are
public lands which form part of the bed of said lake. Such lands denominated as
lakeshore areas are linear strips of open space designed to separate incompatible
6
element or uses, or to control pollution/nuisance, and for identifying and defining
development areas or zone. Such areas of the lake with an approximate total area of
14,000 hectares form a strip of the lakebed along its shores alternately submerged or
exposed by the annual rising and lowering of the lake water. They have environmental
ecological significance and actual potential economic benefits. Under Section 1 of the
law, the national policy of the State is to promote and accelerate the development and
balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces, cities and
towns within the context of the national and regional plans and policies for social and
economic development and to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region
with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of
undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5 of Laguna Lake Development Authority
(LLDA) Resolution No. 113, series of 1996, provides that the LLDA as a matter of policy is
to maintain all shoreland areas lying below elevation 12.50 meters as buffer zone in
consonance with the LLDA policies, plans, programs for the improvement of the water
quality and pollution and conservation of the water resources of the Laguna de Bay.—
The rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore town of
Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-
industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like, created deep concern on the
part of the Government and the general public over the environmental impact of such
development, on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river systems.
The inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and agricultural
wastes from developed areas around the lake and the increasing urbanization have
induced the deterioration of the lake, and that water quality studies have shown that
the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the same. The floods in
the Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns are also influenced by the
hydraulic system of the Laguna de Bay, and any scheme of controlling the floods will
necessarily involve the lake and its river systems. This prompted then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos to issue on October 17, 1978 P.D. 813 amending Rep. Act No. 4850.
Under Section 6 of the law, the LLDA is empowered to issue such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to effectively carry out the policies and programs therein provided
including the policies and projects of the LLDA, subject to the approval of the National
Economic Development Authority. In 1996, the Board of Directors of LLDA approved
Resolution No. 113, series of 1996 relating to the Environmental Uses Fee Systems and
Approval of the Work and Financial Plan for its operationalization in the Laguna de Bay
Basin. Section 5 of the Resolution provides that the LLDA as a matter of policy is to
maintain all shoreland areas lying below elevation 12.50 meters as buffer zone in
consonance with the LLDA policies, plans, programs for the improvement of the water
quality and pollution and conservation of the water resources of the Laguna de Bay.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Admissions; Admissions by a party in the
course of judicial proceedings are binding on said party.—As gleaned from the Survey
Report of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla of the LLDA based on the ocular
inspection dated September 14, 2001 as well as the Memorandum of Engineer
Christopher Pedrezuela, the property is located below the reglementary level of 12.50
m.; hence, part of the bed of the Laguna de Bay, and, as such, is public land. Although
the Report and Memorandum were not offered as evidence in the MTC, the respondent
admitted in its Manifestation in this Court that the property is situated below the 12.50
elevation based on the survey of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla, the same survey
team who conducted an ocular inspection of the property on April 12, 2005, which thus
confirmed the September 14, 2001 survey report. This is a judicial admission in the
course of judicial proceedings which is binding on it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Tax Receipts; While tax receipts and declarations
are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property, particularly when accompanied by proof of
actual possession of property.—Cruz claimed that he and his parents cultivated the
property and planted palay and vegetables, and that they had been paying the realty
taxes over the property before his parents died. However, no tax declarations under the
names of the spouses Apolonio Cruz and/or Eladia Cruz and his siblings were presented,
or realty tax receipts evidencing payment of such taxes. Indeed, while tax receipts and
tax payment receipts themselves do not convincingly prove title to the land, these are
good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind
would pay taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive
possession. While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property, particularly when accompanied by proof of actual possession of property.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes not only
manifests one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also
announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties with an
intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens
one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
7

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for petitioner. Edwin P. Cruz for respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside
the May 21, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73287, which
affirmed in toto the October 12, 2001 Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Taytay, Rizal in Land Registration Case No. 99-0031 declaring respondent the owner of
the parcels of land designated as Lots 3138-A and 3138-B in Plan CSD. 04-018302,
Cainta-Taytay Cadastre.
Sometime in 1998, Candy Maker, Inc. decided to purchase Lot No. 3138 Cad. 688 of the
Cainta-Taytay Cadastre, a parcel of land located below the reglementary lake elevation
of 12.50 meters, about 900 meters away from the Laguna de Bay, and bounded on the
southwest by the Manggahan Floodway, and on the southeast by a legal easement.
On April 1, 1998, Geodetic Engineer Potenciano H. Fernandez, prepared and signed a
Subdivision Plan of the property for Apolonio Cruz. The property was subdivided into
two lots: Lot No. 3138-A with an area of 10,971 square meters, and Lot No. 3138-B with
an area of 239 square meters.3 The technical description of Lot No. 3138 was also
prepared by Fernandez, and was approved by the Regional Technical Director of the
Bureau of Lands on April 14, 1998.4
On April 29, 1999, Antonio, Eladia, and Felisa, all surnamed Cruz, executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Candy Maker, Inc.5 The buyer declared Lot No. 3138 for
taxation purposes in 1999 under Tax Declaration Nos. 004-18929, 004-18930 and 004-
18931.6
On June 16, 1999, Candy Maker, Inc., as applicant, filed an application with the MTC of
Taytay, Rizal, for the registration of its alleged title over Lot No. 3138-A and Lot No.
3138-B under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
Acting thereon, the MTC issued an Order7 on June 18, 1999 directing the applicant to
cause the publication of the notice of initial hearing and for the Deputy Sheriff to post
the same. The Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and the Directors
of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) and Forest Management Bureau (FMB) were
also instructed to submit their respective reports on the status of the parcels of land
before the initial hearing scheduled on October 29, 1999.
The Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Antipolo City
filed on August 18, 1999 his Report8 declaring that “[t]he land falls within the Alienable
and Disposable Zone, under Land Classification Project No. 5-A, per L.C. Map No. 639
certified released on March 11, 1927” and that the property is the subject of CENRO
Case No. 520(97) entitled Perpetua San Jose v. Almario Cruz. On the other hand, the
LRA, in its September 21, 1999 Report,9 recommended the exclusion of Lot No. 3138-
B on the ground that it is a legal easement and intended for public use, hence,
inalienable and indisposable.
On September 30, 1999, the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) approved
Resolution No. 113, Series of 1993, providing that untitled shoreland areas may be
leased subject to conditions enumerated therein.
The applicant filed its Amended Application10 on December 15, 1999 for the
confirmation of its alleged title on Lot No. 3138, alleging therein that:
1. x x x the applicant is the President of CANDYMAKER[,] INC. and registered owner of
a parcel of land located at Panghulo Brgy. San Juan, Taytay, Rizal with an area of TEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE (10,971) square meters and as fully
described and bounded under Lot 3138-A plan CSD-04-018302[,] copy of which and
the corresponding technical descriptions are hereto attached to form parts hereof;
xxxx
8. That for Lot 3138-A the applicant hereby prays for the benefit granted under the
Land Registration Act and/or under the benefits provided for by P.D. No. 1529, as
8
applicant and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, and property,24 and he (Cruz) continued paying the taxes after his father’s death.25 Cruz
peaceful occupation and possession of the said land since time immemorial in [the] insisted that he was the rightful claimant and owner of the property.
concept of true owners and [adverse] to the whole world; x x x11

On March 27, 2000, the MTC issued an Order12 admitting the Amended Application
Sometime in the 1980s, Apolonio Cruz executed an extrajudicial deed of partition in
and resetting the initial hearing to June 23, 2000. However, upon the requests of the
which the property was adjudicated to Antonio Cruz and his sisters, Felisa and Eladia,
LRA for the timely publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the Official Gazette,13
to the exclusion of their five (5) other siblings who were given other properties as their
the court moved the hearing date to September 22, 2000,14 then on January 26, 200115
shares.26 He did not know why his ancestors failed to have the property titled under
and until finally, to June 15, 2001.16
the Torrens system of registration.27 He left the Philippines and stayed in Saudi Arabia
from 1973 to 1983.28 Aside from this, he hired the services of an “upahan” to cultivate
the property.29 The property is about 3 kilometers from the Laguna de Bay, and is
On July 20, 2001, the Republic of the Philippines, the LLDA filed its Opposition17 to the
usually flooded when it rains.30
Amended Application in which it alleged that the lot subject of the application for
registration may not be alienated and disposed since it is considered part of the Laguna
Lake bed, a public land within its jurisdiction pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4850,
Fernando Co Siy testified that the applicant acquired Lot No. 3138 from siblings
as amended. According to the LLDA, the projection of Lot No. 3138-A, Cad-688-D Csd-
Antonio, Eladia and Felisa,31 who had possessed it since 1945;32 that after paying the
04-018302 in its topographic map based on the Memorandum18 of Engineer
real estate taxes due thereon,33 it caused the survey of the lot;34 that possession
Christopher Pedrezuela of the Engineering and Construction Division of the LLDA
thereof has been peaceful35 and none of the former owners claims any right against
indicated that it is “located below the reglementary lake elevation of 12.50 meters
it;36 neither the applicant nor its predecessors-in-interest received information from
referred to datum 10.00 meters below mean lower water” and under Section 41(11) of
any government agency that the lot is a public land;37 the subject lot is 3 kms. away
R.A. No. 4850, the property is a public land which forms part of the bed of the Laguna
from Laguna de Bay,38 above its elevation and that of the nearby road;39 the property
Lake. This Memorandum was appended to the application. At the hearing conducted
is habitable40 and was utilized as a riceland at the time it was sold by the former
on August 31, 2001, the applicant marked in evidence the complementary copies of the
owners;41 and that he was aware that a legal easement is affecting the lot and is willing
Official Gazette and the People’s Tonight as Exhibits “E-1” and “F-1,” respectively.19
to annotate it in the land title.42

Except as to the LLDA and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which was
On cross-examination by the LLDA counsel, Siy admitted that his knowledge as to the
represented by the duly deputized provincial prosecutor,20 the court, upon motion of
distance of the lot with respect to the Laguna de Bay came from “somebody residing
the applicant, issued an Order of general default.21
in Taytay” and also from an adjacent owner of the lot; 43 that the lot is submerged in
water since there is no land fill yet; 44 and that no improvements had been introduced
to the property.45
The applicant presented as witnesses its Treasurer, Fernando Co Siy, and Antonio Cruz,
one of the vendees.

The LLDA moved for a joint ocular inspection of the parcels of land in order to
determine its exact elevation.46 On September 14, 2001, a Survey Team of the
Cruz testified that his grandparents owned the property,22 and after their demise, his
Engineering and Construction Division of the LLDA, composed of Ramon D. Magalonga,
parents, the spouses Apolonio Cruz and Aquilina Atanacio Cruz, inherited the lot;23 he
Virgilio M. Polanco, and Renato Q. Medenilla, conducted an actual ground survey of the
and his father had cultivated the property since 1937, planting palay during the rainy
property. The team used a total station and digital survey instrument to measure the
season and vegetables during the dry season; his father paid the realty taxes on the
elevation of the ground in reference to the elevation of the lake water. A representative
of the applicant witnessed the survey. The team found that the lot is below the

9
prescribed elevation of 12.50 m. and thus part of the bed of the lake; as such, it could
not be titled to the applicant. The team also reported that the property is adjacent to
the highway from the Manggahan Floodway to Angono, Rizal. The LLDA moved that
the application be withdrawn, appending thereto a copy of the Survey Report.47
The LLDA did not offer any testimonial and documentary evidence and agreed to
submit the case for decision based on its Opposition.
On October 12, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision granting the application for
registration over the lots. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
The applicant averred in its Appellee’s Brief54 that it had marked in evidence the actual
copy of the O.G. where the notice of initial hearing was published; in fact, the MTC
Decision stated that the copy of the O.G. containing the notice was referred to as Exhibit
“E-1.” Moreover, Sec. 14, par. 1 of P.D. 1529 is inapplicable since it speaks of possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Instead, par. 4
of the same section55 should govern because the subject parcels of land are lands of
private ownership, having being acquired through purchase from its predecessors-in-
interest, who, in turn, inherited the same from their parents. It pointed out that there
were no adverse claims of interest or right by other private persons and even
government agencies like the Province of Rizal. Lastly, while tax declarations and tax
receipts do not constitute evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless prima facie
evidence of possession.

On May 21, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment which dismissed the appeal
“WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the court hereby rendered judgment confirming
and affirmed in toto the Decision of the MTC,56 holding that the copy of the O.G., where
title of the applicants over the real property denominated as Lot 3138-A Csd-04-018302
the notice was published, was marked as Exhibit “E-1” during the initial hearing. On the
of Cad-688-D Cainta-Taytay Cadastre; Lot 3138-B Csd-04-018302 of Cad 688-D Cainta-
issue of ownership over the subject lots, the CA upheld the applicant’s claim that the
Taytay Cadastre.”48 On appeal to the CA, the petitioner contended that the MTC did
parcels of land were alienable and not part of the public domain, and that it had
not acquire jurisdiction over the application for registration since the actual copies of
adduced preponderant evidence to prove that its predecessors had been tilling the land
the Official Gazette (O.G.) where the notice of hearing was published were not adduced
since 1937, during which palay and vegetables were planted. In fact, before the lots
in evidence; the applicant likewise failed to establish exclusive ownership over the
were purchased, the applicant verified their ownership with the assessor’s office, and
subject property in the manner prescribed by law. The petitioner argued further that
thereafter caused the property to be surveyed; after the lots were acquired in 1999 and
the requirements of Section 23, par. 1 of P.D. No. 1529,49 as amended, are mandatory
a survey was caused by the applicant, no adverse claims were filed by third persons.
and jurisdictional, and that failure to observe such requirements has a fatal effect on
Further, the CA ruled that tax declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession
the whole proceedings. Citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals50 and
in the concept of the owner, which constitute at least positive and strong indication
Register of Deeds of Malabon v. RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 170,51 the Republic averred
that the taxpayer concerned has made a claim either to the title or to the possession of
that a mere certificate of publication is inadequate proof of the jurisdictional fact of
the property.
publication because the actual copies of the O.G. must be presented at the initial
hearing of the case. Moreover, witnesses were not presented to prove specific acts to
show that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in exclusive, open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the subject lots in the concept of the owner The Republic, now petitioner, filed the instant Petition for Review on the following
since June 12, 1945 or earlier, in accordance with Sec. 14, par. 1 of P.D. No. 1529.52 It issues:
noted that the testimonies of the applicant’s witnesses are more of conclusions of law
rather than factual evidence of ownership. Other than the general statement that they
planted rice and vegetables on the subject lots, their possession could properly be A. WHETHER THE LAND IN QUESTION MAYBE THE SUBJECT OF REGISTRATION.
characterized as mere casual cultivation since they failed to account for its exclusive
utilization since 1945 or earlier. After stressing that tax declarations are not conclusive
proof of ownership, it concluded that the subject lots rightfully belong to the State B. WHETHER THE COURT A QUO ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE RES
under the Regalian doctrine.53 CONSIDERING ITS INALIENABLE CHARACTER.

10
 whether the property subject of the amended application is alienable and disposable
property of the State, and, if so, (3) whether respondent adduced the requisite quantum
C. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S
of evidence to prove its ownership over the property under Section 14 of P.D. 1529.
FINDING THAT RESPONDENT COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
ON POSSESSION AS MANDATED BY SECTION 14 OF P.D. NO. 1529.57

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner asserts that the Engineer’s Survey Report58 and the Laguna de Bay Shoreland
Survey59 both show that Lot No. 3138-A is located below the reglementary lake
On the first issue, we find and so rule that the MTC acquired jurisdiction over
elevation, hence, forms part of the Laguna Lake bed. It insists that the property belongs
respondent’s application for registration since a copy of the O.G. containing the notice
to the public domain as classified under Article 502 of the Civil Code.60 Citing the ruling
of hearing was marked and adduced in evidence as Exhibit “E-1.” The representative of
of this Court in Bernardo v. Tiamson,61 petitioner avers that the subject lot is incapable
the OSG was present during the hearing and interposed his objection thereto.
of private appropriation since it is a public land owned by the State under the Regalian
doctrine. On this premise, petitioner avers that the MTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the subject matter, and as a consequence, its decision is null and void.
On the second and third issues, we find and so rule that the property subject of this
application was alienable and disposable public agricultural land until July 18, 1966.
However, respondent failed to prove that it possesses registerable title over the
Petitioner maintains that respondent failed to present incontrovertible evidence to
property.
warrant the registration of the property in its name as owner. The testimonies of the
two witnesses only proved that the possession of the land may be characterized as mere
casual cultivation; they failed to prove that its predecessors occupied the land openly,
continuously, exclusively, notoriously and adversely in the concept of owner since June Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942, reads:
12, 1945 or earlier.

On the other hand, respondent argues that the Engineer’s Survey Report and the
Laguna de Bay Shoreland Survey have no probative value because they were neither
offered nor admitted in evidence by the MTC. It points out that petitioner failed to
invoke these reports in the appellate court. It was only when the petition was filed with
this Court that the respondent learned of its existence. Petitioner’s reliance on the
reports/survey is merely an afterthought. The case of Bernardo v. Tiamson is irrelevant
because the factual issues are different from those of this case.
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Manifestation62 with this Court, appending
thereto the report63 conducted by the survey team of the LLDA Engineering and
Construction Division on April 12, 2005. It stated that the 10,971 sq. m. property subject
of the case is below the 12.5 elevation, and that the profile distance of the property
from the actual lake waters is about 900 m. to 1 km. The issues in this case are the
following: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the amended application; (2)
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, nay apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

11
This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 by substituting the phrase “for at
least thirty years” with “since June 12, 1945”; thus:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land
Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession, and occupation by the applicant himself or through
his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier (emphasis supplied).
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a)
that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either
since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945. Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands
not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. The presumption is that lands of whatever classification belong to the
State.65 Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable
to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and not susceptible of
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept
of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.66
The statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural lands does not operate
against the State unless the occupant proves possession and occupation of the same
after a claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from
the State.67
No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant from the
government, whether express or implied. It is indispensable that there be a showing of
a title from the State.68 The rationale for the period “since time immemorial or since
June 12, 1945” lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State,
and that the occupants or possessor claim an interest thereon only by virtue of their
imperfect title as continuous, open and notorious possession.
A possessor of real property may acquire ownership thereof through acquisitive
prescription. In Alba Vda. de Raz v. Court of Appeals,69 the Court declared that: x x x
[W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that ‘(o)wnership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten
years,’ this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same
Code. This article states that ‘x x x (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.’ Hence, a
prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim
of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo
titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith). The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was
the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there
is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through
one of the recognized modes of acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the
grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.70
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order, or administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigator or a legislative act or statute.71 Until then,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. A certification of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources stating that the land subject of an application is
found to be within the alienable and disposable site per a land classification project
map is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the
application.72
12
 agricultural wastes from developed areas around the lake and the increasing
urbanization have induced the deterioration of the lake, and that water quality studies
The applicant is burdened to offer proof of specific acts of ownership to substantiate
have shown that the lake will deteriorate further if steps are not taken to check the
the claim over the land.73 Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of
same. The floods in the Metropolitan Manila area and the lakeshore towns are also
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own
influenced by the hydraulic system of the Laguna de Bay, and any scheme of controlling
property.74 A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not
the floods will necessarily involve the lake and its river systems.
constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership; such possession is not exclusive and
notorious as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.75

This prompted then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to issue on October 17, 1978 P.D.
813 amending Rep. Act No. 4850. Under Section 6 of the law, the LLDA is empowered
In this case, the evidence on record shows that the property is alienable agricultural
to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively carry out the
land. Romeo Cadano of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,
policies and programs therein provided including the policies and projects of the LLDA,
Antipolo Rizal, certified that the property “falls within the Alienable and Disposable
subject to the approval of the National Economic Development Authority.
zone, under Land Classification Project No. 5-A, per L.C. Map No. 639 certified released
on March 11, 1927.”76 However, under R.A. No. 4850 which was approved on July 18,
1966, lands located at and below the maximum lake level of elevation of the Laguna de
In 1996, the Board of Directors of LLDA approved Resolution No. 113, series of 1996
Bay are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake. Such lands denominated
relating to the Environmental Uses Fee Systems and Approval of the Work and Financial
as lakeshore areas are linear strips of open space designed to separate incompatible
Plan for its operationalization in the Laguna de Bay Basin. Section 5 of the Resolution
element or uses, or to control pollution/nuisance, and for identifying and defining
provides that the LLDA as a matter of policy is to maintain all shoreland areas lying
development areas or zone. Such areas of the lake with an approximate total area of
below elevation 12.50 meters as buffer zone in consonance with the LLDA policies, plans
14,000 hectares form a strip of the lakebed along its shores alternately submerged or
programs for the improvement of the water quality and pollution and conservation of
exposed by the annual rising and lowering of the lake water. They have environmental
the water resources of the Laguna de Bay.
ecological significance and actual potential economic benefits.

As gleaned from the Survey Report of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla of the LLDA
Under Section 1 of the law, the national policy of the State is to promote and accelerate
based on the ocular inspection dated September 14, 2001 as well as the Memorandum
the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding
of Engineer Christopher Pedrezuela, the property is located below the reglementary
provinces, cities and towns within the context of the national and regional plans and
level of 12.50 m.; hence, part of the bed of the Laguna de Bay, and, as such, is public
policies for social and economic development and to carry out the development of the
land. Although the Report and Memorandum were not offered as evidence in the MTC,
Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental
the respondent admitted in its Manifestation in this Court that the property is situated
management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological
below the 12.50 elevation based on the survey of Magalonga, Polanco and Medenilla,
systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
the same survey team who conducted an ocular inspection of the property on April 12,
pollution.
2005, which thus confirmed the September 14, 2001 survey report. This is a judicial
admission in the course of judicial proceedings which is binding on it.77

The rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore town of
Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for
Under R.A. No. 4850 and the issuances of LLDA, registerable rights acquired by
municipalindustrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like, created deep concern
occupants before the effectivity of the law are recognized. However, the respondent
on the part of the Government and the general public over the environmental impact
failed to adduce proof that its predecessors-in-interest had acquired registerable title
of such development, on the water quality and ecology of the lake and its related river
over the property before July 18, 1966:
systems. The inflow of polluted water from the Pasig River, industrial, domestic and
13
 IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73278 is SET ASIDE. The Municipal Trial Court of Taytay,
First. Cruz failed to prove how his parents acquired ownership of the property, and even
Rizal is DIRECTED to dismiss the application for registration of respondent Candymaker,
failed to mention the names of his grandparents. He likewise failed to present his
Inc. in Land Registration Case No. 99-0031. No costs.
father’s death certificate to support his claim that the latter died in 1980. There is
likewise no evidence when his mother died.

Second. Cruz also failed to adduce in evidence the extrajudicial partition allegedly SO ORDERED.
executed by his parents in 1980 where the property was supposedly deeded to him and
Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Chico-
his sisters, Felisa and Eladia, to the exclusion of their five siblings.
Nazario, JJ., concur.

Third. Cruz claimed that he and his parents cultivated the property and planted palay
and vegetables, and that they had been paying the realty taxes over the property before
his parents died. However, no tax declarations under the names of the spouses
Apolonio Cruz and/or Eladia Cruz and his siblings were presented, or realty tax receipts
evidencing payment of such taxes. Indeed, while tax receipts and tax payment receipts
themselves do not convincingly prove title to the land,78 these are good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would pay taxes for
a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession.79 While tax
receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property,
particularly when accompanied by proof of actual possession of property.80 The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes not only manifests
one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also announces an
adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties with an intention to
contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens one’s bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership.81
Petition granted, judgment set aside.
Notes.—In contradistinction with the Philippine Bill of 1902 which was patterned after
the United States Federal Mining Acts which rejected the regalian doctrine, the Mining
Act (C.A. 137) expressly adopted the regalian doctrine following the provisions of the
1935 Constitution. (Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
261 SCRA 528 [1996])
The first sentence of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, embodies the Regalian
doctrine or jura regalia. Introduced by Spain into these Islands, this feudal concept is
based on the State’s power of dominium, which is the capacity of the State to own or
acquire property. (La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association, Inc. vs. Ramos, 421 SCRA 148
[2004])
——o0o——

Fourth. When he testified on October 5, 2001, Antonio Cruz declared that he was “74
years old.”82 He must have been born in 1927, and was thus merely 10 years old in
1937. It is incredible that, at that age, he was already cultivating the property with his
father. Moreover, no evidence was presented to prove how many cavans of palay were
planted on the property, as well as the extent of such cultivation, in order to support
the claim of possession with a bona fide claim of ownership. Fifth. Cruz testified that he
hired a worker “upahan” to help him cultivate the property. He, however, failed to state
the name of the worker or to even present him as witness for the respondent.

14
ALBA vs COURT OF APPEALS, (G.R. 120066, 9/9/1999) subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent, or by secondary evidence of their
contents.—Other than the foregoing transactions involving the subject land which are
Actions; Appeals; Findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final,
borne out by the documentary evidence on record, private respondent/applicant did
binding or conclusive on the parties and upon the Supreme Court, which will not be
not produce the alleged deeds of conveyances evidencing the purported transfers
reviewed or disturbed on appeal; Exceptions.—It is a fundamental and settled rule that
made by Eulalio Raz and Eufrocino Alba in his favor. Instead he relied chiefly on
findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final, binding or
secondary evidence to prove the existence thereof which was sustained by both the
conclusive on the parties and upon this Court, which will not be reviewed or disturbed
trial and the appellate courts. Such reliance on secondary evidence vis-à-vis the peculiar
on appeal unless these findings are not supported by evidence or unless strong and
facts prevailing in this case rests on infirm legal bases much more so in the face of the
cogent reasons dictate otherwise. More explicitly, the findings of fact of the Court of
overwhelming documentary evidence of petitioners arrayed against it because—“. . . [a]
Appeals, which are as a general rule deemed conclusive, may be reviewed by this Court
contract of sale of realty cannot be proven by means of witnesses, but must necessarily
in the following instances: 1.] When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the
be evidenced by a written instrument, duly subscribed by the party charged, or by his
trial court are contradictory; 2.] When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
agent, or by secondary evidence of their contents. No other evidence, therefore, can be
speculation, surmises and conjectures; 3.] When the inference made by the Court of
received except the documentary evidence referred to, in so far as regards such
Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 4.] Where
contracts, and these are valueless as evidence unless they are drawn up in writing in the
there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; 5.] When the appellate
manner aforesaid.” “An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document
court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are
evidencing his title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of his title but the
contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee; 6.] When the judgment of
identity of the land therein referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of
the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts; 7.] When the Court of
his claim for registration or not at all. If, as in this case, he only claims a portion of what
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which,
is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; 8.] When the findings of fact
is included in that title.”
are themselves conflicting; 9.] When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; and 10.] When the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are
Land Titles; Words and Phrases; A person who claims that he has a better right to real
contradicted by the evidence on record.
property must prove not only his ownership of the same but also must satisfactorily prove
the identity thereof; “Palay” is unhusked rice, thus, the term “palayero” refers to land
devoted to the planting of rice; “Cocal” means coconut tree plantation; “Secano” denotes
Same; Same; A review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is not a function that
unwatered land or a dry sand bank.—It will be readily noted vis-à-vis the foregoing that:
the Supreme Court normally undertakes unless the appellate court’s findings are palpably
a.] the land applied for is covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181 while the parcel
unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a
allegedly purchased from Eufrocino Alba is covered by Tax Declaration No. 15792; b.]
misapprehension of facts.—A review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is
the land applied for is palayero whereas the land allegedly acquired from Eufrocino
not a function that this Court normally undertakes unless the appellate court’s findings
Alba is cocal secano. Palay is unhusked rice, thus, the term palayero refers to land
are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is
devoted to the planting of rice; cocal, on the other hand, means coconut tree plantation
based on a misapprehension of facts. A thorough review of the record convinces this
while secano denotes unwatered land or a dry sand bank; c.] the land applied for has
Court that the general rule with regard to the conclusiveness of the trial court’s and
an area of 4,845 square meters whereas the land supposedly sold by Eufrocino Alba
appellate tribunal’s factual findings should not be applied because there are material
measures 12,035 square meters; d.] the land applied for is bounded on the NE by the
circumstances which, when properly considered, would have altered the result of the
Banga Public Market, on the SE by Apolonia Rimate, on the SW by the Banga-Kalibo
case.
National Road; and on the NW by the Banga Public Market whereas the land allegedly
obtained from Eufrocino Alba is bounded on the N by Ernesto Retino and Silverio Relis,
on the E by the Banga-Libacao Carretera Provincial, on the S by Bienvenido Alba and
Contracts; Sales; Land Titles; Evidence; A contract of sale of realty cannot be proven by on the W by Cirilo Rala and Adela Raz. It needs be stressed in this regard that a person
means of witnesses, but must necessarily be evidenced by a written instrument, duly
15
who claims that he has better right to real property must prove not only his ownership
of the same but also must satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.
Same; Tax Declarations; A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of
ownership.—A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of ownership. Tax
declarations for a certain number of years, although constituting proof of claim of title
to land, is not incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they are supported by
other effective proof. It was, thus, held in one case that where realty taxes covering
thirty-one (31) years were paid only a few months prior to the filing of an application,
such payment does not constitute sufficient proof that the applicant had a bona fide
claim of ownership prior to the filing of the application. Still in another case, the claim
that the applicant had been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the
disputed land was not given credence because it was negated by the fact that he
declared the land for taxation purposes in October 1959 when he filed his application
for registration although he could have done so in 1937 when he allegedly purchased
the land. A belated declaration is, furthermore, indicative that the applicant had no real
claim of ownership over the subject land prior to the declaration and where there are
serious discrepancies in the tax declarations as in this case, registration must be denied.
If at all, the foregoing facts only serves to underscore private respondent/applicant’s
crafty attempt to cloak with judicial color his underhanded scheme to seize the
adjoining parcels of land and to enrich himself at the expense of its rightful owners.
Actions; Statutes; The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs the
proceeding consistent with the fundamental dictum that laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is proved.—The law in force at the time an action accrues is
what governs the proceeding consistent with the fundamental dictum that laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is proved. Basic is the rule that no statute,
decree, ordinance, rule, regulation or policy shall be given retrospective effect unless
explicitly stated so. Along the same vein, a court’s jurisdiction depends on the law
existing at the time an action is filed and a law continues to be in force with regard to
all rights which accrued prior to the amendment thereof.
Natural Resources; Public Lands; Classifications.—Public lands are broadly classified into
1.] Alienable or disposable lands; and, 2.] Inalienable or non-disposable public lands.
Non-disposable public lands or those not susceptible of private appropriation include
a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral lands. For purposes of administration and disposition,
the lands of the public domain classified as ‘disposable’ or ‘alienable’ are further sub-
classified into a.] Agricultural; b.] Residential, commercial, industrial or for similar
productive purposes; c.] Educational, charitable or other similar purposes, and d.]
Reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Public agricultural land may be defined as those
alienable portions of the public domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands.—
From the foregoing classifications, public agricultural land may be defined as those
alienable portions of the public domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands.
Thus the term includes residential, commercial and industrial lands for the reason that
these lands are neither timber nor mineral lands.
Same; Same; Land Registration; Prescription; The possession of public agricultural land,
however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor—the statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural land does not
operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of
the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a
grant from the State.—Suffice it to state that the land sought to be registered by private
respondent hardly falls under any of the latter classifications of land referred to by Act
No. 496, as amended. Given the foregoing facts, prescription in the manner invoked by
both courts can not be pleaded to bolster private respondent/applicant’s claim
because—“. . . [N]o public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant,
express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of
title from the state . . . . x x x x x x x x x Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land,
however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the
possessor. The reason, to reiterate our ruling, is because the statute of limitations with
regard to public agricultural land does not operate against the State, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership
for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; A prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere
possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such
possession was acquired with color of title and good faith.—Even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that prescription can be applied in the manner invoked by the trial court and
the appellate court, it must be pointed out that—“. . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code
provides that ‘(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired
by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,’ this provision of law must be
read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that ‘x x x
16
(o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with Virgilio S. Patricio and Ariel B. Gepty for private respondent.
just title for the time fixed by law.’ Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired
by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless
such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
faith). The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant
Before us is an appeal by certiorari from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals
came into possession of the property through one of the recognized modes of
dated August 18, 1992 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could
Kalibo, Aklan, Branch I, in Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC
not transmit any right.”
Record No. K-15104, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose
the fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual
fraud.—It can not be said that private respondent’s possession was con justo titulo y
buena fe. On the contrary, private respondent/applicant’s act of appropriating for “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
himself the entire area of 4,845 square meters to the exclusion of petitioners who have
been occupying portions of the disputed land constituted acts of deprivation of the
latter’s rights which is tantamount to bad faith. Indeed this Court has ruled that the—“. 1. The parcel of land described in Plan Psu-161277 and the improvements thereon
. . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines,
any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud with an area of 4,845 square meters is brought under the operation of the property
supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to registration decree (PD No. 1529) and the title thereto is registered and confirmed in
disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an the name of applicant Jose Lachica, married to Adela Raz of Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines;
allegation of actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon
2. A ten (10) meter road width along the national road mentioned in the application be
which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.”
segregated for future road widening program upon payment of just compensation to
be annotated at the back of the title;

Land Registration; Equity; No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own 3. For lack of merit, the opposition filed by the spouses Manuel and Susana Braulio,
wrongdoing.—Suffice it to state in this regard that to allow private respondent/applicant Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba are hereby
to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur DISMISSED.
actio—no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing.
SO ORDERED.”1

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The factual antecedents of the case as summed by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals are as follows:

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

“Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land on April 28, 1958 with the
claim that the land applied for was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from, from
Ramon N. Casanova and Florentino & Esmaquel Law Office for petitioners. one Eulalio Raz. The documents attached to the application are: technical description,

17
surveyor’s certificate, certification by the chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue
print of Psu-161277.
The initial hearing was scheduled for October 31, 1958 and the certificate of publication
in the Official Gazette was issued on September 23, 1958. The certification of posting
of the notice of initial hearing was issued on October 13, 1958.
The land applied for is residential, situated in the Poblacion of Banga, Aklan, with an
area of 4,845 square meters, bounded on the northeast by the property of the
Municipality of Banga (Sketch, Exh. “F”).
The initial hearing was held on October 31, 1958. An order of general default was issued
but those who presented their opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel
and Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands
and the Municipality of Banga represented by the Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty
(30) days to file their written opposition.
Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed their opposition on October 31, 1958.
They opposed the registration of the southeastern portion of the 240 square meters of
the land applied for alleging that they are the owners in fee simple and possessors of
said portion and all the improvements thereon for not less than 70 years together with
their predecessor-in-interest deriving their title by purchase from the original owners.
They prayed for the Court to declare them the true and absolute owners of the disputed
portion of the same in their names.
On October 31, 1958, Octabela Vda. de Raz filed her opposition.
Jose Rago filed his opposition on November 29, 1958 as the duly constituted attorney-
in-fact of Apolonia Rebeco although no special power of attorney was attached. He
opposed the registration of the northeastern portion of the land applied for, with an
area of 43.83 square meters. He alleged that his principal is the owner by right of
succession and is in the possession of said portion with all its improvements for more
than 80 years together with his predecessor-in-interest, continuously, peacefully and
openly under claim of ownership. He prayed that his principal be declared the true and
absolute owner of the disputed portion of 43.83 square meters.
On March 22, 1966, the Court issued an Order allowing the applicant to hire another
surveyor to segregate the non-controversial portion of the land applied for and to
notify the oppositors and their counsels.
On January 12, 1970, a motion to lift the order of general default and to admit the
attached opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as a motion
to admit the attached amended petition of Octabela Vda. de Raz were filed. The Court
in its order dated March 21, 1970 admitted said opposition and set aside the order of
default.
In their opposition, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba, represented by their attorney-in-fact,
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz, alleged that they are the co-owners of a portion of the land
applied for with an area of 2,262 square meters bounded on the north by Januario
Masigon,
Nicolas Realtor, Agustina Rebeldia and Apolonia Rebeco, on the south by Eulalio Raz
and on the west by the public market of Banga. They claimed to have inherited the
above-mentioned portion from their late father, Eufrosino M. Alba, who purchased the
same from Dionisia Regado in 1918. Hence, they have been in possession continuously,
openly and peacefully under claim of ownership of the above-mentioned portion for
not less 70 years. They prayed that the disputed portion of 2,262 square meters be
registered as their pro-indiviso property.
In her amended opposition, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz opposed the registration of the
southeastern portion of the land applied for with an area of 331.44 square meters. She
claimed to have been in peaceful, continuous and open possession together with her
deceased husband, Eulalio Raz, under claim of ownership of the above-mentioned
portion for not less than 70 years, by purchase from its owners. She likewise opposed
the registration of the western portion of the land applied for, with an area of 676
square meters, having purchased the same from its original owners on (sic) her
predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful and continuous under claim of
ownership for a period of not less than 70 years. She prayed that the portion of 331.44
square meters be registered in her name and that of the heirs of Eulalio Raz, pro
indiviso, and the other portion of 676 square meters be registered solely in her name.
18
On February 25, 1970, the applicant Dr. Jose Lachica filed his consolidated opposition
and reply to the motion to lift order of default stating that there is no reason to do so
under the Rules of Court, and that the opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and
Beatriz Alba, as well as the amended opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz are
without merit in law and in fact.
On March 21, 1970, the motion to lift the order of general default was granted and the
opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the opposition of
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz were all admitted.
In the hearing of March 3, 1972, applicant offered for admission exhibits ‘A’ to ‘I’ and
the testimonies of Pedro Ruiz (April 20, 1971), Jose Rago (Oct. 23, 1970) and Dr. Jose
Lachica (July 16, 1971; Feb. 10, 1972). The Court admitted the same.
On March 13, 1974, the Court issued an order appointing Engr. Angeles Relor to act as
Commissioner and delimit the portions claimed by the three sets of oppositors and
submit an amended approved plan together with the technical description for each
portion.
The Commissioner’s report and sketch was submitted on December 4, 1974. The
applicant filed his opposition to the Commissioner’s report on December 12, 1974. The
Court in its order of December 13, 1974 required the Commissioner to submit an
amended report and amended sketch.
The Commissioner’s corrected report and sketch was submitted on February 24, 1975
which the Court approved on February 25, 1975 there being no objection from the
parties.
On March 15, 1977, the Court issued an order whereby the testimony of oppositor
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off the record for her failure to appear in the
scheduled hearing on March 15, 1977.
Again, in its order dated May 27, 1977 the testimony of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was
stricken off record because the latter was bedridden and can not possibly appear for
cross-examination.
Oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz substituted by her heirs filed a formal offer of
exhibits on August 24, 1988. Applicant filed his comments thereto on August 29, 1988.
The Court admitted said exhibits and the testimony of their witness on March 1, 1989.
In this application for title to land filed by applicant Jose Lachica, four oppositions were
filed by the following:
1. Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia Rebeco;
2. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio;
3. Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by Octabela Alba Vda.
de Raz; and
4. Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.
In the hearing of October 23, 1970, counsel for oppositor Jose Rago manifested that he
would file a motion for withdrawal of opposition and Jose Rago himself declared his
conformity (Tsn, Oct. 23, 1970, p. 5). Although no formal motion to withdraw was
actually filed, oppositor Rago has not presented evidence on his behalf; hence, his
opposition must be disregarded.
As regards oppositor Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio, a deed of sale supposedly
executed by Susana Braulio and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz in 1956 was identified by
Felimon Raz, a witness for the oppositors (Tsn, Sept. 29, 1977, pp. 3 to 4). However, said
deed cannot be found in the records. Even so, the Braulios have not presented evidence
to show that by the time this application was filed, they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous possession of the
land claimed, in concept of owner, for at least 10 years sufficient to acquire title thereto
(Arts. 1117, 1118, 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines). As such, the opposition of Manuel
C. Braulio and Susana Braulio must be dismissed.”2
19
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the applicant
and the oppositor Raz, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of the applicant as
stated at the outset. In dismissing the claim of the remaining oppositors Rodolfo,
Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz and
Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz herself, the trial court in sum noted that said oppositors have
never offered any explanation as to the non-payment of realty taxes for the disputed
portions of the subject property from 1941 to 1958 while the respondent/applicant
continuously paid taxes under Tax Declaration No. 14181 covering said property from
1945-1958 when the case was filed per certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer’s
Office of Banga.3 In rendering judgment in favor of respondent/applicant, the trial court
stressed that while it is true that tax receipts and declarations of ownership for tax
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they become strong evidence
of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual
possession.
Dissatisfied, petitioners interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
Unfazed, petitioners now come to this Court arguing that—
1. The Civil law provisions on prescription are inapplicable.
2. The applicable law is Section 48 [a] of the Public Land Law or Act 141, as amended.
3. Private respondent has not acquired ownership in fee simple, much less has he met
the conditions for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 [a] of Act
141, as amended, except perhaps for a 620 square meter portion of the land applied
for because:
3.1. There is absolutely no proof of the alleged sales made by Raz and Alba.
3.2. There is absolutely no reliable proof of the alleged theft of the deeds of sale.
3.3. The identity of the land has not been established.
3.4. The Court of Appeals misapplied the basic rules governing the introduction of
secondary evidence.
3.5. The applicant/respondent’s Tax Declaration No. 14181 is a ‘doctored’ tax
declaration.
3.6. Applicant/respondent’s tax declarations have no probative value.
3.7. Applicant/respondent has not satisfied the required quantum of evidence in land
registration cases.
3.8. Petitioners-oppositors have proven their right over the subject property.
In rendering judgment in favor of private respondent, the Court of Appeals reasoned,
inter alia, as follows:
“On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the applicant,
the trial court did not err in confirming that the applicant is the absolute owner in fee
simple of the property subject of the application for registration entitling him to register
the same in his name under the operation of PD 1529.
It is of no moment that the applicant failed to produce the originals of those other
deeds/documents of conveyances, for he was able to present sufficient substantial
secondary evidence, in accordance with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court, now Section 5, same Rule of the Revised Rules on Evidence, and
the doctrines in point.
Thus, Government vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817, explained that when the original writing is
not available for one reason or another which is the best or primary evidence, to prove
its contents is the testimony of someone who has read or known about it. Republic vs.
Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 148, laid out the foundation before secondary evidence is
introduced, that the due execution, delivery and reason for non-production of the
original writing must first be produced. Paylago vs. Jarabe, 22 SCRA 1247, ruled that it
is not necessary to prove the loss of the original document beyond all possibility of
mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient and this may be shown by a
bonafide (sic) and diligent search, fruitlessly made, for it in places where it is likely to
be found. After proving the due execution and delivery of the document, together with
the fact that the same has been lost or destroyed, its contents may be proved, among
others, by the recollection of witnesses. And Beall vs. Dearing, 7 ala. 126; and Bogardas
vs. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. (Nn.y.) 639, are of the view that that where the lost
documents are more than thirty (30) years old and would thus prove themselves if
produced, secondary evidence of their contents is admissible without proof of their
execution.
20
In the case at bar, petitioner acquired the property in 1940-1941. He presented the
Deed (Exh. G) executed by the vendor Faustino Martirez. While he failed to present the
other deeds of sale covering the other portions of the property, he has sufficiently
established that they were notarized documents and were taken by his mother-in-law
sometime in 1956. He reported the loss to the authorities and even filed a case of theft.
He further exerted efforts and made a diligent search of those documents from the
notary public but in vain. He presented the clerk of the Municipal Treasurer’s Office of
Banga, who testified having seen those deeds as they were presented to him by the
applicant and which were used as basis for the preparation and issuance of Tax
Declaration No. 14181 in the name of the tax declarant. Tax Declaration No. 14181 (Exh.
H) was presented in Court, proving that the land was declared for tax purposes in the
name of the applicant and his wife. The applicant has been paying the realty tax
covering the property since 1945 and beyond 1958, when the application for
registration was filed in court, per certification of the Municipal Treasurer of Banga (Exh.
1).
In resume, We find and so hold as did the trial court that Dr. Jose Lachica is the absolute
owner in fee simple of the land described in his application for its original registration
in his name. The land contains an area of 4,845 square meters, more or less, situated in
Banga, Aklan, and
“Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., along
line 2-3, by National road; on the SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl.
Government of Banga (Public Market); and on the NW., along line 4-1, by property of
the Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market). Beginning at a point marked 1 on
plan, being N. 45 deg. 02’ E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;
thence, S. 33 deg. 46’ E., 87.66 m. to point “2”
thence, S. 56 deg. 42’ W., 63.81 m. to point “3”
thence, N. 37 deg. 22’ W., 59.26 m. to point “4”
thence, N. 33 deg. 42’ E., 73.08 m. to the point of
beginning, x x x All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the
ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of the survey, January 25, 1957,
and that of the approval, October 3, 1957.”
The applicant has been in public, open, continuous and adverse possession of the
property since 1940-41 up to the present to the exclusion of all, and thereby also
acquired the property by acquisitive prescription, in accordance with Sections 40 and
43 of Act 190, otherwise known as the “Code of Civil Procedure”, having been in actual
and adverse possession under claim of ownership for over ten (10) years, and thus in
whatever way his occupancy might have commenced or continued under a claim of title
exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants, resulted in the acquisition
of title to the land by acquisitive prescription (Vda. de Delima vs. Tio, 32 SCRA 516).
Indeed, to borrow the apt words of the ponente in the Delima case, such proof of
ownership of, and the adverse, continuous possession of the applicant since 1940,
strongly “xxx militate against any judicial cognizance of a matter that could have been
withheld in its ken,” hence, whatever right oppositors may have had over the property
or any portion thereof was thereby also lost through extinctive prescription in favor of
the applicant who had been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession of the
land applied for in the concept of owner for over 10 years when the application for
registration was filed in court.”4
It is a fundamental and settled rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court
of Appeals are final, binding or conclusive on the parties and upon this Court,5 which
will not be reviewed6 or disturbed on appeal unless these findings are not supported
by evidence7 or unless strong and cogent reasons dictate otherwise.8
More explicitly, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, which are as a general rule
deemed conclusive, may be reviewed by this Court in the following instances:
1.] When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;9
21
2.] When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;10
3.] When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd11 or impossible;
4.] Where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;12
5.] When the appellate court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee;
6.] When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of
facts;13
7.] When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;14
8.] When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
9.] When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; and
10.] When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.15
The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not the private respondent/applicant
is entitled to the confirmation of his ownership in fee simple for the 4,845 square meter
parcel of land he applied for.
In sum, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals adjudicated and confirmed private
respondent/applicant’s title to the land on the basis of the findings that: 1.] the private
respondent/applicant purchased the land from Faustino Martirez; 2.] the subject land is
covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181; 3.] the private respondent/applicant has paid
the realty taxes on the land from 1945 up to the filing of his application in 1958; 4.] the
private respondent/applicant has been in actual, open and continuous possession of
the subject land in the concept of owner since 1945, and 5.] the private
respondent/applicant has acquired the land by prescription.
As stated earlier, a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is not a function
that this Court normally undertakes16 unless the appellate court’s findings are palpably
unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.17 A thorough review of the record convinces this Court that
the general rule with regard to the conclusiveness of the trial court’s and appellate
tribunal’s factual findings should not be applied because there are material
circumstances which, when properly considered, would have altered the result of the
case.
First, a circumspect scrutiny of the evidence extant on record reveals that with the
exception of 620 square meters, there has been no satisfactory showing of how private
respondent/applicant acquired the remainder of the subject land.
As can be gathered from the discussion of the appellate court, as well as the arguments
proffered by private respondent, he acquired the land in question from three (3)
sources, namely: a.] A Deed of Sale dated August 13, 1941 allegedly executed by
Faustino Martirez covering 840 square meters; b.] 300 square meters allegedly
purchased from private respondent’s father-in-law Eulalio Raz; and c.] 3,725 square
meters private respondent allegedly bought in 1940 from Eufrocino Alba.
The sale involving the first parcel of land covering 840 square meters, was not
questioned by petitioners as its technical description delineated in the Escritura De
Venta Absoluta dated August 13, 1941,18 to wit:
“Un terreno solar residencia antes palayero regado, actuado en el casco central del
municipio de Banga, Capiz. Sin ninguna mejora, de una extension superficial de
ochocientos cuarenta metros cuadrados (840 mts. cds.) 6 sean cuarenta metros de
frente por otros veinte y unmetrode fondo, cuyos linderos por el Norte con propiedad
de Eufrosino Alba y con Eulalio Raz; por Este con Eulalio Raz y con la carretera provincial
de Kalibo a Banga; por Sur con la misma carretera provincial y con terreno del municipio
para mercado; y por al Oeste con al terreno del mercado municipal de Banga y con
propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y al terreno tienes sus mojones de cemento en todos sus
cuatro cantos de linderia y sin otro limite visible de linderia mas que dichos mojones y
esta amillarado a mi nombre en una sola hoja declaratoria de propiedad Tax No. 12374
en la Oficina del Tasador Provincial de Capiz, cuyo valor amilarado actual es veinte
pesos (P20.00) x x x”
leaves no room for doubt as to its identity, total area of 840 square meters as well as
its dimensions of 40 meters in front and 21 meters at the base. How this parcel was
22
further reduced to 620 square meters is explained by the fact that the Municipal
Government of Banga appropriated 220 square meters thereof for the Banga Public
Market Road.
What, however, is seriously contested are the alleged purchases of the other two parcels
from Eulalio Raz measuring 300 square meters and from Eufrocino Alba measuring
3,725 square meters owing to the questionable circumstances surrounding their
acquisition.
The records disclose that the subject land was originally owned by Dionisia Regado
under Tax Declaration No. 802.19
The records further reveal that Dionisia Regado sold: [1.] 1,850 square meters of the
land to the Municipality of Banga evidenced by a Spanish document denominated as a
deed of sale dated April 29, 1914;20 [2.] 1,320 square meters to Eulalio Raz evidenced
by a document entitled Escritura de Venta Absoluta dated September 6, 1918,21 and
[3.] 2,938 square meters to Eufrocino Alba evidenced by a deed of conveyance dated
September 6, 1918 written in Spanish.22
Faustino Martirez acquired a portion of 840 square meters from Eulalio Raz on January
15, 1933.23 Raz retained 480 square meters, however, he and his wife Octabela Alba
conveyed a 240 square meter portion thereof to Susana Braulio on November 5,
1956.24 Subsequently on May 29, 1969, the heirs of Eufrocino Alba sold a 676 square
meter portion of the parcel purchased by Eufrocino to Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.25
The deed of conveyance was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan
pursuant to Act No. 334 on June 17, 196926 and is covered by Tax Declaration No. 332
in the name of Eulalio Raz, her husband.27
Other than the foregoing transactions involving the subject land which are borne out
by the documentary evidence on record, private respondent/applicant did not produce
the alleged deeds of conveyances evidencing the purported transfers made by Eulalio
Raz and Eufrocino Alba in his favor. Instead he relied chiefly on secondary evidence to
prove the existence thereof which was sustained by both the trial and the appellate
courts. Such reliance on secondary evidence vis-à-vis the peculiar facts prevailing in this
case rests on infirm legal bases much more so in the face of the overwhelming
documentary evidence of petitioners arrayed against it because—
“. . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be proven by means of witnesses, but must
necessarily be evidenced by a written instrument, duly subscribed by the party charged,
or by his agent, or by secondary evidence of their contents. No other evidence,
therefore, can be received except the documentary evidence referred to, in so far as
regards such contracts, and these are valueless as evidence unless they are drawn up in
writing in the manner aforesaid.”28
“An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title
thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of his title but the identity of the land
therein referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for
registration or not at all. If, as in this case, he only claims a portion of what is included
in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included
in that title.”29
Second, there are glaring variances in the identities and technical descriptions of the
land applied for by private respondent/applicant and the land he purportedly
purchased from Eufrocino Alba.
Private respondent/applicant alleged that he purchased the remainder of the subject
land measuring 3,725 square meters from Eufrocino Alba sometime in 1940 averring
that this parcel is listed as Item No. 5 of his Exhibit “I” which is denominated as an
“Inventory And Appraisal Of The Properties Of The Spouses Adela Raz De Lachica
(Deceased) and Dr. Jose Lachica.” Item No. 530 of the said inventory described the
parcel of land mentioned therein as follows:
“5. Una parcela de terreno cocal secano, amillarado en nombre de Eufrocino Alba bajo
el Tax No. 12792 por valor de P390.00, situado en el municipio de Banga, Capiz, que
linda el Norte con Lorenzo Retiro, y Silverio Relis; al Este con la carretera provincial
Banga-Libacao; al sur con Bienvenido M. Alba y al Oeste con Cirilo rala y Adela Raz; con
una extension aproximada de una (1) hectarea (20) areas y (35) centiareas poco mas o
menos. (Note: Said property was purchased by the spouses Jose Lachica and Adela Raz
Lachica from Eufrocino M. Alba in the amount of P500.00 as evidenced by a Escritura
23
de Compraventa executed on November 25, 1940, at Himamaylan, Negros Occidental
and notarized by Atty. Conrado Gensiano, as Reg. Not. 122, Pag. 67, Libro VIII, Serie
1940).
On the other hand, the land applied for is described technically per Psu 161277 as—
“A parcel of land (as shown on Plan Psu-161277), situated in Poblacion, Municipality of
Banga, Province of Aklan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia
Rimate; on the SE., along line 2-3, by National Road; on the SW., along line 3-4, by
property of the Mpl. Government of Banga (Public Market); and on the NW., along line
4-1, by property of the Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market). Beginning at
a point marked “1” on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02’ E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of
Banga, Aklan;
thence S. 33 deg. 46’ E. 87.66 m. to point “2”
thence S. 56 deg. 42’ W., 63.81 m. to point “3”
thence N. 37 deg. 22’ W., 59.26 m. to point “4”
thence N. 33 deg. 42’ E., 73.08 m. to the point of
beginning, containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY FIVE
(4,845) SQUARE METERS. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked
on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of survey, January 25, 1957,
and that of the approval, October 3, 1957.”31
It will be readily noted vis-à-vis the foregoing that: a.] the land applied for is covered
by Tax Declaration No. 14181 while the parcel allegedly purchased from Eufrocino Alba
is covered by Tax Declaration No. 15792; b.] the land applied for is palayero whereas
the land allegedly acquired from Eufro-cino Alba is cocal secano. Palay is unhusked
rice,32 thus, the term palayero refers to land devoted to the planting of rice; cocal, on
the other hand, means coconut tree plantation while secano denotes unwatered land
or a dry sand bank;34 c.] the land applied for has an area of 4,845 square meters
whereas the land supposedly sold by Eufrocino Alba measures 12,035 square meters;
d.] the land applied for is bounded on the NE by the Banga Public Market, on the SE by
Apolonia Rimate, on the SW by the Banga-Kalibo National Road; and on the NW by the
Banga Public Market whereas the land allegedly obtained from Eufrocino Alba is
bounded on the N by Ernesto Retino and Silverio Relis, on the E by the BangaLibacao
Carretera Provincial, on the S by Bienvenido Alba and on the W by Cirilo Rala and Adela
Raz. It needs be stressed in this regard that a person who claims that he has better right
to real property must prove not only his ownership of the same but also must
satisfactorily prove the identity thereof.35
Third, both trial and appellate courts placed undue reliance on Tax Declaration No.
14181 considering that there is no satisfactory explanation of how the area of land
covered by Tax Declaration No. 14181 geometrically ballooned from a modest 620
square meter lot to a huge parcel measuring 4,845 square meters.
As pointed out by petitioners, Tax Declaration No. 14181 was preceded by 1954 Tax
Declaration No. 13578 in the name of private respondent/applicant and his spouse
which shows that the land declared therein for taxation purposes covers an area of 620
square meters. Tax Declaration No. 13578 was preceded by 1953 Tax Declaration No.
13040 in the name of Adela Raz, private respondent’s wife. The land declared for
taxation purposes therein also has an area of 620 square meters. Tax Declaration No.
134040 was preceded by 1947 Tax Declaration No. 6528 in the name of private
respondent’s wife, Adela Raz. The land declared therein for taxation purposes likewise
measures 620 square meters. It appears that the quantum leap from 620 square meters
in 1947 to 4,845 square meters in 1956 came about on account of an affidavit dated
November 17, 1956 wherein private respondent/applicant requested36 the Municipal
Assessor of Banga to issue a revised tax declaration covering 4,845 square meters on
the bare claim that “the area has been decreased” to only 620 square meters. The timing
of the revision and its proximity to the date of filing of the application cannot but
engender serious doubts on the application more so considering that prior thereto
realty tax payments covering the period 1945 to 1956 covered an area measuring 620
square meters and private respondent/applicant is banking on said payments to claim
possession and ownership over the same period for an infinitely larger area of 4,845
square meters.
A tax declaration, by itself, is not conclusive evidence of ownership.37 Tax declarations
for a certain number of years, although constituting proof of claim of title to land,38 is
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership unless they are supported by other effective
proof.39 It was, thus, held in one case40 that where realty taxes covering thirty-one (31)
24
years were paid only a few months prior to the filing of an application, such payment
does not constitute sufficient proof that the applicant had a bona fide claim of
ownership prior to the filing of the application. Still in another case,41 the claim that
the applicant had been in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the disputed
land was not given credence because it was negated by the fact that he declared the
land for taxation purposes in October 1959 when he filed his application for registration
although he could have done so in 1937 when he allegedly purchased the land. A
belated declaration is, furthermore, indicative that the applicant had no real claim of
ownership over the subject land prior to the declaration42 and where there are serious
discrepancies in the tax declarations as in this case, registration must be denied.43 If at
all, the foregoing facts only serves to underscore private respondent/applicant’s crafty
attempt to cloak with judicial color his underhanded scheme to seize the adjoining
parcels of land and to enrich himself at the expense of its rightful owners.
Fourth, the lower court’s reliance on prescription is not well-taken given the peculiar
facts prevailing in this case.
The law in force at the time an action accrues is what governs the proceeding consistent
with the fundamental dictum that laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is proved.44 Basic is the rule that no statute, decree, ordinance, rule, regulation
or policy shall be given retrospective effect unless explicitly stated so.45 Along the same
vein, a court’s jurisdiction depends on the law existing at the time an action is filed46
and a law continues to be in force with regard to all rights which accrued prior to the
amendment thereof.47
In this case, the controlling statute when the private respondent/applicant filed his
application for registration on April 28, 1958 is Section 48 of Commonwealth Act 141,
as amended by RA Nos. 1942 and 6236,48 which states that:
“SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have
applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public
domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and
prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without default
upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or
grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the
filing of their applications.
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.50
(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.51
A circumspect scrutiny of the assailed Decision readily shows that in affirming the ruling
of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of Section 19 of Act
49652 in relation to the Civil Code’s provisions on prescription on the assumption that
the subject land is private land. Therein lies the flaw in the appellate court’s postulate.
The application for registration of private respondent is for the judicial confirmation of
an imperfect title considering that the land is presumed under the Regalian Doctrine to
be part of the public domain.
Public lands are broadly classified into 1.] Alienable or disposable lands; and, 2.]
Inalienable or non-disposable public lands. Non-disposable public lands or those not
susceptible of private appropriation include a.] Timber lands; and, b.] Mineral lands.53
For purposes of administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain classified
as ‘disposable’ or ‘alienable’ are further sub-classified into a.] Agricultural; b.]
Residential, commercial, industrial or for similar productive purposes; c.] Educational,
charitable or other similar purposes; and d.] Reservations for town sites and for public
and quasi-public purposes.54
From the foregoing classifications, public agricultural land may be defined as those
alienable portions of the public domain which are neither timber nor mineral lands.
25
Thus the term includes residential, commercial and industrial lands for the reason that
these lands are neither timber nor mineral lands.55
On the other hand, Section 19 of Act No. 496, as amended, permits the registration of
private lands claimed to be owned by the applicant in fee simple which refer to:
1.] Lands acquired by various types of titles from the government during the Spanish
Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown namely the: a.] Titulo real or royal grant;
b.] Concession especial or special grant; c.] Composicion con el estado title or
adjustment title; d.] Titulo de compra or title by purchase and; e.] Informacion posesoria
or possessory information title, which could become a Titulo gratuito or a gratuitous
title;56
2.] Lands that are claimed to be owned by accession, i.e. accretion, avulsion, formation
of islands, abandoned river beds, as provided for in Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the
Civil Code; and
3.] Lands which have been acquired in any other manner provided by law.
Suffice it to state that the land sought to be registered by private respondent hardly
falls under any of the latter classifications of land referred to by Act No. 496, as
amended. VOL. 314, SEPTEMBER 9, 1999 Alba Vda. de Raz vs. Court of Appeals 63 Given
the foregoing facts, prescription in the manner invoked by both courts can not be
pleaded to bolster private respon-dent/applicant’s claim because—“. . . [N]o public land
can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the
government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of title from the state . . . .57 x
x x x x x x x x Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however long the period
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor.58 The reason, to
reiterate our ruling, is because the statute of limitations with regard to public
agricultural land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required
number of years to constitute a grant from the State.”59 Fifth, even assuming ex gratia
argumenti that prescription can be applied in the manner invoked by the trial court and
the appellate court, it must be pointed out that—“. . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code
provides that ‘(o)wner-ship and other real rights over immovable property are acquired
by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,’ this provision of law must be
read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that ‘x x x
(o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with
just title for the time fixed by law.’ Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired
by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless
such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good
faith).60 The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the
person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could
____________________________ 57 Lee Hong Hok v. David, 48 SCRA 379 (1972). 58 Director
of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 (1994).59 Gordula v. Court of
Appeals, 284 SCRA 617 (1998), citing Director of Lands v. Reyes, supra, citing Province
of Camarines Sur v. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 600 (1937). 60 Santiago v. Cruz, 19 Phil.
145 (1911).
transmit his ownership.61 For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the
adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the recognized
modes of acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the
owner or could not transmit any right.”62
It can not be said that private respondent’s possession was con justo titulo y buena fe.
On the contrary, private respondent/applicant’s act of appropriating for himself the
entire area of 4,845 square meters to the exclusion of petitioners who have been
occupying portions of the disputed land constituted acts of deprivation of the latter’s
rights which is tantamount to bad faith. Indeed this Court has ruled that the—
“. . . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had
any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud
supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to
disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an
allegation of actual fraud.63 Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact,
upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person.”64
Suffice it to state in this regard that to allow private re-spondent/applicant to benefit
from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio—
no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing.65
It need not be overemphasized that extraordinary acquisitive prescription can not
similarly vest ownership over the property upon private respondent/applicant because
Article 1137 of the Civil Code states in no uncertain terms that— “ART. 1137. Ownership
and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse
possession thereof for thirty years, without need of good faith.”
26

Needless to state, private respondent/applicant’s possession of thirteen (13) years falls
way below the thirty-year requirement mandated by Article 1137.
Sixth, petitioners/oppositors have, in stark contrast to the secondary proof of private
respondent, adduced overwhelming evidence to prove their ownership of the portions
they claim in the subject land. The evidence on record clearly points to the fact that
private respondent/applicant’s right, if at all, is confined to only 620 square meters or
what has been left of the 840 square meters he purchased from Faustino Martirez after
220 square meters thereof were appropriated by the Municipality of Banga for the
Public Market Road.66
The records further bear out that the original owner of the whole area was one Dionisia
Regado who executed three (3) deeds of sale covering certain portions of the disputed
lands, namely: 1.] the Deed of Sale dated April 29, 1914 covering 1,850 square meters
executed in favor of the Municipality of Banga;67 the Deed of Sale dated July 10, 1915
covering 1,320 square meters executed in favor of Eulalio Raz;68 and, 3.] the Deed of
Sale dated September 6, 1918 covering the balance with an area of 2,938 square meters
in favor of Eufrocino Alba.69
Faustino Martirez acquired only an 840 square meter portion of the land by purchase
from Eulalio Raz on January 15, 1933 as confirmed in paragraph 2 of the Escritura De
Venta Absoluta executed by him on August 13, 1941.70 After selling 840 square meters
to Faustino Martirez, Eulalio Raz retained 480 square meters but on November 5, 1956
Eulalio Raz and his wife Octabela Alba conveyed 240 square meters to Susana Braulio71
leaving a balance of 240 square meters which remained undisposed.
On May 29, 1969, Virginia Alba, Inocentes Alba and Estrella Alba, children of the
deceased Eufrocino Alba, sold a 676 square meter portion of the 2,938 square meter
lot purchased by their father from Dionisia Regado to petitioner/oppositor Octabela
alba Vda. De Raz.72 This Deed was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Aklan
in accordance with Act No. 3344 on June 17, 1969.73 The land is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 332 in the name of Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz’s husband.74
Petitioner/oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz’s ownership of the remaining 240
square meter portion which she and her husband Eulalio Raz bought from Dionisia
Regado75 and the 676 square meter portion which they bought from the heirs of
Eufrocino Alba76 is fully substantiated by documentary proof.77 Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes
Alba and Beatriz Alba’s ownership of a portion measuring 1,335 square meters78 and
another portion measuring 2,262 square meters79 is likewise backed by documentary
evidence. Susana Braulio’s ownership of a 240 square meter portion80 which she
acquired from Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz on November 11, 195681 is also documented,
her predecessor-in-interest having acquired the same from Dionisia Regado on
September 6, 1918.82 The foregoing only serves to underscore the paucity of the proof
of private respondent/applicant to support his claim of ownership over the entire 4,845
square meter area. He has not adduced evidence to show how and when he was able
to acquire, with the exception of 840 square meters further reduced to 620 square
meters on account of 220 square meters appropriated for the market road, the bigger
area of 3,755 square meters from anybody let alone the ancestral owner, Dionisia
Regado.
His claim is anchored mainly on Revised Tax Declaration No. 14181 which he was able
to procure from the Municipal Assessor of Banga in 1956 on the basis of a self-serving
affidavit which proffered the lame excuse that there was error in the statement of the
area of the land which he claimed to be 4,845 square meters instead of 620 square
meters—which was the area reflected in earlier tax declarations namely, 1954 Tax
Declaration No. 13578; 1953 Tax Declaration No. 13043; and 1947 Tax Declaration No.
6528.
Be that as it may, the Court has reservations on the propriety of adjudicating to
petitioners the contested portions of the subject land, in view of their failure to present
the technical descriptions of these areas. Furthermore, there is no sufficient evidence
showing that petitioners have been in open, adverse, exclusive, peaceful and
continuous possession thereof in the concept of owner, considering that the testimony
of Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz was stricken off the record.
WHEREFORE, based on foregoing premises, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 1 dated August 18, 1992 in Land Registration Case No. K-101, LRC
Record No. K-15104 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
27
1.] The 620 square meter portion on which private respondent Jose N. Lachica’s house
is situated, clearly delineating its metes and bounds, is hereby ORDERED segregated
from the parcel of land described in Psu-161277 situated in the Poblacion of the
Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area of 4,484 square
meters, to be registered and confirmed in the name of private respondent; 2.] A ten (10)
meter road width along the National road mentioned in the application be segregated
for future road widening programs upon the payment of just compensation to be
annotated at the back of the title;

3.] Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the subject land is concerned, the case
is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the reception of further evidence for the
petitioners to establish the other requisites for the confirmation of title and registration
in their names of the areas they respectively claim.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), On official leave.

Reviewed decision modified.

Notes.—Certificates of titles merely confirm or record title already existing and vested—
they cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as
a shield for the commission of fraud, nor to permit one to enrich himself at the expense
of others. (Esquivias vs. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 803 [1997])

While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership, yet, when
coupled with proof of actual possession, they are strong evidence of ownership. (Heirs
of Segunda Maningding vs. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 601 [1997])

——o0o——

28