Ochosa vs.

Alano,
640 SCRA 517, G.R. No. 167459 January 26, 2011
Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply
recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place.—It is also
established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the concept
that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it
simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place
because the affliction—already then existing—was so grave and
permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had
assumed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 36 of the Family Code is not to
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves.—We have stressed time and again
that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of the marriage.

Viñas vs. Parel-Viñas,

747 SCRA 508, G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; The lack of
personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist
or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage.—The lack of personal examination or assessment of the
respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. “If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; The Supreme Court
(SC) understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the
statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s
psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner
from complying with what the law requires.—The Court understands the
inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who
can attest to the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but
such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the
law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes,
the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the
Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated
to comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.

Viñas vs. Parel-Viñas,

747 SCRA 508, G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015
Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; The lack of personal
examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or
psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity
of marriage.—The lack of personal examination or assessment of the
respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. “If the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
to.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; The Supreme Court
(SC) understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the
statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s
psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner
from complying with what the law requires.—The Court understands the
inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who
can attest to the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but
such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the
law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes,
the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the
Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated
to comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
 Halili vs. Santos-Halili,
589 SCRA 25, G.R. No. 165424 June 9, 2009
Dependent personality disorder as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and
submissive behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and
frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others’ comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others
through a quest for overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals
who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without
advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even
when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and
are often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term
concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term—these disorders affect all
areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or adolescence, create
problems for those who display them and for others.—It has been sufficiently
established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and
incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the same Te case,
recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually
have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term. Particularly,
personality disorders are “long-standing, inflexible ways of behaving that are
not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles of living. These
disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in childhood or
adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for others.”
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from
psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is declared null and void.
 Camacho-Reyes vs. Reyes,
628 SCRA 461, G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010
Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features,
while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering from Personality
Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of Inadequacy
especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.
Expert Witnesses; The lack of personal examination and interview of the
respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does
not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors, and neither do their
findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion
as evidence.—Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected,
wholesale, the testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay
since they never personally examined and interviewed the respondent. We
do not agree with the CA. The lack of personal examination and interview of
the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder,
does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their
findings automatically constitute hearsay that would result in their exclusion
as evidence. For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves
only two persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the
cohabitation and marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by
the other. In this case, the experts testified on their individual assessment of
the present state of the parties’ marriage from the perception of one of the
parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had
occasion to interact with, and experience, respondent’s pattern of behavior
which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists and the
psychiatrist. For another, the clinical psychologists’ and psychiatrist’s
assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of
the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and
in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own
observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them, spanning
the period of time they knew him. These were also used as the basis of the
doctors’ assessments.
 Ancheta vs. Ancheta,
424 SCRA 725, G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004
Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 48 of the Family
Code.—In the case of Republic v.Court of Appeals, this Court laid down the
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code,
one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State: (8) The trial court must
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear
as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the
case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

Aquino vs. Delizo, 109 Phil. 21, No. L-15853 July 27, 1960
MARRIAGE; ANNULMENT; CONCEALMENT OF PREGNANCY AT TIME
OF MARRIAGE CONSTITUTES FRAUD AS GROUND FOR
ANNULMENT.—Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes
fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation
to Art. 86, par. (3), New Civil Code).
2.NEW TRIAL; MERE FAILURE TO ANSWER MOTION IS NEITHER
EVIDENCE OF COLLUSION NOR GROUND FOR DENIAL.—When the
evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial, taken together with what
has already been adduced would be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged
by plaintiff, the motion praying for new trial should not be denied simply
because defendant f ailed to file her answer thereto. Such f ailure cannot be
taken as evidence of collusion, especially where a provincial fiscal has been
ordered to represent the Government precisely to prevent such collusion.
 Barrido vs Nonato

Civil Law; Property Regimes of Void Marriages; Under this property regime,
property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be
governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall
be considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household.—The
records reveal that Nonato and Barrido’s marriage had been declared void
for psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. During their
marriage, however, the conjugal partnership regime governed their property
relations. Although Article 129 provides for the procedure in case of
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, Article 147 specifically covers
the effects of void marriages on the spouses’ property relations. x x x This
particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively live together as
husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage.
It is clear, therefore, that for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman:
(1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of
marriage or their marriage is void. Here, all these elements are present. The
term “capacitated” in the first paragraph of the provision pertains to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage. Any impediment to marry has not
been shown to have existed on the part of either Nonato or Barrido. They
lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife. However, their
marriage was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed
by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A
party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed to the same jointly if said party’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household. Efforts in the
care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary
or income or work or industry.
Yu vs. Reyes-Carpio,
652 SCRA 341, G.R. No. 189207 June 15, 2011

“Article 50. xxx

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless
such matters had been adjudicated in the previous judicial proceedings.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all
common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial
court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the
parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for
such matters.”

Yu vs. Yu,
484 SCRA 485, G.R. No. 164915 March 10, 2006
Annulment; Custody of Children; By petitioner’s filing of the case for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC he automatically
submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an incident thereof.—By
petitioner’s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Pasig RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as
an incident thereof. After the appellate court subsequently dismissed the
habeas corpus case, there was no need for petitioner to replead his prayer
for custody for, as above-quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the
custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded. That that is
so gains light from Section 21 of the “Rule on Declaration Of Absolute Nullity
Of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages” which provides:
Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution, custody, support of common
children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes.—Upon entry of the
judgment granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry
of judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody, support of
common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to
Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied) Since this immediately-quoted provision directs the court taking
jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to resolve the
custody of common children, by mere motion of either party, it could only
mean that the filing of a new action is not necessary for the court to consider
the issue of custody of a minor.

Yasin vs. Judge, Shari'a District Court,

241 SCRA 606, G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995
Change of Name; The true and real name of a person is that given to him
and entered in the civil register.—The true and real name of a person is that
given to him and entered in the civil register.
The only name that may be changed is the true and official name recorded
in the Civil Register.—While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code,
no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority,
nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official
name recorded in the Civil Register.
The onerous requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of
name should not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced
woman to resume her maiden name and surname.—Although there is no
legal prohibition against obtaining a judicial confirmation of a legal right,
nevertheless, no law or rule provides for the procedure by which such
confirmation may be obtained. In view of such circumstances, the onerous
requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court on change of name should
not be applied to judicial confirmation of the right of a divorced woman to
resume her maiden name and surname. In the absence of a specific rule or
provision governing such a proceeding, where sufficient facts have been
alleged supported by competent proof as annexes, which appear to be
satisfactory to the court, such petition for confirmation of change of civil
status and/or to resume the use of maiden name must be given due course
and summarily granted as in fact it is a right conferred by law.
Change of Name; No law prohibits a married woman from continuing to use
her maiden name and surname if she wishes to.—It is to be noted that the
introductory sentence uses the directory "may" instead of the mandatory
"shall." Its obvious intendment is that the married woman, if she chooses to,
need not use her husband's surname. Clearly, no law prohibits her from
continuing to use her maiden name and surname if she wishes to; or for that
matter, to resume the same even as she uses her husband's family name
during matrimony, as long as there is disclosure and no fraudulent intent.

Social Security System vs. Jarque Vda. de Bailon,

485 SCRA 376, G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; The applicable law to determine the
validity of a marriage is the law in effect at the time of its celebration. Thus,
if it was solemnized before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988,
the Civil Law provisions on Marriage apply.—The two marriages involved
herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of
the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil
Code which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. Article 83 of
the Civil Code provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any
person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2)
The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by
the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or
if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The
marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared
null and void by a competent court.
Same; Same; Same; A subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime
of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first
annulled or dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional
circumstances.—Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a
subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is
illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or dissolved
or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears
noting that the marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed
valid “until declared null and void by a competent court.” It follows that the
onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the second
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable as it was contracted by the present spouse believing the absent
spouse to be dead, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case
instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in
the subsequent marriage, while under the Family Code, no judicial
proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary as it is
automatically terminated by the recording of an affidavit of reappearance of
the absent spouse.—Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being
voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of annulment in a case instituted
by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in the
subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to
annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. x x x The termination of the
subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of
the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove
the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or
termination of the subsequent marriage.
Same; Marriages; If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action,
such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in
the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.—If the absentee
reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either
by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if
made known to the spouses in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate
such marriage. Since the second marriage has been contracted because of
a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or
she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent
marriage is terminated as provided by law.
Same; Same; Voidable Marriages; A voidable marriage cannot be assailed
collaterally except in a direct proceeding.—It bears reiterating that a voidable
marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding.
Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. Upon the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio.

Amor-Catalan vs. Court of Appeals,

514 SCRA 607, G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007
Marriages; A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.—Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause
arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones
are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. A divorce obtained abroad by
an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must
be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.
Marriages; Parties; A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other
actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest and must be based on a cause of action.—True, under the New Civil
Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married, or
even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same. A petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of
action. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), the Court held that
the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of
the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.

Tenchavez vs. Escaño,

15 SCRA 355, No. L-19671 November 29, 1965
Husband and wife; Foreign divorce between Filipino citizens decreed after
the effectivity of the new Civil Code; Remarriage of divorced consort.—A
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386), is not entitled to
recognition as valid in the Philippines; and neither is the marriage contracted
with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign
decree of divorce, entitled to validity in this country.
Same; Same; Same; Innocent consort entitled to legal separation.—The
marriage of the divorced wife and her cohabitation with a person other than
the lawful husband entitles the latter to a decree of legal separation
conformably to Philippine law.
Same; Same; Same; Invalid divorce entitles innocent consort to recover
damages.—The desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one
consort entitles the other to recover damages.
Same; Action for alienation of affections against parents of one consort;
Absence of proof of malice.—An action for alienation of affections against
the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or
unworthy motives on their part.
 Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr.,
139 SCRA 139, No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
Husband and Wife; Judgments; Marriages; Divorce; A divorce decree
granted by a U.S. Court between a Filipina and her American husband is
binding on the American husband.—There can be no question as to the
validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and
binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public
policy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Absolute divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines if valid under the national law
of such an alien.—lt is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; Actions; An American granted
absolute divorce in his country with his Filipina wife is estopped from
asserting his rights over property allegedly held in the Philippines as conjugal
property by him and his former wife.—Thus, pursuant to his national law,
private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Succession; An American granted absolute
divorce with Filipina wife is cut off from marital and successional rights with
the latter.—To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still
subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code
cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera,

174 SCRA 653, G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
Divorce; Fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country
is admitted and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines.—In
the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the matter of status of persons.
Same; Same; Same; Rule under American jurisprudence that after a divorce
has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offender is in pari materia with ours.—American
jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the
innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently
granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court sees no reason why the same doctrinal
rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction.—We see no reason
why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We
are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-
a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed.
Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse,
at the time of the filing of the complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent being no longer the
husband of petitioner has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case.—Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent,
being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Allegation that private respondent
could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge even if true is of no legal significance or consequence.—The
allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case
before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family
nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our
law on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to
speak of The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the
former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.

Quita vs. Court of Appeals,

300 SCRA 406, G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
Husband and Wife; Conflict of Laws; Divorce; If there is a question as to
whether a wife was still a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from her
husband—the decedent—the trial court should conduct a hearing to
establish her citizenship.—We note that in her comment to petitioner’s
motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether
petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she
had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also
invoked the above quoted procedural rule. To this, petitioner replied that
Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of
the divorce they obtained. Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to
establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth
of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence
as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor
by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law; Once proved that a wife was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from her husband, then she could
very well lose her right to inherit from the latter.—Then in private
respondent’s motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court’s decision
she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing. Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the
issue on her citizenship. The trial court did not grant private respondent’s
prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that
both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were married in the
Philippines.” It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We
deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of
their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine
petitioner’s citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to
whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The
trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved
that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn
would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from Arturo.
Same; Same; Same; Forum Shopping; There is no forum shopping where
one petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions
filed before other courts concern the issuance of new owner’s duplicate
copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of the
decedent.—As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and
her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and that the present petition
be dismissed for forum shopping, the same lacks merit. For forum shopping
to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential
facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action,
subject matter and issue. The present petition deals with declaration of
heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts
concern the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copies of titles of certain
properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to
declare the existence of forum shopping.

Diego vs. Castillo,

436 SCRA 67, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673 August 11, 2004
Mistake of Fact; Mistake of Law; The court carefully distinguished between
a mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a
bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even
a lay person from liability.—This Court, in People v. Bitdu, carefully
distinguished between a mistake of fact, which could be a basis for the
defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law, which does
not excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability. Bitdu held that even if
the accused, who had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan custom,
honestly believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not
committing any violation of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the
same does not justify her act.
This Court further stated therein that with respect to the contention that the
accused acted in good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing
that she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to
say that everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does
not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him
from the consequences thereof.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Marriages; The accused who secured a foreign
divorce, and later remarried in the Philippines, in the belief that the foreign
divorce was valid, is liable for bigamy.—Squarely applicable to the criminal
case for bigamy, is People v. Schneckenburger, where it was held that the
accused who secured a foreign divorce, and later remarried in the
Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is liable for
bigamy. These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is whether or
not respondent Judge should be held administratively liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas,

628 SCRA 266, G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages—void
and voidable marriages—and in both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or
at the time of the marriage; Divorce contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.—The Family Code recognizes
only two types of defective marriages—void and voidable marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment
of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the
other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising
after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Through the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Executive Order No. (EO) 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA
653 (1989).—Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows: “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” Through the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139
(1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989). In both cases, the
Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights
after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered
as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.—As the RTC correctly
stated, the provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.” The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or
her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree.
Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws
do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17
of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot
be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion
of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of
the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action based on the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree—if the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.—An action based on the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court
in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Only the Filipino spouse can
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code—the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision.—Given the rationale and
intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability
of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the
Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; Recognition of
Foreign Judgments; The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip such aliens of legal
interest to petition the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree—direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute
an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.—We
qualify our above conclusion—i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens—with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition
the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce
decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law
have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. * * * To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce
obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The starting point
in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws—the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules
on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.—The starting point in
any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within
its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose
or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; In the instant case
where the foreigner seeking recognition of the foreign divorce decree
attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the foreign
law on divorce, the Court deems it more appropriate to remand the case to
the trial court to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
foreign divorce law, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the
Filipina wife’s obvious conformity with the petition.—In Gerbert’s case, since
both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into
play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2)
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The
records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed
to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we
can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law. We deem it more appropriate to
take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be
served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to
oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have
the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice
of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis
for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound
by its terms.—More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice
of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis
for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound
by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the
Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Same; Same; Civil Registry; While the law requires the entry of the divorce
decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration—there must
first be a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given
res judicata effect; The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.—But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso
facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before
it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no
judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority
of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was
aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited National Statistics
Office (NSO) Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 1982—both of which required a final order from a
competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage,
can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the
foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently
void and cannot produce any legal effect.

San Luis vs. San Luis,

514 SCRA 294, G.R. No. 133743, G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
Family Code; Marriages; The Court stated that “the severance of the marital
bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”—
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA
653 (1989), where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a proper
party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that
“the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or
cast obloquy on the other.”
Same; Same; Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between
two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where
one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it.—When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible
good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage,
being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is
the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad
against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437
(2001), the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving
foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented.—Applying the above doctrine in the instant
case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse.
However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,
366 SCRA 437 (2001), the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record
is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
Marriages; Co-ownership; Property; Any property acquired during the union
is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts.—
Respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest
in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce
and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with
him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be
considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the
beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership. In a coownership, it is not necessary that the
property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-
owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Juan Luces Luna,

730 SCRA 376, G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
Civil Law; Conflict of Laws; Nationality Rule; The Civil Code continued to
follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.—The
first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at
the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the
nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the
effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Divorce; The nonrecognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either
or both of the spouses are residing abroad.—From the time of the celebration
of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute
divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines.
The nonrecognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even
under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing
abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws
have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies
against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of
nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The nonrecognition of absolute divorce in the
Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital
union especially among Filipino citizens.—It is true that on January 12, 1976,
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if
voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12,
1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution, and regards it as a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life. The nonrecognition of absolute
divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of
the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of
either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long as
this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree
dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership of Gains;
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage
settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property
relations.—Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any
marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their
property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in
force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the
spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement
before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so
provides, to wit: Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence
of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall
govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Same; Same; Same; Marriages; In the Philippines, marriages that are
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void.—In the Philippines,
marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71
of the Civil Code clearly states: Article 71. All marriages performed outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by
Philippine law. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. A
bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.
Same; Same; Property Relations; Co-Ownership; Due to the second
marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue
of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144
of the Civil Code.—Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-
ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz.: Article 144.
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. (n) In
such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof
to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became
imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.

Noveras vs. Noveras,

733 SCRA 528, G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014
Civil Law; Family Law; Divorce; Absent a valid recognition of the divorce
decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines.—
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption as the lower courts
did with respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of
divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not
recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally
married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to
liquidation.
Same; Same; Marriage Settlements; As a general rule, any modification in
the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of
marriage.—As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements
must be made before the celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule
is allowed provided that the modification is judicially approved and refers only
to the instances provided in Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family
Code.
Same; Same; Absolute Community Property; Judicial Separation of
Properties; The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated
in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code.—Having established
that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the
petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be
granted. The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community
property automatically dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated
in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 of the Family Code, thus: Art. 99. The
absolute community terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2)
When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is
annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of property
during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
Same; Same; Same; Procedure Observed in the Liquidation of Absolute
Community Regime.—Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation
follows the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the following
procedure should apply: Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute
community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall
be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community
and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) The debts and obligations
of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of
insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the
provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94. (3) Whatever remains of
the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each
of them. (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community
shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between
husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon
in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of
such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits
subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),
the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of
the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the
market value at the time of its dissolution. (5) The presumptive legitimes of
the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with
Article 51. (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition
of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall
be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to
have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case
there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the
best interests of said children.
Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; Lex Situs; Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly
states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.—We agree with the appellate court that the
Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California properties of
David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine
properties. We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with
respect to the share of the spouses in the absolute community properties in
the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s presumptive
legitimes.

Ando vs. Department of Foreign Affairs,

733 SCRA 691, G.R. No. 195432 August 27, 2014
Administrative Law; Passports; Documentary Requirements Before a
Married Woman May Obtain a Passport Under the Name of Her Spouse.—
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which
was adopted on 25 February 1997, the following are the additional
documentary requirements before a married woman may obtain a passport
under the name of her spouse: SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to
married, divorced or widowed women shall be made in accordance with the
following provisions: a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides
to adopt the surname of her husband pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act
No. 386, she must present the original or certified true copy of her marriage
contract, and one photocopy thereof. In addition thereto, a Filipino who
contracts marriage in the Philippines to a foreigner, shall be required to
present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counselling Seminar
conducted by the CFO when applying for a passport for the first time. b) In
case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true
copy of her annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and
the Court Order effecting the annulment. c) In case of a woman who was
divorced by her alien husband, she must present a certified true copy of the
Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular
post which has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or
by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true
copy of the Divorce Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of
Divorce from the Shari’ah Court or the OCRG. d) In the event that marriage
is dissolved by the death of the husband, the applicant must present the
original or certified true copy of the Death Certificate of the husband or the
Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or Shari’ah Court, in which case
the applicant may choose to continue to use her husband’s surname or
resume the use of her maiden surname.
Same; Same; She should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in the event of the denial of her
application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8239.—In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that
she would not be issued a Philippine passport under her second husband’s
name. Should her application for a passport be denied, the remedies
available to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal.—Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the
application of this Act of the implementing rules and regulations issued by
the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
from whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due course.
The IRR further provides in detail: ARTICLE 10. Appeal. In the event that an
application for a passport is denied, or an existing one cancelled or restricted,
the applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to appeal in writing to the
Secretary within fifteen (15) days from notice of denial, cancellation or
restriction. Clearly, she should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of the
DFA in the event of the denial of her application for a passport, after having
complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioner’s argument that her
application “cannot be said to have been either denied, cancelled or
restricted by [the DFA], so as to make her an aggrieved party entitled to
appeal,” as instead she “was merely told” that her passport cannot be issued,
does not persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the
event of the denial of her application.
Civil Law; Husband and Wife; Divorce; Because our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven and like any other fact.—With respect to her prayer for the
recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed,
instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her
first husband. In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), we ruled that a
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction,
provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the
divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
and like any other fact.

People vs. Jumawan,

722 SCRA 108, G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
Same; Same; Marital Rape; In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as
‘marital rape’ due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the
consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital rape
under the general definition of ‘rape.’—The explicit intent to outlaw marital
rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress
on the law’s progenitor’s, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In
spite of qualms on tagging the crime as ‘marital rape’ due to conservative
Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was
clearly to include and penalize marital rape under the general definition of
‘rape.’
Same; Same; Same; The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine
jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262, which regards rape within
marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man
against his wife within or outside the family abode.—The paradigm shift on
marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262,
which regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be
committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family abode, viz.:
Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of
acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife,
or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault,
coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not
limited to, the following acts: A. “Physical Violence” refers to acts that include
bodily or physical harm; B. “Sexual violence” refers to an act which is sexual
in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not
limited to: a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a
woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually
suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim’s
body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof,
forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep
together in the same room with the abuser; b) acts causing or attempting to
cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion; c)
Prostituting the woman or child. Statistical figures confirm the above
characterization. Emotional and other forms of nonpersonal violence are the
most common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among
ever-married women. One in seven ever-married women experienced
physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced
sexual violence.
Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the archaic notion that marital
rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over
his wife’s body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him
is always obligatory or at least, presumed.—The Philippines, as State Party
to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as
well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve
full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all
appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct
of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices,
customs and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority
or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women. One of such measures is R.A. No. 8353 insofar as it eradicated the
archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has
absolute proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus her consent to every
act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which was
promulgated by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDAW. The
Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that
constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified ‘marital rape’ as a
species of sexual violence.
Same; Same; Same; A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or
against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a
State Party to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and its accompanying Declaration,
defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.—Clearly, it is
now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her
will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party
to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the
act as rape under R.A. No. 8353. A woman is no longer the chattel-
antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual
intercourse with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a
marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal to that he
accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing
her to engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent. Surely, the
Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and
accommodate conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities that
have lost their relevance in a progressive society. It is true that the Family
Code, obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions
affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both
spontaneous and mutual and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by
force or coercion.
Same; Same; Same; The delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy
between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion.—The delicate
and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes
cruelty and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a deep
sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It is an
expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it is needed by the other
and it can go a long way in deepening marital relationship. When it is
egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a felonious
urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to
protect its lofty purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State
policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or
uninterested wife’s absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally
seek the court’s intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated to
fulfill an essential marital obligation. But he cannot and should not demand
sexual intimacy from her coercively or violently.
Equal Protection of the Laws; To treat marital rape cases differently from
nonmarital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and
in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.—To treat
marital rape cases differently from nonmarital rape cases in terms of the
elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes
on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so
as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others; no
person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which
is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No.
8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c)
marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator’s own spouse.—As
above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353
pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital
rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator’s own spouse. The single
definition for all three forms of the crime shows that the law does not
distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed without
a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their
husband and those raped by any other man alike.
Same; Same; Same; A marriage license should not be viewed as a license
for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity.—The Court adheres to
and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument
akin to those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage license
should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with
impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as
does an unmarried woman. She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual
intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent
from her in case she refuses.
Same; Same; Same; The human rights of women include their right to have
control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their
sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion,
discrimination and violence.—The human rights of women include their right
freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality, including sexual
and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.
Women do not divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for
the simple reason that human rights are inalienable. In fine, since the law
does not separately categorize marital rape and nonmarital rape nor provide
for different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret
and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of
judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither
can the Court frame distinct or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases
as it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally
classify them differently from the victims of nonmarital rape. Indeed, there
exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the
evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the woman’s own
legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral
certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal
relationship between the accused and his accuser.

Kalaw vs. Fernandez,

657 SCRA 822, G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011
Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity; Psychological incapacity
is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations; The burden of proving psychological incapacity
is on the plaintiff; The psychological problem must be grave, must have
existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.—Psychological
incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and
to assume the basic marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological
incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated
party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological
disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological
problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must
be incurable.
Same; Same; Same; Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation,
but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.—Even
assuming arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity
cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other
men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Campos vs. Campos,

665 SCRA 238, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761 February 8, 2012
In his report dated 16 February 2011, Executive Judge Hector B. Salise
stated that respondent’s admission of homosexuality does not make him
automatically immoral. The investigating judge also found no evidence of
respondent having a relationship with another woman as claimed by Aida.
The investigating judge also found that respondent was not guilty of
dishonesty. The investigating judge stated that the fact that respondent had
children with Aida was not a proof that he was not a homosexual and thus
he was lying in his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
investigating judge also stated that as far as respondent was concerned, the
title to the property was lost and that he was only trying to protect his right
as the true owner of the land. The investigating judge further stated that the
complainants did not controvert respondent’s allegation that while the
property was in the name of Alistair, respondent was the real owner of the
property.
 Ong vs. Ong,
505 SCRA 76, G.R. No. 153206 October 23, 2006
Abandonment; As it was established that Lucita left William due to his
abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by
the said provision.—Also without merit is the argument of William that since
Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be
granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that
legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for
legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was
established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not
constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.
Same; Same; With the enactment of the Family Code, this has been
accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out the
corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and
family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and
those for legal separation.—We reiterate that our Constitution is committed
to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. The
Constitution itself however does not establish the parameters of state
protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy
and the modalities to protect it and put into operation the constitutional
provisions that protect the same. With the enactment of the Family Code,
this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the family, spells out
the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married
and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and
those for legal separation.

Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 685 SCRA 33, G.R. No. 159594
November 12, 2012
Abandonment of Conjugal Home; Infidelity; Abandonment was not one of the
grounds for the nullity of marriage under the Family Code; Sexual infidelity
was not a valid ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.—The only fact established here, which Catalina even admitted
in her Answer, was her abandonment of the conjugal home to live with
another man. Yet, abandonment was not one of the grounds for the nullity of
marriage under the Family Code. It did not also constitute psychological
incapacity, it being instead a ground for legal separation under Article 55(10)
of the Family Code. On the other hand, her sexual infidelity was not a valid
ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
considering that there should be a showing that such marital infidelity was a
manifestation of a disordered personality that made her completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.

De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz,

22 SCRA 333, No. L-19565 January 30, 1968
Abandonment of spouse; Concept of abandonment as ground for separation
of property.—The word "abandonment", when referring to the act of one
consort of leaving the other, is "the act of the husband or the wife who leaves
his or her consort wilfully, and with an intention of causing perpetual
separation" (Gay v. State, 31 S.E. 569). Giving to the word "abandoned", as
used in article 178 of the new Civil Code, the meaning drawn from the
definition above reproduced, it seems rather clear that to constitute
abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be absolute cessation
of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation. Therefore, if there is only physical separation between the
spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving the
conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal
properties with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the
separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and children, the wife's
petition for separation of property can not be granted.
 Dimayuga-Laureana vs. Court of Appeals,
566 SCRA 154, G.R. No. 159220 September 22, 2008
Sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence, homosexuality, physical
violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to change religious affiliation,
and abandonment are grounds for legal separation but not for declaring a
marriage void.—As found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner anchored her
petition on respondent’s irresponsibility, infidelity, and homosexual
tendencies. Petitioner likewise alleged that respondent tried to compel her to
change her religious belief, and in one of their arguments, respondent also
hit her. However, sexual infidelity, repeated physical violence,
homosexuality, physical violence or moral pressure to compel petitioner to
change religious affiliation, and abandonment are grounds for legal
separation but not for declaring a marriage void.

Gandionco vs. Peñaranda,

155 SCRA 725, No. L-79284 November 27, 1987
Conviction for concubinage not necessary before decree of legal separation
can be issued; Doctrine in Francisco vs. Tayao, modified.—A decree of legal
separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal
proceeding or conviction is necessary. To this end, the doctrine in Francisco
vs. Tayao has been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710,
when absolute divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same
grounds for legal separation under the New Civil Code, with the requirement,
under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouse had to be
established by final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has not
been reproduced or adopted by the framers of the present Civil Code, and
the omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent
rule in Francisco v. Tayao.
Same; Support Pendente Lite; Remedy of support pendente lite available in
an action for legal separation and grant at the discretion of the judge.—
Petitioner’s attempt to resist payment of support pendente lite to his wife
must also fail, as we find no proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent Judge in ordering the same. Support pendente lite, as a
remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation, and granted at
the discretion of the judge. If petitioner finds the amount of support pendente
lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce
the same.

People vs. Zapata and Bondoc,

88 Phil. 688, No. L-3047 May 16, 1951
EACH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE A CRIME.—Adultery is a crime of result
and not of tendency, as the Supreme Court of Spain has held (S. 10
December 1945); it is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and
exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual
intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery (Cuello Calón, Derecho Penal,
Vol. II, p. 569).
LAW DOES NOT BAR FILING OF AS MANY COMPLAINTS AS THERE
ARE ADULTEROUS ACTS.—True, two or more adulterous acts committed
by the same defendants are against the same person—the offended
husband, the same status—the union of the husband and wife by their
marriage, and the same community represented by the State for its interest
in maintaining and preserving such status. But this identity of the offended
party, status and society does not argue against the commission of the crime
of adultery as many times as there were carnal acts consummated, for as
long as the status remains unchanged, the nexus undissolved and unbroken,
an encroachment or trespass upon that status constitutes a crime. There is
no constitutional or legal provision which bars the filing of as many
complaints for adultery as there were adulterous acts committed, each
constituting one crime.
 Bucal vs. Bucal,
759 SCRA 262, G.R. No. 206957 June 17, 2015
As defined in Section 8 of RA 9262, “[a] protection order is an order issued
x x x for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman
or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary
relief. The relief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of
safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the
victim’s daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to
independently regain control over her life. x x x.” With a standing PPO issued
for the purpose of protecting not only the woman, but also her child against
acts of violence committed by the person against whom the order is issued
— in this case, Manny — the resolution of the issue of whether or not Manny
should be given visitation rights, despite any discernible basis therefor, is
urgent, else Cherith and Francheska be unduly exposed to the very danger
which they are seeking protection from. As the Court sees it, any further
delay would substantially prejudice their interests, thus, allowing a direct
recourse to certiorari.

Araneta vs. Concepcfon and Araneta,

99 Phil. 709, No. L-9667 July 31, 1956
LEGAL SEPARATION; "COOLING OFF" PERIOD; PURPOSE OF;
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN AND ALIMONY AND SUPPORT "PENDENTE
LITE" MAY BE DETERMINED DURING THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD.—
Article 103 of the Civil Code provides that "an action for legal separation shall
in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of
the petition." The period of six months fixed therein is evidently intended as
a cooling off period to make possible a reconciliation between the spouses.
But this practical expedient does not have the effect of overriding other
provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and
alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article
105, Civil Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined
by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the courts
close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused.
Pacete vs. Carriaga, Jr., 231 SCRA 321, G.R. No. 53880 March 17, 1994
Art. 103, Civil Code now Art. 58, Family Code; Legal Separation must be
tried before six months have elapsed since the filing of the petition to provide
the parties a “cooling-off” period.—Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article
58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation
must “in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition,” obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off’
period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties
to reconcile.

Lapuz vs. Eufemio,

43 SCRA 177, No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
Legal separation; Action abated by death of one of the spouses before final
decree.—An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than
bed-and-board separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code
of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the
innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its Article
108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation, stop or abate
the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of the action
itself—actio personalis moritur cum persona.
Same; Same; Same; Even if action involves property rights; Article 106 of
the Civil Code explained.—A review of the result ing changes in property
relations between spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree
of legal separation: hence, they cannot survive the death of the plaintiff if it
occurs prior to the decree. Article 107 makes it apparent that the right to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community
of property ), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the
profits earned by the partnership or community , or his disqualification to
inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the
innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms if the Civil
Code article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by
their nature and intent, such claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive
as assignable or transmissible.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nature of property rights.—These rights are
mere effects of a decree of separation, their source being the decree itself;
without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and
the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain
unborn.
Same; Declaration of nullity of marriage; Effect of death of one of the
spouses.—Such action became moot and academic upon the death of one
of the spouses, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same
after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines could be resolved and determined in a proper action
for partition by either the surviving spouse or by the heirs of the deceased
spouse.
Remedial law; Substitution of the deceased party in an action for legal
separation involving property rights.—A claim to the rights provided for by
Article 106 of the Civil Code is not a claim that “is not thereby extinguished”
after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant
a continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party. The
same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that
survive for or against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised
Rules of Court, Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of
marriage can be deemed fairly included in the enumeration.

Villanueva vs. Chiong,

554 SCRA 197, G.R. No. 159889 June 5, 2008
Civil Law; Property; Conjugal Partnership; The separation in fact between
husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal
partnership.—Petitioners’ contention that the lot belongs exclusively to
Florentino because of his separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time
of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents’
separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor
prejudiced Elisera’s interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the
separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall
not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature.
Same; Same; Same; Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property
acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or to the wife.—Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all
property acquired by the spouses during the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Petitioners’ mere insistence as to
the lot’s supposed exclusive nature is insufficient to overcome such
presumption when taken against all the evidence for respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Without the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or
encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1998 is not void, but merely voidable.—The sale by Florentino
without Elisera’s consent is not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones
v. Agbayani, 471 SCRA 306 (2005), citing Villaranda v. Villaranda, 423
SCRA 571 (2004), we held that without the wife’s consent, the husband’s
alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable.
Same; Same; Same; In a case involving the annulment of sale executed by
the husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation
must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife
in the conjugal property is concerned.—Petitioners finally contend that,
assuming arguendo the property is still conjugal, the transaction should not
be entirely voided as Florentino had one-half share over the lot. Petitioners’
stance lacks merit. In Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v. Mijares, 410 SCRA
97 (2003), citing Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., 23 SCRA 248 (1968), a case
involving the annulment of sale executed by the husband without the consent
of the wife, it was held that the alienation must be annulled in its entirety and
not only insofar as the share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned.
Although the transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely
voidable, the rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the
same.
Same; Same; Same; If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what
has been given is proper.—If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration
of what has been given is proper. x x x The effect of annulment of the
contract is to wipe it out of existence, and to restore the parties, insofar as
legally and equitably possible, to their original situation before the contract
was entered into.

Espinosa vs. Omaña, 659 SCRA 1, A.C. No. 9081 October 12, 2011
Conjugal Partnership; Extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership
without judicial approval is void.—This case is not novel. This Court has ruled
that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not
facilitate the disintegration of a marriage and the family by encouraging the
separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

Sabalones vs. Court of Appeals,

230 SCRA 79, G.R. No. 106169 February 14, 1994
After a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court may appoint
either one of the spouses or a third person to act as administrator.—We
agree with the respondent court that pending the appointment of an
administrator over the whole mass of conjugal assets, the respondent court
was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was
also correct, taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in
enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his wife’s administration pending
resolution of the appeal. The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint
administration over the conjugal properties as clearly provided in the above-
cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted,
states that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court
shall, in the absence of a written agreement between the couple, appoint
either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the administrator. While
it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such
designation was implicit in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner
any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also disqualifying him as
administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court
of Appeals when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary
injunction now under challenge.

Yangco vs. Rohde, 1 Phil., 404, No. 996 October 13, 1902
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; ALIMONY; PROHIBITION.—Where the
answer to a complaint alleging marriage and praying for a divorce denies the
fact of marriage, the court exceeds its jurisdiction in granting alimony, and
the enforcement of an order granting it will be restrained by the writ of
prohibition.
The right of a wife to support depends upon her status as such, and where
the existence of the status is put in issue by the pleading it can not be
presumed to exist for the purpose of granting alimony.

Lerma vs. Court of Appeals,

61 SCRA 440, No. L-33352 December 20, 1974
Support pendente lite; Petition for support filed in bad faith; Effect of.—The
right to separate support or maintenance, even from the conjugal partnership
property, presupposes the existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse
claiming such right to live separately. This is implicit in Article 104 of the Civil
Code, which states that after the filing of the petition for legal separation the
spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. A petition in bad
faith, such as that filed by one who is himself or herself guilty of an act which
constitutes a ground for legal separation at the instance of the other spouse,
cannot be considered as within the intendment of the law granting separate
support.
Same; When obligation to give support ceases.—In fact under Article 303 of
the same Code the obligation to give support shall cease “when the recipient,
be he a forced heir or not, has committed some act which gives rise to
disinheritance;” and under Article 921 one of the causes for disinheriting a
spouse is “when the spouse has given cause for legal separation.” The loss
of the substantive right to support in such a situation is incompatible with any
claim for support pendente lite.
Same; Right to support under article 292 of the Civil code; When right may
be invoked.—Article 292 of the Civil Code is not in itself the source of the
legal right to receive support. It merely states that the support, not only of the
spouses but also of the children, shall be taken from the conjugal property
during the pendency of the legal separation proceeding. It does not preclude
the loss of such right in certain cases. In the second place, the said article
contemplates the pendency of a court action and, inferentially at least, a
prima facie showing that the action will prosper. For if the action is shown to
be groundless the mere filing thereof will not necessarily set Article 292 in
operation.
Same; Provisional determination by court of pertinent facts; Adultery as a
defense; Case at bar.—In a provisional sense at least, within the meaning of
Section 5 of Rule 61 of the Rules of Court the probable failure of the
respondent’s suit for legal separation can be foreseen since she is not an
innocent spouse, having been convicted of adultery by the Court of First
Instance. It is true that the judgment of conviction is on appeal in the Court
of Appeals, but the same undoubtedly satisfies the standard of provisional
showing set by the aforesaid Rule. If legal separation cannot be claimed by
the guilty spouse in the first place, the fact that an action for that purpose is
filed anyway should not be permitted to be used as a means to obtain support
pendente lite, which, without such action, would be denied on the strength of
the decisions of this Court recognizing adultery as a good defense.