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CRITIQUE OF LEIBNIZ’S PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINISM

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2017.

As regards human free will,1 the rationalist Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716)
maintained a psychological determinism. Determinism “is the theory that the will is not free and
that all our acts, even including those apparently free, are adequately and inevitably determined
by their antecedents…Psychological determinism is the theory that the will necessarily follows
the strongest motive, or what is presented to it as the greatest good.”2 Leibniz explained free will
in such a way that determinism resulted, since for him, in keeping with the principle of sufficient
reason, the human will is intrinsically necessitated to choose the greater good, necessarily
determined by the strongest motive. For Leibniz, “man’s reasonable activity, like that of God’s,
should have a sufficient reason. If liberty were a power to act without reason, it would be absurd
and bad. It must then be conceived, on the one hand, as a spontaneous energy whose operation
satisfies a natural tendency that is not imposed; in this way, reasonable activity shows its
independence. But, on the other hand, its act is infallibly determined to choose the object which,
in this particular psychological circumstance, imposes itself as the best, and in this way it has a
sufficient reason for acting (theory of psychological determinism).”3 In his description of
Leibniz’s psychological determinism, R. P. Phillips writes: “In Leibniz’s view, the last practical
judgment, which ends a deliberation, is indifferent in the sense that it is contingent, i.e., that the
contrary, or at least the contradictory, judgment is possible, inasmuch as it does not imply a
contradiction; but not in the sense that a man, in such-and-such circumstances, and being
mentally disposed in a particular way, could form the contrary or contradictory judgment. To
admit this would be, in Leibniz’s opinion, to deny the principle of sufficient reason. Hence this
last practical judgment is not, as Spinoza would have it, necessary as a conclusion of geometry
is, but is necessary with a moral necessity.”4 For R. P. Phillips’s critique of Leibniz’s
psychological determinism see his The Answer to Psychological Determinism. The Theory of
Leibniz Excluded, pages 290-295 of volume 1 (The Philosophy of Nature) of his two volume
Modern Thomistic Philosophy, Burns Oates and Washbourne, London, 1941.

1
Describing the difference between free will (affirmed and defended by thinkers like St. Augustine and St. Thomas
Aquinas) and determinism (espoused by thinkers like Spinoza [monistic, pantheistic determinism of the One Divine
Substance] and Leibniz [psychological determinism]) Celestine N. Bittle writes: “Free will is defined as the ability
of the will, all conditions for action being present, to decide whether to act or not to act and whether to act in this
manner or in that manner…The essence of the freedom of the will, as just defined, consists in indetermination, so
that the will, no matter what the strength of the conflicting motives or the nature of the antecedent external and
internal conditions for action may be, is not determined to act by necessity. This doctrine is therefore designated as
indeterminism. This indeterminism, however, is not absolute, because in the pursuit of ‘happiness’ the will is, as
stated before, determined. We advocate, then a moderate indeterminism…The doctrine opposed to free will is styled
determinism. According to this doctrine, the will is not intrinsically free, but is determined by the antecedent
psychical and physical conditions and causes to act as it does; it is necessitated in its volition.”(C. BITTLE, The
Whole Man, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1956, pp. 380-381).
2
D. MERCIER, Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, vol. 1, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., London,
1938, p. 272.
3
F.-J. THONNARD, A Short History of Philosophy, Desclée, Tournai, 1956, p. 564.
4
R. P. PHILLIPS, Modern Thomistic Philosophy, vol. 1 (The Philosophy of Nature), Burns Oates and Washbourne,
London, 1941, p. 278.

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Describing Leibniz’s psychological determinism Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P.
writes: “The intellectualism of Leibniz, though maintaining the necessity of the principles of
contradiction and sufficient reason, strives to find a place for freedom. As a matter of fact, it
allows only contingency to remain, and a necessary choice of a moral necessity. In God as in
man, choice is infallibly determined by the principle of sufficient reason. Leibniz read St.
Augustine, St. Thomas, Bannez, and Alvarez, as well as Molina and Fonseca; he admits with the
Thomists that ‘intelligence is, as it were, the soul of freedom’(Théod. III, sec. 228); that freedom
presupposes spontaneity, which means exemption from all external constraint (sec. 301) and also
indifference; but he adds: provided we do not understand by indifference anything more than
contingency.5 Contingency is the ‘exclusion of logical or metaphysical necessity’ (sec. 288), but
not the exclusion of moral necessity which belongs properly to understanding and which inclines
infallibly though without necessity (sec. 310). According to Leibniz, the last practical judgment
which terminates a deliberation is indifferent to what is meant by contingent. This is equivalent
to saying that the contrary or at least the contradictory judgment is possible, or does not imply a
contradiction. But it is not indifferent in this sense, that the contrary or the contradictory
judgment would be compatible with the external circumstances and the internal dispositions in
which one finds oneself in the act of judging. To admit this compatibility, to admit that in the
same circumstances a man can at one tme act and at another time not act or act indifferently, is,
according to Leibniz, a denial of the principle of sufficient reason, because that principle requires
that nothing happen without a determining reason for it. He says further: ‘Without this great
principle we should never be able to prove the existence of God and we should lose a vast
number of very exact and very useful reasonings which ultimately rest upon this principle. It
suffers no exception, otherwise its force would be weakened. There is also nothing so weak as
those systems in which everything is unstable and replete with exceptions.’(Théod., I, sec. 84).

“The last practical judgment that terminates a deliberation is therefore not absolutely
necessary, like a geometrical conclusion – in that Leibniz differs from Spinoza – but it is
necessary, he says, with a moral necessity in virtue of the principle of sufficient reason or that of
the better. In such determined circumstances it cannot at the same time be better to act and better
not to act; in one and the same situation there can be only one better, not two. And if one judges
that it is better to act, the circumstances being the same, one cannot effectively abandon this
judgment and judge that it is better not to act. ‘Everything is certain and predetermined in man as
in everything else, and the human soul is a kind of spiritual automaton’(Théod., I, sec. 52). This
is what is called psychological determinism.

“If that is true, our activity seems to be no more than a series of acts or phenomena, the
connection between them being governed by the laws of association of ideas when we do not
reflect, but by the principle of sufficient reason when we do reflect. Can the rational automaton
be called a person, is it really master of its acts, sui juris? Is it not rather a part of the universe, a
group of phenomena lost in the immense series? Is it not rather limited to the transmission of the
received activity? Is it really the source of its own activity, is it truly endowed with initiative? In

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“So far we have enumerated the two conditions of freedom of which Aristotle speaks, i.e., spontaneity and
intelligence, which are found united in us in deliberation, whereas the second condition is wanting to beasts. But the
Scholastics require still a third condition which they call indifference. And we must admit it if indifference means as
much as contingency; for I have already said that freedom must exclude an absolute and metaphysical or logical
necessity.”(Théod., III, sec. 302; I, sec. 46).

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spite of being endowed with reason, it is not so much acting as acted upon.”6 For Garrigou-
Lagrange, O.P.’s detailed critique of Leibniz’s psychological determinism, see: Section B. In the
Principles of Thomist Intellectualism We Have a Refutation of Psychological Determinism, pages
318-338 of volume 2 of his God: His Existence and His Nature, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1946.

In his description and critique of Leibniz’s psychological determinism James D. Collins


observes that, for Leibniz, human freedom “is the spontaneity of an intelligent being.7 It is
grounded neither in indifferent equilibrium nor in abstention of judgment. For, indifference is not
a sufficient reason for a free action, whereas abstention is itself a prior act that has a prior reason.
Our wills are laden with the spontaneous dispositions of our rational nature, including the
influence of the unconscious, ‘minute perceptions.’ Moreover, intelligent agents can grasp the
nature of the good and, within our universe, will always choose what appears to be the best. This
provides the only sufficient reason for their action. A free act is always rationally motivated and
is the more perfectly free, the more it is determined by what seems best, i.e., by the strongest
motive. Leibniz argues here in much the same way as in his explanation of divine creative
freedom. Human choice is not a blind impulse but proceeds from a reflective deliberation upon
our motives and desires. Although whatever seems best will be the prevailing motive, this reason
inclines or persuades the will efficaciously rather than coerces it. We act not under an absolute
necessity but under a moral necessity, which is the condition of freedom. Nevertheless, we
always do that which seems to be best and which therefore provides the strongest motive or
reason of choice.

“Leibniz’ theory of human freedom encounters the same difficulties as his doctrine on
divine creation, since in both cases he regards the sufficient reason of an action as imposing itself
independently upon the agent. The difference between absolute and hypothetical necessity
becomes nugatory in a theory that identifies freedom with rational spontaneity. Although
intellectual apprehension of the grounds of choice prevents it from being a blind impulse, the
choice is nevertheless determined by the total spontaneous striving of one’s nature and not by the
agent’s uncoerced judgment. Leibniz shows that human choice is internally motivated but not
that it is freely made. He confuses a merely passive and motiveless indifference with the
intellect’s dominating power to judge a particular good in the light of the good in general, and
thus to control its own final practical judgment.8 If a man is bound to follow the most strongly
inclining apparent good, it is difficult (as Locke observed) to see how his choice could ever be
determined freely by himself. Leibniz recognizes that an objection can be drawn from the fact
that men often choose deliberately a lesser good or even a known evil. His reply does not salvage
his position. He states that no action is possible unless it be determined by the strongest motive,
which alone gives a sufficient reason for this particular choice. The strength of the motive is

6
R. GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE, God: His Existence and His Nature, vol. 2, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1946, pp. 269-
271.
7
Theodicy, I, 51-52, and III, 288-311 (Huggard, 151, 303-314); Letters to Clarke, V, 11-17 (Wiener, 240-242); New
Essays Concerning Human Understanding, II, xxi (Langley, 179-221).
8
In his Traité du libre arbitre (Liège, Science et Lettres, 1951), 105-110, Y. Simon remarks that the real question in
free choice is not about which is the greater or lesser good, but about the condition under which a particular good
becomes unconditionally desirable here-and-now for a rational appetite, so that it will actually choose this concrete
good. Whether the multitude of insensible perceptions and sentiments inclines us to regard an object as a greater or a
lesser good, there is still need for a last practical judgment, declaring this object to be a good absolutely desirable, to
the point of being here-and-now chosen in a concrete way.

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determined not merely by rational appraisal of the proposed action but also by all the habits,
dispositions, and passions that make up our character. This notion of freedom is little different
from Spinoza’s outright necessitation by another, the ‘other,’ in Leibniz’ case, being the total
bent of one’s nature and character. Whatever one does, would then bear the stamp of spontaneity
and hence of freedom, leaving no distinction between the acts merely done by man and the
distinctively free or human acts that are morally significant…”9

Mercier’s Critique of Leibniz’s Psychological Determinism: “Psychological determinism


owing to the plausibility given to it by Leibniz calls for more particular attention. According to
him the will is bound to seek the greatest good offered to it, since to conceive it as making a
positive choice whilst indifferent, without being moved by the strongest motive, is to attempt to
deny the principle of sufficient reason.10

“Refutation of Psychological Determinism. – To assert that the will is always dominated,


consciously or unconsciously, by the prevailing motive is, if not tautological, an entirely
gratuitous statement. It may happen, as indeed it does happen, that a choice has to be made
between two good things that in themselves are absolutely equivalent. Who will doubt that
between two glasses of water, between two sovereigns, between two roads of exactly the same
length and leading to the same place, the will is objectively swayed in neither direction? In such
circumstances, inability to choose would remind us of the ass in the proverb which died of
starvation between its two pecks of oats. As the theory of Leibniz stands contradicted by facts, it
remains only to consider his criticism that our theory is a contradiction of the principle of
sufficient reason.

“The value of Leibniz’s criticism will best be gauged by an example. The two glasses of
water we supposed as exactly similar and equally desirable in every respect are objectively equal
motives. If I reach out my hand to the one on the left instead of the one on the right, the sole
reason for my action, since it cannot be in any objective quality attaching to one and not to the
other, must be my desire to act; I am actuated by my desire to act (to take the glass) which can be
realized only on the condition of my making a choice and taking one. My choice, then, which is
without an objective motive, has its sufficient reason in something objective, in my own desire to
exercise my will.

“All difficulty will vanish as soon as it is remembered that the freedom of the will resides
formally not in the selection between different goods (freedom of specification) but in the
volition, or rather, the self-determination to move towards a good or not to move towards it
(freedom of exercise). Determinists who bring forward the above objection make the mistake of
asserting that when the will is presented with two unequal motives it is compelled to choose the
better; an assertion which is only partly true, as can be seen from the example of an artist who is
offered the choice of two pictures of unequal value. The act of preference, as such, is
undoubtedly not free, for it is physically impossible for the will not to prefer that good which the
practical reason judges hic et nunc to be on the whole the better. Thus, if the deliberative faculty
be concentrated upon the relative artistic value of the two pictures, the will cannot but prefer the

9
J. D. COLLINS, The Continental Rationalists: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1967, pp. 164-166.
10
The principle of sufficient reason, on which psychological determinism is grounded, is thus formulated by
Leibniz: ‘Nothing can be true or real for which there is not a sufficient reason of it being so.’

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one which is judged the better. Yet if attention is not paid to the superiority of one over the other,
so that each is presented separately to the will as a particular good which may be chosen because
a good and rejected because not the universal good, then a basis for choice exists: the better
picture may freely be chosen or rejected as also may the inferior one, seeing that in itself it too is
a particular good, yet only a particular good. Of course the man would be foolish to choose the
less good, but it is consistent with our explanation to assert that he is free to be foolish; he may
refuse to allow attention to be paid to the objective considerations that would change the course
of his conduct were he acting reasonably, and instead, if he so will, he may say, ‘Stat pro ratione
voluntas.’ In our explanation, to sum up, choice is founded upon the freedom of exercise, the
freedom of willing an act or of abstaining from willing it.”11

H. D. Gardeil, O.P.’s Critique of Leibniz’s Psychological Determinsm: Perhaps the best


statement of this form of determinism appears in Leibniz, whom it is customary to consult for an
explanation of it. Leibniz propounds this doctrine in connection with his criticism of the so-
called theory of freedom through indifference, which Descartes had apparently enunciated and
espoused before him. According to the theory of indifference free will consists in the will being
completely indifferent regarding the various motives upon which choice is based. The will,
therefore, is supposedly in a state of perfect equilibrium respecting all motives, and when it
makes a choice it does so by an impulse that is absolutely self-initiated, and in no way
conditioned by anything outside the will. The free act, then, is one that arises from such an
unconditioned impulse.

“Leibniz was quick to see, and had little difficulty in showing, that the so-called absolute
indifference of the will in regard to all possible motives was a delusion. As a matter of fact, the
will, as he pointed out, is attracted in different degrees by different motives, since some prove
stronger than others. According to Leibniz, however, the strongest motive must prevail, an
eventuality that is only proper inasmuch as, in his view, even the divine will can but will what is
best. Notwithstanding, the act of the will, he believes, remains spontaneous and is inspired by
reason; consequently it still deserves to be called free.

“Whatever its merits or demerits on details, in general we may observe that despite the
good intentions of its author, the Leibnizian theory of free will does not succeed in avoiding
outright determinism. The strongest motive necessarily prevails, even as the universe itself is the
best possible. All speculation about the possibility of other choices or other worlds remains just
that: idle speculation.

“In opposition to this and similar views it must be maintained with St. Thomas that the
will does not determine itself without motive, and, furthermore, that it is not necessarily
determined by the so-called strongest motive. Indeed, the contention that the strongest motive
must prevail is not founded in fact or experience, but is gratuitously asserted. What is a fact of
experience is that prior to choice we find ourselves engaged in deliberating over and examining
various motives, all of them holding out some attraction for us. Then we single out one of them
and decide to follow it. The decision taken does indeed depend upon the motive; in fact, it is
because I judged this particular motive to be best in this instance that I acted upon it. But the
motive prevails only because the will settled upon and chose it. Hence, it actually becomes the
11
D. MERCIER, op. cit., pp. 272-274.

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strongest, but only because I made and wanted it so. Consequently, in my free act there is both
determination by reason and spontaneous self-determination by the will. Without this appeal to
both reason and will, the free act can be neither safeguarded nor accounted for.

“b) Why the will moves in this or that direction. – Our study of the free act has shown that
it does not admit of determination by the stongest motive in the Leibnizian sense. This is not to
deny, however, that in choosing the will may be more influenced by one motive or circumstance
than by another. In De Malo St. Thomas goes into some detail regarding the reasons why the will
responds to one motive rather than another.12

“Considered as proceeding from the will, which means in the order of exercise, the free
act is interiorly conditioned or moved by God alone, yet so as to act conformably to its nature,
that is, freely and not by necessity.

“Considered from the standpoint of specification, however, or as depending on the


intellect and exclusive of the absolute good, whose moving power over the will is absolute and
necessary, the free act may take one course rather than another for any one of the following three
reasons. Either one motive has become dominant, being so appraised by the intellect and
accepted by the will, as when a man chooses what is suitable to health because it suits the will.
Or, only one motive or circumstance may have been considered – a frequent occurrence. And
lastly, the disposition or character of the subject may be the reason why one object interests him
more than another. One who is stirred by the onrush of passion or labors under the burden of
habit will naturally be inclined to so judge of the impending situation as to suit his passion or
habit. It is for this reason that the same object does not make the same impression on the angry
man and one who is calm, on the virtuous and the corrupt, on the sick and the well. The ways in
which emotions, habits, and similar conditions influence the choice of the will are varied and
infinitely complex. Ordinarily, however, such influence does not overcome the will. If we except
the cases, mentioned earlier, where specification necessitates one’s choice, and those unusual
instances where the storm of passion temporarily deprives an individual of the use of reason,
which is faculty of judgment, the will when confronted with particular goods always retains its
essential power to determine itself or not to determine itself, to act or not to act.”13

Régis Jolivet’s Critique of Leibniz’s Psychological Determinism: “Libertà e


determinismo psicologico. 1. Il privilegio del «motivo più forte». Come abbiamo veduto sopra,
Leibniz ha vigorosamente criticato la libertà di indifferenza e dimostrato che non esiste nessun
atto volontario che sia privo di motivo o di ragione. Siccome d’altronde la volontà non può
restare in stato di equilibrio fra più motivi, secondo Leibniz, è necessariamente il motivo più
forte a prendere il sopravvento e a determinare la volizione.

“Tuttavia, secondo Leibniz, l’atto prodotto in tal modo resta libero, perché è:
intelligente, per il fatto che il motivo più forte è tale solo per l’attenzione che si è concentrata su
di lui - spontaneo, ossia prodotto senza costrizione esterna, – contingente, ossia non

12
Cf. De Malo, q. 6, art. unica.
13
H. D. GARDEIL, Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, vol. 3 (Psychology), B. Herder, St.
Louis, 1956, pp. 217-219.

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metafisicamente necessario. Leibniz riassume tutto ciò dicendo che l’atto libero è quello che
viene compiuto infallibiliter, certo, sed non necessario.

“In questa concezione, aggiunge Leibniz, è evidente che devono esserci dei gradi di
libertà; e questi, in proporzione alla parte di ragione esistente nelle nostre decisioni. La libertà
più bassa, che confina coll’automatismo, sarà quella che ha la sua ragione d’essere soltanto
nell’obbedienza agli imperativi collettivi. La libertà più alta (libertà di perfezione) sarà quella in
cui tutta la decisione e tutte le decisioni deriveranno dalla ragione. Infine, siccome la libertà è in
proporzione alla ragione, essa si definirà come il determinismo del migliore: si potrebbero
perfino prevedere in anticipo tutti gli atti liberi, se si conoscesse (come conosce Dio) tutto ciò
che interviene nel funzionamento di questo determinismo.14

“2. Il determinismo psicologico distrugge la libertà. - Non pare che la concezione di


Leibniz si possa accordare con la vera e propria libertà, perché essa sembra includere, qualunque
cosa ne dica il suo autore, una determinazione necessaria del volere. Se questo è «infallibilmente
e sicuramente» determinato dal motivo più forte, non si riesce ti vedere come si possa sfuggire
alla necessità. Leibniz dice giustamente che è l’attenzione a far sì che un determinato motivo sia
il più forte, e quindi l’anima è libera di considerare, o no, i propri desideri, di confrontarli fra loro
e di fermarsi su uno di essi (libertà di esercizio). Ma non è meno vero che, dal punto di vista
della specificazione, è il desiderio (o motivo) più forte a prendere da se stesso il sopravvento dal
momento in cui viene presentato alla ragione. Insomma Leibniz riduce tutta la libertà alla libertà
di esercizio: noi possiamo concedere o ritrarre la nostra attenzione15; ma supposto che la
concediamo, è necessario che agiamo seguendo il motivo più forte.16 La volizione è quindi un
risultato, e non un atto.

“D’altronde, la contingenza metafisica con cui Leibniz definisce la libertà, non è altro, a
rigor di termini, che la possibilità in astratto: l’atto metafisicamente contingente è quello che
nella sua essenza ideale, non ha niente che lo faccia esistere necessariamente. Ma ciò non ha
niente a vedere con l’atto libero, il quale, se è veramente libero, deve essere psicologicamente
contingente.”17

Guido Berghin-Rosè’s Description and Critique of Leibniz’s Psychological Determinism:


“La volontà non è libera, perchè razionale. a) Una facoltà volitiva che segua l’intelletto, che cioè
non sia capriccio irrazionale, non può essere libera. Infatti l’intelletto giudica secondo
l’oggettività delle cose e non è libero di vedere e valutare i motivi pro e contro. D’altra parte la
14
Cfr. G. W. LEIBNIZ, Nouveaux Essais sur l'entendement humain, 1704, II. 13.54. (Phil. Schrif., ed. Gerhardt.).
15
Cfr. Nouveaux Essais, II, 47: «L’anima ha il potere di sospendere il compimento di alcuni suoi desideri, e, per
conseguenza, è nella libertà di considerarli uno dopo l’altro, e di confrontarli fra loro. Proprio in ciò consiste la
libertà dell’uomo e quello che noi chiamiamo, anche se a mio avviso impropriamente, libero arbitrio».
16
Cfr. Nouveaux Essais, II, 47: «L’esecuzione del nostro desiderio è sospesa o arrestata quando questo desiderio
non è tanto forte da muoverci e da superare la fatica o l’incomodo che si incontra nel soddisfarlo (...). Ma quando il
desiderio è di per sé abbastanza forte da commuoverci, se niente l’impedisce, esso può essere fermato da
inclinazioni contrarie, sia che queste consistano in una semplice tendenza, che è come l’elemento o l’inizio del
desiderio, sia che esse arrivino fino a divenire desiderio. Tuttavia, quantunque queste inclinazioni, queste tendenze e
questi desideri contrari si debbano già trovare nell’anima, questa non li ha in suo potere, e per conseguenza non
potrebbe resistere in una maniera libera e volontaria, in cui possa aver parte la ragione, se non avesse anche un altro
mezzo, che consiste nel volgere altrove la mente».
17
R. JOLIVET, Trattato di filosofia, vol. 3 (Psicologia), Morcelliana, Brescia, 1958, nos. 528-529.

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volontà deve volere ciò che l’intelletto avverte come migliore, altrimenti la sua scelta non
sarebbe giustificata razionalmente,18 ma sarebbe puro capriccio. Dunque non c’è posto per la
libertà.19

“Questa teoria fa capo a Leibniz, che la estende anche a Dio, ed è chiamata


«determinismo psicologico».

“Risposta: Si tratta sostanzialmente di vedere se la volontà, pur restando ragionevole, può


scegliere il bene minore riconosciuto come tale. La risposta deve essere affermativa. Infatti sia
nel bene maggiore che nel minore, finchè non si presentano come bene assoluto, ci sono dei lati
buoni che rendono ragionevole il volerli e dei lati cattivi che rendono ragionevole il non volerli.
Quindi qualunque di essi la volontà rifiuti e qualunque scelga, il suo atto sarà sempre
ragionevole. Solo la conoscenza di un bene come assoluto rende irragionevole l’atto contrario.

“b) Si insiste dicendo che per scegliere razionalmente di fatto un lato dell’alternativa, si
dovrà pure giudicarlo concretamente migliore dell’altro e di fatto questo giudizio viene emesso;
come si è detto sopra, chi, ad es., pecca finisce di considerare in concreto meglio per sè il peccato
che non la virtù. Ora questo giudizio, se è puramente intellettuale non lascia sussistere la libertà e
se lo si vuole comandato dalla volontà, bisognerà trovare a questa un motivo antecedente per cui
comanda tale giudizio e non l’opposto. E così, si indietreggi finchè si vuole, o l’atto di volontà
diviene irragionevole, puro capriccio, o non rimane libero.

“Risposta. – È vero che nel momento della scelta di giudica meglio ciò che si sceglie che
non l’opposto. Questo però è un giudizio non speculativo: è meglio in sè, ma pratico: è meglio
per me ora. Come tale non può dipendere dall’intelletto solo; infatti ognuno dei due lati ha
aspetti sotto cui può essere detto concretamente migliore dell’altro. L’intelletto, da sè, non
oltrepassa il giudizio indifferente. Dipende dunque dalla volontà (vedi n. 308), in quanto ferma
l’intelletto nella considerazione di una parte.

“Questo atto della volontà però non ha più bisogno, per essere giustificato, di un altro
giudizio pratico antecedente (è meglio per me considerare questa parte), cosa che instaurerebbe
un processo all’infinito. Infatti, appunto perchè ognuno dei due lati è visto come avente aspetti
per cui è praticamente il migliore, per cui è veramente preferibile, da qualunque parte si fermi la
volontà, la sua scelta sarà sempre radicata in una ragione, in un perchè sufficiente affinchè sia
razionale. Il giudizio indifferente che precede questa scelta, è insufficiente a determinarla; ma è
sufficiente, con le sue due branche, a giustificarla, qualunque essa sia.20

“In breve: l’ultimo giudizio pratico è determinato dalla sola preferenza della volontà;
questa poi, qualunque essa sia, è giustificata da uno dei due lati del giudizio indifferente che la
precede. Si può dunque veramente dare un atto libero ed insieme razionale.

18
Secondo la terminologia leibniziana, sarebbe senza ragione sufficiente.
19
Nel caso ipotetico (asino di Buridano) in cui i due lati fossero perfettamente uguali, la volontà, non avendo
ragione per scegliere, non potrebbe scegliere.
20
Così se tra lo studio ed il sollievo preferisco il sollievo, la mia preferenza avrà un perchè (non importa ora se
moralmente sufficiente) nel lato per cui il sollievo era migliore; parimente se scelgo lo studio.

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“Per l’intero atto libero la giustificazione razionale si effettua come segue: la volizione
definitiva è giustificata dall’ultimo giudizio pratico; questo è determinato dalla preferenza libera
della volontà e questa è giustificata da uno dei due lati del giudizio indifferente.”21

Celestine N. Bittle’s Critique of Psychological Determinism of the Strongest Motive: “It


is a stock argument of determinists that the strongest motive always does and always must
prevail, so that the will is intrinsically determined to yield to the strongest motive; the will,
therefore, is not free in its choice.

“The objection is invalid. Since the will is an appetency and as such can strive only for
what is perceived to be good, it is obvious that the motives draw the will in proportion to the
amount of value they contain. Slight values influence the will slightly, great values influence it
greatly. It is but natural, therefore, that the will, under ordinary and normal circumstances,
should and does strive for the greater value contained in the proposed motives. It would indeed
be most unusual, if this were not the case.

“The argument of the opponents, however, to be valid, must prove that man, under all
conditions, is necessitated to choose what is intellectually apprehended as possessing the
greatest objective attractiveness for the will.

“It will not do to assert, as the philosopher Bain apparently asserts, that the strongest
motive is the one which actually prevails. He is guilty of a begging of the question. Certainly, the
motive which is willed is the one which prevails, and in a sense this motive is the strongest. This
only means that the motive which prevails actually prevails, but does not settle the question
whether the will is determined or free in making a particular motive prevail.

“The only legitimate meaning which can be attached to the statement that ‘the strongest
motive always prevails and must prevail’ is the deterministic meaning that the objectively
strongest motive must prevail; the will must necessarily follow the motive containing, among
other motives present, the more preferable good considered by the intellect as such.

“J. Stuart Mill interprets the ‘strongest’ motive as the one which is most pleasurable,
because it is the more preferable good. He contends that the will is constrained to accept this
motive and yield to it. We claim that personal experience disproves this contention. It is not true
that we always choose the course of action which is most pleasurable. Every decent person not
infrequently resists temptations, recognized to be most pleasurable, for the sake of an ideal or
from a sense of duty, conscious of the fact that yielding to the temptation would be easy and
offering resistance to it is most difficult. Soldiers and martyrs prefer death to the violation of
their duty, even when excruciating agony accompanies the performance of their duty. To uphold
an ideal and to fulfill one’s duty under such conditions is indeed the stronger motive, but only
because the will makes it so; it is not more pleasurable in itself.

“Most determinists interpret the ‘strongest’ motive as the one which, among others
present before the mind, represents the greatest good or value, without specifying whether or not
it be the most pleasurable; such an object or experience, presented as a motive, is the more
21
G. BERGHIN-ROSÈ, Elementi di filosofia, vol. 4 (Psicologia), Marietti, Turin, 1960, no 289, pp. 309-310.

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preferable and as such forces the will into acceptance. The point at issue is this: Is the will
compelled to choose the motive which the intellect proposes to it as possessing the greatest value
or attractiveness among conflicting motives, so that this particular motive has objective
preference, considered independently of any action of the will? Or on the contrary, can the will
confer subjective preference on any of the motives presented, irrespective of their objective
merits, thereby making an objectively weaker motive the strongest? In the former alternative the
objectively ‘strongest’ motive prevails under all conditions, and the will is determined in its
volition; in the second alternative the will itself determines which motive shall prevail, and it
cannot be said to be determined in its volition by the (objectively) ‘strongest’ motive.

“Of course, the will in choosing always prefers one motive to another and thereby shows
that this one pleases it more than the others; but does this preference of the will correspond to the
preceding judgment of the intellect as to preferableness? If man can act in opposition to this
judgment of the intellect and can prefer the weaker motive, then he determines himself and is
independent of the strength or weakness of the motives proposed by the intellect. Herein lies the
crux of the problem of free will.

“Ordinarily, the will accepts the side proposed as the better or the best; but not always. If
it were really true that the will always and necessarily prefers that which the intellect perceives to
be better or best, how then can it happen that we frequently deplore after our decision that we
have ‘acted against our better judgment,’ that we have ‘acted foolishly,’ having carelessly or
obstinately disregarded what we knew to be the better or best course of action? In many
instances we act contrary to our own interests, simply because we so desire, knowing full well
that we are harming ourselves by acting according to the whim of our will rather than according
to the objective merits of the motives as recognized by the intellect.

“It is not the objectively strongest motive which prevails against the will and determines
it to act; it is the act of the will which determines which motive shall be the strongest and shall
actually prevail.”22

H. D. Gardeil, O.P.’s Defense of Free Will: “a) The Requirements of Morality. – No free
will, no morality! It would be easy to elaborate on this theme, which, so far as it goes, does
constitute a most valuable argument. But whatever else may be said on this score, St. Thomas
has given us the wholesum and substance of it in the following terse rejoinder: ‘I answer that
man has free will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and
punishments would be in vain.’23 To this, nothing material could be added.

“b) The Nature of the Free Act. – The pivotal argument for free will, however, the one
that stays all others, is based on the nature of the free act itself. Admittedly, it is conscious
experience that reveals this act to us, but only when this experience is put through the crucible of
metaphysical analysis does the testimony of consciousness become a decisive argument. Hence,
also, the custom of referring to the present argument as the metaphysical proof, or the proof from
the nature of the will.

22
C. N. BITTLE, The Whole Man, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1956, pp. 394-396.
23
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1, c.

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“For the basic explanation of the free act St. Thomas always appeals to the rational nature
of man, particularly and more directly to his faculty of judgment. Some beings act without the
power of judgment; others, through the intervention of a judgment. If the judgment is instinctive,
not resulting from rational insight, as in the case of brute animals, then there can be no freedom
in the act. But if, as in the case of man, the judgment derives from deliberation and comparison
instituted by reason, then the ensuing act is a product of free will. This power of free
determination is possible because in contingent matters, in judgments that are not intrinsically
necessary, reason may take any of several opposite courses. Since human actions have to do with
particular matters, and since these matters as performable are contingent realities, man’s reason
can form various practical judgments concerning them, none of the judgments being determined
or necessary. In short, the freedom of man’s will is a necessary consequence of his rational
nature. St. Thomas presents the argument as follows: ‘Man acts from judgment, because by his
apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But, because this
judgment in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of
comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being
inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses…Now
particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may
follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it
necessary that man have free will.24

“With respect to the subject or agent, therefore, freedom has its source in reason; with
respect to the object, it lies in the contingent or particular nature of the goods confronting the
agent. In terms of the object we may, as St. Thomas often does, state the argument of free will as
follows: In face of contingent or particular goods the will remains free; only the absolute or
universal good necessarily moves it. These two proofs, moreover, the one from the object and the
other from the rational nature of man, are complementary, since the human or free act is the
product of the reciprocal application of intellect and will.

“As for the experience or consciousness of freedom which is often invoked as an


argument for free will, this refers specifically to the awareness of the nonnecessary character of
the judgments on which my eventual decision rests. I may judge that a given means would be
effective for the attainment of an end in view, and so I decide upon it; but at the same time I am
aware that the reason or motive which prompts me to act is not irresistible, or compulsive. The
good with which I am confronted is a contingent or particular good; therefore my choice cannot
but be free. In a word, my consciousness of being a free agent is the consciousness of having a
reason which judges and evaluates; it is not the feeling of an instinctive impulse coming, so to
speak, from nowhere, as it is so often imagined.

“c) Exercise and Specification. The indetermination of the will may be approached from
yet another point of view. We say that an act is free when it is not caused by a good that
necessarily moves the will. But this absence of predetermination in the will may result from two
sources, from the order of exercise and from the order of specification.

“For example, there may be two or more different means of arriving at a given end, say
two different roads leading to a town I want to visit. Since there is nothing in the nature of things
24
Summa Theologiae, I, q. 83, a. 1.

11
that compels me to take one road to the exclusion of the other, I am free to choose between them.
This freedom to choose one thing over another means that my act is free in the order of
specification. But even if we suppose there is only one road, I am still free, since my visiting the
town, which necessarily requires taking the only road, is a particular good, and so does not
present itself as absolutely necessary. Consequently my will remains free to decide to go or not
to go. And this power to will or not to will is called freedom of exercise.

“It scarcely needs mentioning, moreover, that both the freedom of exercise and
specification rest on the contingent or particular character of the goods in question. From the
standpoint of the agent, however, freedom of exercise is more basic, as even without the other it
is enough to guarantee freedom. But when freedom of exercise is lacking, no free will is possible
at all; whereas when specification is not free but self-imposed and necessary, as in the case of
only one means being available, the will is still free, not to choose between means, but to act or
not to act.

“d) Election (Choice) and the Practical Judgment. – As was noted earlier in examining
the various steps of the free act, intellect and will work conjointly in producing it. This reciprocal
movement or determination reaches a decisive stage at the last practical judgment. Suppose that
having experienced a wish for something, I decide to pursue it (intentio finis). Several means
being available, I deliberate about them. Sooner or later I must decide upon one. How is this final
decision made? It is made by the will, but only after the intellect has judged that this particular
means should be chosen. Through the last practical judgment (judicium practicum) of the
intellect, I determine the means to be adopted, and through an act of the will I choose it (electio).
In this process the judgment of the intellect and the choice of the will are applied concurrently.
Which of the two, it may be asked, is the determining factor? The answer is that both are
determining but from different points of view. In the order of specification, I have chosen
because I have judged; in the order of exercise, I have judged because I have chosen. These two
steps, choice and practical judgment, are distinct; yet it is important to bear in mind that one
determines the other, each in its own order. The free act, therefore, proceeds from intellect and
will together. Since in the last analysis, however, the final decision is made by the will through
the act of choice, we say that freedom has the will as its subject, but reason as its cause: radix
libertatis sicut subjectum est voluntas, sed sicut causa est ratio.25”26

Raymond J. Anable, S.J.’s Defense of Free Will: “Metaphysical Proof for the Freedom of
Deliberate Acts of Will. If intellectual deliberation has any purpose (ratio essendi), the will must
have freedom of choice in its deliberate acts ; But, intellectual deliberation has supreme purpose ;
Therefore, the will has freedom of choice in its deliberate acts.

“Proof of the Minor: It is unquestioned and unquestionable that man acts as man –
reasonably – only subsequent to deliberation. Hence, deliberation has supreme purpose or
significance in human life.

“Proof of the Major: In every act of deliberation I become aware of the objective
indifference, or simultaneous aspects of good and non-good, in this particular object. But the

25
Summa Theologiae, I-II, q. 17, a. 1, ad 2,
26
H. D. GARDEIL, op. cit., pp. 212-216.

12
will, as a faculty whose formal object is rational good, cannot be forced to choose what is
presented to it as non-good. This would involve a contradiction in the nature or being of the will
itself.27 Yet, subsequent to deliberation, in this life, every good presented to the will (either
because of its contingent, finite nature, or because of our imperfect cognition of it), is
simultaneously presented as non-good. Therefore, the only purpose of deliberation must be to
present to the will a good which, as simultaneously non-good, cannot compel a faculty whose
formal object is rational good.

“Hence, in a particular will act, subsequent to deliberation, the ‘determinatio ad unum’


(the determination to do A rather than not to do A), cannot have been made by the object as
presented by the intellect, nor by the nature of the will as such.

“Then, ‘I,’ de-facto freely choose or make this determination rather than that one. And
since ‘I’ do this through my faculty which seeks rational good, we refer this freedom to the will
itself.”28

27
The contradiction in the nature of the will, if the will were not free in its deliberate acts, may be stated thus: a) the
will would be necessitated by a “good” which (as deliberation makes clear) is presented to it as non-necessitating.
Thus, if forced by its nature, v.g., to take the “good,” it would be forced by its nature to take what by its very nature
it must avert from: or, putting the same contradiction in still another way, b) the result of intellectual deliberation is
that the will is moved or pulled by its very nature in two ways
< ---------- and ---------- >
and this is as far as its nature itself takes it. Therefore, its nature cannot at the same time take it only one way
< ---------------
or
-------------- >
28
R. J. ANABLE, Philosophical Psychology, Fordham University Press, New York, 1947, pp. 203-204.

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