PNOC v.

NLRC (GR No 100947)

Fact:
Pineda, while holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary, decided to run for councilor of the
Municipality of Kananga, Leyte. Objection to his candidacy was logged by Major of the City expressing his view that
Pineda could not actively participate in politics unless he officially resigned from PNOC-EDC (Philippine National Oil,
Inc. – Energy Development Corp.)

Sec. 66 states that “any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the AFP,
and officers and employees in the government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto
resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.

Pineda’s contention is that PNOC is not a corporation embraced within the Civil Service.

Issue:
Whether or not an employee in a government-owned or controlled corporation without an original charter
nevertheless falls within the scope of the Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code

Held:
Sec. 66 applies to officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized
under the general laws on incorporation and therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they
do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the Labor Code.
 FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE v. IAC 212 SCRA 637

Facts:
Daniel Funtecha was a working student at the Filamer Christian Institute. He was assigned as the school janitor to
clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of the school president and at the same time he was
the school’s jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes,
Masa returned to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the
students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together. Funtecha
had a student driver’s license so Masa let him take the driver’s seat. While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit
an elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent
civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for the tortious act of Funcheta
and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180 which provides that employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer
assailed the decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars
are excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations between Filamer and
Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable to him alone as it is outside his
assigned task of being the school janitor. The CA denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with
Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for reconsideration.
Issue:

Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.

Held:

Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time Kapunan was already dead).
The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as
compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any
way affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code.
In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction
hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an
injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and
an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts
of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule
on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver’s position in order that
Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of
the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is beneficial to
the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact
that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve
Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the
selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.
 UERMMMC-RDU VS. LAGUESMA
GR NOS. 125425-26

Facts:
The resident physicians formed a union called the UERMMC-Resident Doctors Union and filed the petition for
certification so that it will be recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the resident physicians in the
hospital for purposes of collective bargaining.

The petition for certification was dismissed by the Undersecretary, acting under the authority of the
Secretary of Labor, on the ground that there exist no employer-employee relationship between the resident doctors
and the hospital.

Issue:
WON resident doctors are employees of the hospital.

Held:
The resident doctors are not employees of the hospital. It is clear that physicians undergo residency training
in order to hone their skills and develop or improve their knowledge in a specialized medical field or discipline. Hence,
residency is basically and simply a continuation of their medical course. However, they are not required or mandated
under any law to further undergo a residence training program. Having passed the medical board examinations, they
are already licensed physicians and could very well engage in the general practice of medicine. It is for the practice
of highly specialized medical disciplines which necessitates further on-the-job training thereon.

Viewed from this perspective, residency training clearly amounts to a pursuit of further education on a
specific discipline. Thus, the relationship between the teaching/training hospital and the resident doctor is not one of
employer-employee. The training/teaching hospital may simply be likened to a medical school/university, but in this
instance, the emphasis is on the practical application and training of its students, the resident doctors.
 HYDRO RESOURCES CONTRACTORS CORP. vs PAGALILAUAN
(GR No. L-62909 1989)

Facts:

Petitioner corporation hired the private respondent Aban as its "Legal Assistant” and received basic monthly salary of
Pl,500.00 plus an initial living allowance of P50.00 which gradually increased to P320.00. On September 4, 1980,
Aban received a letter from the corporation informing him that he would be considered terminated effective October
4, 1980 because of his alleged failure to perform his duties well.

Aban filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter ruled that Aban was illegally
dismissed. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. Hence, this present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner corporation and Aban.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, and reinstate Aban to his former or a similar position
without loss of seniority rights and to pay three (3) years backwages without qualification or deduction and
P5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Should reinstatement not be feasible, the petitioner shall pay the private respondent
termination benefits in addition to the above stated three years backpay and P5,000.00 attorney's fees.

A lawyer, like any other professional, may very well be an employee of a private corporation or even of the
government. This Court has consistently ruled that the determination of whether or not there is an employer-
employee relation depends upon four standards: (1) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative
employee; (2) the mode of payment of wages; (3) the presence or absence of a power of dismissal; and (4) the
presence or absence of a power to control the putative employee's conduct. Of the four, the right-of-control test has
been held to be the decisive factor.

In this case, Aban received basic salary plus living allowance, worked solely for the petitioner, dealt only with legal
matters involving the said corporation and its employees and also assisted the Personnel Officer in processing
appointment papers of employees which is not act of a lawyer in the exercise of his profession. These facts showed
that petitioner has the power to hire and fire the respondent employee and more important, exercised control over
Aban by defining the duties and functions of his work which met the four standards in determining whether or not
there is an employee-employer relationship.
 FEATI UNIVERSITY v. BAUTISTA

G.R. No.L-21278

FACTS:

January 14, 1963, the President of Feati University Faculty Club (PAFLU) wrote a letter to Mrs. Victoria L.
Araneta, President of Feati University informing her that it registered as a labor union. PAFLU sent another letter with
26 demands in relation to their employment and requesting an answer within 10 days from receipt thereof. Araneta
answered the letters, requesting that she be given at least 30 days to study thoroughly the different phases of the
demands. Meanwhile counsel for Feati, wrote a letter to the President of PAFLU demanding proof of its majority
status and designation as a bargaining representative. The President of PAFLU rejected the extension of time and
filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor due to Feati’s refusal to bargain collectively.

Parties were called to the Conciliation Division of the Bureau of Labor but efforts to conciliate them failed.
On February 18, 1963, PAFLU declared a strike and established picket lines in the premises of Feati resulting in the
disruption of classes in the University.

The President of the Philippines certified to the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) the dispute between Feati
and PAFLU pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 875.

3 cases were filed with the CIR

41-IPA – PAFLU’s petition to declare in contempt of court since Feati refused to accept them back to work in violation
of the return-to-work order of March 30, 1963 and has employed other professors and/or instructors to take their
places. Also includes the motion to dismiss filed by Feati contending that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the case.

1183-MC – PAFLU’s petition for certification election praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative. This case was later withdrawn since the Case 41-IPA had already been certified by the President to
the CIR and has absorbed the issues herein.

V-30 – PAFLU’s complaint for indirect contempt of court filed against the administrative officials of the Feati
reiterating Case 41-IPA.

May 10, 1963: Feati filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction
which was issued upon the Feati's filing a bond of P50,000 (increased from P1,000), ordering CIR Judge Jose S.
Bautista to desist and refrain from further proceeding. On the strength of the presidential certification, Judge Bautista
set the case for hearing. Feati, thru counsel filed a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground that the CIR has no
jurisdiction over the case, because:

1. the Industrial Peace Act is NOT applicable to the University, it being an educational institution, nor to the
members of the Faculty Club, they being independent contractors

2. the presidential certification is violative of Section 10 of the Industrial Peace Act, as the University is not an
industrial establishment and there was no industrial dispute which could be certified to the CIR

Judge Bautista denied the motion to dismiss and ordered the strikers to return immediately to work and the
University to take them back under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose.

Without the motion for reconsideration having been acted upon by the CIR en banc, Judge Bautista set the case for
hearing on the merits but was cancelled upon Feati’s petition for certiorari alleging that Judge Jose S. Bautista acted
without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, in taking cognizance of, and in issuing the
questioned orders in, CIR Cases Nos. 41-IPA 1183-MC and V-30.
Feati claims that it is not an employer within the contemplation of R.A. 875, because it is not an industrial
establishment. It also claims that it is only a lessee of the services of its professors and/or instructors pursuant to a
contract of services entered into between them because the University does not exercise control over their work

ISSUES: W/N Feati can be considered an employer and PAFLU as an employee to be covered by R.A. 875 and have
right to unionize

RULING:

YES. Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G.R. No. L-21278 is dismissed.

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Based on RA 875 Section 2(c) The term employer include any person acting
in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise than
when acting as an employer) or any one acting in the capacity or agent of such labor organization.

In this case, the University is operated for profit hence included in the term of employer. Professors and instructors,
who are under contract to teach particular courses and are paid for their services, are employees under the Industrial
Peace Act.

Professors and instructors are not independent contractors. university controls the work of the members of its
faculty; that a university prescribes the courses or subjects that professors teach, and when and where to teach; that
the professors’ work is characterized by regularity and continuity for a fixed duration; that professors are
compensated for their services by wages and salaries, rather than by profits; that the professors and/or instructors
cannot substitute others to do their work without the consent of the university; and that the professors can be laid
off if their work is found not satisfactory. All these indicate that the university has control over their work; and
professors are, therefore, employees and not independent contractors.

Moreover, even if university professors are considered independent contractors, still they would be covered by Rep.
Act No. 875. Professors, instructors or teachers of private educational institutions who teach to earn a living are
entitled to the protection of our labor laws — and one such law is Republic Act No. 875.

To certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the law, and this Court will not
interfere in, much less curtail, the exercise of that prerogative. The jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is
exclusive. The parties involved in the case may appeal to the Supreme Court from the order or orders thus issued by
the CIR.

The return-to-work order cannot be considered as an impairment of the contract entered into with the
replacements. Besides, labor contracts must yield to the common good and such contracts are subject to the special
laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and similar subjects.
 G.R. No. L-59229 August 22, 1991
HIJOS DE F. ESCAÑO INC., and PIER 8 ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC., petitioners, vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WORKINGMEN (NOWM)
PSSLU-TUCP and ROLANDO VILLALOBOS, respondents.

Facts:

Prior to the incorporation, Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. (Pier 8 A&S), two stevedoring companies
had been serving vessels docketing in pier 8. One of which was the Manila Integrated Services, Inc. (MISI) which
was serving Escaño vessels that then was docking in pier 8. The other was the San Nicolas Stevedoring and Arrastre
Services, Inc. (SNSASI) which was serving Compania Maritama vessels. Pursuant to Philippine Port Authority’s policy
of “one pier, one Arrastre and/or stevedoring company, MISI and SNSASI merged to form Pier 8 Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services, Inc.

But sometime in June 1978, Escaño transferred to pier 16. Pier 8 A&S encountered problems; business was severely
reduced with only Compania Maritama to service. The continuance of service to Escaño was not possible since there
was another company exclusive authorized to handle and render stevedoring in pier 16. Because of the surplus of
employees, Pier 8 A&S altered the work schedule by rotating them. The scheme was resisted by the stevedores
especially those formerly assigned to service of Escaño vessels. The affected stevedores boycotted Pier 8 leading to
their severance from employment. They continued to refuse to go back to work even after they were served with a
return-to-work order.

On September 8, 1978, National Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM") PSSLU-TUCP, the labor organization
wherein majority of the laborers of petitioner Pier 8 A&S, filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal
dismissal against Pier 8 A&S. On their amendment, they implead to include Escaño as respondent before the Ministry
of Labor and Employment. The complaint for illegal dismissal was addressed in compulsory arbitration wherein the
labor arbiter found through position papers submitted by parties that Pier 8 A&S and Escaño guilty of committing acts
guilty of unfair labor practice and were ordered to reinstate petitioners and pay them jointly and severally of full
backwages counted from the time they were illegal dismissed. The decision was appealed by petitioners with NLRC
but the same was affirmed. They filed petition with the Court contending that NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion on upholding that the stevedores were not only employees of Pier 8 A&S but also of Escaño. The
stevedores claimed that since they had long serving Escaño vessels, they should also be considered as employees of
Escaño.

Issue:

Whether a shipping company engaged with inter-island business has an employee-employer relationship with
stevedores who had been long servicing them with the loading and unloading of cargo on or from the vessel on port
that would make the former liable for illegal dismissal?

Held:

There was no employer-employee relationship between Escaño and the stevedores. It was not alleged that Escaño or
any other shipping company was also engaged in Arrastre and stevedoring services. Considering that a shipping
company is not customarily enagaged in stevedoring and arrastre activities, Escaño and other shipping companies
contracts with other companies offering those services. In this light, stevedores should not be deemed employees of
the shipping company. Therefore, Escaño cannot be held liable with Pier 8 A&S.
 CITIZENS’ LEAGUE OF FREEWORKERS V. ABBAS

G.R. No. L-21212 (23 September 1966)

FACTS:

Respondent-spouses, owners and operators of auto-calesas in Davao City, filed a complaint with the CFI of Davao to
restrain the Union and its members, who were drivers of the spouses in said businesses, from interfering with its
operation, from committing certain acts complained of in connection therewith, and to recover damages. The
complaint alleged that the defendants named therein used to lease the auto calesas of the spouses on a daily rental
basis. When the spouses refused to recognize the alleged lessees as employees and also refused to bargain with it
on that basis, the Union declared a strike. Since then, they had paralyzed the business operations of the said spouses
through threats, intimidation, and violence.

Petitioners filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the respondent-spouses with the Court of Industrial
Relations on the ground, among others, of the latter’s refusal to bargain with them. They also filed a motion to
declare the writ of preliminary injunction void on the ground that it had already expired.

ISSUE:

May the petitioners in this case, as “lessees” of the auto-calesas be considered employees?

RULING:

YES. In the case of Isabelo Doce vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al. (G.R. No. L-9417, December 22,
1958), upon a similar if not an altogether identical set of facts, we held:

“The only features that would make the relationship of lessor and lessee between the respondent, owner of the
jeeps, and the drivers, members of the petitioner union, are the fact that he does not pay them any fixed wage but
their compensation is the excess of the total amount of fares earned or collected by them over and above the
amount of P7.50 which they agreed to pay to the respondent. and the fact that the gasoline burned by the jeeps is
for the account of the drivers. These two features are not, however, sufficient to withdraw the relationship, between
them from that of employer-employee, because the estimated earnings for 'fares must be over and above the
amount they agreed to pay to the respondent for a ten-hour shift or ten-hour a day operation of the jeeps. Not
having any interest in the business because they did not invest anything in the acquisition of the jeeps and did not
participate in the management thereof: their service as drivers of the jeeps being their only contribution to the
business, the relationship of lessor and lessee, cannot be sustained.”

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the respondent
judge in Civil Case No. 3966 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, with costs.
 JARDIN VS NLRC (GR NO. 119268)

FACTS:
1. Petitioners were taxi drivers of private respondent, Philjama International, Inc., a domestic corporation
engaged in the operation of “Goodman Taxi”.
 Petitioners drive the taxicabs ever other day on a 24-hour work schedule under the boundary
system.
 Earns an average of P400.00 daily
2. Private respondents deduct petitioners daily earning by P30.00 for the washing of the taxi units.
3. Petitioner believes that such action by the PR is illegal so they form a labor union to protect their rights and
interests.
 In effect, PR upon learning their plans refused to let petitioners drive their taxicabs when they
report for work starting Aug. 6, 1991 and on succeeding days.
4. Petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a complaint against PR for unfair labor, illegal dismissal and illegal
deduction of washing fees>>>DENIED lack of merit.
 Appeal: NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of Labor arbiter. That petitioners are
employees of PR and such dismissal must be for just cause and after due process.
5. PR 1st motion for recon>>>DENIED.
6. 2nd recon granted: that petitioners and PR have no employer-employee relationship.
7. Petitioners sought reconsideration>>>DENIED. Hence this instant petition.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting 2 nd reconsideration of private
respondents? YES
2. Whether employer-employee relationship exists in boundary system? YES

RULING:
 Private respondent (corp.) had already exhausted administrative remedy by filing the 1st motion for recon
(which was denied) in which the labor tribunal had the ample opportunity to rectify errors or mistakes
before rendering decision. When the PR filed for 2nd recon the public respondents should have denied it in
accordance with rule 7 Sec.14 of its New Rules of Procedure, which allows only one motion for
reconsideration from the same party.
a. Rationale for 1 motion of recon: to assist the parties in obtaining an expeditious and inexpensive
settlement of labor cases.

 Court used the Four Fold Test:

(1) the selection and engagement of the employees
(2) the payment of wages
(3) the power of dismissal
(4) the power of control the employees conduct (most important)

 The court ruled that owners/operators and drivers have employer-employee relationship because the former
exercise supervision and control over the latter. The management of the business is in the hands of the
owner.
o The owner as the holder of the certificate of public convenience must see to it that the driver
follows the route prescribed by the franchising authority and the rules promulgated as regards its
operation.
 The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but only excess in boundary is not sufficient to
withdraw employer-employee relationship.
 Hence, petitioners as employees of PR can only be dismissed for just cause and with due process.
 Petition is granted. Private respondent were ordered to reinstate petitioners to their positions and likewise
ordered to pay petitioners their full backwages.
 R TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ROGELIO EJANDRA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 148508 : May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Private respondent Rogelio Ejandra worked as a bus driver of petitioner bus corporation got almost six years. One
day, he was apprehended by an LTO officer for obstruction of traffic for which his license was confiscated. Ejendra
immediately reported the incident to his manager, Mr. Oscar Pasquin, who gave him P500 to redeem his license but
was able to retrieve his license only after a week. Later on, when Ejandra informed his manager that he was ready to
report for work, he was told that the company was still studying whether to allow him to drive again. Private
respondent was likewise accused of causing damage to the bus he used to drive. He was asked to take a vacation
which the manager did not specify for how long. Petitioner claimed that private respondent, a habitual absentee,
abandoned his job. Petitioner further argued that private respondent was not an employee because theirs was a
contract of lease and not of employment, with petitioner being paid on commission basis.

ISSUES:

1.) Whether or not respondent abandoned his work

HELD:

No, to constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer- employee relationship. Of the two, the
second element is the more determinative factor and should be manifested by some overt acts.

Mere absence is not sufficient. It is the employer who has the burden of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified
refusal of the employee to resume his employment without any intention of returning.

In the instant case, petitioner fell short of proving the requisites. Petitioner's absence was justified because the LTO,
Guadalupe Branch, did not release his license until after a week. The process of redeeming a confiscated license,
based on common experience, depended on when the apprehending officer turned over the same. Second, private
respondent never intended to sever his employment as he in fact reported for work as soon as he got his license
back. Third, labor arbiter Yulo correctly observed that, if private respondent really abandoned his work, petitioner
should have reported such fact to the nearest Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment.
Petitioner made no such report.

In addition to the fact that petitioner had no valid cause to terminate private respondent from work, it violated the
latter's right to procedural due process by not giving him the required notice and hearing.
 SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-approved
Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded
employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation
of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents did not deliver on their promise to
make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May.

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his
repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of
nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money
claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the NLRC to
question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the
ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are
entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.

Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated
Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of the
subject clause. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause.
CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner.

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00
covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of
US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by
the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine
months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00

Issue:
1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-
month employment contract, and not just for a period of three months?
2.) Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award,
because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract?

Held:
1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine
months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were
treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired
portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their
money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary
benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired
portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term
employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of
property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. The subject clause being unconstitutional,
petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant
to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE
Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the
basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in
excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays.

By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the
computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there is evidence that he performed work during those periods.
 People of the Philippines vs. Capt. Florencio O. Gasacao
[G.R. No. 168445 November 11, 2005]

Facts:
Appellant was the Crewing Manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc., a licensed local manning agency, while
his nephew and co-accused, Jose Gasacao, was the President. As the crewing manager, Capt. Gasacao's duties
included receiving job applications, interviewing the applicants and informing them of the agency's requirement of
payment of performance or cash bond prior to deployment. On August 4, 2000, Capt. Gasacao and Jose Gasacao
were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment defined under Section 6, paragraphs (a), (l) and (m) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and penalized under Section 7(b) of
the same law, before the RTC of Quezon City. Only Capt. Gasacao was arrested while Jose Gasacao remained at
large. When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On March 5, 2001, the RTC of Quezon City, rendered its Joint Decision convicting appellant of Large Scale Illegal
Recruitment.

Issue:
Whether or not Capt. Gasacao was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of large scale illegal recruitment

SC Ruling:
RA No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment as follows:
For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment
abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under
Article 13(f) of Pd 442, as amended: Provided, that such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include
the following acts, whether committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of
authority.
(a) To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than the specified in the schedule of
allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount
greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
(b) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment; and
(c) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without
the worker's fault.

Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic
sabotage. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of 3 or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against 3 or more
persons individually or as a group. A license is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or entity to
operate a private employment agency, while an authority is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or
association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity. However, it appears
that even licensees or holders of authority can be held liable for illegal recruitment should they commit any of the
above-enumerated acts.

Thus, it is inconsequential that appellant committed large scale illegal recruitment while Great Eastern Shipping
Agency, Inc. was holding a valid authority. We thus find that the court below committed no reversible error in not
appreciating that the manning agency was a holder of a valid authority when appellant recruited the private
complainants. There is no merit in appellant's contention that he could not be held liable for illegal recruitment since
he was a mere employee of the manning agency, pursuant to Section 6 of RA No. 8042 which provides: The persons
criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons,
the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.

Contrary to Capt. Gasacao's claim, he is not a mere employee of the manning agency but the crewing manager. As
such, he receives job applications, interviews applicants and informs them of the agency's requirement of payment of
performance or cash bond prior to the applicant's deployment. As the crewing manager, he was at the forefront of
the company's recruitment activities. The foregoing testimonies of the private complainantsclearly established that
Gasacao is not a mere employee of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc. As the crewing manager, it was appellant
who made representations with the private complainants that he can secure overseas employment for them upon
payment of the cash bond. It is well settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gave
complainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that
the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. Appellant's act of promising the private
complainants that they will be deployed abroad within three months after they have paid the cash bond clearly shows
that he is engaged in illegal recruitment.

Even assuming that Capt. Gasacao was a mere employee, such fact is not a shield against his conviction for large
scale illegal recruitment. Clearly, the acts of Capt. Gasacao vis-à-vis the private complainants, either as the crewing
manager of Great Eastern Shipping Agency Inc. or as a mere employee of the same, constitute acts of large scale
illegal recruitment which should not be countenanced.

Although he informed them that it is optional, he collected cash bonds and promised their deployment
notwithstanding the proscription against its collection under Section 60 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations
Implementing R.A. No. 8042 which state that:
SEC. 60. Prohibition on Bonds and Deposits. – In no case shall an
employment agency require any bond or
cash deposit from the worker to guarantee performance under the contract or his/her repatriation. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or more persons individually or
as a group.

In this case, five complainants testified against appellant's acts of illegalrecruitment, thereby rendering his acts
tantamount to economic sabotage.
 People vs. Chowdury, 325 SCRA 572, G.R. Nos. 129577-80 February 15, 2000

Facts
Bulu Chowdury was charged with the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale by recruiting Estrella B. Calleja, Melvin
C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis for employment in Korea. Evidence shows that accused –appellant interviewed private
complainant in 1994 at Craftrade’s office, and required them to submit requirements such as passport, NBI
clearance, ID pictures, medical certificate and birth certificate. Chowdury also required them to pay placements fee
for a certain amount. At that time, he was an interviewer of Craftrade which was operating under temporary
authority given by POEA pending the renewal of license. He was charged based on the fact that he was not
registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade and he is not in his personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas
workers. The complainants also averred that during their applications for employment for abroad, the license of
Craftrade was already expired.

For his defense Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His primary duty
was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the instructions given by his
superiors, Mr. Emmanuel Geslani, the agency's President and General Manager, and Mr. UtkalChowdury, the agency's
Managing Director.

The trial Court found Chowdury huilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale.

Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the commission of the crime charged.

Held
No. The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:

(1) The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) He did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and
(3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.

The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) 804219 states who shall be held liable for the offense, thus:
“The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of
juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.”

An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal, together
with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment. The culpability of
the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission. Where
it is shown that the employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts
constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer.

In this case, Chowdury merely performed his tasks under the supervision of its president and managing director. The
prosecution failed to show that the accused-appellant is conscious and has an active participation in the commission
of the crime of illegal recruitment. Moreover, accused-appellant was not aware of Craftrade's failure to register his
name with the POEA and the prosecution failed to prove that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this
knowledge. The obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. A mere
employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its operation. The accused-appellant
carried out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in
turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined
his actions to his job description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirements for
deployment but he never received money from them. Chowdury did not knowingly and intentionally participated in
the commission of illegal recruitment being merely performing his task and unaware of illegality of recruitment.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO MANUNGAS, JR. y GO @ "PERCY",
accused-appellant. (G.R. No. 91552-55 March 10, 1994)

NOCON, J.:

This is an appeal by accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. alias "Percy" from the decision 1 dated October 31, 1989 of
the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasisnan, Branch 38 in Criminal Cases Nos. L-3993, L-3994,

L-3996 and L-4000 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ESTAFA and ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

In the light of what has been stated and discussed above, the court finds and holds the accused Fernando Manungas y Go
alias "Percy" guilty beyond peradventure of doubt of the crimes filed against him and conformable thereto, hereby
pronounces judgment as follows:

In Criminal Case No. L-3993, the court declares accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Percy" guilty of estafa for the sum
of P16,800.00 as alleged in the information filed against him and there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in his favor, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the prison term from
two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten years (10) days as minimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional as maximum and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

The court further orders the accused to reimburse the offended party, Wilfrey Mabalot, the sum of sixteen thousand eight
hundred (P16,800.00) pesos which is the amount of money paid and delivered to him by said complaining witness without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In Criminal Case No. L-3994, the court likewise declares the accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Percy" guilty of estafa
for the sum of P17,550.00 as charged in the information. And there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
present, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law in his favor, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term from two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days as minimum to five (5) years, five (5)
months and (11) days of prision correccional as maximum and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

The court further directs the accused to reimburse the offended party, Danilo Ramirez the sum of seventeen thousand five
hundred fifty (P17,550.00) pesos which the accused took from the complaint without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

In Criminal Case No. L-3996, the court also declares the accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Percy" guilty of estafa for
eighteen thousand six hundred (P18,600.00) pesos as charged in the information filed against him. There being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance present, and applying the Indeterminate Law in his favor, said accused is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term from two (2) years, eleven months (11) months and ten (10) days
asminimum to five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision correccional as maximumand to pay the costs
of the proceedings.

The court also directs the accused to reimburse the offended party the sum of eighteen thousand six hundred (P18,600.00)
pesos which is the amount paid and delivered by the offended party to him without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

In Criminal Case No. L-4000, the court likewise holds the accused, Fernando Manungas y Go alias "Precy" guilty of the crime
of Illegal Recruitment on Large Scale as charged in the information filed against him, defined and penalized under the
provisions of Article 39, par. (a) of Presidential Decree No. 2018 amending Articles 38 and 39 of P.D. No. 442, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, and conformable thereto, hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the
penalty of Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) pesos without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency pursuant to law.

The accused shall serve the penalties herein imposed against him successively or one after the other according to their
severity. 2
Based on the evidence adduced before the trial court, the facts of the case are as follows:

Sometime in April of 1987, accused-appellant Fernando Manungas, Jr. went to Barangay Legaspi, Tayug, Pangasinan where
he stayed in the house of Arturo and Lilia de Vera to recruit workers for employment abroad. During his stay, accused-
appellant was able to convince complainants Wilfrey Mabalot, Danilo Ramirez, Leonardo Estanoco and Crisanto Collado to
apply as janitors in Saudi Arabia. He told them to bring all the necessary documents for the processing of their applications
to his office in Manila.

On April 29, 1987, complainants went to accused-appellant's office located at Room 611, L and S Bldg., 1414 Roxas Blvd.,
Ermita, Manila and paid accused-appellant P250.00 each for their medical examination. Thereafter, accused-appellant
required the complainants to pay, on various occasions, placement fees and other expenses incurred in the processing of
their papers and issued corresponding receipts for said amounts. The total amount paid by the complainants to accused-
appellant are the following: Wilfrey Mabalot — P16,800.00; Danilo Ramirez — P17,550.00, Leonardo Estanoco — 18,600.00,
and Crisanto Collado — 13,300.00

When complainants failed to leave for Saudi Arabia, they requested Luis "Jing" Ramirez, to verify with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) whether accused-appellant was licensed to recruit workers for abroad. They
subsequently learned that he was not as shown by the Certification issued by the POEA. 3

Thereafter, complaints filed against accused-appellant complaints for Estafa defined under par. 2(a), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale. In due course, informations fro three (3) counts of Estafa
(Criminal Cases Nos. L-3993, L-3994 and L-3996) and Illegal Recruitment on a Large Scale (Criminal Case No. L-4000) were
filed against accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.

On the other hand, accused-appellant maintained that he was the operations manager of the ZG Recruitment and
Placement Agency, a duly licensed recruitment agency. Sometime in April 1987, he went to Barangay Legaspi, Tayug,
Pangasinan and recruited complainants to work in Saudi Arabia as janitors. Unfortunately, the job order for the janitorial
services was awarded to Express Placement Agency instead of ZG Recruitment and Placement agency. Thereafter, accused-
appellant transferred complainants' application for overseas employment to Nora Cunanan of Express Placement Agency.
Accused-appellant also turned over the fees paid by the complainants to Nora Cunanan as evidenced by the receipts 4
issued by the latter. When Nora Cunanan absconded with the money of the complainants, accused-appellant filed an estafa
case against Nora Cunanan after securing a Special Power of Attorney from the complainants to prosecute and collect their
money. However, he was not able to attend the hearing as he was arrested in connection with the these cases.

Accused-appellant maintains that he did not make false representations to the complainants when he requited the latter for
employment abroad as he had told complainants that he is only an employee of a licensed recruitment agency in Manila. He
further claims that he was not motivated by any deceitful intentions and had not caused any damage to the complainants
because the amounts of money given to him by the latter were actually spent for their medical tests and other documents
necessary for their overseas employment.

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "Recruitment and Placement" as:

Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any
person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.

In the instant case, accused-appellant told complainants to submit to him their pictures, birth certificates, NBI clearances
and the necessary documents for the processing of their employment in Saudi Arabia. Thereafter, accused-appellant
collected from each of the complainants payment for the their respective passport, training fee, placement fee, medical
tests and other sundry expenses which unquestionably constitutes acts of recruitment within the meaning of the law.
Besides, there is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of his ability to send a worker abroad 5 and there is
evidence that accused-appellant had represented to the complainants that he could send them abroad as janitors in Saudi
Arabia. And because of his representation, complainants gave their hard-earned money to accused-appellant in
consideration of the same representation. As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief:
It may be that at the time appellant recruited private complainants, he was then the operations manager of the ZGR
Placement Agency, a duly licensed recruitment agency. But, as amply established by the evidence, the recruitment of
private complainants was appellant's own personal undertaking. He did not do it for the agency. This is clearly shown by the
sequence of events that led to the consum[m]ation of the transaction in question. Thus: it was appellant who talked private
complainants into applying for employment abroad; when private complainants signified their interest, he alone was the one
who informed them of the documents that they have to secure; he too was the one who demanded and received from them
the fees for medical examination, passport, authentication, training, placement and psycho and AIDS test; also, he was the
one who assured them of employment abroad and of the return of their money in the event of their non-deployment;
moreover, it was he who undertook to inform private complainants of their departure.

But that is not all. When private complainants failed to receive notice of their departure as promised them by appellant, they
had somebody verify with the POEA if appellant was a licensed recruiter. This circumstance shows all the more that indeed
appellant represented himself to be the recruiter, otherwise it would have been the status of the agency with which he
allegedly worked for, that private complainants would have requested to be verified. 6

As to accused-appellant's claim that he did not misappropriate the money given to him by the complainants as he had
turned over the latters' placement fees to Nora Cunanan, who subsequently absconded with the complainant's money, the
trial court correctly held that:

The version of the defense has the nature of a cock and bull story which is difficult and hard to accept. It is something that
is fantastic and ridiculous. It is within the realm of fiction and patently a mere fabrication to exculpate the accused from the
consequences of his nefarious and deceitful activities. If it is really true that the complainants were transferred and
accommodated by the agency of Nora Cunanan, why did not the accused and Mrs. Lydia Zamora who appear to be both
intelligent take the necessary prudence and caution of putting the supposed agreement to transfer in writing considering
the amounts of funds involved in the alleged transfer. Logic and common sense dictate that under such a situation, the
accused and Mrs. Zamora take ordinary care of their concerns. To impress the court that there was really a transfer made,
the accused claimed that there was a estafa case filed against Mrs. Cunanan before the City Fiscal's Office in Manila. It is
however surprising why Atty. Jose Torrefranca who was engaged by the accused to file the estafa case did not present any
letter-complaint or any charged sheet filed against Mrs. Cunanan. He did not even mention the Fiscal who investigated the
case. More intriguing is the fact that counsel does not know what happened to the alleged case of estafa after he filed the
same. Likewise, when Mrs. Lydia Zamora declared, she claimed that the case filed against Nora Cunanan was before the
Regional Trial Court and not in the City Fiscal's Office.

Defense also made capital of the special power of atty. executed by the complainants (exhibit 4) and their letters sent to the
accused (exhibits 5, 6, 7 and 8) to convince the court that the real culprit in the whole mess in Nora Cunanan. The
complainants made convincing explanation why they signed the special power of attorney. Wilfrey Mabalot declared that
when the accused asked him to sign the document, he was told that its purpose is to facilitate their departure and when he
signed the letter exhibit "6" he was just told to sign by the accused and because the latter was in [a] hurry, he signed
without knowing its contents. He likewise explained that being a mere high school graduate he was not able to understand
the imports of its contents. Danilo Ramirez explained that when he signed the special power of attorney, he did not read the
contents because the accused was in [a] hurry in returning to Manila and that he sent the three letters to the accused while
he was confined in jail because Manungas asked him to help him (accused) recover the money given to Mrs. Cunanan.
Leonardo Estanoco declared, that he signed exhibit "4" because the accused told him that the document will be used to
facilitate the processing of their papers. He did not understand its contents because he only understands little English. 7

Thus accused-appellant is guilty of the crimes of Estafa and Illegal Recruitment. Under Article 38 of the Labor Code, as
amended, the crime of illegal recruitment is qualified when the same is committed against three (3) or more persons.

A person who violates any of the provisions under Article 13(b) and Article 34 of the Labor Code can be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment and estafa [Revised Penal Code, Article 315, 2(a)] because illegal recruitment is a
malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for a conviction while estafa is a malum in s e
where criminal intent of the accused is necessary for a conviction.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment in a large scale, decision of
the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
 People vs. SADIOSA

Facts:

Arsenia Conse went to Bayombong, Nueva Ecija in early 1992 where she met Cely Navarro, Marcela Manzano, Erly
Tuliao and Benilda Domingo. She enticed the four to apply for overseas employment informing them that she had a
cousin who could send them to Kuwait as domestic helpers. Apparently convinced by Arsenia Conse, the four went
with her on 5 February 1992 to Manila. Upon arrival, they proceeded to Room 210, Diamond Building, Libertad St.,
Pasay City where Arsenia Conse introduced the group to Delia Sadiosa. The four then applied for work as domestic
helpers. On that occasion, Sadiosa assured the four that she could dispatch them to Kuwait and forthwith demanded
P8,000.00 from each of them for processing fee and P1,000.00 for passport (P1,500.00 from Cely Navarro). She
assured the group that she would facilitate the processing of all the necessary documents needed by them. She
further promised them that upon payment of the required fees, they would be able to leave for Kuwait immediately.
The four did give Sadiosa the money demanded although on different dates. The latter issued the corresponding
receipts therefor. Again, she assured them that they could leave for Kuwait on different dates: Cely Navarro and Erly
Tuliao on 17 February 1992 which was rescheduled twice on 19 February 1992 and on 25 February 1992, and
Benilda Domingo and Marcela Manzano on 17 March 1992 which was moved twice on 24 February 1992 and on 17
March 1992. However, not one of them was able to leave for Kuwait. When they asked for the return of their money,
Sadiosa refused and ignored their demand. Consequently, the four filed the complaint for illegal recruitment against
Sadiosa. The information read: "That on or about and during the period comprise (sic) from January 1992 to March
1992, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused Delia Sadiosa y Cabenta, well knowing that she is not a duly licensed job recruiter, by means of false
representations and fraudulent allegations to the effect that she could secure employment as domestic helpers
abroad for Benilda Sabado y Domingo, Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, Erly Tuliao y Sabado and Cely Navarro y
Manzano, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously recruit aforesaid persons and collected from
them the amount of P8,000.00 each, which amount were given to the accused by the aforesaid complainants upon
receipt of which, far from complying with her obligation aforestated, accused appropriated for herself the said
amount and failed to deploy complainants abroad. Contrary to law." Upon arraignment, Sadiosa pleaded "not guilty."
The trial court found Sadiosa guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale defined by Article 38 (b) and penalized under
Article 39 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree 1920 and 2018, and sentenced her to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00. The court also ordered Sadiosa to indemnify Benilda Sabado y
Domingo, the sum of P8,000.00; Marcela Tabernero y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00; Erly Tuliao y Sabado, the sum
of P8,000.00 and Cely Navarro y Manzano, the sum of P8,000.00. To pay the costs. Sadiosa appealed.

Issue:

Whether the information was sufficient to allege illegal recruitment, and that said charge will not be confused with
estafa by the facts stated therein.

Held:

The information is sufficient where it clearly states the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. However, there is no need to specify or refer to the particular
section or subsection of the statute that was violated by the accused. No law requires that in order that an accused
may be convicted, the specific provision penalizing the act charged should be mentioned in the information. What
identifies the charge is the actual recital of the facts and not that designated by the fiscal in the preamble thereof. It
is not even necessary for the protection of the substantial rights of the accused, nor the effective preparation of his
defense, that the accused be informed of the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. He must look
to the facts alleged. Herein, the information filed against Sadiosa sufficiently shows that it is for the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, as defined in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and penalized in Art. 39 of the same Code
although it is designated as for "illegal recruitment" only. Under the Code, the essential elements of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale are as follows: (1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of
workers, as defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2)
accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with
respect to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, whether locally or overseas; and
(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group." All these elements are
to be found in the information. It alleges that Sadiosa, knowing fully well that she was "not a duly licensed job
recruiter," falsely represented that she could "secure employment as domestic helpers abroad" for the four
complainants.
As such, the purpose of the requirement under Sec. 8, Rule 110 to inform and apprise the accused of the true crime
of which she was charged, has been complied with. The main purpose of the requirement that the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting an offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language is to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged so that he could suitably prepare for his
defense. It is also required so that the trial court could pronounce the proper judgment. This gives substance to the
constitutional guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. Herein, Sadiosa was fully accorded the right to be informed of the charges against her.
The fact that she put up the defense of having accepted the money only in her capacity as an officer of the
recruitment agency shows that she fully understood the nature and cause of the accusation against her.

Furthermore, it is incorrect for Sadiosa to maintain that the information filed against her contained conflicting and
irreconcilable charges of illegal recruitment, estafa under Article 315 par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code and estafa
under the same article but under par. 2 (a) thereof. While on its face the allegations in the information may
constitute estafa, it merely describes how Sadiosa was able to consummate the act of illegal recruitment — through
false and fraudulent representation by pretending that she was a duly-licensed recruiter who could secure
employment for complainants in Kuwait. These allegations in the information therefore do not render the information
defective or multiplicitous. Sadiosa could have been validly charged separately with estafa under the same set of
facts in the illegal recruitment case, but she was fortunate enough not to have been so charged. Nevertheless, there
is no doubt from a reading of the information, that it accurately and clearly avers all of the ingredients that constitute
illegal recruitment in large scale. The prosecutor simply captioned the information with the generic name of the
offense under the Labor Code — illegal recruitment. Hence, to avoid misconception and misinterpretation of the
information, the prosecutor should have indicated in its caption, the offense he had clearly alleged in its body, that
the crime charged was for illegal recruitment in large scale. However, such omission or lack of skill of the prosecutor
who crafted the information should not deprive the people of the right to prosecute a crime with so grave a
consequence against the economic life of the aggrieved parties. What is important is that he did allege in the
information the facts sufficient to constitute the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale.