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TURNING
POINT
A New Comprehensive Strategy
for Countering Violent Extremism
commission cochairs
TURNING POINT
A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism
commission cochairs
Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral
Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American
prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962,
CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institu-
tions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transna-
tional challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and
economic integration.
CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views ex-
pressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
Disclaimer
II Members of the CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extremism
served in an advisory capacity. Their participation and listing herein
does not necessarily imply that they, or their institutions, subscribe indi-
vidually to each and every recommendation or finding in the report.
IV Executive Summary
1 Introduction
65 Commissioner Biographies
73 Acknowledgments
75 CSIS Contributors
77 Consultations
4) Aligning policies and values: The United States should put hu-
man rights at the center of CVE, ensuring that its engagement with
domestic and foreign actors advances the rule of law, dignity, and
accountability. In particular, the U.S. government should review its
security assistance to foreign partners to certify that it is being used
in just and sustainable ways.
7) Expanding CVE models: The United States and its allies and partners
urgently need to enlarge the CVE ecosystem, creating flexible platforms
for funding, implementing, and replicating proven efforts to address the
We can change the course of this threat. Doing so will require aligning
all of these pieces into a comprehensive strategy and investing in CVE
programs, partnerships, and policies at scale and over the next decade
or more.
Letter from the Cochairs We are at a turning point. Continu-
ing to address extremist ideologies
hroughout both of our careers,
sporadically and on the cheap
we have personally witnessed the
guarantees that terrorist attacks—
devastation wrought by violent
and the related bloodshed—will
extremism. The cost measures not
continue indefinitely. To defeat the
only in the lives lost, but also in the
scourge of violent extremism, the
profound toll it has taken on our
United States and its allies need a
sense of security, societal cohe-
new comprehensive strategy that
sion, and international norms and
has weight, is capable of building
values. Since September 11, 2001,
the right alliances, and can be a
efforts to combat terrorism have
practical guide for policymakers.
been far-reaching and mostly ef-
This report offers such a strategy,
fective in preventing another large-
so that nations, faiths, and cultures
scale, complex attack in the United
States. Yet, terrorist groups contin- can live in peace and stability with
ue to gain strength and spread to each other, and so that our citi-
new corners of the globe, threat- zens can live free from the fear of
ening to derail an entire generation terrorism that has taken the lives of
of Muslim youth and destabilize so many innocents.
every country on earth. Purpose and Process
Current approaches are insuffi- In the fall of 2015, CSIS president
cient to cope with this intensi- and CEO John J. Hamre asked us
fying threat. We urgently need a to chair a Commission that would
new paradigm—one that recog- produce an innovative CVE strate-
nizes violent extremism as the gy for the next U.S. administration.
global, generational challenge
that it is and leverages all tools This bipartisan Commission,
VI
available to defeat it. In this fight, managed by Shannon N. Green,
military and law enforcement senior fellow and director of the
solutions are essential. We will CSIS Human Rights Initiative, was
need to continue to take ter- composed of 23 public- and pri-
rorists off the battlefield, disrupt vate-sector leaders from technol-
plots, and safeguard our borders. ogy companies, civil society, the
But we will never eradicate the faith community, and academia.
violence caused by these groups Juan Zarate and Farah Pandith
until we defeat their ideologies. were central to this effort. Serving
as senior advisers and commis-
We must be clear-eyed about the sioners, they lent their tremen-
nature of the enemy. This Commis- dous expertise, historical knowl-
sion focused on terrorist organiza- edge, energy, and passion to
tions that claim the religion of Islam
TURNING POINT
cochairs
1
Tony Blair, former prime minister of the United Kingdom (remarks at “CSIS Com-
mission on Violent Extremism,” CSIS, Washington, DC, February 23, 2016, https://
www.csis.org/events/csis-commission-countering-violent-extremism.
2
Farah Pandith and Juan Zarate, “Winning the War of Ideas,” in Global Forecast
2016, ed. Craig Cohen and Melissa Dalton (Washington, DC: CSIS, 2015), https://
csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/151116_Co-
hen_GlobalForecast2016_Web.pdf.
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database.
Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
“Violent extremists are • Selectively using theology to while focusing on violent extrem-
legitimize violence and compel ists that claim to represent or draw
altering the political
“true believers” to target their inspiration from Islam, this report
landscape and erasing governments, Western powers, offers broader recommendations
national borders, and and even civilians. for addressing growing intolerance 3
in so doing, destroying The Commission focused its anal-
and hatred.
evidence of people, ysis and recommendations on
history, and cultures this form of violent extremism as The Origins of Extremist
that threaten their it presents the most immediate Ideologies
transnational and national security
world view.” threat to the United States, its allies,
Modern extremists’ world view did
not just appear out of the blue. It
and communities across the globe.
has been deliberately cultivated
Groups like ISIS, al Qaeda, Boko
and spread for many decades. As
Haram, the Taliban, and others are
Mubaraz Ahmed, Milo Comerford, and Emman El-Badawy, “Milestones to Militancy” (Tony Blair Faith Foundation, Centre on
3
4
Zalmay Khalilzad, “‘We Misled You’: How the Saudis Are Coming Clean on Funding Terrorism,” Politico,
September 14, 2016, http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/saudi-arabia-terrorism-fund-
ing-214241.
5
Yaroslav Trofimov, The Siege of Mecca: The Forgotten Uprising in Islam’s Holiest Shrine and the Birth of
Al Qaeda (New York: Doubleday, 2007).
6
Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam (New York: Routledge, 2007).
7
Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, trans. Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 2002).
GLOBAL TERROR ATTACKS SINCE 2012
6 Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd
With the Soviets’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in itary and intelligence actions as well as policing and
1989, a global terrorist network emerged. Under the defensive measures.
leadership of Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda became
These measures, aimed at thwarting opportunities
the refuge for battle-hardened and highly motivated
militants from Afghanistan. Al Qaeda would become for terrorists to plan and execute complex attacks on
emblematic of a new breed of terrorism: transna- the homeland, included: hardening and expanding
tional, well-financed, savvy to the theatrical nature physical barriers around sensitive locations and crit-
of terrorist tactics, and focused less on Arab auto- ical infrastructure; improving security procedures and
crats than on the “far enemy.” The 1992 bombing in equipment, identity checks, and luggage screening at
Aden, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, airports; enhancing detection and screening process-
TURNING POINT
the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es es for cargo coming into the United States via sea-
Salaam, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 all pre- ports, land border ports, and mail facilities; strength-
saged the tragedy of September 11.8 ening investigation and prosecution capabilities for
terrorism-related cases; tightening controls on peo-
September 11, 2001, and beyond ple entering the United States; and training personnel
to effectively implement these measures.
For much of the twentieth century, the spread of ex-
tremist ideologies went largely unchallenged by the More than 263 government entities were either cre-
West. The devastating terrorist attacks of September ated or reorganized in response to the September 11
11 brought the danger home to the United States, attacks.9 Chief among them were the Department of
prompting a response that has relied heavily on mil- Homeland Security (DHS), which integrated all or part
8
Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).
9
Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, “A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control,” Washington Post, July 19, 2010, http://projects.
washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/print/.
of 22 different federal departments The massive human and financial
and agencies to create a more uni- resources devoted to security since
fied approach to safeguarding the September 11 have made us safer in
United States against terrorism, some respects. It is more difficult for
and the Transportation Security terrorists to get into the United States
Administration (TSA), which cen- and, if they do, harder for them to
tralized and standardized airport pull off a complex attack.13 However,
security. Intelligence cooperation as the U.S. government—and its al-
was bolstered by the Intelligence lies and partners—improved coun-
Reform and Terrorism Prevention terterrorism capabilities, terrorists
Act of 2004, which established the quickly moved to exploit gaps in
position of director of national in- the response. As David Kilcullen ex-
telligence and the National Coun- plains, these counterterrorism, law
terterrorism Center to integrate enforcement, and intelligence ef-
terrorism-related intelligence. forts imposed “strong evolutionary
pressure on terrorist organizations,”
Internationally, the United States
since a technique that worked once
invested vast sums on countering
was highly unlikely to work again, at
terrorism and building the capacity
least not in the same form.14 Terrorist
of partner security and intelligence
groups adapted by choosing softer
services. According to estimates,
targets, conducting less complicated
Congress has appropriated $1.6
attacks, and relying on decentralized
trillion to the Department of De-
cells and individual actors (so-called
fense (DOD) for war-related oper-
“lone wolves”), making it harder for
ational costs since September 11.
law enforcement to detect and dis-
When combined with an estimated
rupt plots. These groups have also
$123.2 billion for relevant State De-
become much more proficient at
partment and Foreign Operations,
using social media and modern dig- 7
the DOD, Department of State, and
ital technologies to target recruits,
U.S. Agency for International De-
build their brand and market share,
velopment (USAID) have received
and expand their reach globally. The
over $1.7 trillion for activities and
terrorist threat today is therefore
operations since the attacks.10 This
more atomized, pervasive, and chal-
is comparable to more than 10
lenging to counter than it was at the
years of federal funding for edu-
turn of the century.
cation. Likewise, intelligence bud-
gets have significantly expanded. In As a result, the methods the U.S.
2007, Congress appropriated $43.5 government has used in the past
10
Susan B. Epstein and Lynn M. Williams, “Overseas Contingency Operations
Funding: Background and Status,” Congressional Research Service, July 13, 2016,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44519.pdf.
11
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “DNI Releases Budget Figure for
FY 2017 Appropriations Requested for the National Intelligence Program,” press
release, February 9, 2016, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releas-
es/215-press-releases-2016/1315-dni-releases-budget-figure-for-fy2017-appropri-
ations-requested-for-the-national-intelligence-program.
12
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “DNI Releases Budget Figure for
National Intelligence Program,” press release, October 30, 2007, https://www.dni.
gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Press%20Releases/2007%20Press%20Releas-
es/20071030_release.pdf.
13
Steven Brill, “Is America Any Safer?,” Atlantic, September 2016, http://www.theat-
lantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/.
14
David Kilcullen, Blood Year: Islamic State and the Failures of the War on Terror
(London: C. Hurst, 2015).
What expanded to address the structur-
al social, economic, and political
grievances that can be conducive
is “CVE”? to terrorist radicalization and re-
cruitment. CVE includes efforts to
shrink public support for violent
extremist movements; build the
resilience of local communities;
The field of countering violent
offer peaceful alternatives to po-
extremism emerged from a rec-
tential recruits; dissuade radical-
ognition that military and law en-
ized individuals from committing
forcement operations are essen-
criminal acts; and rehabilitate
tial to taking terrorists off of the
and reintegrate individuals who
battlefield and disrupting plots,
have either served their prison
but are insufficient for extinguish-
sentences or are otherwise no
ing the underlying ideologies and
longer deemed a security threat.
grievances that motivate scores
Though the precise definition and
of recruits to join violent extremist
boundaries are widely debated,
groups. The White House reflected
in essence, CVE encompasses a
this understanding in the 2006 Na-
spectrum of interventions aimed
tional Security Strategy. The Strat-
at preventing the recruitment and
egy defined its short-run goals as
radicalization of individuals into
“using military force and other in-
violent extremist organizations.
struments of national power” to cut
off terrorists’ activities and sourc-
es of support, while underscoring
that in the long run, success would The Need for a New
mean “winning the battle of ideas, Comprehensive Strategy
8 for it is ideas that can turn the dis-
enchanted into murderers willing Despite the security enhance-
to kill innocent victims.”15 ments made in the last 15 years,
the United States and its allies do
The competition of ideas would not yet have an effective strate-
eventually come to be known as gy, with broad bipartisan support,
CVE.16 CVE refers to the nonco- for undermining the appeal of ex-
ercive, longer-range tools de- tremist ideologies and narratives
ployed in an effort to counter and stemming recruitment and
extremists’ ideologies and narra- mobilization to terrorism. Pop-
tives, reducing their appeal and ulist figures on both sides of the
ultimately neutralizing the threat Atlantic have taken advantage of
of violence.17 Initially focused on this gap—and the fear created by
the ideological dimension, over terrorist attacks—to sell their own
TURNING POINT
15
George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washing-
ton, DC: The White House, March 2006), 9, http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/nss2006.pdf.
16
The U.S. government defines CVE as “efforts focused on preventing all forms of ideo-
logically based extremist violence, to include prevention of successful recruitment into
terrorist groups. It is distinct from disruptive actions which focus on stopping acts of
terrorism by those who have already subscribed to violence.” See U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, “A Comprehensive U.S. Government Approach to Countering Violent
Extremism,” n.d., https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/US%20Govern-
ment%20Approach%20to%20CVE-Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
17
The term “preventing violent extremism,” or PVE, has gained traction, particularly within
the United Nations and European countries. For some, PVE suggests a more proactive,
longer-term effort to address the underlying conditions and root causes associated with
support for violent extremism, whereas CVE is more reactive. The Commission does not
see this distinction. For the purposes of this report, CVE is inclusive of preventative efforts
at the societal, community, and individual levels.
off our borders will not prevent extremist ideol-
ogies from taking hold and inspiring people to
commit horrific attacks using any means avail-
able. So long as individuals throughout the world
are attracted to violent extremist groups and the
revolutionary ideologies they espouse, we must
continue to use our military, intelligence, and law
enforcement capabilities to protect our safety.
Until we defeat the ideologies themselves, how-
ever, we will not achieve lasting security.
18
Soft power refers here to the ability to shape the
preferences and choices of others through appeal and
attraction rather than by coercion (hard power). The
currency of soft power is culture, political values, and
foreign policies. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power: The
Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Publi-
cAffairs, 2004). Also Richard L. Armitage and Joseph
S. Nye Jr., cochairs, A Smarter, More Secure Ameri-
ca: Report of the CSIS Commission on Smart Power
(Washington, DC: CSIS, 2007), https://csis-prod.s3.am-
azonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/
pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf. Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism
https://www.csis.org/analysis/
survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism
JUAN C. ZARATE, SENIOR ADVISER AND COMMISSIONER
• Go all in. The United States and not sufficient. We must address
its allies must build an around- the spread of extremist ideolo-
the-clock operation to confront gies to Africa, Europe, South and
violent extremism, with the right Southeast Asia, the Caucuses,
personnel, financial support, and Russia, and elsewhere to prevent
10
accountability structures. To terrorist groups from regenerat-
date, CVE has been ad hoc and ing in new forms.
undervalued compared to the
military, law enforcement, and • Forge dynamic partnerships.
intelligence aspects of the fight. The nature of the enemy—
We must significantly increase decentralized, globalized, com-
the resources and attention ded- mitted, and crowdsourced—
icated to challenging extrem- requires intensive and adapt-
ists’ narratives and creating new able partnerships between and
pathways for those vulnerable to among governments, the private
radicalization and recruitment. sector, and civil society. This de-
mands more than sporadic en-
• Take a global approach. The gagements and pilot programs,
threat of violent extremism can
TURNING POINT
19
Shannon N. Green, executive director, CVE Commission, interview with Jesse
Morton, CSIS, June 23, 2016.
DEFINING
THE
PROBLEM
The unique challenges and oppor- This section addresses three
tunities facing Muslim youth, who questions:
are growing up immersed in so-
1. Why do some young people find
cial media in the post-September
extremist ideologies appealing?
11 world, make them a particular
target for violent extremist recruit- 2.
What kinds of factors have
ers. There are 1.6 billion Muslims in facilitated the spread of violent
the world today—a number that is extremism?
expected to grow to nearly 2.8 bil-
3. What shortcomings inhibit our
lion in 2050.20 This increase is due
ability to effectively confront vi-
to the youthful nature of the glob-
olent extremism, and replicate,
al Muslim population and fertility
scale, and sustain successful
rates that exceed the world’s aver-
interventions?
age. In the Middle East and South
Asia, nearly two-thirds of the pop-
ulation is younger than 30 and in- Motivations and Drivers
creasing rapidly. Violent extremism is not caused
by any single factor or grievance.
While the vast majority of Muslim
It grows out of an intolerant world
youth are peaceful and hopeful,
view in which violence is the pri-
tectonic cultural, political, and
mary medium of exchange and
social changes—brought on by
society is a means to an end. That
September 11 and its aftermath,
said, nearly 15 years of global re-
globalization, the erosion of tra- search has shed light on why some
ditional societies and influencers, people are attracted to violent
the rapid evolution of technology, extremism while others are not.
widespread displacement, and ur- Experts have identified intersect-
14 ban migration—have created an ing “push” and “pull” factors often
opening for violent extremists to operating within fragile, oppres-
shape their world view. These dy- sive, or conflicted-affected envi-
namics are expected to transform ronments that help to explain this
the trajectory of Muslim-majority phenomenon. Structural condi-
and non-Muslim majority coun- tions, including real and perceived
tries over the next few decades.21 marginalization, grievances, and
If we fail to act, we could lose an experiences of injustice or cor-
entire generation and see com- ruption, may push individuals into
munities and countries ripped joining a violent extremist organi-
apart. However, with concerted zation, while radical recruitment
action and resources behind the narratives, propaganda, and social
strategy proposed in this report, ties to extremist networks work to
we can dramatically reduce the pull them in. Psychological factors,
TURNING POINT
20
Pew Research Center, “The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projec-
tions, 2010–2050: Muslims,” April 2, 2015, http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/
muslims/.
21
Kristin Lord, “Here Come the Young,” Foreign Policy, August 12, 2016, http://for-
eignpolicy.com/2016/08/12/here-comes-the-young-youth-bulge-demographics/.
22
Magnus Ranstorp, “The Root Causes of Violent Extremism,” RAN Centre of Ex-
cellence, January 4, 2016, 3, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/
networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/issue_paper_
root-causes_jan2016_en.pdf.
Unfortunately, radicalization models
cannot predict who will become a
terrorist. There is no single pathway
into terrorism and no archetypal vio-
lent extremist. Violent extremists are
not simply marginalized misfits. They
are no more likely to suffer from men-
tal illness than the average person.
Many are married and have children.
Contrary to popular perceptions, vi-
olent extremists are often well-off,
employed, and educated.23 Nor is vi-
olent extremism simply rooted in re-
ligious devotion.24 Religious fluency,
in fact, can help individuals challenge
extremist ideas and narratives.
23
Alan B. Krueger, What Makes a Terrorist:
Economics and the Roots of Terrorism
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2008); Eli Berman et al., “Do Working Men
Rebel? Employment and Insurgency in
Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines,”
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 55, No. 4
(2011): 496–528.
24
Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind
of God: The Global Rise of Religious
Violence, 3rd. ed. (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 2003); Christopher
Paul, “How Do Terrorists Generate and
Maintain Support?,” in Social Science for
Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces To-
gether, ed. Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2009).
25
Shannon N. Green, managing director,
CVE Commission, phone interview with
Suhaib Webb, CSIS, August 31, 2016.
26
Shannon N. Green, managing director,
CVE Commission, interview with Farah
Pandith, CSIS, July 22, 2016.
Source: http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/muslims/,
Chart titled “Projected Global Muslim Population, 2010 to 2050”
in Germany, for example, encoun-
ter an education system that forc-
es young people to choose their
course of study in their early teens,
disadvantaging those who are non-
native German speakers.30 In the
Netherlands, the Dutch word used
for individuals born outside the
country or with at least one parent
born outside the country, alloch-
toon, is often applied more broadly
to those who are nonwhite and not
“indigenous” to the soil. This usage
creates a second class of citizens,
including Muslims, who are labeled
as outsiders even if they were born
and have lived their entire lives in
FARAH PANDITH, SENIOR ADVISER AND COMMISSIONER the Netherlands.31 The response
from some Muslims in the West
Violent extremists provide seem- ty, they face systematic disenfran- has been to reject assimilation
ingly authentic answers to these chisement and injustice. Muslims and adopt an inflexible, unfavor-
questions, offering a way to rec- are often passed over for jobs able view of Western culture and
oncile religious identity and mo- simply because of their last name ideals.32 According to an individual
dernity and to find glory, redemp- or address.28 For example, a 2010 incarcerated in the United States
tion, or simply a way out of their study indicated that French Mus- for linkages to terrorism, “I was so
current situation. Joining a violent lims of Middle Eastern or North Af- bitter. I felt discriminated against as
extremist movement is, for many, rican descent were 2.5 times less an African American man in Amer-
16 an aspirational social act—an op- likely to receive a call back from ica, but also as a Muslim. I felt like
portunity to gain power, prestige, an interview than their Christian Muslims in America were being tar-
and status; to address the abuses counterparts.29 Moreover, Muslims geted as the enemies, and this ex-
suffered by their coreligionists; or are often physically separated from clusionary treatment led me to seek
to participate in a utopian effort to society, as seen in the banlieues, answers from the wrong people. I
remake the world.27 In this sense, a pejorative term for the impov- went down the wrong path.”33
violent extremists offer something erished and neglected neighbor-
This dynamic may be exacerbated
universally appealing: a chance to hoods on the outskirts of Paris.
in countries where the govern-
participate in an enterprise larger
The failure to integrate generations ment attempts to impose secu-
than one’s self.
of Muslim immigrants, particular- larism on its citizens, demanding
This search for identity plays out ly in Western countries, sends the that national identity take prece-
differently depending on one’s message that they will never be dence over religious or cultural
circumstances. In some countries truly accepted as equal and valued identity.34 These efforts can back-
TURNING POINT
where Muslims are in the minori- members of society. Immigrants fire. Banning religious dress or
27
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview with Scott Atran, CSIS, May 13, 2016.
28
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview with Peter Neumann, CSIS, July 22, 2016.
29
Claire L. Adida, David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Valfort, “Identifying Barriers to Muslim Integration in France,” Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences in the United States of America 107, no. 52 (December 2010): 22384–22390, http://www.
pnas.org/content/107/52.toc.
30
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview with Farah Pandith, CSIS, July 22, 2016; and Katrine Thom-
asen, “A Hard Look at Discrimination in Education in Germany,” Open Society Foundations, October 17, 2012, https://www.
opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/hard-look-discrimination-education-germany.
31
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview with Farah Pandith, CSIS, July 22, 2016.
32
Peter Skerry, “Problems of the Second Generation: To Be Young, Muslim, and American,” Brookings Institution, June 28, 2013,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/problems-of-the-second-generation-to-be-young-muslim-and-american/.
33
Courtney La Bau, interview with an individual whose name and location have been withheld, June 16, 2016.
34
Dan Bilefsky, “France’s Burkini Debate Reverberates Around the World,” New York Times, August 31, 2016, http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/09/01/world/europe/burkini-france-us-germany-africa.html.
symbols, in a bid to preserve the dominant cultural iden-
tity, contributes to “us vs. them” narratives manipulated
“Joining a by violent extremists. Researchers have found that Fran-
violent extremist cophone countries, which have taken a particularly hard
movement is, line on questions of secularism and identity, have prov-
for many, an en to be fruitful recruiting grounds for ISIS.35 Of course,
Muslim-minority countries do not have a monopoly on
aspirational the ill treatment of Muslims. In many Muslim-majority
social act—an countries, minority sects experience unrelenting perse-
opportunity cution, from the Ahmadiyya of Pakistan to Iran’s Sufis to
to gain power, the Shi’a in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
prestige, In countries in which opportunity is lacking and injustice is
and status; prevalent, terrorist recruiters offer a way out. Studies have
to address found that a profound sense of injustice and alienation
from formal state structures can motivate young people to
the abuses join terrorist groups.36 There is also a significant correlation
suffered by their between gross human rights abuses—such as extrajudicial
coreligionists; killings, arbitrary detention, and policies undermining re-
or to participate ligious freedom—and a high incidence of terror attacks.
In fact, 92 percent of all terrorist attacks over the past 25
in a utopian years occurred in countries where state-sponsored politi-
effort to remake cal violence was widespread.37 As one former extremist in
the world.” London explained, “if you are living under a dictatorship,
people will look for an outlet because they are already fac-
ing injustice and inequality.”38
destruction in their lifetime. Despite wide- survey participants think that social media
spread anxiety about the terrorist threat, 73 platforms can be used effectively to amplify
percent of respondents believe that the chal- positive messages. Respondents were also
lenge of violent extremism is solvable. open to cultural influencers, such as Holly-
wood, Bollywood, music and fashion icons,
and sports figures, playing a greater role in
MOTIVATIONS AND DRIVERS
contesting extremist propaganda. Howev-
Views on motivations for violent extremism er, when asked who are the most credible
are divided between Muslim-minority and
messengers, respondents defaulted to reli-
Muslim-majority countries. In every country
except for Turkey and Egypt, “religious fun- gious leaders in all countries. Finally, while
damentalism” is identified as the primary root 64 percent of survey respondents believe
cause of violent extremism. In Turkey, mili- that religious schools sometimes play a role
tary actions by foreign governments are per- in radicalization, 80 percent say that they are
ceived to be the main driver, while Egyptians an important part of the solution.
The Recruitment Process Former extremists interviewed Shabaab have long relied on per-
by the Commission emphasized sonal connections to facilitate re-
Charismatic recruiters fuse local
the importance of making a hu- cruitment.41 Indeed, social ties and
grievances, both real and per- man connection when recruiting. personal relationships may help
ceived, with emotion to fill their Individuals rarely graduate from explain why some extremists cross
ranks. Recruitment tends to pro- passively consuming propaganda into violence while others do not.
ceed in two phases. First, they cast to active support without direct For instance, one study estimates
a wide net, using general griev- engagement from a third party. that peer-to-peer recruiting ac-
ance narratives to attract sympa- Recruiters provide the personal counts for more than 80 percent
thizers and potential supporters. touch, showering potential recruits of ISIS recruits.42
Then, local and online recruiters with attention and supplying criti-
Social media is not the cause of
methodically monitor what po- cal information about how to con-
violent extremism, then, but a
tential sympathizers are saying tribute to the extremist cause.40
powerful amplifier and accelerant.
in their social circles and online, Evidence suggests that recruit- Digital platforms and increased ac-
evaluate their economic oppor- ers are more successful when cess to smart phones and internet
tunities, and assess their mental they have strong social, familial, connectivity help facilitate radical-
state, looking for some weakness or business ties with their target. ization and recruitment. Accord-
to exploit. al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and al ing to CIA director John Brennan,
40
Shannon N. Green, “Changing the Narrative: Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda,” CSIS Commentary, September 25,
2015, https://www.csis.org/analysis/changing-narrative-countering-violent-extremist-propaganda.
41
Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
42
Scott Atran, “ISIS Is a Revolution: All World-Altering Revolutions Are Born in Danger and Death, Brotherhood and Joy. How
Can This One Be Stopped?,” AEON, December 15, 2015, https://aeon.co/essays/why-isis-has-the-potential-to-be-a-world-
altering-revolution.
OF THE
forts aimed at foreign fighters will cause them
to increasingly focus on domestic attacks. As
such, homegrown extremists will become a
THREAT bigger threat. Terrorist groups are also likely to
continue the evolution toward attacks plotted
and executed by small groups or individuals,
against soft targets, using less sophisticated
In developing its recommendations, the and easy-to-acquire weapons. Such attacks
Commission considered how extremist ide- do not require extensive training, planning, or
ologies are manifesting today and what coordination, making them harder to detect,
the landscape may look like for the next 10 but no less lethal.
years. The strategy in this report is forward-
looking and meant to guide CVE efforts over SOCIAL MEDIA USE
the next decade. This forecasting is based on Violent extremists’ use of social media is also
interviews with former extremists, research- predicted to evolve. According to interview-
ers, youth, policymakers, and CVE practi- ees, to escape surveillance and account sus-
tioners across the United States, Europe, the pensions, terrorists are moving onto private,
Middle East, Africa, and Asia, and expertise encrypted platforms like WhatsApp and Tele-
drawn from commissioners themselves. gram and have experimented with smaller
social media platforms including Friendica,
THE FUTURE Diaspora, KIK, WICKR, and the Russian version
20 The Commission posits that the future of ter- of Facebook, VKontakte. However, industry
rorism is likely to be marked by growing com- experts expect that Twitter, Facebook, and
petition among terrorist networks; more fre- YouTube will remain important because they
quent but less complex attacks; and a wider offer unrivaled outreach opportunities.
array of recruits. The terrorist threat is likely to
morph in ways yet unimagined. CVE efforts PROFILE OF RECRUITS
must therefore anticipate a future that features Experts suggest that violent extremist groups
new technologies, infrastructure, and innova- will likely diversify their recruitment pool,
tion used by us as well as by violent extremists. reaching out increasingly to women and old-
er and younger generations. According to a
RESURGENCE OF AL QAEDA Nigerian CVE practitioner, “they will try to re-
The majority of those interviewed expect a re- cruit women and older men, because security
surgence of al Qaeda and its affiliates. Experts agencies are currently focusing much more
TURNING POINT
point out that once ISIS is defeated militarily, attention on young people.” Terrorists have
those drawn to its ideology will seek a new already started recruiting children in their pre-
home, which will likely be al Qaeda. As one in- teens—a trend that is likely to accelerate. Ex-
terviewee stated, “al Qaeda is playing the long perts also predict that the presence of women
game. ISIS has only released seven videos in high-profile roles as supporters, mobilizers,
during this past Ramadan, where al Qaeda has and members of terrorist groups will continue
released 300 videos.” Several people noted to be a key feature of the future landscape. Fi-
that al Nusra Front (which recently changed nally, interviewees emphasized that converts
its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) stands to are highly susceptible to radicalization, as
gain significantly as ISIS is degraded. Accord- the conversion process dramatically chang-
ing to interviewees, al Nusra Front has been es one’s life and dismantles existing social
steadily planting roots and gaining support networks and relationships, allowing violent
throughout Syria, offering a more moderate extremists to manipulate them into believing
form of governance than ISIS. warped interpretations of Islam.
the internet provides violent ex-
tremist groups with tools to “co-
ordinate operations, attract new
recruits, disseminate propaganda
and inspire sympathizers across
the globe.”43 Violent extremists’ ex-
ploitation of digital platforms allows
would-be terrorists to seek inspira-
tion and information online—and
rally around a terrorist group as a
brand, an idea, or a methodology—
without ever leaving their homes.44
The widespread use of social me-
dia has also made violent extrem-
ists’ plans more difficult to disrupt.
Security agencies have to track
a much larger number of poten- AHMED ABBADI, COMMISSIONER
tial plotters, giving terrorists more
space to plan large, complex oper- collapse. It seems, then, that violent feed their “us versus them” narra-
ations against a higher background extremism arises out of conflict and tive. Similarly, the invasions of Iraq
level of activity.45 disorder as much as it contributes and Afghanistan have manufac-
to these conditions.47 tured the grist for extremist propa-
ganda about the “crusading West.”
Enabling Environments For many youth in the Middle East This plays along sectarian lines as
and North Africa, marginalization well. The Iranian nuclear deal an-
Socioeconomic, cultural, and tech-
and powerlessness were dramat- imates conspiracy theories about
nological shifts have contributed to
ically accelerated by the disap- a U.S. agenda to keep Sunni Arabs
increasingly complex and contest-
pointments of the Arab Spring. fractured and weak. For some, the
ed environments, creating open- 21
Throughout this region, the Arab United States’ refusal to engage
ings for extremist ideologies to take
Spring saw a generation find its militarily in Syria against the Assad
root. The dimensions of this chal-
lenge should be addressed in turn: political voice only to be silenced. regime proves Washington’s cal-
More than five years later, the lousness to the mass suffering of
Widespread violence—whether per- promise of liberal democracy has Sunnis. Terrorist recruiters hold up
petrated by the state or the result faded, while the appeal of other these examples as evidence that
of civil conflicts—creates environ- ideologies, such as Arab national- the West is at war with Islam and
ments conducive to radicalization. ism and political Islam, has dimin- that Muslims will never truly be
The 2015 Global Terrorism Index ished. These factors have ceded valued by Western countries.
identified two factors closely asso- the ideological space to more in-
43
“CIA Director Brennan: Social Media Makes It Harder to Fight Terror,” NBC News, March 13, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/
storyline/isis-terror/cia-director-brennan-social-media-makes-it-harder-fight-terror-n323151.
44
Kilcullen, Blood Year, 120–123.
45
Ibid.
46
IEP, Global Terrorism Index, 2015, 4.
47
International Crisis Group, Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (Brussels: International Crisis Group, March
2016), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf.
48
Ibid.
22
TURNING POINT
• Researchers are still seeking definitive answers re- Organizational and Funding Challenges
garding the radicalization process, the most salient
Political leaders often speak of their commitment to
drivers and how those drivers interact with each
“win the battle of ideas,” particularly after high-profile
other and the environment in which radicalization
attacks, but no consensus has emerged on the strate-
occurs, and the most effective strategies for break-
gies, resources, tools, and partnerships needed to ef-
ing the cycle of radicalization and recruitment.
fectively counter extremist ideologies and narratives.
• Civil society actors are unclear about whether violent The following organizational, operational, and fund-
extremism is primarily a military and law enforcement ing challenges have hindered a coherent response:
challenge—to which they have little to contribute—
• Coordination within government. To date, U.S.
or a social, political, and economic problem.
government efforts to deal with violent extrem-
Persistent controversy has hindered CVE efforts, par- ism have been fragmented. There has been in-
ticularly in the United States, obscuring the original sufficient coordination across government silos—
purpose of moving away from a purely securitized international and domestic, civilian and military,
law enforcement and social There are several forums for information sharing,
service delivery. As a result, ef- notably the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF),
forts to respond to the array of which brings together experts and practitioners
challenges facing Muslim com- from around the world to share expertise and de-
munities in the United States or velop tools and strategies on combatting terror-
align diplomatic, development, ism. Through its CVE Working Group, GCTF is also
and strategic communications supporting the development of national CVE action
initiatives overseas have suf- plans. However, the exchange of best practices has
fered. The creation of the inter- been sporadic and is often at too senior of a level
agency CVE Task Force—hosted to sustain and benefit those actually responsible for
by DHS with overall leadership implementing CVE policies or programs. In addition,
provided by DHS and the De- these forums do not typically focus on stemming
partment of Justice (DOJ)—and the spread of extremist ideologies and narratives.
the Bureau of Counterterrorism The United States needs to strengthen mechanisms
and Countering Violent Extrem- for collaboration, at multiple levels, with key allies
ism at the Department of State throughout the world, specifically geared toward
to coordinate CVE efforts do- reducing the appeal of violent extremism.
mestically and internationally,
• Collaboration with nongovernmental partners.
respectively, are steps in the
There is incredible room for innovative partnerships
right direction. However, public
to counter violent extremism and its manifestations;
diplomacy and messaging ef-
this is because CVE requires engagement with a
forts led by the Global Engage-
broad range of stakeholders. However, to date, pub-
ment Center fall outside both
lic-private partnerships and private-private partner-
of these structures. Even more
ships have been characterized by ad hoc or hastily
problematically, responsibility
assembled coalitions. Technology sector represen-
at the National Security Coun-
tatives, entertainment industry executives, and civil
cil (NSC) is diffuse and unclear.
society leaders complain of erratic outreach, broad
24 There are currently three sep-
statements of interest in collaboration with few con-
arate directorates at the NSC,
crete asks, and little follow-through from U.S. gov-
in additional to other regional
ernment officials. Developing meaningful, sustain-
and functional directorates, that
able, long-term partnerships will require rebuilding
are responsible for some aspect
trust between the government and partner commu-
of CVE, and they report to dif-
nities and better defining the scope of collaboration.
ferent deputy national securi-
ty advisers. Unified leadership • Measurement. Political leaders and Congressional
and commitment starting at the appropriators have largely focused on the issues
White House is needed to lever- that can be measured. The number of terrorists
age all relevant assets and en- killed or the number of troops deployed fit into
hance accountability for results. metrics that more easily satisfy government over-
sight bodies. Accountability and results are import-
• International cooperation with
ant. However, the old dictum of “what gets mea-
other governments. Many of
TURNING POINT
The resources available for international efforts are similarly lacking. Al-
though precise figures are hard to come by given the definitional chal-
lenges mentioned earlier, State and USAID had roughly $100 million to
$150 million in FY 2016 for CVE programming and staffing. The adminis-
tration requested $187 million for international CVE efforts in its FY 2017
budget (nearly double the FY 2015 request),although convincing Con-
gress of the merits of investing in preventative efforts remains an uphill
battle.49 Even marshaling the resources to fully respond to the human-
itarian fallout from Syria has been difficult. The United States has con-
tributed $5.9 billion to support Syrian refugees and internally displaced
persons since 2011—and that barely scratches the surface of the need.50
In contrast, the United States spends over $50 billion annually on intel-
ligence efforts and nearly $60 billion a year for defense activities related
to combatting terrorism.51
All told, U.S. expenditures for “soft power” initiatives to confront ex-
tremist ideologies, domestically and abroad, total roughly 1/10th of 1
percent of the resources dedicated to military, law enforcement, and
intelligence efforts to combat terrorism.
49
Susan B. Epstein, Marian L. Lawson, and Alex Tiersky, “FY2017 State, Foreign Op-
erations and Related Programs Budget Request: In Brief,” Congressional Research
Service, February 19, 2016, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc824741/
m2/1/high_res_d/R44391_2016Feb19.pdf
50
U.S. Department of State, “Syrian Refugee Response,” http://www.state.gov/j/prm/
policyissues/issues/refugeeresponse/.
51
Susan B. Epstein and Lynn M. Williams, “Overseas Contingency Operations
Funding: Background and Status,” Congressional Research Service, June 13, 2016,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44519.pdf.
52
Matt Weinberger, “This CEO Barely Survived the 2008 Market Crash—Now His
Startup Has 400 Million Users, and It's Going Head-to-Head with Facebook,” Busi-
ness Insider, March 20, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/anchorfree-ceo-da-
vid-gorodyansky-interview-2016-3; Andy Greenberg, “Google’s Clever Plan to Stop
Aspiring ISIS Recruits,” Wired, September 7, 2016, https://www.wired.com/2016/09/
googles-clever-plan-stop-aspiring-isis-recruits/.
53
For example, in Minneapolis, local companies have committed $2 million to sup-
port CVE efforts. These resources came about largely because of the persistent
efforts of the U.S. attorney and the severity of the challenge in that city.
A NEW
COMPREHENSIVE
STRATEGY
TO COUNTER
VIOLENT
EXTREMISM
he United States and its allies need jection of strength, and protect
a new, comprehensive strategy to our security and the security of
counter violent extremism. A reli- our allies and partners.
ance on fighting terrorists abroad
These five strategic elements
so we do not have to face them
encompass activities that are
on our soil may be effective in
CVE-specific and those that are
the short term but will fail in the
CVE-relevant. CVE-specific refers
long term if we do not significant-
to measures designed to prevent
ly weaken the appeal of extremist
violent extremism in a direct, tar-
ideologies and narratives.
geted fashion, such as interven-
A new strategy to prevent and ing with someone drawn to ex-
counter violent extremism must: tremist ideologies. By contrast,
CVE-relevant measures are more
1)
Strengthen resistance to ex-
general, intending to reduce vul-
tremist ideologies: Forging a new
nerability to extremism in an in-
global partnership around educa-
direct way.54 CVE-relevant efforts
tion reform and expanding efforts
are primarily advanced through
to enhance respect for religious
education, development, human
diversity, stem the spread of intol-
rights and governance programs,
erance, and reinforce community
and youth initiatives.
resilience to extremist narratives.
This strategy seeks to plug the
2)
Invest in community-led pre-
gaping holes in the United States’
vention: Enabling civil society
current efforts and amplify what is
efforts to detect and disrupt rad-
working. It is focused on actions
icalization and recruitment, and
that the U.S. government should
rehabilitate and reintegrate those
take, in partnership with key stake-
who have succumbed to extrem-
28 holders, in the United States and
ist ideologies and narratives.
abroad. Implemented together, at
3)
Saturate the global market- scale and with the right partners,
place of ideas: Mobilizing tech- these elements will have a signifi-
nology companies, the enter- cant impact on reducing the reach
tainment industry, community and regeneration of violent ex-
leaders, religious voices, and tremist groups.
others to compete with and
overtake violent extremists’ nar- 1. STRENGTHENING
ratives in virtual and real spaces.
RESISTANCE
4) Align policies and values: Put- TO EXTREMIST
ting human rights at the center IDEOLOGIES
of CVE and ensuring that U.S.
Violent extremists seek to impose
engagement with foreign part-
TURNING POINT
Peter Romaniuk, Does CVE Work?: Lessons Learned from the Global Effort to
54
55
United Nations, “High Level General Assembly Thematic Debate, Promoting Tolerance and Reconciliation: Fostering Peaceful,
Inclusive Societies and Countering Violent Extremism: 21–22 April 2015, United Nations Headquarters, New York,” June 17, 2015,
http://www.un.org/pga/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/06/170615_HLTD-Promoting-Tolerance-Reconciliation-Summary.pdf.
56
Pew Research Center, “Public Remains Conflicted over Islam,” August 24, 2010, http://www.pewforum.org/2010/08/24/pub-
lic-remains-conflicted-over-islam/; Shibley Telhami, “What Americans Really Think about Muslims and Islam,” Brookings Insti-
tution, December 9, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/2015/12/09/what-americans-really-think-about-muslims-and-islam/.
57
Stevan Weine et al., Lessons Learned from Mental Health and Education: Identifying Best Practices for Addressing Violent Ex-
tremism, Final Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Home-
land Security, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (College Park, MD: START, October
2015), https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_LessonsLearnedfromMentalHealthAndEducation_FullReport_Oct2015.pdf.
58
Emile Lester and Patrick S. Roberts, Learning about World Religions in Public Schools: The Impact on Student Attitudes and
Community in Modesto, California (Nashville, TN: First Amendment Center, 2006), http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/
files/FirstForum_ModestoWorldReligions.pdf.
ucation is used to bring together als who represent these groups.
diverse groups, from evangelical Where youth do not have safe
Christians to Sikhs, to teach under- “Shoring up community spaces and opportunities to pur-
standing, build bridges, and pro- sue their interests, explore their
and individual resilience
mote respect for the First Amend- identities, and contribute to their
ment.58 Similar efforts include the is vital to delegitimizing communities, it creates an open-
Faith Community Working Group extremist narratives ing for violent extremists. For
in Montgomery County, Maryland, and enabling peaceful example, research on the Soma-
which aims to increase respect for alternatives to gain li-American community in Minne-
religious traditions, and the An- apolis identified three risk factors:
hold.” (a) the perceived social legitimacy
ti-Defamation League’s antibias
educational programs.59,60 With of violent extremism, (b) youths’
silience is vital to delegitimizing unaccounted-for time in unob-
over 16 million participants, the
extremist narratives and enabling served spaces, and (c) contact
Anti-Defamation League’s Class-
peaceful alternatives to gain hold. with recruiters or associates of
room of Difference offers knowl-
edge and resources that promote Invest in social cohesion, peace- violent extremist movements.64
respect and inclusion in schools.61 building and conflict mitigation. Vio- In the case of Minneapolis, these
Nongovernmental organizations lent extremists capitalize on conflict findings informed a model called
are also experimenting with virtu- and political, ethnic, or economic Building Community Resilience,
al exchanges to build intercultural division. Indeed, conflict within a which involves active partnerships
understanding and respect be- community is a leading indicator between families, civic groups,
tween the United States and Mid- of whether violent extremists will religious leaders, law enforce-
dle East, impart critical thinking be able to find traction.63 By con- ment, and local government of-
skills, and improve communication trast, when communities are well- ficials to raise awareness of risk
and collaboration.62 integrated and individuals of differ- factors, improve communication
ent ethnicities and religions peace- with youth to get a better sense of
Such initiatives have successfully how they are spending their time
fully coexist, extremist organiza-
combated discrimination and bul- and what they are encountering in
32 tions are less able to manipulate
lying and can be models for pro- those spaces, and empower com-
local tensions. Empowering local
moting social cohesion in diverse munity leaders and parents to in-
voices for peace is important to re-
communities. tervene with at-risk individuals.
ducing the personal experiences of
violence and marginalization that Raising awareness of the threats—
Reinforcing Local facilitate violent extremism. but also giving communities the
Resilience to Extremist tools to address them—is vital to
Create safe spaces for commu-
Ideologies and Narratives strengthening local resilience to
nities and youth to interact posi-
violent extremism.
Violent extremist movements tively. In many cases, the key fac-
thrive where they can co-opt tor determining whether a young Foster meaningful civic engage-
local grievances and conflicts, person will support or participate ment opportunities for youth. Youth
where they have ready access to in violent extremist activity is not seek meaning, connection, and
a “supply” of recruits, and where simply sympathy for their ideolo- opportunities to shape the world
TURNING POINT
voices opposed to extremism are gy, or the existence of grievances; around them. Too often, however,
silenced. Consequently, shoring it is having the means and oppor- young people are shunted aside,
up community and individual re- tunities to engage with individu- contributing to widespread feel-
59
International Cultural Center, “Families, Faith and Your School,” May 2016, http://www.theicc.net/ourcauses/families-faith-and-
your-school.
60
Anti-Defamation League, “Anti-Defamation League, Education and Outreach, Anti-Bias Education,” http://www.adl.org/educa-
tion-outreach/anti-bias-education/.
61
Ibid.
62
Aspen Institute, “Stevens Initiative,” http://stevensinitiative.org/.
63
USAID, “Mali Transition Initiative (MTI): Evaluation of the Impact of Social Networks in Gounzoureye Commune, Gao Cercle,
Mali,” Washington, DC: USAID, 2016; Nils N. Weidmann and Patrick M. Kuhn, “Unequal We Fight: Between- and Within-Group
Inequality and Ethnic Civil War,” Political Science and Research Methods 3, no. 3, (2015): 543–68.
64
Stevan M. Weine and John G. Horgan, “Building Resilience to Violent Extremism: One Community’s Perspective,” FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, April 2014, https://leb.fbi.gov/2014/april/building-resilience-to-violent-extremism-one-communitys-per-
spective.
Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism
https://www.csis.org/analysis/survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism
ings of frustration. It is imperative For this initiative to be effective,
to create mechanisms, both formal robust monitoring and response
and informal, for young people to mechanisms must be put in place.
find their voices and articulate their A few models exist, with varying
goals in public spaces. Political, degrees of international ownership
community, and religious leaders and accountability:
must offer young people meaning-
• Open Government Partnership.
ful opportunities for representation.
The Open Government Partner-
ship (OGP) provides an interna-
Signature Recommendation tional platform for reformers to
The United States should lead an make their governments more
effort to establish international open, accountable, and respon-
principles to stem the spread of sive to citizens.68 Participation
extremist ideologies and intoler- in the initiative is voluntary and
ance in education systems, with requires governments to meet
stringent mechanisms for over- certain eligibility criteria, commit
sight and enforcement. The ten- to the principles of open gov-
sions, prejudices, and stereotypes ernment, and deliver a coun-
that facilitate exclusion—and by try action plan developed with
extension, violent extremism— broad public consultation. OGP
are often embedded in textbooks monitors progress through the
and curricula.65 The United States Independent Reporting Mecha-
should work with likeminded nism, which issues an annual re-
countries and the United Nations port assessing each participating
to advance initiatives, like Glob- government on the quality and
al Citizenship Education, that en- implementation of their reform
plans. Based on concerns about
34 courage governments to revise
civic space, OGP instituted a re-
curricula, textbooks, and other
sponse policy that offers reme-
instructional materials to reflect
diation to participating coun-
the diverse experiences, back-
tries, and eventually designates
grounds, and composition of so-
countries as “inactive” if they do
ciety itself.66 These commitments
not improve the enabling envi-
would also prohibit the teaching of
ronment for civil society.
intolerance in education systems
and reaffirm the responsibility of • Universal Periodic Review. The
governments to ensure that text- Universal Periodic Review (UPR)
books, teachers, and educational is a unique process in which all
materials do not justify the use of 193 UN member states submit
violence to advance political, reli- to a public review of their hu-
gious, or social change; vilify other man rights records.69 The review
TURNING POINT
65
Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (New York: United Na-
tions, 2003), http://www.un.org/humansecurity/content/human-security-now.
66
UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), “Global Citizen-
ship Education,” http://en.unesco.org/gced.
67
“Homeland Security Advisory Council: Subcommittee on Countering Violent Ex-
tremism: Interim Report and Recommendations: June 2016,” 23, https://www.dhs.
gov/sites/default/files/publications/HSAC/HSAC%20CVE%20Final%20Interim%20
Report%20June%209%202016%20508%20compliant.pdf.
68
Open Government Partnership (OGP), “About,” http://www.opengovpartnership.
org/about.
69
UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Basic Facts about the
Universal Periodic Review,” http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/Basic-
Facts.aspx.
state under review; 2) reports of nal buy-in is essential, particularly if the U.S. govern-
independent human rights ex- ment wants noncompliance with the principles to
perts and groups, known as the carry real consequences.
Special Procedures, human rights
treaty bodies, and other UN enti-
2. INVESTING IN COMMUNITY-LED
ties; and 3) information from oth-
er stakeholders including nation-
PREVENTION
al human rights institutions and Historically, efforts to counter extremist ideologies and
nongovernmental organizations. narratives have been reactive. Rather than anticipating
Following an interactive discus- emerging threats, appropriate resources and expertise
sion, the review committee drafts are often deployed after the fact. The public health
a report, involving the country field offers some important lessons for breaking this
under review, summarizing its reactive cycle. A public health-based approach to CVE
findings and recommendations. would entail detecting and interrupting a behavior be-
In future UPRs, the state is ex- fore it becomes dangerous and spreads, changing the
pected to provide information on thinking of those most at risk, and, in time, reshaping
what concrete steps it has taken the social norms that exacerbate those risks.71
to implement the recommenda-
tions in the previous report. To invest in community-led prevention, the United
States and its allies must:
• Annual Trafficking in Persons
Report. Established in several • Build trust among key communities and poten-
successive pieces of legislation, tial partners. The United States and its allies need
the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) to build bridges with a wide range of grassroots
Report functions as the principal actors and invest in relationship-building and on-
diplomatic tool to engage foreign going communication.
governments on human traffick- • Improve detection and referral. Systematizing the
ing. Using the TIP Report, the identification of local warning signs, raising aware-
U.S. government assigns coun- 35
ness, and intervening before extremist ideologies
tries to one of four tiers based
spread is vital to a more effective strategy.
on minimum standards (set out
in legislation) for the elimination • Raise awareness about radicalization and recruit-
of trafficking. Countries falling ment. Within the United States, the government
in the bottom tier for failing to should work with civil society and the private sector
meet the minimum standards to expand community awareness programs and or-
and to make serious and sus- ganize safe spaces for parents, students, and teach-
tained antitrafficking efforts face ers to learn about how terrorists radicalize and re-
serious repercussions unless the cruit youth, on- and offline.
70
U.S. Department of State, “Trafficking in Persons Report: June 2016,” June 2016, http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/258876.pdf.
71
Cure Violence, “The Model,” http://cureviolence.org/the-model/the-model/.
tors on the frontlines—including concerned citizens, cal actors and furthers CVE efforts.
religious leaders, public health and social workers, There, police officers partnered
teachers, and private-sector representatives. Credible with local businesses to fund and
local actors are best placed to counter the recruiting organize programs to empower
narratives and tactics of violent extremists and pro- women in the local community.73
vide compelling alternatives. These community lead- Programming sought to address
ers are also in the strongest position to address the the needs of women from minority
underlying grievances making their loved ones vul- communities by providing access
nerable to extremist ideologies. to career guidance sessions, men-
torship from local business lead-
Unfortunately, these opportunities have not been ful-
ers, English language workshops,
ly realized due to a profound trust deficit between and related vocational training.
governments, nongovernmental partners, and local These programs have not only
actors. In many communities, families live in fear of strengthened social services avail-
law enforcement or are alienated from formal gov- able to disadvantaged populations,
ernment, civic, and religious structures. Particularly but also have improved relations
in dictatorships, the opportunities for partnership are between community members
extremely limited. Peer-to-peer exchanges, cultural and law enforcement. As a result,
activity, and social media platforms are controlled. they collaborate more readily with
Official imams are often discredited, as they are per- local police on CVE, including
ceived as being co-opted by the government. Fur- communicating their concerns
thermore, when governments only reach out to their about individuals being radical-
preferred interlocutor, it creates a disingenuous rela- ized or recruited.74 As this exam-
tionship with communities. Governments need to “go ple demonstrates, governments
wide and go deep to bring in as many diverse voices interested in CVE must evidence
within a community as possible.”72 that they are committed to help-
This trust gap has real security implications. Mothers ing locals address their concerns
36 and fathers are less likely to report concerns or seek and priorities. Such an approach
help when their child is falling under the sway of re- creates opportunities to engage
cruiters if they do not trust authorities or believe their on more sensitive issues like CVE
child will be treated fairly. Women’s groups may be once trust is established.
wary of engaging in CVE-related efforts if their securi- Finally, building trust with local
ty or credibility is compromised, or if their operations actors requires creating new influ-
have been negatively impacted by other counterter- encer networks that can do things
rorism measures. And young people are unlikely to that governments cannot. This is a
consult a local imam whom they see as part of a cor- vital partnership tool that should
rupt and oppressive system. be recognized more broadly. For
example, in 2008, the U.S. govern-
Rebuilding trust will not happen overnight. It will re-
ment provided a small seed grant
quire extensive engagement and respect for the priori-
to the Vienna-based organization
ties and values of the communities concerned. Clumsy
Women Without Borders to create
TURNING POINT
72
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview with Farah Pandith, CSIS, July 22,
2016.
73
UK Department for Communities and Local Government, Empowering Muslim Women: Case Stud-
ies (London: UK Department for Communities and Local Government, 2008), 10, http://dera.ioe.
ac.uk/7422/7/669801_Redacted.pdf.
74
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, phone interview with Talene Bilazarian, CSIS,
August 17, 2016.
In the years since, SAVE has grown
exponentially and seeded dozens of
grassroots CVE programs as well as
designing new models for schools,
mothers, and the next generation.
The U.S. government should build
on these investments, expanding
and sustaining networks of credible
local actors to confront extremist
ideologies and narratives.
Improving detection
and referral
Identifying early-warning signs
Adopting a proactive approach to
CVE requires engaging at the ear-
liest sign that extremist ideologies
are taking hold. At the community-
level, such warning signs include:
76
Ziauddin Sardar, “The Destruction of Mecca,” New York Times, September 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/01/opin-
ion/the-destruction-of-mecca.html?_r=0.
77
Pandith and Zarate, “Winning the War of Ideas.”
78
Bruno S. Frey and Dominic Rohner, “Protecting Cultural Monuments against Terrorism,” Defence and Peace Economics 18, no.
3 (2007): 245–52.
79
Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: ISIS Kidnaps Shia Turkmen, Destroys Shrines: Pillaging, Threats in Capture of Villages near Mosul,”
June 27, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/27/iraq-isis-kidnaps-shia-turkmen-destroys-shrines.
80
Rizwan Mohammed and Karin Brulliard, “Militants Attack Two Ahmadi Mosques in Pakistan; 80 Killed,” Washington Post, May
28, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/28/AR2010052800686.html.
81
Lynn Davies, Zubeda Limbada, Laura Zahra McDonald, Basia Spalek, and Doug Weeks, “Formers & Families: Transition Jour-
neys in and out of violent extremisms in the UK,” ConnectJustice, 2015; Hedayah and the Global Center on Cooperative Secu-
rity, “The Roles of Families and Communities in Strengthening Community Resilience Against Violent Extremism,” Meeting
Note, May, 2014.
82
Tower Hamlets Partnership, Tower Hamlets Prevention Action Plan: April 2008 to March 2011 (London: Tower Hamlets
Partnership, June 2010), http://www.towerhamletsfoi.org.uk/documents/3034/LBTH%20%20Prevent%20Action%20Plan%20
June2010.pdf.
to community members on the unique ideological factors that groups have prevented approx-
recruitment tactics that violent draw people to violent extrem- imately 1,500 boys and young
extremist groups use, on- and ism, not just anyone is qualified men from being recruited by vi-
offline, provide a menu of fac- to intervene, regardless of their olent extremists. Similarly, Moth-
tors often present during pre- professional or religious back- ers’ Schools, created by Women
radicalization, and raise aware- ground.83 Those involved in this without Borders, connect moth-
ness of behavior changes or ac- sensitive work must be highly ers within their communities and
tivity associated with radicaliza- trained to deal with the specific across the globe to confidentially
tion. Awareness-raising should be drivers and motivations involved. discuss warning signs and inter-
incorporated into ongoing public vene with their children before
The goal of early intervention ef-
safety or public health programs they get too far down the path of
forts is to enhance a community’s
to mainstream the effort and radicalization.86 In addition, wom-
ability to act when it perceives a
avoid the tendency to see violent en’s groups, either individually or
vulnerability. There are many suc-
extremism as something entirely through networks, have continued
cesses using this approach to tamp
distinct from other dangers af- to advance women’s empower-
down on gang violence in the Unit-
fecting communities. ment, challenge oppressive norms
ed States and prevent radicalization
abroad. For instance, since 2000, and legislation, and support wom-
For example, in the London Borough
Cure Violence has applied public en’s inclusion in peace and securi-
of Tower Hamlets, law enforce-
health techniques to disrupt vio- ty processes. These are all critical
ment combined early-intervention
lence in communities throughout measures for challenging violent
programs with a reporting mech-
the United States. Using a mix of extremists’ assault on women’s
anism to log hate crimes against
interventions, including providing rights and security.
Muslims.82 This initiative integrated
the threat of radicalization into a safe spaces for youth, getting out Training and empowering commu-
broader approach of safeguard- in communities to detect potential nity members, particularly women,
ing the entire community, put- flare-ups of violence, and training allows communities to take charge
ting community-identified needs local actors on conflict preven- of radicalization at its earliest stages.
first, improving community cohe- tion, Cure Violence reduced shoot-
sion, and closing the trust gap. As ings in Chicago’s most dangerous Developing off-ramps 39
a result, over a two-year period, neighborhood by 67 percent and A key gap in CVE efforts is the
community referrals about poten- in Baltimore by 56 percent.84 These lack of “off-ramps”—programs
tial terrorist threats increased by gains have proven fragile, once that provide support for individ-
800 percent. again underscoring the need for a uals who are being radicalized,
steady and sustained presence and
but have yet to become violent
strategy for violence prevention.
Increasing investment or commit a criminal act. Devel-
in intervention and Internationally, women have been oping off-ramps is essential be-
rehabilitation at the forefront of such efforts. cause law enforcement’s tools are
The PAIMAN Trust, led by Mossarat circumscribed and because com-
83
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview and podcast with Jesse Morton, CSIS, June 23, 2016.
84
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, phone interview and podcast with Gary Slutkin, CSIS, July 21, 2016.
85
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview and podcast with Mossarat Qadeem, CSIS, June 22, 2016.
86
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview and podcast with Edit Schlaffer, CSIS, August 4, 2016.
87
Mateen killed 49 people and wounded 53 others at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida.
help for people like Omar Mateen, Focusing on Rehabilitation
who, though disturbed and sym- and Reintegration
pathetic to extremist causes, had
Increasingly, justice sector officials
not yet committed a criminal of-
are looking for alternatives or sup-
fense.87 Such off-ramps could be
plements to jail for extremists who
used to address violent extrem-
have committed a criminal offense
ism of all stripes, preventing the
(e.g., providing material support
retaliatory escalation of violence
to a terrorist group) but have not
that we are seeing in the United
engaged in violence. Expanding
States and elsewhere. For exam-
alternative sentences to incarcera-
ple, Dylan Roof, the 21-year-old
tion, particularly for young people
who gunned down nine black
who have fallen prey to extrem-
churchgoers in Charleston, South
ist recruiters, is viewed as a mor-
Carolina, told friends he intended
al imperative but is also strategic.
to murder in order to catalyze “a
In Minneapolis, where 10 Soma-
race war.”
li-Americans attempted to flee the
Throughout the United States, United States to fight for ISIS, U.S.
there are emerging programs in District Judge Michael Davis called
which community groups are on deradicalization expert Daniel
working closely with law enforce- Koehler to evaluate each defen-
ment, local officials, counselors, dant’s path to radicalization and
families, and public health pro- propose a plan to turn him away
fessionals to identify disillusioned from extremism.89 This evaluation
young people and steer them will inform Judge Davis’s decision
away from violence before it is too about what sentencing and addi-
late. For example, in Montgom- tional support is needed to reha-
ery County, Maryland, WORDE bilitate these individuals.
40 (World Organization for Resource
A few countries have gone a step
and Development and Education)
further, piloting deradicalization
has been a pioneer in communi-
programs in prison. For example,
ty-led intervention. Begun in late
Dr. Fatima Akilu, psychologist and
2013, WORDE works closely with
initiator of Nigeria's deradicaliza-
the Montgomery County Police
tion program, focuses on loosen-
Department, local government of-
ing Boko Haram’s psychological
ficials, trauma counselors, youth
and ideological grip on Nigerian
activists, faith leaders, and vio-
prisoners. This program takes a
lence-prevention experts to assess
comprehensive approach, incor-
each program participant’s unique
porating religious education with
grievances and motivations, and
local imams, psychological coun-
intervene to reduce these risk fac-
seling, and basic life skills training
tors. This model functions on the
TURNING POINT
88
World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), “The
Montgomery County BRAVE Model,”
http://www.worde.org/programs/the-montgomery-county-model/.
89
Nicole Hong, “Judge Tries New Approach with Terror Defendants: Derad-
icalization,” Wall Street Journal, May 8, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
judge-tries-new-approach-with-terror-defendants-deradicalization-1462751841.
90
Shannon N. Green, managing director, CVE Commission, interview and podcast
with Fatima Akilu, CSIS, June 22, 2016.
ue to experiment with alternative
sentencing practices and rehabil-
itation and reintegration efforts.
These programs should be rigor-
ously monitored and evaluated to
draw conclusions about their effi-
cacy and replicability.
Signature Recommendation
Support community-led preven-
tion efforts, including awareness
raising, intervention, and rehabili-
tation, by enlarging the space (i.e.,
legal and policy environment) for
civil society to do this work.
91
Lifeline, “Lifeline Embattled CSO Assistance Fund,” https://www.csolifeline.org/.
an ideal society where you will always belong.” Sim- 100 percent of respondents had
ilarly, al Qaeda offered a narrative of empowerment, a negative view of ISIS.92 Not sur-
an opportunity to strike back at “foreign aggressors.” prisingly, respondents from coun-
To protect youth from being radicalized, we must not tries closer in proximity and more
only ensure they understand how and why violent ex- directly affected by ISIS’s rise, and
tremists are targeting them, but also disrupt recruit- the resulting refugee flows, had
ers’ efforts to make these linkages. It is not enough much more hostile views toward
to merely counter these messages. We have to put the terrorist group.
our own affirmative vision forward, amplifying many
This rejection of violent extrem-
different kinds of ideas and voices.
ism is not unique to ISIS. Extremist
To saturate the global marketplace of ideas, the Unit- ideologies are often at odds with
ed States and its allies must: local beliefs and practices. Rigid
interpretations of the Quran, pro-
• Reboot strategic communications efforts. The Unit-
moted by violent extremist groups,
ed States and its allies need to fundamentally re-
often clash with grassroots tradi-
think the scale and delivery of “counternarratives”
tions that are more pluralistic and
and “alternative narratives”, on- and offline. Strate-
tolerant. These differences may
gic communications efforts will only be effective if
be magnified by their tactics—
they are organic, embedded in local peer networks,
excessive violence, cruelty, and
delivered by credible messengers, and articulate a
oppression of locals—which can
positive vision for society.
further undermine public sympa-
• Engage the private sector to produce and deliver thies.93 For example, following
compelling narratives across media platforms. The the 2002 terrorist bombings in
storytelling and technical know-how of leading tech- Bali, citizens cooperated to build
nology and digital media companies, when paired a “peace park” on the site of the
with local knowledge, perspectives, and communi- attack to mobilize popular opinion
cation specialists, can professionalize and amplify ef- against violent extremist groups.94
42 Aversion to terrorist tactics can
forts to promote alternative and counternarratives.
be a powerful tool in the struggle
• Create alternative opportunities for young peo- against violent extremism if the
ple to achieve meaning and status. Helping youth voices of the majority of Muslims
channel their energy and passion in a positive di- are heard. Unfortunately, one-off
rection is necessary for decreasing the potency of statements, speeches, or sound-
extremist ideologies and narratives. bites cannot substitute for a con-
sistent and normalized view that
Rebooting strategic this sentiment exists.
communications efforts In spite of this deep-seated antip-
The vast majority of Muslims worldwide reject ex- athy, the United States and its allies
tremist ideologies and the groups that espouse them. have not effectively competed with
A 2015 Pew survey found that most citizens in Mus- extremists’ narratives, on- or offline.
TURNING POINT
lim-majority countries detest ISIS. In Indonesia, only 4 Much of the attention to CVE in the
percent of respondents had a favorable view of ISIS; last few years has been focused
in Pakistan it was 9 percent. In Turkey, 73 percent of on “countermessaging.” Yet, these
respondents had an unfavorable view, compared to 8 programs have had mixed success
percent favorable (and 19 percent who did not know). because of the absence of cre-
In the Palestinian territories, the unfavorables jump to ativity, risk-taking, and nimbleness
84 percent, while in Jordan 94 percent of those polled within government bureaucra-
had a dismal view of the terrorist group. In Lebanon, cies; lack of funding; and difficulty
92
Jacob Poushter, “In Nations with Significant Muslim Populations, Much Disdain for ISIS,” Pew Research
Center, November 17, 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-signifi-
cant-muslim-populations-much-disdain-for-isis/.
93
Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Cam-
paigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
94
Ibid.
43
Source: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/17/in-nations-with-significant-muslim-
populations-much-disdain-for-isis/, Chart titled “Views of ISIS Overwhelmingly Negative
in scaling up what works. Messaging efforts are also enemy. We must be prepared to advance a positive
96
Lawrence Pintak, “Can Cartoons Save Pakistan’s Children from Jihad?,” Foreign Policy, August 19, 2016,
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/19/can-cartoons-save-pakistans-children-from-jihad/.
97
Rachel Kleinfeld and Harry Bader, Extreme Violence and the Rule of Law: Lessons from Eastern Afghanistan
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2014), http://carnegieendowment.
org/files/violence_rule_of_law.pdf.
MARTHA MINOW, COMMISSIONER
ships—which is currently a major gap in CVE efforts. • Resolve tensions between coun-
terterrorism objectives and hu-
man rights. Too often, human
4. ALIGNING POLICIES rights concerns are subordinated
AND VALUES to other foreign policy priorities,
The most compelling message violent extremists including the need for counter-
can deploy against the United States and its allies terrorism cooperation. These
tradeoffs should be minimized to
is the charge of hypocrisy. When the United States
avoid charges of U.S. hypocrisy
abandons bedrock principles, such as keeping sus-
that feed extremists’ propaganda.
pected terrorists indefinitely detained at Guantana-
mo Bay or torturing prisoners at Abu Ghraib, we not • Protect and enlarge civic space
only undermine our own credibility, but also supply as a foreign policy priority. Civil
violent extremists with fodder for their narratives. society—and citizens’ voices—
We must do better. The Commission acknowledges must be protected in order to
address the grievances and nar- one template. The central aim of this
ratives that drive radicalization initiative is to help partner countries
and recruitment. develop policies, structures, and
processes to deliver security and
Prioritizing rule of law and justice to their citizens.100 SGI is not
human rights focused on tactical-level engage-
ments but rather on improving the
Oppressive, abusive and corrupt management, oversight, account-
states are the headwaters from ability, and sustainability of secu-
which violent extremism often rity-sector institutions. Such ap-
springs. Where governments are proaches need to be strengthened
predatory and unaccountable, re- in close partnership with civil soci-
cruits are largely motivated by a ety and expanded to other regions
desire for justice and dignity.98 The where security and law enforce-
Department of State and U.S. Agen- ment practices do more to drive vi-
cy for International Development’s olent extremism than ameliorate it.
Joint CVE Strategy underscores
these findings: “in today’s terror- In countries where the govern-
ist landscape, terrorist groups of- ment has long relied on repres-
ten thrive in areas with limited or sion, discrimination, or corruption
abusive governance, weak rule of to maintain its grip on power, the
law, high degrees of violence and relationship between the state
corruption… and where civil so- and society is typically in sham-
ciety has limited agency or space bles. Rebuilding the social con-
to operate.”99 Rooting out violent tract between citizens and all lev-
extremism, therefore, will require els of government must be part of
that we employ our diplomatic and the solution to violent extremism.
development tools to promote hu- Donors and policymakers need to
look for opportunities to rebuild 47
man rights; advance government
policies that support good gover- trust and mutual confidence—for
nance and inclusion; enhance just example, by creating forums for
law enforcement and security ap- governments and civil society to
proaches; and reconcile policy ten- work together on issues of com-
sions that advance short-term se- mon concern—without jeopardiz-
curity cooperation at the expense ing the independence or legitima-
of longer-term stability. cy of civil society organizations.
98
Proctor, Youth & Consequences.
99
U.S. Department of State, “Department of State & USAID Joint Strategy on Coun-
tering Violent Extremism,” May 2016, https://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/257913.pdf.
100
U.S. Department of State, “Security Governance Initiative: 2015 Review,” March 2,
2016, http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/2016/253906.htm.
However, security cooperation— address the challenges of terror- forefront of CVE. They cannot per-
such as train-and-equip programs ism and violent extremism in just form this critical function when
with partner government militaries and sustainable ways.104 they are squeezed between violent
and law enforcement agencies— extremists on the one hand and
can backfire when their values and Protecting and enlarging their governments on the other.106
interests diverge from our own,
civic space
particularly on issues of human Signature Recommendation
rights, accountability, and civilian An empowered civil society is one
oversight.101 For example, in So- of the best defenses against violent Review and monitor all security
malia, the heavy-handed conduct extremism, serving as a powerful assistance provided to foreign
of AMISOM (African Union Mission bulwark against the pernicious in- partners to ensure that it is being
in Somalia) partners—particularly fluences and narratives of extrem- used effectively to address ter-
the allegations of widespread ci- ist groups. Yet, in spite—or perhaps rorist threats and is in alignment
vilian abuses and casualties—has, because—of the key role played by with U.S. values and interests in
in spite of some field successes, civil society, civic space is increas- advancing rule of law, dignity, and
undermined the effort to quash ingly under siege. In 2015 alone, justice. The next administration
al Shabaab. Indeed, such partner- there were serious threats to civ- should conduct a thorough review
ships can fuel grievances that mo- ic freedoms in over 100 countries, of all weapons transfers, train-
tivate violence, such as when part- including restrictions on foreign and-equip programs, and oth-
ners use heavy-handed tactics and funding, onerous registration re- er security assistance provided
extra-legal measures to address quirements, intrusive government to countries that restrict politi-
terrorist threats.102 oversight, and politicized charges cal rights or civil liberties or with
or legal proceedings against a record of other serious human
The U.S. government should nongovernmental organizations.105 rights violations. Countries ranked
ensure that its commitment to Many countries with serious ter- as “not free” or “partially free” in
strong security relationships rorist threats, like Egypt, India, Freedom House’s annual index
abroad is matched by a commit- and Russia, have enacted laws or of Freedom in the World should
ment to human rights and the rule regulations limiting foreign sup-
48 be subjected to this review. The
of law. Providing partners with port for civil society organizations. administration can triage this in-
training, equipment, and other Elsewhere, as in Kenya, the gov- formation with the Department
support to fight terrorism runs ernment has waged a sustained of State’s annual Country Reports
the risk of exacerbating sympa-
campaign to discredit civil society on Human Rights Practices and
thy for terrorists if this assistance
actors. These restrictions have had other independent human rights
is not coupled with a parallel ef-
a devastating impact on human reports. This assessment should
fort to developing partners’ ca-
rights and other civil society groups consider whether the assistance,
pacity to pursue democratic and
who are critical for addressing the on balance, is contributing to
rights-based approaches.103 This
underlying conditions that violent security and counterterrorism
will require improving collabora-
extremists exploit. objectives or exacerbating the
tion, planning, and decisionmak-
ing within the U.S. government Whether threats to civil society conditions exploited by violent ex-
to ensure that security coopera- come from violent extremists or tremist groups. Assistance should
tion decisions take broader for- governments, we must act to pre- be suspended or used as leverage,
TURNING POINT
eign policy considerations into serve civic space. The United States as appropriate, to incentivize po-
account and help advance our and its allies should engage con- litical reforms or improvements in
short-, medium-, and long-term sistently with partner governments human rights.
objectives. It will also require to open and protect the space for
training partner security forces to civil society actors who are at the
101
Ibid.
102
Nancy Lindborg, “The Causes and Consequences of Violent Extremism and the Role of Foreign Assistance” (testimony before
the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs, April 12, 2016), http://www.usip.
org/publications/2016/04/12/the-causes-and-consequences-of-violent-extremism-and-the-role-of-foreign.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Civicus, State of Civil Society Report 2016: Executive Summary (New York: Civicus, June 2016), http://civicus.org/images/docu-
ments/SOCS2016/summaries/State-of-Civil-Society-Report-2016_Exec-Summary.pdf.
106
Green, “Violent Groups Aggravate.”
5. DEPLOYING To effectively deploy military and • Strengthen counterterrorism
MILITARY AND LAW law enforcement tools as part of a capabilities. The United States
comprehensive strategy, the Unit- should deepen partnerships with
ENFORCEMENT TOOLS
ed States and its allies must: frontline states and strengthen
Preventing the radicalization and its own and its partners’ opera-
recruitment of young people and • Utilize counterterrorism tools as
tional capabilities to address to-
dealing with the physical manifes- part of a broader political and
day’s global terrorist threats.
tations of extremist ideologies will diplomatic strategy. The Unit-
require mobilizing all elements of ed States and its allies will need • Build rapid response teams.
national and international pow- to continue to conduct military Militaries and law enforce-
er, including military and law en- and law enforcement operations ment agencies should use their
forcement tools. While the Com- to avert and respond to imme- unique assets and training to
mission believes that CVE must diate terrorist threats, dislodge protect civilian populations and
be kept separate from counter- extremist groups that control important religious, cultural,
terrorism in terms of the tactics, territory, assist and support oth- and historical sites at risk from
agencies, and actors involved, an er nations engaged in the fight violent extremist groups.
effective strategy will require soft against terrorism, and discredit
and hard power operating at scale terrorists’ assertions of invinci-
and in tandem.107 bility and momentum.
Some commissioners felt that discussions regarding military strategies were outside their areas of expertise, and accordingly
107
a powerful
Military and law enforcement tools, then, are nec- bulwark against
essary but not sufficient for countering terror-
ism. These approaches need to be coordinat-
the pernicious
ed and embedded in a comprehensive strategy influences
that also includes diplomacy, development, and and narratives
cyber and information operations. Most impor- of extremist
tantly, soft and hard power must be better bal-
groups.”
anced to ensure that prevention is not always an
after-thought.
• Invested partners on the ground, bust Special Operations Forces to partner military forces. Current-
in the form of effective local and tactical military intelligence ly under consideration by the U.S.
government and security forces; capabilities honed in Iraq and Af- Army, such a training component
ghanistan, as well as investing in would encourage long-term rela-
• Coalition partners, to increase a broader set of tools needed for tionships between the United States
legitimacy and augment con- defeating terrorist groups. The and partner security forces.109 An
strained resources; U.S. military has largely reverted institutionalized training compo-
• Intelligence, surveillance and to its traditional training regimes nent would also free up combat
reconnaissance, including un- to prepare soldiers for large-scale troops who previously would have
conventional conflicts. Policymak- been taken out of battle to train their 51
manned aerial vehicles, strategic
intelligence systems, and human ers need to strike a better balance counterparts. This training should
intelligence resources; training and equipping the U.S. include how to stabilize and estab-
armed forces for the spectrum of lish governance in territory retaken
• Special forces to help target conflicts they are likely to face. from terrorists; how to engage ef-
terrorist leaders and communi- fectively with communities, devel-
cations infrastructure and train The United States should also
opment agencies, and civil society
local security forces; demonstrate its sustained commit-
organizations; and importantly, how
ment to its partners, offering more
• Persistent close air support and to ensure respect for human rights
systematic capacity-building as-
tactical mobility to support local and prevent civilian harm.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Mulls Train & Advise Brigades: Gen. Milley,” Breaking Defense, December 14, 2015,
109
http://breakingdefense.com/2015/12/army-mulls-train-advise-brigades-gen-milley/.
corridors or protected zones for
civilians. For example, the interna-
“Preventing the tional community should build and
radicalization and institutionalize the capacity to con-
recruitment of young duct life-saving operations, such
as the rescue mission on Mount
people and dealing
Sinjar, which delivered food, wa-
with the physical ter, and urgent supplies to Yazidis
manifestations of trapped by ISIS and lifted others to
extremist ideologies safety. In addition to being in line
will require mobilizing with U.S. values, helping preserve
life and sacred sites would under-
all elements of national mine terrorists’ assertions that the
and international West is callous to others’ suffering.
power, including
military and law Signature Recommendation
enforcement tools.” Build an enduring coalition to
degrade and defeat terrorist or-
United States has pieced together ganizations and dismantle their
support from the U.S. military, State strategic communications infra-
Department, and private contrac- structure, while creating rapid
tors. Rather than taking the lead on response mechanisms to protect
this element of the fight, at the risk threatened civilian populations
of militarizing local police forces, and cultural heritage sites. Con-
the United States should leverage siderable progress has been made
European and Asian allies that have in building the network of interna-
comparable national police forces tional cooperation needed to fight
52 terrorism in the 15 years since Sep-
that can provide training.
tember 11. Those existing arrange-
ments provide a strong foundation.
Building rapid response However, the next administration
teams needs to develop deeper partner-
Military forces have unique assets ships with frontline states in the
and training that can be leveraged to Middle East, Africa, Central Asia,
protect civilian populations; import- South Asia, and Southeast Asia.
ant religious, cultural, and histori- The United States must play a
cal sites; and critical infrastructure central role in persuading allies
or natural resources from terrorist and partners, especially Muslim-
groups. Strengthening these ca- majority countries, to contribute
pabilities—including investing in militarily to the struggle against vi-
TURNING POINT
the creation of specialized “jump olent extremism and to use all oth-
teams” to protect civilians, sites, and er tools to starve terrorist groups
infrastructure—is essential. of the recruits, weapons, money,
These teams should be led by and legitimacy they need to survive
skilled representatives of civilian, and spread into new regions. This
multilateral, or international or- outreach should include pressing
countries throughout the world to
ganizations, and buttressed, as
provide for the basic needs of their
necessary, by military and police
population so they do not search
forces. Depending on the nature of
elsewhere for fulfillment.
the extremist threat, these teams
would have two primary mandates: To build a broad-based coalition,
a) securing sacred religious, cultur- the next administration should
al, and historical sites and artifacts; start by reinvigorating its leadership
and b) establishing humanitarian role in the world, particularly in the
Source: Views from Around the World: Countering Violent Extremism 53
https://www.csis.org/analysis/survey-findings-global-perceptions-violent-extremism
Middle East. The relative absence Partnership does not mean turn- • ceasing to provide support to
of American leadership throughout ing a blind eye to the shortcom- terrorist groups; and
a period of great turmoil has un- ings and human rights abuses that
• participating in a political and
dermined our credibility within the feed into the cycle of radicaliza- military campaign against vio-
region. Reestablishing our credibil- tion and recruitment that we are lent extremism.
ity will not be an easy task. Sunni trying to stop. Rather, the United
57
Funders
TURNING POINT
110
“Homeland Security Advisory Council,” 19.
111
This consortium would complement the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF),
a public-private partnership aimed at strengthening resilience against violent extremist agendas.
However, unlike GCERF, governments would not be involved in the management, decisionmaking, or
oversight of the consortium, beyond the initial facilitative role played by the U.S. government.
112
“Homeland Security Advisory Council,” 19.
build the knowledge base; and ant part of the CVE ecosystem.
offer long-term, core support However, such groups are few and
to strengthen the capacity of “Implementing this far between and need help with
its partners. vision will require capacity building from their peers.
Research Institutions
approximately $1 1)
Civil Society-Led Prevention
billion on an annual Network. The Commission en-
Research institutions, including
think tanks and universities, have a
basis. While that is a dorses the idea, put forward by
The Prevention Project, for a civil
significant role to play in creating huge figure…it is orders
society-led network in the United
the analytical and evidence base of magnitude less than States “to harness the efforts of
for more successful CVE initiatives. the trillions required the growing number of commu-
These institutions should increas-
in military and law nities and professionals around
ingly be tapped to generate an-
swers on motivations and drivers,
enforcement spending the country interested in help-
ing to prevent the violent radi-
the radicalization process, and ef- and the billions needed
calization of individuals in their
fective interventions. for humanitarian aid communities.”113 Such a network
1)
Public-Private Research Co- if violent extremist would help amplify community
alition. A major barrier to ev- groups are able to efforts to intervene with individ-
idence-based programming gain traction.” uals at-risk or in the process of
has been the divide between being radicalized. It would also
governments and technology provide emerging CVE profes-
companies who have access to 2) Programmatic Database. Do- sionals with a platform for shar-
data and researchers who need nors and policymakers have ing information, best practices,
the data to conduct rigorous been reluctant to invest in CVE and lessons learned with each
experiments and research. For over lingering doubts about other and with more established
example, researchers could whether competent organiza- practitioners and social service
use data on how users behave tions exist to do this work and providers (e.g., those working
62 in related fields like drug pre-
online after being exposed to whether programs make a tan-
counter- or positive messag- gible difference. CSIS could vention and treatment, mental
es to draw conclusions about contribute to advancing the field health provision, gang violence
the impact of those efforts and by developing a database of all prevention and rehabilitation).
make recommendations for CVE-specific programs, with
2)
Network of Young Leaders.
improving them. However, that concrete measures of effective-
Through its education and cul-
would require the government ness that could be tracked over
tural exchange programs, the
and technology companies to time. Using this data, CSIS could U.S. government has identified
provide access to such infor- identify the characteristics of ef- and invested in young leaders
mation. Likewise, researchers fective programs, sharing these from all over the world. These
should open their datasets to best practices and recommen- are individuals who were hand-
the government and other re- dations for scaling up success- picked because of their poten-
searchers to avoid recreating ful efforts. This database could tial as role models and change-
TURNING POINT
the wheel and allow for the rep- serve as the “gold standard” for makers. The government should
lication of quantitative studies. assessing the efficacy of CVE capitalize on these investments,
Building on RESOLVE—a global programs worldwide. creating a global network of
network of researchers con- young leaders who are interest-
Community-based Actors
ducting locally informed analy- ed in CVE, community resilience,
sis on the drivers and solutions Civil society and community-based or related areas. Through the
to violent extremism—the U.S. organizations working on preven- network, thousands of grass-
government should forge re- tion, intervention, deradicalization, roots actors could share infor-
search partnerships with uni- reintegration, and rehabilitation, as mation and best practices, rais-
versities, think tanks, and the well as strategic communications, ing the bar for a new generation
technology sector. are in many ways the most import- of practitioners.
Eric Rosand, “Communities First: A National Prevention Network to Defeat ISIS,” The Hill, August 2, 2016, http://thehill.com/
113
blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/290046-communities-first-a-national-prevention-network-to
Capacity Building and Intermediary Organizations to gain traction. This number is the least amount re-
For CVE efforts to ever reach scale, the United States quired to scale up CVE efforts to match the serious-
and its allies need to invest in international and na- ness of the threat and catalyze further investment.
tional nongovernmental organizations with a proven The United States cannot do this alone, but this
track record in CVE, existing partnerships and net- commitment is the first step in the right direction.
works, and strong capacity. The Commission rec- The Commission recommends the following alloca-
ommends investing in such “intermediary organiza- tion of funds to maximize the impact of this strategy on
tions” to drive major strides in the field and help build
reducing the radicalization and recruitment of young
the capacity of policymakers and practitioners.
people in the United States and all over the world.
1) CVE Accelerators. The United States and its allies,
Grantmaking—$550 million
as well as the private sector, should make major in-
vestments in existing hubs and agencies that use Technology Innovation Fund (In-Q-Tel model):
research, technology, and a start-up mentality to $150 million
incubate and accelerate evidence-based CVE pro-
grams and narrative campaigns. Such organizations Domestic small grants and related operational
occupy a central role in creating opportunities for costs: $150 million
entrepreneurs to design and implement success- International small grants and related operational
ful CVE operations. With a proven track record and costs: $250 million
trust from both the government and civil society,
they are also essential in delivering cutting-edge Research—$50 million
CVE programs, innovating and distributing strategic
Public-Private Research Coalition: $10 million
messaging campaigns, and mobilizing social move-
ments against extremism, both on- and offline. Programmatic Database: $5 million
2) CVE Training Academies. Training academies in the Independent Research: $35 million
United States and overseas—run by nongovern-
Community-based Actors—$65 million
mental organizations and civil society actors and
funded by the government—could fill vital knowl- 63
Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs:
edge gaps for government actors, law enforcement $45 million
officials, local organizations, parents, teachers, and
social workers. One model for this effort is the He- Network of Networks—Young Leaders: $20 million
dayah International Center of Excellence, a UAE- Capacity Building Organizations—$85 million
based hub for building the capacity of CVE actors
across the globe. Educational programs could cov- CVE Accelerators: $55 million
er: the risks and warning signs of radicalization; ef-
Training Academies (3 at $10 million/year):
fective methods of counseling and mentoring; child
$30 million
brain development; how violent extremists use so-
64
Commissioner Biographies
Cochairs
TONY BLAIR,
FORMER PRIME MINISTER OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM
LEON PANETTA,
FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND FORMER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FARAH PANDITH,
FORMER SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO MUSLIM
COMMUNITIES AND ADJUNCT SENIOR FELLOW,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Commissioners
AHMED ABBADI,
SECRETARY GENERAL, MOHAMMADIAN
66 LEAGUE OF SCHOLARS, MOROCCO
SCOTT ATRAN,
DIRECTEUR DE RECHERCHE, CENTRE NATIONAL
DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE AND FOUNDING
FELLOW, CENTRE FOR THE RESOLUTION OF
INTRACTABLE CONFLICT, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
MONIKA BICKERT,
HEAD OF PRODUCT POLICY AND
COUNTERTERRORISM, FACEBOOK
STEPHEN HADLEY,
FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER AND
CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
SHERMAN JACKSON,
KING FAISAL CHAIR OF ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND
CULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
FRED KHOSRAVI,
COFOUNDER AND PARTNER, INCEPT, LLC AND
BOARD MEMBER, CSIS
NANCY LINDBORG,
PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
MARTHA MINOW,
MORGAN AND HELEN CHU DEAN AND PROFESSOR,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
VALI NASR,
DEAN AND PROFESSOR, JOHNS HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED
MARK PENN,
PRESIDENT AND MANAGING PARTNER,
THE STAGWELL GROUP
DINA POWELL,
HEAD OF GLOBAL IMPACT INVESTING, GOLDMAN
SACHS, AND FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS
AND DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE FOR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
BRAD SMITH,
PRESIDENT AND CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER,
MICROSOFT
FRANCES TOWNSEND,
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR WORLDWIDE
GOVERNMENT, LEGAL AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS,
MACANDREWS AND FORBES INCORPORATED
KENT WALKER,
GENERAL COUNSEL, GOOGLE
JAY WINIK,
AUTHOR AND HISTORIAN
72
Acknowledgments A warm thanks to Courtney La Bau
for conducting interviews and re-
CSIS would like to thank all of the
search on the future of the threat,
commissioners for their immea-
which is summarized in the report.
surable commitment, expertise,
Also, CSIS would like to thank So-
and judgment throughout the
hini Chatterjee for offering analysis
Commission’s hearings and de-
on constituency-building.
velopment of this report. Without
their invaluable contributions and CSIS would also like to express its
creativity, this report would not appreciation to the senior advisers
have been possible. and staff of the cochairs and com-
missioners, particularly Ed Husain,
In particular, CSIS would like
Robert Danin, Corey Ganssley,
to thank Tony Blair and Secre-
Cabrina Flanagan, Alysha Tierney,
tary Leon Panetta for agreeing to
Will Guarino, and many others who
take on the challenge of cochair-
helped facilitate the completion of
ing this Commission and giving it
the report.
the full measure of their support.
Throughout the process, both The deliberations of the com-
cochairs were asking the tough missioners were informed and
questions, listening to a wide va- guided by a number of CSIS se-
riety of perspectives, and guiding nior scholars, especially Kathleen
the Commission toward final rec- Hicks, Melissa Dalton, Kimberly
ommendations that would make a Goddess, Jon Alterman, Andrew
real and lasting impact on the way Shearer, Stephen Morrison, and
CVE is understood and practiced in James Lewis, and others listed on
the United States and abroad. the following pages. These experts
offered their knowledge, expertise,
The Commission’s two senior
and advice to the Commission and 73
advisers and commissioners—
managing director, briefing com-
Juan Zarate and Farah Pandith—
missioners, commenting on drafts
provided vital substantive guidance
of the report, and appearing on the
and expertise in shaping the Com-
companion podcast On Violent Ex-
mission's analysis and recommen-
tremism. Their contributions sub-
dations. Their unflagging support,
stantially enhanced the Commis-
advice, and energy were integral to
sion’s understanding of the issues.
crafting this report. Juan and Farah
are both pioneers of CVE and con- Special thanks are due to Dr. John
tinue to be on the leading edge of J. Hamre, president and CEO
CSIS Contributors THOMAS M. SANDERSON,
SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR,
Managing Director TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT
SHANNON N. GREEN,
H. ANDREW SCHWARTZ,
DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, EXTERNAL RELATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVE
HEATHER A. CONLEY,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR EUROPE,
EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC; AND DIRECTOR,
EUROPE PROGRAM
JENNIFER G. COOKE,
DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM
75
MELISSA DALTON,
SENIOR FELLOW AND CHIEF OF STAFF,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM
KIMBERLY GODDES,
VISITING FELLOW,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM
JOHN J. HAMRE,
KATHLEEN H. HICKS,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT; HENRY A. KISSINGER
CHAIR; AND DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY PROGRAM
JAMES A. LEWIS,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR,
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGIES PROGRAM
J. STEPHEN MORRISON,
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR,
GLOBAL HEALTH POLICY CENTER
DANIEL F. RUNDE,
WILLIAM A. SCHREYER CHAIR AND DIRECTOR,
PROJECT ON PROSPERITY AND DEVELOPMENT
TURNING POINT
76
Consultations AMBASSADOR (RET.) DANIEL BENJAMIN,
NORMAN E. MCCULLOCH, JR. DIRECTOR, JOHN
The CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extrem-
SLOAN DICKEY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
ism consulted with a wide and diverse array of ex-
UNDERSTANDING, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
perts, practitioners, academics, private-sector repre-
sentatives, government officials, and others to shape
ALEJANDRO J. BEUTEL,
the strategy and recommendations in this report. We
RESEARCHER, NATIONAL CONSORTIUM FOR
are eternally grateful for each of their contributions
THE STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES
and have included their names here. However, we
TO TERRORISM, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
would like to note that being listed does not neces-
sarily indicate endorsement of the report's findings or
JEROME P. BJELOPERA,
conclusions. We would also like to thank those inter-
SPECIALIST, ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM,
viewed and consulted, not listed here, for their sup-
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
port and input.
HILLARY BRIFFA,
MASOOD AKHTAR,
DOCTORAL CANDIDATE, KING’S COLLEGE LONDON
ENTREPRENEUR AND ADVISER TO THE MADISON,
WISCONSIN MUSLIM COMMUNITY
RABIA CHAUDRY,
JENNINGS RANDOLPH SENIOR FELLOW,
FATIMA AKILU,
U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NEEM FOUNDATION
SARAH COCHRAN,
MOHAMED ABDULKADIR ALI,
ONEBLUE.ORG, PRESIDENT AND COFOUNDER
FOUNDER, IFTIIN FOUNDATION
JARED COHEN,
RASHAD ALI,
PRESIDENT, JIGSAW
SENIOR FELLOW AND COUNTERTERRORISM PRAC-
TITIONER, INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
MICHAEL P. DAVIDSON,
77
CEO, GEN NEXT
AMBASSADOR YOUSELF AL-OTAIBA,
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES AMBASSADOR TO
MARY DEBREE,
THE UNITED STATES
FACEBOOK
NAIF AL-MUTAWA,
MICHAEL P. DOWNING,
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST; CREATOR, THE 99;
DEPUTY CHIEF AND COMMANDING OFFICER,
AND FOUNDER, THE SOOR CENTER
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
BUREAU, LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT
SHAHED AMANULLAH,
WILL MCCANTS,
JONATHAN KAPLAN, SENIOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
FOUNDER AND CEO,
PURE DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES ROBERT MCCAW,
DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS,
HUMERA KHAN, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, MUFLEHUN
HISHAM MELHEM,
ADNAN KIFAYAT, COLUMNIST, AL-ARABIYA ENGLISH AND
SENIOR FELLOW, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND ANNAHAR NEWSPAPER
SANAM NARAGHI-ANDERLINI,
OMAIR PAUL,
COFOUNDER AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, REPRESENTATIVE, UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY ACTION NETWORK MUSLIMS FOR PROGRESSIVE VALUES
GARY SLUTKIN,
FOUNDER AND CEO, CURE VIOLENCE
80
DAVID SOLOFF,
COFOUNDER AND CEO, PREMISE DATA
ALI SOUFAN,
CHAIRMAN AND CEO, THE SOUFAN GROUP
BRETTE STEELE,
ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CVE TASK FORCE,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MEREDITH STRICKER,
PROGRAM DIRECTOR, PEACE AND SECURITY
FUNDERS GROUP
TURNING POINT
VASILI TSAMIS,
COO, STAVROS NIARCHOS FOUNDATION
CRAIG VACHON,
VICE PRESIDENT, CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT,
ANCHORFREE
MOBEEN VAID,
AUTHOR, MUSLIMMATTERS
MOSUL, IRAQ - OCTOBER 25: A child is seen on the street as smoke rises from oil
wells set on fire by ISIS to limit coalition forces’ eyesight and take the wells out of
service following the Iraqi army’s retaking of Al Qayyarah. Picture taken in Mosul,
Iraq on October 25, 2016.
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