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STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

THE LUFTWAFFE
1933 -1945
By
Williamson Murray

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World War, 1939-1945 - Aerial operations, German; Germany. Luftwaffe - History - World War,
1939-1945; Germany. Luftwaffe - History.
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Strategy
Strategy for
for Defeat
Defeat
The
The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
1933-1945
1933-1945
By
By

WILLIAMSON
WILLIAMSON MURRAY
MURRAY

AIR
AIR UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY
AIR
AIR UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRESS
MAXWELL
MAXWELL AIR
AIR FORCE
FORCE BASE,
BASE, ALABAMA
ALABAMA

January
January 1983
1983
DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER
DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER
The views
The views expressed
expressed dodo not
not necessarily
necessarily reflect
reflect any
any formal
formal position
position by
by the
the
Airpower Research Institute, the Air University, the Air Training Command, or the
Airpower Research Institute, the Air University, the Air Training Command, or the
United
United States
States Air
Air Force.
Force.
Clearance
Clearance for public release
for public release of
of this
this work under the
work under the provisions
provisions of
of AFR
AFR 190-1
190-1 has
has
been
been accomplished
accomplished..

Pur
I'cir sale
sale by
l).v the
tlic Superintemlent
Siii»'i-i"liMi(lent of
ol' Doeuments,
DoiMimeiits, U
U.S. Government Printing
.S . Government Printing Office
Office
Washington,
Waslilneton, D .C . 20402
D.C. 20402
Library
Library of Congress Cataloging
of Congress Cataloging in
in Publication
Publication Data
Data

Murray, Williamson
Murray, Williamson..
Strategy
Strategy for
for Defeat
Defeat:: The
The Lutfwaffe,
Lutfwaffe, 1933-1945
1933-1945..
At
At head
head of
of title
title:: Airpower
Airpower Research
Research Institute
Institute..
"January
"January 1983
1983." ."
Bibliography
Bibliography:: p. p.
Includes
Includes index.
index.
11.. World
World War,
War, 1939-1945-Aerial
1939-1945—Aerial operations,
operations, German
German..
2.
2. Germany.
Germany. Luftwaffe-History-World
Luftwaffe—History—World War, War, 1939-1945
1939-1945..
3.
3. Germany.
Germany. Luftwaffe-History
Luftwaffe—History.. I. I. Air
Air University
University (US)
(US).. Airpower
Airpower Research
Research Institute
Institute.. 11
II.. Title.
Title.
D787 .M841982
D787.M84 1982 940 .54'4943 82-73232
940.54'4943 82-73232

ISBN
ISBN 1-58566-010-8
1-58566-010-8

First
First Printing
Printing January
January 1993
1993
Second Printing
Second Printing July
July 1999
1999
Third
Third Printing
Printing December
December 2000
2000
WILLIAMSON
WILLIAMSON MURRAY
MURRAY
Dr.
Dr. Williamson
Williamson Murray
Murray earned
earned BA,
BA, MA,
MA, and
and PhD
PhD degrees
degrees in
in history
history from
from Yale
Yale
University.
University. A A former Air Force
former Air Force maintenance
maintenance officer,
officer, Dr.
Dr. Murray
Murray presently
presently teaches
teaches
at Ohio
at Ohio State University where
State University he is
where he is rapidly
rapidly acquiring reputation as
acquiring aa reputation as one
one of
of the
the
foremost
foremost US US authorities
authorities on on the
the German
German Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. AnAn avid
avid scholar
scholar on on military
military
affairs,
affairs, Dr
Dr.. Murray
Murray hashas written
written numerous
numerous articles
articles in
in professional
professional journals
journals onon various
various
facets
facets of
of military
military history
history.. Another
Another major
major research
research effort,
effort, "The
"The Path
Path toto Ruin:
Ruin: The
The
Change
Change in in European
European Balance
Balance of Power, 1938-1939,"
of Power, 1938-1939," has has just
just been
been accepted
accepted for
for
publication
publication by by thethe Princeton
Princeton University
University Press
Press.. Dr.
Dr. Murray
Murray still retains his
still retains his
commission
commission in in the
the USAF
USAF Ready
Ready Reserve,
Reserve, serving
serving asas aa major
major in the Air
in the Air Force
Force
Intelligence
Intelligence Service
Service..
TO MY
TO MY PARENTS
PARENTS
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
Page
Page

DISCLAIMER-AB
DISCLAIMER-ABSTAINER STAINER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v v
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS xii
LIST
LIST OF MAPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xvii
OF MAPS xvii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xix
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi
FOREWORD xxi
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xxiii xxiii

CHAPTER
CHAPTER
II THE
THE LUFTWAFFE
LUFTWAFFE:: ORIGINS AND PREPARATION
ORIGINS AND PREPARATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
The Economic
The Economic ProblemProblem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
The Development
The Development of of thethe Luftwaffe,
Lw/fwaj^e, 1933-39 1933-39. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The
The Luftwaffe's
LM/nvaj5%'s Impact,Impact, 1933-39 1933-39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 14
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Conclusion 19
Notes, Chapter
Notes, Chapter II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 22

II
II THE
THE EASY
EASY WAR
WAR:: GERMANY
GERMANY TRIUMPHANT, TRIUMPHANT, SEPTEMBER SEPTEMBER
1939-SEPTEMBER
1939-SEPTEMBER 1940
1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
27
Background
Background to to Poland
Poland . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 27
The
The Polish
Polish Campaign
Campaign and and the the "Phony"
' 'Phony'' War War . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 30
Scandinavia
Scandinavia and
and FranceFrance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 35
The
The Battle
Battle ofBritain.
of Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 39
Conclusion
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
55
Notes,
Notes, Chapter
Chapter II II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57 57

III
III THE
THE TURN
TURN TO
TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69
69
The
The Strategic
Strategic Problem
Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 69
Distractions
Distractions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
72
Barbarossa:
Barbarossa: Background
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 77
Barbarossa:
Barbarossa: The
The Invasion
Invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 81
Production
Production and
and Strategy,
Strategy, 1940-41 1940-41 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88 88
Conclusion
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103
103
Notes, Chapter III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .108
Notes, Chapter III 108
Page
Page

IV
IV ON THE
ON THE BRINK
BRINK:: JANUARY-OCTOBER
JANUARY-OCTOBER 1942.
1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113
113

The East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113


The East 113
The Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
The Mediterranean 126
The
The West:
West: British
British Efforts Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 127
The
The German
German Response:
Response: Air
Air War
War in
in the
the West
West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132
132
German Production, 1942:
German Production, 1942: Performance
Performance and and
Implications . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
Implications 136
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139
139
Notes,
Notes, Chapter
Chapter IV IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 141

V
V ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THETHE PERIPHERY:PERIPHERY: NOVEMBER NOVEMBER 1942- 1942-
AUGUST 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147
AUGUST1943 147
The
The War
War in
in the
the East:
East: November
November 1942- 1942-
August 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .147
Augustl943 147
The
The Mediterranean
Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 159
The
The Air
Air War
War inin thethe West:West: The The Combined
Combined
Bomber
Bomber Offensive
Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 166
The
The Defense
Defense ofof thethe Reich.
/?eic/i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 174
Losses,
Losses, Production,
Production, and and Strategy
Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .182 182
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .191
Conclusion 191
Notes, Chapter V
Notes, Chapter V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
193

VI
VI ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE THE REICH: REICH: SEPTEMBER SEPTEMBER 1943- 1943-
MARCH 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209
MARCH1944 209
Night
Night Defense
Defense of of thethe Reich
7?eic/i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 210
The
The Day
Day Battle:
Battle: Victory, Victory, September-October
September-October
1943
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .222
222
The
The Day
Day Battle:
Battle: The The Pause,Pause, November- November-
December
December 1943 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .226 226
Defeat:
Defeat: January-March
January-March 1944 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .234 234
War
War in
in the
the East,
East, the the Mediterranean,
Mediterranean, and and
Over
Over Britain
Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245 245
Production
Production and and Training
Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 251
Conclusion
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .255 255
Notes,
Notes, Chapter
Chapter VI VI . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .256
256

VII
VII DEFEAT
DEFEAT:: APRIL-SEPTEMBER
APRIL-SEPTEMBER 1944
1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .263
263
"Overlord" and
"Overlord'' and "Strategic"
"Strategic'' Bombing
Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .264 264
Defense of the Frontiers: The LUFTWAFFE,
Defense of the Frontiers: The LUFTWAFFE,
April-September 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .277
April-September 1944 277
Page
Page
Conclusion
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .291
291
Notes, Chapter
Notes, Chapter VII VII . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .293
293
VIII
VIII CONCLUSION.
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .299
299
The
The Results
Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .299
299
The
The Other
Other Side
Side of of the the HillHill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .302 302
Notes,
Notes, Chapter
Chapter VIII VIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320 320

APPENDIX
APPENDIX
11 THE
THE PREWAR
PREWAR DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH
DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH AND AND
AMERICAN
AMERICAN DOCTRINE
DOCTRINE AND AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
AND AIRPOWER 321
The
The Royal
Royal AirAir ForceForce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321 321
The Development of
The Development of Airpower
Airpower in in the
the. United
United
States.
States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .331
331
Notes, Appendix 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .337
Notes, Appendix 1 337

22 EFFECT
EFFECT ON
ON A
A 10,000-AIRCRAFT
10,000-AIRCRAFT FORCE FORCE STRUCTURE STRUCTURE OF OF
A 3 .6-PERCENT LOSS RATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .341
A 3.6-PERCENT LOSS RATE 341

33 AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT WRITTEN
WRITTEN OFF, OFF, BOMBER BOMBER COMMAND- COMMAND—
1941-1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .343
1941-1944 343

44 EIGHTH
EIGHTH AIR
AIR FORCE,
FORCE, PERCENTAGE
PERCENTAGE SORTIE SORTIE LOSS LOSS RATE RATE
(HEAVY
(HEAVY BOMBERS)
BOMBERS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .345
345

BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347
347

INDEX
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .357
357
LIST
LIST OF
OF ILLUSTRATIONS
ILLUSTRATIONS
Table
TMe Page
Page
II Planned and Actual Aircraft Output-1938 and
PlannedandActualAircraftOutput—1938 and 1939
1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
12
II
II Aircrew
Aircrew Readiness-August
Readiness—^August 1938
1938 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
17
III
III German
Gennan Aircraft
Aircraft Losses
Losses (Damaged
(Damaged and and Destroyed)-
Destroyed)—
May-June
May-June 1940
1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40
40
IV
IV German
German Aircraft
Aircraft Losses
Losses 1940
1940 (All
(All Types)
Types) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
41
V
V German
Gennan Fighter
Fighter Losses
Losses 1940
1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42
42
VI
VI German
German Bomber
Bomber Losses
Losses 1940
1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
43
VII
VII Aircraft
Aircraft and
and Crew
Crew Losses-August
Losses—^August 1940
1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50
50
VIII
VIII Percentage
Percentage of
of Fully
Fully Operational
Operational Ready Ready Crews, Crews,
July-September 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51
July-September 1940 51
IX
IX Aircraft
Aircraft Losses-July-September
Losses—^July-September 1940.
1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53
53
X
X Aircraft
Aircraft Losses-May-September
Losses—^May-September 1940
1940 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54
54
XI
XI Luftwaffe Bomber
Luftwaffe Bomber Losses--October-December
Losses—Octobei^December 1940
1940 . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
55
XII
XII German
German Aircraft
Aircraft Strength
Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
80
XIII
XIII Crew
Crew and
and Aircraft
Aircraft Losses
Losses on
on the
the Eastern
Eastern Front- Front—
June 22-November 1, 1941
June22-Novemberl, 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
89
XIV
XIV German
German Aircraft
Aircraft Losses
Losses 1941
1941 (All Types) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .90
(AUTypes) 90
XV
XV German
German Bomber
Bomber Losses
Losses 1941
1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
91
XVI
XVI German
German Fighter
Fighter Losses
Losses 1941
1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .92
92
XVII
XVII German
German Losses,
Losses, All
All Causes-1941
Causes—1941 (Not (Not Including
Including
November)
November) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93
93
XVIII
XVm Z,M/nvaj5% "In-Commission"
Luftwaffe "In-Commission" Rates
Rates 1941
1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95
95
XIX
XIX %
% of
of Fully
Fully Operational
Operational Crews, Crews, July July 1941-January
1941-January
1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97
1942 97
XX
XX Production
Production of
of German Aircraft—1939-1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
German Aircraft-1939-1941 100

XXI
XXI Authorized and
Authorized and Actual
Actual Strength, Combat Aircraft-
Strength, Combat Aircraft—
September 1939-March
September 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101
1939-March 1942 101
Page
Page

XXII
XXII Average Monthly
Average Monthly Production Production by by Half Half Years Years::
Fighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104
Fighters 104

XXIIl
XXIII Average
Average Monthly
Monthly Production
Production by by Half Half Years: Years:
Twin-Engine Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Twin-Engine Aircraft 105
XXIV
XXIV Average Monthly Production
Average Monthly Production by by Half Half Years: Years:
Four-Engine Aircraft
Four-Engine Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
106
XXV
XXV German
German Losses,
Losses, Jun-Dec 1942, by
Jun-Decl942, by Theater 114
Theater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
XXVI
XXVI German
German Aircraft
Aircraft Losses
Losses 1942
1942 (All
(All Types)
Types) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
115
XXVII
XXVII German
German Bomber
Bomber Losses
Losses 1942
1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .116
116
XXVIII
XXVIII German
German Fighter
Fighter Losses
Losses 1942
1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117
117
XXIX
XXIX German
German Losses,
Losses, All
All Causes-January-October
Causes—January-October 1942
1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .140
140
XXX
XXX German
German Losses by Theater,
Losses by Theater, Jan-Nov
Jan-Nov 1943
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .148
148
XXXI
XXXI German
German Fighter
Fighter Losses,
Losses, 1943
1943 (Number
(Number of
of Aircraft)
Aircraft) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149
149
XXXII
XXXII German
German Aircraft
Aircraft Losses, Mediterranean Theater-
Losses, Mediterranean Theater—
November 1942-May 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .163
November 1942-May 1943 . . . . 163
XXXIII
XXXIII Aircraft
Aircraft Written
Written Off:
Off: Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force,
Force, 1943 1943
(Heavy Bombers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175
(Heavy Bombers) 175
XXXIV
XXXIV Crew
Crew Losses
Losses Eighth
Eighth Air
Air Force,
Force, 1943
1943 (Heavy
(Heavy Bombers)
Bombers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
176
XXXV
XXXV German
German Aircraft
Aircraft Losses
Losses 1943
1943 (All
(All Types)
Types) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
184
XXXVI
XXXVI German
German Bomber
Bomber Losses
Losses 1943
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185
185
XXXVII
XXXVII German Fighter Losses
German Fighter Losses 1943
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
186
XXXVIII
XXXVIII Fighter
Fighter Pilot
Pilot Loss,
Loss, Jan-Aug
Jan-Aug 1943
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .187
187
XXXIX
XXXIX Fighter
Fighter and
and Bomber
Bomber Strength
Strength in
in Frontline
Frontline Units
Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
188
XL
XL Bomber
Bomber Command
Command Strength
Strength and
and Aircraft
Aircraft Losses-1943
Losses—1943 . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .212
212
XLI
XLI Bomber
Bomber Command
Command Losses,
Losses, January
January 1943-March
1943-March 1944
1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .220
220
XLII
XLII British Bomber Losses-1944
British Bomber Losses—1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
220
XLIII
XLIII Aircraft
Aircraft Losses,
Losses, Schweinfurt-October
Schweinfurt—October 1943
1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .226
226
XLIV
XLIV Fighter
Fighter Pilot
Pilot Losses - Sept-Dec 1943
Losses-Sept-Dec 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227
227
XLV
XL V Production of New
Production of New and Reconditioned Fighter
and Reconditioned Fighter
Aircraft-June-December 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .229
Aircraft—^June-December 1943 229
Page
Page

XLVI
XLVI Production
Production of
of New Fighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .230
New Fighters 230

XLVII
XLVII Frontline
Frontline Strength
Strength and
and Operational
Operational Ready
Ready Rate,
Rate,
Fighter Force-August-December
Fighter Force—August-December 1943 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
233
XLVIII
XLVIII Losses in
Losses in Jagdgeschwader
Jagdgeschwader 26
26 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
234
XLIX
XLIX Bomber
Bomber and
and Fighter
Fighter Strength,
Strength, Eighth
Eighth Air
Air Force
Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
234
L
L Aircraft Written
Aircraft Off:: Eighth
Written Off Eighth Air
Air Force,
Force, 1944 1944
. . . . . .
(Heavy Bombers) . . . . . . . . . .
(Heavy Bombers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .235
235
LI
LI German
German Aircraft
Aircraft Losses, Jan-Jun 1944
Losses, Jan-Jun 1944 (All
(All Types)
Types) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .238
238
LII
LII German
German Fighter
Fighter Losses,
Losses, Jan-Jun
Jan-Jun 1944
1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .239
239
LIII
LIII Fighter
Fighter Pilot
Pilot Losses - Jan-May 1944
Losses-Jan-May 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
240
LIV
LIV German
German Bomber
Bomber Losses,
Losses, Jan-Jun
Jan-Jun 1944
1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .241
241
LV
LV Number of
Number of Loaded
Loaded Wagons
Wagons (Excluding
(Excluding aa RelativelyRelatively
Small Number Owned
Small Number Owned Privately)
Privately) Originating
Originating in in
Region
Region North (Weekly Totals)
North (Weekly Totals) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .268
268
LVI
LVI Number
Number of
of Loaded Wagons (Excluding
Loaded Wagons (Excluding aa Relatively Relatively
Small Number Owned Privately) Originating in
Small Number Owned Privately) Originating in
Region
Region West
West (Weekly
(Weekly Totals)
Totals) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .269
269
LVII
LVII Number
Number of
of Trains
Trains Passing
Passing Along
Along the
the Route
Route Valenton-Juvisy
Valenton-Juvisy
in
in Relation
Relation to
to the Tonnages of
the Tonnages of Bombs
Bombs Directed
Directed
Against
Against Railway
Railway Centres
Centres Along
Along the
the Route
Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .270
270
LVIII
LVIII German
German Fuel
Fuel Production
Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .275
275
LIX
LIX Fighter
Fighter Forces
Forces Available,
Available, Luftflotte
Luftflotte Reich
Reich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .275
275
LX
LX Distribution
Distribution ofGerman
of German Fighters,
Fighters, End
End of
of June
June 1944
1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .284
284
LXI
LXI Aircrew Survival Rate, Bomber Command-1939-1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . .303
AircrewSurvivalRate,BomberCommand—1939-1945 303
LXII
LXII German
German Aircraft
Aircraft Losses,
Losses, 6-Month
6-Month Periods
Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .304
304
LXIII
LXIII Bomber Losses,
Bomber Losses, 6-Month
6-Month Periods
Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
305
LXIV
LXIV Fighter
Fighter Losses,
Losses, 6-Month
6-Month Periods
Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .306
306
LXV
LXV No
No title
title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .307
307
LXVI
LXVI No
No title
title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .308
308
LXVII
LXVII %
% of
of Aircraft
Aircraft Authorized
Authorized Strength.
Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .309
309
Page
Page
LXVIII
LXVIII %
% Loss
Loss Fighter
Fighter Pilot
Pilot Strength,
Strength, Jan Jan 1942-Jun
1942-Jun
1943 - Part I . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
1943-PartI 310

Part II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .311
Part II 311
LXIX
LXIX %
% of
of Crews Operational Ready
Crews Operational Ready (Fully)
(Fully) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .313
313
LXX
LXX Flying
Flying Hours
Hours in
in British,
British, American
American and and GermanGerman
Training Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .314
Training Programs 314
LXXI
LXXI Number
Number of
of Victories
Victories Achieved
Achieved Each Each 50 50 Missions
Missions
Flown : 4 German Aces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .315
Flown: 4 German Aces 315

Photographs
Photographs
Following Page 61
Following Page 61

General Walther Wever,


General Walther Wever, first
first Chief
Chief ofStaff
of Staff

Reichsmarschall Hermann
Reichsmarschall Hermann Gbring
Goring and Generaloberst Hans
and Generaloberst Hans Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek

Ernst
Ernst Udet
Udet and
and Willi
Willi Messerschmitt
Messerschmitt

Mainstay
Mainstay of
of the
the fighter
fighter force
force:: the
the Bf
Bf 109G
109G

The
The flawed
flawed fighter
fighter:: the
the Bf
Bf 110
110

The
The "fast"
"fast" bomber:
bomber: the
the Ju
Ju 88
88

The
The interim
interim bomber
bomber:: the He 111
the He 111

The
The cancelled
cancelled "strategic"
"strategic" bomber:
bomber: the
the Do
Do 19
19

The
The flawed
flawed "strategic"
"strategic" bomber:
bomber: the
the He
He 177
177

Russian
Russian Air
Air Force
Force Base
Base at
at Kovno
Kovno after
after German
German attack,
attack, 22
22 June
June 1941
1941

Field
Field Marshal
Marshal Albert
Albert Kesselring
Kesselring

Following
Following Page
Page 199
199
Field
Field Marshal
Marshal Erhard
Erhard Milch
Milch visiting
visiting the
the 55th
55th Bomb
Bomb Wing
Wing

xv
B-17 formation attacking
B-17 formation attacking Brunswick
Brunswick

B-17's
B-17's under
under attack
attack by
by Fw
Fw 190, 29 Nov
190,29 Nov 1943, target:: Bremen
1943, target Bremen

The cost: B-17


The cost: straggler under
B-17 straggler under the
the guns of an
guns of an Fw
Fw 190
190

The
The cost
cost

The
The cost:
cost: B-17
B-17 falling
falling out
out of
of formation
formation

The
The cost:
cost: B-17
B-17 munition
munition handling
handling accident
accident

The
The defenders
defenders:: Galland
Galland and
and Hermann
Hermann at
at war
war game
game with
with 1st
1st Fighter
Fighter Wing,
Wing, Nov-Dec
Nov-Dec
1943
1943

The
The defenders
defenders:: the
the Fw
Fw 190
190

The
The defenders
defenders:: mainstay
mainstay of
of the
the night
night fighter
fighter force-the
force—the Bf
Bf 110G
1 lOG

Air
Air superiority
superiority:: American
American fighters
fighters over
over B-17
B-17 formation
formation

Attrition
Attrition:: destruction
destruction of
of aa Bf
Bf 109
109

Attrition
Attrition:: Bf
Bf 109
109 pilot
pilot bales
bales out
out

Air superiority
Air superiority:: He
He 177
177 under
under strafing
strafing attack
attack

Defeat
Defeat:: occupied
occupied German
German airfield,
airfield, 1945
1945

Goring
Goring in
in defeat:
defeat: the
the Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall removes
removes his
his medals
medals for
for his
his American
American captors
captors
LIST
LIST OF
OF MAPS
MAPS
Page
Page
The
The Invasion
Invasion of
of France
France 1940:
1940: The Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
The Plans 34
Battle
Battle of Britain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49
of Britain 49
The
The Invasion
Invasion of
of Russia
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85
85
The
The German
German Summer
Summer Offensive
Offensive:: 1942
1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
123
The
The Soviet
Soviet Counter
Counter Attack
Attack:: Stalingrad
Stalingrad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
153
The
The Mediterranean
Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161
161
Major
Major Targets
Targets:: The
The Strategic
Strategic Bombing
Bombing Offensive
Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .168
168
Escort
Escort Fighter Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .172
Fighter Range 172
German Air Defense-Oct 1943
GermanAirDefense—Oct 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .178
178
Kassel 22/23rd October 1943
Kassel22/23rdOctober - Outward Route . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .211
1943-OutwardRoute 211
Plots
Plots on
on Bombers
Bombers Passed Passed Over Over RT RT & & WT WT to to
Nightfighters,
Nightfighters, RaidRaid on on Nuremberg,
Nuremberg,
30/31 .3 .44. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219
30/31.3.44 219
The
The Soviet
Soviet Advance,
Advance, Nov 1942-Dec 1944
Novl942-Dec 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .287
287
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In aa work
In work of of this
this nature,
nature, it it is
is not
not surprising
surprising that that many
many people people played played aa
considerable
considerable role role in in advising
advising me me as as II began
began and and conducted
conducted my my research
research.. The The
strengths
strengths of of this
this book
book reflect
reflect their
their help;
help; its weaknesses, my
its weaknesses, my failings.
failings. In In particular,
particular, II
would
would likelike to to thank
thank Professor
Professor PhilipPhilip Flammer
Hammer of Brigham Young
of Brigham Young University
University who who
introduced
introduced me me toto the
the AirAir WarWar College
College and and played
played aa majormajor role role inin developing
developing my my
interest
interest in in doing
doing aa study
study of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe..
At
At the
the AirAir University,
University, Colonel Colonel Thomas Fabyanic, founder
Thomas Fabyanic, founder of of thethe Airpower
Airpower
Research
Research Institute
Institute (ARI),
(ARI), deserves
deserves special
special mention
mention for for hishis generous
generous supportsupport of of this
this
project as does
project as does the
the current
current Director
Director of
of the
the Institute,
Institute, Colonel
Colonel Kenneth
Kenneth Alnwick
Alnwick. .
Without
Without the the wholehearted
wholehearted support support of of Major
Major General
General David David Gray, Gray, former
former
Commandant
Commandant of the Air
of the Air War College, this
War College, this study
study could
could not not have
have beenbeen conducted
conducted.. II
would also like to thank the
would also like to thank the following
following individuals
individuals at
at the
the Air
Air War
War College
College for
for their
their
help and guidance: Colonel Donald Frizzell,
help and guidance: Colonel Donald Frizzell, Lieutenant
Lieutenant Colonels
Colonels Donald
Donald Baucom,
Baucom,
David
David Maclssac,
Maclssac, David David Lupton,
Lupton, and and James True;; and
James True and my my colleagues
colleagues in the ARI,
in the ARI, Dr.
Dr.
David Mets and Dr. Kenneth Werrell . My special thanks to John Schenk and
David Mets and Dr. Kenneth Werrell. My special thanks to John Schenk and
Dorothy
Dorothy McCluskie
McCluskie of of the
the ARI
ARI forfor their
their thorough
thorough and and detailed
detailed editorial
editorial assistance.
assistance. II
would also be remiss if I were not to express my thanks to those who helped with
would also be remiss if I were not to express my thanks to those who helped with the
the
typing of this manuscript and with arrangements for my travels : especially Edna
typing of this manuscript and with arrangements for my travels: especially Edna
Davis,
Davis, Jo Jo Ann
Ann Perdue,
Perdue, Mary Mary Schenk,
Schenk, BettyBetty Brown,
Brown, and and Norma
Norma Todd Todd.. II must
must thank
thank
Rose McCall for the excellent graphics and Steve Garst, Air University Review, for
Rose McCall for the excellent graphics and Steve Garst, Air University Review, for
designing the cover . In the academic world, my colleagues Professors I . B. Holley
designing the cover. In the academic world, my colleagues Professors I. B. Holley
and
and Hans
Hans Gatzke
Gatzke deserve
deserve thanksthanks for for their
their help
help and and advice
advice.. At At thethe Ohio
Ohio State
State
University, Kenneth Watman and Bruce Nardulli were especially helpful in
University, Kenneth Watman and Bruce Nardulli were especially helpful in
reviewing the content of the final manuscript. I should also like to thank Harry
reviewing the content of the final manuscript. I should also like to thank Harry
Fletcher
Fletcher forfor hishis considerable
considerable help help inin guiding
guiding me through the
me through the archives
archives at at the
the Albert
Albert
F. Simpson Historical Research Center. In addition, I received substantial
F. Simpson Historical Research Center. In addition, I received substantial
assistance
assistance whilewhile working
working abroad abroad in in European
European archives
archives.. In In Great
Great Britain,
Britain, Group
Group
Captain "Tony" Mason afforded me access to critical materials in the RAF Staff
Captain "Tony" Mason afforded me access to critical materials in the RAF Staff
College
College archives
archives;; "J "J.. P."P." McDonald
McDonald guided guided me me through
through the the materials
materials available
available in in
the
the Public Record Office
Public Record Office (PRO)(PRO) fromfrom his his post
post in in the
the AirAir Historical
Historical Branch Branch;; and and
"Freddie"
"Freddie" LambertLambert and and Suzanne
Suzanne MarshMarsh provided
provided invaluable
invaluable researchresearch assistance.
assistance. II
must
must also
also thank
thank Professors
Professors Paul Paul Kennedy,
Kennedy, John John Gooch,
Gooch, Brian Brian Bond,Bond, and and Richard
Richard
Overy
Overy for for their
their help
help as as well
well as as friendship
friendship that that they
they extended
extended to to me
me while
while II waswas inin
Great
Great Britain
Britain.. Dr. Dr. Noble
Noble Frankland
Frankland provided
provided hishis time
time and and his
his vast
vast knowledge
knowledge at at the
the
Imperial
Imperial War War Museum
Museum.. II also also must
must thank
thank thethe staffs
staffs at at the
the PRO,
PRO, the the Imperial
Imperial WarWar
Museum,
Museum, and and the
the RAF
RAF Staff
Staff College
College..
In
In Germany,
Germany, the the staffs
staffs at at thethe military
military archives
archives in in Freiburg
Freiburg and and thethe
Militdrgeschichtliches
Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt
Forschungsamt played played an an invaluable
invaluable role role in in furthering
furthering my my
work
work.. InIn particular,
particular, II must must thank
thank Dr. Manfred Messerschmidt,
Dr. Manfred Messerschmidt, Dr. Dr. Jurgen
Jiirgen Forster,
Forster,
Dr.
Dr. Horst Boog, and
Horst Boog, and especially
especially Dr. Dr. Wilhelm
Wilhelm DeistDeist and and Oberstleutnant
Oberstleutnant Klaus Klaus Maier
Maier
for
for their
their help
help andand friendship
friendship.. MajorMajor General
General Hans
Hans W. W. Asmus provided enormous
Asmus provided enormous
patience,
patience, wisdom,
wisdom, as as well
well asas great
great courtesy
courtesy and
and hospitality
hospitality during
during my
my stay
stay in
in
Germany . I should also like to thank Oberst Werner Geissinger for his considerable
Germany. I should also like to thank Oberst Werner Geissinger for his considerable
help
help in
in proofreading
proofreading the the German
German as as well
well as
as the
the English
English inin the
the various
various drafts
drafts of
of this
this
work. In
work. In the
the military
military archives
archives inin Freiburg,
Freiburg, Frau
Frau Eleonore
Eleonore Miiller
Miiller was
was most
most helpful,
helpful,
always friendly,
always friendly, and
and invariably
invariably pleasant
pleasant..
Finally, II must
Finally, must thank
thank mymy wife
wife Marjorie
Marjorie and
and my
my children,
children, Alexandra
Alexandra and
and Spencer,
Spencer,
for their
for their support
support and
and love
love in
in all
all the
the separations
separations that
that this
this project
project entailed.
entailed.
FOREWORD
FOREWORD
Military
Military history
history is is aa window
window through
through which
which we we may may study
study the the lessons
lessons of of past
past
combat . These lessons become clear only after thoughtful examination of events
combat. These lessons become clear only after thoughtful examination of events
and
and factors
factors thatthat influenced
influenced them them.. Organizations
Organizations that that have
have not not been
been willing
willing to to
examine the past, especially their own, have usually paid a price for that oversight .
examine the past, especially their own, have usually paid a price for that oversight.
We
We stand
stand today
today on on thethe far
far side
side of gulf of
of aa gulf time which
of time which separates
separates us us from
from the the
experiences of the Second World War . Nearly forty years ago, the Allied Air Forces
experiences of the Second World War. Nearly forty years ago, the Allied Air Forces
fought an
fought an extensive,
extensive, costlycostiy battle
battle for air superiority
for air superiority over over the the European
European continent
continent..
The air
The war over
air war over Europe
Europe represented
represented aa great great struggle
struggle between
between fully fully mobilized
mobilized
industrial
industrial powers
powers.. This This conflict
conflict had had the
the scale,
scale, characteristics,
characteristics, and and balance
balance of of
strength between both
strength between both sides
sides which
which we we might
might wellwell experience
experience in in aa future
future conflict
conflict..
Though over
Though over time
time we we were
were ableable to
to bring
bring our
our massive
massive productive
productive superiority
superiority to to bear
bear
in
in this
this war,
war, itit nevertheless
nevertheless was was aa struggle
struggle which
which challenged
challenged our our staying
staying power
power and and
stamina
stamina.. The The length
length and and attrition
attrition of of that
that conflict
conflict suggest
suggest thatthat should
should we we ever
ever face
face
another
another war war on on aa similar
similar scale,
scale, the clash of
the clash of power
power may may neither
neither be be short
short nor
nor quickly
quickly
decisive. We
decisive. We maymay again
again havehave to face aa battlefield
to face battlefield environment
environment and and setset of
of challenges
challenges
which
which are are wholly
wholly different
different from from what
what wewe have
have faced
faced in in recent
recent conflicts
conflicts..
Only
Only aa fewfew of of our
our senior
senior officers
officers cancan call
call directly
directly uponupon thethe experience
experience of of World
World
War
War II II to
to guide
guide themthem in in leading
leading the the Air
Air Force.
Force. Our Our combat
combat experience
experience base base is is
limited mainly
limited mainly to to the
the events
events of of Korea
Korea and and Vietnam
Vietnam.. Should Should we we have
have to to fight
fight aa large
large
scale
scale war
war again,
again, onlyonly history
history cancan provide
provide the the necessary
necessary insights
insights.. If If history
history has has had
had
one direct
one direct lesson
lesson forfor the
the student
student of of war,
war, itit is
is that
that nations
nations and and their
their armed
armed forces
forces will
will
not
not be
be fully
fully prepared
prepared for for the
the war
war that
that comes
comes.. If If this
this isis so,
so, we we must
must acquire
acquire by by anan
extensive
extensive studystudy of of past
past conflicts,
conflicts, aa flexibility
flexibility ofmind
of mind and and intellectual
intellectual rigorrigor that
that will
will
permit
permit us us toto deal
deal with
with the the unexpected
unexpected and and adapt
adapt to to changing
changing conditions
conditions as as they
they are,
are,
not as
not as wewe forecast
forecast them them to to be.
be. History
History clearly
clearly points
points outout that
that those
those who who ignore
ignore the the
past
past are
are doomed
doomed to to repeat
repeat old old mistakes
mistakes..
This
This book
book is is aa comprehensive
comprehensive analysis analysis of of an an air
air force,
force, thethe Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, in in World
World
War
War II.
II. ItIt follows
follows the the Germans
Germans from from their
their prewar
prewar preparations
preparations to to their
their final
final defeat
defeat..
There
There areare many
many disturbing
disturbing parallels
parallels withwith our
our current
current situation
situation.. II urgeurge every
every student
student
of
of military
military science
science to to read
read itit carefully.
carefully. The The lessons
lessons of of the
the nature
nature of of warfare
warfare and and the
the
application
application of, of airpower
airpower can can provide
provide thethe guidance
guidance to to develop
develop our our fighting
fighting forces
forces and and
employment
employment conceptsconcepts to to meet
meet thethe significant
significant challenges
challenges we we areare certain
certain to to face
face inin the
the
future
future..

doi^-dr^^ V\aadb;_.
ROBERT
ROBERT C . MATHIS
C.MATHIS
General,
General, USAF
USAF (Retired)
(Retired)
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
As with
As with all
all military
military thought,
thought, aa wide wide variety
variety of political, historical,
of political, historical, and and economic
economic
factors guided
factors guided the
the development
development of
of air
air doctrines
doctrines in
in the
the period
period between
between the
the First
First and
and
Second
Second World
World Wars Wars.. Yet Yet standing
standing above above all all other influences was
other influences was aa revulsion
revulsion
against
against the
the mud
mud andand despair
despair of of the
the trenches
trenches.. Thus,Thus, itit isis not
not surprising
surprising that that anan Italian
Italian
senior officer, Giulio Douhet, would argue
senior officer, Giulio Douhet, would argue that
that airpower
airpower could
could prevent
prevent the
the
repetition of a war that had cost Italy
repetition of a war that had cost Italy more
more than
than 400,000
400,000 dead.
dead. In
In terms
terms of
of the
the first
first
formulations
formulations of of air doctrine, Douhet's
air doctrine, Douhet's thoughtthought did did not
not prove
prove particularly
particularly influential
influential..
In Britain, the development
In Britain, the development of
of doctrine,
doctrine, both
both within
within and
and outside
outside of
of the
the Royal
Royal AirAir
Force (RAF), already was well advanced by
Force (RAF), akeady was well advanced by the
the end
end of
of the
the First
First World
World War.'
War.'
Douhet
Douhet maymay have
have exercised
exercised more more influence
influence on on American
American doctrine,doctrine, since since various
various
translated extracts of his work found their way
translated extracts of his work found their way into
into the
the library
library and
and schools
schools of
of the
the
American Air Service as early as 1922. 2 But
American Air Service as early as 1922.^ But the
the formulation
formulation of
of a
a precision
precision bombing
bombing
doctrine
doctrine in the United
in the United States States raises
raises the the question
question of of how deeply his
how deeply his writings
writings
influenced early Army Air Corps pioneers .
influenced early Army Air Corps pioneers.
Yet, Douhet's theories
Yet, Douhet's theories are are symptomatic
symptomatic of of intellectual
intellectual attitudes
attitudes current
current among
among
military and civilian thinkers in the post-World War I era . They are, therefore, aa
military and civilian thinkers in the post-World War I era. They are, therefore,
useful
useful point
point ofof departure
departure.. Douhet's
Douhet's central,
central, single-minded
single-minded argument argument was was that
that the
the
decisive mission for an air force was "strategic" bombing .' All other missions
decisive mission for an air force was "strategic" bombing.' All other missions
would
would only
only detract
detract fromfrom this
this role
role andand thus were considered
thus were considered counterproductive
counterproductive and and aa
misuse of air resources . Douhet excluded the possibility of air defense, denied
misuse of air resources. Douhet excluded the possibility of air defense, denied
fighter
fighter aircraft
aircraft aa place
place in in future
future air air forces,
forces, and and argued
argued that that close
close air air support
support and and
interdiction were an irrelevant waste of aircraft . The only role for the air force of the
interdiction were an irrelevant waste of aircraft. The only role for the air force of the
future would be that of "strategic" bombing . Douhet further reasoned that the
future would be that of "strategic" bombing. Douhet further reasoned that the
more heavily armed bomber would always prove superior to the fighter in air-to-air
more heavily armed bomber would always prove superior to the fighter in air-to-air
combat
combat.* .4 Underlying
Underlying Douhet'sDouhet's arguments
arguments was was aa belief
belief thatthat bombardment
bombardment of of anan
enemy's
enemy's population
population centerscenters wouldwould shatter
shatter his his morale
morale and and leadlead directly
directly to to the
the
collapse
collapse of of his
his war
war effort
effort.'.' Such
Such an an attitude
attitude underlay
underlay most most airpower
airpower theories
theories
between
between thethe wars
wars and and reflected
reflected aa fundamental
fundamental disbelief disbelief in in the
the staying
staying power
power of of
civilian
civilian societies
societies..
Douhet's
Douhet's approach
approach represented
represented the the hope
hope thatthat airpower
airpower and and "strategic"
"strategic" bombing bombing
would
would enable international conflict
enable international conflict to to return
return to to an
an era
era of of short,
short, decisive
decisive wars wars andand
thus
thus would
would allow
allow Europe
Europe to to escape
escape the the massmass slaughter
slaughter of of the
the last
last warwar.. However,
However,
nowhere
nowhere in in Douhet's
Douhet's writings
writings is is there
there aa sensesense of of the
the technological
technological and and industrial
industrial
underpinnings
underpinnings necessary
necessary for for air air war.
war. This This may may subconsciously
subconsciously reflect reflect the the
circumstance
circumstance that that Italy
Italy possessed
possessed none none of of the
the resources,
resources, expertise,
expertise, or or industrial
industrial
requirements
requirements for for such
such aa war. war. ItIt isis worth
worth noting,
noting, however,
however, that that most
most other
other theorists
theorists
of
of the
the period
period were
were similarly
similarly reluctant
reluctant to to recognize
recognize the the technological
technological and and industrial
industrial
complexities
complexities of of their
their subject.
subject. In In retrospect,
retrospect, what what makes makes the the present-day
present-day
conventional
conventional wisdom
wisdom that that Douhet
Douhet was was the the prophet
prophet of of airpower
airpower so so surprising
surprising isis thethe
fact
fact that
that his
his theory
theory denigrated
denigrated all all the
the major
major missions
missions of of modern
modern air air forces
forces except
except
"strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing.. Douhet Douhet dismissed
dismissed air air defense,
defense, tacticaltactical air, air, airlift,
airlift.

XXlll
reconnaissance, and
reconnaissance, and air
air superiority
superiority as immaterial.. Not
as immaterial Not surprisingly,
surprisingly, he he also
also argued
argued
that airpower
that airpower eliminated
eliminated thethe requirement
requirement for armies and
for armies and navies
navies;; consequently,
consequently, there there
was
was no need for
no need for interservice
interservice cooperation
cooperation..
The
The theories
theories of of Douhet
Douhet and
and other
other early
early airpower
airpower advocates,
advocates, with
with their
their stress
stress onon
the
the notion
notion that
that "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing was
was the
the exclusive
exclusive air
air mission,
mission, have
have exercised
exercised aa
great
great influence
influence on on the
the development
development of of air
air forces
forces since
since that
that time.
time. Commentators
Commentators on on
airpower
airpower havehave all
all too
too often
often tied
tied their subject directly
their subject directly and
and exclusively
exclusively to to "strategic"
"strategic"
bombing,
bombing, whilewhile ignoring
ignoring other possible applications.
other possible applications. Air Air forces,
forces, however,
however, have have
had
had to
to perform
perform a
a wide
wide variety
variety of
of tasks
tasks other
other than
than "strategic"
"strategic" bombing.
bombing. The
The real
real
contribution of airpower to
contribution of airpower to final
final victory
victory in
in the
the Second
Second World
World War
War lay
lay in
in the
the very
very
diversity
diversity of its capability
of its capability.. Ironically,
Ironically, thethe conduct
conduct of of air
air operations
operations in in that
that war
war
resembled, in many
resembled, in many facets,
facets, the
the strategy
strategy of
of the
the previous
previous conflict
conflict except
except that
that attrition
attrition
came now
came now in in terms
terms of of aircraft
aircraft and
and aircrews
aircrews rather
rather than
than mud-stained
mud-stained infantry
infantry.. Month
Month
after month, year after year,
after month, year after year, crews
crews climbed
climbed into
into their
their aircraft
aircraft to
to fly
fly over
over the
the
European continent . Those in charge of the air battle
European continent. Those in charge of the air battle came
came to
to measure
measure success
success by
by
drops in percentage points of bomber and
drops in percentage points of bomber and fighter
fighter losses
losses rather
rather than
than in
in terms
terms of
of yards
yards
gained
gained.. As As one
one commentator
commentator has has pointed
pointed out
out::

Despite
Despite the
the visions
visions of
of its protagonists of
its protagonists of prewar
prewar days,
days, the
the air
air war
war
during
during the
the Second
Second World
World War War .. .. .. was
was attrition
attrition war
war.. ItIt did
did not
not
supplant
supplant the
the operations
operations of of conventional
conventional forces;
forces; itit complemented
complemented
them
them.. Victory
Victory went
went to
to the air forces
the air forces with
with the greatest depth,
the greatest depth, thethe
greatest balance, the
greatest balance, greatest flexibility
the greatest flexibility in employment.. The
in employment The result
result
was
was an
an air strategy completely
air strategy completely unforeseen
unforeseen by by air
air commanders
commanders .. .. . .*6

Thus, air
Thus, air war
war proved
proved toto have
have none
none of of the
the decisive
decisive elements
elements that that prewar
prewar thinkers
thinkers andand
advocates had so confidently predicted .
advocates had so confidently predicted. Rather,
Rather, air
air superiority
superiority and
and the
the utilization
utilization of
of
airpower to break the opponent proved to be elusive
airpower to break the opponent proved to be elusive and
and intractable
intractable problems .
problems.
Enemy air
Enemy air forces
forces could
could and
and did
did live
live to
to fight
fight another
another day
day despite
despite setbacks
setbacks and defeat
and defeat..
Only the elimination of their supporting industries and resources, or the occupation
Only the elimination of their supporting industries and resources, or the occupation
of
of their
their bases
bases by
by ground
ground forces,
forces, guaranteed
guaranteed complete
complete victory.
victory. The
The accomplishment
accomplishment
of the former task proved extraordinarily difficult, while the latter indicated
of the former task proved extraordinarily difficult, while the latter indicated aa
degree of interdependence among air, ground, and naval forces that airpower
degree of interdependence among air, ground, and naval forces that airpower
advocates
advocates had had so
so casually
casually dismissed
dismissed before
before the
the war.
war. If If the
the aircraft
aircraft had
had added
added aa newnew
dimension to warfare, it had not changed the underlying principles.
dimension to warfare, it had not changed the underlying principles.
While
While thethe concept
concept ofof "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing intrigued
intrigued prewar
prewar airair forces,
forces, practical
practical
factors-the "real world" of interservice relationships, defense priorities, political
factors—the "real world" of interservice relationships, defense priorities, political
attitudes,
attitudes, andand economic
economic limitations-exercised
limitations—exercised an an important
important influence
influence over over their
their
establishment
establishment and and development
development.. Entirely
Entirely different
different strategic
strategic factors
factors determined
determined
control
control over
over the
the constitution
constitution andand strategies
strategies ofof each
each different
different European
European air air force,
force, not
not
to
to mention
mention the the Army
Army AirAir Corps
Corps in in the
the United
United States.
States. To To understand
understand the the course
course ofof
those
those developments
developments as as well
well asas the
the doctrine
doctrine that
that guided
guided the the employment
employment of of airpower
airpower
in
in the
the Second
Second World
World War,
War, oneone must
must grasp
grasp not
not only
only those
those factors
factors influencing
influencing the the air
air
forces
forces themselves
themselves but but also
also the
the larger
larger problems
problems of of national
national policy
policy and
and strategy
strategy that
that
influenced
influenced both both politicians
politicians and
and the
the military.
military.

xxiv
The
The Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, as as with
with all
all military
military organizations,
organizations, was was aa child
child of of its
its time
time.. The
The
theories
theories current throughout Europe
current throughout Europe in in the 1920's and
the 1920's 1930's with
and 1930's with respect
respect to to the
the
future
future course
course of of warfare
warfare in in general
general and and air war in
air war in particular
particular alsoalso werewere present
present in in
Germany
Germany.. Conversely,
Conversely, and and notnot surprisingly,
surprisingly, the the peculiar
peculiar forces
forces that
that hadhad guided
guided and and
molded
molded GermanGerman history
history exercised
exercised their their influence
influence on on the
the growth
growth and and development
development of of
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. Like
Like their
their counterparts
counterparts in other nations,
in other German airmen
nations, German airmen believed
believed thatthat
their
their air air force
force would
would be be able
able to to exercise
exercise an an important,
important, if if not
not decisive,
decisive, impactimpact on on aa
future
future war. war . To
To them,
them, aircraft
aircraft wouldwould be be thethe definitive
definitive "strategic"
"strategic" weapon weapon in in the
the
coming
coming conflict
conflict.^ .' Those
Those currents
currents within within the the German
German military,
military, typified
typified by by Erich
Erich
Ludendorff's
Ludendorff s conceptions
conceptions of of total
total war war and
and thethe mobilization
mobilization of of the
the population,
population, not not
only made the mass movement of the Nazi
only made the mass movement of the Nazi Party
Party attractive
attractive to
to many
many officers
officers but
but also
also
led
led to to aa greater
greater acceptance
acceptance of of airpower theories among
airpower theories among the the air
air force
force officer
officer corps
corps.* .'
On the other hand, Germany's location and strategic situation presented
On the other hand, Germany's location and strategic situation presented the
the German
German
miliary with
miliary with aa reality
reality that
that they
they could
could not not ignore one major
ignore;; one major defeat
defeat on on land
land might
might
well seal the fate of the Reich before the Luftwaffe could have an impact . That
well seal the fate of the Reich before the Luftwaffe could have an impact. That
represented a strategic situation quite different from that facing British and
represented a strategic situation quite different from that facing British and
American airmen .
American airmen.
Besides
Besides reflecting
reflecting its its society,
society, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe reflected
reflected thethe traditions
traditions and and values
values of of
the Prussian officer corps . Like their brother officers in the army, Luftwaffe officers
the Prussian officer corps. Like their brother officers in the army, Luftwaffe officers
would
would prove prove imaginative,
imaginative, innovative,
innovative, and and highly
highly competent
competent in in operational
operational and and
tactical matters . They would, however, prove themselves lost in the higher realms
tactical matters. They would, however, prove themselves lost in the higher realms
of
of strategy
strategy and
and grand
grand strategy,
strategy, and and itit would
would be be in
in those
those realms
realms thatthat thethe Reich
Reich would
would
founder. After the war, the German generals and admirals would rush into print to
founder. After the war, the German generals and admirals would rush into print to
prove that defeat had been largely the result of Hitler's leadership. In fact, their
prove that defeat had been largely the result of Hitler's leadership. In fact, their
strategic
strategic concepts
concepts in in the
the war
war provedproved to to bebe asas flawed
flawed as as had
had the the Fiihrer's.
Fiihrer's. The The
German generals and admirals aided and abetted Hitler's strategy in 1940 ; and when
German generals and admirals aided and abetted Hitler's strategy in 1940; and when
itit succeeded
succeeded beyond
beyond theirtheir wildest
wildest expectations
expectations with with the
the fall
fall of
of France,
France, they they reacted
reacted
in awe, suspending
in awe, suspending reason reason for for aa blind
blind faith
faith in in the
the invincibility
invincibility of of the
the Reich
Reich and and its
its
Fiihrer.
Fiihrer. The The strategic
strategic advice
advice they they tendered
tendered from from that
that point
point forward
forward ignoredignored the the
industrial,
industrial, economic,
economic, and and political
political realities
realities of of war
war between
between industrialized
industrialized nations nations
that
that havehave existed
existed sincesince thethe American
American Civil Civil War War.. The
The failure
failure of of German
German grand grand
strategy
strategy and and mobilization
mobilization in 1940-41 insured
in 1940-41 insured not not only
only the
the defeat
defeat of of the
the German
German
armed
armed forces
forces and
and thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in in the
the coming
coming years years but
but aa catastrophe
catastrophe for for the
the German
German
nation
nation as as well
well.. Therefore,
Therefore, exploring
exploring the the causes
causes forfor the
the defeat
defeat of of the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, the the
focus
focus of of this
this study,
study, explains
explains more more than than the
the downfall
downfall of of an
an air
air force
force..
Notes
Notes
11.. For
For aa detailed
detailed discussion
discussion of of this point, see
this point, see the
the excellent
excellent workwork byby Barry
Barry D D.. Powers,
Powers, Strategy
Strategy Without
Without
Slide-Rule,
Slide-Rule, BritishBritish Air
Air Strategy,
Strategy, 1914-1939
1914-1939 (London,
(London, 1976)1976)..
22.. Robert
RobertF. F . Futrell, Ideas, Concepts,
Futreh,Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine
Doctrine:: A A History
History of ofBasic
Basic Thinking
Thinking in in the
the United States Air
United States Air
Force, 1907-1964 (Montgomery,
Force, 1907-1964 (Montgomery, 1971), 1971), pppp.. 38-39
38-39..
33.. For
For the
the purposes
purposes of of this
this study,
study, the
the use of the
use of the term "strategic" bombing
term "strategic" bombing will will have
have thethe word
word strategic
strategic
inclosed
inclosed withinwithin quotation
quotation marks,
marks, as this author
as this author believes that the
believes that the use of the
use of the word
word strategic
strategic byby airpower
airpower
enthusiasts
enthusiasts to to connote
connote aa particular
particular formform ofof bombing
bombing distorts
distorts the
the classical
classical meaning
meaning of of the
the word
word.. The
The
difficulty
difficulty into into which
which thethe misuse
misuse of of this
this word
word hashas led
led historians
historians might
might be be best
best characterized
characterized by by the
the
following
following question
question:: InIn May
May 1940,
1940, given
given Germany's
Germany's military
military situation,
situation, what
what waswas the
the best
best strategic
strategic use
use to
to
which
which the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could
could bebe put
put;: supporting
supporting thethe army's
army's drive
drive to
to the
the channel
channel and and the
the crushing
crushing of of French
French
and British
and land power,
British land power, oror attacking
attacking French
French factories
factories and
and cities?
cities? The
The answer
answer isis clear
clear inin aa classical
classical sense
sense..
Within
Within the the existing
existing definitions
definitions ofof "strategic"
"strategic" and and "tactical"
"tactical" bombing,
bombing, itit isis not
not so
so clear
clear..
44.. General
General Giulio
Giulio Douhet,
Douhet, TheThe Command
Command of of the
the Air
Air (London,
(London, 1943),
1943), pppp.. 16-17,
16-17, 44, 55, 218,
44, 55, 218, 239
239..
55.. Edward
Edward Warner,
Warner, "Douhet,
"Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky:: Theories
Mitchell, Seversky Theories of of Air
Air Warfare,"
Warfare," MakersMakers of of Modern
Modern
Strategy,
Strategy, ed ed.. bby
y Edward
Edward Mead Earle, 2nd
Mead Earle, 2nd edition
edition (Princeton,
(Princeton, 1971),
1971), pp.. 489
489..
66.. William
William Emerson,
Emerson, "Operation
"Operation Pointblank,"
Pointblank," Harmon Memorial Lecture,
Harmon Memorial Lecture, No No.. 44 (Colorado
(Colorado Springs,
Springs,
1962),
1962), pp.. 41 41..
77.. For
For the
the basic
basic groundbreaking
groundbreaking work work onon this
this point,
point, II am
am indebted
indebted toto aa lecture
lecture given
given in in September
September 1980 1980
at
at the the Air
Air War War College,
College, Maxwell
Maxwell AFB, AFB, Alabama,
Alabama, by by Oberstleumant
Oberstleutnant Klaus Klaus MaierMaier of of the
the
Militargeschichtliches
Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt,
Forschungsamt, Federal Federal Republic
Republic of of Germany
Germany.. See See the
the further
further discussion
discussion andand
amplification
amplification of of this
this point
point in Chapter II and
in Chapter and in my article,
in my article, "The
"The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe Before
Before the
the Second
Second World
World War:
War:
A
A Mission,
Mission, A Strategy?," Journal
A Stiategyt," Journal of ofStrategic
Strategic Studies
Studies (September
(September 1981)1981)..
88.. See,
See, in in particular,
particular, the
the articles
articles dealing
dealing with
with airpower
aitpower thatthat appeared
appeared in in the
the Militdrwissenschaftliche
Militarwissenschaftliche
Rundschau
Rundschau from from 1936
1936 through
through 1939
1939..

XXVI
CHAPTER
CHAPTER II

The Luftwaffe:: Origins


The Luftwaffe Origins and
and Preparation
Preparation

Since World
Since World War War II, American and
II, American and British
British advocates
advocates of of "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing
have criticized the Luftwaffe as being "in effect the hand maiden
have criticized the Luftwaffe as being "in effect the hand maiden of
of the
the German
German
army."' Such a view does not do justice to the complexity of the rearmament
army."' Such a view does not do justice to the complexity of the rearmament
problem
problem facedfaced by by the
the Third
Third Reich
Reich inin general
general andand the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in in particular
particular.. ItIt also
also
misses entirely the fact that a significant body within
misses entirely the fact that a significant body within the
the Luftwaffe's high command
Luftwaffe's high command
were
were converts
converts to to the
the doctrine
doctrine of of "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing before
before the
the outbreak
outbreak of of World
World
War 11. That Germany was not able to wage a successful "strategic" bombing
War II. That Germany was not able to wage a successful "strategic" bombing
campaign
campaign in in 1940
1940 reflected
reflected merely
merely thethe fact
fact that
that German
German air air strategists
strategists in in the
the prewar
prewar
period, like those in other nations, had considerably overestimated their ability to
period, like those in other nations, had considerably overestimated their ability to
inflict
inflict punishing
punishing strategic
strategic damage
damage withwith the the weapons
weapons at hand.. Before
at hand Before the the war,
war, the
the
same
same trends that marked
trends that marked the the air
air forces
forces of of Great
Great Britain
Britain and
and the
the United States also
United States also
were present
were present in the officer
in the officer corps
corps ofof the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. ButBut an
an important
important geographic
geographic
consideration,
consideration, the the fact
fact that
that Germany
Germany was was aa continental
continental power,
power, had had an an additional
additional
impact
impact on German strategic
on German strategic thinking
thinking.. In In any
any conceivable
conceivable conflict
conflict involving
involving thethe
military
military forces
forces of of the
the Reich,
Reich, Germany
Germany facedfaced the
the probability
probability ofof land
land operations
operations at at the
the
outset
outset ofof hostilities
hostilities.. Thus,
Thus, itit would scarcely improve
would scarcely improve Germany's
Germany's strategic
strategic position
position
if-at
if—at thethe same time that
same time that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe launched
launched aerial
aerial attacks
attacks on on London,
London, Paris,
Paris,
and Warsaw—Germany's enemies
and Warsaw-Germany's enemies defeated
defeated the the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht on on the
the border
border andand
overran
overran Silesia,
Silesia, EastEast Prussia,
Prussia, and the Rhineland
and the Rhineland..

THE
THE ECONOMIC
ECONOMIC PROBLEM
PROBLEM
Constraining
Constraining and and guiding
guiding the the course
course ofof German
German rearmament
rearmament throughout
throughout the the
1930's
1930's was
was an an economic
economic situation
situation considerably
considerably different
different from
from thatthat which
which
determined
determined British
British or
or American
American rearmament
rearmament.^ .' The
The only
only raw
raw material
material possessed
possessed by by
Germany
Germany in in any
any abundance
abundance was was coa1.3
coal.^ All
All other
other raw
raw materials
materials required
required forfor the
the
continued
continued functioning
functioning of of the
the German
German economy,
economy, not not to
to mention
mention the the successful
successful
prosecution
prosecution of of war,
war, had
had toto be
be imported
imported to to one
one extent
extent or
or another.
another. Imports
Imports of of oil,
oil,
rubber,
rubber, aluminum,
aluminum, and and other
other critical
critical materials
materials necessary
necessary for for the
the continued
continued
functioning
functioning of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and and the
the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht were were all
all subject
subject to to blockade
blockade..
Moreover,
Moreover, in in peacetime
peacetime the the Germans
Germans had had to to use
use aa substantial
substantial portion
portion of of their
their
industrial
industrial production
production to to export
export goods
goods inin order
order toto earn
earn the
the foreign
foreign exchange
exchange
necessary
necessary to
to pay
pay for
for these
these strategic
strategic raw
raw material
material imports
imports needed
needed forfor rearmament
rearmament..
Symptomatic
Symptomatic of of this
this German
German economic
economic vulnerability
vulnerability waswas the
the situation
situation inin the
the
petroleum
petroleum industry.
industry. InIn order
order toto maintain
maintain anan increasingly
increasingly motorized
motorized economy
economy and and to
to
cut
cut down
down onon dependence
dependence from foreign sources,
from foreign sources, the
the Germans
Germans pushed
pushed construction
construction of of
synthetic
synthetic fuel
fuel plants
plants (i(i.e.,
.e ., plants
plants that
that used
used coal
coal to
to make
make petroleum
petroleum products)
products)..
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, in in spite
spite of of substantial
substantial investments
investments in in aa synthetic
synthetic fuel fuel industry,
industry,
synthetic production never
synthetic production never caught
caught up up with
with demand
demand during during the the 1930's
1930's.. While
While the the
percentage
percentage of of synthetic
synthetic fuel fuel in in terms
terms of of consumption
consumption steadily steadily increased
increased in in this
this
period,
period, Germany
Germany importedimported more more fuel fuel inin 1937
1937 than than she she had
had at at the
the beginning
beginning of of the
the
decade.'
decade." DemandDemand had had simply increased faster
simply increased faster thanthan production
production.^ .' The
The fuel
fuel situation
situation
in the
in summer of
the summer of 1938
1938 reflects
reflects the the extent
extent of of the
the problem
problem.. In In June
June of of that
that year,
year,
supplies
supplies in in storage
storage tanks tanks could could cover cover only only 25 25 percent
percent of of mobilization
mobilization
requirements--on the
requirements—on average, four
the average, four months
months of of full
full wartime
wartime needs needs.. Supplies
Supplies of of
aviation lubricants
aviation lubricants were were as as low
low as as 66 percent
percent of of mobilization
mobilization requirements
requirements.* .' This
This
was,
was, of of course,
course, aa reflection
reflection of of Germany's
Germany's inherent inherent inability
inability to meet petroleum
to meet petroleum
requirements from
requirements from her her ownown resources
resources and and her her considerable
considerable problem problem in in earning
earning
foreign
foreign exchange
exchange to to pay
pay for
for strategic
strategic raw raw material
material imports
imports..
In
In fact,
fact, the
the most
most serious
serious constraint
constraint on German rearmament
on German rearmament in in the 1930's was
the 1930's was thethe
lack
lack ofof foreign
foreign exchange.
exchange. Without Without hard hard currency
currency to to cover
cover imports,
imports, German
German industry
industry
could not
could not reach
reach the the level
level of of armament
armament production
production demanded demanded by by the
the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht and and
Hitler
Hitier.. Indeed,
Indeed, the the Reich
Reich experienced
experienced increasingincreasing difficulties
difficulties in in acquiring
acquiring these these rawraw
materials
materials required
required for for military
military production.
production. A A series
series of of more
more difficult
difficult economic
economic
crises, caused
crises, caused by by aa lacklack of of foreign
foreign exchange,
exchange, marked marked the the course
course of of German
German
rearmament throughout
rearmament throughout the the 1930's
1930's.' .' Beginning
Beginning in in 1930,
1930, aa worldwide
worldwide depression
depression
had caused
had caused aa sharpsharp dropoff
dropoff in in thethe value
value of of German
German exports exports that that continued
continued throughthrough
1934
1934.. Thereafter,
Thereafter, only only aa marginal
marginal recoveryrecovery took took place
place.. As As aa result,
result, holdings
holdings of of
foreign exchange
foreign exchange steadily steadily dwindled,
dwindled, and and this this shortage
shortage of of hard
hard currency
currency in in the
the
thirties set
thirties set definite
definite limits
limits on on thethe level
level of of raw
raw material
material imports
imports available
available to to support
support
rearmament.'
rearmament.*
As
As early
early as as the
the fall
fall ofof 1934,
1934, the the German
German cotton cotton industry
industry held held reserves
reserves for for nono more
more
than two weeks' production, rubber plants for two months, and the petroleum
than two weeks' production, rubber plants for two months, and the petroleum
industry for
industry for three
three to to three
three andand one-half
one-half monthsmonths.. Moreover,
Moreover, foreign foreign suppliers
suppliers already
already
were becoming doubtful as to the liquidity of the German economy and, as a result,
were becoming doubtful as to the liquidity of the German economy and, as a result,
would not deliver on credit . 9 By 1935, this situation had caused significant portions
would not deliver on credit.' By 1935, this situation had caused significant portions
of
of German
German industryindustry to to draw
draw down stockpiles . From
down stockpiles. From March March to to December
December 1935, 1935,
stockpiles
stockpiles of of major
major industrial
industrial raw raw materials
materials fell fell dramatically;
dramatically; and and forfor the
the remainder
remainder
of the 1930's,
of the 1930's, the the German
German economy economy lived lived aa hand-to-mouth
hand-to-mouth existence, existence, scratching
scratching to to
find
find sufficient
sufficient foreign
foreign exchange
exchange to to pay
pay for imports..
for imports
By
By 1937,
1937, the the German
German economy economy was was suffering
suffering serious
serious shortages
shortages of of steel
steel because
because
of
of aa lack
lack ofof oreore imports,
imports, while while the the industry
industry itselfitself was
was operating
operating at at barely
barely 83 83 percent
percent
of
of capacity
capacity.'" . 10 These economic difficulties affecting rearmament most likely played
These economic difficulties affecting rearmament most likely played
aa role
role in in pushing
pushing Hitler Hitler intointo the the confrontations
confrontations of of 1938
1938.. HereHere again,
again, despite
despite
substantial
substantial financial
financial gains gains made
made by by the
\ht Anschluss
Anschluss with with Austria,
Austria, efforts
efforts to to expand
expand the the
rearmament program, to build up synthetic and munition industries, to begin the
rearmament program, to build up synthetic and munition industries, to begin the
massive
massive construction
construction of of the
the Westwall
Westwall project,project, and and to to mobilize
mobilize for for the
the Czech
Czech crisiscrisis
severely
severely strained
strained the the German
German economy economy.. In In November
November 1938, 1938, Hermann
Hermann G6ring Goring
admitted
admitted that that thethe German
German economiceconomic infrastructure
infrastructure had had reached
reached aa point point ofof maximum
maximum
economic distress."
economic distress." As As aa direct
direct result,
result, the the Oberkommando
Oberkommando der der Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht (OKW), (OKW),
the
the German
German armed forces high
armed forces high command,
command, made made major major reductions
reductions in in steel
steel andand rawraw
ORIGINS
ORIGINS AND
AND PREPARATION
PREPARATION

material
material allocations
allocations to to armament
armament production
production.'^." Continuing
Continuing difficulties
difficulties ledled Hitler
Hitler to
to
announce
announce to to the
the Reichstag
Reichstag on on January
January 30,30, 1939, that Germany
1939, that Germany must must wage wage an an
"export
"export battle"
battle" (Exportschlacht)
(Exportschlacht) to to raise
raise foreign
foreign exchange.
exchange. Simultaneously,
Simultaneously, he he
announced
announced further
further reduction
reduction inin Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht allocations
allocations:: steel,
steel, 30
30 percent
percent;; copper,
copper,
20
20 percent
percent;; aluminum,
aluminum, 47 47 percent
percent;; rubber,
rubber, 14 percent.. 's'^
14 percent
Problems
Problems stemming
stemming from from both
both insufficient
insufficient foreign
foreign exchange
exchange andand raw
raw materials
materials
guided
guided the course of
the course of the
the German
German rearmament.
rearmament. Neither
Neither were were available
available in in sufficient
sufficient
quantity
quantity toto build
build aa massive
massive "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing force.
force. Moreover,
Moreover, the the army,
army, given
given
Germany's
Germany's strategic
strategic position
position as
as aa continental
continental power,
power, laid laid claims
claims to to resources
resources that that
any
any rearmament
rearmament program
program had had toto meet.
meet. Finally,
Finally, the
the country's
country's doubtful
doubtful access
access toto
foreign
foreign supplies
supplies ofof petroleum
petroleum products
products raises
raises the
the question
question as as to
to whether
whether Germany
Germany
could
could support
support anan independent
independent "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing offensive
offensive.. Thus,
Thus, itit isis clear
clear that
that
definite
definite economic
economic constraints
constraints limited
limited German
German air air planners
planners in in the
the creation
creation of of the
the
Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, and
and the
the force
force they
they molded
molded bothboth before
before and
and during
during the the war
war was
was influenced
influenced
by
by different
different strategic
strategic factors
factors than
than those
those guiding
guiding either
either the
the British
British or
or the
the Americans
Americans..

THE
THE DEVELOPMENT
DEVELOPMENT OF
OF THE LUFTWAFFE, 1933-39
THE LUFTWAFFE, 1933-39
The
The Germans
Germans faced faced considerable
considerable difficulties
difficulties in in the
the creation
creation of of an
an air
air capability
capability
with the onset of rearmament in 1933. Given the fact that no German air
with the onset of rearmament in 1933. Given the fact that no German air force
force
survived from the Great War except as a camouflaged planning staff within the
survived from the Great War except as a camouflaged planning staff within the
army and that the capacity for civil aircraft production was largely inadequate for
army and that the capacity for civil aircraft production was largely inadequate for
military purposes, the development of the Luftwaffe was an enormously complex
military purposes, the development of the Luftwaffe was an enormously complex
and
and difficult
difficult task.
task. Considering
Considering the the fact
fact that
that within
within six six and
and aa halfhalf years
years this
this force
force
would go to war and render vital support in the early campaigns, the Germans were
would go to war and render vital support in the early campaigns, the Germans were
most successful in their efforts .
most successful in their efforts.
The
The first
first strategic
strategic problem
problem on on Hitler's
Hitler's ascension
ascension to to power
power in in January
January 19331933 was
was
the
the perception
perception that that aa still disarmed and
still disarmed and vulnerable
vulnerable ReichReich faced
faced the the possibility
possibility of of aa
preventive
preventive war, war, waged
waged by by her
her neighbors
neighbors to to stop
stop the
the resurrection
resurrection of of Germany
Germany as as aa
military
military power.
power. As As Hitler
Hitler told
told his
his generals
generals shortly
shortly after
after hehe had
had come
come to to power,
power, if if
France possessed any
France possessed any statesmen,
statesmen, she she would
would wage wage war
war in in the
the immediate
immediate future.
future.■'''4

Thus,
Thus, whatever
whatever theoretical
theoretical advantages
advantages might might accrue
accrue to to Germany
Germany throughthrough the the
possession
possession of of aa "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing force force inin the
the late
late 1930's,
1930's, the the Third
Third Reich
Reich faced
faced
the
the possibility
possibility of of an
an imminent
imminent war. war. Future
Future "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing capabilities
capabilities would
would
do
do nothing
nothing for for present
present military
military difficulties,
difficulties, whilewhile the
the tactical
tactical potential
potential of of aa less
less
sophisticated,
sophisticated, more more conventional
conventional air air force
force would
would be be more
more quickly
quickly realized
realized forfor
utilization
utilization in in aa contemporary
contemporary militarymilitary confrontation
confrontation..
German
German interest
interest in in aa "strategic"
"strategic" air air weapon
weapon goesgoes backback toto the
the early
early days
days ofof the
the
First
First World
World War War.. Frustrated
Frustrated at at the
the imposition
imposition of of aa distant
distant blockage
blockage in in 1914
1914 byby the
the
Royal Navy,
Royal Navy, German
German naval naval strategists
strategists looked
looked for for aa means
means to to strike
strike atat the
the British
British
Empire
Empire.. As As early
early as as August
August 1914,
1914, Rear Admiral Paul
Rear Admiral Paul Behncke,
Behncke, Deputy
Deputy Chief
Chief ofof the
the
Naval
Naval Staff,
Staff, urged
urged thatthat the
the navy's
navy's Zeppelins
Zeppelins attack attack London,
London, the the heart
heart of
of the
the British
British
Empire
Empire.. Such
Such attacks,
attacks, he he argued,
argued, "may
"may be be expected,whether
expected,whether they they involve
involve London
London
or
or the
the neighborhood
neighborhood of of London,
London, to to cause
cause panic
panic in in the population which
the population which may may
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

possibly
possibly render
render itit doubtful
doubtful thatthat the
the war
war can
can be
be continued ." 15 Grand
continued."" Admiral Alfred
Grand Admiral Alfred
von
von Tirpitz
Tirpitz noted
noted in in aa letter
letter of November 1914
of November 1914 that
that::

The
The English
English areare now
now inin terror
terror ofof the
the Zeppelin,
Zeppelin, perhaps
perhaps not not without
without
reason
reason.. II contend
contend here
here,. ....
. . II go
go for
for the
the standpoint
standpoint of of "war
"war to
to the
the
knife," but II am
knife," but am not
not in
in favor
favor of of "frightfulness
"frightfulness" . . .....
. . . Also,
Also, single
single
bombs
bombs from
from flying
flying machines
machines are are wrong
wrong;; they
they are
are odious
odious whenwhen they
they
hit
hit and
and kill
kill old
old women,
women, andand one
one gets
gets used
used toto them
them.. IfIf [however]
[however] oneone
could
could set
set fire
fire to
to London
London in in thirty
thirty places,
places, then
then what
what in in aa small
small way
way isis
odious
odious would
would retire
retire before something fine
before something fine and powerful.. 16
and powerful '*

When
When the the Zeppelin
Zeppelin campaigncampaign failed, failed, the the Germans
Germans attacked attacked London
London with with the the
heavier-than-air
heavier-than-air bomber bomber.. That campaign, even
That campaign, even if if itit did
did not
not achieve
achieve greatgreat material
material
damage,
damage, did did lead
lead toto the
the creation
creation ofthe of the Royal
Royal AirAir Force."
Force."
The
The defeat
defeat of of 1918
1918 and and thethe conditions
conditions of of the
the Versailles
Versailles Treaty Treaty eliminated
eliminated aircraft
aircraft
from the
from the German
German arsenal
arsenal. . Not
Not only
only was
was Germany
Germany denied
denied access
access to
to new
new technology
technology
as
as represented
represented by by the
the submarine,
submarine, the the airplane,
airplane, and and the the tank,
tank, butbut the
the peace
peace alsoalso
severely limited the size and
severely limited the size and capability
capability of
of Germany's
Germany's military
military services.
services. The
The
victorious
victorious Allies,
Allies, however,
however, could could not not prevent
prevent the the Germans
Germans from from thinking
thinking about
about
their experiences and the weapons ofthe last war.
their experiences and the weapons of the last war.
Hans
Hans von von Seeckt,
Seeckt, father
father of of the Reichswehr, insured
the Reichswehr, insured that that the
the miniscule
miniscule army army leftleft
to Germany included a small body of officers (180) who had had experience in the
to Germany included a small body of officers (180) who had had experience in the
conduct ofthe air battles in the Great War . As was the case with the development of
conduct of the air battles in the Great War. As was the case with the development of
motorized/mechanized warfare, Seeckt showed considerable prescience with
motorized/mechanized warfare, Seeckt showed considerable prescience with
respect
respect to to airpower"
airpower'* and and sawsaw to to itit that
that its
its advocates
advocates possessedpossessed at at least
least some
some voice
voice
within the army. Limitations imposed by Versailles forced German aviation into a
within the army." '9 Limitations imposed by Versailles forced German aviation into a

narrow
narrow framework
framework.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, extensive extensive subsidies
subsidies to to civil
civil aviation
aviation contributed
contributed
to the survival of Germany's aviation industry, and preparations for air rearmament
to the survival of Germany's aviation industry, and preparations for air rearmament
during
during the Weimar Republic
the Weimar Republic played played aa significant
significant role role in in the
the establishment
establishment of of the
the
Luftwaffe during the Nazi period .z° Germany's lead in civil aviation was such that
Li^twc^e during the Nazi period.^" Germany's lead in civil aviation was such that
by
by 1927,
1927, German
German airlines
airlines flew flew greater
greater distances
distances with with more more passengers
passengers than than their
their
British, and Italian competitors together.^' .z'
French, British, and Italian competitors together This experience in long-distance
French, This experience in long-distance
flying,
flying, navigation,
navigation, and and instrument
instrument flying flying obviously
obviously had had aa positive
positive impact
impact on on
developing the Luftwaffe in the interwar period .
developing the Luftwaffe in the interwar period.
Still, the
Still, the problems
problems facingfacing the the Nazis
Nazis in in January
January 1933 1933 in in the
the creation
creation of of an
an air
air force
force
that
that could
could serve serve as as an an effective
effective tool tool of of diplomatic
diplomatic and and military
military policy
policy werewere
enormous
enormous.. Only Only aa tinytiny cadre
cadre of of experienced
experienced officers officers existed
existed within
within the the army
army and and
navy;
navy; Lufthansa
Lufthansa experience
experience was was notnot directly
directly convertible
convertible into into aa military
military force
force;; and
and
the
the German
German aircraftaircraft industry,
industry, weakened
weakened not not only
only by by thethe depression
depression but but also
also by by
internecine
internecine quarrelsquarrels amongst
amongst its its almost
almost bankrupt
bankrupt firms, firms, was was notnot prepared
prepared for for
massive
massive expansion
expansion..
The
The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was was favored
favored at at its
its birth, however, by
birth, however, by thethe fact
fact that
that itsits patron
patron and and
first
first leader,
leader, Hermann
Hermann Goring, Goring, was was Hitler's
Hitler's right-hand
right-hand man man.. Goring's
Goring's political
political pull
pull
insured
insured that that thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe gained gained position
position as as an
an independent
independent serviceservice and and that
that itit
enjoyed
enjoyed aa privileged
privileged statusstatus in interservice arguments
in interservice arguments over over allocation
allocation of of funding
funding and and
resources
resources.. While While funding
funding did did notnot represent
represent aa problem problem in in the
the early days of
early days of
ORIGINS AND
ORIGINS AND PREPARATION
PREPARATION

rearmament,
rearmament, by by the late thirties
the late serious economic
thirties serious economic difficulties impacted on
difficulties impacted on allall
services-but
services—but on
on the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe least
least of
of all
all because
because of
of Gbring's
Goring's position.
position.
Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, however, however, for for the
the efficient
efficient functioning
functioning of of thethe German
German commandcommand
system, G6ring, as Minister of
system. Goring, as Minister of Aviation,
Aviation, refused
refused to
to subordinate
subordinate himself
himself to
to the
the
Minister of War, Werner von Blomberg. Thus, Blomberg faced
Minister of War, Werner von Blomberg. Thus, Blomberg faced the
the impossible
impossible task
task
of coordinating
of coordinating and and controlling
controlling the the three
three services.
services. His His problems
problems were were further
further
compounded by the fact that Goring, as Commander in Chief of
compounded by the fact that Goring, as Commander in Chief of the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, went
went
around him at every opportunity
around him at every opportunity.^^ ."
In the long
In the long run,
run, G6ring
Goring had had aa disastrous
disastrous impact impact on on thethe Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's, history
history andand hishis
position as number two in the political hierarchy prevented Hitler from removing
position as number two in the political hierarchy prevented Hitler from removing
him
him eveneven after
after hishis many failures demanded
many failures demanded such such action
action.. Initially,
Initially, G6ring's
Goring's political
political
tasks
tasks asas Hitler's
Hitler's chief chief aide
aide during
during the the consolidation
consolidation of of power
power (the (the establishment
establishment of of
the
the Gestapo,
Gestapo, the the savaging
savaging of of the
the Communists,
Communists, and and the the purge
purge of of Ernst
Ernst R6hm
Rohm and and the
the
SS.A.)
.A.) absorbed
absorbed aa substantial
substantial portion
portion of of "der
"der Dicke's"
Dicke's" time time.^^ ." Thus,
Thus, while
while G6ring
Goring
as
as Reich
Reich Air Air Minister
Minister and and after
after March
March 1935 1935 Commander
Commander in in Chief
Chief played
played at at the
the role,
role,
at
at least until 1936
least until 1936 othersothers mademade the the substantive
substantive decisionsdecisions creating
creating the the newnew force.
force.
G6ring's
Goring's mental mental framework
framework was was that
that of of aa squadron-level
squadron-level fighter fighter pilot
pilot which
which he he had
had
been
been in in the
the First
First World
World War War;; and
and throughout
throughout his his tenure
tenure as as Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe commander,
commander, he he
remained
remained largely largely ignorant
ignorant of of supply,
supply, logistics,
logistics, strategy,strategy, aircraft
aircraft capabilities,
capabilities,
technology,
technology, and and engineering-in
engineering—in other other words,
words, just just about
about everything
everything havinghaving to to do
do
with
with airpower
airpower.. Compounding
Compounding his his ignorance
ignorance was was the the fact
fact that
that G6ring
Goring tooktook aa rather
rather
loose
loose viewview on on thethe subject
subject of hard work,
of hard work, and and his his visits
visits to to the
the Air
Air Ministry
Ministry were were
sporadic
sporadic at at best.
best. In In July
July 1938,
1938, during
during an an address
address to to aircraft
aircraft manufacturers,
manufacturers. Goring Goring
even
even admitted
admitted that that he he sawsaw Ernst
Ernst Udet,
Udet, at at this
this timetime in in charge
charge of of all
all the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's
technical
technical departments,
departments, only only once
once aa week week.^''.24 The
The long-range
long-range implications
implications of of such
such
leadership
leadership spelledspelled disaster.
disaster. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, in in the
the short
short term,
term, G6ring's
Goring's political
political pullpull
was
was ofgreat
of great use use inin the
the establishment
establishment of of anan independent
independent air air arm.
arm.
G6ring
Goring was was particularly
particularly fortunate
fortunate in in his
his leading
leading subordinate
subordinate.. Erhard Erhard Milch,
Milch,
G6ring's
Goring's and and Hitler's
Hitler's selection
selection for for thethe position
position of of State
State Secretary
Secretary in in the
the new
new Air Air
Ministry,
Ministry, possessed
possessed tremendous
tremendous drive, drive, aa thorough
thorough knowledge knowledge of of the
the production
production
capabilities
capabilities of of the the German
German aircraft
aircraft industry,
industry, aa detailed detailed understanding
understanding of of its
its
managers
managers and and designers,
designers, and, and, perhaps
perhaps most most importantly,
importantly, excellent excellent connections
connections
within
within the the political
political leadership
leadership of of thethe newly
newly established
established Third Third Reich."
Reich?^ Milch's
Milch's
brashness
brashness and and arrogance
arrogance eventually
eventually led led to to conflict
conflict with with moremore conventional
conventional
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe officers
officers who who had had remained
remained professional
professional soldiers soldiers duringduring the the Weimar
Weimar
period
period.. Those
Those regular
regular officers
officers never
never forgot
forgot thatthat Milch
Milch had had leftleft the
the military
military after
after the
the
war
war to to become
become the the eventual
eventual head head ofLufthansa
oiLufthansa..
The
The other
other senior
senior officers
officers of of thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe came came from from the the Reichswehr.
Reichswehr. Of Of
particular
particular note note here here is is Blomberg's
Blomberg's contribution
contribution to to the
the establishment
establishment of of the
the new
new
service's
service's officer
officer corpscorps.. In In 1933,
1933, onon thethe occasion
occasion of of the
the founding
founding ofthe of the Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry,
Blomberg commented that the new Luftwaffe would require an elite officer corps
Blomberg commented that the new Luftwaffe would require an elite officer corps
with "a tempestuous spirit of attack ." More to the point, he insured that the army
with "a tempestuous spirit of attack. 26
"^^ More to the point, he insured that the army
transferred first-class officers to the new service . Significantly, not only personnel
transferred first-class officers to the new service. Significantly, not only personnel
with flying experience
with flying experience moved moved to to the
the AirAir Ministry
Ministry but but also
also highly
highly trained
trained officers
officers
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

from
from the the army's
army's general
general staffstaff transferred
transferred to to the Luftwaffe.. Blomberg
the Luftwaffe Blomberg offered offered Goring
Goring
aa choice
choice between
between WaltherWalther Wever Wever and and thethe future
future FieldField Marshal
Marshal ErichErich von von Manstein
Manstein
for
for the
the position
position of of Chief
Chief of of Staff
Staff of of the Luftwaffe;; Goring
the Luftwaffe Goring chosechose the the former.
former. WhenWhen
Wever
Wever died died in in anan aircraft
aircraft crash
crash in in 1936,
1936, Blomberg
Blomberg initiallyinitially considered
considered offering
offering
Goring
Goring the the future
future chiefchief of of the
the army's
army's general
general staff, staff, General
General Franz Franz Halder,
Haider, as as aa
replacement
replacement." ." Along
Along with with Wever,
Wever, other other armyarmy luminaries
luminaries such such as as Albert
Albert Kesselring
Kesselring
and
and Hans
Hans Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek transferred
transferred to to the Luftwaffe.. Jeschonnek,
the Luftwaffe Jeschonnek, among among other other
accomplishments,
accomplishments, had had finished
finished firstfirst inin his
his class
class at at the Kriegsakademie, usually
the Kriegsakademie, usually aa
sure
sure sign
sign of of promise
promise for quick rise
for aa quick rise toto the
the top top ofof the
the military
military profession
profession.^* .28 ByBy
October
October 1933, 1933, 228 228 officers
officers up up toto the
the rank
rank of of colonel
colonel had had transferred
transferred from from thethe older
older
services
services.. By By January
January 1939, 1939, aa further
further 70 70 had had followed
followed along along with with 1,600
1,600
noncommissioned
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and
officers (NCOs) and enlisted
enlisted men men.. Blomberg
Blomberg demanded demanded that that
individuals
individuals selected
selected for for transfer
transfer represent
represent the the "best of the
' 'best of the best
best.'. "29
'^'
The
The high
high quality
quality of of these
these officers
officers should
should not not obscure
obscure the the fact
fact that
that the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's
officer
officer corps
corps and and general
general staff,
staff, never
never in in their short careers,
their short careers, reached
reached aa levellevel of of
homogeneity
homogeneity and and competence
competence that that the army officer
the army officer corps
corps and general staff
and general staff enjoyed
enjoyed..
The
The simple
simple mechanics
mechanics of of expansion
expansion alone alone ruled
ruled out out such
such aa possibility
possibility.. FromFrom 19331933 to to
1935, the
1935, Luftwaffe developed
the Luftwaffe developed aa personnel
personnel strengthstrength of of approximately
approximately 900 900 flying
flying
officers,
officers, 200 200 flakflak (antiaircraft)
(antiaircraft) officers,
officers, and and 17,000
17,000 men men.. In In addition
addition to to the
the army,
army,
the
the officer
officer corps corps camecame from from widely
widely different
different sourcessources;; many many pilots
pilots entered
entered the the
Luftwaffe directly
Luftwaffe directly from from civil
civil aviation,
aviation, whilewhile veterans
veterans of of the
the First
First World
World War War further
further
fleshed
fleshed out out thethe officer
officer corpscorps.. From From thisthis mixture,
mixture, the Luftwaffe expanded
the Luftwaffe expanded to to aa
strength of 15,000
strength of 15,000 officers
officers and
and 370,000 men
370,000 men by
by the
the outbreak
outbreak of
of the
the war . 3°
war.'" Within
Within
the
the officer
officer corpscorps alone,
alone, thethe sheer
sheer magnitude
magnitude of of the
the expansion
expansion resulted
resulted in in an
an entirely
entirely
understandable lack of coherence and a notable lack of
understandable lack of coherence and a notable lack of strategic
strategic competence .
competence.
Shortly after
Shortly after thethe surprise
surprise Japanese
Japanese attackattack on on Hawaii
Hawaii when when Hitler
Hitler asked
asked hishis military
military
staff for the location of Pearl Harbor, none, including his Luftwaffe officers, could
staff for the location of Pearl Harbor, none, including his Luftwaffe officers, could
locate the American naval base ." Luftwaffe officers, understandably given the
locate the American naval base.^' Luftwaffe officers, understandably given the
shortness of their service's lifespan, had an immense task of catching up and
shortness of their service's lifespan, had an immense task of catching up and
maintaining
maintaining currency currency in in the
the . technical
technical aspects
aspects of of their
their service
service.. TheThe result
result waswas that
that
they became at best technocrats and operational experts with limited vision." Thus,
they became at best technocrats and operational experts with limited vision.^^ Thus,
with
with perhaps
perhaps the the exception
exception of of Wever
Wever and and to to aa lesser
lesser extent
extent Milch,
Milch, the the officer
officer corps
corps
showed a lack of understanding of the larger issues revolving around the
showed a lack of understanding of the larger issues revolving around the
interrelation of airpower to national strategy, defects which may, indeed, have been
interrelation of airpower to national strategy, defects which may, indeed, have been
nothing
nothing less less than
than fatal
fatal..
At the outset of rearmament
At the outset of rearmament in in 1933,
1933, German
German plannersplanners facedfaced the the problem
problem as as toto
what role the Luftwaffe would play within the larger framework of national strategy .
what role the Luftwaffe would play within the larger framework of national strategy.
In
In MayMay 1933, 1933, Milch,Milch, the the keykey figure
figure in in the Luftwaffe's organization
the Luftwaffe's organization and and
development
development in in the
the 1933-36
1933-36 period,period, received
received aa major major studystudy fromfrom one one of of his his
Lufthansa subordinates,
Lufthansa subordinates. Dr. Dr. Robert
Robert Knauss,
Knauss, on on thethe strategic
strategic concept
concept for for the
the new
new air air
force
force.". 33 Knauss'
Knauss' reportreport contained
contained major major elements
elements of of Douhet's
Douhet's "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing
philosophy,
philosophy, Tirpitz's Tirpitz's "risk "risk theory,"
theory," and and what what wouldwould today today be be regarded
regarded as as
"deterrence"
"deterrence" doctrine doctrine.. He He believed
believed that that the the purpose
purpose of of thethe regime
regime was was the the
"restoration
"restoration of of Germany's
Germany's great great power position in
power position in Europe"
Europe" and and argued
argued that
that since
since
ORIGINS
ORIGINS AND
AND PREPARATION
PREPARATION

Poland,
Poland, and particularly France,
and particularly France, would would resist
resist such development, Germany
such aa development, Germany faced faced
the
the immediate
immediate possibility
possibility of
of a
a preventive
preventive war
war waged
waged by
by those
those two
two powers
powers. . ToTo
overcome
overcome German German military
military weakness
weakness through
through rearmament,
rearmament, thereby thereby re-establishing
re-establishing
Germany's great
Germany's great power
power status,
status, Knauss
Knauss suggested
suggested the the rapid
rapid creation
creation of of aa strong
strong air air
force . The decisive element in this
force. The decisive element in this force
force would
would be
be the
the deterrent
deterrent effect
effect of
of aa fleet
fleet of
of
400 four-engine bombers . Knauss argued that modern
400 four-engine bombers. Knauss argued that modem industrialized
industrialized society
society offered
offered
targets which, when
targets which, when destroyed,
destroyed, would would halt halt the
the enemy's
enemy's industrial
industrial production
production and and
that population centers offered the possibility of breaking the enemy's morale.
that population centers offered the possibility of breaking the enemy's morale.
Naturally,
Naturally, he he felt
felt that
that the newly created
the newly created totalitarian
totalitarian society
society of of Germany
Germany could could
endure the pressures of bombing better than the fractured societies ofthe British and
endure the pressures of bombing better than the fractured societies of the British and
French democracies . Thus, if Germany possessed a "strategic" bombing fleet, her
French democracies. Thus, if Germany possessed a "strategic" bombing fleet, her
putative enemies-Poland and France-would think seriously before incurring the
putative enemies—Poland and France—would think seriously before incurring the
risk
risk ofof air
air attack
attack on on major
major population
population centers.
centers. Above
Above all, Knauss argued
all, Knauss argued that that the the
creation
creation of of such
such aa bombing
bombing fleet offered aa greater
fleet offered greater possibility
possibility for for affecting
affecting the the
European
European militarymilitary balance
balance than than diddid thethe establishment
establishment of army divisions
of army divisions or or thethe
construction
construction of of naval
naval surface
surface units
units..
The
The creation
creation of of such
such aa bomber
bomber force force aborted
aborted forfor several
several reasons
reasons.. First,First, the
the army
army
was
was hardly
hardly enthusiastic
enthusiastic about about such such aa strategic
strategic conception
conception.. Colonel
Colonel KonradKonrad Gossler,
Gossler,
head
head of the Truppenamt's
of the Truppenamt's operation operation section,
section, argued
argued thatthat aa clear
clear separation
separation between between
the
the homeland
homeland and and the the combat
combat front front no no longer
longer existed
existed.. Thus,
Thus, both both opposing
opposing air air
forces
forces possessed
possessed the the same
same opportunity
opportunity to to attack
attack their
their enemy's
enemy's homeland
homeland.. Moreover,
Moreover,
since
since thethe beginning
beginning of of time,
time, Gossler
Gossler argued,
argued, eacheach newnew weapon
weapon had had led many to
led many to
conclude
conclude that that the
the oldold weapons
weapons of war were
of war were no no longer
longer needed
needed.. This This had had simply
simply not not
happened
happened.. Finally,
Finally, he he objected
objected that that such
such aa conception,
conception, if if realized,
realized, "might"might destroy
destroy
war
war byby making impossible for
making itit impossible for both
both sides
sides." ." Such
Such arguments
arguments would would lead lead inevitably
inevitably
to
to pacifism!14
pacifism!**
More
More decisive
decisive for for the
the actual
actual establishment
establishment ofthe of the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was was thethe discovery
discovery that that
German aircraft
German aircraft industry
industry lacked lacked the the designers,
designers, industrial
industrial capacity,
capacity, or or experience
experience to to
build such
build such aa "strategic"
"strategic" bombing bombing fleet fleet.. During
During thethe summer
summer of of 1933,
1933, MilchMilch and and his his
planners found
planners found thatthat they
they could
could barely
barely squeeze
squeeze 1,0001,000 aircraft
aircraft out out of
of industry
industry for for the
the
first production
first production program
program.. Most Most of that effort
of that effort consisted
consisted of of training
training aircraft
aircraft to to expand
expand
the
the flying
flying basebase.^'.'5 The
The "combat"
"combat" aircraft aircraft hardly
hardly deserved
deserved that that characterization.
characterization.
From
From aa JanuaryJanuary 1933 1933 industrial
industrial base base of of 4,000
4,000 workers,
workers, the the aircraft
aircraft industry
industry
expanded
expanded to to 16,870
16,870 workers
workers in 1934 and
in 1934 and to 204,100 workers
to 204,100 workers by by the
the fall
fall of
of 1938
1938.3* . 36
To
To aa great
great extent,
extent, this this represented
represented Milch's Milch's greatgreat triumph
triumph as as anan organizer
organizer and and
bureaucrat
bureaucrat..
While
While Milch
Milch played
played the the decisive
decisive role role in in the
the administrative
administrative and and industrial
industrial tasks tasks of of
creating
creating the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Wever Wever played played aa no-less-important
no-less-important role role inin formulating
formulating the the
new
new service's
service's doctrine
doctrine and and strategy
strategy.. He He waswas notnot an an unabashed
unabashed advocate advocate of of
"strategic"
"strategic" bombing bombing but but rather
rather argued
argued for for aa broadly
broadly based
based air air strategy
strategy.. WeverWever did did
not
not believe
believe that that the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's existence
existence as as aa separate
separate service
service gave gave itit aa mission
mission
entirely
entirely independent
independent of of the
the army
army and and navy.
navy. Rather,
Rather, he he argued
argued that that itsits mission
mission
should complement
should complement those those of of the
the other
other services
services.. Thus,
Thus, thethe Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's contribution
contribution
to
to victory
victory couldcould involve
involve attacks
attacks on on an enemy's air
an enemy's air forces,
forces, his his army,
army, his his fleet,
fleet, or or
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

even the
even the destruction
destruction of of his resources and
his resources and armament
armament industryindustry.. The The conditions
conditions of of the
the
general
general situation
situation and
and overall
overall national
national strategy
strategy would
would determine
determine in
in what
what form
form one
one
would
would wage wage the the air battle.. While
air battle While not not denying
denying the the possibility
possibility of of air
air defense
defense or or the
the
importance of fighters, Wever felt that the
importance of fighters, Wever felt that the "decisive
"decisive weapon
weapon of
of air
air warfare
warfare is
is the
the
bomber. ""
bomber.""
Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, aa careful careful analysis
analysis ofGermany's
of Germany's strategic
strategic situation
situation raised
raised doubts
doubts as as to
to
whether "strategic" bombing should be the Luftwaffe's sole
whether "strategic" bombing should be the Luftwaffe's sole mission
mission. . A
A war
war game
game
conducted
conducted during during the the winter
winter of 1933-34 indicated
of 1933-34 indicated that that aa bomber
bomber fleet fleet alone
alone could
could
not immediately destroy the enemy's air fleet . The conclusion was that strong
not immediately destroy the enemy's air fleet. The conclusion was that strong
fighter
fighter forces,
forces, as as well
well as as antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns,guns, werewere necessary
necessary to to protect
protect the the Reich's
Reich's
industrial
industrial and and population
population centers.38
centers.^*
Wever's
Wever's thinking
thinking on on the the subject
subject of of airpower
airpower was was bestbest summed
summed up up in in the
the
formulation
formulation of of German
German air air doctrine
doctrine that that first
first appeared
appeared in in 1935:
1935: "Conduct
"Conduct of of the
the Air
Air
War
War (Die (Die Luftkriegfuhrung)
Luftkriegfiihrung)."^^ . "39 As As withwith most most German
German militarymilitary doctrinal
doctrinal
statements,
statements, this this one
one waswas aa clear,
clear, concise
concise formulation
formulation.. It It was
was not
not meant
meant to to restrict
restrict or or
dogmatize
dogmatize but but rather
rather to to give
give air air force
force commanders
commanders the the widest
widest latitude
latitude and and to to
encourage
encourage maximummaximum flexibility
flexibility.. Among Among the the chief
chief points
points enunciated
enunciated was was the the
reiteration
reiteration ofWever's
of Wever's point point thatthat the
the employment
employment of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe shouldshould reflect
reflect thethe
overall
overall framework
framework of of national
national grand strategy. Within
grand strategy. Within grand grand strategy,
strategy, the the critical
critical
tasks
tasks ofof the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe would would be be the
the attainment
attainment and and maintenance
maintenance of of air
air superiority,
superiority,
support of
support of the
the army
army and and the the navy,
navy, attacks
attacks on on enemy
enemy industry,
industry, and and interdiction
interdiction
between
between front front andand homeland
homeland.. "The "The nature
nature of of the
the enemy,
enemy, the the time
time of of year,
year, thethe
structure
structure of of his
his land,
land, thethe character
character of of his
his people,
people, as as well
well asas one's
one's own own military
military
capabilities"
capabilities" would would determine
determine how how one should employ
one should employ airpower.4°
airpower.*
Wever's
Wever's doctrinal
doctrinal statement
statement stressed stressed thatthat air air resources
resources should should not not be be used
used
piecemeal
piecemeal nor nor should
should frequent
frequent changeschanges be be made
made in in goals
goals.. In In allall likelihood,
likelihood,
however,
however, one one could
could probably
probably not not clearly
clearly separate
separate the the struggle
struggle withwith an an enemy
enemy air air
force
force from
from support
support provided
provided to to the
the army
army and
and navy.
navy. Unlike
Unlike most most airpower
airpower theorists,
theorists,
he
he showed
showed aa ready ready understanding
understanding for for the
the fact
fact that
that air
air superiority
superiority wouldwould be be aa most
most
elusive
elusive goalgoal.. Changing
Changing technical
technical capabilities,
capabilities, new new production,
production, and and replacement
replacement of of
losses
losses would
would all all combine
combine to to allow
allow the the enemy
enemy to to fight
fight another
another day day.. While
While Wever Wever feltfelt
that
that "strategic"
"strategic" bombingbombing attacksattacks on on the
the enemy's
enemy's industrial
industrial and and economic
economic sources sources
of
of power
power could could have
have an an absolute
absolute impact,impact, he he warned
warned that that such
such anan offensive
offensive might might
take
take tootoo long
long to to bebe decisive
decisive and and might
might thus
thus be be too
too late
late toto help
help thethe army
army and and the the
navy.
navy. He He emphasized
emphasized that that only
only the the strongest
strongest cooperation
cooperation among among the the three
three services
services
could
could achieve
achieve the the overall
overall objectives
objectives of of national
national grandgrand strategy.
strategy. TheThe air air war
war against
against
the
the enemy
enemy industrial
industrial base base should
should occur only when
occur only when (1) (1) anan opportunity
opportunity existed existed to to
affect
affect quickly
quickly the the war's
war's course,
course, (2) (2) when
when land
land and and naval
naval preparations
preparations had had prepared
prepared
the
the way,
way, (3) (3) when
when aa stalemate
stalemate had had occurred,
occurred, or or (4)
(4) when
when aa decisive
decisive effect
effect could
could
only be
only be achieved
achieved throughthrough the the destruction
destruction of of thethe enemy's
enemy's economic
economic sources sources of of
power.
power.
Wever's
Wever's death death in in the
the spring
spring of of 1936
1936 waswas aa major major blow blow to to thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe..
However, itit did
However, did not
not result
result in in cancellation
cancellation of of the
the four-engine
four-engine "strategic"
"strategic" bomber bomber
project
project as as some
some have have claimed
claimed.'" .4' In
In 1936,
1936, the the Air Air Ministry
Ministry cancelled
cancelled the the
ORIGINS
ORIGINS AND
AND PREPARATION
PREPARATION

development
development of of the four-engine Dormer
the four-engine Domier Do Do 1919 and
and Junkers
Junkers JuJu 89,
89, because
because suitable
suitable
engines were
engines were not not yet
yet available
available from
from the German aircraft
the German aircraft industry
industry to to provide
provide
adequate
adequate power.*
power.* The The failure
failure to
to have
have aa suitable
suitable engine
engine available
available in in 1936
1936 andand 1937
1937
reflected the fact
reflected the fact that
that German
German air air rearmament
rearmament had had only
only begun
begun in in 1933.
1933. As
As aa result,
result,
German
German engine
engine research
research and and development
development was was inin some
some important
important respects
respects behind
behind
what was
what was occurring
occurring in in Great
Great Britain
Britain and
and the
the United
United States
States.. Moreover,
Moreover, the the long
long
lead-time required
lead-time required forfor engine
engine development
development constrained
constrained German
German aircraft
aircraft design
design
throughout
throughout the the 1930's
1930's.. The Germans did
The Germans embark on
did embark on the
the He
He 177
177 project
project inin 1937
1937 in
in
the
the belief
belief that Heinkel could
that Heinkel could design
design andand build
build aa long-range
long-range "strategic"
"strategic" bomber
bomber by by
the early
the early 1940's.
1940's. TheThe design
design ofof the
the He
He 177,
177, inin effect,
effect, represented
represented an an effort
effort to
to
shortcut
shortcut the
the development
development processprocess of
of aa high-powered
high-powered engineengine for
for aa heavy
heavy bomber
bomber by by
placing four engines
placing four engines within
within two nacelles.. Heinkel
two nacelles Heinkel designers
designers expected that by
expected that by cutting
cutting
down
down on on the
the drag,
drag, they
they would have aa bomber
would have bomber comparable
comparable to to other
other four-engine
four-engine
aircraft
aircraft with
with more
more powerful
powerful engines
engines.. Unfortunately
Unfortunately for for the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, theythey were
were
never able to
never able to overcome
overcome the the difficulties
difficulties inherent
inherent in in the
the design
design;; hence
hence the
the failure
failure of
of
the
the program
program reflected
reflected the the failure
failure ofof engineering
engineering and and not
not aa lack
lack ofof interest
interest inin
"strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing.''^. 42
Wever's
Wever's broadly
broadly basedbased approach
approach to to the
the question
question of of airpower
airpower should
should notnot obscure
obscure
the fact that his writings never denied the possibility that "strategic" bombing
the fact that his writings never denied the possibility that "strategic" bombing
could
could play
play anan important
important part part inin air warfare.. Moreover,
air warfare Moreover, aa significant
significant portion
portion of of the
the
Luftwaffe's doctrinal
Luftwaffe's doctrinal thinking
thinking remained
remained enamored
enamored with with "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing
throughout
throughout the the thirties
thirties.. There
There was was an an obvious
obvious reason
reason whywhy this
this should
should be be so:
so: The
The
concepts
concepts of of total
total war
war and
and total
total mobilization
mobilization had had proved
proved attractive
attractive to to much
much of of the
the
German
German military
military throughout
throughout the the interwar period.. While
interwar period While Seeckt
Seeckt argued
argued for for
establishment
establishment of of an
an elite
elite army,
army, Ludendorff
Ludendorff articulated
articulated thethe concept
concept that
that modern
modem war war
had
had become
become totaltotal.. Unlike
Unlike mostmost interwar
interwar military
military thinkers
thinkers who
who sought
sought to to escape
escape thethe
horrors
horrors of World War
of World War I'sI's mass
mass warfare,
warfare, Ludendorff
Ludendorff embraced
embraced what what had
had happened
happened
and
and argued
argued that
that Germany
Germany must must prepare
prepare in in ruthless
ruthless fashion
fashion during
during peace
peace forfor the
the next
next
war
war.. Among
Among other other things,
things, Ludendorff
Ludendorff argued argued thatthat war
war involved
involved the the entire
entire
population
population in in the
the conflict,
conflict, not not just
just armies
armies.. InIn his
his view,
view, economic
economic production
production had had
become
become as as important
important as battles on
as battles on the
the frontline .41 The
frontline."^ The 1918
1918 collapse
collapse convinced
convinced him him
that
that Germany
Germany required
required aa dictatorship
dictatorship for for the
the next
next war
war and,
and, even
even more
more importantly,
importantly,
that
that some
some method
method must must bebe found
found to to inspire
inspire the
the national
national unity
unity that
that had
had come
come apart
apart inin
the
the last
last months
months of of the
the war . 44
war.**
From the
From the first,
first, the
the Nazi
Nazi Party
Party appeared
appeared as as aa particularly
particularly attractive
attractive means
means to to insure
insure
such
such aa unity
unity of of national
national will.will. Hitler's
Hitler's popularity
popularity withwith the
the masses
masses offered
offered thethe
possibility
possibility of of establishing
establishing aa national
national cohesion
cohesion thatthat the
the conception
conception of of total
total war
war
demanded
demanded.*' .45 Thus,
Thus, whatwhat made made the the NaziNazi movement
movement attractive
attractive to to the
the military
military
throughout the 1930's was the fact that the Nazis seemingly provided the
throughout the 1930's was the fact that the Nazis seemingly provided the
psychological
psychological basis basis and
and preparation
preparation necessary
necessary for for total
total war.
war. "Ein
"Ein Volk,
Volk, ein
ein Reich,
Reich,

*German
•German aircraft
aircraft designations
designations do
do not
not contain
contain aa hyphen
hyphen between
between manufacture
manufacture and
and model
model number.
number. American
American designations
designations do
do.. The
The text
text will
will
reflect national
reflect national preferences.
preferences.
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

ein
ein Fiihrer"
Fiihrer" was was more
more thanthan aa slogan
slogan;; in in the
the mass
mass rallies
rallies and and propaganda
propaganda displays,displays, itit
guaranteed
guaranteed that that the
the 1918 collapse would
1918 collapse would not not recur
recur.. Thus,
Thus, Ludendorff's
Ludendorff s conceptionconception
of
of total
total war
war and and thethe mass
mass movement
movement of of the
the Nazi
Nazi Party
Party provided
provided an an affinity
affinity between
between
the
the military
military and and thethe National
National Socialist
Socialist movement
movement that that helps
helps explain
explain the the readiness
readiness of of
the officer corps to serve a party
the officer corps to serve a party that
that hardly
hardly represented
represented their
their upper-class
upper-class attitudes
attitudes. .
Many
Many within
within the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe found found in in this
this political
political and and psychological
psychological preparation
preparation
for war a basis to argue that the next
for war a basis to argue that the next war
war would be a total war of
would be a total war of the
the air and
air and that
that
because of the national unity that the Nazis had created, Germany could better
because of the national unity that the Nazis had created, Germany could better
withstand
withstand such such aa struggle
struggle.. In In the
the May
May 1933 1933 memorandum
memorandum discussed discussed above, above, Knauss
Knauss
argued that "the terrorizing of the enemy's chief cities and industrial regions
argued that "the terrorizing of the enemy's chief cities and industrial regions
through
through bombing
bombing would would lead lead that much more
that much more quickly
quickly to collapse of
to aa collapse of morale,
morale, the the
weaker the national character of his people is, and the more that social and political
weaker the national character of his people is, and the more that social and political
rifts
rifts cleave
cleave his his society
society." ." Knauss
Knauss assumedassumed that that aa totalitarian
totalitarian societysociety like like Nazi
Nazi
Germany would prove more capable of enduring bombing attacks than the fractured
Germany would prove more capable of enduring bombing attacks than the fractured
societies
societies of of Britain
Britain and and France.46
France.'^ Such Such attitudes
attitudes playedplayed an an important
important role role in in
Luftwaffe thinking throughout the remainder of the thirties .
Luftwaffe thinking throughout the remainder of the thirties.
Knauss
Knauss himself
himself went went on on from
from the the Air
Air Ministry
Ministry to become the
to become the head
head of of the
the new
new AirAir
War College in Gatow. There, under his leadership, the emphasis remained solidly
War College in Gatow. There, under his leadership, the emphasis remained solidly
on
on "strategic"
"strategic" bombing bombing until until thethe outbreak
outbreak of of the
the war Nearly all
war.. Nearly all lectures
lectures concerned
concerned
the "strategic" uses of airpower; virtually none discussed tactical cooperation with
the "strategic" uses of airpower; virtually none discussed tactical cooperation with
the
the army
army.'''.47 Similarly,
Similarly, the the emphasis
emphasis in in the
the military
military journals
journals centered
centered on on "strategic"
"strategic"
bombing.
bombing. The The prestigious
prestigious Militdrwissenschaftliche
Militdrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Rundschau, the the new
new journal
journal of of
the
the War
War Ministry,
Ministry, foundedfounded in 1936, published
in 1936, published aa number
number of of theoretical
theoretical piecespieces on on
future
future developments
developments in in air
air war war.. Nearly
Nearly all all discussed
discussed the the useuse of of "strategic"
"strategic"
airpower
airpower with with somesome emphasizing
emphasizing that that aspect
aspect of of air
air warfare
warfare to to thethe exclusion
exclusion of of
.48 One author
others
others.*' One author commentedcommented that that European
European military
military powerspowers were were increasingly
increasingly
making the
making bomber force
the bomber force the the heart
heart of of their
their airpower.
airpower. The maneuverability and
The maneuverability and
technical
technical capability
capability of of the
the new
new generation
generation of of bombers
bombers were were suchsuch thatthat "already
"already in in
today's circumstances the
today's circumstances bomber offensive
the bomber offensive wouldwould be be as as unstoppable
unstoppable as as the
the flight
flight ofof
aa shell.'""
shell . -49 Major Herhudt von
Major Herhudt von Rohden,
Rohden, eventually
eventually the the head
head of of the
the general
general staff's
staff's
historical
historical section,
section, wentwent so so far
far as as to
to argue
argue thatthat unlike
unlike thethe army
army and and the
the navy,
navy, only
only the
the
air
air force
force waswas in in the
the position
position to to attack
attack the the enemy
enemy in in depth
depth and and to to launch
launch immediately
immediately
"destructive
"destructive attacks attacks against
against the the economic
economic resources
resources of of thethe enemy
enemy from from all all
directions.
directions."" Moreover,Moreover, von von Rohden
Rohden stressed,
stressed, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe should should not not be be anan
auxiliary
auxiliary to to the
the other
other two two services
services.. Interservice
Interservice cooperation
cooperation did did not
not mean
mean dividing
dividing
the Luftwaffe up
the Luftwaffe up and
and parceling
parceling out out its
its personnel
personnel and and materiel
materiel to to support
support ground
ground or or
naval
naval tactical
tactical purposes
purposes.. Rather,
Rather, interservice
interservice cooperation
cooperation meant meant usingusing the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
in
in "a"a unified
unified and and massed
massed `strategic'
'strategic' air air war"
war" that
that could
could provide
provide for for better
better long-
long-
range
range support
support.^ .°
The
The failure
failure of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to progress
progress further
further towards
towards aa "strategic"
"strategic" bombing bombing
capability
capability is is attributable
attributable to to several
several factors
factors.. The
The firstfirst is is that
that many
many withinwithin the the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe thoughtthought that that they
they possessed
possessed sufficient
sufficient capability
capability with with their
their twin-engine
twin-engine
aircraft
aircraft to to launch
launch "strategic"
"strategic" attacks attacks against
against Germany's
Germany's most most likely
likely continental
continental
opponents-France,
opponents—^France, Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia, and and Poland
Poland.. EnglandEngland presented
presented greatergreater

10
10
ORIGINS
ORIGINS AND
AND PREPARATION
PREPARATION

problems,
problems, but even here
but even here General
General Felmy, Commander of
Felmy, Commander of Luftf otte 22 and
Luftflotte and charged
charged
with planning of an air war against Britain in 1939, saw possibilities . Concluding
with planning of an air war against Britain in 1939, saw possibilities. Concluding
the
the 1939
1939 spring planning effort,
spring planning effort, Felmy
Felmy admitted
admitted to to hishis subordinates
subordinates that that the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwc^e did did not
not yet
yet possess
possess any any of of the
the prerequisites
prerequisites for for aa successful
successful "strategic"
"strategic"
bombing
bombing offensive
offensive against
against Great Britain.. He
Great Britain He did did suggest,
suggest, however,
however, that that thethe panic
panic
that
that had
had broken
broken out out in in London
London in in September
September at at the
the height
height of of the
the Munich
Munich crisis crisis
indicated
indicated that
that aa massive
massive aerial onslaught directed
aerial onslaught directed against
against LondonLondon might might break break
Britain's
Britain's powers
powers of of resistance."
resistance." A A second
second factor
factor lay lay on on the
the technical
technical side: side: TheThe
engineers
engineers nevernever solved
solved the the He He 177 177 design difficulties.. Moreover,
design difficulties Moreover, not not onlyonly diddid
Germany
Germany not not possess
possess the the economic
economic strength
strength and resources to
and resources to build
build aa "strategic"
"strategic"
bombing
bombing forceforce onon the
the scale
scale of of the
the British
British and
and American
American effort effort of of 1943-44
1943-44 but but few
few
airmen
airmen ofof any
any nation
nation in in the
the prewar
prewar period
period had
had foreseen
foreseen the the enormous
enormous magnitude
magnitude of of
the
the industrial
industrial and
and military
military effort
effort that
that "strategic"
"strategic" bombingbombing would would require
require.. Thus,
Thus, it it is
is
not
not surprising
surprising that
that Germany
Germany was was notnot much
much better
better prepared
prepared to to launch
launch aa "strategic"
"strategic"
bombing
bombing campaign
campaign than Britain in
than Britain in 1939.
1939.
As
As previously mentioned, Wever's
previously mentioned, Wever's deathdeath in in 1936
1936 waswas disastrous
disastrous for for thethe future
future
course
course of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe but but inin aa sense
sense other
other than
than that
that which
which most most historians
historians have have
suggested
suggested.. First,
First, he
he provided
provided the the glue that held
glue that held the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe together
together in in the
the early
early
rearmament
rearmament years.years. He He gotgot onon relatively
relatively well well with
with other Luftwaffe leaders,
oihexLuftwaffe leaders, including
including
Milch,
Milch, and and all
all respected
respected his his qualities
qualities of of intellect
intellect and and leadership.
leadership. Second,Second, and and
equaljy
equaljy important,
important, WeverWever possessed
possessed both both aa practical
practical military
military mind mind andand aa first-class
first-class
strategic
strategic sense
sense that
that thought
thought in in terms
terms of of the
the longlong pull
pull and and notnot just
just immediate,
immediate,
,operational
xjperational problems
problems.. Given Given the the financial
financial and and raw raw material
material constraints
constraints on on
rearmament,
rearmament, Wever Wever could could not not have created aa "strategic"
have created "strategic" bombing bombing force force in in the
the
thirties
thirties in
in terms
terms ofof what
what the the United
United States
States Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces (USAAF)
(USAAF) would would have have in in
1943
1943 andand 1944
1944.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, his his presence
presence would would have have mitigated
mitigated the the rather
rather
haphazard
haphazard approach
approach that that characterized
characterized the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in in the
the late
late thirties
thirties and and early
early
forties
forties..
The
The caliber
caliber ofof Wever's
Wever's successors
successors underlines
underlines his his importance
importance to to the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe..
Albert
Albert Kesselring,
Kesselring, his his immediate
immediate successor,
successor, was was aa troop
troop leader
leader parpar excellence,
excellence, but but
overall
overall hehe was
was not
not anan effective
effective Chiefof
Chief of Staff
Staff and
and diddid not
not getget along
along well
well with
with Milch
Milch..
The
The back-biting
back-biting between
between the the two
two ledled to
to Kesselring's
Kesselring's replacement
replacement by by Hans-Jurgen
Hans-Jiirgen
Stumpff
Stumpff within
within aa year."
year." The The latter
latter proved
proved littlelittle better
better thanthan Kesselring
Kesselring;; and and inin
February
February 1939,
1939, Goring
Goring named named Hans Hans Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek as as Chief
Chief of of the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe'% GeneralGeneral
Staff.
Staff. Despite
Despite hishis brilliance
brilliance at at the
the Kriegsakademie,
Kriegsakademie, Jeschonnek Jeschonnek proved proved no no better
better
than
than his
his predecessors
predecessors.. He He was arrogant, shortsighted, and had had several bitter
was arrogant, shortsighted, and had had several bitter
run-ins
run-ins with
with Milch
Milch.'^.s' Moreover,
Moreover, Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek fell fell under
under Hitler's
Hitler's spell
spell and
and swallowed
swallowed
the
the line
line that
that the
the Fiihrer
Fuhrer was was thethe "greatest
"greatest commander
commander in in history
history." ." AsAs aa result,
result, he he
never possessed the independent judgment that his position required . Shortly after
never possessed the independent judgment that his position required. Shortly after
Munich,
Munich, HitlerHitler demanded
demanded aa fivefold fivefold increase
increase in in the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe by by 1942,1942, an an
impossible goal given the economic constraints and the megalomaniacal proportion
impossible goal given the economic constraints and the megalomaniacal proportion
of
of the
the program (Such aa force
program.. (Such force would
would require
require 85 85 percent
percent of of the
the world's
world's aviation
aviation fuel fuel
and would cost 60 million RM, a total equivalent to all German defense spending
and would cost 60 million RM, a total equivalent to all German defense spending
for the
for the 1933-39
1933-39 period
period.) Senior officers
.) Senior officers correctly
correctly concluded
concluded that that there
there was was no no
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

prospect
prospect of accomplishing such
of accomplishing such aa plan plan.. Jeschonnek,
Jeschonnek, however,
however, announced,
announced,
"Gentlemen,
"Gentlemen, in in my view itit is
my view is our
our duty
duty toto support
support thethe Fuhrer
Ftihrer and
and not
not work
work against
against
"54 Such
him.
him."''' Such an an attitude
attitude was was notnot consistent
consistent withwith the
the traditions
traditions ofof the
the general
general staff,
staff,
but fully conformed
but fully conformed to to Hitler's
Hitler's belief
belief that
that his
his generals
generals werewere there
there not to give
not to give advice
advice
but
but to
to carry
carry out
out orders
orders.'' ."
The
The almost
almost yearly
yearly changes
changes in in the
the position
position of of Chief
Chief of of Staff
Staff from
from 1936
1936 to to 1939
1939
was
was not
not the
the only
only result
result of of G6ring's
Goring's mishandling
mishandling of the Luftwaffe
of the Luftwaffe.. HeHe now
now severely
severely
constrained
constrained Milch Milch by by balancing
balancing the the State
State Secretary
Secretary with with others
others within
within the the
Luftwaffe's bureaucracy.
Luftwaffe's bureaucracy. Ernest Ernest Udet,Udet, aa great
great fighter
fighter pilot
pilot in
in World
World War War II and and
barnstormer
barnstormer of the 1920's,
of the 1920's, received
received an an appointment
appointment as as head
head of the Luftwaffe's
of the Luftwt^e's
technical
technical departments
departments as as well
well as as the Office of
the Office of Air
Air Armament
Armament where where he he controlled
controlled
research and development for the Luftwaffe . Udet did not possess the technical or
research and development for the Luftwaffe. Udet did not possess the technical or
engineering skills to handle such responsibilities and was a dreadful administrator.
engineering skills to handle such responsibilities and was a dreadful administrator.
He
He had
had nono less
less than
than 2626 separate
separate departments
departments reporting
reporting directly
directly to
to him."
him."
In sum, G6ring possessed neither the ability nor background to
In sum, Goring possessed neither the ability nor background to runrun thethe
enormously expanded Luftwaffe . Milch was increasingly isolated from the centers
enormously expanded Luftwaffe. Milch was increasingly isolated from the centers
of power; and
of power; and the
the other
other toptop leaders,
leaders, such such asas Kesselring,
Kesselring, Udet,Udet, and
and Jeschonnek,
Jeschonnek, did did
not possess Wever's strategic insight. Long-range planning and strategic thinking
not possess Wever's strategic insight. Long-range planning and strategic thinking
went
went byby the
the boards,
boards, andand thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe increasingly
increasingly became
became aa force
force that
that reacted
reacted to to
day-to-day
day-to-day political
political andand operational
operational pressures.
pressures.
The
The result
result of of this
this increasingly
increasingly chaotic chaotic organizational
organizational situation
situation showed
showed up up most
most
directly in the production programs of the late prewar period . Even considering
directly in the production programs of the late prewar period. Even considering
their
their raw material shortages
raw material shortages and and their economic and
their economic and foreign
foreign exchange
exchange difficulties,
difficulties,
the Germans undercut the production capacity of their aircraft industry . Waste,
the Germans undercut the production capacity of their aircraft industry. Waste,
obsolete
obsolete production
production methods,
methods, and and bad bad planning
planning characterized
characterized the the efforts
efforts of of even
even thethe
major
major manufacturers.
manufacturers. Throughout
Throughout the the late
late 1930's,
1930's, thethe Germans
Germans produced
produced numerous
numerous
plans
plans for
for aircraft
aircraft production
production due due to to constantly
constantly changing
changing goalsgoals and
and priorities
priorities.. By By
1939, aircraft
1939, aircraft production
production was was only
only 70 70 percent
percent of of stated
stated production
production goals
goals (goals
(goals that
that
were
were significantly
significantly underunder Hitler's
Hitler's demand
demand for for quintupling
quintupling of the Luftwaffe)
of the Luftwaffe)." .57 The
The
following figures in Table I's reflect the shortfall between planned expansion and
following figures in Table P* reflect the shortfall between planned expansion and
actual production figures in the last years of peace.
actual production figures in the last years of peace.

TABLE
TABLEII

Planned
Planned and
and Actual
Actual Aircraft
Aircraft Output-1938
Output—1938 and
and 1939
1939

1938
1938 1939
1939
Plan
Plan Nos
Nos.. All
All Types
Types Combat
Combat Plan
Plan Nos
Nos.. All
All Types
Types Combat
Combat
66 5,800
5,800 4,129
4,129 88 9,957
9,957 7,095
7,095
77 6,021
6,021 3,971
3,971 10
10 8,299
8,299 6,051
6,051
7/8
7/8 6,154
6,154 3,710
3,710 10/11
10/11 8,619
8,619 6,357
6,357
Actual
Actual Actual
Actual
Production
Production 5,235
5,235 3,350
3,350 Production
Production 8,295
8,295 4,733
4,733

112
2
ORIGINS AND PREPARATION
ORIGINS AND PREPARATION

The
The mobilization
mobilization plans, plans, donedone by the general
by the general staff staff under
under Jeschonnek,
Jeschonnek, and and thethe
production
production plans plans of of Udet's
Udet's technical
technical expertsexperts continued
continued to diverge—the former
to diverge-the former
influenced
influenced by by pressure
pressure from from Goring
Goring and and Hitler
Hitler (and (and thethe real
real possibility
possibility of of war),
war), thethe
latter
latter under
under the the impact
impact of of the
the distressing
distressing economic economic situation situation discussed
discussed at at the
the
beginning
beginning of of this
this chapter
chapter.. TheThe repercussions
repercussions of this situation
of this situation were were notnot immediately
immediately
apparent
apparent since
since the Luftwaffe's size
the Luftwaffe's size andand strength
strength proved proved sufficient
sufficient to to meet
meet initial
initial
wartime
wartime demands
demands in in Poland
Poland and France. But
and France. But in in long-range
long-range terms, terms, this
this unbridgeable
unbridgeable
gulf between
gulf between the the general
general staff
staff and and the Luftwaffe's technical
the Luftwaffe's technical departments
departments made made
industrial planning almost
industrial planning almost irrelevant
irrelevant in
in the
the consideration
consideration of
of German
German strategy
strategy. . There
There
was
was nono person
person or or agency,
agency, except
except Goring,
Goring, in in overall
overall chargecharge of of strategic
strategic planning,
planning,
force structure, or
force structure, or industrial
industrial production.
production. The
The results
results led
led directly
directly to
to the
the situation
situation of
of
1943,44.
1943^14.
Beginning
Beginning in in 1936,
1936, but with increasing
but with increasing force force in in 1937,
1937, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe transitioned
transitioned
into its second generation
into its second generation of
of aircraft
aircraft. . The
The emphasis
emphasis from
from above
above on
on statistics
statistics
complicated an inherently difficult
complicated an inherently difficult process
process. . As
As Goring
Goring stated,
stated, what
what mattered
mattered were
were
numbers "to impress Hitler and to enable Hitler,
numbers "to impress Hitler and to enable Hitler, in
in turn, to
turn, to impress
impress the
the world . -19
world."''
Milch
Milch at at least
least mitigated
mitigated some some of of the
the worst
worst aspectsaspects of of this numbers craze
this numbers craze.. In In 1935,
1935,
he recognized that most models in production were obsolescent and refused to
he recognized that most models in production were obsolescent and refused to
increase their production levels . But to stop aircraft production just because nothing
increase their production levels. But to stop aircraft production just because nothing
better was yet
better was yet available
available wouldwould have have been been counterproductive,
counterproductive, especially especially since since aa
national goal was to expand aircraft production capacity. Fortunately for
national goal was to expand aircraft production capacity. Fortunately for the
the
Luftwaffe, the Ju 52, produced as a bomber during this period, proved an
Luftwaffe, the Ju 52, produced as a bomber during this period, proved an
outstanding transport aircraft and formed the backbone of the Luftwaffe's airlift
outstanding transport aircraft and formed the backbone of the Luftwaffe's airlift
force
force throughout
throughout the Second World
the Second World War War.*" . 6° Complicating
Complicating the the introduction
introduction of of new
new
aircraft were the difficulties experienced by German engine manufacturers in
aircraft were the difficulties experienced by German engine manufacturers in
producing
producing engines
engines that that met
met comparable
comparable performanceperformance standards standards of of American
American and and
British
British industry.6'
industry.*' The The fact
fact that the Ju
that the Ju 52
52 waswas not not anan adequate
adequate bomber bomber in in any
any respect
respect
led
led to
to pressure
pressure from from the the bomber
bomber units units forfor replacement
replacement.. As As aa result,
result, thethe Air
Air Ministry
Ministry
rushed the Ju 86, He 111, and Do 17 into production before complete evaluation .
rushed the Ju 86, He 111, and Do 17 into production before complete evaluation.
None
None of of the
the three
three was was fully
fully satisfactory
satisfactory with with the the JuJu 86 86 virtually
virtually useless,
useless, whilewhile thethe
He
He 111
111 showed
showed the the most
most potential
potential for for improvement
improvement.*^ . 62
The
The 1936
1936 medium
medium bomber bomber program
program was was meantmeant to to serve
serve as as an
an interim
interim measure
measure
until
until aa third
third generation
generation of of bombers
bombers arrivedarrived.. Udet's Udet's growing
growing love love affair
affair withwith the
the dive
dive
bomber
bomber disastrously
disastrously affectedaffected thatthat program
program.. In In Spain,
Spain, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had experienced
experienced
difficulty
difficulty in in hitting
hitting targets
targets accurately
accurately from from high high altitude,
altitude, while while the the JuJu 8787 was
was most
most
accurate
accurate in in putting
putting bombs bombs directly
directly on on target
target.. From From this this experience,
experience, Udet Udet concluded
concluded
that
that every
every bomber
bomber should should be be aa dive
dive bomber
bomber.. There There were were sound
sound arguments
arguments for for the
the
need
need to to achieve
achieve more more accurate
accurate bombing,
bombing, because because the the lowlow production
production capacity
capacity of of the
the
German
German munitions
munitions industry industry in in the
the late
late thirties
thirties did did not
not allow
allow for for much
much wastage
wastage of of
bombs.63 But
bombs.*' But thethe decision
decision that that thethe next
next generation
generation of of bombers
bombers should should have have the the
characteristics of
characteristics of dive
dive bombers
bombers was was manifestly
manifestly impractical,
impractical, if if not
not impossible
impossible.. The The
results
results were
were serious
serious for for both
both the the Ju Ju 8888 andand the the He He 177 177.. In In the
the case
case of of the
the JuJu 8888
prototype,
prototype, Udet's
Udet's demand demand that that it it possess
possess aa dive-bombing
dive-bombing capability, capability, along along withwith
50,000 other design
50,000 other design changes,
changes, increased
increased the the aircraft
aircraft weight
weight from from 77 to to 12 12 tons
tons with
with aa

13
13
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

concomitant
concomitant loss in speed
loss in speed fromfrom 500500 km/h
km/h to to 300
300 km/h
km/h.. Moreover,
Moreover, thesethese changes
changes
delayed actual production by at least a year The additional requirement that that the
delayed actual production by at least a .64
year.'"' The additional requirement the
He
He 177
177 be be able
able toto dive
dive bomb
bomb came came in in the
the middle
middle of of program
program development
development and and
virtually
virtually insured
insured that,
that, given
given an an inherently
inherently complex
complex engine engine design,
design, the
the model
model would
would
never
never evolve
evolve into
into an
an effective
effective heavy
heavy bomber
bomber.*' .65
Goring's
Goring's and Hitler's fascination
and Hitler's fascination with with numbers
numbers also also served
served toto distort
distort thethe
maintenance
maintenance and and supply
supply system
system.. Theoretically,
Theoretically, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe based
based its
its approach
approach to to
airpower
airpower on on the
the belief
belief that
that aa flying
flying unit
unit was
was not not combat-ready
combat-ready unlessunless itit possessed
possessed
modern,
modem, reliable
reliable aircraft
aircraft backed
backed up up byby aa first-class
first-class maintenance
maintenance organization
organization and and
supply system. Using
supply system. this rationale,
Using this rationale, frontline
frontline units
units had
had toto receive adequate numbers
receive adequate numbers
of
of replacement
replacement aircraft and reserves
aircraft and reserves of spare parts.
of spare parts. In
In an
an "after
"after action"
action" report
report onon
the
the Czech
Czech crisis,
crisis, the
the chief
chief of of the Luftwaffe's supply
the Luftwaffe's supply services
services reported
reported that
that these
these
requirements
requirements had had not
not yet been met
yet been .66 Among
met.** Among other other items,
items, hehe underscored
underscored the the fact
fact
that
that the
the number
number of of aircraft
aircraft engines
engines in in maintenance
maintenance and and supply
supply depots
depots represented
represented
only
only 44 toto 55 percent
percent of of total
total engines
engines in in service.
service. The The basic
basic reason
reason whywhy this
this situation
situation
existed
existed was was in in Goring's
Goring's refusal
refusal to to follow
follow recommendations
recommendations that that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
devote
devote 20 20 toto 3030 percent
percent of of production
production to to provide
provide adequate
adequate inventories
inventories of of spare
spare
parts .6' Instead,
parts.*^ Instead, the the Germans
Germans assigned
assigned production
production almostalmost exclusively
exclusively to to firstline
firstline
strength
strength because
because of of the
the political
political outlook
outlook of of the
the toptop leaders
leaders andand their
their fascination
fascination with
with
numbers
numbers.. ThisThis practice
practice continued
continued throughout
throughout the the war.
war. AsAs aa result,
result, theLuftwaffe
theLuftwqffe was was
chronically
chronically shortshort spare
spare parts
parts andand had
had to to cannibalize
cannibalize with with aa direct
direct and
and negative
negative
impact
impact on on operational
operational ready
ready rates.
rates.

THE
THE LUFTWAFFE'S
LUFTWAFFE'S IMPACT,
IMPACT, 1933-39
1933-39
The
The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's initial
initial strategic
strategic purpose
purpose had had been
been to to deter Poland and
deter Poland and France
France
from launching a preventive war against the Reich. It was neither notably successful
from launching a preventive war against the Reich. It was neither notably successful
nor
nor unsuccessful
unsuccessful in in this
this role.
role. Hitler's
Hitler's diplomatic
diplomatic skills,
skills, particularly
particularly thethe 1934
1934 Non
Non
Aggression Pact with Poland, were more important in altering the European
Aggression Pact with Poland, were more irpportant in altering the European
diplomatic
diplomatic balance
balance of of power.
power. The The French,
French, at at least
least in
in the
the early
early period
period ofof German
German
rearmament, were somewhat blase about the implications of the Luftwaffe . As
rearmament, were somewhat blase about the implications of the Liftwqffe. As late
late
as September 1937, one military leader told the British that with "a veritable forest
as September 1937, one military leader told the British that with "a veritable forest
of
of guns"
guns" over
over the
the Maginot
Maginot Line,Line, France
France could
could prevent
prevent the the German
German air air force
force from
from
intervening in the land battle .6$ The following month, the French assured the
intervening in the land battle.** The following month, the French assured the
visiting British Chief of the Imperial General Staff that they planned to strengthen
visiting British Chief of the Imperial General Staff that they planned to strengthen
the
the Maginot
Maginot LineLine toto counter German aircraft
counter German aircraft superiority
superiority and and that
that they
they believed
believed any any
"enemy would require an unrealizable supremacy of machines to get over the
"enemy would require an unrealizable supremacy of machines to get over the
antiaircraft defenses. . .
antiaircraft defenses. .
..."*'69

If
If at
at first
first the
the air
air threat
threat diddid not
not impress
impress thethe French,
French, itit certainly
certainly upset
upset the
the British.
British.
Stanley Baldwin's remark that the bomber "would always get through" is ample
Stanley Baldwin's remark that the bomber "would always get through" is ample
testimony to British fears about the air threat . There is, of course, some irony here,
testimony to British fears about the air threat. There is, of course, some irony here,
because at least until 1937-38 Hitler did not seriously consider Great Britain as
because at least until 1937-38 Hitler did not seriously consider Great Britain as aa
possible
possible opponent
opponent.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, British alarms over
British alarms over thethe "growing
"growing air air threat"
threat" andand
their hopes
their hopes of of realizing
realizing an an air
air limitation
limitation agreement
agreement between
between the European powers
the European powers
were useful diplomatic
were aa useful diplomatic tooltool that
that allowed
allowed Hitler
Hitler toto manipulate
manipulate the the island
island power.
power.

114
4
ORIGINS
ORIGINS AND
AND PREPARATION
PREPARATION

If the
If the threat
threat ofof the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, along along withwith the army's buildup
the army's buildup in in the
the mid-thirties,
mid-thirties,
impressed many Europeans
impressed many Europeans with
with the
the resurgence
resurgence of
of German
German military
military power,
power, the the
reality was a different matter . The conclusion
reality was a different matter. The conclusion drawn
drawn from
from an
an assessment
assessment of
of an
an
April 1936 war game in the Luftwaffe staff warned that German air rearmament thus
April 1936 war game in the Luftwaffe staff warned that German air rearmament thus
far
far was
was insufficient
insufficient and and inferior
inferior to the French
to the French air air force
force.™ .'° Not
Not until
until 19381938 did did thethe
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe beginbegin to to realize
realize its its potential
potential.. BeforeBefore thatthat point,
point, eventsevents in in southern
southern EuropeEurope
had
had already
already influenced
influenced the the Luftwaffe's
LM/hvaj5%'s development
development..
While
While the the Germans
Germans completed
completed the the first
first stages
stages of of rearmament,
rearmament, the the Spanish
Spanish Civil Civil
War
War occurred
occurred.. Hitler
Hitler willingly
willingly provided
provided substantial
substantial aid aid to to the
the rebels,
rebels, especially
especially in in
the
the air,
air, but regarded the
but regarded the warwar mostly
mostly as as useful
useful inin distracting
distracting Europe's Europe's attention
attention from from
the
the growing
growing dangerdanger of of Nazi
Nazi Germany
Germany.^' ." For
For thethe Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Spain Spain was was aa helpful
helpful
testing
testing ground
ground for for its
its aircraft
aircraft and and tactics
tactics.. TheThe JuJu 52 52 quickly
quickly showed showed its its limitations
limitations
as
as aa bomber
bomber and and waswas soon
soon relegated
relegated to to its
its World
World War War 11 role as
II role as aa transport
transport;; the the He He
51
51 biplanes
biplanes proved
proved inferior
inferior to to Russian
Russian aircraft
aircraft supplied
supplied to to the
the Republic.
Republic. By By 1937,
1937,
the
the Germans
Germans had had introduced
introduced the the Bf Bf 109109 fighter,
fighter, thethe He He 111, 111, and and Do Do 17 17 bombers,
bombers, as as
well
well asas aa few
few Ju Ju 8787 dive
dive bombers
bombers.. All All these
these aircraft
aircraft soon soon indicated
indicated their their relative
relative
worth
worth.. On On the
the ground,
ground, the the 88mm88mm flak flak gungun proved
proved itself itself effective
effective not not only
only as as anan
antiaircraft weapon but
antiaircraft weapon but alsoalso against
against groundground targets
targets.'^ . 72 The
The fighter
fighter commander
commander
Adolph
Adolph Galland,
Galland, however,
however, felt felt that
that thethe combat
combat experience
experience gained gained in in Spain
Spain led led thethe
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to overestimate
overestimate the the performance
performance of of antiaircraft
antiaircraft weapons, weapons, thereby thereby
distorting
distorting future
future programs
programs for for the
the airair defense
defense ofthe
of the Reich
Reich.''^ .'s
Perhaps
Perhaps of of greater
greater importance,
importance, the the Germans
Germans learned
learned invaluable
invaluable combat combat lessons
lessons in in
Spain which
Spain which theythey quickly
quickly absorbed
absorbed into into their
their doctrine
doctrine.. The The development
development of of close
close air air
support
support and and cooperation
cooperation with with the the army
army camecame directly
directly from from the the Spanish
Spanish Civil Civil WarWar..
Wolfram von
Wolfram von Richthofen,
Richthofen, Manfred's Manfred's cousin, cousin, arrived
arrived in in Spain
Spain out out of of favor
favor withwith thethe
Air
Air Ministry
Ministry in in Berlin
Berlin.. His His conception
conception of of air
air war
war uponupon arrivalarrival was was not not substantially
substantially
different
different from
from most
most otherother Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe officers officers atat that
that time;
time; in in other
other words,
words, closeclose air air
support
support for for the
the army
army ranked
ranked at at the
the bottom
bottom of of his
his priorities.
priorities. However,However, once once in in his
his
position
position as as Chief
Chief of of Staff
Staff to to the
the Condor
Condor Legion,
Legion, Richthofen
Richthofen recognized recognized that that thethe
theories
theories of of airpower
airpower and and Spanish
Spanish political
political realities
realities did did not not have
have much much in in common
common..
The
The stalemate
stalemate on on the
the ground,
ground, the the lack
lack of of suitable
suitable "strategic"
"strategic" targets, targets, and and the the great
great
Nationalist
Nationalist weakness
weakness in in artillery
artillery led led Richthofen
Richthofen to to consider
consider using using his his forces
forces to to
support
support directly
directly Franco's
Franco's offensive
offensive againstagainst Bilbao
Bilbao.''*. 74
Against
Against considerable
considerable opposition opposition and and without
without official
official sanction,
sanction, Richthofen
Richthofen
developed
developed the the technique
technique and and tactics
tactics of of close
close airair support
support for for ground
ground forces forces in in
offensive
offensive operations
operations." .'S None
None of of thethe elements
elements required
required for for such
such operations
operations existed existed
within
within the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe before before the the offensive
offensive against
against the the Basque
Basque Republic.
Republic. To To begin
begin
with,
with, there
there was was an an overall
overall lack lack of of experience
experience and and technical
technical expertise,
expertise, for for
communication
communication between between ground ground and and airair units
units (particularly
(particularly radio) radio) did did notnot yet
yet exist.
exist.
By
By thethe time
time Richthofen
Richthofen was was through
through developing
developing the the concept
concept and and tactics,
tactics, the the
Germans
Germans had had recognized
recognized the the necessity
necessity for for closer
closer cooperation
cooperation and and improved
improved
planning
planning between
between ground
ground and and air air units,
units, hadhad established
established close close communication
communication links links
and
and recognition
recognition devices,
devices, and and hadhad detailed
detailed Luftwaffe
LM/nvaj^e liaisonliaison officers
officers to to serve
serve directly
directly
with
with frontline
frontline units
units.. All
All of of this
this was
was due due toto Richthofen's
Richthofen's drive drive and and imagination
imagination.'* .'6

115
5
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

The
The lessons
lessons ofof "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing were were more
more muted
muted.. On On the
the one
one hand,
hand, oneone
after
after action report (Erfahrungsbericht)
action report (Erfahrungsbericht) went went soso far
far as
as to
to emphasize
emphasize the the impact
impact upon
upon
morale
morale of of bombing
bombing thethe Republic's
Republic's workwork force,
force, ii.e.,
.e ., attacks
attacks resulting
resulting in
in supposedly
supposedly
bad
bad discipline
discipline among
among thethe working
working class
class.. Continuous
Continuous attacks
attacks even
even by
by small
small bombing
bombing
units against a single city, especially where
units against a single city, especially where antiaircraft
antiaircraft defenses
defenses were
were insufficient,
insufficient,
had
had "deeply
"deeply impressed
impressed and and depressed"
depressed" the the population."
population." Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the
Luftwaffe's yearbook for 1938
Luftwaffe's yearbook for 1938 suggested
suggested that
that "strategic"
"strategic" air
air warfare
warfare in
in Spain
Spain had
had
not occurred
not occurred for
for aa variety
variety ofof reasons
reasons.. The
The Nationalists
Nationalists had had been
been inin aa position
position toto
destroy utterly Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia with incendiaries but had not done
destroy utterly Madrid, Barcelona, and Valencia with incendiaries but had not done
so because
so because ofof the
the delicate
delicate political
political problems
problems involved
involved in in aa civil
civil war
war.. Franco
Franco had had not
not
attacked the major ports because these lay within the "international zone" and had
attacked the major ports because these lay within the "international zone" and had
not authorized
not authorized attacks
attacks onon armament
armament factories
factories since
since Spain
Spain possessed
possessed so so few .'e
few.''*
Conversely, Captain Heye of the Seekriegsleitung (naval high command) gained
Conversely, Captain Heye of the Seekriegsleitung (naval high command) gained
aa different
different impression
impression after
after talking
talking with
with Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe officers
officers during
during aa 1938
1938 visit
visit to
to
Spain. He reported on his return to Berlin :
Spain. He reported on his return to Berlin:

Disregarding
Disregarding the the military
military success
success accompanying
accompanying the the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's use use
in
in immediate
immediate support
support ofof army
army operations,
operations, oneone gets
gets the
the impression
impression
that
that our
our attacks
attacks onon objects
objects ofof little
little military
military importance,
importance, through
through
which
which in in most
most cases
cases many
many women
women and and children
children .. .. .. were
were hit,
hit, are
are
not aa suitable
not suitable means
means to to break
break anan opponent's
opponent's resistance
resistance.. They
They seem
seem
to
to strengthen
strengthen hishis resistance
resistance.. .. .. .. The
The memory
memory of of the
the airair attack
attack onon
Guemica
Guernica by by the
the (Condor]
[Condor] Legion
Legion stillstill today
today affects
affects the
the population
population
and
and permits
permits nono friendly
friendly feelings
feelings for for Germany
Germany in in the
the population
population of of
the
the Basques,
Basques, whowho earlier
earlier were
were thoroughly
thoroughly friendly
friendly toto Germany
Germany and and
in
in no
no manner
manner Communistic.
Communistic.^' 79

Significantly,
Significantly, whatever whatever their
their attitudes
attitudes towards
towards the the effects
effects of of bombing,
bombing, the the
Spanish
Spanish CivilCivil War War confirmed
confirmed in in some
some Germans'
Germans' minds
minds thethe belief
belief that
that fighter
fighter aircraft
aircraft
and
and civil
civil defense
defense measures
measures would
would be be of
of importance
importance in in the
the coming
coming war.war. InIn 1937,
1937,
Udet
Udet increased
increased the the proportion
proportion of of fighters
fighters toto bombers
bombers from from the
the existing
existing 1-to-3
l-to-3 ratio
ratio
to
to 1-to-2 . e° Moreover, unlike
l-to-2.*''Moreover, unlike their
their counterparts
counterparts in in Britain,
Britain, German
German airpower
airpower experts
experts
"believed
' 'believed that civil defense
that civil defense measures
measures could
could appreciably
appreciably reduce
reduce casualties
casualties in in an
an air
air
attack
attack."*'. "8'
Spain
Spain alsoalso indicated
indicated the the difficulties
difficulties ofof hitting
hitting targets
targets byby both
both day
day and
and night
night.. The
The
experience
experience gleaned gleaned from from night
night attacks
attacks proved
proved generally
generally beneficial,
beneficial, while
while the the
problem
problem of of hitting
hitting targets
targets accurately
accurately inin daylight
daylight missions
missions helped
helped push
push Udet
Udet towards
towards
his
his conception
conception that that every
every bomber
bomber should
should have
have aa dive-bombing
dive-bombing capability
capability.. AtAt night,
night,
the
the Germans
Germans discovered
discovered the the difficulties
difficulties not
not only
only in in finding
finding targets
targets butbut in
in hitting
hitting
them
them.*^ ." This
This led led to
to aa recognition
recognition that
that navigational
navigational aidsaids were
were critical
critical for
for bad
bad weather
weather
and
and night
night operations
operations.. In In March
March 1939,
1939, Kesselring
Kesselring admitted
admitted that
that even
even given
given aa high
high
level
level ofof technical
technical competence,
competence, he he doubted
doubted whether
whether the the average
average bomber
bomber crewcrew could
could
hit
hit their
their target
target withwith any
any degree
degree ofof accuracy
accuracy at at night
night or or in
in bad
bad weather
weather.*' ." ToTo help
help
overcome
overcome this difficulty, Luftwaffe
this difficulty, Luftwaffe scientists
scientists experimented
experimented with with radio
radio direction
direction
systems
systems as as anan aidaid to
to navigation
navigation andand asas aa technological
technological answeranswer to to the
the problem
problem of of
bombing
bombing targets targets in in conditions
conditions ofof limited
limited visibility.
visibility. The
The "Knickebein"
"Knickebein" system,system, first
first
used
used in the Battle
in the Battle ofof Britain,
Britain, was direct result
was aa direct .84
result.*"

16
16
ORIGINS
ORIGINS AND
AND PREPARATION
PREPARATION

The introduction
The introduction ofof aa new
new generation
generation of of bombers
bombers and and fighters
fighters after 1936 caused
after 1936 caused
serious transition problems . High accident rates coupled with low in-commission
serious transition problems. High accident rates coupled with low in-commission
rates
rates continued
continued toto plague
plague thethe transition
transition program
program as as late
late as
as the
the summer
summer of 1938.. At
of 1938 At
that time, Luftwaffe operational ready rates were surprisingly low. On August 1,
that time, Luftwaffe operational ready rates were surprisingly low. On August 1,
1938, the
1938, the in-commission
in-commission rate rate for
for bombers
bombers was was 4949 percent,
percent, for
for fighters
fighters 70
70 percent,
percent,
and
and for
for the
the whole
whole force
force 5757 percent
percent.*^.85 Only
Only after
after drastically
drastically reducing
reducing flying
flying and
and
training
training time
time could
could the Luftwaffe bring
the Luftwaffe bring its
its in-commission
in-commission rate rate to
to aa respectable
respectable level
level
by
by the
the end
end of
of September 1938, shortly
September 1938, shortly before
before the
the onset
onset of
of the
the planned
planned invasion
invasion ofof
Czechoslovakia."
Czechoslovakia.** The The level of aircrew
level of aircrew training
training waswas equally
equally deplorable
deplorable.. In
In August,
August,
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe possessed
possessed barely two-thirds of
barely two-thirds of its
its authorized
authorized crew
crew strength,
strength, and
and over
over
40 percent
40 percent ofof the
the crews
crews on on duty
duty were
were not fully operational
not fully operational.. Table
Table 1117
IP' helps
helps to
to point
point
out
out the
the extent
extent of
of the
the problem
problem..
TABLE
TABLE IIII
Aircrew
Aircrew Readiness-August
Readiness—August 1938
1938

Crew
Crew Training
Training Status
Status
Authorized
Autliorized Fully
Fully Partially
Partially
Type
Type ofof Aircraft
Aircraft Number
Number ofof Crews
Crews Operational
Operational Operational
Operational
Strat
Strat Recon
Recon 228
228 84
84 57
57
Tac
Tac Recon
Recon 297
297 183
183 128
128
Fighter
Fighter 938
938 537
537 364
364
Bomber
Bomber 1,409
1,409 378
378 411
411
Dive
Dive Bomber
Bomber 300
300 80
80 123
123
Ground
Ground Attack
Attack 195
195 89
89 11
11
Transport
Transport 117
117 10
10 17
17
Coastal
Coastal and
and Navy
Navy 230
230 71
71 34
34
TOTAL
TOTAL 3,714
3,714 1,432
1,432 1,145
1,145

Moreover, the chief


Moreover, the chief of
of supply
supply services
services pointed
pointed out
out in
in an
an after
after action
action report
report on
on the
the
Czech
Czech crisis
crisis that:
that:
In
In the
the last
last months
months [before [before Munich],
Munich], the the following
following
special
special measures
measures were were carried
carried through
through concurrently
concurrently:: (I)(1) equipping
equipping
of
of many
many new new units
units;; (2)
(2) rearming
rearming of of numerous
numerous units
units;; (3)
(3) early
early partial
partial
overhaul
overhaul for for approximately
approximately 60 60 percent
percent of of frontline
frontline aircraft;
aircraft; (4) (4)
replacement
replacement of of spare
spare parts
parts;; (5)
(5) rebuilding
rebuilding of of numerous
numerous aircraft
aircraft in in
supply
supply depots,
depots, units,
units, and
and industry;
industry; (6) (6) rearmament
rearmament of of many
many aircraft
aircraft;;
(7)
(7) accelerated
accelerated introduction
introduction of of partially
partially overhauled
overhauled motors
motors .. .. .. ;; (8)
(8)
establishment
establishment of of four
four new
new air
air groups
groups and and one
one new
new airfield
airfield .. .. .. ;; (10)
(10)
preparation
preparation and resupply of
and resupply of mobilization
mobilization supplies
supplies corresponding
corresponding to to
the
the newly
newly established
established units,
units, rearmed
rearmed units,
units, and and transferred
transferred
units
units.. .. .. .. The
The compression
compression of of these
these tasks
tasks into
into aa very
very short
short time time
span has once
span has more and
once more and in
in clear
clear fashion
fashion pointed
pointed out
out the
the known
known lack lack
of
of readiness
readiness in in the
the maintenance
maintenance of of flying
flying equipment
equipment as as well
well as as
among
among technical
technical personnel
personnel.. .. .. ..
The
The consequence
consequence of of these
these circumstances
circumstances was was;: (a)
(a) aa
constant
constant and,
and, for
for firstline
firstline aircraft,
aircraft, complete
complete lack
lack ofof reserves
reserves both
both as
as
accident
accident replacements
replacements and and for
for mobilization
mobilization;; (b)
(b) aa weakening
weakening of of the
the
aircraft
aircraft inventory
inventory inin the
the training
training schools
schools in
in favor
favor ofof regular
regular units;
units;
(c)
(c) aa lack
lack ofof reserve
reserve engines and supplies
engines and supplies for
for the
the timely
timely equipment
equipment
of
of airfields,
airfields, supply
supply services,
services, and
and depots
depots both
both for
for peacetime
peacetime needs
needs as
as
well
well as
as mobilization
mobilization.** . 88

117
7
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

While
While the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was was not not prepared
prepared to to face
face aa military
military confrontation
confrontation over over
Czechoslovakia," it had a major impact on British and French
Czechoslovakia,*' it had a major impact on British and French diplomacy
diplomacy. .
Throughout the late 1930's, the British Chiefs of Staff had reiteratively warned their
Throughout the late 1930's, the British Chiefs of Staff had reiteratively warned their
ministers
ministers about about the the German
German air air danger
danger.. In In late
late March
March 1938, 1938, they
they emphasized
emphasized that that in in
aa military
military confrontation
confrontation over over Czechoslovakia,
Czechoslovakia, Germany Germany would would dominate
dominate the the airair
and,
and, moreover,
moreover, that that thethe entire
entire Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe might might concentrate
concentrate on on Britain
Britain as as the
the most
most
promising
promising method method of of winning
winning the the war.
war. In In addition,
addition, they they warned
warned that that while
while earlier
earlier
studies
studies hadhad considered
considered aa possible possible air air attack
attack in in 1939,
1939, an an air
air offensive
offensive in in 1938
1938 would
would
cause
cause moremore damage damage because because fewer fewer defenses
defenses yet yet existed.9°
existed.* Upon Upon his his return
return fromfrom
meeting
meeting HitlerHitler at at Godesberg,
Godesberg, ChamberlainChamberlain remarked remarked to to his
his Cabinet
Cabinet colleagues
colleagues that that
he
he had
had just
just flown
flown up up the Thames and
the Thames and hadhad imagined
imagined German German bombers
bombers taking taking the the
same
same course
course." .9'
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, in in the
the final
final analysis,
analysis, fears fears aboutabout the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe probably
probably were were not not
decisive
decisive in in molding
molding the the British response to
British response to German
German threats threats before
before Munich
Munich.. In In fact,
fact,
by
by September
September 1938 1938 many many leading leading appeasers
appeasers felt felt that
that thethe WestWest could could beat beat
Germany
Germany in in aa war,
war,''^12 while
while the the British
British military
military in in late
late September
September came came around
around to to the
the
view
view that
that "the "the latent
latent resources
resources of of our
our Empire
Empire and and thethe doubtful
doubtful morale morale of of our
our
opponents
opponents under under the the stress
stress of of war
war give
give us us confidence
confidence as as to
to the
the ultimate
ultimate outcome
outcome [of [of
aa war]
war]."". "9s ButBut the the terrible
terrible costscosts of of World
World War War II lingered
lingered in in British
British mindsminds and and
tempered
tempered the the response
response.. As As the the Foreign
Foreign Minister,
Minister, Lord Lord Halifax,
Halifax, toldtold thethe Cabinet
Cabinet he he
"could
' 'could not not feelfeel we we werewere justified
justified in in embarking
embarking on on an an action
action thatthat would
would resultresult in in
such
such untold suffering.'. "94
untold suffering '*''
The
The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's effect effect on on the
the French
French in in 1938
1938 can,can, at at best,
best, bebe described
described as as causing
causing
both
both panic
panic and and aa collapse
collapse in in morale
morale.. AfterAfter the the French
French Chief Chief ofof Air
Air Staff
Staff hadhad visited
visited
Germany
Germany in in mid-August
mid-August and and hadhad been
been shown
shown aa displaydisplay of of aerial
aerial might,
might, he he returned
returned
to
to Paris
Paris to to advise
advise his his government
government that that thethe French
French air air force
force would
would last last barely
barely two two
weeks
weeks againstagainst the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe."^^ . 95 The
The spectacle
spectacle that that the the French
French Foreign
Foreign Minister,
Minister,
Georges
Georges Bonnet, Bonnet, made made in in warning
warning the the German
German ambassador
ambassador that that an an attack
attack on on
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia would would lead lead to to war,
war, while
while at at the
the same
same timetime begging
begging that that Germany
Germany
not
not putput France
France in in aa position
position where where she she must must honorhonor her her obligations,
obligations, reflected
reflected
desperate
desperate French French fears fears concerning
concerning the the German
German air air threat
threat.**.96 At
At the
the endend of of September
September
1938,
1938, aa seniorsenior general
general told told the the British
British military
military attachdattach^ thatthat in in aa European
European war, war,
"French
"French cities cities wouldwould be be laid
laid inin ruins
ruins [because]
[because] .. .. .. they they had
had nono means
means of of defense
defense." ."
He
He added
added that that France
France was was now now payingpaying the the price
price forfor thethe years
years ofof neglect
neglect of of her
her air air
force.
force." 91 There
There was, was, of of course,
course, no no more
more talktalk about
about aa forest
forest ofof guns
guns over over the
the Maginot
Maginot
Line
Line..
What is
What is Surprising,
surprising, given given the the predilection
predilection of of some
some historians
historians to to argue
argue that
that Munich
Munich
saved Britain from the Luftwaffe, is the fact that the German air force had made
saved Britain from the Luftwaffe, is the fact that the German air force had made
almost no preparation to wage war against the British. In August 1938, a staff
almost no preparation to wage war against the British. In August 1938, a staff
officer of Luftflotte 2, responsible in 1938 for operations over the North Sea and
officer of Luftftotte 2, responsible in 1938 for operations over the North Sea and
against
against the British Isles,
the British Isles, suggested
suggested that Germany's current
that Germany's current capability
capability to to attack
attack
Britain
Britain wouldwould amount amount to to pinpin pricks
pricks.'* ." In In late
late September,
September, General General Felmy, Felmy,
Commander of
Commander of Second
Second Air Force, warned
Air Force, warned the the high command that
high command that "given
"given the the means
means
at
at his disposal, aa war
his disposal, war of destruction against
of destruction against EnglandEngland seemed seemed to to be excluded."" In
be excluded."99 In

18
18
ORIGINS
ORIGINS AND
AND PREPARATION
PREPARATION

May
May 1939,
1939, Felmy
Felmy concluded
concluded an address by
an address by highlighting
highlighting the the lack
lack ofof preparation
preparation for for aa
"strategic" bombing offensive against Britain. He doubted whether the Luftwaffe
"strategic" bombing offensive against Britain. He doubted whether the Luftwaffe
could
could achieve
achieve more
more than limited success
than aa limited success in in 1940
1940 and
and admitted
admitted that that thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
would not have one air division fully trained and prepared to attack Britain in
would not have one air division fully trained and prepared to attack Britain in thethe
summer
summer of of 1939.
1939. Considering
Considering Second Second Air Air Force's
Force's equipment,
equipment, preparations
preparations for for an an
air offensive
air offensive on on Britain
Britain werewere totally
totally inadequate
inadequate (vollig
(vollig ungenugend)
ungenugend)."^ . 100
This
This state
state ofof affairs
affairs waswas aa result
result of of Germany's
Germany's strategic
strategic situation
situation.. Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
planners
planners hadhad toto face
face thethe fact
fact that their first
that their first commitment
commitment would would be be to
to aa major
major ground
ground
war
war.. The
The conduct
conduct and and thethe success
success of of those
those operations
operations wouldwould determine
determine whether whether
Germany
Germany would would surmount
surmount her narrow economic
her narrow economic and and strategic
strategic base
base and
and thusthus be be able
able
to
to fight
fight aa protracted
protracted worldworld war.war. If If not,
not, the
the war
war would
would endend right
right there.
there. In 1938, "Fall
In 1938, ' 'Fall
Griin,"
Grun," the the proposed
proposed attack attack on on Czechoslovakia,
Czechoslovakia, would would have have involved
involved the the
Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht in in aa major
major landland campaign
campaign againstagainst thethe Czech
Czech Republic,
Republic, leaving
leaving the the army
army
with
with only
only weak
weak ground
ground forcesforces to to protect
protect thethe Polish
Polish and
and French
French frontiers
frontiers.. As As waswas the the
case
case with "Fall Weiss,"
with "Fall Weiss," the the attack
attack on on Poland,
Poland, the the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht would would then then havehave
faced major ground
faced aa major ground campaign
campaign in in the
the west.
west.""101
The
The result
result of
of this strategic situation
this strategic situation was was that
that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe tied tied its
its plans
plans for for both
both
1938
1938 and 1939 closely
and 1939 closely to the operations
to the operations of of the
the army.
army. TheThe tasks
tasks of of the
the twotwo air air fleets
fleets
assigned
assigned to support the
to support the invasion
invasion of of Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia were were to to destroy
destroy the the Czech
Czech air air
force,
force, toto hinder
hinder the the mobilization
mobilization and and movement
movement of of reserves,
reserves, to support the
to support the army's
army's
advance,
advance, and and only
only then then to to attack
attack the the enemy's population.'"^2 Similarly,
enemy's population.'° Similarly, the the
Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's general
general staffstaff underscored
underscored that that the
the most
most important
important missions
missions in in the
the west
west
would
would be be toto attack
attack the French air
the French air force and prevent
force and prevent aa breakthrough
breakthrough along along the the
Westwall
Westwall by by Allied
Allied forces.
forces.'"^103 The
The same pattern repeated
same pattern repeated itself
itself inin 1939,
1939, except
except that that
this
this time
time Hitler refused to
Hitler refused to allow
allow himself
himself to to be
be robbed
robbed on on an
an opportunity
opportunity to to wage
wage his his
"little
"little war
war."."

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
In
In conclusion,
conclusion, several
several features
features of prewar Luftwaffe
of prewar Luftwaffe doctrine
doctrine deserve
deserve further
further
elaboration . The first, and most obvious, is that the prevailing historical picture of
elaboration. The first, and most obvious, is that the prevailing historical picture of aa
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe tiedtied closely
closely to to the
the army's
army's coattails
coattails isis no
no longer
longer tenable
tenable.. Most
Most Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
leaders
leaders from
from Goring
Goring through
through the the general
general staff
staff believed,
believed, as as did
did their
their counterparts
counterparts in in
Britain and the United States, that "strategic" bombing was the chief mission of an
Britain and the United States, that "strategic" bombing was the chief mission of an
air
air force
force and
and that
that in
in such
such aa role
role they
they would
would winwin the
the next
next war.
war.'"* They probably did
104 They probably did

not
not consider
consider the
the twin-engine
twin-engine aircraft
aircraft at
at their
their disposal
disposal inin 1937
1937 and
and 1938
1938 sufficient
sufficient for
for
aa campaign
campaign against
against Britain,
Britain, Russia,
Russia, oror the
the United
United States
States;; but
but within
within the
the context
context of of
Central Europe, were not such aircraft adequate for attacking Warsaw, Prague, and
Central Europe, were not such aircraft adequate for attacking Warsaw, Prague, and
Paris?
Paris? Most
Most Germans
Germans thought
thought so,so, and
and certainly
certainly thethe leaders
leaders ofthe
of the French
French and
and British
British
air forces agreed with them. For the long run, the Luftwaffe had begun work on
air forces agreed with them. For the long run, the Luftwaffe had begun work on aa
four-engine bomber for more distant targets . Like most of their contemporaries in
four-engine bomber for more distant targets. Like most of their contemporaries in
other air forces, Luftwaffe officers considerably overestimated the possibilities and
other air forces, Luftwaffe officers considerably overestimated the possibilities and
potential
potential ofof "strategic"
"strategic" air air war,
war, both
both inin terms
terms of of industrial
industrial damage
damage andand its
its impact
impact
on
on morale
morale.. This
This was
was neither
neither surprising
surprising nor nor unique,
unique, since
since there
there was
was so so little
little

19
19
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

empirical evidence on
empirical evidence on which
which to to base
base predictions
predictions.. The The prevalence
prevalence of of such
such attitudes
attitudes
within the Luftwaffe's
within the Luftwaffe % officer
officer corps
corps helps
helps explain
explain Rotterdam
Rotterdam as
as well
well as
as the
the
seemingly casual shift from an
seemingly casual shift from an air
air superiority
superiority strategy
strategy to
to a
a direct
direct attack
attack on
on London
London
during
during the the Battle
Battle of of Britain.
Britain. Moreover,
Moreover, in their approach
in their approach to to "strategic"
"strategic" bombing,bombing,
the Germans showed a greater awareness of the difficulties involved
the Germans showed a greater awareness of the difficulties involved in
in finding
finding and
and
hitting targets at night or in bad weather than did other air forces . For instance,
hitting targets at night or in bad weather than did other air forces. For instance, their
their
preparations
preparations in in developing
developing blind blind bombing
bombing devicesdevices like like "Knickebein"
"Knickebein" were were further
further
advanced by a full two years than those of the RAF .
advanced by a full two years than those of the RAF.
When
When AdolphAdolph Hitler launched the
Hitler launched the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht against against Poland Poland on on September
September 1, 1,
1939, to begin the Second World War, the Luftwaffe was in a considerably better
1939, to begin the Second World War, the Luftwaffe was in a considerably better
position
position than than itit had
had been
been the the previous
previous fall fall.. The
The staffstaff and and commanders
commanders had had solved
solved
most of the teething problems that had marked the transition into a new generation
most of the teething problems that had marked the transition into a new generation
of
of aircraft
aircraft in in 1937
1937 and and 1938 1938.. AirAir units
units possessed
possessed modern modern equipment,
equipment, and and anti-
anti-
aircraft
aircraft and and airborne
airborne forcesforces gave gave the the Germans capabilities that
Germans capabilities that other
other European
European air air
forces could
forces could not not match.
match. In In 1939,
1939, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was was closer
closer to to realizing
realizing the the potential
potential
of the
of the aircraft,
aircraft, while
while the the doctrine
doctrine of of close
close airair support
support and and cooperation
cooperation with with thethe army
army
placed
placed the the German
German air air force
force in in the
the position
position to to have
have aa decisive
decisive impactimpact on on the
the coming
coming
battles
battles beside
beside the the army's
army's armored
armored forcesforces..
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, there there werewere problems
problems.. AboveAbove all, all, there
there were were serious
serious deficiencies
deficiencies in in
the
the character
character of of thethe Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's leadership
leadership since since most most of of those
those occupying
occupying top top
positions
positions were were incapable
incapable of of thinking
thinking for for the the long
long pull pull.. On On the the technical
technical and and
production
production side, side, thethe Germans
Germans appeared appeared well well on on their
their way way to disaster.. By
to disaster By thethe spring
spring
of
of 1939,
1939, British
British aircraft
aircraft production
production was was approaching
approaching German German levels levels and and in in 1940
1940
would
would actually
actually surpass
surpass GermanGerman output .'°s The
output.'"' The factfact that that Goring
Goring had had shunted
shunted Milch Milch
aside
aside and turned the
and turned the technical
technical and and production
production side side over over to to Udet
Udet insured
insured that that this
this
ominous
ominous trend trend wouldwould continue.
continue. FurtherFurther exacerbating
exacerbating the the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's dangerous
dangerous
position
position were were certain
certain critical
critical research
research and and development
development decisions decisions taken taken in in thethe last
last
month
month before
before the the outbreak
outbreak of of war.
war. In In December
December 1938, 1938, Milch Milch pushed
pushed through
through aa
major
major reorganization
reorganization of of thethe production
production system system so so that
that the the aircraft
aircraft industry
industry could could
concentrate
concentrate on on developing
developing aa few few superior
superior aircraft
aircraft.'"*'. 101 InIn August
August 1939 1939 shortly
shortly before
before
the
the outbreak
outbreak of of war,
war. Goring
Goring along along withwith Udet,
Udet, Milch,Milch, and and Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek decided decided to to
constrict
constrict development
development and and production.
production. They They placedplaced strong strong development
development emphasis emphasis
on
on thethe He 177, Ju
He 177, Ju 88,
88, and and Me Me 210.'°'
210.'»' While
While such such emphasis
emphasis was was notnot meant
meant to to halt
halt
research
research and and development
development on on thethe next
next generation
generation of of aircraft,
aircraft, itit did did tend
tend to to slow
slow
down
down experimentation
experimentation.. When When the the Germans
Germans awoke awoke to to the
the danger
danger in in 1942,
1942, itit was was
already
already too too late
late;; they
they wouldwould fightfight thethe great
great air air battles
battles of of 1943
1943 and and 1944 1944 with with
basically
basically the the same
same equipment
equipment that that they
they had
had used
used against
against Poland Poland..'"^**
As
As discussed
discussed above, above, there there were
were factors
factors pushing
pushing the the Germans
Germans towards towards aa broaderbroader
conception
conception of of airpower
airpower than than waswas thethe case
case in in Britain
Britain and America.. Economic
and America Economic reality reality
placed severe limits on the nature and force structure of the Luftwaffe in the prewar
placed severe limits on the nature and force structure of the Luftwaffe in the prewar
period
period.. Even Even more more important
important than than this
this limiting
limiting factor factor was was Germany's
Germany's general general
strategic placement in the heart of the European continent .
strategic placement in the heart of the European continent. Unlike
Unlike British
British and
and
American air strategists, German air strategists
American air strategists, German air strategists faced
faced the
the prospect
prospect of
of a
a large-scale
large-scale
land
land battle
battle from
from the the moment
moment that that aa war
war began
began and and werewere nevernever in in aa position
position to to ignore
ignore

20
20
ORIGINS AND PREPARATION
ORIGINS AND PREPARATION

entirely
entirely the
the demands
demands of of Germany's
Germany's ground ground forces
forces.. Simultaneously,
Simultaneously, most most German
German
airmen did believe that "strategic" bombing would be a decisive factor in
airmen did believe that "strategic" bombing would be a decisive factor in the
the
coming war . Thus, German air strategy was a combination of these two divergent
coming war. Thus, German air strategy was a combination of these two divergent
elements
elements.. So So with
with the
the outbreak
outbreak of of hostilities,
hostilities, German
German airmen
airmen found
found themselves
themselves in in
quite
quite different
different strategic
strategic circumstances
circumstances than than they
they had
had originally
originally envisioned.
envisioned.
Unfortunately
Unfortunately for for the
the West,
West, thethe broader
broader based
based approach
approach of of Wever,
Wever, along
along withwith aa
greater
greater flexibility
flexibility inin Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe doctrine,
doctrine, corresponded
corresponded moremore closely
closely toto the
the combat
combat
capabilities
capabilities of of aircraft
aircraft inin the
the late
late 1930's than did
1930's than did the
the almost
almost exclusive
exclusive "strategic"
"strategic"
bombing
bombing doctrines
doctrines of of the
the RAF
RAF or or the
the US
US Army
Army Air
Air Corps . 109 The
Corps.'"^ The real
real war
war of
of 1939
1939
and
and 1940
1940 was not the
was not the war
war for
for which
which most
most of
of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had
had prepared,
prepared, butbut itit was
was aa
war
war in
in the
the initial
initial stages
stages to to which
which itit could
could and
and did
did adapt,
adapt, and
and to to which
which itit applied
applied
airpower
airpower in in cooperation
cooperation with with the
the army
army toto gain
gain anan initial,
initial, devastating
devastating strategic
strategic
victory
victory that
that unfortunately,
unfortunately, fromfrom the
the German
German perspective,
perspective, could
could notnot be
be sustained
sustained..

21
Notes
Notes
11.. For
For this
this view,
view, see see Dennis
Dennis Richards,
Richards, The The Royal
Royal AirAir Force,
Force, 1939-1945
1939-1945 (London,
(London, 1953), 1953), pp,. 29
29;; Asher
Asher
Lee,
Lee, The German Air
The German Force (New
Air Force (New York,York, 1946),
1946), pp pp.. 16-17
16-17;; and and even
even surprisingly
surprisingly Sir Sir Charles
Charles Webster
Webster
and
and Noble
Noble Frankland,
Frankland, The Strategic Air
The Strategic Offensive Against
Air Offensive Against GermanyGermany (SAOAG),
(SAOAG), Vol Vol.. I,I, Preparation
Preparation
(London,
(London, 1961), 1961), pp.. 125 125..
22.. For
For aa fuller
fuller discussion
discussion of the impact
of the impact of of the
the German
German economic
economic situation
situation on on rearmament,
rearmament, see see my
my
dissertation
dissertation:: Williamson
Williamson Murray, Murray, "The "The Change
Change in in the
the European
European Balance Balance of of Power,
Power, 1938-1939,"
1938-1939," Yale Yale
University
University dissertation,
dissertation, 1975, 1975, Chapter
Chapter V V..
33.. For
For aa discussion
discussion of of the
the German
German coal coal situation,
situation, see see:: Institut
Institut fiir
fiir Weltwirtschaft
Weltwittschaft an an der
der Universitat
Universitat
Kiel,
Kiel, "Die "Die Kohlenversorgung
Kohlenversorgung Europas Europas durch durch Grossdeutschland
Grossdeutschland unter unter den den gegenwartigen
gegenwartigen
kriegswirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten,"
kriegswirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten," Oct Oct 1939,
1939, National
National ArchivesArchives and and Records
Records Service
Service (NARS)
(NARS)
T-84/195/1560466..
T-84/195/1560466
44.. Abschrift
Abschrift einer einer Aufstellung
Aufstellung der der Uberwachungsstelle
Uberwachungsstelle fur fiir Mineral61
Mineralol vom vom 33.5.38.,
.5 .38 ., "Deutschlands
"Deutschlands
Mineraldl
Mineralol nach nach In- In- andund Auslandsaufkommen
Auslandsaufkommen in in denden JahrenJahren 1928-1937
1928-1937 in in 1000t,"
lOOOt," NARS NARS
T-77/282/1107267
T-77/282/1107267.. There There is is an
an additional
additional problem
problem present
present here here.. The
The synthetic
synthetic fuelfuel process
process andand its
its basic
basic
raw
raw material,
material, coal, coal, were
were not not conducive
conducive to to the
the production
production of of high-octane gasoline, and
high-octane gasoline, and the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
would
would have have aa major major problem
problem throughout
throughout the the warwar inin obtaining
obtaining sufficient
sufficient amounts
amounts of of high-octane
high-octane aviation
aviation
fuel
fuel..
55.. Speech
Speech by by Korvettenkapitan
Korvettenkapitiin Haensel, Haensel, 44.3.39. .3 .39 . wahrend
wahrend des des Kriegsspieles
Kriegsspieles des des
Marinekommandoamtes
Marinekommandoamtes in Oberhof, pp.. 13,
inOberhof, 13, NARS
NARS T-1022/PG49089
T-1022/PG49089..
66.. OKW
OKW Economic Economic Staff, Staff, "Die"Die Arbeiten
Arbeiten des des Wi Wi RiiRii Amtes
Amtes an an der
der Mineraldl-Versorgung,"
Mineralol-Versorgung," pp.. 37, 37,
NARS T-77/282/1107267
NARS T-77/282/1107267..
77.. For
For aa fullerfuller discussion
discussion of of these
these problems,
problems, see: see: Hans-Erich
Hans-Erich Volkmann,
Volkmann, "Aussenhandel
"Aussenhandel and und
Aufrustung
Aufriistung in in Deutschland,
Deutschland, 1933 1933 bisbis 1939,"
1939," Wirischaft
Wirtschafi and und Riistung
Riistung am am Vorabend
Vorabend des des Zweiten
Zweiten
Weltkrieges,
Wellkrieges, ed ed.. bbyy Friedrich
Friedrich Forstmeier
Forstmeier and and Hans-Erich
Hans-Erich Volkmann
Volkmann (Dusseldorf,
(Dflsseldorf, 1975),1975), pp.. 8585..
88.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp.. 89 89..
99.. Ibid
Ibid..
10
10.. Dieter
DieterPetzim,Petzina, Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart, 1968),
AutarkiepolitikimDritlenReich(Stuttgm, 1968), pp.. 103
103..
11
11.. International
International Military Military Tribunal
Tribunal (IMT),
(IMT), TrialTrial of Major War
of Major War Criminals
Criminals (TMWC),
(TMWC), XXXII, XXXII, Doc Doc..
#3575PSS
#3575PSS..
12
12.. Ibid ., Doc . #1301PS
Ibid.,Doc. #1301PS..
13
13.. JJ.. Dulffer,
DUlffer, Weimar,Weimar, HitlerHitler andund die
die Marine
Marine:: Reichpolitik
Reichpoliiik and und Flottenbau,
Ftotienbau, 1920-1939
}920-1939 (Ddsseldorf,
(Diisseldorf,
1973),
1973), pp.. 504 504..
14
14.. Edward
Edward W W.. Bennett,
Bennett, German
German Rearmament
Rearmament and and the
the West,
West, 1932-1933
1932-1933 (Princeton,
(Princeton, 1979),
1979), pp.324.
.324 .
15
15.. Douglas
Douglas H H.. Robinson,
Robinson, "The "The Zeppelin
Zeppelin Bomber,"
Bomber," The The Air Air Power
Power Historian
Historian (July(July 1961),
1961), pp.. 133
133..
16
16.. Grand
Grand AdmiralAdmiral Alfred
Alfred von von Tirpitz,
Tirpitz, MyMy Memoirs,
Memoirs, Vol Vol.. II II (New
(New York,
York, 1919),
1919), pp pp.. 271-72
271-72..
17
17.. For
For an an excellent
excellent discussion
discussion of of the
the German
German "strategic"
"strategic" bombing bombing efforteffort in
in World
World War War I,I, see
see:: Francis
Francis
K
K.. Mason,
Mason, Battle Battle Over
Over Britain
Britain (New(New York,
York, 1969), Chapter II,.
1969), Chapter
18
18.. For
For Seeckt's
Seeckt's interest
interest in in the
the development
development of of motorized
motorized forces forces and and hishis recognition
recognition of of their
their
importance
importance for for future
future defense
defense policy,
policy, see see:: Reichswehrministerium,
Reichswehrministerium, Chef Chef der der Heeresleitung,
Heeresleitung, Betr: Betr:
"Harzdbung
"Harziibung 88.1.22.," .1 .22 .," NARS
NARS T-79/65/000622
T-79/65/000622..
19
19.. For
For the the best
best description
description of of Seeckt's
Seeckt's contribution
contribution to to the
the carrying
carrying over
over ofof aa portion
portion of of Germany's
Germany's
World
Worid War War II air air force
force into
into the
the body
body of of the
the Reichswehr,
Reichswehr, see see:: Karl-Heinz
Karl-Heinz Volker,
Volker, "Die "Die Entwicklung
Entwicklung der der
militdfschen
militarischen Luftfahrt Luftfahrt in in Deutschland,
Deutschland, 1920-1933,"
1920-1933," in Beitrdge zur
inBeitrdge zur Militdr-und Kriegsgeschichte, Vol
Militdr-undKriegsgeschichte Vol.
III,
III, (Stuttgart,
(Stuttgart, 1962), 1962), pp pp.. 126-27
126-27..
20
20.. ForFor aa discussion
discussion of of the
the historiography
historiography surrounding
surrounding the the Weimar
Weimar period's
period's contribution
contribution to to the
the
Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, see see:: Edward
Edward L L.. Homze's
Homze's outstanding
outstanding study study Arming
Arming the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, The The Reich
Reich AirAir Ministry
Ministry and and
the
the German
German AircraftAircraft Industry,
Industry, 1919-1939
1919-1939 (Lincoln,
(Lincoln, 1976),
1976), pp pp.. 40-41
40-41.. For
For the
the other
other outstanding
outstanding studystudy ofof
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe after after 1933,
1933, seesee:: Karl-Heinz
Karl-Heinz Volker,
Volker, Die Die deutsche
deutsche Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, 1933-1939
1933-1939:: Aufbau,Aufbau, Fuhrung
FUhrung
und
und Rllstung
Riistung der der Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe Bowie sowie die die Entwicklung
Entwicklung der der deutschen
deutschen Luftkriegstheorie
Luftkriegstheorie (Stuttgart,
(Stuttgart, 1967)1967)..
From
From the the small
small corps
corps of of flying officers within
flying officers within the the Reichswehr,
Reichswehr, 97 97 army
army andand 1919 naval
naval officers
officers would
would reach
reach
general officer rank
general officer rank in in the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. In In addition,
addition, aa number
number of of army
army officers
officers such
such as as Kesselfng
Kesselring and and
Wever
Wever would would transfertransfer to to the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and and then
then learn
learn toto fly
fly after
after 1933
1933.. Volker,
Volker, "Die "Die Entwicklung
Entwicklung der der
militarischen
militarischen LuftfahrtLuftfahrt in in Deutschland,
Deutschland, 1920-1933,"
1920-1933," pp pp.. 284-88
284-88..
21
21.. Ibid
Ibid., ., pp.. 32
32..
22
22.. It
It isis worth
worth noting
noting that
that the
the army
army waswas no more willing
no more willing to to allow
allow the
the establishment
establishment of of aa joint
joint services
services
high
high command
command..

22
22
ORIGINS AND PREPARATION
ORIGINS AND PREPARATION

23
23.. For
For aa discussion
discussion of Goring's role
of G6ring's role in in the
the Nazi
Nazi seizure
seizure of of power,
power, see see Karl Dietrich Bracher,
Karl Dietrich Bracher,
Wolfgang
Wolfgang Sauer,Sauer, and Gerhard Schulz,
and Gerhard Schulz, DieDie Nationalsozialistische
Nationalsozialislische Machtergreifung
Machtergreifung (K6ln, (Koln, 1960)
1960)..
24
24.. IMT,
IMT, TMWC,
TMWC. XXXVIII, XXXVIII, Doc Doc.. 140-R
140-R..
25
25.. For
For anan interesting
interesting study study of of Milch
Milch and and his
his contribution
contribution to to the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, see see David
David Irving's
Irving's The The Rise
Rise
and
and Fall
Fall ofofthe
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, The The Life of Field
Life of Field Marshal
Marshal ErhardErhard Milch
Milch (Boston,
(Boston, 1973) 1973)..
26
26.. Wilhelm
Wilhelm Deist,Deist, Manfred Messerschmidt, Hans-Erich
Manfred Messerschmidt, Hans-Erich Volkmann,
Volkmann, Wolfram Wolfram Wette,Wette, DasDas deutsche
deutsche
Reich
Reich and and derder Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. 1, I, Ursachen
Ursachen and und Voraussetzung
Voraussetzung der der deutschen
deutschen Kriegspolitik
Kriegspolitik
(Stuttgart,
(Stuttgart, 1979),
1979), pp.. 478 478..
27
27.. Homze,
Homze, ArmingArming the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp pp.. 60,
60, 235 235..
28
28.. Ibid
Ibid.,., p.
p. 236
236.. ItIt isis worth
worth noting
noting that
that Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek had had been
been aa pilotpilot inin World
World WarWar II and
and subsequently
subsequently
served
served mostly
mostly withwith the the air
air planning
planning staffs
staffs within
within the the Reichswehr
Reichswehr during during the the Weimar
Weimar periodperiod..
29
29.. Deist,
Deist, et al ., Das
etal.. Das deutsche
deutsche Reich Reich andund derder Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. II., ., pp
pp.. 478-79
478-79..
30
30.. Ibid.,
Ibid ., pp.. 479
479..
31
31.. Horst
Horst Boog,
Boog, "Higher"Higher CommandCommand and and Leadership
Leadership in in the
the German
German Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, 1935-1945,"
1935-1945," Air Air
Power
Power and Warfare, Proceedings
and Warfare, Proceedings of the Eighth
of the Eighth Military
Military History
History Symposium,
Symposium, USAF USAF Academy,
Academy, ed ed.. bbyy
Colonel
Colonel Alfred
Alfred F. F. Hurley
Huriey and and Major Robert C
Major Robert C.. Ehrhart
Ehihart (Washington,
(Washington, 1979) 1979)..
32.. Dr
32 Dr.. Boog's
Boog's aboveabove cited cited article
article is particularly useful
is particularly useful inin his
his discussion
discussion of of the
the intellectual
intellectual limitations
limitations
of
of the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's officer corps..
officer corps
33
33.. Bernard Heimann and
Bernard Heimann and Joachim
Joachim Schunke,
Schunke, "Eine "Bine geheime
geheime Denkschrift
Denkschrift zur zur Luftkriegskonzeption
Luftkriegskonzeption
Hitler-Deutschlands
Hitler-Deutschlands vom vom MaiMai 1933,"
1933," Zeitschriftf4rMilitirgeschichte,
ZeitschriftfiirMilitargeschichte, Vol Vol.. III
Ill (1964),
(1964), pp pp.. 72-86
72-86..
34
34.. Klaus
Klaus A A.. Maier,
Maier, Horst Horst Rohde,
Rohde, BerndBemd Stegemann,
Stegemann, and and HansHans Umbreit,
Umbreit, Das Das deutsche
deutsche Reich
Reich and und der
der
Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. II, II, Die
Die Errichtung
Errichtung der der Hegemonie
Hegemonie auf aufdemdem Europdischen
Europdischen Kontinent
Kontinent (Stuttgart,
(Stuttgart,
1979),
1979), pp.. 44
44..
35
35.. For
For aa full
full discussion
discussion of of the
the different
different programs
programs and and the
the industrial
industrial and and engineering
engineering problems
problems that that the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe faced,
faced, seesee:: Homze,
Homze, ArmingArming the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Chapter
Chapter IX IX..
36
36.. Deist,
Deist, et et alal..., Das
Das deutsche
deutsche Reich Reich and und der der Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. I,I, pp
pp.. 480-81
480-81;; seesee Homze,
Homze,
Arming
Arming the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 184, 184, forfor aa detailed
detailed breakdown
breakdown of of worker
worker distribution
distribution within
within thethe aircraft
aircraft
industry
industry..
37
37.. See,
See, in in particular,
particular, Wever'sWever's lecturelecture to to the
the German
German Air Air WarWar College,
College, 11.11.35.
.11 .35 . "Vortrag
"Vortrag des des
Generalmajors
Generalmajors Wever Wever bei bei Erbffnung
Eroffnung der der Luftkriegsakademie
Luftkriegsakademie and und Lufttechnischen
Lufttechnischen Akademie Akademie in in Berlin-
Berlin-
Gatow
Gatowam am I1.. November
November 1935," \9'i5," Die Die Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe (1936) (\9^(,)..
38
38.. Karl-Heinz
Karl-Heinz V61ker, Volker, Dokumente
Dokumente and und Dokumentarfotos
Dokumentarfotos zur zur Geschichte
Geschichte der der deutschen
deutschen Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
(Stuttgart,
(Stuttgart, 1968),
1968), DocDoc.. # 184, pp.. 429
#184, 429..
39
39.. "Die
"Die Luftkriegf0hrung,"
Luftkriegfiihrung," Berlin Beriin 1935
1935;; copycopy made
made available
available to to the
the author
author by by Oberstleumant
Oberstleutnant Klaus Klaus
Maier
Maier of of the
the Militiirgeschichtliches
Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt,Forschungsamt, Freiburg, Freiburg, Federal
Federal Republic
Republic of of Germany
Germany..
40
40.. Ibid ., paragraph
Ibid., paragraph 11 11..
41
41.. See
See Herbert
Herbert M M.. Mason,
Mason, Jr., Jr., The
The Rise
Rise of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe (New (New York, York, 1973),
1973), pp pp.. 213-15
213-15;; Peter
Peter
Calvocoressi
Calvocoressi and and GuyGuy Wint, Wint, TotalTotal WarWar (London,
(London, 1972), 1972), pp.. 492 492;; Dennis
Dennis Richards,
Richards, Royal
Royal AirAir Force,
Force,
1939-1945,
1939-1945, Vol Vol.. II (London,
(London, 1953), 1953), pp.. 29 29;; Basil
Basil Collier,
Collier, The
The Defense
Defense of of the
the United
United Kingdom
Kingdom (London,
(London,
1957),
1957), pp.. 121 121;; Telford
Telford Taylor,Taylor, The The Breaking
Breaking Wave Wave (New
(New York, York, 1967), 1967), pp.. 83 83;; and
and Webster
Webster and and
Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,
SAOAG, Vol Vol.. 1,
I, pp.. 125
125..
42
42.. V61ker,
Volker, Die deutsche Luftwaffe,
Die'deutsche Luftwaffe, pp pp.. 132-33
132-33;; andand H H.. Schliephake,
Schliephake, The The Birth
Birth ofof the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
(Chicago,
(Chicago, 1972),
1972), pp pp.. 38-39
38-39.. For For further
further amplification
amplification on on the
the failure
failure to to have
have aa heavy
heavy bomber
bomber in in the
the later
later
1930's,
I930's, seesee Edward
Edward LL.. Homze's Homze's excellent
excellent piece,
piece, "The"The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's Failure Failure to to Develop
Develop aa Heavy
Heavy Bomber
Bomber
Before
Before World
World War War II," II," Aerospace
Aerospace Historian
Historian (March (March 1977)
1977).. ForFor aa fascinating
fascinating and and groundbreaking
groundbreaking work work
on
on thethe problems
problems of of engine
engine development,
development, see see Edward
Edward W W.. Constant,
Constant, III, III, The
The Origins
Origins of of the
the Turbo
Turbo Jet Jet
Revolution
Revolution (Baltimore,
(Baltimore, 1980) 1980).. See See also
also C C.. Fayette
Fayette Taylor,
Taylor, Aircraft
Aircraft Propulsion,
Propulsion, A A Review
Review of of the
the
Evolution
Evolution ofAircraftPiston
ofAircraft Piston Engines Engines (Washington,
(Washington, 1971) I97I)..
43
43.. See
See the
the discussion
discussion by by Hans
Hans Speier,
Speier, "Ludendorff-.
"Ludendorff-. The The German
German Concept Concept of of Total
Total War,"
War," Makers
Makers of of
Modern
Modern Strategy,
Strategy, ed ed.. byby Edward_
Edward Mead Mead Earle
Earie (Princeton,
(Princeton, 1943)
1943).. II would
would also also like
like to
to thank
thank Oberstleumant
Oberstleutnant
Klaus
Klaus Maier
Maier of of the
the MiliOrgeschichtliches
Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt
Forschungsamt for for making
making available
available to to me
me his
his lecture
lecture given
given at at
the
the Air
Air War
War College
College in in September
September 1980 1980 in in Montgomery,
Montgomery, Alabama, Alabama, that that clarified
clarified thethe connection
connection and and
importance
importance of of the
the concept
concept of of total
total war
war andand its
its relationship
relationship to to the
the development
development of of Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe doctrine
doctrine..
44
44.. Erich
Erich Ludendorff, Kriegsfuhrung and
Ludendorff, Kriegsfiihrung Politik (Berlin,
undPolitik (Beriin, 1922),
1922), pp pp.. 328-33
328-33..
45
45.. See
See the
the interesting
interesting discussion
discussion of of this
this point
point in in Deist,
Deist, et et alal.,., Das
Das deutsche
deutsche ReichReich andund der
der Zweite
Zweite
Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. 1,I, pp
pp.. 124-25
124-25..
46 . Heimann
46. Heimann and and Schunke,
Schunke, "Eine "Eine geheime Denkschrift zur
geheime Denkschrift zur Luftkriegskonzeption
Luftkriegskonzeption Hitler-Deutschlands
Hitler-Deutschlands
vom
vomMai 1933," pp
Mai 1933," pp.. 72-86
72-86..

23
23
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

47.. See
47 See Air Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise Fall of
and Fall
Rise and of the
the German
German Air Air Force
Force (1933-1945),
(1933-1945), issued issued byby the
the AirAir
Ministry (ACAS) (London,
Ministry (ACAS) (London, 1948), 1948), pp.. 4242..
48
48.. See,
See, in in particular,
particular, OberstOberst (E) (E) Frhr
Frhr.. vv.. Bulow,
Bulow, "Die "Die Grundlagen
Grundlagen neuzeificher
neuzeitlicher Luftstreitkriifte,"
Luftstreitkrafte,"
Militkrwissenschgftliche
Militdrwissenschaftliche Rundschau Rundschau (1936) (1936);; Major Major Bartz,Bartz, "Kriegsflugzeuge,
"Kriegsflugzeuge, ihre ihre Aufgaben
Aufgaben and und
Leistung,"
Leistung," (1936) (1936);; and particularly Major
and particularly Major Herhudt
Herhudt von von Rohden,
Rohden, "Betrachtungen
"Betrachtungen uber iiber den
den Luftkrieg,"
Luftkrieg,"
also Milit6rwissenschaftlicheRundschau 44 parts
alsoMilildrwissenschaftlicheRundschau parts (1937)
(1937)..
49.. Bartz,
49 Bartz, "Kriegsflugzeuge,
"Kriegsflugzeuge, ihre ihre Aufgaben
Aufgaben and und Leistung,"
Leistung," pp.. 210 210..
50
50.. von
von Rohden,
Rohden, "Betrachtungen
"Betrachtungen abet iiber denden Luftkrieg,"
Luftkrieg," Part Parti,I, pp
PP-. 198-200
198-200..
51
51.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL7/42, RL7/42, Luftflottenkommando
Luftflottenkommando 2, 2, Fuhrungsabteilung
Fuhrungsabteilung Nr Nr.. 7093/39
7093/39 gg.. Kdos,
Kdos, 13 .5 .39 .,
13.5.39.,
Schlussbesprechung
Schlussbesprechung des des Planspiels,
Planspiels, 1939 1939.. Those
Those who desire another
who desire example of
another example of how
how senior
senior staff
staffofficers
officers
thought
thought the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe would would wage wage an an independent
independent "strategic"
"strategic" air air warwar should
should consult: Chef des
consult: Chef des
Organisationsstabes
Organisationsstabes im im Generalstab
Generalstab der der Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe Nr Nr.. 50/38
50/38 Chefsache,
Chefsache, An An denden Chef
Chef des
des Generalstabes
Generalstabes
der
der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, "Organisationsstabee
"Organisationsstudie I950," 1950," NARS NARS T-971/36/0002
T-971/36/0002..
52
52.. Irving,The
Irvingjhe Rise Rise and and Fall
Fall ofof the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 47 47..
53.. Ibid
53 Ibid., ., pp.. 69
69.. Although
Although many many times,
times, Milch's
Milch's abrasive
abrasive personality
personality led led him
him into major conflicts
into major conflicts with with
his
his fellow
fellow Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe officers,officers, thethe fault
fault inin this
this case
case seems
seems to to have
have lain
lain with
with Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek..
54.. Homze,
54 Homze, Arming Arming the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp pp.. 223-24
223-24..
55.. Deist,
55 Deist, et al ., Das
etal., Das deutsche
deutsche Reich
Reich andund der der Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Wellkrieg, Vol Vol.. I,
I, pp.. 645
645..
56
56.. Irving,
Irving, The The Rise and Fall
Rise and Fall ofof the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 68 68..
57
57.. RR.. JJ.. Overy,
Overy, "German"German Aircraft
Aircraft Production
Production 1939-1942
1939-1942:: A A Study
Study in in the
the German
German War War Economy,"
Economy,"
Cambridge
Cambridge University
University dissertation,
dissertation, 1977,1977, pp.. 22;; for for aa discussion
discussion of of the
the prewar
prewar German
German production
production plans,
plans,
see
see:: R R.. JJ.. Overy,
Overy, "The German Pre-War
"The German Pre-War Aircraft Production Plans
Aircraft Production Plans:: November
November 1936-April
1936-April 1939,"
1939,"
English
English Historical
Historical Review Review (1975)
(l975)..
58
58.. Ibid
Ibid., ., pp.. 11
11..
59
59.. Homze,
Homze, Arming Arming the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 106 106..
60
60.. Deist,
Deist, et et al ., Das
al.. Das deutsche
deutsche Reich
Reich andund der der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol
Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol.. 1,I, pp
pp.. 484-85
484-85..
61
61.. Homze,
Homze, Arming Arming the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp pp.. 82-87
82-87 and 158-63..
and 158-63
62
62.. Ibid
Ibid., ., pp
pp.. 120-21
120-21..
63
63.. For
For the the surprisingly
surprisingly low low capacity
capacity levelslevels of of the
the German
German munitions
munitions industry
industry in in the
the thirties,
thirties, see see::
Bericht
Bericht des des HewnHerm Professor
Professor Dr. Dr. CC.. Krauch
Krauch fiber iiber die
die Lage
Lage aufauf dem
dem Arbeitsgebiet
Arbeitsgebiet der der Chemie
Chemie in in der
der
Sitzung
Sitzung des des Generalrates
Generalrates am am 24 .6 .41 . , NARS
24.6.41., NARS T-84/217/1586749
T-84/2I7/1586749..
64
64.. Deist,
Deist, et al ., Das
etal.. Das deutsche
deutsche Reich
Reich andund der der Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. I,
I, pp.. 490
490..
65.. Homze,
65 Homze, Arming Arming the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp pp.. 167-68
167-68..
66
66.. Milch
Milch Collection,
Collection, Imperial
Imperial War War Museum,
Museum, Reel Reel 55,55, Vol
Vol.. 57,
57, Der
Der ChefChef des des Nachschubamts,
Nachschubamts, Nr Nr..
3365/38,
3365/38, gg.. Kdos Kdos.,., Berlin,
Berlin, 33.11.38.,
.11 .38 ., Anlage
Anlage L L.. EE.. 22.. Nr
Nr.. 15 .222/3 8 gg.. Kdos,
15.222/38 Kdos, Berlin,
Berlin, OkiOkt 1938,
1938,
"Erfahrungsbericht
"Erfahrungsbericht uber iiber die
die Spannungszeit
Spannungszeit 1938," 1938," pp.. 32703270..
67
67.. Richard Suchenwirth, The
Richard Suchenwirth, The Development
Development of ofthe
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, 1919-1939
I9J9~J939 (New (New York,
York, 1970),
1970),
pp.. 148
148..
68.. PRO
68 PRO CAB CAB 23/89,
23/89, Cab Cab 35(37), Meeting of
35(37), Meeting of the
the Cabinet,
Cabinet, 29 .9 .37 ., pp.. 215
29.9.37., 215..
69
69.. PRO
PRO CAB CAB 21/575,
21/575, 15 .10 .37 ., "French
15.10.37., "French and and German
German Maneuvers,"
Maneuvers," aa note note by by Field
Field Marshal
Marshal Sir Sir C C..
Deverell
Deverell on on hishis visit
visit.. TheThe French,
French, of of course,
course, mightmight have have been
been disguising
disguising their their real
real fears
fears from
from aa
thoroughly
thoroughly unreliable
unreliable ally ally.. Still,
Still, they
they spent
spent little
little on
on their
their air
air force
force until
until the
the awakening
awakening of of 1938
1938..
70.
70. Volker,
V6\Vier, Dokumente
Dokumente and Dokumentarfotos zur
undDokumentarfotos zur Geschichte
Geschichte der der deutschen
deutschen Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Doc Doc.. # 196, pp..
#196,
449
449..
71
71.. Gerhard
Gerhard Weinberg,
Weinberg, The The Foreign
Foreign Policy
Policy ofHitler's
of Hitler's Germany,
Germany, 1933-1936
1933-1936 (Chicago,
(Chicago, 1970),
1970), pp.. 298 298..
72
72.. "Einsatz
"Einsatz der der deutschen
deutschen Flakartillerie
Flakartillerie in in Spanien,"
Spanien," Aus Aus Koehlers
Koehlers Flieger Flieger Kilender
Kalender 1940 1940;;
"Flakeinsatz
"Flakeinsatz "wahrend "wahrend des des Feldzuges
Feldzuges in in Spanien,"
Spanien," Auszug Auszug aus aus einer
einer Ausarbeitung
Ausarbeitung von von Gen
Gen.. Lt
Lt.. Karl
Karl
Veith
Veith vom vom Mai Mai 194,194, Karlsruhe
Karlsruhe Collection,
Collection, AlbertAlbert FF.. Simpson
Simpson Historical
Historical Research
Research Center
Center (AFSHRC)
(AFSHRC)-: K K
113 .302 .
113.302.
73
73.. "Auswirkung
"Auswirkung der der Erfahrungen
Erfahrungen in in Spanien,"
Spanien," Aus Aus einer
einer Ausarbeitung
Ausarbeitung von von Generallt
Generallt.. Galland
Galland uber uber
die Luftverteidigung des Reiches, 1946
dieLuftverteidigungdesReiches, 1946.. Ibid
Ibid..
74
74.. Conversation
Conversation with with Generalmajor
Generalmajor aa.D. .D . Hans
Hans W W.. Asmus,
Asmus, Baden
Baden Baden,
Baden, November
November 77 and and 88;; 1980,
,
1980,
and
and letter
letter from
from General
General Asmus,Asmus, February
February 6, 6, 1981
1981..
75
75.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofofthethe German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 16-17
16-17..
76
76.. "Lehren
"Lehren aus aus demdem Feldzug
Feldzug in in Spanien,
Spanien, Einsatz
Einsatz von von Schlachtfliegem,"
Schlachtfliegem," aus aus einer
einer Studie
Studie derder 88.. Abt
Abt..
des
des Generalstabes
Generalstabes aus aus dem
dem Jahre
Jahre 1944
1944;; Hans
Hans Hennig
Hennig Freiherr
Freiherr vonvon Beust,
Beust, "Die "Die deutsche
deutsche Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe im im
spanischen
spanischenKrieg," Krieg," 22.10.56.,.10 .56 ., pp.. 162,
162, AFSHRC
AFSHRC:: K K 113 .302 .
113.302.
77.. Maier,
77 Maiei, et et al
al.,., Das
Das deutsche
deutsche ReichReich andund der der Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 53
53..

24
24
ORIGINS AND PREPARATION
ORIGINS AND PREPARATION

78
78.. Oberst
Oberst Jaenecke,
Jaenecke, "Lehren"Lehren des spanischen Biirgerkrieges,"
des spanisehen Biirgerkrieges," Jahrbuch Jahrbuch des des deutschen
deutschen Heeres,
Heeres. 1938 1938
(Leipzig,
(Leipzig, 1939)1939)..
79.. OKM,
79 OKM, B B.. Nr
Nr., ., l1.. Abt.
Abt. Skl.
Ski. llaa 961/38g .Kdos ., Berlin,
961/38g.Kdos., Berlin, 14 Geheime Kommandosache,
.7 .38., Geheime
14.7.38., Kommandosache,
NARS
NARS T-I022/2957/PG48902
T-1022/2957/PG48902..
80
80.. Homze,
Homze, Arming
Arming the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, p. p. 172.
172.
81
81.. PRO
PRO CABCAB 63/14,
63/14, II.. O. O. (S)l
(S)l., ., 19 .7 .37., Air
19.7.37., Air Raid
Raid Precautions
Precautions Department,
Department, Intelligence
Intelligence Section,
Section,
visit
visit toto Berlin
Berlinof of Major
Major F. F. L L.. Fraser,
Fraser, "Interview
"Interview with with Ministeralrat
Ministeralrat Grosskreuz
Grosskreuz." ."
82
82.. Von
Von Beust,
Beust, "Die"Die deutsche
deutsche Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe im im spanischen
spanischen Krieg,"Krieg," p. p. 140ff.
140ff.
83.. BA/MA
83 BA/MA RL RL 22 II/101,
11/101, "Zusammenhdnge
"Zusammenhange zwischen zwischen Meteorologic
Meteorologie and und Taktik,"
Taktik," Vortrag:
Vortrag: General
General
derFlieger Kesselring, Chef
derFliegerKesselring, Chef der Luftflotte 11.,
der Luftflotte ., 11.3.39.,
.3 .39., p. p. 5.
5.
84.. See
84 PRO AIR
See PRO AIR 20/1623,
20/1623, Air Air Scientific
Scientific Intellience
Intellience ReportReport No No.. 6,6, "The
"The Crooked
Crooked Leg,"Leg," 28 .6 .40.,
28.6.40.,
for
for aa discussion
discussion of of how
how British
British intelligence
intelligence discovered
discovered the the German
German systemsystem..
85
85.. Air
Air Historical
Historical Branch,
Branch, Air Air Ministry,
Ministry, VII, VII, Translations
Translations;: Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability
Statistics,
Statistics, G G 302694/AR/9/51/50
302694/AR/9/51/50..
86
86.. BA/MA
BA/MA RL RL 7/164,
7/164, Der Der Kommandierende
Kommandierende General General and und Befehlshaber
Befehlshaber der der Luftwaffengruppe
Luftwaffengruppe 3., 3.,
11.12.38.,
.12 .38., "Erfahrungsbericht
"Erfahrungsbericht fiber iiber die
die Spannungszeit
Spannungszeit 1938 1938:: Teil
Teil II ."
II."
87
87.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise andFall
and Fall of of the
ihe German
German AirForce,
Air Force. 1933-1945
J933-1945 (London,(London, 1948),
1948), pp pp.. 19-20.
19-20.
88
88.. Milch
Milch Collection,
Collection, Imperial
Imperial War War Museum,
Museum, Reel Reel 55, 55, Vol.
Vol. 57,57, Der
Der Chef
Chef des
des Nachschubamts,
Nachschubamts, Nr Nr..
3365/38,
3365/38, g. g. KdosKdos., ., 3.11 .38. ; Anlage
3.11.38.; Anlage L.E L.E.. 22.. Nr Nr.. 15 .222/38, "Erfahrungsbericht
15.222/38, "Erfahrungsbericht uber iiber die die
Spannungszeit,"
Spannungszeit," p. p. 3270
3270..
89
89.. For
For aa fuller
fuller discussion
discussion of of this
this issue,
issue, seesee my my article,
article, "German
"German Air Air Power
Power and and the
the Munich
Munich Crisis,"
Crisis,"
War
War andand Society,
Society, VolVol.. II, II, ed
ed.. by
by Brian
Brian Bond Bond and and IanIan Roy
Roy (London,
(London, 1977) 1977)..
90
90.. Public
Public Record
Record Office
Office (PRO)
(PRO) CAB CAB 53/37,
53/37, COS COS 698 698 (Revise),
(Revise), CID, CID, COSCOS Subcommittee,
Subcommittee, "Military"Military
Implications
Implicationsof of German
German Aggression
Aggression AgainstAgainst Czechoslovakia,"
Czechoslovakia," 28 .3 .38 ., pp
28.3.38., pp.. 150-51
150-51..
91
91.. PRO
PRO CAB
CAB 23/95,
23/95, Cab Cab 42(38),
42(38), Meeting
Meeting of of the
the Cabinet,
Cabinet, 24 .9 .3 ., p.
24.9.3., 178..
p. 178
92
92.. Neville
Neville Henderson
Henderson admittedadmitted that that Germany
Germany might might not not last
last more
more thanthan "a"a certain
certain number
number of of months
months.'' ."
PRO
PRO FO FO 800/309,
800/309, Part Part IV,IV, letter
letter from
from Henderson
Henderson to Cadogan, 44.9.38.
to Cadogan, .9 .38. Halifax
Halifax toldtold the
the Cabinet
Cabinet in in mid-
mid-
September
September 1938 1938 that
that "he"he had
had no no doubt
doubt that that if
if we
we were
were involved
involved in in war
war now,
now, we we should
should winwin itit after
after aa long
long
time
time." ." PRO
PRO CAB
CAB 23/95,23/95, Cab Cab 39(38),
39(38), Meeting
Meeting of of the
the Cabinet,
Cabinet, 17 .9 .38., pp
17.9.38., pp.. 98-99.
98-99.
93.. PRO
93 PRO CAB
CAB 53/41,
53/41, COS COS 773,773, COS
COS Subcommittee,
Subcommittee, "The "The Czechoslovak
Czechoslovak Crisis," Crisis," 29 .9 .38 .
29.9.38.
94
94.. PR
PROO CAB
CAB 23/95,
23/95, Cab Cab 39(38),
39(38), Meeting
Meeting of of the
the Cabinet,
Cabinet, 17 .9 .38 ., pp
17.9.38., pp.. 98-99.
98-99.
95
95.. For General Vuillemin's
For General Vuillemin's visit visit to to Germany,
Germany, see: see: Documents
Documents diplomatiquesfran(ais
diplomatiques frangais (DDF), (DDF), 2nd 2nd
Series,
Series, Vol.Vol. X,
X, Doc.
Doc. #401,#401, 18 .8 .38., Doc
18.8.38., Doc.. #429,
#429, 21 .8 .38., and
21.8.38., and Doc.
Doc. #444,
#444, 23 .8 .38. For
23.8.38. For what
what he he told
told
his
his government,
government, also also see:
see: Paul
Paul Stehlin,
Stehlin, Temoignage,
Temoignage, Pour Pour l'histoire
I'histoire (Paris,
(Paris, 1964),
1964), pp pp.. 86-91
86-91.. For For
Vuillemin's
Vuillemin's adviceadvice at at the
the end
end of of the
the month,
month, see: see: DDF,
DDF, 2nd 2nd Series,
Series, VolVol.. XI,
XI, Doc
Doc.. #377,
#377, 26 .9 .38.
26.9.38.
96
96.. Akten
Akten zur
zur deutschen
deutschen auswdrtigen
auswdrtigen Politik Politik (ADAP),
(ADAP). Series Series D,D, VolVol.. II,
II, Doc.
Doc. #422,
#422, 22.9.38.
.9 .38.
97
97.. PRO
PRO CABCAB 24/279,
24/279, CP CP 206(38),
206(38), Colonel
Colonel Fraser
Fraser to to Phipps,
Phipps, 23 .9 .38., p.
23.9.38., p. 52
52..
98
98.. Vortragsnotiz
Vortragsnotiz fiber iiber Besprechung
Besprechung mit mit to la des
des Befehlshabers
Befehlshabers der der Luftwaffengruppe
Luftwaffengruppe Braunschweig,
Braunschweig,
25 .8 .38., NARS
25.8.38., NARS T-1022/2307/34562.
T-1022/2307/34562.
99
99.. L.
L. WW.. Gr
Gr.. Kdo.
Kdo. 2., 2., Fuhrungsabteilung,
Fiihrungsabteilung, Nr Nr.. 210/38,
210/38, 22 .9 .38 ., "Planstudie
22.9.38., "Planstudie `Fall 'Fall Blau'
Blau'." ." Quoted
Quoted
by
by Richard
Richard Suchenwirth,
Suchenwirth, Hans Hans Jeschonnek,
Jeschonnek, pp pp.. 39-40.
39-40.
100
100.. BA/MA
BA/MA RL RL 7/42,
7/42, RL RL 7/43, Luftflottenkommando 22.,
7/43, Luftflottenkommando ., Fiihrungsabteilung,
Fiihrungsabteilung, Nr Nr.. 7093/39,
7093/39, 13 13.5.39.,
.5 .39.,
"Schlussbesprechung
"Schlussbesprechung des des Planspieles
Planspieles 1939 1939."."
101
101.. For
For aa fuller
fuller discussion
discussion of of the
the overall
overall strategic
strategic situation
situation at at the
the time
time of of Munich
Munich in in 1938,
1938, seesee my my
article:
article: Williamson
"Williamson Murray,
Murray, "Munich,
"Munich, 1938 1938:: The Military Confrontation,"
T\ieiWi\iiary Conitontaiion," Journal Journal of of Strategic
Strategic Studies
Studies
(December
(December 1979) 1979)..
102.
102. Concerning
Concerning Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe planning
planning for for the
the invasion
invasion of of Czechoslovakia,
Czechoslovakia, see see in
in particular
particular BA/MA
BA/MA RL RL
7/164,
7/164, Der Der Kommandierende
Kommandierende General General and und Befehlshaber
Befehlshaber der der Luftwaffengruppe
Luftwaffengruppe 33., ., 11.12.38.,
.12 .38.,
"Erfahrungsbericht
"Erfahrungsbericht fiber uber diedie Spannungszeit
Spannungszeit 1938 1938." ."
103.
103. IMT,
IMT, TMWC,
TMWC, Vol Vol.. XXV,
XXV, pp.. 381 381..
104.
104. OneOne ofof the
the surprising
surprising elements
elements in in thethe widespread
widespread willingness
willingness to to accept
accept the the legend
legend thatthat thethe
Luftwaffe was
Luftwaffe was thethe "hand
"hand maiden"
maiden" of of the
the army
army isis the the fact
fact that
that Goring
Goring nevernever gotgot along
along withwith the
the army,
army, and and
it
it thus
thus seems
seems totally
totally contradictory
contradictory from from what what we we know
know of of his
his personality
personality that that hehe would
would accept
accept aa role
role that
that
subordinated
subordinated his air force
his air force to to the
the army
army in in overall German strategy
overall German strategy..
105.
105. Overy,
Overy, "The"The German
German Pre-War Aircraft Production
Pre-War Aircraft Production Plans: Plans: November
November 1936-April
1936-April 1939,"1939," p. p. 796.
796.
106
106.. Milch
Milch Collection,
Collection, Imperial Imperial War War Museum,
Museum, Reel Reel 64, 64, Vol Vol.. 65, 65, p. p. 7400:
7400: 13 .12.38 .,
13.12.38.,
"Vortragsunterlagen
"Vortragsunterlagen fiir fiir den
den Vortrag
Vortrag vor vor dem
dem HermHerm Generalfeldmarschall,"
Generalfeldmarschall," p. p. 7419
7419..
107.
107. Homze,
Homze, Arming
Arming the Luftwaffe, p.
the Luftwaffe, p. 229
229..

25
25
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

108
108.. ItIt should
should be
be noted
noted that
that the
the Allies
Allies also
also fought
fought these
these 1940
1940 battles
battles by
by and
and large
large with
with the
the aircraft
aircraft in
in
production
production or or on
on the
the drawing
drawing boards
boards..
109
109.. See
See Appendix
Appendix II for
for aa description
description of
of the
the development
development of
of air
air doctrine
doctrine in
in Britain
Britain and
and the
the United
United
States..
States

26
CHAPTER 11
CHAPTER II

THE
THE EASY
EASY WAR:
WAR:
GERMANY TRIUMPHANT,
GERMANY TRIUMPHANT,
SEPTEMBER 1939-SEPTEMBER
SEPTEMBER 1939-SEPTEMBER 1940
1940

BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND TO
TO POLAND
POLAND
The German
The German triumphtriumph over over Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia in in September
September 1938 1938 misled
misled not not only
only
Hitler but his military as well and created the psychological preconditions that
Hitler but his military as well and created the psychological preconditions that
contributed heavily to the decision to attack Poland the following year-a decision
contributed heavily to the decision to attack Poland the following year—a decision
that
that precipitated
precipitated the the Second
Second WorldWorld War War.. Almost
Almost immediately
immediately after after the the signing
signing of of
the Munich agreement, Hitler regretted that he had backed away from a limited war
the Munich agreement, Hitler regretted that he had backed away from a limited war
against Czechoslovakia.. Further
against Czechoslovakia Further aggravating
aggravating his his displeasure
displeasure was was the the fact
fact that
that thethe
Sudetenland's
Sudetenland's inclusion
inclusion within
within Germany
Germany did did nothing
nothing to to relieve
relieve the the Reich's
/?ejc/i's serious
serious
economic
economic problems
problems.. Goring
Goring admitted
admitted in in November
November 1938 1938 thatthat economic
economic difficulties
difficulties
had
had reached
reached the the point
point where
where no no more
more workers
workers were were available,
available, factories
factories were were at at full
full
capacity,
capacity, foreign
foreign exchange
exchange was was completely
completely exhausted,
exhausted, and and thethe economy
economy was was inin dire
dire
straits .' These
straits.' These economic
economic troubles
troubles meant
meant that
that in
in early
early 1939,
1939, thethe regime
regime had had to
to reduce
reduce
the Wehrmacht's
the Wehrmacht's steel steel allocations
allocations by by 3030 percent,
percent, copper
copper by by 20 20 percent,
percent, aluminum
aluminum
by
by 47
47 percent,
percent, rubber
rubber by by 3030 percent,
percent, andand cement
cement from from 25 25 percent
percent to to 4545 percent
percent.^ .2
Under
Under thesethese conditions,
conditions, the the temptation
temptation to to seize
seize thethe remainder
remainder of of Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia
and
and gain
gain control
control of of its
its industrial
industrial resources
resources as as well
well as as its
its considerable
considerable holdings holdings of of
foreign
foreign exchange
exchange was was overwhelming
overwhelming.. In In March
March 1939, 1939, using using Czech Czech political
political
troubles
troubles as as anan excuse,
excuse. Hitler ordered the
Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht to to complete
complete what what Munich
Munich had had
begun.. He
begun He threatened
threatened the the Czech
Czech leader,
leader. Dr.Dr. EmilEmil Hacha,
Hacha, by by declaring
declaring that that if if
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia refused refused to to accede
accede to to German
German demands,
demands, "half "half of of Prague
Prague would would be be in in
ruins
ruins from
from bombing
bombing withinwithin twotwo hours,
hours, andand that
that this
this would
would be be only
only the the beginning
beginning..
Hundreds
Hundreds ofbombers
of bombers were were waiting
waiting thethe order
order to to takeoff,
takeoff, and and they
they would
would receive
receive that
that
order
order atat six
six in
in the
the morning,
morning, if if the
the signatures
signatures werewere not not forthcoming
forthcoming.' . "3'^
But
But the
the seizure
seizure of of Prague
Prague in in March
March 19391939 was
was one one of of the
the last
last ofof Hitler's
Hitler's peaceful
peaceful
conquests
conquests.. (Several
(Several weeks
weeks later,
later, the
the Nazis
Nazis browbeat
browbeat Lithuania
Lithuania into into surrendering
surrendering the the
port
port city
city of of Memel
Memel.) .) TheThe diplomatic
diplomatic explosion,
explosion, resulting
resulting from from the the seizure
seizure of of
Prague,
Prague, finally
finally forced
forced thethe British
British government
government to to make
make aa serious
serious commitment
commitment to to the
the
continent
continent and and to to alter
alter the
the "business-as-usual"
"business-as-usual" approach approach that that they
they hadhad taken
taken towards
towards
rearmament
rearmament.. Yet, Yet, the
the new new British
British course
course was was due due moremore to to internal
internal political
political
pressure,
pressure, precipitated
precipitated by by the
the British
British public's
public's outrage,
outrage, thanthan of of aa basic
basic change
change in in the
the
government's
government's attitude attitude.. Great
Great Britain
Britain nownow attempted
attempted diplomatically
diplomatically to to bolster
bolster
Europe
Europe against
against further
further Nazi
Nazi aggression
aggression.. However,
However, British British leaders
leaders did did not not yet
yet regard
regard
war
war asas inevitable
inevitable and, and, as as aa result,
result, did
did not
not seek
seek to to create
create military
military alliances
alliances against
against

27
27
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

that
that eventuality
eventuality.. The The slowslow andand hesitant
hesitant approach
approach towards
towards Russia
Russia in in the
the summer
summer of of
1939
1939 hardly indicated serious
hardly indicated serious preparation
preparation for for war.
war. Also
Also during
during thisthis period,
period, the the
British
British offered
offered the the Germans
Germans aa major economic loan
major economic loan if they behaved
if they behaved themselves-
themselves—
hardly
hardly the the sort
sort ofpolicy
of policy to to deter
deter Adolf
Adolf Hitler .4
Hitler."
The
The Fuhrer's
Fuhrer's reaction
reaction to to British
British criticism
criticism andand diplomatic
diplomatic activity
activity waswas at at first
first
outrage and then contempt. As he told his staff, he had seen his opponents at
outrage and then contempt. As he told his staff, he had seen his opponents at
Munich and they were worms.' After hearing that the British had extended aa
Munich and they were worms.' After hearing that the British had extended
guarantee
guarantee to to Poland
Poland at at the
the end
end ofof March,
March, he he shouted
shouted:: "I'll
"I'll cook
cook themthem [the
[the British]
British] aa
stew they'll choke on.
stew they'll choke on."'"6
But as the summer progressed, Hitler seems to
But as the summer progressed, Hitler seems to have
have
convinced himself that Britain would not intervene in a military campaign against
convinced himself that Britain would not intervene in a military campaign against
Poland
Poland.. Both
Both the the aforementioned
aforementioned inadequacies
inadequacies of of British
British diplomacy
diplomacy and and the
the skill
skill
with which Hitler manipulated the European powers led him to conclude that he
with which Hitler manipulated the European powers led him to conclude that he
could get away with a small war on Poland . By signing the Nazi-Soviet Non
could get away with a small war on Poland. By signing the Nazi-Soviet Non
Aggression
Aggression Pact, Pact, thus
thus removing
removing the the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union fromfrom thethe list
list of
of possible
possible enemies,
enemies.
Hitler,
Hitler, in in effect,
effect, isolated
isolated the the Poles
Poles more
more thoroughly
thoroughly than than he he had
had the
the Czechs
Czechs the the
previous
previous year.
year.
Further
Further confirming
confirming Hitler Hitter in in his
his small
small warwar thesis
thesis waswas thethe consensus
consensus among among the the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe that that the
the threat
threat of of "strategic"
"strategic" bombingbombing (or (or terror
terror bombing)
bombing) would would serve
serve to to
keep
keep thethe Western
Western PowersPowers out out ofof anan eastern
eastern war.'
war.^ Ironically,
Ironically, the the unpreparedness
unpreparedness of of
the Luftwaffe
the Luftwaffe in in the
the fall
fall of
of 1938
1938 played
played aa role
role in
in Hitler's
Hitler's decision
decision not not toto push
push the the
Czech
Czech crisis into aa direct
crisis into military confrontation
direct military confrontation but but rather
rather to to negotiate
negotiate at at Munich
Munich..
However, the
However, the spectacle
spectacle that that the
the British
British managed
managed to to make
make outout ofof themselves
themselves that that late
late
September
September as they dug
as they dug slit
slit trenches
trenches and and passed
passed outout gas
gas masks
masks played
played an an important
important
role
role inin shaping
shaping Hitler's
Hitler's as as well
well asas the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's strategic
strategic thinking
thinking in in 1939
1939.. As As
mentioned
mentioned earlier,
earlier, when when speaking
speaking to to his
his senior
senior commanders,
commanders, General General Felmy,
Felmy,
commander
commander ofLufifotte
of Luftflotte 2, 2, had
had speculated
speculated in in May
May 19391939 on on the
the moral
moral pressure
pressure that
that aa
terror
terror bombing
bombing campaign
campaign against London might
against London might offer.
offer. The
The events
events in in Britain
Britain inin the
the
fall
fall of
of 1938
1938 suggested
suggested to to Felmy
Felmy thatthat aa high
high degree
degree of of war
war hysteria
hysteria already
already existed
existed in in
Britain
Britain andand that
that the
the Third
Third Reich
Reich should
should taketake full
full advantage
advantage of of such
such aa state
state of
of affairs
affairs
in contrast
in contrast to to the
the hesitant
hesitant behavior
behavior of of Germany's
Germany's World World War War II government.
government.*$
That
That same month, the
same month, the Fifth
Fifth Section
Section (intelligence)
(intelligence) ofthe
of the general
general staffstaff echoed
echoed such
such
sentiments.
sentiments. ItIt reported
reported that that in
in every
every respect,
respect, compared
compared to to other
other European
European air air forces,
forces,
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was was the
the best
best prepared
prepared..

Germany
Germany is, is, on
on the
the basis
basis of
of all
all reports,
reports, the
the only
only state
state that
that in
in respect
respect
to
to equipment,
equipment, organization,
organization, tactics,
tactics, and
and leadership
leadership has
has advanced
advanced to to
aa total
total conception
conception of of preparation
preparation andand leadership
leadership of
of an
an offensive
offensive asas
well
well as
as defensive
defensive airair war
war.. This
This fact
fact indicates
indicates aa general
general advance
advance inin
military
military preparedness
preparedness and and with
with itit aa strengthening
strengthening ofof the
the whole
whole
military
military situation
situation..

As
As proof
proof of
of the
the value
value of
of air
air superiority,
superiority, the
the intelligence
intelligence experts
experts pointed
pointed toto the
the Italian
Italian
success
success in
in Abyssinia
Abyssinia and
and particularly
particularly to
to Germany's
Germany's diplomatic
diplomatic triumph
triumph thethe previous
previous
autumn.. They
autumn They argued
argued that
that panic
panic in
in London
London and
and Paris
Paris over
over the
the threat
threat of
of air
air attacks
attacks
had
had contributed
contributed directly
directly toto the
the Munich
Munich surrender
surrender and
and suggested
suggested thatthat the
the
parliamentary
parliamentary systems
systems of
of the
the Western
Western Powers
Powers gave
gave Britain
Britain and
and France
France considerably
considerably

2288
THE
THE EASY WAR: GERMANY
EASY WAR: GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
TRIUMPHANT

less
less flexibility
flexibility in strategic policy
in strategic policy than
than an
an authoritarian
authoritarian NaziNazi Germany
Germany.. This This line
line of
of
reasoning led to the dangerous suggestion
reasoning led to the dangerous suggestion that
that it
it was
was "quite
"quite possible
possible that
that in
in spite
spite of
of
[Western] pacts and promises to Eastern
[Western] pacts and promises to Eastern Europe,
Europe, a
a conflict
conflict in
in that
that region
region would
would
remain
remain localized."9
localized."'
In
In early
early July,
July, both
both Hitler
Hitler andand Goring
Goring visited
visited the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's test test station
station atat Rechlin
Rechlin
to examine the latest in research and development . The technical experts did
to examine the latest in research and development. The technical experts did aa
thorough job of implying that aircraft and equipment in the design and test stages
thorough job of implying that aircraft and equipment in the design and test stages
were
were close
close to production.. Although
to production Although this this was
was notnot the
the case,
case, the the demonstration
demonstration
provided one more confirmation to the Fuhrer that the Luftwaffe not only possessed
provided one more confirmation to the Fiihrer that the Luftwaffe not only possessed
current superiority over its opponents but would maintain such superiority for
current superiority over its opponents but would maintain such superiority for the
the
foreseeable future . In 1942, Goring recalled: "The Fuhrer took the most serious
foreseeable future. In 1942, Goring recalled: "The Fiihrer took the most serious
decisions
decisions on on the
the basis
basis ofof that
that display
display.. ItIt was
was aa miracle that things
miracle that things worked
worked out out as
as
well
well asas they
they did did and
and that
that the
the consequences
consequences were were not
not far
far worse.
worse."'""'° While
While thethe Rechlin
Rechlin
demonstration
demonstration did did not
not aim
aim at at supporting
supporting Hitler's
Hitler's inclination
inclination for for aa military
military solution
solution
to
to the
the Polish
Polish question
question butbut rather
rather atat convincing
convincing him him that
that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe should should receive
receive
more
more of of the
the defense budget for
defense budget for the
the coming
coming years,
years, itit undoubtedly
undoubtedly helped helped to to push
push
Hitler
Hitler towards
towards the the precipice
precipice..
On
On August
August 22, 22, 1939,
1939, Hitler
Hitler metmet with
with senior
senior military
military officers
officers to to announce
announce the the
reasons
reasons behind
behind his his inclination
inclination to to settle
settle accounts
accounts withwith Poland
Poland." . I' He
He gave
gave pride
pride ofof
place
place to to his historical uniqueness
his historical uniqueness and and the
the danger
danger thatthat he
he could
could "be' 'be eliminated
eliminated at at any
any
time
time by
by aa criminal
criminal or or aa lunatic
lunatic."." Second
Second in in importance
importance was was the
the factfact that
that Germany's
Germany's
economic
economic situationsituation was precarious . "Because
was precarious. "Because of of the
the constraints
constraints on on us,
us, ourour
economic
economic situation
situation is is such
such that
that we
we can
can only
only hold
hold out
out for
for aa few
few more more years
years."." Four
Four
days
days later,
later, Hitler
Hitler summed
summed up up his
his general
general evaluation
evaluation of of the
the strategic
strategic situation
situation in in aa
letter to
letter to Mussolini
Mussolini::

As
As neither France nor
neither France nor Britain can achieve
Britain can any decisive
achieve any decisive successes
successes in
in
the
the west,
west, and
and asas Germany,
Germany, as as aa result
result of
of the
the agreement
agreement with
with Russia,
Russia,
will
will have
have all
all her
her forces
forces free
free in
in the
the east
east after
after the
the defeat
defeat of
of Poland,
Poland,
and
and as
as air
air superiority
superiority isis undoubtedly
undoubtedly on on our
our side,
side, II do
do not
not shrink
shrink
from
from solving
solving the
the eastern
eastern question
question even
even atat the
the risk
risk of
of complications
complications
with
with the
the West
West.'^. 12

What
What is is interesting
interesting in in the
the above
above calculation
calculation of of risks
risks is
is that
that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe played
played aa
role in
role in two
two outout of
of three
three factors
factors the
the Fuhrer
Fiihrer cited.
cited. The
The belief
belief inin the
the short
short war
war against
against
Poland, of
Poland, of course,
course, rested
rested on on the
the army
army as as well
well asas the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, but
but clearly
clearly the
the
German air
German air force
force contributed
contributed to to aa belief
belief that
that Poland
Poland would
would not not take
take long
long to
to destroy
destroy..
The
The emphasis
emphasis on on air
air superiority
superiority undoubtedly
undoubtedly represented
represented aa miscalculation
miscalculation that
that the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could
could deter the Western
deter the Western Powers
Powers by by the
the mere
mere threat
threat of
of major
major air
air attacks
attacks
against
against their
their population
population centers
centers.. AsAs we
we now
now know
know Hitler
Hider was
was wrong,
wrong, not
not so
so much
much in in
his
his estimate
estimate of of Western
Western leadership,
leadership, forfor that
that remained
remained cautious,
cautious, overpessimistic,
overpessimistic, andand
unwilling
unwilling to to take
take risks,
risks, but
but rather
rather in
in his
his failure
failure toto recognize
recognize thatthat Western
Western popular
popular
opinion
opinion waswas so so incensed
incensed at at German
German actions
actions that
that Chamberlain
Chamberiain and and Daladier
Daladier had
had nono
choice
choice but
but toto declare
declare war
war inin response
response toto aa German
German invasion
invasion of of Poland ."
Poland.''
Hitler's
Hitler's remarks
remarks in in August
August 1939 1939 to
to his
his generals
generals just
just prior
prior to
to the
the invasion
invasion of of
Poland
Poland raise
raise an an interesting
interesting historiographical
historiographical question
question as as to
to the
the nature
nature of
of the
the war
war that
that

29
29
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

the
the Germans expected to
Germans expected fight . Since
to fight. Since thethe war,
war, aa number
number of of Anglo-American
Anglo-American
historians
historians have
have argued
argued that that before
before the
the war
war Hitler
Hitler andand the
the German
German high high command
command
deliberately
deHberately developed
developed aa "Blitzkrieg
''Blitzkrieg strategy"
strategy" whichwhich theythey then
then applied
applied on on the
the
battlefields
battlefields of of Europe
Europe from from 19391939 toto 1941 .'° The
1941.'" The heart
heart ofof this
this strategy
strategy supposedly
supposedly
was
was the the close
close cooperation
cooperation of of tactical
tactical air air and
and armored
armored formations
formations in in the
the
accomplishment
accomplishment of of deep
deep armored
armored drives
drives into enemy rear
into enemy rear areas.
areas. ByBy choosing
choosing such such aa
strategy,
strategy, thethe Germans,
Germans, the the argument
argument runs,runs, escaped
escaped the the necessity
necessity of of rearming
rearming in in
depth.
depth. On On the
the armored
armored side side of of the
the argument,
argument, several
several major
major difficulties
difficulties exist
exist with
with
such
such aa theory
theory.. First,
First, thethe German
German army army did did not
not emphasize
emphasize the the establishment
establishment of of an
an
armored
armored forceforce in in its
its rearmament
rearmament program,program, and and there
there isis no evidence that
no evidence that Hitler
Hitler
interfered
interfered in in the
the formulation
formulation of of army
army doctrine
doctrine before
before the the war ." As
war." As the
the previous
previous
chapter
chapter suggests,
suggests, therethere areare also
also problems
problems relating
relating to to airpower.
airpower. CloseClose air
air support
support
developed in Spain with little urging from the
developed in Spain with little urging from the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's high
high command in Berlin,
command in Berlin,
while
while many
many German
German air air force
force leaders
leaders and
and general
general staff
staff officers
officers remained
remained enamored
enamored
with
with thethe concept
concept of of "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing.. Hitler's
Hitler's emphasis
emphasis on on airpower
airpower in in his
his
August
August speech
speech to to the
the generals
generals suggests
suggests that
that atat the
the beginning
beginning of of the
the war,
war, he he placed
placed
higher
higher reliance
reliance on on the
the deterrent
deterrent value
value asas well
well asas the
the actual
actual capabilities
capabilities ofof airpower
airpower
in
in the
the coming
coming war war thanthan most
most historians
historians havehave allowed
allowed.. The The impact
impact of of the
the Polish
Polish
campaign on German air strategy
campaign on German air strategy and
and the
the initial
initial strategic
strategic response of
response of Hitler
Hitler to
to the
the
war
war inin the west provide
the west provide further
further support
support for
for such
such aa thesis
thesis..

THE
THE POLISH CAMPAIGN AND
POLISH CAMPAIGN AND THE
THE "PHONY"
"PHONY" WAR
WAR
In
In the
the early
early morning
morning hours
hours of of September
September 1, 1, 1939,
1939, German bombers and
German bombers and fighters
fighters
delivered heavy attacks on
delivered heavy attacks on targets
targets throughout Poland
throughout Poland. . Unlike
Unlike the
the previous
previous year
year
when the Czechs had
when the Czechs had fully
fully mobilized
mobilized by
by the
the end
end of
of September,
September, the
the German
German attack
attack
'6 Interestingly, the Luftwaffe
caught
caught the the PolesPoles in in the
the process
process of of mobilizing.
mobilizing.'* Interestingly, the Luftwaffe
considered
considered launching
launching an an all-out
all-out attack
attack on on military
military installations
installations andand armament
armament
factories in Warsaw to paralyze Polish resistance. But bad weather prevented the
factories in Warsaw to paralyze Polish resistance. But bad weather prevented the
launching of such a "knockout" blow. By the time the weather had cleared, the
launching of such a "knockout" blow. By the time the weather had cleared, the
interdiction
interdiction and and close
close airair support
support aspects
aspects of of operations
operations were were going
going so so well
well that
that
the general staff hesitated to shift the emphasis ." One must also note that at the
the general staff hesitated to shift the emphasis." One must also note that at the
conclusion of the Polish campaign, the Luftwaffe launched massive air assaults
conclusion of the Polish campaign, the Luftwaffe launched massive air assaults
against
against military
military targets
targets inin Warsaw
Warsaw.. In In these
these raids,
raids, thethe Germans
Germans were
were notnot adverse
adverse to to
any collateral damage inflicted on the civilian populace.
any collateral damage inflicted on the civilian populace.
Complicating
Complicating Poland's Poland's strategic
strategic difficulties
difficulties at at the
the beginning
beginning of of the
the campaign
campaign was was
the fact that her high command had not separated operational from political
the fact that her high command had not separated operational from political
requirements
requirements.. To To defend
defend those
those areas
areas regarded
regarded as as politically
politically essential,
essential, the
the Poles
Poles had
had
distributed
distributed theirtheir forces
forces inin indefensible
indefensible regions
regions such
such as as the
the Corridor
Corridor and
and Silesia
Silesia.. AsAs
aa result,
result, their
their army army waswas unable
unable to to defend
defend itself
itself andand to to carry
carry out
out aa prolonged
prolonged
resistance
resistance.'* . 's
Within
Within the the first
first days
days of of the
the campaign,
campaign, panzer panzer units
units fromfrom General
General Walther
Walther von von
Reichenau's
Reichenau's Tenth Tenth ArmyArmy had had broken
broken out out into
into thethe open,
open, thereby
thereby achieving
achieving
operational
operational freedom freedom.. By By September
September 6, 6, tank
tank units
units were
were halfway
halfway to to Warsaw,
Warsaw, the the

30
30
THE
THE EASY
EASY WAR:
WAR: GERMANY
GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
TRIUMPHANT

Corridor
Corridor hadhad beenbeen closed,
closed, and the Polish
and the Polish army
army was was disintegrating
disintegrating.. The The Polish
Polish air air
force put up
force put up substantial
substantial resistance
resistance in
in the
the first
first days
days of
of the
the war;
war; its
its pilots,
pilots, as
as they
they
would
would do do inin the
the Battle
Battle of
of Britain,
Britain, notnot only proved themselves
only proved themselves tenacious
tenacious and and brave
brave
but highly skilled as well
but highly skilled as well. . Overwhelming
Overwhelming German
German superiority,
superiority, however,
however, soon
soon
'9 On the ground for the first time in modem war, the combination of armored
told. On the ground for the first time in modern war, the combination
told." of armored
mobile formations supported
mobile formations supported by by aircraft
aircraft proved
proved devastatingly
devastatingly effective
effective.^" .z°
Interdiction strikes made it impossible for the Poles to move large bodies of
Interdiction strikes made it impossible for the Poles to move large bodies of troops
troops
in
in the
the open, while efforts
open, while efforts by
by Polish
Polish troops
troops toto fight
fight their
their way
way out
out of of encirclements,
encirclements,
especially along the Bzura River, collapsed in the face of Luftwaffe bombing. These
especially along the Bzura River, collapsed in the face of Luftwaffe bombing. These
air
air attacks
attacks soso demoralized
demoralized the the Poles
Poles that
that some
some troops
troops threw
threw away their weapons
away their weapons.^' ."
After the
After the fall
fall of
of most
most of
of Poland,
Poland, the
the Germans
Germans faced
faced the
the problem
problem of
of forcing
forcing the
the
capital to surrender
capital to surrender.. Richthofen,
Richthofen, in charge of
in charge of the
the air
air assault
assault onon the
the city,
city, requested
requested
permission
permission to destroy Warsaw
to destroy Warsaw completely
completely as as "it
"it would,
would, in in the
the future,
future, be be only
only aa
customs station . "
customs station." Operational
Operational orders
orders from
from the
the OKW
OKW for
for the
the attack
attack on
on the
the city
city were
were
more restrained
more restrained and
and only
only required
required that
that the
the bombardment
bombardment aim
aim at
at eliminating
eliminating those
those
installations
installations judged essential for
judged essential for the
the maintenance
maintenance of of life
life in
in the
the city
city."."
By
By the
the end
end of of September,
September, not not only
only hadhad the
the Germans
Germans managed
managed to to destroy
destroy the the
Polish
Polish army
army and and air
air force
force but
but Poland
Poland had ceased to
had ceased to exist
exist asas an
an independent
independent nation nation..
The
The Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht had had won this victory
won this victory at surprisingly low
at aa surprisingly cost.. Polish
low cost Polish losses
losses were were
70,000
70,000 dead,
dead, 133,000
133,000 wounded,
wounded, and and 700,000
700,000 prisoners
prisoners against
against thethe Germans;
Germans; while while
German
German losses
losses were
were only
only 11,000
11,000 dead,
dead, 30,000
30,000 wounded,
wounded, and and 3,400
3,400 missing
missing." . 21
Despite
Despite the
the overwhelming
overwhelming nature
nature of
of the
the victory,
victory, serious
serious problems
problems remained
remained for for
the
the Germans
Germans toto resolve
resolve in
in the
the areas
areas of
of high
high strategy,
strategy, the
the national
national economy,
economy, andand the
the
Wehrmacht's
Wehrmacht's actual
actual versus
versus anticipated
anticipated military
military performance
performance.. InIn particular,
particular, the
the
army high command (Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH) was most dissatisfied with
army high command (Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH) was most dissatisfied with
the
the level
level of
of performance
performance of of even
even active
active duty
duty regular
regular formations.
formations. Serious
Serious
shortcomings had shown up throughout the regular army, while reserve and
shortcomings had shown up throughout the regular army, while reserve and
Landwehr units were well below the standards acceptable to senior army
Landwehr units were well below the standards acceptable to senior army
commanders
commanders.^''."
But
But the
the largest
largest problem
problem confronting
confronting HitlerHitler was
was the
the fact
fact that
that Germany
Germany facedfaced aa
major
major European
European war. war. The
The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had not
not succeeded
succeeded inin deterring
deterring thethe West
West from
from
honoring
honoring its its obligations
obligations to to Poland.
Poland. Moreover,
Moreover, Hitler
Hitler had
had calculated
calculated thatthat the
the
combination
combination of of the
the Nazi-Soviet
Nazi-Soviet Non Non Aggression
Aggression Pact,
Pact, supplies
supplies from
from the
the Balkans,
Balkans,
and
and autarkic
autarkic measures
measures taken
taken inin the 1930's would
the 1930's would mitigate
mitigate the
the effects
effects ofof an
an Allied
Allied
blockade
blockade.. He He had
had assured
assured his
his generals
generals before
before the
the outbreak
outbreak ofof war
war that
that Germany
Germany had had
little
little reason
reason to
to fear
fear aa blockade,
blockade, since
since itit would
would "be"be ineffective
ineffective due
due to
to our
our autarky
autarky andand
because
because we we have
have economic resources in
economic resources in the
the East.
East. We
We need
need have
have nono worry.
worry. .. .. .. The
The
East
East will
will deliver
deliver us us grain,
grain, cattle,
cattle, coal,
coal, lead
lead and
and zinc ."" Reality,
zinc.''^^ Reality, however,
however, proved
proved
quite
quite different
different.. Import
Import tonnage
tonnage fell
fell 5757 percent
percent.. ByBy January
January 1940,
1940, thethe value
value of of
imports
imports had had fallen
fallen to to RM
RM 186186 million
million as as compared
compared to to RM
RM 472
All million
million in in January
January
1939,
1939, while
while import
import tonnage
tonnage declined
declined fromfrom 4,445,000
4,445,000 tons
tons the
the previous
previous yearyear to
to
1,122,000
1,122,000 tons .26 With
tons.^* With such
such problems,
problems, the the long-term
long-term outlook
outlook appeared
appeared exceedingly
exceedingly
dangerous
dangerous.. Moreover,
Moreover, petroleum
petroleum reserves
reserves declined
declined from
from 2,400,000
2,400,000 tons tons atat the
the

31
31
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

beginning
beginning of of the
the war
war to to 1,600,000
1,600,000 tons tons in
in May
May 1940,
1940,^'2' while
while gasoline supplies fell
gasoline supplies fell
from
from 300,000
300,000 tons tons inin September
September 1939 1939 to 110,000 tons
to 110,000 tons by
by April
April 1940
1940.28.2 $
This
This critical
critical economic
economic situation,
situation, caused
caused by by the
the outbreak
outbreak of of aa wider
wider European
European war
war
than
than Hitler
Hitler had expected, helps
had expected, helps toto explain
explain anan historical
historical puzzle
puzzle:: Why
Why throughout
throughout thethe
fall
fall and
and early
early winter
winter of of 1939
1939 did
did Hitler
Hitler push
push soso strongly
strongly for
for an
an immediate
immediate offensive
offensive
in
in the
the west?
west?^' 29 Because
Because of of these
these economic
economic pressures,
pressures, Hitler
Hitler felt
felt that
that the
the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht
must move before the economy's
must move before the economy's difficulties
difficulties affected German fighting srength
affected German fighting srength.. In
In
early
early October,
October, he he warned
warned thatthat time
time favored
favored Germany's
Germany's enemies
enemies.. "The"The danger,
danger, in
in
case of a prolonged war, lies in the difficulty of securing from a limited food and
case of a prolonged war, lies in the difficulty of securing from a limited food and
raw material base
raw material base [enough
[enough to to sustain
sustain the]
the] population,
population, while
while at at the
the same
same time
time
securing the means for the prosecution of the war. "'° Thus, the pressure for an
securing the means for the prosecution of the war."'" Thus, the pressure for an
immediate offensive .
immediate offensive.
On
On thethe same
same day day that
that Hitler
Hitler waswas justifying
justifying thethe factors
factors behind
behind his his strategy,
strategy, hehe
issued "Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War." In it he spelled out the
issued "Directive No. 6 for the Conduct of the War." In it he spelled out the
territorial
territorial goals
goals of of the
the coming
coming campaign
campaign as as well
well asas its
its strategic
strategic purposes
purposes::

(a)
(a) An
An offensive will be
offensive will be planned
planned on on the
the northern
northern flank
flank
of
of the
the western
western front
front through
through Luxembourg,
Luxembourg, Belgium,
Belgium, and
and Holland
Holland..
This offensive
This offensive must be launched
must be launched atat the
the earliest
earliest possible
possible moment
moment and
and
in
in the greatest possible
the greatest possible strength
strength,.
(b)
(b) The
The purpose
purpose ofof this
this offensive
offensive willwill be
be to
to defeat
defeat asas
much
much ..... . of
of the
the French
French army
army and . . . the
and... the forces
forces ofof the
the allies
allies
fighting
fighting atat their
their side,
side, and
and at
at the
the same
same time
time toto win
win as
as much
much territory
territory
as
as possible
possible in in Holland,
Holland, Belgium,
Belgium, andand northern
northern France
France toto serve
serve as
as aa
base
base for
for the
the successful
successful prosecution
prosecution of of the
the air
air and
and sea
sea war
war against
against
England
England and and asas aa wide
wide protective
protective area
area for
for the
the economically
economically vital
vital
Ruhr ."
Ruhr.''

Hitler's
Hitler's order
order that
that the
the armed
armed forces
forces launch
launch aa fall
fall offensive
offensive in the west
in the west caused
caused anan
enormous
enormous row row with
with thethe generals.
generals. OnOn the
the basis of "after
basis of "after action"
action" reports
reports from
from Poland
Poland
and
and the
the western
western front,
front, army leaders argued
army leaders argued that
that their
their troops
troops could
could not
not meet
meet the
the
demands
demands thatthat aa western
western campaign
campaign wouldwould place
place on
on them
them.'^. '2 In
In retrospect, the generals
retrospect, the generals
were
were correct:
correct: TheThe fall
fall and
and winter
winter ofof 1939-40
1939-40 provided
provided the the necessary
necessary time
time toto bring
bring
regular,
regular, reserve,
reserve, and and Landwehr
Landwehr divisions
divisions up up toto the
the same
same high
high standard
standard of of
performance
performance..
Generally,
Generally, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe seconded
seconded the the army's
army's efforts
efforts to to postpone
postpone the the western
western
offensive
offensive."." Weather
Weather conditions
conditions in in central
central Europe,
Europe, however,
however, probably
probably played
played aa
greater
greater role
role in in Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe calculations.
calculations. The The air
air staff
staff waswas happier
happier withwith thethe
performance
performance in in Poland
Poland than than was
was the
the army
army high
high command
command and, and, of
of course,
course, the
the air
air
force did not face the problem of training enormous numbers of reservists . Still, the
force did not face the problem of training enormous numbers of reservists. Still, the
pause
pause between
between the the end
end ofof the
the Polish
Polish campaign
campaign and and the
the beginning
beginning of of air
air operations
operations
against Norway allowed the Germans to augment considerably their air strength. On
against Norway allowed the Germans to augment considerably their air strength. On
September 2, 1939, the Luftwaffe possessed 4,161 aircraft: 604 reconnaissance,
September 2, 1939, the Luftwaffe possessed 4,161 aircraft: 604 reconnaissance,
1,179
1,179 fighters,
fighters, 1,180
1,180 bombers,
bombers, 366366 dive
dive bombers,
bombers, 40 40 ground
ground attack,
attack, 240
240 coastal,
coastal,
and 552 transports . By the beginning of April 1940, the number had increased to
and 552 transports. By the beginning of April 1940, the number had increased to
5,178 aircraft: 671 reconnaissance, 1,620 fighters, 1,726 bombers, 419 dive
5,178 aircraft: 671 reconnaissance, 1,620 fighters, 1,726 bombers, 419 dive

32
32
THE EASY WAR
THE EASY WAR:: GERMANY
GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
TRIUMPHANT

bombers,
bombers, 46 46 ground
ground attack,
attack, 230230 coastal,
coastal, andand 466
466 transport .34 In
transport.^'* addition, the
In addition, the
general quality
general quality of
of the
the bomber
bomber force
force rose
rose somewhat
somewhat with
with the
the widespread
widespread introduction
introduction
of the
of Ju 88
the Ju 88 into
into its squadrons..
its squadrons
Hitler's
Hitler's approach
approach to to Germany's
Germany's strategic problems in
strategic problems in the
the fall
fall ofof 1939
1939 further
further
suggests a belief at the top level that
suggests a belief at the top level that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could
could and
and would
would be
be the
the decisive
decisive
weapon
weapon in in the
the coming
coming struggle.
struggle. Historians,
Historians, as as well
well as
as the
the German
German generals
generals of of that
that
time, have noted that the
time, have noted that the fall
fall offensive
offensive did
did not aim to
not aim to achieve
achieve aa decisive
decisive success
success
against
against the
the French
French army.
army. Rather,
Rather, as as Hitler's
Hitler's directive
directive made
made clear,
clear, its its fundamental
fundamental
aim, while crippling as much of the Allied armies as possible, was "to win
aim, while crippling as much of the Allied armies as possible, was "to win asas much
much
territory as possible in Holland, Belgium, and northern France to serve as a base for
territory as possible in Holland, Belgium, and northern France to serve as a base for
the successful prosecution ofthe air and sea war against England" [my emphasis] .
the successful prosecution of the air and sea war against England'' [my emphasis].
Such
Such territorial
territorial gains
gains would
would allow
allow thethe German
German air air force
force toto strike
strike at at the
the heart
heart ofof
English power and also serve as a buffer against air attacks on "the economically
English power and also serve as a buffer against air attacks on ' 'the economically
vital
vital Ruhr
Ruhr."". "3s
The
The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's chief chief ofof intelligence,
intelligence, "Beppo"
"Beppo" Schmid,
Schmid, argued
argued in in late
late
November
November 1939 1939 for for an
an exclusive
exclusive airair strategy
strategy.. The
The Wehrmacht,
Wehrmacht, he he suggested,
suggested, should
should
not
not carry
carry out
out any
any operations
operations against
against the
the French,
French, but
but rather
rather the
the entire
entire strength
strength of
of the
the
Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, with
with whatever
whatever helphelp the
the navy
navy could
could provide,
provide, should
should concentrate
concentrate against
against
English
English imports
imports.. German
German airair strategy
strategy would
would emphasize
emphasize attacks
attacks on on English
English ports
ports and
and
docks,
docks, and
and Schmid
Schmid noted noted that,
that, "Should
"Should the the enemy
enemy resort
resort to
to terror
terror measures-for
measures—for
example,
example, to to attack
attack ourour towns
towns in in western
western Germany-here
Germany—here again again [retaliatory]
[retaliatory]
operations
operations could
could be be carried
carried out
out with
with even
even greater
greater effect
effect due
due toto the
the greater
greater density
density ofof
population
population of of London
London and and thethe big
big industrial
industrial centers
centers.. "36
"^^ While
While elements
elements from
from
Schmid's
Schmid's memorandum
memorandum were were present
present inin an
an OKW
OATW Directive
Directive ofof November
November 29, 29, Hitler
Hitler
was
was unwilling
unwilling to to go quite so
go quite so far
far and
and risk
risk all
all on
on an
an air-sea
air-sea war
war against
against Britain
Britain before
before
certain
certain preconditions
preconditions had had been
been met.
met. The
The OKW
OKW stated
stated that
that anan attack
attack onon British
British
imports
imports could
could not not occur
occur until
until the
the army
army had
had either
either defeated
defeated thethe Allied
Allied armies
armies inin the
the
field
field or
or until
until itit had
had seized
seized the
the coast
coast opposite
opposite Britain ."
Britain.^'
The
The great
great fall
fall campaign
campaign nevernever took
took place
place.. Hitler
Hitler himself
himself does
does not
not seem
seem toto have
have
abandoned the idea of such a campaign until January 1940 when an aircraft carrying
abandoned the idea of such a campaign until January 1940 when an aircraft carrying
the
the plan
plan crash-landed
crash-landed in in Belgium
Belgium.. However,
However, the the weather,
weather, one
one of
of the
the worst
worst winters
winters
in memory, resulted in repeated postponements until January . Thereafter, Hitler,
in memory, resulted in repeated postponements until January. Thereafter, Hitler,
supported
supported byby Army
Army Group
Group A, A, forced
forced the
the OKH
OKH to to alter
alter the
the plans
plans for
for the
the western
western
campaign
campaign to to aa massive
massive armored
armored thrust
thrust through
through the the Ardennes.
Ardennes. The The new
new strategy
strategy
aimed
aimed not
not at
at creating
creating thethe strategic
strategic basis
basis for
for an an air
air and
and naval
naval offensive
offensive against
against
Britain
Britain but
but rather
rather at the strategic
at the strategic overthrow
overthrow of of the
the Allied
Allied position
position on
on the
the continent
continent..
While
While many
many armyarmy commanders
commanders doubteddoubted thethe operational
operational feasibility
feasibility ofof aa deep
deep
penetration
penetration armored
armored drive,
drive, Hitler
Hitler supported
supported the
the radicals
radicals urging
urging aa rapid
rapid exploitation
exploitation
across
across the
the Meuse
Meuse.'*." Almost
Almost concurrently,
concurrently, German
German planning
planning turned
turned towards
towards
Scandinavia
Scandinavia.. The
The Altmark
Altmark affair
affair convinced
convinced Hitler
Hitler that
that the
the British
British would
would notnot respect
respect
the
the neutrality
neutrality of
of Scandinavia
Scandinavia and and that
that Germany
Germany must must move
move toto protect
protect the
the critical
critical ore
ore
imports
imports from
from northern
northern Sweden
Sweden thatthat moved
moved through Narvik.. Thus,
through Narvik Thus, the
the decision
decision to
to
attack
attack Norway
Norway in in the
the spring
spring."."

33
33
H
p7
G1
-<
THE 3
0
THE INVASION
INVASION OF
OF FRANCE
FRANCE 1940:
1940: The
The Plans
Plans PC

I
d

OKH
OKH PLAN,
PLAN, OCT
OCT 1939
1939
i
aH

FINAL
FINAL PLAN
PLAN MARCH
MARCH 1940
1940

HOtlAf

GROUP C
ARMY GROUP C
THE EASY WAR:
THE EASY WAR; GERMANY
GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
TRIUMPHANT

Within
Within thethe framework
framework of of these
these twotwo great
great operations,
operations, the
the strategy
strategy of of the
the three
three
services was
services was integrated
integrated rather
rather than
than separate While there
separate.. While there were
were instances
instances where
where the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe acted as an
acted as an independent
independent force, force, itsits basic
basic mission
mission in both campaigns
in both campaigns laylay
within
within thethe carefully structured framework
carefully structured framework of of overall
overall German
German strategy
strategy.. As
As one
one of
of
Hitler's
Hitler's directives
directives forfor the
the fall
fall offensive
offensive in in the
the west
west suggested,
suggested, "the"the air
air force
force will
will
prevent
prevent attacks
attacks byby the Anglo-French air
the Anglo-French air forces
forces on
on our
our army
army and and will
will give
give all
all
necessary direct support to
necessary direct support to the
the advance
advance."^ . "^° It
It was
was not
not a
a case
case of
of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe being
being
subordinated
subordinated to to the
the dictates
dictates of of the
the army
army or or the
the navy
navy (in
(in the
the case
case ofof Norway)
Norway) butbut
rather that overall air strategy fit within the conceptual
rather that overall air strategy fit within the conceptual design
design of
of the
the campaign's
campaign's
strategy
strategy.. Thus,
Thus, the the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's role followed closely
role followed closely Wever's
Wever's thoughts
thoughts on on air
air
strategy and the role of airpower
strategy and the role of airpower in
in future
future wars.
wars. The
The general
general strategic
strategic conception
conception
and
and military
military purposes
purposes of of the
the campaign
campaign had had determined
determined how the Germans
how the Germans would
would use
use
their air resources .
their air resources.

SCANDINAVIA
SCANDINAVIA AND
AND FRANCE
FRANCE
On
On April
April 7, 7, 1940,
1940, German
German sea, sea, land,
land, andand air
air forces
forces struck
struck Denmark
Denmark and and Norway
Norway..
Within
Within thethe first
first hours,
hours, Danish
Danish resistance
resistance had had collapsed
collapsed.. In In Norway,
Norway, despite despite almost
almost
complete
complete surprise,
surprise, the the Germans
Germans were were not not as
as successful.
successful. The The occupation
occupation of of Bergen,
Bergen,
Trondheim,
Trondheim, and and Narvik
Narvik went went without
without serious
serious difficulty,
difficulty, even even though
though the the landings
landings
were dangerously
were dangerously exposed exposed to to countermoves
countermoves by by British
British naval
naval forces
forces.'" .4' At
At Oslo
Oslo and
and
Christiansand,
Christiansand, the the Germans
Germans ran ran intointo serious
serious opposition,
opposition, and and at at both
both locations
locations
intervention
intervention by by the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe turned turned the the scales.
scales. InIn the
the latter case, German
latter case, German bombers bombers
silenced forts guarding
silenced forts guarding the the harbor
harbor entrance
entrance so so that
that thethe navy
navy could
could land land troops
troops.. At
At
Oslo,
Oslo, the
the forts
forts protecting
protecting the the capital,
capital, despite
despite their
their ancient
ancient equipment,
equipment, shelled shelled and
and
sank
sank the
the heavy
heavy cruiser
cruiser Blucher
Blucher and, and, for for most
most of of the
the day,
day, denied
denied German
German landinglanding
forces
forces access
access to the city.
to the city. However,
However, German German paratroopers
paratroopers seized seized the the airport,
airport, and
and
reinforcements
reinforcements rushed rushed in in by
by airair overawed
overawed the the Norwegian
Norwegian population.
population. The The breathing
breathing
space
space provided
provided by by thethe defenders
defenders of of the
the Oslo
Oslo fjord
fjord diddid allow
allow the the Norwegian
Norwegian
government
government to to escape
escape and and set set inin motion
motion measures
measures of of resistance.
resistance. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, by by
the
the end
end ofof the
the first
first 24
24 hours,
hours, the the strategic
strategic situation
situation fromfrom thethe Norwegian
Norwegian perspective
perspective
was
was hopeless.
hopeless. With With all all important
important harbors harbors and and airfields
airfields in in German
German hands, hands, the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe dominated
dominated Norwegian
Norwegian resistanceresistance and and prevented
prevented the the intervention
intervention of of the
the
Royal
Royal NavyNavy except
except against
against Narvik
Narvik.. In the course
In the course of of operations,
operations, the the German
German air air
force
force played
played aa crucial
crucial rolerole in in maintaining
maintaining air air superiority,
superiority, in in providing
providing support support toto
advancing
advancing groundground forces,
forces, and and in in supplying
supplying widely
widely scattered
scattered forces .4 z
forces."*^
No
No matter
matter what what thethe tactical
tactical successes
successes of of the
the Norwegian
Norwegian campaign campaign might might have
have
been,
been, the
the impact
impact of of the
the campaign
campaign on on Germany's
Germany's strategic
strategic situation
situation was was negative
negative
both
both for
for the
the short
short asas well
well as as the
the long
long haul.
haul. InIn the
the latter
latter case,
case, Norway
Norway proved proved aa
strategic
strategic drain
drain throughout
throughout the the Second
Second World World War.War. Moreover,
Moreover, the the conquest
conquest of of the
the
Lorrain
Lorrain oreore fields
fields inin the
the campaign
campaign against against France
France mitigated
mitigated the the need
need for for Swedish
Swedish
iron
iron ore
ore.. Those
Those imports,
imports, while while useful,
useful, werewere never
never decisive
decisive."' .4' The
The short-range
short-range
strategic impact was even more dubious ., By the time that naval operations in
strategic impact was even more dubious. By the time that naval operations in
Norwegian waters had concluded, the German navy had ceased to exist as an
Norwegian waters had concluded, the German navy had ceased to exist as an
effective
effective surface
surface force.
force. By By mid-June,
mid-June, Admiral Admiral ErichErich Raeder,
Raeder, Commander
Commander in in Chief
Chief

35
35
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

of the navy,
of the navy, was was downdown to to one
one heavy
heavy cruiser,
cruiser, two light cruisers,
two light cruisers, and and four destroyers;;
four destroyers
the remainder of the fleet was either at the bottom of the
the remainder of the fleet was either at the bottom of the ocean
ocean or
or in
in drydock
drydock
undergoing repair.°° The naval staff compounded the inevitable
undergoing repair.'" The naval staff compounded the inevitable naval
naval losses
losses that
that
went with such a campaign by what can only be categorized as strategic
went with such a campaign by what can only be categorized as strategic
incompetence
incompetence.. In In late
late MayMay and and early
early June,June, afraid that the
afraid that the warwar would
would end end before
before its its
two
two battle cruisers had
battle cruisers had significantly
significantly engaged engaged enemy enemy forces, forces, the the naval
naval high high
command
command risked risked the Gneisenau and
the Gneisenau Scharnhorst in
and Scharnhorst in strategically
strategically pointlesspointless
operations
operations in in northern
northern waterswaters.. As As aa result,
result, both both were seriously damaged
were seriously damaged and and diddid notnot
return
return to service until
to service until December
December 1940. 1940.*' 45 Considering
Considering that that Raeder
Raeder had had already
already
broached
broached the the possibility
possibility of an invasion
of an invasion of of Britain
Britain with with the Fuhrer as
the Fiihrer as early
early as as the
the
20th
20th of of May,
May, such frittering away
such aa frittering away of of naval
naval strength
strength in in thethe north
north is is quite
quite
surprising
surprising.''*.46
With
With initiation
initiation of operations against
of operations against Scandinavia,
Scandinavia, the the Germans
Germans completedcompleted
preparations
preparations for for aa move
move againstagainst thethe West
West.. On On MayMay 10, 10, 1940,
1940, the Wehrmacht began
the Wehrmacht began
an
an offensive
offensive aimed aimed at at the
the strategic
strategic overthrow
overthrow of of its opponents.. Operations
its opponents Operations againstagainst
Holland
Holland and and northern
northern BelgiumBelgium by by Army
Army Group Group B B confirmed
confirmed Allied Allied expectations
expectations as as
to German strategy
to German strategy and
and fixed
fixed their
their attention
attention away
away from
from the
the decisive
decisive threat
threat. .
Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, German
German armor
armor moved
moved through
through the
the Ardennes
Ardennes until
until it
it hit
hit the
the Meuse
Meuse. . By
By
the
the evening
evening of the 13th,
of the Panzer Group
13th, Panzer Group KleistKleist had had three
three bridgeheads
bridgeheads across across thethe river.
river.
Within
Within less than two
less than two days,days, the the Germans
Germans achieved achieved operational
operational freedom freedom and and were
were
rolling towards the
rolling towards the English
English Channel
Channel. . At
At that
that time,
time, Germany's
Germany's opponents
opponents believed
believed
that
that the Wehrmacht enjoyed
the Wehrmacht enjoyed overwhelming
overwhelming superioritysuperiority.. As As wewe nownow know,know, except
except in in
the air (and even here German
the air (and even here German superiority
superiority was
was not
not overwhelming),
overwhelming), the
the Germans
Germans did
did
not enjoy aa significant,
not enjoy significant, quantifiable
quantifiable advantage
advantage.'*' ." Their
Their victory
victory was was duedue to to an an
operational plan whose
operational plan whose serious
serious risks
risks were
were more
more than
than offset
offset by
by corresponding
corresponding
advantages
advantages that that would
would not not have
have been
been present
present in in aa more
more conventional
conventional operation operation..
Second, German training and doctrine were more realistic and demanding than
Second, German training and doctrine were more realistic and demanding than
those of their opponents . Third, the army and the Luftwaffe had closely integrated
those of their opponents. Third, the army and the Luftwaffe had closely integrated
their
their plans
plans to to meet
meet the the overall
overall demands
demands of of German
German strategy.
strategy.
German
German air attacks that
air attacks that accompanied
accompanied the the start
start ofof the
the offensive
offensive aimed aimed at at achieving
achieving
air
air superiority
superiority over over the the LowLow Countries
Countries and and northern
northern France.
France. In In the
the first
first hours,
hours, aa
significant
significant portion
portion of of the Luftwaffe's effort
the Luftwaffe's effort struck
struck at at Allied
Allied air air forces
forces and and their
their
ground
ground organizations
organizations.. Neither Neither the the Dutch
Dutch nor nor the
the Belgians
Belgians were were capable
capable of of serious
serious
opposition
opposition as as most
most of their equipment
of their equipment was was obsolete
obsolete.. The The British
British had had stationed
stationed aa
significant
significant force force of of bombers
bombers and and fighters
fighters ("Hurricanes")
("Hurricanes") in in northern
northern FranceFrance to to
support the
support the British
British Expeditionary
Expeditionary Force. Force."* 48 The
The French
French air air force,
force, unfortunately,
unfortunately, was was
in
in great
great disarray
disarray as as itit was
was transitioning
transitioning to to aa newer
newer generation
generation of of aircraft
aircraft (as (as had
had thethe
Luftwaffe in
Luftwaffe in 1937-38
1937-38 and and thethe RAF
RAF in in 1938-39
1938-39 with with similar
similar results)
results).. The The French
French
were,
were, in in fact,
fact, having
having considerable
considerable difficulty
difficulty in in equipping
equipping squadronssquadrons with with new new
aircraft
aircraft as as well
well as as maintaining
maintaining operational
operational ready ready rates.
rates. In In early
early 1940,1940, somesome French
French
squadrons
squadrons ran ran in-commission
in-commission rates rates of of barely
barely 40 40 percent,
percent, and and the the pressure
pressure of of
operations
operations only only compounded
compounded their their difficulties
difficulties."' .49 The
The Allies'
Allies' defeat
defeat in in the
the campaign
campaign
should
should notnot obscure
obscure the the fact
fact that
that the
the French
French air cur force
force fought
fought well,well, and and its
its experienced
experienced
pilots,
pilots, often
often in in inferior
inferior equipment,
equipment, foughtfought tenaciously
tenaciously.'" ."'

36
36
THEEASY
THE EASY WAR
WAR:: GERMANY
GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
TRIUMPHANT

The
The first German air
first German air strikes
strikes against
against the Belgians and
the Belgians and Dutch
Dutch virtually
virtually eliminated
eliminated
their air forces as possible factors in the campaign ; the
their air forces as possible factors in the campaign; the British
British and
and French
French also
also
suffered heavy aircraft losses on the ground and in the air . But the first
suffered heavy aircraft losses on the ground and in the air. But the first day's
day's
operations
operations did not come
did not come lightly
lightly.. On On May May 10, 10, the the Germans
Germans lost lost 83 83 aircraft
aircraft (not(not
including
including Ju 52's), including
Ju 52's), including 47 47 bombers
bombers and and 25 25 fighters,
fighters, equalling
equalling the worst losses
the worst losses
for
for aa dayday in the Battle
in the Battle of of Britain
Britain.. On On thethe following
following day, day, thethe Germans
Germans lost lost aa further
further
42
42 aircraft,
aircraft, including
including 22 22 bombers,
bombers, 88 dive bombers, and
dive bombers, and 10 10 fighters
fighters." ."
Significantly,
Significantly, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe launched
launched few attacks on
few attacks on Allied
Allied forces
forces advancing
advancing into into
Belgium
Belgium to to meet
meet Army Army Group Group B's B's drive Rather, itit shielded
drive.. Rather, shielded GeneralGeneral Gert Gert von von
Rundstedt's
Rundstedt's forces moving through
forces moving through the the Ardennes
Ardennes from from the prying eyes
the prying eyes of of Allied
Allied
reconnaissance
reconnaissance aircraft. aircraft. By By thethe 12th,
12th, Luftflotte reported general
Luftflotte 33 reported general superiority
superiority over over
its
its opponents,
opponents, and German aircraft
and German now turned
aircraft now turned increasingly
increasingly to attacks on
to attacks on the
the Allied
Allied
transportation
transportation network network and and toto supporting
supporting the the advance
advance of of ground forces.. Reinforcing
ground forces Reinforcing
the impression made
the impression made by
by air
air attacks
attacks in
in the
the early
early days
days of
of the
the campaign
campaign went
went the the
psychological
psychological impact
impact of
of German
German paratrooper
paratrooper operations.
operations. Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe airborne
airborne forces
forces
seized strategic bridges
seized strategic bridges throughout
throughout Belgium Belgium and and Holland,
Holland, while while German
German glider glider
forces captured the
forces captured the supposedly
supposedly impregnable
impregnable fortress
fortress of
of Eban
Eban Emael
Emael. . Such
Such successes
successes
created
created an an impact
impact out out of of all
all proportion
proportion to to German
German paratrooper
paratrooper strength."strength." By By
materially aiding Army Group
materially aiding Army Group B's
B's advance,
advance, they
they furthered
furthered the
the impression
impression of
of Allied
Allied
commanders
commanders that that the Wehrmacht's offensive
the Wehrmacht's offensive weightweight lay lay inin the
the north
north..
Like the German army, the
Like the German army, the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had prepared
had prepared for
for the
the coming
coming campaign
campaign with with
ruthless efficiency. Richthofen had honed his "Stukas" to a fine edge ."
ruthless efficiency. Richthofen had honed his "Stukas" to a fine edge." Now
Now on
on
the banks of the Meuse, the work paid off. On the
the banks of the Meuse, the work paid off. On the 13th,
13th, German infantry (an
German infantry (an
integral
integral partpart of of the
the panzer
panzer divisions)
divisions) began began to to cross
cross the the river. Guderian had
river. Guderian had
carefully worked out plans with his air counterpart, General Bruno Loerzer,
carefully worked out plans with his air counterpart. General Bruno Loerzer,
Commander
Commander of of Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps II. II. The
The two two hadhad decided
decided that that thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe would would
provide continuous support rather than a massive, one-shot attack. It would thus
provide continuous support rather than a massive, one-shot attack. It would thus
force French artillerymen and infantry to keep their heads down while German
force French artillerymen and infantry to keep their heads down while German
infantry
infantry made
made the the crossing
crossing.. Despite
Despite interference
interference at at higher
higher levels,
levels, the the plan
plan went
went like like
clockwork . 5° Continuous "Stuka" attacks on French reservists holding the line had
clocl^vork.'* Continuous "Stuka" attacks on French reservists holding the line had
aa devastating
devastating effect effect." ." By nightfall, the Germans had established a secure
By nightfall, the Germans had established a secure
bridgehead;
bridgehead; by by the
the next
next day,
day, tanks
tanks were across; and
were across; and by by the
the 15th,
15th, thethe panzers
panzers were were in in
the open with a clear run to Abbeville . The use of dive bombers to support the
the open with a clear run to Abbeville. The use of dive bombers to support the
Meuse
Meuse crossings
crossings played
played aa majormajor rolerole in one of
in one of the
the mostmost decisive
decisive strategic
strategic victories
victories
in the military history of the 20th century .
in the military history of the 20th century.
In
In the
the north,
north, Dutch
Dutch resistance
resistance collapsed
collapsed in in the
the face
face of of the
the German
German assault assault.. By By thethe
third
third day,day, the
the 9th
9th Panzer
Panzer Division
Division had had reached
reached the the outskirts
outskirts of of Rotterdam
Rotterdam.. On On MayMay
14,
14, the
the 54th
54th Bomber
Bomber Wing Wing shattered
shattered the the center
center of of that
that city
city andand killed
killed overover 800800 and and
rendered 80,000 homeless despite the fact that negotiations were already in motion
rendered 80,CKX) homeless despite the fact that negotiations were already in motion
to surrender the
to surrender the town.
town. AfterAfter the the war,
war, quitequite naturally,
naturally, there there was was aa paucity
paucity of of
individuals
individuals willing willing to to accept
accept responsibility
responsibility.. Whether Whether or or notnot thethe bombing
bombing was was aa
deliberate
deliberate act act of
of terror,
terror, as as Telford
Telford Taylor
Taylor suggests,
suggests, itit "was "was part part of of the
the German
German
pattern
pattern of of conquest-a
conquest—a pattern pattern woven
woven by by Hitler
Hitler and
and the the Wehrmacht.
Wehrmacht."" 36'* To To avoid
avoid the the
possibility
possibility that that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe would would destroy
destroy another
another city, city, thethe Dutch
Dutch Commander
Commander in in

37
37
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

Chief
Chief surrendered
surrendered all his forces
all his forces in in Holland
Holland on on thethe next
next day.day. At At that
that time,
time, the the
Germans
Germans were were not not hesitant
hesitant to to note
note thethe connections'
connection.'^
Exploitation
Exploitation by German armored
by German armored formations
formations proceeded
proceeded with with utmost
utmost dispatch
dispatch..
What
What is is remarkable
remarkable is is the
the speed
speed with
with which
which short-range
short-range fighterfighter and and dive
dive bombers
bombers
moved forward to support ground forces that were rapidly drawing out of
moved forward to support ground forces that were rapidly drawing out of range
range. . By
By
the 17th, within 24 hours of the French evacuation, German fighters were
the 17th, within 24 hours of the French evacuation, German fighters were
establishing
establishing their their operational
operational base base at at Charleville,
Charleville, west west ofof the Meuse.. For
the Meuse For several
several
days, fuel, ammunition, parts, and ground personnel flew in by Ju 52's since the
days, fuel, ammunition, parts, and ground personnel flew in by Ju 52's since the
army's movement into the ever-deepening pocket had choked the Meuse bridges .
army's movement into the ever-deepening pocket had choked the Meuse bridges.
The
The forward operating base
forward operating base was was soso short
short ofof fuel
fuel that
that ground
ground personnel
personnel siphoned
siphoned all all
but
but the
the minimum
minimum amount amount of gasoline from
of gasoline every noncombat
from every noncombat aircraft aircraft landing
landing at at
Charleville.
Charleville. This rapid deployment
This rapid deployment forward forward was was due due entirely
entirely to to an an air
air transport
transport
system
system of of Ju Ju 52's.58
52's.'* The The system
system supported
supported the the army
army as as well
well as as the
the air
air force
force in in itsits
drive
drive to
to thethe Channel
Channel;; and and shortly
shortly after
after the
the fighters
fighters had had moved
moved to Charleville, the
to Charleville, the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe flew flew in in 2,000
2,000 army army technicians
technicians to to establish
establish aa tank tank repair
repair facility
facility at at the
the
same
same location
location.'' .59

The next
The next stagestage of of the
the campaign
campaign led led toto one
one of of the
the more
more controversial
controversial episodes episodes in in
the war, the
the war, the famous
famous "stop "stop order"
order" that that resulted
resulted in in the
the eventual
eventual escape escape of of most
most of of
British
British Expeditionary
Expeditionary Force Force and and large
large numbers
numbers of of Frenchmen
Frenchmen through through DunkirkDunkirk..
Available
Available evidence
evidence contradicts
contradicts the the well-publicized
well-publicized post-war post-war testimony
testimony of of German
German
generals
generals that that Hitler
Hitler was responsible for
was responsible for halting
halting the the movement
movement of of German
German tank tank
forces
forces shortshort of of Dunkirk
Dunkirk.. The The most most careful
careful reconstruction
reconstruction suggests suggests that that
Generaloberst
Generaloberst Gerd Gerd von von Rundstedt
Rundstedt and and Hitler,
Hitler, supported
supported by by aa number
number of of other
other
senior
senior officers,
officers, stoppedstopped the the armor
armor before before itit could
could cut cut Allied
Allied forces forces off off from
from
Dunkirk
Dunkirk.*" . 6° Given
Given the the extent
extent of of German
German success success and and theirtheir understandable
understandable
nervousness,
nervousness, as as well
well as as aa desire
desire to to protect
protect their
their armored
armored forcesforces for for the
the anticipated
anticipated
conquest
conquest of of France,
France, the the stop
stop order
order made made sense
sense at at the
the time.
time. Interwoven
Interwoven with with this
this
German
German cautioncaution was was aa considerable
considerable underestimation
underestimation of of howhow swiftly
swiftly the the British
British
could
could organize
organize and and conduct
conduct aa withdrawalwithdrawal operationoperation.. On On May May 25, 25, Goring
Goring
compounded
compounded what what was was in in retrospect
retrospect aa serious
serious strategic
strategic mistake
mistake by by suggesting
suggesting to to
Hitler
Hitier that
that the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could could by by itself
itself destroy
destroy whatwhat was was left
left ofAllied
of Allied armiesarmies in in the
the
Low
Low Countries
Countries.*' ." Hitler
Hitler foundfound Goring's
Goring's proposal
proposal sufficient
sufficient to to delay
delay further
further the the
ground
ground offensive
offensive against against the the Dunkirk
Dunkirk perimeter
perimeter.. By By the
the timetime the the army
army movedmoved
forward,
forward, the the opportunity
opportunity had had been
been lost;
lost; the
the enemy
enemy had had entrenched
entrenched and and hadhad begun
begun aa
full-scale
full-scale evacuation.
evacuation.
Over
Over Dunkirk,
Dunkirk, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe suffered
suffered its its first
first serious
serious rebuff
rebuff of of the
the war.war. As As
Galland
Galland has has noted,
noted, the the nature
nature and and style
style of of the
the airair battles
battles over
over the the beaches
beaches shouldshould
have
have provided
provided aa warning warning as as to
to the
the inherent
inherent weaknesses
weaknesses of of the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe'% force force
structure
structure.*^ .6z Admittedly,
Admittedly, the the Germans
Germans fought fought at at aa disadvantage
disadvantage.. AlthoughAlthough positioned
positioned
forward
forward at at captured
captured airfields,
airfields, the the Bf Bf 109
109 was
was at at the
the outer
outer limits
limits of of its
its range
range and and
possessed
possessed less flying time
less flying time overover Dunkirk
Dunkirk than than diddid the
the "Hurricanes"
"Hurricanes" and and "Spitfires"
"Spitfires"
operating
operating from from southern
southern EnglandEngland.. GermanGerman bombersbombers were were still
still located
located in in western
western
Germany
Germany and and had had even
even farther
farther to to fly
fly.. Thus,
Thus, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could could not not bring
bring its its full
full
weight to bear so
weight to bear so that
that when
when its
its bombers
bombers hammered
hammered those
those on
on the
the beaches
beaches or
or

38
38
THE
THE EASY WAR: GERMANY
EASY WAR: GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
TRIUMPHANT

embarking,
embarking, the the RAFRAF intervened
intervened in significant fashion
in aa significant fashion.. German
German aircraft
aircraft losses
losses
were high, and
were high, and British
British fighter
fighter attacks
attacks oftenoften prevented
prevented German bombers from
German bombers from
performing
performing with with fullfull effectiveness
effectiveness.. Both Both sides
sides suffered
suffered heavy losses.. During
heavy losses During the the
nine
nine days
days from
from May May 26 through June
26 through June 3, 3, the
the RAF
RAF lost lost 177177 aircraft
aircraft destroyed
destroyed or or
damaged;
damaged; the the Germans
Germans lost lost 240.63
240.*' For For muchmuch of of the Luftwaffe, Dunkirk
the Luftwaffe, Dunkirk came came as as aa
nasty
nasty shock.
shock. Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps II II reported
reported in in its
its war
war diary
diary thatthat itit lost
lost more
more aircraft
aircraft on on the
the
27th
27th attacking
attacking the
the evacuation
evacuation than
than it
it had
had lost
lost in
in the
the previous
previous ten
ten days
days of
of the
the
campaign
campaign.*"*.6a

The destruction or
The destruction or forced
forced evacuation
evacuation of of the
the entire
entire Allied
Allied leftleft wing
wing in in the
the LowLow
Countries (consisting of the most mobile
Countries (consisting of the most mobile and
and best
best trained
trained divisions)
divisions) made
made the
the
defense of France hopeless . Nevertheless, the remaining
defense of France hopeless. Nevertheless, the remaining French
French forces
forces put
put up aa
up
creditable defense in early June, suggesting what they
creditable defense in early June, suggesting what they might
might have
have accomplished
accomplished
with better leadership
with better leadership in in May
May.. Their
Their hopeless military position
hopeless military position made made defeat
defeat quickquick
and brutal . To a certain extent, the strategic collapse of the entire
and brutal. To a certain extent, the strategic collapse of the entire western
western position
position
has
has obscured
obscured the significant attrition
the significant attrition of of German
German armored armored and and airair forces
forces thatthat took
took
place during the fighting . At the beginning of the western offensive, the
place during the fighting. At the beginning of the western offensive, the army
army
possessed
possessed 2,574
2,574 tankstanks." .65 By
By thethe armistice,
armistice, the the Germans
Germans had had lost
lost 753
753 tanks
tanks or or nearly
nearly
30 percent of their armored forces Luftwaffe losses of aircraft were on a similar
30 percent of their armored forces.** .66 Luftwaffe losses of aircraft were on a similar
scale
scale (see Tables 111,67
(see Tables III,*^ IV,
IV,*^ 6e V,69
V,*" and
and VI'°).
VI™).
Tables
Tables III
III through
through VI
VI underscore
underscore the
the extent
extent of of German
German aircraftaircraft losses
losses inin the
the Battle
Battle
of France . They
of France. They suggest
suggest that
that the
the tendency
tendency to
to view
view the
the Battle
Battle of
of Britain
Britain as
as aa separate
separate
episode
episode from
from the defeat of
the defeat of France
France does does not not dodo justice
justice to to the
the resistance
resistance of Allied air
of Allied air
forces in the spring of 1940
forces in the spring of 1940 and
and distort
distort the
the fact
fact that
that for
for five
five months,
months, from
from May
May
through
through September,
September, the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, with with only
only aa short
short pause,
pause, was was continuously
continuously in in
action . The break in morale of
action. The break in morale of bomber
bomber pilots,
pilots, reported
reported over
over London
London in
in mid-
mid-
September
September 1940, 1940, thus thus waswas the result not
the result not only
only of of the
the strain
strain of of fighting
fighting over
over Britain
Britain
but of operations that had been continuous
but of operations that had been continuous from
from the
the previous
previous May.
May.

THE
THE BATTLE
BATTLE OF
OF BRITAIN
BRITAIN
Serious
Serious German
German aircraft
aircraft losses
losses from
from the
the spring
spring campaign
campaign greatly
greatly weakened
weakened the the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe before
before the
the Battle
Battle of
of Britain.
Britain. Had
Had that
that been
been thethe only
only disadvantage
disadvantage underunder
which
which thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe operated,
operated, German
German strategic
strategic problems
problems wouldwould have have been
been
daunting
daunting enough,
enough, given
given the
the difficulties
difficulties ofof mounting
mounting aa major major combined
combined arms arms
operation.
operation. Unfortunately
Unfortunately for for the
the Germans,
Germans, the the strain
strain that
that recent
recent battles
battles had
had
imposed
imposed onon their
their military
military structure
structure represented
represented only
only aa small
small portion
portion of
of the
the problem;
problem;
aa whole
whole host
host of
of strategic,
strategic, economic,
economic, tactical,
tactical, and
and technological
technological problems
problems had had to
to be
be
faced
faced and
and surmounted
surmounted before
before the
the Reich
Reich could
could solve
solve the
the "British
"British question
question." ."
What
What made
made anan inherently
inherently complex
complex tasktask impossible
impossible was was the
the overconfidence
overconfidence that that
marked
marked the
the German
German leadership
leadership inin the
the summer
summer of of 1940
1940.. Hitler,
Hitler, basking
basking in in aa mood
mood of of
preening
preening self-adulation,
self-adulation, went
went onon vacation
vacation.. During
During aa visit
visit to
to Paris
Paris after
after the
the signing
signing
of
of the
the armistice,
armistice, tours
tours of
of World
World WarWar II battlefields,
battlefields, and
and picnics
picnics along
along the
the Rhine,
Rhine, the
the
last
last thing
thing onon Hitler's
Hitler's mind
mind waswas grand
grand strategy ." The
strategy.^' The high
high command
command structure,
structure,
however,
however, was was such
such that
that without
without Hitler
Hitler there
there was
was no no one
one with
with either
either the
the drive
drive oror

39
39
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

TABLE
TABLE III
III
German Aircraft
German Aircraft Losses
Losses (Damaged
(Damaged and
and Destroyed)--May-June
Destroyed)—^May-June 1940
1940

Destroyed on Operations
Destroyed on Operations

Due
Due to
to Not
Not Due
Due Destroyed
Destroyed
Strength
Strength Enemy
Enemy to
to Enemy
Enemy Not
Not on
on Total
Total Losses
Losses asas Percent
Percent
Type
Type Aircraft
Aircraft 4 .5 .40 . Action
4.5.40. Action Action
Action Total
Total Operations
Operations Destroyed
Destroyed of
of Initial
Initial Strength
Strength

Close
Close Recce
Recce 345
345 67
67 55 72
72 66 i8
7« 23%
23%
Long-Range
Long-Range
Recce
Recce 321
321 68
68 18
18 86
86 22 88
88 27%
27%
Single-Engine
Single-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 1,369
1,369 169
169 66
66 235
235 22
22 257
257 19%
19%
Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 367
367 90
90 16
16 106
106 44 110
110 30%
30%
Bombers
Bombers 1,758
1,758 438
438 53
53 491
491 30
30 521
521 30%
30%
Dive
Dive Bombers
Bombers 417
417 89
89 24
24 113
113 99 122
122 30%
30%
Transport
Transport 531
531 188
188 18
18 206
206 77 213
213 40%
40%
Coastal
Coastal 241
241 20
20 16
16 36
36 33 39
39 16%
16%
TOTAL
TOTAL 5,349
5,349 1,129
1,129 216
216 1,345
1,345 83
83 1,428
1,428 28%
28%

Damaged
Damaged on
on Operations
Operations

Total
Total Damaged
Damaged
Due
Due to
to Not
Not Due
Due Damaged
Damaged Total
Total and
and Destroyed
Destroyed
Enemy
Enemy to
to Enemy
Enemy Not
Not on
on Total
Total Damaged
Damaged and
and as Percent
as Percent of
of
Type
Type Aircraft
Aircraft Action
Action Action
Action Total
Total Operations
Operations Damaged
Damaged Destroyed
Destroyed Initial
Initial Strength
Strength
Close
Close Recce
Recce 13
13 44 17
17 11 18
18 96
96 28%
28%
Long-Range
Long-Range
Recce
Recce 12
12 88 20
20 1I 21
21 109
109 34%
34%
Single-Engine
Single-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 33
33 92
92 125
125 25
25 150
150 407
407 30%
30%
Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 20
20 66 26
26 33 29
29 139
139 38%
38%
Bombers
Bombers 116
116 47
47 163
163 40
40 203
203 724
724 41%
41%
Dive
Dive Bombers
Bombers 20
20 77 27
27 11 28
28 150
150 36%
36%
Transport
Transport 88 14
14 22
22 55 27
27 240
240 45%
45%
Coastal
Coastal 33 55 88
88 44 12
12 51
51 21%
21%
TOTAL
TOTAL 225
225 183
183 488
488 80
80 488
488 1,916
1,916 36%
36%

40
TABLE IV
TABLE IV

GERMAN
GERMAN AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT LOSSES 1940 (ALL
LOSSES 1940 (ALL TYPES)
TYPES)

BATTLE
BATTLE OF
OF BATTLE
BATTLE OF
OF LONDON
LONDON
FRANCE
FRANCE BRITAIN
BRITAIN "BLITZ"
"BLITZ"
30%

20
.2%
20.2%
20r.
Wt x
16 .1 °~u

>
15.6% ??
no
cn
tn
7>
10% 2
g >
1%
H
7>

"0
a>
MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC z
TABLE
TABLE V
V

o
GERMAN
GERMAN FIGHTER
FIGHTER LOSSES
LOSSES 1940
1940 ■<

3
a
m
BATTLE
BATTLE OF
OF BATTLE
BATTLE OF
OF LONDON
LONDON a>
FRANCE
FRANCE BRITAIN
BRITAIN "BLITZ"
"BLITZ"
30%
30%

26.5%

20%
20% 0-

12.3%

1004
10% p-

3.7%

MAY
MAY JUNE
JUNE JULY
JULY AUG
AUG SEP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV
NOV DEC
DEC 1»,
TABLE VI
TABLE VI

GERMAN
GERMAN BOMBER
BOMBER LOSSES
LOSSES 1940
1940

BATTLE
BATTLE OF
OF BATTLE
BATTLE OF
OF LONDON
LONDON
FRANCE
FRANCE BRITAIN
BRITAIN "BLITZ"
"BLITZ"
30%
30°x°

27.4°/,

20%
20°x°
18.9% m
m
a
en
-c
•<

71
12.6% '.
nb
10%
>
5.2% z
-<
6% ' -i
71
cC
1 1 1 1 l 1 1 -11 S
MAY
MAY JUNE
JUNE JULY
JULY AUG
AUG SEP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV
NOV DEC
DEC >
zH
z
y
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

strategic vision
Strategic vision to pick up
to pick up the
the reins-a
reins—a state state of of affairs
affairs precisely
precisely in in accord
accord with with the the
Fuhrer's wishes .
Fu/irer'swishes.
Until mid-July 1940,
Until mid-July 1940, Hitler
Hitler believed
believed that that England
England would would sue sue for for aa peace
peace that that hehe
would
would have
have happily
happily extended
extended to to her
her.. As
As early
early as as May
May 20, 20, Hitler
Hitler had had remarked
remarked that that
England could
England could have have peace
peace for for thethe asking
asking.'^ . 'z Nothing
Nothing in in British
British behavior
behavior in in thethe late
late
1930's
1930's suggested
suggested that
that Hitler's
Hitler's expectation
expectation was
was unrealistic
unrealistic. . In
In fact,
fact, there
there were
were still
still
some within
some within the the British
British government
government who who regarded
regarded Churchill's
Churchill's intransigence
intransigence with with
distaste . In late May, Lord
distaste. In late May, Lord Halifax,
Halifax, the
the Foreign
Foreign Secretary,
Secretary, expressed
expressed his
his alarm
alarm at
at
the relish with which
the relish with which Churchill
Churchill approached
approached his
his task,
task, while
while "Rab"
"Rab" Butler,
Butler, Under
Under
Secretary
Secretary of of State
State for for Foreign
Foreign Affairs,
Affairs, toldtold the the Swedish
Swedish minister
minister in in London
London that that'"no 'no
opportunity would be neglected
opportunity would be neglected for
for concluding
concluding a
a compromise
compromise peace
peace if
if the
the chance
chance
[were]
[were] offered
offered on on reasonable conditions.'.""
reasonable conditions ''^
But the
But the mood
mood in Britain had
in Britain had changed
changed.. Churchill,
Churchill, furious furious at at Butler's
Butler's indiscretion,
indiscretion,
passed along aa biting
passed along biting notenote to to Halifax
Halifax.. Butler's
Butler's whining whining reply reply that that he he hadhad been been
misunderstood
misunderstood and and had had meant
meant no no offense
offense indicates
indicates how how much
much things things had had changed
changed
since Churchill
since Churchill had assumed power
had assumed power.''* ." But But one one mustmust stress stress that that Churchill's
Churchill's
toughness
toughness as as thethe nation's leader reflected
nation's leader reflected aa new new mood
mood in in Britain
Britain.. In In late
late June
June 1940,1940,
Admiral
Admiral Dudley
Dudley Pound Pound told told the
the French
French liaison
liaison officer
officer at at the
the Admiralty
Admiralty that that'"the 'the one
one
object
object we we hadhad in in view
view was was winning
winning the the warwar and and that
that itit was
was as essential for
as essential for them
them [the [the
French]
French] as as forfor us us that
that wewe should
should do do so.so. .. .. .. All
All trivialities,
trivialities, such such as as questions
questions of of
friendship
friendship and hurting people's
and hurting people's feeling,
feeling, mustmust be be swept
swept aside."
aside. "'^ Indeed they were,
15 Indeed they were,

when
when forfor strategic
strategic reasons,
reasons, the the British
British government
government ordered ordered the the Royal
Royal Navy Navy to to attack
attack
and
and sink
sink the
the French
French fleet fleet atat Mers-el-Kebir
Mers-el-Kebir.'* .76
The Germans missed
The Germans missed the the newnew British
British resolve
resolve almostalmost completely,
completely, and and Hitler's
Hitler's
strategic
strategic policy
policy from from the the summer
summer of of 1940
1940 though
though 1941 1941 sought
sought aa method,method, whether whether itit
be military,
be military, diplomatic,
diplomatic, or or political,
political, to to persuade
persuade the the British
British to to make
make peace. peace. The The
mood
mood in in Berlin
Berlin was was euphoric,
euphoric, since since thethe Germans
Germans believed believed that that the the warwar was was nearly
nearly
over.
over. All All that
that remained,
remained, from from their their viewpoint,
viewpoint, was was to to find
find the the right
right formula
formula for for
ending
ending hostilities
hostilities.. Confirming
Confirming this this perspective
perspective was was aa strategic
strategic memorandum
memorandum of of late
late
June
June in in which
which Alfred Alfred Jodl,
Jodl, thethe number
number two two man man in in the
the OKW,
OKW, suggested
suggested that that "the"the
final
final victory
victory of of Germany
Germany over over England
England is is only
only aa question
question of of time.'
time."'' Jodl's
171 Jodl's

approach
approach to to thethe English
English "problem"
"problem" reflected reflected aa generalgeneral failing
failing within within the the officer
officer
corps of
corps of all
all three
three services.
services. As As the the campaign
campaign in in the
the west
west in in 19401940 had had shown,
shown, the the
tactical and
tactical and operational
operational performance
performance of of German
German militarymilitary forces
forces was was without
without equal equal..
The
The problem
problem lay lay onon aa higher
higher level:
level: that
that of of strategy
strategy.. TheThe Germans,
Germans, if if they
they had had
mastered
mastered the the tactical
tactical and and operational
operational lessonslessons of of World
World War War I,I, had had not not mastered
mastered the the
strategic
strategic lessons
lessons of of that
that terrible
terrible conflict
conflict.. While
While the the French
French failure
failure to to learn
learn fromfrom the the
last
last war
war hadhad immediate
immediate consequences
consequences in in May May 1940, 1940, in in the the longlong run run German
German
unwillingness
unwillingness to to face
face thatthat war's
war's strategic
strategic lessons
lessons had had anan eveneven more more catastrophic
catastrophic
impact
impact on on their
their history.
history.
German
German strategic
strategic planningplanning and and discussions
discussions throughoutthroughout the summer of
the summer of 1940
1940
reflect, in glaring fashion, a
reflect, in glaring fashion, a failure
failure to
to grasp
grasp the
the essentials
essentials of
of strategy
strategy. . The
The navy
navy had
had
squandered its battle cruiser assets
squandeied its battle cruiser assets in
in strategically
strategically meaningless
meaningless operations
operations off
off

44
THE
THE EASY
EASY WAR: GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
WAR-. GERMANY TRIUMPHANT

Norway
Norway in in the
the late
late spring.
spring. The army drew
The army drew up up aa plan
plan for for thethe proposed
proposed cross-channel
cross-channel
invasion, code named "Sea Lion," that one can charitably
invasion, code named "Sea Lion," that one can charitably describe
describe as
as irrelevant
irrelevant to to
and ignorant of the general state of available
and ignorant of the general state of available naval
naval strength
strength. . The
The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
throughout
throughout the the summer,
summer, following
following Goring'sGoring's lead, lead, paid paid minimal
minimal attentionattention to to the
the
operational problems of a channel crossing by the army in the belief that its victory
operational problems of a channel crossing by the army in the belief that its victory
over
over thethe RAF
RAF wouldwould make make an an invasion
invasion unnecessary
unnecessary.^* . 78
Jodl's
Jodl's June memorandum posed
June memorandum posed two two possibilities
possibilities for for German
German strategy strategy againstagainst
England
England:: (a) (a) "a direct attack
"a direct attack on on the
the English
English motherland;
motherland; (b) (b) anan extension
extension of of the
the war
war
to
to peripheral
peripheral areas" areas" such such as as the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean and and trade
trade routes.
routes. In In the
the casecase of of aa
direct
direct strategy,
strategy, there there existed
existed three avenues:: (1)
three avenues (1) an
an offensive
offensive by by air
air andand seasea against
against
British shipping combined
British shipping combined with with air air attacks
attacks against
against centers
centers of of industry
industry;; (2) (2) terror
terror
attacks
attacks by by air
air against
against population
population centers;centers; and and (3) finally, aa landing
(3) finally, landing operation
operation aimed aimed
at
at occupying
occupying England England.. The The precondition
precondition for German success,
for German success, Jodl Jodl argued,
argued, must must be be
the attainment
the attainment of of air
air superiority
superiority.. Furthermore,
Furthermore, attacks attacks on on British
British aircraft
aircraft plantsplants
would insure that
would insure that the
the RAFRAF wouldwould not not recover
recover from from its its defeat
defeat.. Interestingly,
Interestingly, Jodl Jodl
suggested
suggested that that air superiority would
air superiority would lead lead toto aa diminishing
diminishing capacity capacity for for the the RAFRAF
bomber force
bomber force to to attack
attack Germany
Germany.. It It isis in
in this
this context
context that that German
German attacks attacks in in the
the
coming
coming struggle
struggle on on Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's bases bases mustmust be be seen.
seen. By By extending
extending the the air
air
offensive
offensive to to interdict imports and
interdict imports and to to thethe use
use of of terror
terror attacks
attacks against
against the the British
British
population
population (justified
(justified as as reprisal attacks), Jodl
reprisal attacks), Jodl believed
believed that that thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe would would
break
break British
British willpower
willpower.. He He commented
commented that that German
German strategy strategy would would requirerequire aa
landing
landing on on the
the British
British coast
coast onlyonly as as the
the final
final blow
blow ("Todesstoss")
("Todesstoss") to to finish
finish off off anan
England
England that that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and and navy
navy had had already
already defeated.
defeated." 19
On
On June
June 30, 30, 1940,
1940, Goring
Goring signedsigned an an operational
operational directive
directive for for the
the airair war
war against
against
England
England.. After After redeployment
redeployment of of its
its units,
units, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe would would firstfirst attack
attack the the RAF,
RAF,
its
its ground
ground support
support echelons,
echelons, and and itsits aircraft
aircraft industry.
industry. SuccessSuccess of of these
these attacks
attacks wouldwould
create
create the the conditions
conditions necessary
necessary for for anan assault
assault on on British
British imports
imports and and supplies,
supplies, while while
at
at the
the same
same timetime protecting
protecting GermanGerman industry
industry.. "As "As long
long as as the
the enemy
enemy air air force
force is is not
not
destroyed,
destroyed, itit is is the
the basic
basic principje
principle of of the
the conduct
conduct of of air
air war
war to to attack
attack the the enemy
enemy air air
units
units at at every
every possible
possible favorable
favorable opportunity-by
opportunity—by day day and and night,
night, in in the
the air,
air, andand on on
the
the ground-without
ground—without regard regard for for other
other missions
missions." ." What What is is apparent
apparent in in early
early
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe studiesstudies is is the
the fact
fact that
that thethe German
German air air force
force regarded
regarded the the whole
whole RAF RAF as as
the
the opponent
opponent rather rather thanthan justjust Fighter
Fighter Command.
Command. Thus, Thus, the the attacks
attacks on on Bomber
Bomber
Command
Command bases bases and and other
other RAF RAF installations
installations partially
partially reflected
reflected an an effort
effort to to destroy
destroy
the
the entire British air
entire British air force
force rather
rather than
than badbad intelligence
intelligence.. Parenthetically,
Parenthetically, the the losses
losses in in
France
France directly
directly influenced
influenced Goring'sGoring's thinking.
thinking. He He demanded
demanded that that the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
maintain
maintain its its fighting
fighting strength
strength as as much
much as as possible
possible and and not not allow
allow its its personnel
personnel and and
materiel
materiel to to be
be diminished
diminished because because of of overcommitments.8
overcommitments.*"°
In
In retrospect,
retrospect, the the task
task facing
facing the the Germans
Germans in in the
the summer
summer of of 1940
1940 was was beyond
beyond
their
their capabilities.
capabilities. Even Even disregarding
disregarding the the gaps
gaps in in interservice
interservice cooperation-a
cooperation—a must must in in
any
any combined
combined operations-the
operations—the force force structure,
structure, training,
training, and and doctrine
doctrine of of thethe three
three
services
services were were not not capable
capable of of solving
solving the the problem
problem of of invading
invading the the British
British IslesIsles.. The The
Norwegian
Norwegian campaign campaign had had virtually
virtually eliminated
eliminated the the Kriegsmarine
Kriegsmarine as as aa viable
viable naval naval
force.
force. Thus,Thus, there there were
were neither
neither heavyheavy units units nornor light
light craft
craft available
available to to protect
protect

45
45
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

amphibious forces
amphibious forces crossing
crossing the
the Channel
Channel.. TheThe lack
lack of
of escorting forces would
escorting forces would have
have
made "Sea Lion"
made "Sea Lion" particularly
particularly hazardous
hazardous because
because itit meant
meant thatthat the
the Germans
Germans
possessed
possessed no no support against British
support against British destroyer
destroyer attacks
attacks coming
coming up up oror down
down the
the
Channel
Channel.. TheThe Admiralty
Admiralty had had stationed
stationed 4 4 destroyer
destroyer flotillas
flotillas (approximately
(approximately 36 36
destroyers)
destroyers) inin the
the immediate
immediate vicinity
vicinity ofof the
the threatened
threatened invasion
invasion area,
area, and
and additional
additional
forces of cruisers,
forces of cruisers, destroyers,
destroyers, andand battleships were available
battleships were available from
from the
the Home
Home Fleet."
Fleet.*'
Even
Even with air superiority,
with air superiority, itit is
is doubtful
doubtful whether
whether thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could
could have
have prevented
prevented
some
some British
British destroyers
destroyers from
from getting
getting inin among
among the the amphibious
amphibious forces
forces;; the
the Navy
Navy
certainly
certainly could
could not
not.. The
The landing
landing craft
craft that
that circumstances
circumstances forced
forced thethe Germans
Germans to to
choose,
choose, Rhine
Rhine River barges, indicates
River barges, indicates the
the haphazard
haphazard nature
nature ofof the
the undertaking
undertaking as as
well
well as
as the
the tenuous
tenuous links
links to
to supplies
supplies and
and reinforcements
reinforcements thatthat the
the Germans
Germans would
would
have had across the Channel . Just a few British destroyers among the slow moving
have had across the Channel. Just a few British destroyers among the slow moving
transport
transport vessels
vessels would
would have
have caused
caused havoc
havoc..
Air
Air superiority
superiority itself
itself represented
represented aa mostmost difficult
difficult task,
task, given
given Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe strength
strength
and
and aircraft
aircraft capabilities
capabilities.. Somewhat
Somewhat ironically,
ironically, the the strategic
strategic problem
problem confronting
confronting thethe
Germans
Germans in in the
the summer
summer of 1940 represented
of 1940 represented in in microcosm
microcosm that that facing
facing Allied
Allied air
air
forces
forces in 1943.. Because
in 1943 Because of of the
the Bf 109's limited
Bf 109's limited range,
range, German
German bombersbombers could
could only
only
strike
strike southern
southern England where fighter
England where fighter protection
protection could
could holdhold thethe loss
loss rate
rate down
down to to
acceptable
acceptable levels
levels.. This
This state
state of
of affairs
affairs allowed
allowed the the RAF
RAF aa substantial
substantial portion
portion ofof the
the
country
country asas aa sanctuary
sanctuary where
where itit could
could establish
establish and and control
control an an air
air reserve
reserve and
and where
where
British
British industrial
industrial power,
power, particularly
particularly in in the
the Birmingham-Liverpool
Birmingham-Liverpool area, area, could
could
maintain
maintain production
production largely
largely undisturbed
undisturbed.. Moreover,
Moreover, the the limited
limited range
range ofof German
German
fighter
fighter cover
cover allowed
allowed thethe British
British one
one option
option that
that they
they never
never had had toto exercise:
exercise: Should
Should
the
the pressure
pressure on on Fighter
Fighter Command
Command become
become too too great,
great, they
they could
could withdraw
withdraw their
their
fighters
fighters north
north of of London
London to to refit
refit and
and reorganize
reorganize;; thenthen when
when the the Germans
Germans launched
launched
"Sea
"Sea Lion,"
Lion," they they could
could resume
resume thethe struggle
struggle.. Thus Thus in in the
the final
final analysis,
analysis, thethe
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could
could only
only impose
impose on on Fighter
Fighter Command
Command aa rate rate of of attrition
attrition that
that its
its
commanders
commanders would would accept
accept.. The
The Germans
Germans werewere never
never inin aa position
position to to attack
attack the
the RAF
RAF
over
over the
the full
full length
length and
and breadth
breadth ofof its
its domain.
domain. Similarly
Similarly in 1943, Allied
in 1943, Allied fighters
fighters
could
could only
only grapple
grapple with
with the
the Germans
Germans up to aa line
up to line approximately
approximately along along the
the Rhine
Rhine..
On
On the
the other
other side
side of
of the
the line,
line, the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could
could impose
impose an an unacceptable
unacceptable lossloss rate
rate
on
on Allied
Allied bombers
bombers.. NotNot until
until Allied
Allied fighters
fighters could
could range
range overover thethe entire
entire length
length and
and
breadth
breadth of of Nazi
Nazi Germany
Germany couldcould Allied
Allied air air forces
forces win win air air superiority
superiority over
over thethe
continent.
continent.

The
The rather
rather long
long preparatory
preparatory period
period between
between thethe end
end ofof the
the French
French campaign
campaign and and
the
the launching
launching ofof the
the great
great air
air offensive
offensive against
against the
the British
British Isles
Isles was
was due
due to
to more
more than
than
just German
just German confidence
confidence that that the
the war
war was
was over
over and
and that
that Britain
Britain would
would accept
accept peace
peace..
The
The losses
losses suffered
suffered in in the
the spring
spring and
and the
the extensive
extensive commitments
commitments of of aircraft
aircraft and
and
aircrews
aircrews in the May-June
in the May-June battles battles demanded
demanded considerable
considerable timetime for
for rest
rest and
and
recuperation
recuperation asas well
well as the integration
as the integration ofof fresh
fresh crews
crews into
into bomber
bomber and
and fighter
fighter units
units..
Moreover,
Moreover, the the speed
speed of of thethe German
German advance
advance had had caused several major
caused several major
redeployments
redeployments of of air
air units
units to
to keep up with
keep up with ground
ground operations
operations.. The
The attack on Britain
attack on Britain
now
now required another major
required another major redeployment
redeployment and and the
the preparation
preparation ofof permanent
permanent

46
46
THE EASY
THE EASY WAR: GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
WAR: GERMANY TRIUMPHANT

airfields
airfields andand facilities
facilities forfor an an extended
extended campaign
campaign.. The logistical difficulties
The logistical difficulties involved
involved
in
in establishing
establishing aa new new base structure far
base structure far from
from Germany
Germany were were considerable
considerable..
Further
Further complicating
complicating the the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's tasks tasks was was an an inadequate
inadequate intelligence
intelligence
system.
system. While
While the gap
the gap between
between the
the British
British and
and the
the Germans
Germans was
was not
not yet
yet wide,
wide, thethe
British were on the way towards gaining a decisive edge in intelligence collection."
British were on the way towards gaining a decisive edge in intelligence collection.*^
Already
Already the the British
British had had enjoyed
enjoyed theirtheir first
first successes
successes in in breaking
breaking into into the
the German
German
"enigma" coding system, and poor signal discipline by the Luftwaffe throughout
"enigma" coding system, and poor signal discipline by the Luftwaffe throughout
the
the war provided the
war provided the British
British with with easy
easy access
access to to German
German air air force
force communications
communications
traffic . The impact of "Ultra" (the comprehensive generic term for
traffic. The impact of "Ultra" (the comprehensive generic term for intelligence
intelligence
based on intercepted and decoded German messages) on the Battle of Britain is
based on intercepted and decoded German messages) on the Battle of Britain is not
not
entirely clear. The official historian of British intelligence in the war claims that itit
entirely clear. The official historian of British intelligence in the war claims that
had
had nono direct
direct impact
impact on on the the battle,
battle, while another historian
while another historian argues argues thatthat "Ultra"
"Ultra"
indicated
indicated German
German targets targets for for the
the August
August 15 15 attacks
attacks early
early enough
enough for for Air
Air Marshal
Marshal Sir Sir
Hugh
Hugh Dowding,
Dowding, Commander Commander in in Chief
Chief of of Fighter
Fighter Command,
Command, to to use
use the
the decrypts
decrypts in in
his
his conduct
conduct of of that
that day's
day's air air battles
battles."." What
What is is clear
clear is
is that
that "Ultra,"
"Ultra," in in combination
combination
with
with `Y'
'Y' Service
Service intercepts
intercepts of of German
German radioradio traffic,
traffic, gave
gave the the British
British an an increasingly
increasingly
accurate
accurate picture
picture of of the
the German
German order order of of battle
battle as as air
air operations
operations continued
continued into into
September
September."" . 1' Finally,
Finally, the the Battle
Battle of of Britain
Britain witnessed
witnessed the the integration
integration of of British
British
scientists
scientists directly
directly into into the
the intelligence
intelligence network
network.. The The combination
combination of of scientists
scientists withwith
signals
signals and
and otherother intelligence
intelligence gave gave the
the Allies
Allies aa detailed
detailed picture
picture of of German
German scientific
scientific
advances
advances as as well
well as as the
the enemy's
enemy's tactics
tactics andand operations
operations.. Conversely,
Conversely, the the picture
picture of of
Allied
Allied developments
developments remained remained almost almost opaque
opaque to to the
the Germans
Germans.*' .85 The
The first
first clear
clear
break
break inin scientific
scientific intelligence
intelligence came came when
when the the British-on
British—on the the basis
basis ofof aa few
few scraps
scraps
of
of information
information drawn drawn fromfrom crashed
crashed aircraft,
aircraft, the the interrogation
interrogation of of captured
captured aircrews,
aircrews,
and
and several
several "Ultra"
"Ultra" messages-deduced
messages—deduced the the nature
nature ofof thethe German
German blindblind bombing
bombing
system,
system, thethe so-called
so-called "Knickebein"
"Knickebein" method." method.** This This was
was the the first
first ofmany
of many triumphs
triumphs..
The
The undervaluing
undervaluing of of intelligence
intelligence and and aa concomitant
concomitant underestimation
underestimation of of enemy
enemy
capabilities
capabilities marked marked Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe operations
operations throughout
throughout the the war."
war.*' These
These defects
defects
showed
showed up up in appreciations written
in appreciations written by by the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's intelligence
intelligence section section for for the
the air
air
offensive
offensive on on Britain
Britain.. However,
However, given given the the successes
successes of of May May and and June
June and and the
the
overestimation
overestimation of of airpower
airpower capabilities
capabilities thenthen current
current in in the
the air air forces
forces of of the
the world,
world, itit
is
is perhaps
perhaps understandable
understandable that that the
the Germans
Germans misjudged
misjudged their their opponents
opponents.. In In aa study
study
dated
dated July
July 16, 16, Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe intelligence
intelligence estimated
estimated the the "Hurricane"
"Hurricane" and and "Spitfire"
"Spitfire"
well
well below
below their their actual
actual performance
performance capabilities,
capabilities, made made no no mention
mention of of Britain's
Britain's
radar-controlled
radar-controlled air air defense
defense system,system, and and ended
ended on on the
the optimistic
optimistic note note that
that "the
"the
Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, unlike unlike the the RAF,
RAF, will will be
be inin aa position
position in in every
every respect
respect to to achieve
achieve aa
decisive effect
decisive effect this year.'"I'
this year. '**
The
The initial
initial Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe estimate
estimate on on the
the duration
duration of of the
the coming
coming campaign
campaign was was four
four
days for
days for the defeat of
the defeat of Fighter
Fighter Command
Command in in southern
southern England,
England, followedfollowed by by four
four
weeks
weeks during
during which which German
German bombers bombers and and long-range
long-range fightersfighters wouldwould mop mop up up the
the
remainder
remainder of of the
the RAF
RAF and and destroy
destroy thethe British
British aircraft
aircraft industry."
industry.*' On On July
July 21,
21, G6ring
Goring
intimated
intimated to to hishis commanders
commanders that that beside
beside the the RAF,
RAF, the the British
British aircraft
aircraft industry
industry
represented
represented aa critical critical target
target for for winning
winning air air superiority
superiority.. Above Above all, all, the
the initial
initial
strategic goal must aim at the
strategic goal must aim at the weakening
weakening of
of the
the morale
morale and
and actual
actual strength
strength of
of British
British

47
47
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

fighter
fighter units
units.. Interestingly,
Interestingly, Goring Goring suggested
suggested that that his his fighter
fighter forces
forces exercise
exercise
maximum
maximum operational
operational latitude,
latitude, and
and to
to this
this end
end commanders
commanders should
should not
not tie
tie them
them too
too
closely to the bombers
closely to the bombers. . Such
Such a
a strategy
strategy would
would allow
allow the
the fighters
fighters to
to use
use their
their speed
speed
and
and maneuverability
maneuverability.*' .9° Three
Three days days later,
later, Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps II delineated delineated four four direct
direct
missions for the Luftwaffe in the coming battle . The first and most important was to
missions for the Luftwaffe in the coming battle. The first and most important was to
win air superiority by attacks on the RAF and its industrial support, particularly the
win air superiority by attacks on the RAF and its industrial support, particularly the
engine
engine industry;
industry; second,second, to to support
support the the Channel
Channel crossingcrossing by by attacks against the
attacks against the
enemy
enemy fleetfleet and
and bombers,
bombers, and and eventually
eventually through
through directdirect aid aid forfor the
the army
army;; third,
third, toto
attack British
attack British ports,
ports, supplies,
supplies, and and imports
imports;; and and finally,
finally, independent
independent of of the
the first
first three
three
tasks,
tasks, launch ruthless retaliatory
launch ruthless retaliatory terror terror attacks
attacks on on majorBritish
major British cities.9' cities."
The
The first
first phase
phase of of the
the battle,
battle, July through early
July through early August,
August, involved involved exploratory
exploratory
operations
operations over over the the Channel
Channel as as the
the Germans,
Germans, preparingpreparing for for aa major
major offensive
offensive in in
August,
August, sought
sought to to draw
draw Fighter
Fighter Command
Command out out andand to close the
to close Channel.. Neither
the Channel Neither
side
side came
came out out aa clearclear winner,
winner, but but oneone can can perhaps
perhaps criticizecriticize the the Admiralty
Admiralty for for
continuing
continuing coastal
coastal convoys
convoys in in the
the face
face ofof the
the airair threat
threat from from acrossacross the the Channel
Channel and and
the
the Air
Air Ministry
Ministry for for accepting
accepting an an additional
additional responsibility
responsibility for for Fighter
Fighter Command
Command to to
protect
protect aa relatively
relatively unimportant
unimportant movement movement of of ships
ships.. By By the the endend of of July,
July, despite
despite
losses,
losses, both
both sides
sides werewere stronger
stronger numerically
numerically than than at at the
the end end ofJune.9
of June.'^z
Even
Even before
before the the Germans
Germans launched launched their aerial assault,
their aerial assault, code-named
code-named "Eagle "Eagle
Day,"
Day," distressing
distressing tactical
tactical problems
problems had appeared over
had appeared over the the Channel
Channel.. The The bombers
bombers
and
and "Stukas"
"Stukas" had had proven
proven as as vulnerable
vulnerable to to British
British fighter
fighter attack attack as as they
they had had over
over
Dunkirk,
Dunkirk, while while the the Bf Bf 110 110 proved
proved unable unable to to defend
defend itself itself adequately
adequately against against
"Hurricanes"
"Hurricanes" and and "Spitfires
"Spitfires." ." Only
Only the the Bf Bf 109 109 showedshowed itself itself equal
equal to to the
the
"Spitfire"
"Spitfire" and and superior
superior to to the
the "Hurricane
"Hurricane." ." Thus,
Thus, the the single-engine
single-engine fighter fighter force
force
had
had to to provide
provide protection
protection to to all
all bomber
bomber sorties
sorties and and Bf Bf 110 110 missions,
missions, as as well
well as as
conduct
conduct its its own
own campaign
campaign against against Fighter
Fighter Command.
Command. The The helplessness
helplessness of of German
German
bombers
bombers faced faced with with British
British fighter
fighter opposition
opposition was was reflected
reflected in in Goring's
Goring's early early
August
August directive
directive that that German
German fighters fighters flying
flying cover
cover shouldshould stick stick close
close to to the
the units
units
they
they were
were protecting
protecting and and not not allow
allow themselves
themselves to to bebe deflected
deflected from from their
their primary
primary
mission
mission by by the
the appearance
appearance of of single
single enemy
enemy aircraft
aircraft.'^ . 91
The
The airair battles
battles in in mid-August
mid-August underlined underlined the the weakness
weakness of of the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's force force
structure
structure.. On On August
August 15, 15, RAFRAF fighters
fighters basedbased in in central
central and and northern
northern EnglandEngland
decimated
decimated German German bombers bombers and and Bf Bf 110's
llO's flying
flying unescorted
unescorted from from Scandinavia
Scandinavia and and
proved
proved onceonce andand forfor allall that
that unsupported
unsupported daylightdaylight bomberbomber operations
operations againstagainst Britain
Britain
were
were nearly
nearly impossible.
impossible. RAF RAF opposition
opposition in in the
the north
north also also disproved
disproved the the German
German
view
view that
that Dowding
Dowding would would concentrate
concentrate his his entire
entire strength
strength in in the
the south
south to to meet
meet the the air
air
threat
threat from
from across
across the the Channel
Channel.. In In that
that area,
area, the
the contest
contest for for air
air superiority
superiority lastedlasted forfor
aa little
little over
over aa month.
month. Flying Flying up up toto three
three sorties
sorties aa day,
day, the the Bf Bf 109
109 force
force could
could not not bebe
everywhere;
everywhere; and and as as bomber
bomber and and Bf. Bf. 110
110 losses
losses mounted,
mounted, the the fighter
fighter squadrons
squadrons
unfairly
unfairly camecame underunder criticism
criticism from from Goring
Goring and and his staff for
his staff for insufficientlyprotecting
insufficientlyprotecting
the
the bombers
bombers.** .94 The fuel supply of the Bf 109 limited the arena
The fuel supply of the Bf 109 limited the arena within
within which
which the the
Luftwaffe grappled with Fighter Command, as well as the time that
Luftwaffe grappled with Fighter Command, as well as the time that fighter
fighter
formations
formations could could remain
remain with with the the bombers
bombers.. Surprisingly,
Surprisingly, the the Condor
Condor LegionLegion had had
successfully experimented in Spain with drop tanks that extended the
successfully experimented in Spain with drop tanks that extended the Bf
Bf 109's
109's

48
48
THE
THE EASY
EASY WAR:
WAR: GERMANY
GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
TRIUMPHANT

U FIGHTER
FIGHTER COMMAND
COMMAND BASES
BASES
BATTLE
BATTLE OF
OF BRITAIN ~_i
BRITAIN * LUFTWAFFE
LUFTWAFFE FIGHTER
FIGHTER BASES
BASES
v ^ LUFTWAFFE BOMBER
LUFTWAFFE BOMBER BASES
BASES
—. RAF
o -o RAF GROUP
GROUP BOUNDARIES
BOUNDARIES
v LUFTFLOTTEBOUNDARIES
LUFTFLOTTE BOUNDARIES

RANGE
RANGE OF
OF OF
BF 109
109
i
___RANGE
.RANGE OF
OF LOW
LOW LEVEL
LEVEL RADAR
RADAR
_ RANGE
RANGE OF
OF HIGH
HIGH LEVEL
LEVEL RADAR
RADAR

NORTH SEA

LUFTFLOTTE 3

49
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

range
range by upwards of
by upwards of 125
125 miles;
miles; nonenone werewere available
available for
for use
use in in 1940-a
1940—a state state of
of
affairs
affairs quite similar to
quite similar to what
what waswas to to occur
occur in in the
the US US Army
Army AirAir Forces
Forces in in 1943
1943.".95
On
On August
August 15, 15, anan easily
easily discouraged
discouraged Goring Goring questioned
questioned the the promising
promising attacks
attacks
that
that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had made
made on on radar
radar install ations .96 Thereafter,
installations.** Thereafter, the the Germans
Germans left left
the
the British
British radar
radar network
network alone alone and and concentrated
concentrated on on Fighter
Fighter Command,
Command, aircraft
aircraft
bases,
bases, and
and sector
sector stations
stations in in southern England.. The
southern England The pressure
pressure that that these
these attacks
attacks
placed
placed onon the
the air
air defense
defense forces
forces has has received
received justifiable
justifiable attention
attention from
from historians,
historians,
and
and Dowding's
Dowding's conduct
conduct ofthe
of the airair battle,
battle, supported
supported by by the
the Commander
Commander of of 11
11 Group,
Group,
Keith
Keith Park,
Park, ranks
ranks among
among the the great
great defensive
defensive victories
victories ofof the
the war.
war.
What
What hashas not
not been
been so so clear
clear isis that
that these
these airair battles
battles placed
placed aa comparable,
comparable, if if not
not
greater, strain on the Luftwaffe's resources . For the week beginning with "Eagle
greater, strain on the Luftwaffe's resources. For the week beginning with "Eagle
Day"
Day" on on August
August 13 13 and
and ending
ending on on August
August 19, 19, the
the Germans
Germans wrote wrote off
off approximately
approximately
284
284 aircraft,
aircraft, oror 77 percent
percent of of their
their total
total force
force structure,
structure, or or approximately
approximately 10 10 percent
percent
of all aircraft
of all aircraft deployed
deployed in in the
the three
three air
air fleets
fleets facing
facing Britain
Britain as as of
of July
July 20.9'
20.'' For
For
August, aircraft losses
August, aircraft losses were
were 774
774 from
from all
all causes,
causes, or
or 18 .5
18.5 percent
percent of
of all
all combat
combat
aircraft
aircraft available
available at at the
the beginning
beginning of of the
the month.98
month.'*
Such a high attrition rate had an obvious impact
Such a high attrition rate had an obvious impact on on crew
crew strength
strength andand morale.
morale. As As
Table VII 99 indicates, pilot losses for August were disproportionately high
Table VII'' indicates, pilot losses for August were disproportionately high
compared
compared to to aircraft
aircraft losses,
losses, undoubtedly
undoubtedly reflecting
reflecting the the fact
fact that
that most
most ofof the
the air
air
fighting occurred over the Channel or British territory .
fighting occurred over the Channel or British territory.

TABLE
TABLE VII
VII

Aircraft
Aircraft and
and Crew
Crew Losses-August
Losses—^August 1940
1940

Aircraft
Aircraft Pilots
Pilots
Written
Written Off
Off Killed
Killed Captured
Captured Injured
Injured Uninjured
Uninjured Missing
Missing

Me
Me 109
109 229
229 57
57 33 41
41 47
47 84
84
Me
Me 110
no 123
123 48
48 22 66 19
19 48
48
Do
Do 17
17 75
75 22
22 22 14
14 10
10 26
26
He
He 111
111 98
98 36
36 11 99 15
15 34
34
Ju 88
Ju88 104
104 33
33 44 55 17
17 44
44
Ju 87 -
Ju87 - 62
62 20
20 11 55 99 28
28

The
The attrition
attrition of
of experienced
experienced aircrews
aircrews in
in the battle is
the battle is indicated
indicated by
by aa steady
steady drop
drop in
in
the
the percentage
percentage of of operational
operational ready
ready crews
crews present
present in
in the
the squadrons
squadrons over
over the
the summer
summer
(see
(see Table VIII'°°) .
Table VIII'«*).

50
TABLE
TABLE VIII
VIII

PERCENTAGE
PERCENTAGE OF
OF FULLY
FULLY OPERATIONAL
OPERATIONAL READY
READY CREWS
CREWS
JULY
JULY -- SEPTEMBER
SEPTEMBER 1940
1940
BOMBERS ■■■uiiiiHiiH
BOMBERS
BF
BF 1095
109s -—.
BF
BF 110s
110s .
-.-...
. ., . .

90% -
84% 83 % ° 85%
82% 401"*
*# am
x""
801/0 -
81% 81% 80% k v I 78%~, .,43%
81% "" 81 %".;6 %
w..... . %
75% "comma 77% en
~''.. 70% 71% 76% 74% >
70% 73 70°/."",..1., 74°4
744%
•<
690/0 64%
67% " '". . .d"~n nnuuynnnnufuu ,~~. $
66/0 65% ??
.OJp 66% "I~
60°/, - W O
61%
60%
591/9 >
z
50%
50% . •<
1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 i 1 I 1
ic
JUL
JUL 77 JUL
JUL 16
16 JUL
JUL 23
23 JUL
JUL 30
30 AUG
AUfi 3
3 AUG
AUG 10
10 AUG
AU6 17
17 AUG
AUG 24
24 AUG
AUG 31
31 SEP
SEP 77 SEP 14
SEP 14 SEP 21
SEP 21
IX
ao
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

The
The figures
figures in in Tables
Tables VII VII and
and VIII
VIII only
only hint
hint at the problem
at the problem.. Not Not only
only had
had the
the
Germans
Germans lost many of
lost many of their
their most
most experienced combat crews
experienced combat crews but but byby September
September
1940,
1940, the percentage of
the percentage of operational
operational readyready crews
crews against
against authorized
authorized aircraft
aircraft had
had
dropped
dropped to to an
an unacceptable
unacceptable level.level. On On September
September 14, Luftwaffe Bf
14, Luftwaffe 109 squadrons
Bf 109 squadrons
possessed only 67
possessed only 67 percent
percent operational
operational readyready crews
crews against authorized aircraft.
against authorized aircraft. For
For
Bf
Bf 110
110 squadrons,
squadrons, the the figure
figure waswas 4646 percent
percent;; and
and for
for bombers,
bombers, itit was 59 percent
was 59 percent..
One
One week
week later, the figures
later, the figures werewere 64 64 percent,
percent, 52 52 percent,
percent, and and 5252 percent,
percent,
respectively. 101
respectively.""
Conversely,
Conversely, aircraft
aircraft losses
losses forfor July
July through
through September
September give give thethe impression
impression that
that
the Germans were running out of aircraft as well as aircrews! (See Table IX .'°z)
the Germans were running out of aircraft as well as aircrews! (See Table IX.'"2)
Table X'"'3 indicates
Table X'° indicates the cumulative effect
the cumulative effect of
of losses
losses from
from May
May through
through September
September..
These losses indicate the Luftwaffe's heavy commitment for the period .
These losses indicate the Luftwaffe'% heavy commitment for the period.
The
The impact
impact of of losses
losses over
over southern
southern England
England combined
combined with with inclinations
inclinations already
already
present in Luftwaffe doctrine to
present in Luftwaffe doctrine to induce
induce aa change
change in
in German
German air
air strategy
strategy early
early in
in
September . Attacks on
September. Attacks on Britain's
Britain's air
air defense
defense system
system through
through September
September 6
6 had
had given
given
no indication
no indication that that Fighter
Fighter Command
Command was was weakening
weakening.. As As aa result,
result, Goring-at
Goring—at
Kesselring's urging and with Hitler's
Kesselring's urging and with Hitler's support-turned
support—turned to
to a
a massive
massive assault
assault on
on the
the
British capital . This all-out effort, directed at
British capital. This all-out effort, directed at London's
London's East
East End
End and
and the
the Thames
Thames
docks,
docks, accorded
accorded well well with
with Douhet's
Douhet's theories
theories and
and the the German's
German's own own belief
belief that
that
ruthlessness could pay extra dividends .
ruthlessness could pay extra dividends.
Hitler's
Hitler's conversion
conversion to to the the assault
assault on
on London
London reflected
reflected aa predilection
predilection that
that would
would
haunt
haunt the Luftwaffe in
the Luftwaffe in the
the coming
coming years his insatiable
years:: his insatiable fascination
fascination with
with aa retaliatory
retaliatory
air
air strategy
strategy in
in reply
reply toto enemy
enemy bombings
bombings.. OnOn September
September 4, 4, the Fiihrer declared
the Fuhrer declared in in
Berlin:
Berlin: "When
"When theythey declare
declare they they will
will attack
attack our
our cities
cities in
in great
great measure,
measure, we we will
will
eradicate
eradicate their
their cities.
cities. .. .. .. The
The hour
hour will
will come when one
come when one ofof us
us will
will break, and itit will
break, and will
not
not be
be National
National Socialist
Socialist Germany!"
Germany!"'"^ '°'
The
The results
results of
of the
the great
great September
September 77 raid on the
raid on the London
London docks
docks were
were indeed
indeed
spectacular.
spectacular. Over
Over the
the night
night of
of September
September 7-8,7-8, London
London firemen
firemen fought
fought nine
nine fires
fires that
that
they
they rated
rated over
over 100 pumps, and
100 pumps, and one
one fire
fire on
on the
the Surrey
Surrey docks
docks of
of over
over 300
300 pumps . 105
pumps.'"'
The
The attack
attack of
of September
September 77 diddid not
not entirely
entirely step
step over
over the
the line
line into
into aa clear
clear terror
terror
bombing
bombing effort
effort since
since the
the primary
primary target
target was
was the
the London
London docks,
docks, but
but there
there clearly
clearly was
was
an
an assumed
assumed hope
hope ofof terrorizing
terrorizing the
the London
London population.
population. TheThe relief
relief toto Fighter
Fighter
Command
Command provided
provided byby this
this change
change in in German
German strategy
strategy benefited
benefited not
not so
so much
much thethe
exhausted
exhausted fighter
fighter crews
crews who
who still
still faced
faced considerable
considerable fighting
fighting but
but rather
rather the
the ground
ground
infrastructure
infrastructure ofof the
the British
British air
air defense
defense system
system (the
(the maintenance
maintenance personnel,
personnel,
airfields,
airfields, and
and sector
sector stations
stations needed
needed toto keep
keep the
the aircraft
aircraft flying)
flying)..

The
The heavy
heavy night
night bombing
bombing andand daylight
daylight probes
probes ofof the
the next
next week
week putput heavy
heavy
pressure
pressure on
on both
both London's
London's inhabitants
inhabitants and
and German
German bomber
bomber crews.
crews. However,
However, not
not
until
until September
September 15 15 did
did the Luftwaffe launch
the Luftwaffe launch the
the next
next massive
massive daylight
daylight attack
attack on
on
London.
London. This
This strike
strike represented
represented the
the climactic
climactic moment
moment of of the
the battle
battle.. While
While on
on
earlier
earlier occasions
occasions the
the Germans
Germans hadhad lost
lost more
more aircraft,
aircraft, the
the stunning
stunning impact
impact of
of aa
Fighter
Fighter Command
Command that that was
was rested
rested and
and prepared
prepared by
by aa week
week ofof less
less critical
critical operations
operations

52
52
THE EASY WAR
THE EASY WAR:: GERMANY
GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
TRIUMPHANT

TABLE
TABLE IX
IX

Aircraft Losses-July-September
Aircraft Losses—^July-September 1940
1940

Destroyed
Destroyed on
on Operations
Operations

Due
Due to
to Not
Not Due
Due Destroyed
Destroyed Total
Total Destroyed
Destroyed
Strength
Strength Enemy
Enemy to Enemy
to Enemy Not
Not on
on Total
Total as
as Percent
Percent of
of
Type
Type Aircraft
Aircraft 29 .6 .40 .
29.6.40. Action
Action Action
Action Total
Total Operations
Operations Destroyed
Destroyed Initial
Initial Strength
Strength

Close
Close Recce
Recce 312
312 11 22 33 55 88 3%
3%

Long-Range
Long-Range
Recce
Recce 257
257 47
47 14
14 61
61 99 70
70 27%
27%

Single-Engine
Single-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 1,107
1,107 398
398 79
79 477
477 41
41 518
518 47%
47%
Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 357
357 214
214 99 223
223 12
12 235
235 66%
66%
Bombers
Bombers 1,380
1,380 424
424 127
127 551
551 70
70 621
621 45%
45%
Dive
Dive Bombers
Bombers 428
428 59
59 10
10 69
69 19
19 88
88 21%
21%
Transport
Transport 408
408 33 11 44 11
11 15
15 4%
4%
Coastal
Coastal 233
233 38
38 29
29 67
67 14
14 81
81 35%
35%

TOTAL
TOTAL 4,482
4,482 1,184
1,184 271
271 1,455
1,455 181
181 1,636
1,636 37%
37%

Damaged
Damaged on
on Operations
Operations

Total
Total Damaged
Damaged
Due
Due to
to Not
Not Due
Due Total
Total and
and Destroyed
Destroyed
Enemy
Enemy to
to Enemy
Enemy Not
Not on
on Total
Total Damaged
Damaged and
and as
as Percent
Percent of
of
Type
Type Aircraft
Aircraft Action
Action Action
Action Total
Total Operations
Operations Damaged
Damaged Destroyed
Destroyed Initial
Initial Strength
Strength
Close
Close Recce
Recce 00 33 33 99 12
12 20
20 6%
6%
Long-Range
Long-Range
Recce
Recce 66 88 14
14 55 19
19 89
89 35%
35%
Single-Engine
Single-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 47
47 83
83 130
130 55
55 185
185 703
703 64%
64%
Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 49
49 11
11 60
60 55 65
65 300
300 84%
84%
Bombers
Bombers 118
118 118
118 236
236 98
98 334
334 955
955 69%
69%
Dive
Dive Bombers
Bombers 22
22 66 28
28 21
21 49
49 137
137 32%
32%
Transport
Transport 11 11 22 99 11
11 26
26 6%
6%
Coastal
Coastal 44 66 10
10 12
12 22
22 109
109 47%
47%
TOTAL
TOTAL 247
247 236
236 483
483 214
214 697
697 2,339
2,339 52%
52%

5533
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

TABLE
TABLEXX

Aircraft
Aircraft Losses-May-September
Losses—^May-September 1940
1940

Destroyed
Destroyed on
on Operations
Operations

Aircraft
Aircraft Destroyed
Destroyed
Due
Due to
to Not
Not Due
Due Destroyed
Destroyed in
in May-Sep
May-Sep
Type
Type Strength
Strength Enemy
Enemy to
to Enemy
Enemy Not
Not on
on Total
Total Period
Period as
as of
of
Aircraft
Aircraft 4 .5 .40 .
4.5.40. Action
Action Action
Action Total
Total Operations
Operations Destroyed
Destroyed Initial
Initial Strength
Strength

Close
Close Recce
Recce 345
345 68
68 77 75
75 11
11 86
86 25%
25%
Long-Range
Long-Range
Recce
Recce 321
321 115
115 32
32 147
147 11
11 158
158 49%
49%
Single-Engine
Single-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 1,369
1,369 567
567 145
145 712
712 63
63 775
775 57%
57%
Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 367
367 304
304 25
25 329
329 16
16 345
345 94%
94%
Bombers
Bombers 1,758
1,758 862
862 180
180 1,042
1,042 100
100 1,142
1,142 65%
65%
Dive
Dive Bombers
Bombers 417
417 148
148 34
34 182
182 28
28 210
210 50%
50%
Transport
Transport 531
531 191
191 19
19 210
210 18
18 228
228 43%
43%
Coastal
Coastal 241
241 58
58 45
45 103
103 17
17 120
120 50%
50%
TOTAL
TOTAL 5,349
5,349 2,313
2,313 487
487 2,800
2,800 264
264 3,064
3,064 57%
57%

broke
broke the back of
the back of the
the attack.
attack. Unlike
Unlike the the previous
previous weekweek when
when the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had
devastated
devastated the the Thames
Thames docks, docks, thethe bombers
bombers now now scattered
scattered overover London
London and and ran
ran forfor
the
the coast
coast.. As
As aa consequence,
consequence, there there was
was no no concentrated
concentrated patternpattern to
to the
the bombing.
bombing.''* 106
The
The failure
failure of of the
the daylight
daylight offensive
offensive in September led
in September to the
led to the cancellation
cancellation of of "Sea
"Sea
Lion"
Lion" andand toto aa rethinking
rethinking ofGerman
of German air air strategy
strategy against
against Britain
Britain as
as part
part ofan
of an overall
overall
reassessment
reassessment.. The The Germans
Germans now now turned
turned to to aa night
night bombing
bombing offensive.
offensive. TheThe strategic
strategic
problem
problem thatthat faced the Luftwaffe
faced the Luftwaffe was was howhow exactly
exactly itit could
could conduct
conduct this
this campaign
campaign..
As with the
As with the air
air superiority
superiority battlebattle ofof August
August and and early
early September,
September, this this problem
problem was,was,
in
in many
many ways,
ways, similar
similar toto that
that facing
facing those
those directing
directing the
the Allied
Allied "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing
campaign
campaign of of 1943
1943 andand 1944.
1944, German
German planners
planners had had to
to decide
decide whether
whether the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
should
should deliver
deliver thethe weight
weight of of its
its attack
attack against
against aa specific
specific segment
segment of of British
British industry
industry
such
such asas aircraft
aircraft factories,
factories, or or against
against aa system
system of of interrelated
interrelated industries
industries such
such as as
Britain's
Britain's import
import and and distribution
distribution network,
network, or or even in aa blow
even in blow aimed
aimed at at breaking
breaking thethe
morale
morale of of the
the British
British population
population.. The bombing offensive
The bombing offensive against
against London,
London, referred
referred
to as the
to as the Blitz,
Blitz, attempted
attempted to to achieve simultaneously all
achieve simultaneously all three
three strategies,
strategies, none
none of of
which proved
which proved decisive
decisive."" . 101 As
As with
with the
the daylight attacks, the
daylight attacks, the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe did not possess
did not possess
the
the strength
strength or or the capabilities to
the capabilities to achieve
achieve thesethese objectives,
objectives, but but these direct attacks
these direct attacks
on British
on British military
military industrial
industrial targets
targets and
and population
population centers
centers only
only spurred
spurred British
British
desires to repay
desires to repay the
the Germans
Germans in
in kind
kind. .'0'
'"*

4
554
THE
THE EASY
EASY WAR
WAR:: GERMANY
GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
TRIUMPHANT

aspect of
One aspect
One the German
of the German night
night bomber
bomber offensive
offensive deserves
deserves closercloser scrutiny
scrutiny.. The
The
switch
switch to
to night
night bombing resulted from
bombing resulted from aa realistic
realistic appreciation
appreciation that that German
German fighters
fighters
were
were not
not sufficiently
sufficiently numerous
numerous to to protect
protect thethe bombers
bombers from from devastating
devastating British
British
fighter
fighter attacks
attacks.. The
The night
night effort
effort ledled to
to aa drastic
drastic falloff
falloff in in bomber losses due
bomber losses due to
to
combat
combat;; and
and through
through the
the winter
winter of of 1941,
1941, British night fighter
British night fighter and and antiaircraft
antiaircraft
defenses generally ineffective
were generally
defenses were ineffective against
against German
German intruders.
intruders. While While combat-
combat-
related losses were
related losses were low,
low, the
the accident
accident rate
rate remained
remained high
high. . Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe crews
crews flew
flew these
these
combat missions at night
combat missions at night and
and in
in bad
bad weather,
weather, or
or trained
trained in
in less-than-perfect
less-than-perfect
conditions
conditions to to achieve the flying
achieve the flying proficiency
proficiency required
required.. Thus, Thus, to to list
list only
only combat
combat
losses considerably
losses considerably understates
understates the
the attrition
attrition taking
taking place
place. . From
From October
October to
to
December 1940, bomber losses due
December 1940, bomber losses due to
to noncombat
noncombat causes
causes ran
ran well
well over
over 50
50 percent
percent
of
of all
all losses
losses each
each month;
month; while
while for the whole
for the whole period,
period, 63 63.5 .5 percent
percent of of bomber
bomber losses
losses
resulted from noncombat causes . (See
resulted from noncombat causes. (See Table
Table XI. 109
XI."") )

TABLE
TABLE XI
XI

Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe Bomber
Bomber Losses---October-December
Losses—October-December 1940
1940

Bombers
Bombers
Total No..
Total No Bombers
Bombers Destroyed on
Destroyed on Bombers
Bombers
of
of Bombers
Bombers Destroyed
Destroyed Operations
Operations But
But Destroyed
Destroyed
at
at Beginning
Beginning Due
Due to
to Enemy
Enemy Not
Not Due
Due to
to Not
Not on
on Total
Total
of Month
of Month Action
Action Enemy
Enemy Action
Action Operations
Operations Destroyed
Destroyed

October
October 1940
1940 (28 .9 .40 .)
(28.9.40.) 64
64 78
78 29
29 171
171
1,420
1,420
November
November 1940
1940 (2 .11 .40 .)
(2.11.40.) 14
14 57
57 13
13 84
84
1,423
1,423
December
December 1940
1940 (30 .11 .40 .)
(30.11.40.) 62
62 58
58 99 129
129
1,393
1,393

Average
Average
TOTAL
TOTAL 1,412
1,412 140
140 193
193 51
51 384
384

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
As
As with
with most
most wars,
wars, those
those who
who participated
participated inin oror who
who observed
observed the the Battle
Battle ofof
Britain
Britain and
and the
the Blitz
Blitz drew
drew conclusions
conclusions compatible
compatible with with their
their own
own views
views onon force
force
structure
structure and
and doctrine
doctrine.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, inin every
every sense,
sense, those
those directing
directing thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
came
came off
off least
least well
well inin the
the "lessons
"lessons learned"
learned" analysis.
analysis. Although
Although thethe Germans
Germans had had
suffered
suffered the
the hardest
hardest psychological
psychological knocks,
knocks, since
since itit had
had been
been their
their air
air offensive
offensive that
that
had
had failed,
failed, their
their reaction
reaction seems
seems best
best represented
represented by by Jeschonnek's
Jeschonnek's remark
remark shortly
shortly
before the invasion of Russia : "At last, a proper war!""° Before going on
before the invasion of Russia: "At last, a proper war!""" Before going on toto
examine the full implications of such a statement, one should note that Jeschonnek
examine the full implications of such a statement, one should note that Jeschonnek
and the general
and the general staff
staff paid minimal attention
paid minimal to the
attention to the attrition
attrition that
that had
had taken
taken place
place not
not

555
5
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

only
only in in thethe Battle
Battle of of Britain
Britain butbut inin the
the land
land campaign
campaign that had preceded
that had preceded it. it. Thus,
Thus,
willfully
willfully and and confidently,
confidently, they they embarked
embarked on on aa campaign
campaign to to conquer
conquer the the largest
largest
nation
nation in in the world with
the world with an an air
air force
force thatthat quantitatively
quantitatively was was virtually
virtually the the same
same sizesize
as
as itit had
had been been the the previous
previous year year andand thatthat waswas arguably
arguably weakerweaker in in terms
terms of of crew
crew
experience
experience and and training
training.. Moreover,
Moreover, industrial
industrial production
production of of aircraft
aircraft had
had stagnated
stagnated
for the third consecutive year.
for the third consecutive year.
For
For the the British,
British, the the Battle
Battle of Britain confirmed
of Britain confirmed what what operations
operations over over the the
Heligoland Bight had
Heligoland Bight had indicated
indicated the
the previous
previous December-daylight bomber
December—daylight bomber
operations
operations in in the
the face
face of of enemy
enemy fighters
fighters were were not possible.. Surprisingly,
not possible Surprisingly, German German
night operations, which often did not achieve either concentration or accuracy in
night operations, which often did not achieve either concentration or accuracy in
bombing, did not raise the obvious question of the RAF's bombing accuracy over
bombing, did not raise the obvious question of the RAF's bombing accuracy over
German
German territory territory.. Not Not until
until thethe summer
summer of of 1941,
1941, on on thethe basis
basis of of Bomber
Bomber
Command's own operations, did the British recognize that only one-third of
Command's own operations, did the British recognize that only one-third of their
their
bombs were falling within 5 miles of the target (a target circle equal to 78.54 square
bombs were falling within 5 miles of the target (a target circle equal to 78.54 square
miles)."'
miles).'" Nor Nor did did the the fact
fact that massive German
that massive German bombing bombing of of London
London had had not not
diminished but rather strengthened British morale make much impression. On this
diminished but rather strengthened British morale make much impression. On this
very
very point,
point. Air Air Marshal
Marshal Sir Sir Charles
Charles Portal,Portal, Commander
Commander in in Chief
Chief of of the
the RAF,
RAF,
remarked
remarked at at that
that time
time that
that the Germans surely
the Germans surely could
could not not take
take thethe same
same levellevel of of
pounding
pounding as as had
had thethe British
British people
people.. 112"^
The
The American
American assessment
assessment of of the tactical lessons
the tactical lessons was was equally
equally dubious
dubious.. Army Army Air Air
Forces' observers attributed the high loss rate of German bombers at the hands of
Forces' observers attributed the high loss rate of German bombers at the hands of
British
British fighters
fighters to to inadequate
inadequate defensive
defensive armament armament and and airframe
airframe size, size, to to flying
flying
missions
missions at at too
too lowlow aa level,
level, andand to to poor formation discipline
poor formation discipline under
under attack.
attack.'" "' The
The
Army
Army Air Air Forces'
Forces' plan plan of of employment,
employment, drawn drawn up up in in August
August 1941 1941 forfor America's
America's
possible
possible entrance
entrance into into aa European
European war, war, argued
argued that that "by
"by employing
employing large large numbers
numbers of of
aircraft
aircraft with with highhigh speed,
speed, good good defensive
defensive power, power, and and highhigh altitude,"
altitude," its its bombers
bombers
could
could penetrate
penetrate deep deep intointo thethe heart
heart of of Germany
Germany in in daylight
daylight without
without unbearable
unbearable
losses
losses."''. "" The
The impediment
impediment that that the
the BfBf 109's lack of
109's lack of range
range placed
placed on on German
German bomberbomber
operations
operations did did notnot receive
receive proper
proper recognition
recognition until until the
the disaster
disaster over
over Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt in in
October
October of of 1943
1943 had had again
again underscored
underscored the the need
need for for long-range
long-range fighter
fighter support
support..
According
According to to American
American officialofficial historians,
historians, such such an an oversight
oversight "is "is difficult
difficult to to account
account
for . 11115
for.'""
In
In oneone critical
critical respect,
respect, however,
however, the the British
British and and American
American air air forces
forces drewdrew the the
correct
correct lessonlesson from from the the Battle
Battle of of Britain
Britain.. Both Both air air forces
forces concluded
concluded that that the
the German
German
force
force structure
structure had had been
been inadequate
inadequate to to meet
meet the the demands
demands of of the
the battle
battle.. Encouraged
Encouraged
by
by an an overestimation
overestimation of of actual
actual German
German air air strength,
strength, both both air
air forces
forces setset targets
targets for for
their
their industrial
industrial production
production and and force
force structure
structure that that demanded
demanded enormousenormous increases
increases in in
air
air strength.
strength. Thus, Thus, at at the
the same
same time time that that thethe Germans
Germans continued
continued aa minimum minimum
program
program of of air
air armament,
armament, Britain Britain and and thethe United
United States
States setset in
in motion
motion preparations
preparations
that
that gave
gave them them aa decisive
decisive quantitative
quantitative edge edge in in the
the later
later years
years ofof the
the warwar.. The
The air air
struggle
struggle of of those
those years,
years, as as with
with thethe 19401940 battles,
battles, rested
rested on on numbers
numbers of of aircraft,
aircraft,
industrial
industrial capacitycapacity and and production,
production, and and availability
availability of of trained
trained aircrews
aircrews.. TheThe basis
basis of of
Allied superiority,
Allied superiority, thus, thus, would
would restrest on on thethe production
production programsprograms drawndrawn up up inin 1940
1940
and
and 1941
1941 by by both
both sides.
sides.

5566
Notes
Notes

11.. IMT,
IMT, TMWC,TMWC, Vol Vol.. XXXII,
XXXII, Doc Doc.. #3575,
#3575, pp.. 413413..
22.. Jost
Jost Ddlffer,
Diilffer, Weimar,
Weimar, Hitler
Hitler andund die
die Marine,
Marine, Reichspolitik
Reichspolitik and und Flottenbau
Flottenbau 1920-1939
1920-1939 (Dusseldorf,
(Diisseldorf,
1973),
1973), pp.. 504 504..
33.. William
William LL.. Shirer,
Shirer, The The Rise
Rise and
and FallFall of
of the
the Third
Third Reich (New York,
Reich (New York, 1960),
1960), pp pp.. 446-47
446-47..
44.. For
For aa fuller
fuller discussion
discussion of of this
this criticism
criticism of of British
British policy,
policy, see see mymy soon-to-be-published
soon-to-be-published study study TheThe
Change in
Change in the
the European
European BalanceBalance of of Power,
Power, 1938-1939,
1938-1939, ChaptersChapters X X and
and XI XI.. This
This is is aa fundamentally
fundamentally
different view
different view thanthan that expressed by
that expressed by Gerhard
Gerhard Weinberg
Weinberg in in The
The Foreign
Foreign Policy
Policy of ofNazi
Nazi Germany,
Germany, Vol Vol.. ItII
(Chicago,
(Chicago, 1981) 1981).. Readers interested in
Readers interested in the
the subject
subject areare invited
invited to to compare
compare the the differing
differing interpretations
interpretations..
55.. IMT,
IMT, TMWC,TMWC, Vol Vol.. XXVI,
XXVI, Doc Doc.. #798PS,
#798PS, pp.. 338 338..
66.. Shirer,
Shirer, The The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall of
of the
the Third
Third Reich,
Reich, pp.. 467
467..
77.. II am
am indebted
indebted to to Oberstleumant
Oberstleutnant Dr Dr.. Klaus Maier of
Klaus Maier the Militargeschichtliches
of the Militargeschichthches Forschungsamt
Forschungsamt for for
this
this line
line ofof argument
argument..
88.. BA/MA
BA/MA RL RL 7/42,
7/42, RLRL 7/43,
7/43, Luftflottenkommando
Luftflottenkommando 22., ., Fuhrungsabteilung,
Fuhrungsabteilung, Nr Nr.. 7093/39,
7093/39, 13 .5 .39 .,
13.5.39.,
"Schlussbesprechung
"Schlussbesprechung des des Planspieles
Planspieles 1939 1939." ."
99.. Maier,
Maier, et al., Das
etal.. deutsche Reich and
Das deutscheReich undderder Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. 11,
11, pp 63-64..
pp.. 63-64
10
10.. Quoted
Quoted in in David
David Irving,
Irving, TheThe WarWar Path,
Path, Hitler's
Hitler's Germany,
Germany, 1933-1939
1933-1939 (New (New York,
York, 1978),
1978), pp.. 225225;;
for
for further
further discussion
discussion of of this
this visit,
visit, see
see Irving,
Irving, TheThe Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofofthe
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp pp.. 73-74
73-74..
11 . Documents
11. Documents on German Foreign
on German Foreign Policy
Policy (DGFP),
(DGFP), SeriesSeries D, D, Vol
Vol.. VII
VII.. Doc
Doc.. # 192, 22
#192, .8 .39 .
22.8.39.
12 . Ibid
12. Ibid., ., Vol
Vol.. VII,
VII, Doc
Doc.. #307,
#307, 26 .8 .39 .
26.8.39.
13
13.. See
See thethe outstanding
outstanding article
article onon the
the real attitudes within
real attitudes within thethe Chamberlain
Chamberlain Cabinet Cabinet by by Peter
Peter Ludlow,
Ludlow,
"The
"The Unwinding
Unwinding of of Appeasement"
Appeasement" in in Das
Das "Andere
"Andere Deutschland"
Deutschland" im im Zweiten
Zweiten Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, ed ed.. by by L L..
Kettenacker
Kettenacker (Stuttgart,
(Stuttgart, 1977)1977)..
14
14.. For
For the economic side
the economic side of
of such
such aa strategy,
strategy, seesee Burton
Burton Klein,
Klein, Germany's
Germany's Economic
Economic Preparations
Preparationsfor for
War
War (Cambridge,
(Cambridge, 1959), 1959), andand Alan
Alan Milward,
Milward, The The German
German Economy
Economy at at War
War (London,
(London, 1965) 1965).. On On the the
military
military side side of of the
the argument,
argument, see see Larry
Larry Addington,
Addington, The The Blitzkrieg
Blitzkrieg Era Era andand the the German
German GeneralGeneral Staff,Staff,
1865-1941
1865-1941 (New (New Brunswick,
Brunswick, 1971) 1971).. ForFor aa recent
recent restatement
restatement of of the
the theory,
theory, see see FF.. HH.. Hinsley,
Hinsley, EE.. EE..
Thomas,
Thomas, C C.. F.F. GG.. Ransom,
Ransom, R R.. CC.. Knight,
Knight, British
British Intelligence
Intelligence in in the
the Second
Second World World War,War, Vol Vol.. II (London,
(London,
1979),
1979), Chapter
Chapter 11..
15
15.. For
For aa fuller
fuller discussion
discussion of of these
these issues,
issues, seesee Murray,
Murray, "The "The Change
Change in in the
the European
European Balance
Balance of of
Power,
Power, 1938-1939,"
1938-1939," Chapter Chapter I1..
16.
16. Maier,
Maier, et al ., Das
etal., Das deutsche
deutsche Reich
Reich and und der
der Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 117
117..
17
17.. "The
"The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in in Poland,"
Poland," aa study study produced
produced by by the
the German
German Historical
Historical BranchBranch (8th (8th Abteilung),
Abteilung),
11 .7 .44 ., AHB,
11.7.44., AHB, Translation
Translation No No.. VII/33
VII/33..
18
18.. For
For aa fuller
fuller discussion
discussion of of the
the planning
planning and and conduct
conduct of of operations
operations in in the
the Polish
Polish campaign,
campaign, see see::
Robert
Robert M M.. Kennedy,
Kennedy, The The German
German Campaign
Campaign in in Poland
Poland 1939 1939 (Washington,
CWash'mgton, 1956) 1956);; andand Maier,
Maier, et al ., Das
etal.. Das
deutsche
deutsche Reich Reich and und der der Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. 11, Part IV
II, Part IV..
19
19.. For
For an an interesting
interesting discussion
discussion of of the
the Polish
Polish campaign
campaign in in the
the air,
air, see
see JJ.. SS.. Orworski,
Orworski, "Polish"Polish Air Air
Force
Force VersusVersus Luftwaffe,"
Luftv/afie," Air Air Pictorial,
Pictorial, Vol Vol.. 21, Nos . 10
21, Nos. 10 and
and 11,
II, October
October and and November
November 1959 1959..
20
20.. In In fact,
fact, itit can
can be be argued
argued that
that itit was
was only
only inin Poland
Poland that
that the
the Germans
Germans integrated
integrated armored
armored formations
formations
and
and closeclose airair support
support into into aa coherent
coherent operational concept.. It
operational concept It was
was only
only inin Poland
Poland that that aa significant
significant body body
within
within the the German
German army's army's high
high command
command became became convinced
convinced that that anan armored
armored exploitation
exploitation strategy
strategy was was in in
the
the offing
offing..
21
21.. Maier,
Maier, et et al
al.,., Das
Das deutsche
deutsche Reich
Reich and und der
der Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. 11,
11, pp.. 124
124;; for
for aa detailed
detailed account
account
of
of the
the battle
batrie along
along the the Bzura,
Bzura, see
see Rolf
Rolf Elbe,
Elbe, DieDie Schlacht
Schlacht an an der
der Bzura
Bzura im im September
September 1939 1939 aus aus deutscher
deutscher
and
und polnischer
polnischer Sicht Sicht (Freiburg,
(Freiburg, 1975)
1975)..
22
22.. "German
"German Bombing Bombing of of Warsaw
Warsaw and and Rotterdam,"
Rotterdam," Air Air Historical
Historical Branch,
Branch, Translation
Translation VII/ 132 .
VII/132.
23
23.. Maier,
Maier, et al ., Das
etal.. Das deutsche
deutsche Reich
Reich and der Zweite Weltkrieg,
undderZweite Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. 11,
II, pp.. 133
133..
24
24.. ForFor aa fuller
fuller discussion
discussion of of the
the state
state ofof the
the German
German army army after
after the
the Polish
Polish campaign
campaign and and its efforts to
its efforts to
correct
correct its its deficiencies,
deficiencies, see see mymy article
article in in Armed
Armed Forces
Forces and and Society
Society (Winter
(Winter 1981), 1981), "The"The German
German
Response
Response to to Victory
Victory in in Poland
Poland:: A A Case
Case Study
Study in in Professionalism
Professionalism." ."
25
25.. IMT,
IMT, TMWC,TMWC, Vol Vol.. XXVI,
XXVI, Doc Doc.. #798#798 PS,PS, pppp.. 342-43
342-43..
26
26.. Schlesisches
Schlesisches Institut Institut furfiir Wirtschafts-
Wirtschafts- and und Konjunkturforschung,
Konjunkturforschung, "Zahlen "Zahlen des des deutschen
deutschen
Aussenhandels
Aussenhandels seit seit Kriegsbeginn,"
Kriegsbeginn," August August 1940,1940, pp pp.. 2-7,
2-7, NARS
NARS T-84/195/1560551
T-84/195/1560551..
27.. Bericht
27 Bericht des des Herm
Herm Professor
Professor Dr Dr.. CC.. Krauch iiber die
Krauch (fiber die Lage
Lage aufauf dem
dem Arbeitsgebiet
Arbeitsgebiet der der Chemie
Chemie in in der
der
Sitzung
Sitzung des des Generalrates
Generalrates am am 24
24.6.41., "Treibstoff-Vorrate," NARS
.6 .41 ., "Treibstoff-Vorrdte," NARS T-84/217/1586749
T-84/217/1586749..

7
557
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

28
28.. InIn particular,
particular, see see Harold
Harold C C.. Deutsch,
Deutsch, The The Conspiracy
Conspiracy Against Against Hitler
Hitler in in the
the Twilight
Twilight War War
(Minneapolis,
(Minneapolis, 1968), 1968), who who regards
regards Hitler's
Hitler's desire
desire for western offensive
for aa western offensive in in the
the fall
fall asas completely
completely
irrational
irrational..
29.
29. Maier,
MaieT,et et alat.,., Das
Das deutsche
deutsche Reich Reich and der Zweite Weltkrieg, Vol
undderZweiteWeltkrieg, Vol.. 11,
II, pp.. 267
267..
30.. OKW
30 OKW files files:: "Denkschrift
"Denkschrift and und Richtlinien
Richtlinien fiberiiber die die F0hrung
Fiihrung des des Krieges
Krieges im im Westen,"
Westen," Berlin, Berlin,
99.10.39.,
.10 .39 ., NARS T-77/775 .
NARST-77/775.
31
31.. H H.. R R.. Trevor-Roper,
Trevor-Roper, ed ed.. ., Blitzkrieg
Blitzkrieg to to Defeat,
Defeat, Hitler's
Hitler's War War Directives
Directives (New (New York, York, 1965),1965),
Directive #6
Directive #6 for for the
the Conduct
Conduct of of the
the War,
War, 99.10.39.,
.10 .39 ., pp.. 13
13..
32
32.. For
For aa fuller
fuller discussion
discussion of of these
these "after
"after action" reports and
action" reports and their
their impact
impact on on army
army thinking,
thinking, see see my
my
article "The
article "The German
German Response Response to to Victory
Victory in in Poland
Poland:: A A Case
Case StudyStudy in in Professionalism
Professionalism." ."
33
33.. Maier,
Maier, et al ., Das
etal., deutscheReich and
DasdeutscheReich derZweite Weltkrieg, Vol
undderZweiteWeltkrieg, Vol.. 11,
II, pp.. 242
242..
34
34.. Air
Air Historical
Historical Branch, Branch, Translation
Translation No No.. VII/107,
VII/107, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe StrengthStrength and and Serviceability
Serviceability Tables,
Tables,
August 1938-April
August 1938-April 1945 1945 (compiled
(compiled from from the the records
records of of VI VI Abteilung
Abteilung Quartermaster
Quartermaster General's General's
Department
Department of of thethe German
German Air Air Ministry)
Ministry).. Dates
Dates forfor the
the figures
figures are are September
September 2, 2, 1939,
1939, and and April
April 6, 6,
1940
1940..
35
35.. Trevor-Roper,
Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg Blitzkrieg to to Defeat,
Defeat, Directive
Directive #6 #6 forfor the
the Conduct
Conduct of of the
the War,
War, 99.10.30.,
.10 .30 ., pp.. 1313..
36
36.. "Proposal
"Proposal for for the the Conduct
Conduct of of Air
Air War
War Against
Against Britain,"
Britain," made made by by General
General Schmid Schmid of of the
the German
German
Air
Air Force
Force Operations
Operations Staff Staff (intelligence),
(intelligence), 22 .11 .39 ., AHB,
22.11.39., AHB, Translation
Translation No No.. VII/30
VII/30..
37
37.. Trevor-Roper,
Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg Blitzkrieg to to Defeat,
Defeat, Directive
Directive #9, #9, "Instructions
"Instructions for for Warfare
Warfare Against Against the the Economy
Economy
of the Enemy," 29
oftheEnemy," .11 .39 ., pp.. 18
29.11.39., 18..
38
38.. See,
See, in in particular,
particular, Guderian's
Guderian's description
description of of the
the major
major argument
argument in in the
the March
March conference
conference betweenbetween
himself and
himself and Generals
Generals Halder Haider and and Busch
Busch.. Heinz
Heinz Guderian,
Guderian, Panzer Panzer Leader
Leader (London,
(London, 1952), 1952), pp pp.. 90-92
90-92..
For
For fuller
fuller accounts
accounts of of arguments
arguments within within the the German
German high high command
command over over the the proper
proper strategy
strategy for for the
the
coming
coming campaign,
campaign, see: see: Telford
Telford Taylor,
Taylor, The The March
March of of Conquest
Conquest (New (New York,York, 1958) 1958);; Alistair
Alistair Home,
Home, To To
Lose
Lose aa Battle,
Battle, France
France 1940 1940 (London,
(London, 1969) Hans-Adolf Jacobsen,
1969);; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Fall Fall GelbGelb.. Der Kampf um
Der Kampf urn den
den
deutschen Operations
deutschen Operations plan plan zur zur Westoffensive
Westoffensive 1940 1940 (Wiesbaden,
(Wiesbaden, 1957) 1957);; Hans-Adolf
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Jacobsen,
Dokumente
Dokumente zur zur Vorgeschichte
Vorgeschichte des des Wesfeldzuges
Westfeldzuges 1939-1940
1939-1940 (Gottingen,
(Gottingen, 1956) 1956)..
39
39.. Taylor,
Taylor, The The March
March ofConquest,
of Conquest, pp.. 90 90..
40.. Trevor-Roper,
40 Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg Blitzkrieg to to Defeat,
Defeat, Directive
Directive #6 #6 for for thethe Conduct
Conduct of of the War, 99.10.39.,
the War, .10 .39 ., pp.. 1414..
These instructions
These instructions for for the
the immediate
immediate operational
operational employment
employment of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe do do not
not contradict
contradict the the thesis
thesis
that the
that the purpose
purpose of of the the campaign
campaign was was to to create
create the
the conditions
conditions for for aa strategic
strategic offensive
offensive (air (air and
and naval)
naval)
against
against Britain
Britain.. For For aa fuller
fuller description
description of of Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe tasks,tasks, see see:: ObdL,
ObdL, Fbhrungsstab
Fiihrungsstab la la Nr
Nr.. 5330/39,
5330/39,
77.12.39.
.12 .39 . Weisung
WeisungNr. Nr . 5, 5, Luftkrieg
Luftkriegim im Westen
Westen.. AFSHRC
AFSHRC:: K K 113 .306 .2 .
113.306.2.
41
41.. The
The misreading
misreading of of these
these German
German naval naval operations
operations by by thethe Admiralty
Admiralty and and by by Churchill
Churchill in in particular
particular
must be
must be counted
counted as as oneone of of the
the great
great British
British failures
failures of
of the
the Second
Second World World War.War.
42
42.. The
The clearest
clearest accountaccount of of the
the campaign
campaign in in English
English is is contained
contained in in Taylor,
Taylor, The The March
March of of Conquest;
Conquest:
see also
see also T. T. K K.. Derry,
Deny, The The Campaign
Campaign in in Norway
Norway (London,
(London, 1952) 1952);; SS.. W W.. Roskill,
Roskill, The The WarWar at at Sea,
Sea,
1939-45 (London,
1939-45 (London, 1954) 1954);; andand Maier,
Maier, et al ., Das
etal.. Das deutsche
deutsche Reich Reich and der Zweite Weltkrieg,
undderZweite Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. IIII..
43
43.. For
For thethe bestbest discussion
discussion on on thethe importance
importance of Swedish iron
of Swedish iron ore
ore imports
imports to to the
the Reich,
Reich, see see:: Rolf
Rolf
Karlbom,
Karlbom, "Sweden's
"Sweden's Iron Iron Ore Ore Exports
Exports to to Germany
Germany 1933-1944,"
1933-1944," Scandinavian
Scandinavian Economic Economic History History
Review,
Review, No No.. 11 (1965)
(1965)..
44
44.. Maier,
Maier, et al ., Das
etal.. Das deutsche
deutsche Reich Reich an und derZweite Weltkrieg, Vol
der ZweiteWeltkrieg, Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 224
224..
45
45.. Ibid
Ibid.,., 221-24
221-24.. It It should
should be be stressed
stressed that that the
the navynavy risked
risked these
these shipsships partially
partially to to gain
gain an an
advantageous
advantageous position position for for the
the post-war
post-war budget
budget debates
debates..
46
46.. Raeder
Raeder claims claims in in his
his memoir
memoir that that hehe only
only raised
raised the the issue
issue of of aa possible
possible invasion
invasion to to pre-empt
pre-empt the the
topic
topic.. HisHis strategy
strategy thereafter
thereafter indicates
indicates that that from
from thethe start,
start, he he never
never considered
considered an an invasion
invasion aa serious
serious
possibility
possibility.. See See Erich
Erich Raeder,
Raeder, Struggle for the Sea (London,
5rrM^g/e/orrte5ea (London, 1952), 1952), pp.. 331
331..
47
47.. For
For aa numerical
numerical comparison
comparison of of the
the forces
forces employed
employed in in this
this campaign,
campaign, see see in in particular
particular R R.. H H.. SS..
Stolfi,
Stolfi, "Equipment
"Equipment for for Victory
Victory in in France
France in in 1940,"
1940," History
History (February
(February 1970) 1970).. ThereThere is, is, of
of course,
course,
another
another aspect
aspect and and thatthat is is the
the qualitative
qualitative difference
difference.. See See also
also my my article
article inin Armed
Armed ForcesForces and and Society,
Society,
"The
"The German
German Response
Response to to Victory
Victory in in Poland
Poland:: A A Case
Case Study
Study in in Professionalism
Professionalism." ."
48
48.. For
For thethe disposition
disposition of of RAF
RAF forcesforces in in France
France at at the
the start
start ofof the
the 1940
1940 campaign,
campaign, see see Major
Major LL.. FF..
Ellis, The
Ellis, The War
War in in France
France and and Flanders,
Flanders. 1939-1940 (London, 1953),
1939-1940 (London, 1953), mapmap between
between pages pages 34 34 and
and 35 35..
49
49.. See,
See, in in particular,
particular, Patrice Patrice Buffotot
Buffotot and Jacques Ogier,
and Jacques Ogier, "L'armee
"L'armee de de fairI'air francaise
francaise dans dans la la
campagne
campagnede France (10
de France (10 mai-25
mai-25juin juin 1940),"
1940)," RevueRevue historique
historique des des Armies,
Armees, Vol Vol.. II,II, No
No.. 3, 3, pp
pp.. 88-117
88-117..
50
50.. For
For an interesting discussion
an interesting discussion of of the
the relative
relative experience
experience level of pilots
level of pilots in in the
the French
French and and German
German air air
forces,
forces, see see:: JJ.. Curry,
Curry, "Hawk "Hawk 75 75 in in French
French Service,"
Ser/ice," American
American AviationAviation Historical
Historical Society Society Journal,
Journal. Vol Vol..
11,
II, No
No.. 11 (Spring
(Spring 1966), 1966), pp pp.. 13-30
13-30..

8
558
THE
THE EASY
EASY WAR GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
WAR:: GERMANY TRIUMPHANT

51
51.. "Der Einsatz der
"Der Einsatz der deutschen
deutschen Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe wahrendwahrend der der ersten
ersten 11 11 Tage
Tage des des Frankreichfeldzuges,"
Frankreichfeldzuges,"
Auszfge aus
Ausziige aus den taglichen Lagemeldungen
den taglichen Lagemeldungen des des Oberbefehlshabers
Oberbefehlshabers der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Abt Abt.. IcIc,., AFSHRC
AFSHRC:: K K
113 .306-3, vV.. 22..
113.306-3,
52
52.. Seventy
Seventy German
German paratroopers
paratroopers ended ended up up on
on toptop ofof Eben-Emael
Eben-Emael and and werewere sufficient
sufficient to force the
to force the
surrender
surrender of of the fort with
the fort with itsits 1,200
1,200 defenders
defenders.. "Der "Der Handstreich
Handstreich auf auf die
die Werk-Gruppe
Werk-Gruppe Eben-Emael Eben-Emael am am
10.. Mai
10 Mai 1940,"
1940," NARS NARS T-971/35/1019
T-971/35/1019..
53 KTB VIII
53.. KTB VIII Fl Korps, BA/MA
Fl.. Korps, BA/MA RL8/45 RL8/45..
54
54.. For
For Guderian's
Guderian's account,account, see Panzer Leader, pp
see/'anzerZ-earfer, pp.. 79-82
79-82.. See also "Der
See also "Der Bericht
Bericht der
der Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fiber
iiber
die
die Durchf0hrung,"
Durchfiihrung," Auszug Auszug aus aus den den taglichen
taglichen Luftlagemeldungen
Lufdagemeldungen des des Oberbefehlshabers
Oberbefehlshabers der der
Luftwaffe-Lagebericht
Luftwaffe-Lagebericht Nr Nr.. 251,
251, 14 .5 .40, AFSHRC
14.5.40, AFSHRC;: K K 113 .306-3, vv.. 22;; and
113.306-3, and KTB
KTB VIII VIII Fl Fl.. Korps,
Korps,
BA/MA
BA/MA RL RL 8/45
8/45..
55
55.. For
For the
the collapse
collapse of of thethe French
French infantry
infantry under
under "Stuka"
"Stuka" attack,
attack, see see Home,
Home, To To Lose
Lose aa Battle,
Battle,
France,
France, 1940,
1940. pp. pp . 290-92
290-92..
56
56.. Taylor,
Taylor, March
March of ofConquest,
Conquest, pp.. 203 203..
57
57.. SeeSee thethe diary
diary entry entry for for General
General von von Waldau's
Waldau's diary diary:: Auszugweise
Auszugweise WiedergabeWiedergabe aus aus dem
dem
pers6nlichen
personlichen Tagebuch Tagebuch des des Generals
Generals von von WaldauWaldau vom vom Maa Marz 1939-10 .4 .42 Chef
1939-10.4.42 Chef des des
Luftwaffenffihrungstabes
Luftwaffenfiihrungstabes.. AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K 113 .306-3, vv.. 22..
113.306-3,
58
58.. "Das
"Das Jagdgeschwader
Jagdgeschwader 27 des VIII
27 des VIII.. Flieger-Korps
Flieger-Korps im im Frankreichfeldzug,
Frankreichfeldzug, 1940," 1940," Generalmajor
Generalmajor aa..
D
D.. Max
Max Ibel,
Ibel, 25 BA/MA, RL
.6 .53 ., BA/MA,
25.6.53., RL 10/591
10/591..
59
59.. Generaloberst
Generaloberst Haider, Haider, Kriegstagebuch,
Kriegstagebuch, Vol Vol.. I,I, ed
ed.. by
by Hans-Adolf
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen Jacobsen (Stuttgart,
(Stuttgart, 1964),
1964),
diary
diary entry
entry for
for 16 .5 .40 .
16.5.40.
60
60.. See
See the
the carefully
carefully worked
worked out out argument
argument in in Taylor,
Taylor, The The March
March of of Conquest,
Conquest, pp pp.. 255-03
255-63..
61
61.. Testimony
Testimony by by former
former Chief Chief of of Intelligence Schmid on
Intelligence Schmid on 18 .6 .54 ., AFSHRC:
18.6.54., AFSHRC: K K 113 .306-3, vv.. 33..
113.306-3,
62
62.. Adolf
Adolf Galland,
Galland, The The First
First andand thethe Last
Last (New
(New York, 1954), pp.. 66..
York, 1954),
63
63.. Ellis,
Ellis, The
The WarWar in in France
France and and Flanders,
Flanders, pp.. 246 246.. The
The German
German losses,losses, itit should
should bebe noted,
noted, were
were for
for
the
the entire
entire western
western theatertheater of of operations,
operations, but most of
but most of the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's effort effort was
was concentrated
concentrated in in this
this time
time
period
period over
over Dunkirk
Dunkirk..
64
64.. "Einsatz
"Einsatz des des II II.. Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps bei bei Dankirchen
Diinkirchen am am 27 .5 .40 . : Schwerer
27.5.40.: Schwerer Tag Tag des
des IIII.. Fliegerkorps,"
Fliegerkorps,"
AFSHRC:
AFSHRC: K K 113 .306-3, vV.. 33..
113.306-3,
65
65.. Guderian,
Guderian, Panzer
Panzer Leader,
Leader, pp.. 75 75..
66
66.. Maier,
Maier, et al ., Das
era/., Das deutsche
deutscheReich Reich and der Zweite Weltkrieg,
undderZweite Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 294
294..
67
67.. These
These two two tables
tables are
are drawn
drawn fromfrom two two major
major compilations
compilations of of the
the Air
Air Historical
Historical Branch
Branch.. They They are
are
AHB,
AHB, Translation
Translation VII/107,VII/107, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability Tables, August 1938-April
Tables, August 1938-April 1945" 1945";;
and
and Translation
Translation VII/83,
VII/83, "German
"German AircraftAircraft Losses,
Losses, September
September 1939-December
1939-December 1940." 1940." TheseThese tables,
tables, in
in
turn, were compiled
turn, were compiled from from thethe German
German Quartermaster
Quartermaster recordsrecords then
then inin the
the hands
hands of of the
the AHB
AHB..
68
68.. BA/MA
BA/MA RL 2 III/1025, gen
RL2III/1025, Qu.. 66.. Abt
gen.. Qu Abt.. (III
(Ill A),
A), "Front-Flugzeug-Verluste,"
"Front-Flugzeug-Verluste," 1940 1940..
69 . Ibid .
69.Ibid.
70.
70. Ibid
Ibid..
71
71.. For
For Hitler's
Hider's mood mood after
after thethe defeat
defeat of of France,
France, see see Telford
Telford Taylor,
Taylor, The The Breaking
Breaking WaveWave (New (New York,
York,
1967),pp
1967), pp..53-5453-54..
72
72.. IMT,
IMT, TMWC,
TMWC, Vol Vol.. XXVIII,
XXVIII, Jodl Jodl diary
diary entry
entry for
for 20 .5 .40 .
20.5.40.
73
73.. The
The Earl
Earl of of Birkenhead,
Birkenhead, Halifax Halifax (Boston,
(Boston, 1966),
1966), pp.. 458458;; andand Llewellyn
Llewellyn Woodward,
Woodwani, British British
Foreign
Foreign Policy
Policy in in the
the Second
Second World World War War (London,
(London, 1962),1962), pp.. 5353..
74
74.. For
For the
the British
British files
files on
on thisthis incident,
incident, see see PRO
PRO FO FO 371/24859
371/24859 and and FOFO 800/322
800/322..
75
75.. PRO
PRO ADMADM 205/4 205/4 undated
undated and and unsigned
unsigned memorandum
memorandum..
76
76.. For
For aa full
full discussion
discussion of of the
the British
British attack
attack on
on the
the French
French fleet
fleet atat Mers-el-Kebir,
Mers-el-Kebir, see see the the thoughtful
thoughtful
study
study by by Arthur
Arthur Marder
Marder in in From
From the the Dardanelles
Dardanelles to to Oran
Oran (London,
(London, 1974), 1974), Chapter
Chapter VV..
77
77.. Chef
Chef WFA,WFA, 30 .6 .40., "Die
30.6.40., "Die Weiterfiihrung
Weiterfuhrung des des Krieges
Krieges gegen
gegen England,"
England," IMT, IMT, TMWC, TMWC Vol Vol.
XXVIII,
XXVIII, pp pp.. 301-03
301-03..
78
78.. Maier,
Maier, et al.,., Das
et al Das deutsche
deutsche Reich Reich and und der Zweite Weltkrieg,
derZweite Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp
pp.. 378-79
378-79..
79
79.. Chef
Chef WFA,WFA, 30 .6 .40 ., "Die
30.6.40., "Die Weiterfiihrung
Weiterfuhrung des des Krieges
Krieges gegen
gegen England,"
England," IMT, IMT, TMWC,TMWC, Vol Vol.
XXVIII,
XXVIII, pp pp.. 301-03
301-03..
80
80.. BA/MA
BA/MA RL RL 211/27,
211/27, "Allgemeine
"Allgemeine Weisung Weisung fur fur den
den Kampf
Kampf der der Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe gegen gegen England,"
England," ObdL, ObdL,
Fiihrungsstab
Fuhrungsstab Ia la Nr.
Nr. 5835/40,
5835/40, 30 .6 .40 .
30.6.40.
81
81.. Roskill,
Roskill, TheThe War at Sea, Vol
WaratSea, Vol.. I,I, pp
pp.. 248-49
248^9..
82
82.. For
For the
the intelligence
intelligence advantage
advantage that that the
the British
British enjoyed,
enjoyed, see see:: RR.. VV.. Jones,
Jones, The The Wizard
Wizard War War (New
(New
York,
York, 1978)
1978);; Hinsley,
Hinsley, et et al
al.,., British
British Intelligence
Intelligence in in the
the Second
Second World
World War, War, VolVol.. I;I; Ronald
Ronald Lewin,
Lewin, Ultra
Ultra
Goes
Goes to to War
War (New
(New York, York, 1978)
1978);; andand Brian
Brian Johnson,
Johnson, The The Secret
Secret WarWar (London,
(London, 1978) 1978)..

59
59
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

83
83.. Hinsley,
Hinsley, et et al
al.,., British Intelligence in
British Intelligence in the
the Second
Second WorldWorld War, War, VolVol.. I,I, pp 176-77;; and
pp.. 176-77 and Harold
Harold
Deutsch, "Ultra
Deutsch, "Ultra and and the the Air
Air War
War in in Europe
Europe and and Africa,"
Africa," Air Air Power
Power and and Warfare,
Warfare, pp pp.. 165-66
165-66.. For
For the
the
German
German view view on on Ultra's
Ultra's impact,
impact, see see Maier,
Maier, et et al
al.,., Das deutsche Reich
Das deutsche Reich andund der
der Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg,
Weltkrieg, pp.. 384384..
84
84.. For
For thethe contribution
contribution of "Y" Service,
of "Y" Service, see see Aileen
Aileen Clayton,
Clayton, The Enemy is
The Enemy is Listening
Listening (London,
{London, 1980)1980)..
85.. See,
85 See, in in particular,
particular, Jones, Jones, Wizard
Wizard War War and and Solly
Solly Zuckerman,
Zuckerman, From From ApesApes to to Warlords
Warlords (London,
(London,
1978)
1978)..
86
86.. In In particular,
particular, see see PRO
PRO AIR AIR 20/1623
20/1623 Air Air Scientific
Scientific Intelligence
Intelligence Report
Report No No.. 6, 6, "The
"The Crooked
Crooked
Leg,"
Leg," 28 .6 .40 ., for
28.6.40., for R R.. VV.. Jones'
Jones' initial
initial report
report andand estimation
estimation of of the
the "Knickebein"
"Knickebein" system system..
87
87.. See See particularly,
particularly, Boog, Boog, "Higher"Higher Command Command and and Leadership
Leadership in in thethe German
German Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe,
1935-1945,"
1935-1945," Air Air Power
Power and and Warfare,
Warfare, pp.. 145 145..
88
88.. Mason,
Mason, BattleBattle Over Over Britain,
Britain, Appendix
Appendix K, K, OKL,
OKL, 16,716,7.40,.40 ., Operations
Operations Staff Staff IcIc..
89
89.. Basil Collier, The
BasilCollier, Defense of the United Kingdom (London, 1957),
TheDefenseoftheUnitedKingdom(London, 1957), pp.. 160
160..
90
90.. BA/MA
BA/MA RL 11/30, "Besprechung
RL 22 II/30, "Besprechung Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am 21 .7 .40 ."
21.7.40."
91
91.. BA/MA
BA/MA RL RL 8/1 Generalkommando II.. Fliegerkorps
8/1 Generalkommando Fliegerkorps Abt Abt.. II aa Nr
Nr.. 10260/40,
10260/40, 24 .7 .40 ., "Gedanken
24.7.40., "Gedanken
uber die Fuhrung
fiber die Ffihrung des des Luftkrieges
Luftkrieges gegen gegen England
England.'' ."
92
92.. Basil
Basil Collier,
Collier, The The Battle
Battle of of Britain
Britain (New (New York,York, 1962),
1962), pp pp.. 62-75
62-75..
93
93.. BA/MA
BA/MA RL RL 22 II/30,
11/30, H H.. Qu
Qu., ., 22 August
August 1940, 1940, Aktenvermerk
Aktenvermerk..
94
94.. See
See Galland,
Galland, The The First
First and
and thethe Last,
Last. pp pp.. 24-29
24-29..
95
95.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp.. 24
24..
96
96.. BA/MA
BA/MA RL RL 22 IU30,
11/30, Besprechung
Besprechung am am 15 .8 .40 .
15.8.40.
97
97.. The
The figures
figures of of Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe aircraft
aircraft written
written off off (60(60 percent
percent or or greater
greater damage)
damage) comes comes from from the
the loss
loss
tables
tables in in Mason,
Mason, Battle Battle Over Over Britain,
Britain, pp pp.. 241-43,
241-43, 247, 247, 263-G4,
263-64, 272-73,
272-73, 274, 274, 281-84,
281-84, 286-87286-87;; thethe 77
percent
percent figure
figure represents
represents total total Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe aircraft
aircraft typestypes involved
involved in in the
the Battle
Battle ofof Britain
Britain as as of
of August
August 10 10
based
based on on AHB,
AHB, Translation
Translation No No.. VII/107,
VII/107, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability Tables, Tables, August
August
1938-April
1938-April 1945" 1945";; while while the the 10 10 percent figure represents
percent figure represents aircraft
aircraft deployed
deployed in in the
the three
three airair fleets
fleets as
as ofof
July
July 20, Mason, Battle
20, Mason, Battle Over Over Britain,
Britain, pp.. 128 128..
98
98.. Figures
Figures basedbased on: AHB, Translation
on: AHB, Translation No No.. VII/107,
VII/107, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe StrengthStrength and and Serviceability
Serviceability Tables,Tables,
August 1938-April 1945"
August 1938-April 1945";; and and AHB,AHB, Translation
Translation VII/83, VII/83, "German
"German AircraftAircraft Losses,Losses, September
September
1939-December
1939-Decemberl940." 1940 ."
99.. This
99 This table
table is is drawn
drawn from from the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe loss loss reports
reports in in Mason,
Mason, Battle
Battle Over Over Britain
Britain.. With
With thethe
exception of
exception of the
the BfBf 109109 figures
figures in in which,
which, with with only
only aa pilot
pilot aircrew,
aircrew, losses
losses directly
directly reflect
reflect pilot
pilot losses,
losses, this
this
table
table estimates
estimates pilot losses as
pilot losses as pilots
pilots areare not
not directly
directly identified
identified among
among crew crew losses
losses.. TheThe Mason
Mason tables
tables only
only
concern
concern air air fleets
fleets involved
involved in in the
the battle
battle so so that
that losses
losses in in the
the Reich
Reich or or in
in OTUs
OTUs (Operational
(Operational Training
Training
Units) are
Units) are not counted.. The
not counted The figures
figures for for pilots killed, captured,
pilots killed, captured, injured,
injured, uninjured,
uninjured, or or missing
missing are are not
not
directly
directly equivalent
equivalent to to aircraft written off
aircraft written off since,
since, in in some
some cases,
cases, pilots
pilots were
were killed
killed or or injured
injured in in accidents
accidents in in
which
which the the aircraft
aircraft was was not not written
written off off.. In
In other
other losses,
losses, aircraft
aircraft were
were destroyed
destroyed with with no no aircrew
aircrew losses
losses
involved
Involved (i(i.e., .e ., enemy
enemy bombing,
bombing, ground ground accident)
accident).. However,
However, since since only
only those
those pilots
pilots who who were
were uninjured
uninjured
returned
jretumed to to duty,
duty, the the extent
extent of of pilot
pilot losses
losses is is obvious
obvious.. Finally,
Finally, the the high
high number
number of of missing
missing aviators
aviators
indicates
indicates that that many
many pilotspilots were captured by
were captured by the
the British
British..
100
100.. Based
Based on on figures
figures in in the
the quartermaster
quartermaster returns returns in in BA/MA
BA/MA RL RL 22 III/708
III/708 andand 709709..
101
101.. Based
Based on on figures
figures drawn drawn fromfrom BA/MA
BA/MA RL RL 22 III/709
III/709 forfor 14 .9 .40 . and
14.9.40. and 21 .9 .40 .
21.9.40.
102
102.. AHB,
AHB, Translation
Translation VII/83, VII/83, "German
"German AircraftAircraft Losses,
Losses, September
September 1939-December
1939-December 1940." 1940."
103 . Ibid .
103.Ibid.
104
104.. Quoted
Quoted in in Maier,
Maier, et al ., Das deutsche
etal.,Das deutsche Reich Reich and der Zweite Weltkrieg,
undderZweite Weltkrieg, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 386
386..
105
105.. Mason,
Mason, BattleBattle Over Over Britain,
Britain, pp.. 363363..
106
106.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp
pp.. 387-91
387-91..
107.. For
107 For an an excellent
excellent discussion
discussion of of various
various arguments
arguments over over target
target selection
selection and and strategy
strategy in in the
the post-
post-
September
September 15 15 period,
period, see see:: Maier,
Maier, et al ., Das
etal.. Das deutsche
deutsche Reich Reich and der Zweite Weltkrieg,
undderZweite Weltkrieg, pp pp.. 388-96
388-96..
108
108.. Air
Air Marshal
Marshal `Bert' 'Bert' Hams
Harris recalls
recalls taking
taking Sir Sir Charles
Charies Portal
Portal up up to
to the
the roof
roof of of the
the Air
Air Ministry
Ministry to to
watch
watch the the spectacular
spectacular results results of of one
one of of the
the December
December raids raids on on London
London.. Harris
Harris interview,
interview, RAF RAF Staff
Staff
College,
College, Bracknell,
Bracknell, England England..
109
109.. Table
Table drawn drawn from from AHB,AHB, Translation
Translation No No.. VII/83,
VII/83, "German"German Aircraft
Aircraft Losses,Losses, September
September
1939-December
1939-December 1940" 1940";; and and AHB,AHB, Translation
Translation No No.. VII/107,
VII/107, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability
Tables,
Tables, AugustAugust 1938-April
1938-April 1945 1945." ."
110
no.. Irving,
Irving, The The RiseRise andand Fall
Fall of of the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 123 123..
111
111.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG, Vol Vol.. IV,
IV, Annexes
Annexes and and Appendices,
Appendices, pp.. 205 205..

6600
THE EASY WAR:
THE EASY GERMANY TRIUMPHANT
WAR: GERMANY TRIUMPHANT

112
112.. Dennis
Dennis Richards,
Richards, Portal
Portal (London,
(London, 1979),
1979), pp.. 146
146.. The
The similarity
similarity between
between Portal's
Portal's comment
comment and
and
Knauss'
Knauss' argumentation
argumentation is is indeed
indeed striking
striking.. See
See Chapter
Chapter II of
of this
this book,
book, pp.. 10 10..
113
113.. Haywood
Haywood SS.. Hansell,
Hansell, Jr.,
Jr., The
r/ie Air
Air Plan
P/a/i that Defeated Hitler (Atlanta,
(toDc/carerf//Wer (Atlanta, 1972),
1972), pp
pp.. 53-54
53-54..
114
114.. Craven and Cate, The Army
Cra\enan<iCM!e,The Army AirAir Forces
Forces in World War 11,
inWorldWar II, Vol
Vol.. I,I, pp.. 149
149..
115
115.. Ibid ., pp.. 604
Ibid., 604..

61
General
General Walther
Walther Wever,
Wever, First
First Chief
Chief of
of Staff
Staff
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: AFSHRC)
AFSHRC)

6622
Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall Hermann
Hermann Goring
Goring and
and Ceneraloberst
Generaloberst Hans Jeschonnek
Hans Jeschonnek
(Photo
(Photo Credit:
Credit; AFSHRC)
AFSHRC)

63
Ernst
Ernst Udet
Udet and
and Willi
Willi Messerschmitt
Messerschmitt
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: AFSHRC)
AFSHRC)

64
Mainstay
Mainstay of
of the
the fighter
fighter force
force:: the
the Bf
Bf 109G
109G
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

5;->»SfeS^*Jifc*i;
The
The flawed
flawed fighter
fighter:: the
the Bf
Bf 110
110
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

The
The "fast"
"fast" bomber:
bomber: the
the Ju
Ju 88
88
(Photo
(Photo Credit:
Credit: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

665
5
The
The interim
interim bomber
bomber:: the
the He
He 111
111
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

The cancelled "strategic"


The cancelled "strategic" bomber
bomber:: the
the Do
Do 19
19
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: AFSHRC)
AFSHRC)

The
The flawed
flawed "strategic" bomber;: the
"strategic" bomber the He
He 177
177
(Photo
(Photo Credit:
Credit: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

6
666
Russian
Russian Air
Air Force
Force Base
Base at
at Kovno
Kovno after
after German
German attack,
attack, 22
22 June
June 1941
1941
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: AFSHRC)
AFSHRC)

Field
Field Marshal
Marshal Albert
Albert Kesselring
Kesselring
(Photo
(Photo Credit:
Credit: AFSHRC)
AFSHRC)

67
67
CHAPTER III
CHAPTER III

The
The Turn
Turn to
to Russia
Russia

THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM


THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM
Ifearly
If early summer
summer 1940 1940 brought
brought Hitler
Hitler an an unimagined,
unimagined, easy easy triumph
triumph over over France,
France, itit
also brought unanticipated strategic problems Hitler
also brought unanticipated strategic problems. . Hitler had
had expected
expected the
the British
British to to
recognize their hopeless situation and sue for peace. He seems, however, to have
recognize their hopeless situation and sue for peace. He seems, however, to have
given
given almost
almost no thought to
no thought to what
what options
options Germany
Germany possessedpossessed should should Britain
Britain reject
reject
his offer' . The unrealistic optimism that characterized the air offensive against the
his offer'. The unrealistic optimism that characterized the air offensive against the
British Isles marked the German approach towards their strategic problems
British Isles marked the German approach towards their strategic problems
throughout
throughout the the 1940-41
1940-41 periodperiod.. As As Italian
Italian Foreign
Foreign Minister
Minister Galeazzo
Galeazzo Ciano Ciano noted noted
after a visit to Munich in June 1940, Hitler resembled a successful gambler who
after a visit to Munich in June 1940, Hitler resembled a successful gambler who
"has made a big scoop and would like to get up from the table, risking nothing
"has made a big scoop and would like to get up from the table, risking nothing
more.
more."^ "2 Ciano's
Ciano's description
description was was most
most apt,
apt, for
for Hitler
Hitler did,
did, indeed,
indeed, wishwish to to escape
escape aa
war against Britain. He calculated, quite correctly, that those who stood most
war against Britain. He calculated, quite correctly, that those who stood most to to
gain from a British defeat were the Japanese and the Americans and not the
gain from a British defeat were the Japanese and the Americans and not the
Germans
Germans.' .' Thus,
Thus, the the road
road thatthat policymaking
policymaking within within Germany
Germany travelled
travelled up up to to the
the
beginning of "Barbarossa" led (1) from a direct air offensive on Britain to persuade
beginning of "Barbarossa" led (1) from a direct air offensive on Britain to persuade
the
the British
British of of their
their hopeless
hopeless position
position and and to to allow
allow an an unhindered
unhindered move move against
against
Russia
Russia;; (2)
(2) toto aa search
search for for an
an indirect
indirect strategy
strategy to to defeat
defeat the the British;
British; (3) (3) toto increasing
increasing
interest
interest in in attacking
attacking the the Soviet
Soviet UnionUnion to to remove
remove aa major major buttress
buttress in in Churchill's
Churchill's
strategic
strategic policy
policy;; and,and, finally,
finally, (4) (4) to
to the
the decision
decision to to invade
invade Russia
Russia as as the
the basis
basis for for
realizing
realizing Hitler's
Hitler's long-term
long-term ideological
ideological goals goals."* .4
What
What the the Germans
Germans misread,misread, however,
however, was was the the real
real significance
significance of of the
the victory
victory
over
over France
France in in 1940
1940.. Their
Their success
success did did not
not mean
mean that that Germany
Germany had had wonwon the the war,
war, as as
Jodl's
Jodl's memorandum
memorandum of of June
June 30, 30, 1940,
1940, suggested
suggested.' .s Rather,
Rather, itit meant
meant that that Germany
Germany
had
had acquired
acquired the the economic
economic and and rawraw material
material resources
resources to to fight
fight aa long
long war.war. The The
nature
nature andand direction
direction that that aa protracted
protracted war war might
might take take would
would depend
depend on on thethe strategic
strategic
choices
choices that
that thethe Germans
Germans were were now now to to make
make;; nevertheless,
nevertheless, no no matter
matter what what strategy
strategy
Hitler
Hitler andand his his advisers
advisers chose,chose, the the Reich
Reich was was in in for
for an an extended
extended and and difficult
difficult
struggle
struggle.. TheThe refusal
refusal of of Germany's
Germany's politicalpolitical and and military
military leaders
leaders to to recognize
recognize that that
fact
fact destroyed
destroyed whatever
whatever small small chance
chance Germany
Germany had had to to realize
realize herher inordinate
inordinate goals goals
and
and contributed
contributed directlydirectly to to the
the catastrophe
catastrophe of of 1945
1945.. Above
Above all, all, this
this failure
failure in in grand
grand
strategy
strategy reflected
reflected the the unwillingness
unwillingness of of the
the German
German militarymilitary to to comprehend
comprehend the the
nature
nature of of warfare
warfare betweenbetween the the great
great powers
powers in in the
the modern
modem age age.. This
This led led to to the
the
unrealistic
unrealistic belief
belief that
that victory
victory over over France
France represented
represented aa return return to to the
the eraera ofof the
the short
short
war.
war.
With
With Britain's
Britain's rejection
rejection of of peace, Hitler sensed
peace. Hitler sensed the the strategic
strategic basis
basis forfor Churchill's
Churchill's
decision
decision.. As As he he suggested
suggested to to Halder,
Haider, the the British
British hopedhoped that that both
both the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union
and
and the
the United
United StatesStates would
would intervene
intervene in in the
the warwar against
against Germany'b
Germany.* In In this
this Hitler
Hitler

69
69
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

was
was correct,
correct, for for Churchill
Churchill had had indeed
indeed based based his his hard
hard lineline on on the
the belief
belief that that Russia
Russia
and
and America
America could could not, not, in their own
in their own self-interest,
self-interest, allow allow Germany
Germany to to dominate
dominate
Europe
Europe.^ .7 With
With that that strange
strange mixture
mixture of of intuition
intuition andand ignorance
ignorance that that characterized
characterized
Hitler's
Hitler's makeup,
makeup, the the Fuhrer
Fuhrer urgedurged on on his
his military
military advisers
advisers the the possibility
possibility of of aa
quick,
quick, latelate summer
summer campaign campaign againstagainst the the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union to to remove
remove that that propprop fromfrom
British
British policy
policy.. His His military advisers eventually
military advisers eventually were were ableable to to persuade
persuade him him that that such
such
aa campaign,
campaign, late late inin the
the year,
year, mademade no no sense
sense.* .8
Yet,
Yet, Hitler's
Hitler's interest
interest in possible strike
in aa possible strike against
against Russia
Russia in in the
the summer
summer of of 1940
1940
does not indicate that he had firmly set Germany's course for
does not indicate that he had firmly set Germany's course for the
the following
following
summer.9
summer.' Rather Rather as as itit became
became clear clear by by mid-September
mid-September that that the
the RAFRAF wouldwould hold hold itsits
own
own and and thatthat "Sea
"Sea Lion" Lion" was was no no longer
longer aa viable
viable option,
option. HitlerHitler turnedturned to to the
the
peripheral
peripheral strategy
strategy which which Jodl Jodl hadhad urged
urged in in June
June.. In the early
In the early fall
fall of of 1940,
1940, Hitler
Hitler
approached
approached Spain Spain and and Vichy
Vichy FranceFrance about about helping
helping Fascist
Fascist Italy Italy attack
attack BritishBritish
interests
interests in in thethe Mediterranean,
Mediterranean, North North Africa,
Africa, and and the Middle East.
the Middle East. Such Such an an
approach
approach might might have have workedworked in in the
the early
early summer
summer of of 1940
1940 when
when the the Wehrmacht's
Wehrmacht's
reputation
reputation was was at at its highest.. But
its highest But having
having suffered
suffered defeat
defeat in in the
the skies
skies over over Britain,
Britain, itit
was
was notnot soso easy
easy to to forge
forge an alliance among
an alliance among powers
powers whose whose interests
interests and and appetites
appetites
were
were mutually
mutually exclusive
exclusive.. Hitler Hitler fully
fully recognized
recognized the the diplomatic
diplomatic difficulties
difficulties when when
he
he commented
commented before before meetingmeeting with Franco and
with Franco and Pdtain
Retain thatthat thethe need
need of of the
the hour
hour waswas
aa gigantic
gigantic fraud.
fraud.'" 10
Conversations
Conversations with with the the French
French and and particularly
particularly the the Spanish
Spanish led led nowhere,
nowhere, and and
upon
upon return
return to to Berlin
Berlin HitlerHitler remarked
remarked that that hehe would
would soonersooner have have "three"three or or four"
four"
teeth
teeth pulled
pulled than than faceface another
another conversation
conversation with with Franco.
Franco. HitlerHitler had had missed
missed the the
bus
bus."." In
In the
the early
early summer
summer in in the
the full
full flush
flush ofof victory,
victory, he he might
might well well havehave persuaded
persuaded
Spain
Spain to to participate
participate.. After After Mers-el-Kebir,
Mers-el-Kebir, had had he he granted substantial concessions
granted substantial concessions to to
France
France in in terms
terms of of thethe eventual
eventual peace peace treaty,
treaty, he he might
might also also have
have enlisted
enlisted Vichy Vichy
support
support.. However,
However, with with the the Wehrmacht's
Wehrmachfs overwhelming
overwhelming success, success, he he felt
felt no no need
need to to
cut
cut Spain
Spain in in onon the
the lootloot oror toto mitigate
mitigate the the onerous
onerous termsterms he he wished
wished to to impose
impose on on
France
France.. Now Now in in thethe fallfall ofof 1940,
1940, itit was was tootoo late
late;; thethe Spanish
Spanish and and the the French
French
recognized
recognized that that the
the war war waswas notnot over.
over. The The former
former mademade impossibly
impossibly high high demands
demands
concerning
concerning the the price
price for for Spain's
Spain's entrance
entrance into into the
the war;
war; the the latter
latter decided
decided to to wait
wait on on
further
further events
events despite
despite bitterness
bitterness against
against the the British
British for
for Mers-el-Kebir
Mers-el-Kebir..
There
There remained
remained only only the the Russians
Russians as as aa means
means of of pressuring
pressuring the the British
British.. SinceSince
Hitler
Hitler hadhad hoped
hoped to to end the war
end the war in in the
the west
west so so that
that he he could
could solve solve the the eastern
eastern
question,
question, one one can can wonder
wonder how how seriously
seriously the the Fuhrer
Fuhrer ever ever considered
considered the the possibility
possibility
of
of aa closer
closer alliance
alliance with with Russia
Russia.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, in in November
November 1940, 1940, the the Soviet
Soviet
Foreign
Foreign Minister,
Minister, VyacheslavVyacheslav Molotov, Molotov, arrived arrived in in Berlin
Berlin to to explore
explore further further
cooperation
cooperation between between the the dictatorships
dictatorships.. The The Russians
Russians overplayed
overplayed their their handhand.. Stalin
Stalin
seems
seems to to have
have believed
believed his his diplomatic
diplomatic position position was was stronger
stronger than, than, in in fact,
fact, itit was
was..
Thus,
Thus, Molotov
Molotov was was at at his
his most
most truculent,
truculent, brushing
brushing aside aside German
German suggestions
suggestions that that
the Soviets interest
the Soviets interest themselves
themselves in
in the
the Persian
Persian Gulf,
Gulf, Iran,
Iran, and
and India.
India. While
While such
such
goals
goals were
were not not entirely
entirely out out of
of the
the range
range of Soviet expectations,
of Soviet expectations, Molotov Molotov emphasized
emphasized
more concrete and immediate aims in Europe .
more concrete and immediate aims in Europe. Among
Among other
other items,
items, he
he suggested
suggested
that Finland, the Balkans, and the Dardanelles all lay
that Finland, the Balkans, and the Dardanelles all lay within
within the
the Soviet
Soviet sphere
sphere of of

70
70
THE TURN
THE TO RUSSIA
TURN TO RUSSIA

interest.
interest. What
What undoubtedly
undoubtedly made made the the Germans
Germans choke choke was was Molotov's
Molotov's proposalproposal that that aa
two-nation commission
two-nation commission control
control the
the Skagerrak,
Skagerrak, entrance
entrance and
and exit
exit to
to the
the Baltic-the
Baltic—the
proposed
proposed nations
nations being
being the the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union and and Denmark
Denmark.. Adding Adding furtherfurther to to the
the
German discomfort were Molotov's tactless contradictions of the Fuhrer and his
German discomfort were Molotov' s tactless contradictions of the Fuhrer and his
justly famous rejoinder to Joachim von Ribbentrop's (the German Foreign Minister)
justly famous rejoinder to Joachim von Ribbentrop's (the German Foreign Minister)
comment
conmient that that Britain
Britain was was finished
finished;; whywhy then,
then, he he asked,
asked, were were theythey in in anan air
air raid
raid
shelter?'
shelter?'^2

Molotov's
Molotov's behavior,
behavior, typical typical of Soviet diplomatic
of Soviet diplomatic practices practices that that have
have
subsequently
subsequently workedworked so so wellwell inin dealings
dealings with with the the West,
West, made made aa disastrous
disastrous
impression
impression on on his
his hosts
hosts andand undoubtedly
undoubtedly contributed
contributed to to the
the German
German decisiondecision to to
settle
settle matters
matters with the Soviets
with the Soviets thatthat coming
coming summersummer.. There There had had been,
been, moreover,
moreover, aa
general deterioration in
general deterioration in relations
relations between
between the the twotwo powers
powers since since the the summer
summer of of
1940.'3
1940.'^ Stalin
Stalin hadhad taken
taken advantage
advantage of of German
German preoccupation
preoccupation in in thethe west
west to to
incorporate
incorporate Lithuania,
Lithuania, Latvia,
Latvia, and and Estonia
Estonia into into the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union.. MoreMore threatening
threatening
to
to German
German interests
interests was
was thethe Russian
Russian movemove against Rumania in
against Rumania in July
July 1940,
1940, whenwhen the the
Soviets
Soviets forced
forced theirtheir neighbor
neighbor to surrender not
to surrender not onlyonly the the province
province of of Bessarabia
Bessarabia
(covered
(covered by by the
the Nazi-Soviet
Nazi-Soviet Non Aggression Pact)
Non Aggression Pact) but but the
the province
province of of Bukovina
Bukovina as as
well
well (not
(not covered
covered by by the
the agreement)
agreement)..
Hitler's
Hider's reply
reply to to what
what he he regarded
regarded as as aa threat
threat to to German
German interests
interests in in the
the Balkans,
Balkans,
particularly
particularly Rumanian
Rumanian oil, oil, waswas direct
direct andand forceful
forceful.. Complicating
Complicating the the diplomatic
diplomatic
situation
situation was
was the
the fact
fact that
that Hungary
Hungary and and Rumania
Rumania were were on on the
the brink
brink of of war
war over
over thethe
province
province of of Transylvania
Transylvania.'" . 14 To
To the
the Germans,
Germans, such such aa disruption
disruption of of Balkan
Balkan relations
relations
was unacceptable
was unacceptable.. Under Under pressure
pressure fromfrom both
both Ribbentrop
Ribbentrop and and Ciano,
Ciano, the the Rumanians
Rumanians
surrendered
surrendered substantial
substantial territory
territory to to Hungary.
Hungary." '5 With
With that that difficulty
difficulty cleared
cleared up,up, thethe
Germans
Germans turned
turned to to bolster
bolster aa Rumanian
Rumanian regime regime badlybadly shaken
shaken by by aa serious
serious diplomatic
diplomatic
defeat.. The
defeat The Germans
Germans moved moved with with their
their usual
usual speedspeed.. In In early
early September,
September, they they
supported
supported the establishment of
the establishment of aa pro-German
pro-German military regime under
military regime under General
General Ion Ion
Antonescu
Antonescu.. At At the
the end
end ofof the
the month,
month, theythey sent
sent aa military
military "mission"
"mission" consisting
consisting of of aa
motorized
motorized infantry
infantry division,
division, supported
supported by by flak
flak and
and airair units,
units, to to protect
protect the the oil
oil region
region
and
and to
to demonstrate
demonstrate GermanGerman support support for for the
the newnew regime
regime.. One One of of the
the "mission's"
"mission's"
major
major tasks
tasks was:
was: "In"In case
case aa warwar with
with Soviet
Soviet Russia
Russia isis forced
forced uponupon us,us, to to prepare
prepare for for
the
the commitment
commitment of of German
German and and Rumanian
Rumanian forces forces from from the the direction
direction of of
Rumania.
Rumania."'* "'6
These German
These German moves,moves, all all without
without consultation,
consultation, elicited elicited aa vigorous
vigorous response
response from from
the
the Russians
Russians.. TheyThey protested
protested strongly
strongly against
against the the Vienna
Vienna Accords
Accords that that hadhad settled
settled
the
the difficulty
difficulty between
between RumaniaRumania and and Hungary,
Hungary, and and the the movement
movement of of German
German
motorized
motorized troops
troops intointo Rumania
Rumania could could not not have
have contributed
contributed to to aa Soviet
Soviet sense
sense of of
well-being
well-being.'^ ." Equally
Equally disturbing,
disturbing, in in view
view of of Soviet
Soviet interests
interests in in the
the Baltic,
Baltic, waswas aa
Finnish-German
Finnish-German agreement agreement that that allowed
allowed the the Germans
Germans to to transport
transport substantial
substantial
forces
forces through
through Finland
Finland to to northern
northern Norway
Norway.. Of Of thethe 4,800
4,800 troops
troops involved
involved in in the
the
move,
move, 1,8001,800 remained
remained in in Finland
Finland for for aa considerable
considerable period period.. UnderUnder these these
circumstances,
circumstances, the the Russians
Russians had had every
every rightright to to bebe suspicious
suspicious.'* . '8 Given
Given thesethese
frictions,
frictions, the
the rapacious
rapacious naturenature of of the
the two
two dictators'
dictators' appetites,
appetites, as as well
well as as Hitler's
Hitler's
belief
belief that
that only
only inin the
the east
east could
could Germany
Germany achieve achieve the the living
living space
space she she needed,
needed, the the

71
71
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

conflict between Russia


conflict between Russia and Germany was
and Germany indeed inevitable.
was indeed inevitable. Had
Had Molotov
Molotov been been
more tactful and tractable, it is still unlikely
more tactful and tractable, it is still unlikely that
that the
the Russians
Russians could
could have
have delayed
delayed
the
the coming
coming confrontation
confrontation forfor long
long..
Nevertheless, Molotov's visit did
Nevertheless, Molotov's visit did precipitate
precipitate aa quick
quick decision
decision byby Hitler Within aa
Hitler.. Within
little over a month, Hitler issued Directive No . 21, "Operation Barbarossa," to
little over a month, Hitler issued Directive No. 21, "Operation Barbarossa," to the
the
armed forces. It stated: "The German Wehrmacht must be prepared to crush Soviet
armed forces. It stated: "The German Wehrmacht must be prepared to crush Soviet
Russia in
Russia in aa quick campaign even
quick campaign before the
even before the conclusion
conclusion of of the
the war
war against
against
"'9 The
The directive
directive itself
itself reflected
reflected aa culmination
culmination of the planning
of the planning process
process that
England
England.''" . that
had begun during
had begun during the
the preceding
preceding summer summer.^". 2° Before examining the
Before examining outlines of
the outlines of
German military and
German military and strategic
strategic planning,
planning, oneone need
need only
only note
note that
that Hitler
Hitler had
had set
set the
the
final
final direction
direction to German grand
to German strategy . From
grand strategy. From thisthis point
point forward,
forward, thethe Germans
Germans
began
began serious preparations to
serious preparations to destroy
destroy thethe Soviet
Soviet Union
Union in in aa swift,
swift, fast-moving
fast-moving
campaign
campaign in in which
which the Wehrmacht would
the Wehrmacht would drive
drive into
into the
the heart
heart ofof the
the Eurasian
Eurasian
continent
continent..

DISTRACTIONS
DISTRACTIONS

Unfortunately for
Unfortunately for the
the Germans,
Germans, difficulties
difficulties now now arose
arose in
in the
the south
south.. InIn June
June 1940,
1940,
believing
believing that that the
the war
war waswas overover andand the
the time
time propitious
propitious to to loot
loot the
the British
British and and
French
French empires,
empires, the the Italians
Italians joined
joined thethe war.
war. Most
Most Italians,
Italians, particularly
particularly thosethose in in the
the
upper
upper classes-the
classes—the militarymilitary and and Royalist
Royalist circles,
circles, as as well
well as as the
the Fascists-wildly
Fascists—^wildly
applauded
applauded Mussolini's
Mussolini's war war declaration,
declaration, aa declaration
declaration thatthat Franklin
Franklin Roosevelt
Roosevelt so so
aptly
aptly described
described:: "On "On thisthis tenth
tenth day
day ofof June
June 1940,
1940, the
the hand
hand that
that held
held the
the dagger
dagger has has
stuck
stuck itit into
into the
the back
back of of its
its neighbor.
neighbor."^' "2' The
The Italian
Italian armed
armed forces,
forces, however,
however, were were
woefully
woefully unprepared
unprepared for for anyany military
military commitments.
commitments. The The army
army possessed
possessed obsolete
obsolete
equipment,
equipment, aa faultyfaulty doctrine,
doctrine, and and aa thoroughly
thoroughly inadequate
inadequate tabletable ofof organization
organization..
The
The navy
navy was was acquiring
acquiring an an up-to-date
up-to-date battle
battle fleet
fleet but
but had
had nono desire
desire toto use
use its
its ships
ships in in
combat
combat.. The The Italian
Italian air air force,
force, supposedly
supposedly heirs heirs ofof Douhet,
Douhet, couldcould not
not provide
provide an an
accurate
accurate count
count ofof the
the aircraft
aircraft at at its
its disposal
disposal.^^. 22 These
These deficiencies,
deficiencies, whichwhich became
became so so
glaringly
glaringly obvious
obvious in in coming
coming months,
months, had had nothing
nothing to to do
do with
with the the bravery
bravery of of the
the
Italian
Italian people
people;; rather,
rather, they
they hadhad to
to do
do with
with military
military organizations
organizations that that did
did not
not exist
exist toto
fight
fight.. As As General
General Ubaldo
Ubaldo Soddu Soddu described
described his his military
military career:
career: "".... . . when
when you you
have
have aa fine
fine plate
plate of of pasta
pasta guaranteed
guaranteed for for life,
life, and
and aa little
little music,
music, you you don't
don't need
need
anything
anything more.more. 1123
"^^
The
The Germans
Germans soon soon paidpaid for for their
their belief
belief that
that Mussolini
Mussolini had had reformed
reformed the the
capabilities
capabilities of of the
the Italian
Italian military.
military. The Reich assigned
The Reich assigned the the Italians
Italians thethe task
task of of
pinning
pinning down down BritishBritish forcesforces in in thethe Mediterranean
Mediterranean.. Hence, Hence, the the Italian
Italian
characterization
characterization of of their
their Mediterranean
Mediterranean effort effort asas aa "parallel
"parallel war."
war." That
That waswas anan apt
apt
description
description for, for, inin fact,
fact, there
there was
was little
little military
military cooperation
cooperation between
between the the Axis
Axis
powers
powers untiluntil the
the following
following winterwinter when
when the the Germans
Germans had had toto take
take over
over because
because of of
Italian
Italian military
military ineptitude.
ineptitude.
Disaster
Disaster came came soon enough.. Despite
soon enough Despite an an explicit
explicit German
German warning
warning in in late
late
September not to stir
September not to stir up
up trouble
trouble in
in the
the Balkans,
Balkans, the
the Italians
Italians blithely
blithely went
went their
their own
own
way . 24 In
way.^'* In October
October 1940,1940, in in an
an effort
effort to to parallel
parallel thethe German
German move move into
into Rumania,
Rumania,

72
72
THE
THE TURN
TURN TO
TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

they
they attacked Greece.. With
attacked Greece With little
little preparation,
preparation, no no strategic
strategic planning,
planning, and and at at the
the onset
onset
of
of bad
bad weather,
weather, Mussolini
Mussolini launchedlaunched his his forces
forces into
into the the highlands
highlands of of northern
northern
Greece
Greece.. The The result
result was military defeat
was aa military defeat with
with serious
serious strategic
strategic implications
implications.. Italian Italian
incompetence
incompetence had had upset
upset the the Balkans
Balkans and and had
had provided
provided an an entree
entree intointo thethe region
region for for
the British .
the British.
Worse
Worse news news soon followed. In
soon followed. In November, "Swordfish" torpedo
November, "Swordfish" torpedo bombers,
bombers, flying flying
off the carrier Illustrious, attacked
off the carrier Illustrious, attacked the
the Italian
Italian fleet
fleet in
in the
the harbor
harbor of
of Taranto
Taranto. . By
By the
the
time two strike forces of 12 and 9 aircraft had
time two strike forces of 12 and 9 aircraft had completed
completed their
their mission,
mission, they
they had
had
sunk
sunk 22 new new and and 22 older older Italian
Italian battleships
battleships and and had altered permanently
had altered permanently the the
Mediterranean naval balance in the Royal Navy's favor
Mediterranean naval balance in the Royal Navy's favor." . 21

The
The collapse
collapse of of Italian
Italian ground
ground forcesforces in in North
North AfricaAfrica in in December
December 1940 1940
completed the catalogue of disasters . Beginning on December 9, British
completed the catalogue of disasters. Beginning on December 9, British
mechanized
mechanized units units within
within the the space
space of of two
two months
months destroyed
destroyed an an Italian
Italian army
army that that had
had
invaded Egypt and moved forward into Libya to capture Bardia, Tobruk, and
invaded Egypt and moved forward into Libya to capture Bardia, Tobruk, and
Benghazi, and by the beginning of February the British threatened to drive the
Benghazi, and by the beginning of February the British threatened to drive the
Italians entirely from North Africa . With the fall of Tobruk on January 12, 1941,
Italians entirely from North Africa. With the fall of Tobruk on January 12, 1941,
the
the British
British had had captured
captured well well over
over 100,000
100,000 Italian
Italian troops
troops and and destroyed
destroyed nearly nearly the the
entire Italian army in North Africa . 26 The Italians, with their "parallel war," had
entire Italian army in North Africa.^* The Italians, with their "parallel war," had
wrecked
wrecked the Axis' strategic
the Axis' strategic position
position not not only
only in the Balkans
in the Balkans but but also also in in the
the
Mediterranean
Mediterranean..
The
The Germans
Germans now now had had no choice but
no choice but toto restore
restore stability
stability to to the
the southern
southern flank flank
before
before "Barbarossa
"Barbarossa." ." As As early
early as as August
August 1940, 1940, they
they had had considered
considered sending sending aa
panzer
panzer corps
corps to to Libya
Libya to to aid
aid inin the
the drive
drive toto Suez,
Suez, butbut thethe Italians
Italians had had rebuffed
rebuffed the the
offer The destruction
^^ The
offer..21 destruction of much ofthe
of much of the Italian
Italian battle
battle fleet
fleet at at Taranto
Taranto and and thethe military
military
disaster
disaster in in Greece forced Hitler
Greece forced Hitler to to stronger
stronger action
action.. OnOn November
November 20, 20, after
after pointed
pointed
recriminations
recriminations at the lack
at the lack ofof diplomatic
diplomatic discipline
discipline and and military
military incompetency
incompetency of of
Italy,
Italy, the Fuhrer proposed
the Fuhrer proposed that that Germany
Germany send send strong
strong air air units
units to to Sicily
Sicily to to make
make
long-range
long-range attacksattacks on on thethe British
British fleet
fleet in
in the
the eastern
eastern Mediterranean
Mediterranean.^* The Italians,
.28 The Italians,

in
in no
no position
position to to refuse
refuse any any offer
offer of of help,
help, speedily
speedily acquiesced.
acquiesced. By By the
the beginning
beginning of of
January
January 1941, 1941, Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps X, X, mostly
mostly drawndrawn fromfrom units
units operating
operating in in Norway,
Norway, had had
arrived
arrived at at bases
bases in in Sicily
Sicily.. By By mid-January,
mid-January, nearly nearly 200200 German
German bombers
bombers and and long-
long-
range
range fighters
fighters were were operating
operating againstagainst the the Royal
Royal Navy Navy and and its its lines
lines of of
communications
communications in in the
the central
central andand eastern
eastern basins
basins of of the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean.. The The impact
impact
of
of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe on on naval
naval andand air air operations
operations in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean theater theater was was
immediate
immediate and and direct
direct.^'. 29
The
The disasters
disasters that that overtook
overtook Italian
Italian ground
ground forces
forces in in Libya
Libya forced
forced HitlerHitler to to
increase
increase the the level
level of of aid.
aid. ByBy the
the end
end of of December,
December, the the military
military situation
situation looked
looked so so
bleak
bleak that
that thethe German
German Embassy Embassy in in Rome
Rome suggested
suggested that that onlyonly aa joint
joint Mediterranean
Mediterranean
command,
command, dominateddominated by by German
German officers,
officers, could
could save
save the the situation
situation.'" . 10 For
For political
political
reasons,
reasons. HitlerHitler rejected
rejected the the proposal
proposal to to take
take overover directly
directly the the Italian
Italian war war effort
effort..
Nevertheless, he could not escape the need to bolster Italy in North Africa with
Nevertheless, he could not escape the need to bolster Italy in North Africa with
significant
significant groundground forces.
forces. On On January
January 11, 11, he ordered the army to prepare a blocking
he ordered the army to prepare a blocking
force
force for
for service
service in in Libya
Libya.. At At the
the same
same time,
time, he he allowed
allowed Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps X X toto move
move to to
North
North Africa
Africa to to support
support Axis Axis ground
ground forces."
forces." By By mid-February,
mid-February, Hitler Hider had had added
added aa

73
73
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
FOR DEFEAT

panzer
panzer division
division to an initial
to an initial commitment
commitment of of one
one light
light division
division.. Commander
Commander ofof the
the
new
new German
German forces in Africa
forces in Africa was
was aa recently
recently promoted lieutenant general,
promoted lieutenant general, Erwin
Erwin
Rommel
Rommel..
The
The emphasis
emphasis on on thethe North
North African
African campaign
campaign by many Anglo-American
by many Anglo-American
historians should not obscure the fact that the Mediterranean
historians should not obscure the fact that the Mediterranean remained
remained aa strategic
strategic
backwater for Hitler-an area in which the Germans consistently minimized the
backwater for Hitler—an area in which the Germans consistently minimized the
forces committed. 3z Rommel's task was to prevent an Italian collapse and to pin
forces committed.^^ Rommel's task was to prevent an Italian collapse and to pin
down
down as as many Commonwealth forces
many Commonwealth forces as as possible
possible;; hehe was
was notably
notably successful
successful in in this
this
endeavor . Moreover, criticism of his capabilities as a strategist missed the point that
endeavor. Moreover, criticism of his capabilities as a strategist missed the point that
Rommel
Rommel never never received
received the resources necessary
the resources necessary for for aa wide
wide ranging
ranging strategic
strategic
campaign . Although Rommel's surge into Egypt in the spring of 1942 was not, as
campaign. Although Rommel's surge into Egypt in the spring of 1942 was not, as itit
turns out, capable of overturning Britain's Middle Eastern position, it did manage to
turns out, capable of overturning Britain's Middle Eastern position, it did manage to
unbalance the British so thoroughly that not until the following October were they
unbalance the British so thoroughly that not until the following October were they
able
able to
to utilize
utilize their
their overwhelming
overwhelming superiority
superiority in in the
the theater.
theater. For the Luftwaffe,
For the Luftwaffe, the the
Mediterranean
Mediterranean represented
represented aa peripheral
peripheral theater
theater from
from January
January 1941
1941 through
through the the fall
fall
of
of 1942 The Luftwaffe's
1942.. The Luftwaffe'^ mission
mission in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean largely
largely involved
involved attacks
attacks on on
the island of
the island of Malta,
Malta, support
support for for the
the Africa
Africa Corps,
Corps, attacks
attacks onon the British fleet,
the British fleet, anan
increasing
increasing commitment
commitment to to protect
protect the the tenuous
tenuous supply
supply lines
lines between
between Africa
Africa and and
Europe,
Europe, andand support
support forfor the
the ineffective
ineffective Italians
Italians.. As
As German
German liaison
liaison officers
officers noted
noted
early
early in
in the
the war,
war, the
the Italians
Italians had
had neither
neither thethe personnel
personnel nor nor the
the production
production rate rate to
to
support
support aa sustained
sustained airair war. 13
war.'^
Because
Because the
the Germans
Germans werewere using
using aa defensive
defensive strategy
strategy inin the
the Mediterranean,
Mediterranean, they they
had to restore
had to restore order
order to
to the
the Balkans
Balkans before
before "Barbarossa"
"Barbarossa" couldcould begin
begin.. British
British aid
aid to
to
Greece,
Greece, inin the
the form
form ofof RAF
RAF squadrons,
squadrons, alarmed
alarmed Hitler
Hitler who
who particularly
particularly feared
feared air
air
attacks
attacks onon the
the oil
oil fields
fields and
and refineries
refineries ofof Rumania'
Rumania.'■* Further Wehrmacht
3' Further Wehrmacht
deployments
deployments into into Rumania
Rumania in in the
the late
late fall
fall initiated
initiated preparations
preparations both both forfor
"Barbarossa"
"Barbarossa" and and the
the elimination
elimination of of Greece
Greece as as an
an opponent
opponent.. However,
However, both both
geographic
geographic and and diplomatic
diplomatic difficulties
difficulties hindered
hindered the the buildup
buildup;; bad
bad weather
weather in in
December
December 1940 1940 andand January
January 1941,
1941, combined
combined with with Rumania's
Rumania's primitive
primitive
transportation
transportation system,
system, caused
caused serious delays.. Moreover,
serious delays Moreover, Bulgaria,
Bulgaria, worried
worried about
about
Turkey,
Turkey, hesitated
hesitated to
to allow
allow German
German troops
troops access
access to
to its
its territory
territory.. Not
Not until
until the
the end
end ofof
February
February did
did the
the Germans
Germans assuage
assuage Bulgarian
Bulgarian fears,
fears, and
and only
only on
on March
March 11 did
did their
their
troops
troops cross
cross the
the Danube
Danube to to begin
begin deployment
deployment against
against Greece ."
Greece.^^
As
As the
the German
German armyarmy prepared
prepared toto invade
invade Greece,
Greece, Hitler
Hitler pressured
pressured Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia to to
join
join the
the Axis
Axis and
and to
to provide
provide additional
additional routes
routes for
for the
the offensive
offensive.. Here
Here the
the truculence
truculence
that has
that has marked
marked much
much of of Serbian
Serbian history
history stymied
stymied Hitler's
Hitler's objectives
objectives.. Shortly
Shortly after
after
the Regent acceded to German demands, Serbian officers overthrew his regime .
the Regent acceded to German demands, Serbian officers overthrew his regime.
Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, the the plotters proved surprisingly
plotters proved surprisingly hesitant
hesitant toto accept
accept British
British support;
support;
they
they failed to recognize
failed to recognize that
that their
their actions
actions had so antagonized
had so antagonized Hitler
Hitler that
that war
war was
was
inevitable Furious, Hitler
." Furious,
inevitable.3' Hitler was
was not
not the
the sort
sort to hesitate.. Afraid
to hesitate Afraid that
that the
the Yugoslavs
Yugoslavs
represented
represented aa threat to the
threat to the southern
southern flank
flank of German armies
of German armies invading Russian, not
invading Russian, not to
to
mention the
mention the attack
attack on Greece, Hitler
on Greece, Hitler determined
determined to remove Yugoslavia
to remove Yugoslavia from
from the
the list
list
of independent
of Balkan nations.
independent Balkan nations.

4
74
7
THE TURN TO
THE TURN TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

The
The spring
spring 1941 campaign heralded
1941 campaign heralded the the return
return of of major
major air operations for
air operations for the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe after the period
after the period of of relative-calm
relative-calm lasting lasting from from December
December 1940 1940 through
through
March
March 1941 1941.. However,
However, the the onset
onset of this new
of this new campaign
campaign differed differed fromfrom thatthat of of the
the
year before . This time, the Luftwaffe would face increasing commitments with no
year before. This time, the Luftwaffe would face increasing commitments with no
recuperative
recuperative periods
periods until until its
its final
final defeat
defeat in 1945.. Hitler's
in 1945 Hitler's angeranger atat what
what he he regarded
regarded
as
as aa Yugoslav
Yugoslav betrayal insured that
betrayal insured that the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe received received aa missionmission well well
beyond
beyond aa role role ofof strict
strict military
military utility
utility.. On On March
March 27 27 inin War
War Directive
Directive #25, #25, he he
emphasized that
emphasized that "Yugoslavia,
"Yugoslavia, even even if if itit makes
makes initialinitial professions
professions of of loyalty,
loyalty, must must
be
be regarded
regarded as as an
an enemy
enemy and and beaten
beaten downdown as as quickly
quickly as as possible
possible." . " The
The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's
first
first objective
objective wouldwould be: be: "As
"As soonsoon as as sufficient
sufficient forces forces are are available
available and and thethe weather
weather
allows,
allows, the ground installations
the ground installations of of the
the Yugoslav
Yugoslav air air force
force and and the
the city of Belgrade
city of Belgrade
will
will be
be destroyed
destroyed from from the the air
air by
by continual
continual day day and and night
night attacks
attacks [my[my emphasis]
emphasis]."" . "3'
German
German military planning exhibited
military planning exhibited its its usualusual adaptability
adaptability to to changing
changing
circumstances
circumstances.. As As Halder
Haider admitted
admitted later, later, the the OKH OKH had had already
already prepared
prepared the the
theoretical
theoretical groundwork
groundwork for for an an attack
attack on Yugoslavia; all
on Yugoslavia; all that
that remained
remained was was to to solve
solve
the
the practical
practical difficulties
difficulties of of moving
moving troops troops and and supplies
supplies for for the the expanded
expanded
campaign."
campaign.'* In In little
little moremore than than aa weekweek after after the the coup,
coup, the the Germans
Germans had had altered
altered
Twelfth
Twelfth Army's
Army's dispositions
dispositions in in Bulgaria
Bulgaria to to include
include Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia in in its
its mission
mission and and
had
had established
established the the Second
Second Army Army in in southern
southern Austria Austria and and Hungary
Hungary along along the the
Yugoslav
Yugoslav frontier.
frontier. Armored
Armored forces forces from
from the the twotwo armies,
armies, one one advancing
advancing from from the the
north
north and
and the
the other
other from from the the south,
south, would
would strike strike deepdeep into into Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia at at Belgrade
Belgrade..
Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, Twelfth Twelfth Army Army would would bypass
bypass Greek Greek defensesdefenses by by swinging
swinging throughthrough
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia to to take
take the the Greeks
Greeks in in the
the flanks
flanks and and rear.'9
rear.'' Along
Along with with these
these new new
deployments
deployments went went an an extensive
extensive redeployment
redeployment of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. Nearly
Nearly 600 600 aircraft
aircraft
moved
moved fromfrom various
various basesbases within
within the the Reich
Reich to to support
support the the extension
extension of of the
the campaign
campaign
to Yugoslavia
to Yugoslavia;; some some units units werewere deployed
deployed from from bases bases as as far
far away
away as as southern
southern
France.
France. Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe strength
strength for the coming
for the coming offensive
offensive now now exceeded
exceeded 1,000 1,000 aircraft
aircraft.'*".°°
The
The reasons
reasons behind
behind such such aa drastic
drastic increase
increase in in aircraft
aircraft strength
strength become
become readily readily
apparent
apparent in in reviewing
reviewing the the orders
orders directing
directing the the airair attacks
attacks on on Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia. The The
campaign's
campaign's strategic
strategic plan plan specifically
specifically excluded
excluded bombing bombing either either industrial
industrial plantsplants or or
the
the transportation
transportation network, network, since since thethe Germans
Germans hoped hoped to to utilize
utilize the the Yugoslav
Yugoslav
economy
economy as as soon
soon as as possible
possible for for their
their own own needs needs.. However,
However, the the major
major task, task,
concurrent
concurrent with with achieving
achieving air air superiority,
superiority, was was "the "the destruction
destruction of of Belgrade
Belgrade throughthrough
aa great
great air
air attack
attack.''. " That
That attack
attack would
would begin
begin in in the
the morning
morning with with aa direct
direct bombing
bombing of of
the
the city's
city's center
center with
with 75 75 percent
percent high high explosives
explosives and and 25 25 percent
percent incendiaries;
incendiaries; after after aa
quick
quick turnaround,
turnaround, the the bombers
bombers would would return
return that that same
same afternoon
afternoon with with 40 40 percent
percent
high
high explosives
explosives and and 60 60 percent
percent incendiaries
incendiaries.. The The change
change in in bomb
bomb load load reflected
reflected aa
desire
desire to to cause
cause as as many
many firesfires as as possible
possible "to "to ease
ease the the problem
problem of of marking
marking the the city
city
for
for the
the night
night attack
attack.'' . " Night
Night bombers
bombers would would drop drop 50 50 percent
percent high high explosives
explosives and and 50 50
percent
percent incendiaries
incendiaries.. FurtherFurther bombings
bombings of of Belgrade
Belgrade would would occur occur on
on D+ D+1. 1 . The code
The code
word
word for for the
the operation
operation was was "Punishment,
"Punishment,"'*' "4' an an accurate
accurate description
description of of Hitler's
Hitler's
feelings
feelings.. By By thethe time
time the the Germans
Germans had had completed
completed their their attacks
attacks on on aa city
city that
that thethe
Yugoslavs
Yugoslavs had had declared
declared open, open, 17,000
17,000 peoplepeople had had died
died.''^.4z Hitler had exacted his
Hitler had exacted his
measure
measure of of revenge
revenge..

75
75
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

The
The campaign
campaign was was aa stunning
stunning repetition
repetition of of the
the success
success the the previous
previous spring spring..
Within
Within less
less than than aa week,
week, German mechanized forces
German mechanized forces had had captured
captured the the ruins
ruins of of
Belgrade.
Belgrade. German
German spearheads
spearheads supportedsupported by by thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe sliced sliced through
through the the land
land.*^ .43
By
By April
April 17, 17, organized
organized resistance
resistance had had ended
ended with with thethe surrender
surrender of of thethe remnants
remnants of of
the Yugoslav army .^4 The drive to the south against the Greeks and British did not
the Yugoslav army.''^ The drive to the south against the Greeks and British did not
last
last much
much longer
longer.. The The sweep
sweep through
through Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia not not only
only outflanked
outflanked Allied Allied forces
forces
facing Bulgaria but also cut off the Greek's First Army fighting the Italians in
facing Bulgaria but also cut off the Greek's First Army fighting the Italians in
Albania . By April 22, German armored and air units had broken through the pass at
Albania. By April 22, German armored and air units had broken through the pass at
Thermopylae, and the remainder of the campaign was a race to see whether the
Thermopylae, and the remainder of the campaign was a race to see whether the
Royal
Royal Navy
Navy could could evacuate
evacuate BritishBritish troops
troops before
before GermanGerman armor armor couldcould cut cut offoff their
their
escape . 45 There was one climactic clash to the campaign . On May 20, German
escape.*^ There was one climactic clash to the campaign. On May 20, German
airborne
airborne forces
forces droppeddropped on Crete.. However,
on Crete However, they they met met an an unexpectedly
unexpectedly warm warm
reception . In fact, on the basis of the first day's operation, it looked as if
reception. In fact, on the basis of the first day's operation, it looked as if the
the
Germans might fail entirely . Not only did the paratroopers not capture a landing
Germans might fail entirely. Not only did the paratroopers not capture a landing
strip
strip but
but the
the survivors
survivors were were isolated
isolated and and under
under great great pressure
pressure.. Only Only faulty
faulty leadership
leadership
and
and coordination
coordination around around the the Malene
Malene airfield
airfield allowed
allowed the the Germans
Germans to to seize
seize that that
airbase
airbase and
and to to fly
fly inin reinforcements
reinforcements.. Air Air superiority
superiority gave gave the the paratroopers
paratroopers critical critical
support
support and and prevented
prevented the the Royal
Royal Navy Navy from from bringing
bringing to to bear
bear its its full
full weight
weight."* .46

Despite
Despite thethe successful
successful outcome,
outcome, the the Germans
Germans indeed indeed had had received
received aa bloodybloody nose nose in in
Crete
Crete.. Altogether,
Altogether, their their losses
losses totalled
totalled nearly
nearly 4,000 4,000 men men or or one-quarter
one-quarter of of thethe
attacking
attacking forceforce.. Out Out of of the
the 500500 transport
transport aircraft,
aircraft, the Luftwaffe had
the Luftwaffe had to to write
write off off 146146
as
as total
total losses,
losses, whilewhile aa further
further 150 150 were
were damaged
damaged,"' .4' Because
Because of of the
the operation's
operation's high high
cost,
cost, Hitler
Hitler considered
considered the the day
day of of large
large paratrooper
paratrooper operations
operations as as finished
finished..
In
In retrospect,
retrospect, the the Balkan
Balkan campaign
campaign was was only only aa footnote
footnote in in the
the war.war. ItIt diddid not not
significantly
significantly postponepostpone the the invasion
invasion of of Russia
Russia.. The The delay
delay in in the
the Russian
Russian campaigncampaign
resulted
resulted moremore from from supply
supply and and organizational
organizational difficulties
difficulties and and poorpoor ground
ground and and
weather
weather conditions
conditions associated
associated with with thethe late
late spring
spring thanthan fromfrom the the attack
attack on on Greece
Greece
and
and Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia."* .4s At
At the most, Balkan
the most, Balkan operations
operations affectedaffected the the freshness
freshness and and staying
staying
power
power of of units
units transferred
transferred from from operations
operations in in the
the south
south to to the
the Russian
Russian campaign
campaign..
Ironically,
Ironically, the the campaign
campaign in in thethe Balkans
Balkans succeeded
succeeded too too well.
well. The The advance
advance of of
armored
armored spearheads
spearheads had had been
been so so quick
quick and and thethe collapse
collapse so so sudden
sudden that that the
the Germans
Germans
were
were notnot able
able to to round
round up up thousands
thousands of of Greek
Greek and and Yugoslav
Yugoslav soldierssoldiers left left in in thethe
backwater
backwater areas areas of of those
those countries
countries.. Rapid Rapid redeployment
redeployment of of German
German units units to to
"Barbarossa"
"Barbarossa" assignmentsassignments allowed allowed those those soldiers
soldiers to to roam
roam the the countryside
countryside;; they they
soon
soon formed
formed the the basis
basis forfor the
the considerable
considerable guerillaguerilla movements
movements throughoutthroughout the the area.
area.
By 1942, these
By 1942, these guerrillas
guerrillas were were tying
tying downdown large large numbers
numbers of of Germans
Germans and atvd wereweTe
Qreventingthe Reich from fully utilizing the resources the
pteveuling the Reich from fully utilizing the resources of
of the southern
southern Balkans
Balkans. .
For
For thethe Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, the the spring
spring of 1941 offered
of 1941 offered the the last
last easy easy campaign
campaign..
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, even before "Barbarossa,"
even before "Barbarossa," aircraft aircraft losses
losses were were rising
rising ominously
ominously..
Operations
Operations in in the
the Balkans,
Balkans, as as well
well as as anan increased
increased effort effort against British cities
against British cities to to
disguise the redeployment to the east, pushed the loss rate (all
disguise the redeployment to the east, pushed the loss rate (all aircraft)
aircraft) from
from 2 .6
2.6
percent (written off) in January 1941 to 7 .2 percent in April, and to
percent (written off) in January 1941 to 7.2 percent in April, and to 7 .5
7.5 percent
percent in
in
May."' The
May.49 The loss loss rate for bombers
rate for bombers (written(written off) off) climbed
climbed in in the
the same period
same period from 4.8 from 4 .8

percent
percent in January, to
in January, to 55.5 percent in
.5 percent in February,
February, to 8.6 percent
to 8.6 percent in March,
in March, to 10.6 to 10.6

76
76
THE TURN TO
THE TURN TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

percent
percent inin April,
April, and
and to
to 12
12 percent
percent inin May.
May. Thus,
Thus, the
the strain
strain on
on resources
resources was
was
already
already mounting
mounting before
before operations
operations in
in the east began
the east began.. Furthermore,
Furthermore, official
official German
German
reaction
reaction among
among the
the ruling
ruling hierarchy
hierarchy to
to the
the loss
loss rate
rate suggests general indifference
suggests aa general indifference
to
to the
the potential
potential impact
impact that
that such
such losses
losses might
might have
have in
in sustained
sustained combat
combat operations
operations in
in
Russia
Russia..

BARBAROSSA
BARBAROSSA:: BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
The
The decisive
decisive campaign
campaign of of thethe Second
Second World World War War was was thethe German
German invasioninvasion of of
Russia
Russia inin 1941
1941.. TheThe defeat
defeat of of that
that effort
effort reflected
reflected the the failure
failure of of German
German leaders leaders to to
prepare
prepare the
the economic
economic and and productive
productive capacity
capacity of of the
the Reich
Reich and and western
western Europe Europe for for
war on aa continental
war on continental rather
rather thanthan aa western
western European
European scale.scale. Thus,
Thus, in in aa certain
certain sense,
sense,
the
the production
production and and industrial
industrial decisions
decisions made made by by thethe German
German leadership
leadership in in the
the
summer
summer of 1940 represented
of 1940 represented aa decisive
decisive turning
turning point
point in in World
World War War 11 II.. In
In effect,
effect,
Germany's
Germany's leadership
leadership had had sealed
sealed her fate before
her fate before thethe campaign
campaign opened opened..
Hitler
Hitler had
had turned
turned to to Russia
Russia in in the
the summer
summer of of 1940
1940 as as aa possible
possible solution
solution to to the
the
British
British dilemma.
dilemma. While While the the ideaidea of of aa fall fall 1940
1940 campaign
campaign had had to to be be shelved
shelved
temporarily,
temporarily, contingency
contingency planning
planning for for anan invasion
invasion of of Russia
Russia beganbegan almost
almost at at once.
once.
By
By the
the end
end of of July
July 1940,
1940, serious
serious planning
planning was was underway
underway in in the
the OKH.
OKH. On On August
August 5, 5,
General
General Erich
Erich Marcks
Marcks presented
presented aa strategicstrategic study study thatthat sketched
sketched in in outline
outline aa
framework
framework for for the
the proposed
proposed campaign
campaign.. Marcks Marcks posited
posited as as the
the main
main strategic
strategic aim aim the
the
destruction
destruction of of Soviet
Soviet armed
armed forces.
forces. The The Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht would would advance
advance at at least
least as as far
far as
as
the
the line
line Archangel-Gorki-Rostov
Archangel-Gorki-Rostov to to prevent
prevent the the possibility
possibility of of bomber
bomber attacks attacks
against Germany . The
against Germany. The main
main thrust
thrust would
would occur occur north
north of of the
the Pripyat
Pripyat marshes
marshes and and
attempt
attempt thethe capture
capture of of Moscow
Moscow.. Subsidiary
Subsidiary drives drives in in the
the north
north andand south
south would
would
protect
protect the
the flanks
flanks of of the
the advance
advance on on the
the capital
capital andand prevent
prevent aa Soviet
Soviet spoiling
spoiling attackattack
on Rumanian
on Rumanian oil
oil resources
resources. . Marcks
Marcks suggested
suggested that
that the
the decisive
decisive battles
battles would
would occur
occur
in
in the
the first
first few
few weeks
weeks withwith the the armored
armored drive drive playing
playing the the critical
critical role;role; these
these
penetrations
penetrations would
would hopefully
hopefully destroy
destroy the the main
main body
body of of the
the Red
Red Army
Army in in the
the border
border
areas.
areas. The
The study
study estimated
estimated aa slightslight numerical
numerical advantage
advantage in in favor
favor ofof the
the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht
and
and certainly
certainly aa decisive
decisive qualitative
qualitative superiority
superiority.. Once Once German
German troopstroops hadhad pierced
pierced the the
Red Army's
Red Army's forward
forward lineslines andand had
had begun
begun the the exploitation
exploitation phase,phase, Marcks
Marcks believedbelieved
that
that the Soviet command
the Soviet command and and control
control system
system wouldwould collapse,
collapse, allowing
allowing the the Germans
Germans
to
to destroy
destroy Soviet
Soviet armies
armies piecemeal
piecemeal.. The The studystudy suggested
suggested that that aa period
period of of between
between
nine
nine andand seventeen
seventeen weeks weeks would would be be necessary
necessary to to achieve
achieve the the campaign's
campaign's
objectives.so
objectives.'"
Further
Further studies
studies in in the
the fall
fall of of 1940
1940 followed
followed the the direction
direction that that Marcks
Marcks had had
suggested
suggested.. While
While certain
certain problems
problems emergedemerged in in the
the war
war gaming
gaming of of operations,
operations, such such
as
as the
the distances
distances involved
involved in Russia, most
in Russia, most officers
officers concurred
concurred with with the the proposed
proposed
strategy
strategy with
with itsits emphasis
emphasis on on gaining
gaining aa swift swift military
military victory
victory by by advancing
advancing on on
Moscow.
Moscow. However,
However, HitlerHitler did
did notnot agree
agree fully,
fully, and
and thethe Fuhrer
Fuhrer emphasized
emphasized that that after
after
the
the capture
capture of of the
the border
border areas,
areas, thethe advance
advance on on Moscow
Moscow would would not not proceed
proceed until until
German
German forces
forces had had captured .s'
Leningrad The emphasis in Hitler's strategy was on
captured Leningrad." The emphasis in Hitler's strategy was on
gaining
gaining Soviet
Soviet economic
economic resources
resources as as quickly
quickly as as possible
possible.. Thus,Thus, right
right from from thethe
beginning,
beginning, there
there waswas aa dicotomy
dicotomy in in German
German strategystrategy between
between Hitler's
Hitler's emphasis
emphasis on on

77
77
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

capturing economic
capturing economic spoils spoils and and the army's preoccupation
the army's preoccupation with with strictly
strictly military
military
factors.
factors. This This was
was the the first
first direct
direct interference
interference by the Fuhrer
by the Fiihrer inin "Barbarossa's"
"Barbarossa's"
planning process;
planning process; as as inin France,
France, he he would involve himself
would involve himself deeply
deeply in in operational
operational
matters.
matters.
There
There are are several elements in
several elements in the
the planning
planning process
process thatthat require
require amplification.
amplification. The The
first is that, while Hitler and the OKH held somewhat
first is that, while Hitler and the OKH held somewhat different
different views
views as
as to
to the
the
proper strategy for the campaign's later stages, all substantially
proper strategy for the campaign's later stages, all substantially underestimated
underestimated the
the
Red
Red Army's
Army's numerical
numerical strength,
strength, Soviet
Soviet industrial
industrial resources,
resources, and and thethe inherent
inherent
logistical difficulties involved in waging a campaign on a continental scale. 12 There
logistical difficulties involved in waging a campaign on a continental scale.'^ There
were, of course, reasons for such underestimations of the Red Army ; the pernicious
were, of course, reasons for such underestimations of the Red Army; the pernicious
effect
effect of of the
the purges
purges as as well
well asas the
the depressingly
depressingly poor poor showing
showing of of Soviet
Soviet military
military
forces in
forces in Poland
Poland and and Finland
Finland werewere all all too
too obvious
obvious.. Moreover,
Moreover, the the Germans
Germans found found itit
difficult
difficult to to build
build an an accurate
accurate picture
picture of of Soviet
Soviet industrial
industrial potential.
potential. InIn Stalin's
Stalin's police
police
state,
state, intelligence
intelligence agents
agents did did not
not last
last long
long.. For
For security
security reasons,
reasons. Hitler
Hitler forbade
forbade deep
deep
reconnaissance
reconnaissance flights flights into
into the
the Soviet
Soviet UnionUnion until
until shortly
shortly before
before thethe invasion,
invasion, and and
the Luftwaffe
the Luftwaffe did did not
not possess
possess reconnaissance
reconnaissance aircraft aircraft with
with the
the range
range to to reach
reach thethe
Urals ." Nevertheless,
Urals.^' Nevertheless, there there were
were glimpses
glimpses behind
behind the the curtain
curtain ofof Soviet
Soviet security
security..
Shortly before
Shortly before "Barbarossa,"
"Barbarossa," the the Russians
Russians allowed
allowed several
several German
German engineers
engineers to to
see the
see the new
new aircraft
aircraft factories
factories in in the
the Urals
Urals and
and the the extensive
extensive production
production that that was
was
already
already underway
underway;; theirtheir reports
reports went
went unheeded
unheeded.'* ."
This
This underestimation
underestimation of of Russian
Russian capabilities
capabilities lay lay not
not only
only inin misreadings
misreadings of of Soviet
Soviet
resources
resources but but in
in the
the nature
nature of of the
the war
war that
that Hitler
Hitler waswas launching
launching.. ThisThis warwar was
was more
more
than aa political
than political oror strategic
strategic struggle
struggle.. It It was
was an
an ideological
ideological war, war, aa crusade,
crusade, waged
waged to to
encompass
encompass not not simply
simply the the defeat
defeat of of an
an enemy
enemy nation
nation but but the
the utter
utter destruction
destruction and and
subjugation
subjugation of of aa whole
whole people
people.. The The purposes
purposes for for this
this campaign
campaign in in Hitler's
Hitler's eyes
eyes were
were
to
to (1)
(1) capture
capture thethe Lebensraum
Lebensraum (living (living spaces)
spaces) forfor the
the Germanic
Germanic peoples,
peoples, (2) (2) destroy
destroy
the
the Jewish-Bolshevist
Jewish-Bolshevist regime, regime, (3) (3) root
root outout and
and destroy
destroy the the Jewish
Jewish population
population (along
(along
with
with several
several other
other unfortunate
unfortunate nationalities),
nationalities), (4) (4) reduce
reduce the the Russian
Russian people
people to to aa
servile
servile mass,
mass, and and (5)(5) capture
capture the the resources
resources to to conduct
conduct aa war war against
against thethe Anglo-
Anglo-
Saxon
Saxon powerspowers.. It It is
is now
now clear
clear thatthat thethe German
German military,
military, withwith fewfew exceptions,
exceptions,
concurred
concurred with with the
the ideological
ideological framework
framework within within whichwhich Hitler determined to
Hitler determined to wage
wage
"55
"Barbarossa.
"Barbarossa."" From
From the the first, the Fuhrer
first, the Fiihrer made
made clearclear to to his
his commanders
commanders that that the
the
coming
coming campaign
campaign

was
was aa battle
battle of
of extermination
extermination.. .. .. .. Annilhilation
Annilhilation of of Bolshevik
Bolshevik
commissars
commissars and and communist
communist intellectuals
intellectuals.. .. .. .. The
The struggle
struggle must
must be
be
conducted
conducted against
against this
this poison
poison.. There
There is is no
no question
question ofof the
the laws
laws of
of
war
war.. .. .. commissars
commissars andand members
members of of the
the secret
secret police
police are
are criminals
criminals
and
and must
must be be treated
treated as
as such
such li .e ., shot}
[i.e., . 56
shot].'*

Shortly
Shortly before
before the
the beginning
beginning ofof "Barbarossa,"
"Barbarossa," the the head
head of the Luftwaffe's
of the Luftwaffe's air
air
mission
mission in Rumania returned
in Rumania returned from
from meeting Goring to
meeting Goring to report
report toto his
his leading
leading
"the Reichsmarschall
that "the
subordinates that
subordinates Reichsmarschall has clearly ordered
has clearly ordered that among Russian
that among Russian
prisoners each Bolshevik
prisoners each Bolshevik functionary
functionary is
is to
to be
be immediately
immediately shot
shot without
without any
any judicial
judicial
proceedings . That right [to
proceedings. That right [to shoot
shoot communists]
communists] every
every officer
officer possesses.""
possesses."" If
If there
there

778
9
THE
THE TURN TO RUSSIA
TURN TO RUSSIA

were
were some
some opposition
opposition to to the
the "commissar
"commissar order,"
order," itit was
was not
not widespread
widespread.. As As the
the
head
head of
of the
the army's
army's Rumanian
Rumanian mission
mission suggested,
suggested, warwar had
had returned
returned to
to the
the religious
religious
and
and ideological
ideological basis
basis of
of the
the Thirty
Thirty Years'
Years' War:
War: Germany's
Germany's opponents
opponents werewere the
the
financiers,
financiers, Freemasonry,
Freemasonry, and and the
the financial
financial and
and political
political power
power of of the
the World
World
Jewry .s8 Far
Jewry.'* Far too
too many
many officers
officers acquiesced
acquiesced in
in outrages,
outrages, such
such as
as the
the murder
murder of of
hundreds of thousands of Jews by SS commando teams (Einsatzgruppen), while the
hundreds of thousands of Jews by SS commando teams (Einsatzgruppen), while the
starvation
starvation ofof literally
literally hundreds
hundreds of of thousands
thousands (if(if not
not millions)
millions) of
of prisoners
prisoners was
was
directly attributable to Wehrmacht authorities .19
directly attributable to Wehrmacht authorities.''
The
The widespread acceptance of
widespread acceptance of Hitler's
Hitler's goals
goals and and attitudes
attitudes throughout
throughout the the officer
officer
corps made possible the terrible atrocities that occurred . It was not merely a matter
corps made possible the terrible atrocities that occurred. It was not merely a matter
of Hitler and the SS . On the political side of the invasion, the scale of criminality
of Hitler and the SS. On the political side of the invasion, the scale of criminality
quickly
quickly disabused disaffected Russians
disabused disaffected Russians and and Ukrainians
Ukrainians of of thethe notion
notion thatthat thethe
Germans might be their liberators . German atrocities rallied the
Germans might be their liberators. German atrocities rallied the population
population
to
to the
the defense
defense of of aa thoroughly
thoroughly unpopular
unpopular and and vicious
vicious regime
regime.. On On the the military
military side,
side, aa
sense of a racial and cultural superiority, shared by most German officers,
sense of a racial and cultural superiority, shared by most German officers,
contributed
contributed to an underestimation
to an underestimation of of Russia's
Russia's powers
powers of of resistance
resistance.. As As sophisticated
sophisticated
aa general
general officer
officer asas Gunther
Giinther Blumentritt
Blumentritt could could claim
claim in in 1941
1941 that
that "Russian
"Russian military
military
history shows that the Russian as a combat soldier, illiterate and half-Asiatic, thinks
history shows that the Russian as a combat soldier, illiterate and half-Asiatic, thinks
and feels differently . -60 Given such attitudes, it is not surprising that many German
and feels differentiy."*" Given such attitudes, it is not surprising that many German
soldiers,
soldiers, asas well
well as as their
their leader,
leader, expected
expected that that once
once they
they kicked
kicked in in the
the door,
door, thethe
structure-ruled
structure —^ruled by by Jewish
Jewish subhumans-would
subhumans—would collapse collapse.*' .a'
One
One ofof the
the more
more glaring
glaring defects
defects in in mapping
mapping out out the
the preinvasion
preinvasion strategy strategy was was the
the
scant
scant attention
attention the the Germans
Germans paid paid to to the
the logistical
logistical difficulties
difficulties of of supporting
supporting troopstroops
deep
deep inside
inside Russia
Russia.. The The general
general assumption
assumption seems seems to to have
have beenbeen that that the
the first
first great
great
rush
rush ofof mechanized
mechanized forces forces wouldwould carrycarry to to Smolensk
Smolensk and and destroy
destroy the the Red
Red Army
Army in in
the
the border
border areas.
areas. Thereafter,
Thereafter, depending
depending on on railroads,
railroads, German
German troops troops wouldwould exploit
exploit
the
the initial
initial success
success to to finish
finish the the campaign
campaign.. Surprisingly,
Surprisingly, the the units
units scheduled
scheduled to to repair
repair
railroads
railroads leading
leading to to Smolensk
Smolensk lay lay atat the
the bottom
bottom of of army
army priorities-a
priorities—a reflection
reflection of of
an
an unduly
unduly optimistic
optimistic approach
approach to to logistics.bz
logistics." Compounding
Compounding this this casual
casual attitude
attitude
towards
towards logistics
logistics was was the the failure
failure to to appreciate
appreciate the the distances
distances involved
involved in in traversing
traversing
Russia
Russia.. TheThe push
push to to Smolensk
Smolensk and and from
from there
there to to Moscow
Moscow represented
represented aa logistical
logistical
problem
problem on on aa vastly
vastly different
different scalescale from
from thethe campaign
campaign in in the
the west
west against
against France
France..
For the Luftwaffe,
For the Luftwaffe, the the awesome
awesome geographic
geographic size size ofof Russia
Russia presented
presented comparable
comparable
logistical
logistical difficulties
difficulties.. What What is is more,
more, the the major
major commitments
commitments occupying occupying the the air
air
force
force from
from June
June 1940
1940 on on hadhad allowed
allowed almost
almost none none of of the
the periods
periods of of rest
rest the
the army
army
had
had enjoyed
enjoyed to to conserve
conserve and and rebuild
rebuild strength
strength.. Goring
Goring claimed
claimed after after the the war
war thatthat he
he
had
had opposed
opposed the the invasion
invasion;; but but hishis remarks
remarks to to General
General Georg Georg Thomas,
Thomas, head head of of the
the
OKW's
OKW^ economic
economic section,
section, that that such
such aa warwar waswas simply
simply aa "problem
"problem of of the
the necessary
necessary
supply
supply organization"
organization" suggests suggests that that hehe was
was as as overconfident
overconfident as as thethe rest .6' Hitler's
rest." Hitler's
Directive
Directive #21 #21 stressed
stressed that \he Luftwaffe's
that the Luftwaffe's first first task
task was
was to to eliminate
eliminate the the Russian
Russian air air
force
force and
and to to prevent
prevent it it from
from interfering
interfering with with the the advance
advance on on the the ground
ground;; afterafter
gaining
gaining air superiority, the
air superiority, the Luftwaffe
Luftwcffe was was to to support
support the the army
army.. Interestingly,
Interestingly, the the
directive explicitly ruled
directive explicitly ruled out
out attacks
attacks on
on the
the enemy's
enemy's armament
armament industry
industry "during
"during the
the
main operations . Only after
main operations. Only after the
the completion
completion of
of the
the mobile
mobile operations
operations may
may such
such

9
779
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

attacks
attacks be
be considered-primarily
considered—primarily against against thethe Ural
Ural region
region.""." 6' The
The assumption
assumption was was
that ground operations would proceed so rapidly that the
that ground operations would proceed so rapidly that the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht would
would soon
soon
occupy Soviet industrial
occupy Soviet industrial centers;
centers; thus,
thus, itit made
made no no sense
sense to destroy what
to destroy what would
would soon
soon
be in German hands . No one considered or even thought it possible that the Soviets
be in German hands. No one considered or even thought it possible that the Soviets
would
would transfer
transfer much
much of of their
their military industrial complex
military industrial complex behind
behind the
the Urals
Urals..
The extension of
The extension of thethe warwar to
to Russia
Russia meant
meant that the Luftwaffe
that the Luftwajfe nownow faced
faced the
the
prospect
prospect of of war
war on
on two
two fronts
fronts (three
(three fronts
fronts ifif one
one considers
considers thethe Mediterranean
Mediterranean aa
separate
separate theater) .65 What
theater).*' What shouldshould have
have alarmed
alarmed senior
senior German
German military
military and
and civilian
civilian
officials
officials was
was that,
that, despite drastic increase
despite aa drastic increase in in commitments,
commitments, there there had
had been
been
virtually
virtually no
no change
change in
in the
the number
number of of aircraft
aircraft inin the force structure
the force structure from
from the
the previous
previous
year
year.. (See
(See Table
Table XII . 66 )
XII.^)

TABLE
TABLE X11XII
German
German Aircraft
Aircraft Strength
Strength

May
May 11,
11, 1940
1940 June
June 21,
21, 1941
1941
Close
Close Recce
Recce 335
335 440
440
Long-Range
Long-Range Recce
Recce 322
322 393
393
Single-Engine
Single-Engine Fighters
Fighters 1,356
1,356 1,440
1,440
Night
Night Fighters
Fighters 263
263
Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine Fighters
Fighters 354
354 188
188
Bombers
Bombers 1,711
1,711 1,511
1,511
Dive
Dive Bombers
Bombers 414
414 424
424
Ground
Ground Attack
Attack 50
50
Coastal
Coastal 240
240 223
223
TOTAL
TOTAL 4,782
4,782 4,882
4,882

A
A revealing
revealing statistic
statistic in Table XII
in Table XII is
is the
the fact
fact that the Luftwaffe
that the Luftwc^e began
began the
the invasion
invasion of of
Russia with 200
Russia with 200 fewer
fewer bombers
bombers than than itit had
had possessed
possessed at at the
the start
start ofof operations
operations
against
against the
the West
West;; German
German bomber
bomber production
production had had not
not kept
kept pace
pace with
with losses
losses over
over the
the
course
course ofof the
the year.
year.
The OKL
The OKL (Oberkommando
(Oberkommando der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, German
German air air force
force high
high command)
command)
detailed three
detailed three air
air fleets
fleets to cooperate directly
to cooperate directly with
with the
the three
three army
army groups
groups in in the
the
subjugation of
subjugation of the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union.. Two Two thousand
thousand seven
seven hundred
hundred seventy
seventy aircraft,
aircraft, oror
65
65 percent
percent of of the
the frontline
frontline strength
strength of the Luftwaffe,
of the Luftwaffe, movedmoved easteast against
against the the
Russians
Russians;; through
through the
the spring
spring of of 1943,
1943, the
the bulk
bulk of the Luftwaffe
of the Luftwaffe would
would remain
remain tied
tied to
to
the
the eastern
eastern front .67 Facing
front.*' Facing the the Germans
Germans was was aa Soviet
Soviet air
air force
force estimated
estimated at at 8,000
8,000
aircraft,
aircraft, with
with somewhere
somewhere around around 6,000
6,000 deployed
deployed in in European
European Russia
Russia.**.68 Like
Like the
the
army, the Luftwaffe
army, the Luftwaffe believed
believed thatthat after
after the
the first
first day's
day's operations
operations had had broken
broken thethe back
back
of
of the
the Soviet
Soviet air air forces,
forces, the the Russians
Russians would
would not not recover.
recover. Moreover,
Moreover, RussiaRussia
seemingly offered
seemingly offered an an opportunity
opportunity to to replicate
replicate thethe victorious
victorious effort
effort against
against France
France
with none
with none of of the
the frustrations
frustrations of of the aerial assault
the aerial assault on on the
the British
British Isles
Isles.. Thus,
Thus,
Jeschonnek's
Jeschonnek's remarkremark "at"at last
last aa proper
proper war" represented more
war" represented than just
more than just the
the relief
rehef ofof
an air
an air staff
staff that
that had
had suffered
suffered the
the only
only German
German defeat
defeat thus
thus far
far in
in the
the war.
war. Flight
Flight crews
crews
also
also were
were glad to terminate
glad to terminate increasingly
increasingly dangerous
dangerous and and ineffective
ineffective night
night missions
missions
over Great Britain.69 By February
over Great Britain.*' By February 1941,
1941, RAF
RAF countermeasures
countermeasures had
had so
so neutralized
neutralized

80
80
THE
THE TURN
TURN TO
TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

German
German blind bombing devices
blind bombing devices thatthat scarcely
scarcely 20 percent of
20 percent of bombs
bombs dropped
dropped were were
falling
falling near
near their
their targets The rest
targets.. The rest were
were landing
landing in in the
the countryside
countryside.™ .'°
In
In retrospect,
retrospect, considering
considering the the opposing force structures,
opposing force structures, the the difficulties
difficulties and and
extent
extent of of the
the theater
theater andand the
the overconfidence
overconfidence within within the the high
high command,
command, the the Germans
Germans
did
did better
better than
than they
they should
should havehave.. Their
Their enormous
enormous tactical
tactical successes
successes through
through thethe fall
fall
of
of 1941
1941 were were asas much
much the the result
result ofof Stalin's
Stalin's incompetence
incompetence as as ofof German
German military
military
brilliance.
brilliance. In In his
his search
search forfor internal
internal security,
security, thethe soviet dictator had
soviet dictator quite literally
had quite literally
destroyed
destroyed his his army's
army's officer
officer corps
corps inin aa purge
purge that
that lasted
lasted fromfrom 19371937 through
through 19391939.'■."
Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, the the purge
purge had had hithit hardest
hardest at at those
those in in the
the high
high command
command who who
possessed
possessed the the most
most realistic
realistic sense
sense ofof operational
operational and and tactical
tactical matters,
matters, including
including the the
strategic
strategic difficulties
difficulties that
that Russia
Russia would
would face
face in
in aa major
major European
European war. war.^^ 'z
Stalin
Stalin compounded
compounded the the problems
problems facing
facing his
his armies
armies in in his
his reaction
reaction to to the
the German
German
victory
victory overover France
France.. TheThe Russians
Russians overplayed
overplayed their their diplomatic
diplomatic hand hand in in the
the fall
fall ofof
1940;
1940; thenthen when
when ominous
ominous signals
signals accumulated
accumulated as as German
German troops troops deployed
deployed to to the
the
east,
east, Stalin
Stalin lost
lost control
control ofof the
the situation
situation.. He He disbelieved
disbelieved the the evidence
evidence that that pointed
pointed to to
aa German
German invasion.
invasion. Admittedly,
Admittedly, the the Germans
Germans threwthrew considerable
considerable misinformation
misinformation at at
the Soviets, and the cover plan for "Barbarossa" was a carefully worked out
the Soviets, and the cover plan for "Barbarossa" was a carefully worked out
attempt
attempt to to throw
throw the the Russians
Russians off off the
the scent."
scent.^' The
The lastlast minute
minute deployment
deployment of of air
air
units to operating bases in East Prussia and along the frontier also helped deceive
units to operating bases in East Prussia and along the frontier also helped deceive
the
the Soviets
Soviets.. Not Not until
until June
June 19 19 did
did Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps VIII VIII move
move to to East
East Prussia
Prussia fromfrom deep
deep
inside Germany where it had replenished supplies and drawn new aircraft and
inside Germany where it had replenished supplies and drawn new aircraft and
crews .'°
crews.^"
Finally
Finally on on the
the evening
evening of of June
June 21,
21, Stalin
Stalin allowed
allowed his his high
high command
command to to issue
issue aa
strategic warning to troops on the frontier . The warning from Moscow came so
strategic warning to troops on the frontier. The warning from Moscow came so late
late
that it reached few frontline units." Surprise was almost complete, and the
that it reached few frontline units." Surprise was almost complete, and the
dispairing
dispairing signalsignal of of aa border
border patrol-"We
patrol—"We are are being
being firedfired on,on, whatwhat shall
shall wewe
do?"-indicates the
do?"—indicates the level
level of of unpreparedness
unpreparedness.. The The reply reply from from higher
higher
headquarters-"You
headquarters—"You must must be be insane,
insane, andand why
why isis your
your signal
signal not not in
in code?" points
code?"—^points
.76
out
out the
the disadvantages
disadvantages underunder which
which thethe Soviets
Soviets began
began the the campaign
campaign.'*

BARBAROSSA
BARBAROSSA:: THE
THE INVASION
INVASION

In
In the
the early
early morning
morning hours
hours ofof June
June 2222 from
fi-om the
the Baltic
Baltic toto the
the Black
Black Sea,
Sea, the
the
Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht stormedstormed across
across the
the frontier
frontier.. German
German aircraft,
aircraft, crossing
crossing the the frontier
frontier atat
high
high altitudes
altitudes inin order
order not
not to
to alert
alert Soviet
Soviet defenses,
defenses, dropped
dropped to to attack
attack altitude
altitude and
and
pulverized
pulverized Russian
Russian airfields
airfields.. Still
Still unalerted,
unalerted, Soviet
Soviet air
air units
units had
had their
their aircraft
aircraft lined
lined
up
up in
in neat
neat rows
rows facilitating
facilitating the
the Luftwaffe's
Lw^oj^'e's task.
task. Those
Those few
few aircraft
aircraft that
that managed
managed to to
scramble soon
scramble soon fell
fell to
to the guns of
the guns of German
German fighters
fighters.. The
The extent
extent of of the
the surprise
surprise is is
shown
shown by
by Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps IV,
IV, which on the
which on the first
first day
day reported
reported destroying
destroying 142
142 enemy
enemy
aircraft
aircraft on
on the
the ground
ground andand only
only 1616 in the air
in the ." By
air.'' By noon
noon ofof the
the 22nd,
22nd, thethe Russians
Russians
had lost 528 aircraft on the ground and 210 in the air in the
had lost 528 aircraft on the ground and 210 in the air in the western
western district
district. . For
For the
the
entire front, Russian losses totalled no less
entire front, Russian losses totalled no less than
than 1,200
1,200 planes
planes in
in the
the first
first eight
eight and
and
one-half
one-half hours
hours.'*."

8811
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

The
The situation
situation on on thethe ground
ground forced
forced the the Soviets
Soviets to to commit
commit their their remaining
remaining air air
resources
resources in in aa desperate
desperate efforteffort toto stabilize
stabilize the
the collapse Ill-trained, ill-equipped,
collapse.. 111-trained, ill-equipped, and and
ill-prepared,
ill-prepared, Soviet Soviet aircrews floundered in
aircrews floundered in impossible
impossible formations
formations and and inin obsolete
obsolete
aircraft;' 9 the
aircraft;^' the slaughter
slaughter of
of Soviet
Soviet aircraft
aircraft resembled
resembled the
the destruction
destruction of
of the
the Japanese
Japanese
fleet air
fleet air armarm in in the
the "Mariana's
"Mariana's turkey turkey shoot"
shoot" of of 1943
1943.. TheThe attacks
attacks on on Soviet
Soviet
airbases and ground support organizations led to a general collapse of the Russian
airbases and ground support organizations led to a general collapse of the Russian
air
air force's
force's abilityability to to control
control its its units
units.. Desperate
Desperate appeals,
appeals, radioed
radioed in in clear
clear text
text from
from
air units to higher headquarters, gave the impression of a thoroughly
air units to higher headquarters, gave the impression of a thoroughly chaotic
chaotic
situation
situation.*" . 8° Milch
Milch recorded
recorded in in his
his diary
diary thethe destruction
destruction of of 1,800
1,800 Soviet
Soviet aircraft
aircraft on on
the fast day, followed by 800 on June 23, 557 on the 24th, 351 on the 25th, and 300
the first day, followed by 800 on June 23, 557 on the 24th, 351 on the 25th, and 300
on the
on the 26th."
26th." Whether,Whether, in in fact,
fact, the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had managed
managed to to destroy
destroy that that many
many
aircraft is beside the point; a defeat of immense proportion had overtaken the Red
aircraft is beside the point; a defeat of immense proportion had overtaken the Red
Air Force--a catastrophe overshadowed only by events on the ground .
Air Force—a catastrophe overshadowed only by events on the ground.
On
On thethe mainmain battlefronts,
battlefronts, aided aided by by Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe close close air
air support
support and and interdiction
interdiction
missions,
missions, German German armies armies surged
surged forward
forward against
against aa collapsing
collapsing opponent
opponent.. WithinWithin
four days,
four days, Manstein's
Manstein's panzer panzer corpscorps hadhad advanced
advanced nearlynearly 200200 miles
miles to to the
the Dvina
Dvina
River; and
River; and by by the
the end
end ofof the
the month,
month, thethe entire
entire Russian
Russian position
position in in the
the Baltic
Baltic region
region
was
was in in shreds
shreds.. The The greatest
greatest disaster
disaster occurred,
occurred, however,
however, on on the
the central
central front
front in in an
an
enormous
enormous double double envelopment
envelopment around around thethe cities
cities ofof Bialystok
Bialystok and and Minsk.
Minsk. When When the the
armored pincers
armored pincers of of Panzer
Panzer GroupsGroups 22 and and 33 met met behind
behind Minsk,
Minsk, they they inclosed
inclosed
elements from
elements from four Soviet armies
four Soviet armies.. By By thethe time
time that
that mopping-up
mopping-up operationsoperations had had
finished
finished on on JulyJuly 9, 9, the
the Germans
Germans had had claimed
claimed 287,704
287,704 prisoners
prisoners and and destruction
destruction of of
2,585 tanks
2,585 tanks.'^ ." Probably
Probably another
another quarter
quarter ofof aa million
million Soviet
Soviet soldiers
soldiers had had died
died or or been
been
wounded in
wounded in operations
operations leadingleading up up toto this
this final
final collapse
collapse.. The The German
German drive, drive,
however,
however, did did not remain stationary
not remain stationary.. As As the
the infantry
infantry hurried
hurried forward
forward to to encompass
encompass
and
and destroy
destroy the the pocket, mechanized forces
pocket, mechanized forces fromfrom Panzer
Panzer Groups
Groups 22 and and 33 swung
swung out out
again
again to to meet
meet on on July
July 19 19 atat Smolensk
Smolensk to to complete
complete another
another envelopment
envelopment of of Soviet
Soviet
forces.
forces. By By the the time
time that
that they
they hadhad reduced
reduced the the Smolensk
Smolensk pocket,
pocket, the the Germans
Germans had had
captured
captured aa furtherfurther 100,000
100,000 prisoners,
prisoners, 2,000
2,000 tanks,
tanks, and
and 1,900
1,900 guns."
guns." OnlyOnly in in the
the
south
south did
did the the Germans
Germans fail fail to
to gain
gain aa significant
significant success
success.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, even even there
there
Army
Army Group
Group South South closed
closed up up onon Kiev
Kiev andand waswas breaking
breaking intointo the
the big
big bend
bend of of the
the
Dneper
Dneper River.
River. On On July
July 3, Halder noted
3, Haider noted optimistically:
optimistically:
On
On thethe whole,
whole, oneone can
can already
already say
say that
that the
the task
task of
of destroying
destroying the the
mass
mass of of the Russian army
the Russian army in
in front
front of
of the
the Dvina
Dvina and
and Dneper
Dneper has has been
been
fulfilled
iiilfilled.. II believe
believe the
the assertion
assertion of-
of aa captured
captured Russian
Russian general
general toto be
be
correct
correct that
that we we can
can calculate
calculate on
on meeting
meeting east
east of
of the
the Dvina
Dvina andand
Dneper
Dneper only only disjointed
disjointed forces
forces which
which alone
alone dodo not
not possess
possess thethe
strength
strength to to hinder
hinder German
German operations
operations substantially
substantially.. It
It is,
is, therefore,
therefore,
truly
truly not
not claiming
claiming too
too much
much when
when II assert
assert that
that the
the campaign
campaign
against
against Russia
Russia hashas been
been won
won inin fourteen
fourteen days
days.. Naturally,
Naturally, itit is
is not
not
yet
yet ended
ended.. The The extent
extent of
of the
the theater
theater and
and the
the tenacity
tenacity ofof resistance
resistance
that
that will
will be be conducted
conducted with
with every
every means
means will
will still
still claim
claim many
many
weeks
weeks.**.s°

Yet,
Yet, the
the advance
advance to Smolensk stretched
to Smolensk supply lines
stretched supply lines to
to the
the breaking
breaking point
point.. As
As the
the
Smolensk cauldron died down at the end of July, the Germans found it almost
Smolensk cauldron died down at the end of July, the Germans found it almost

82
82
THE
THE TURN
TURN TO
TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

impossible
impossible to to supply
supply their
their forward
forward spearheads
spearheads.. TheThe distance
distance to to the
the railheads,
railheads, the the
movement
movement of of infantry
infantry to to support
support the the mechanized
mechanized forces,forces, andand the
the exhaustion
exhaustion of of the
the
motorized supply system
motorized supply system created
created aa logistical
logistical nightmare
nightmare.. Further
Further complicating
complicating the the
serious
serious supply
supply situation
situation were
were Soviet
Soviet attacks
attacks launched
launched from from within
within and and without
without thethe
Smolensk
Smolensk pocket
pocket to to break
break through
through the the German
German encirclement
encirclement.. The The intensive
intensive fighting
fighting
made
made heavy
heavy demands
demands on on ammunition
ammunition stocks stocks of
of divisions
divisions in in the
the forward
forward lines
lines soso that
that
the
the transportation
transportation system
system had had to to bring
bring upup ammunition,
ammunition, and and thusthus there
there was was nono
opportunity
opportunity to to stockpile
stockpile fuel
fuel for
for the
the next
next advance
advance.*' .gs By
By July
July 23,
23, Halder
Haider admitted
admitted
that
that the
the existing
existing situation
situation where
where frontline
frontline units
units were
were living
living aa "hand-to-mouth"
"hand-to-mouth"
existence
existence in in terms
terms ofof their
their supplies
supplies waswas making
making itit impossible
impossible to to build
build up
up stockpiles
stockpiles
for
for the
the next
next push.
push.'*86 Thus,
Thus, the the infamous
infamous August
August pausepause during
during which
which thethe German
German
army
army remained
remained virtually
virtually stationary
stationary at at Smolensk
Smolensk and and in in the
the north
north resulted
resulted not
not only
only
from
from disagreements
disagreements within
within thethe high
high command
command as as to the next
to the next objective
objective and and the
the need
need
to
to refresh
refresh exhausted
exhausted mechanized
mechanized units units but
but also
also from
from aa logistical
logistical system
system that
that could
could
barely
barely supply
supply frontline
frontline forces,
forces, much
much less
less build
build upup reserves
reserves." ."
The
The demands
demands placed
placed on on the
the frontline
frontline units
units reflected
reflected the the grievous
grievous underestimation
underestimation
that
that the
the Germans
Germans had had made
made of Russian strength.
of Russian strength. Often
Often badly
badly ledled and
and consisting
consisting of of
ill-equipped
ill-equipped and and ill-trained
ill-trained troops,
troops, Russian
Russian counterattacks
counterattacks strained strained thethe entire
entire
German
German structure
structure.. Halder
Haider admitted
admitted on on August
August 11 11 that:
that:

[The]
[The] whole
whole situation
situation shows
shows more
more and
and more
more clearly
clearly that
that wewe have
have
underestimated
underestimated the the colossus
colossus of of Russia-a
Russia—a Russia
Russia that that had
had
consciously
consciously prepared
prepared for for the
the coming
coming war war with
with the the whole
whole
unrestrained
unrestrained power
power of of which
which aa totalitarian
totalitarian state
state is
is capable
capable.. This
This
conclusion
conclusion is is shown
shown both both onon the
the organization
organization as as well
well as as the
the
economic
economic levels,
levels, inin the
the transportation,
transportation, andand above
above all, all, clearly
clearly in
in
infantry
infantry divisions
divisions.. We
We have
have already
already identified
identified 360
360.. These
These divisions
divisions
are
are admittedly
admittedly notnot armed
armed andand equipped
equipped inin our
our sense,
sense, and and tactically
tactically
they
they are
are badly
badly led
led.. But
But they
they are
are there
there;; and
and when
when we we destroy
destroy aa
dozen,
dozen, the
the Russians
Russians simply
simply establish
establish another
another dozen . 88
dozen.'*

These
These Soviet
Soviet attacks
attacks on on Army
Army Group
Group Center
Center failed
failed to to gain
gain any
any appreciable
appreciable
tactical
tactical success
success and and clearly
clearly expended
expended an an immense
immense number
number of of Russian
Russian lives.
lives. Yet,
Yet, in
in
the
the long
long run,
run, they
they had
had anan important
important strategic
strategic impact.
impact. The
The wear-and-tear
wear-and-tear on on German
German
units,
units, attacked
attacked in in the
the Yel'nya
Yel'nya and and Smolensk
Smolensk battles,
battles, waswas perhaps
perhaps of of greater
greater
importance
importance than than any
any tactical
tactical victory
victory Soviet
Soviet forces
forces might
might have
have gained
gained.. The
The battle
battle of
of
attrition
attrition had
had begun
begun with
with aa terrible
terrible vengeance
vengeance.. Having
Having advanced
advanced as as far
far as
as they
they had
had in
in
the
the entire
entire French
French campaign,
campaign, the the Germans
Germans discovered
discovered thethe geographical
geographical difference
difference
between
between continental
continental distances
distances and and those
those inin Central
Central Europe
Europe.. TheThe Russians
Russians possessed
possessed
strategic depth; and even if they had not fully utilized it in the first months, itit was
Strategic depth; and even if they had not fully utilized it in the first months, was an
an
inevitable strategic advantage .
inevitable strategic advantage.
For
For the
the Luftwaffe, these same
Luftwaffe, these same factors
factors were
were operative
operative.. The deeper that
The deeper that flying
flying units
units
moved into Russia, the more precarious became their supply situation . By mid-
moved into Russia, the more precarious became their supply situation. By mid-
July,
July, air units were
air units were crying
crying for for fuel and ammunition;
fuel and ammunition; and and within
within the jumble moving
the jumble moving
forward to support the spearheads, the Luftwaffe's logistical system
forward to support the spearheads, the Luftwaffe's logistical system functioned
functioned no
no
more efficiently
more efficiently than that of
than that of the army. Fliegerkorps
the army. Fliegerkorps VIII
VIII reported
reported as early as July 55
as early as July
that fuel was
that fuel was lacking
lacking eveneven though
though the the corps
corps had
had already limited its
already limited its missions
missions..

8833
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

Laconically,
Laconically, RichthofenRichthofen noted: noted: "Supply
"Supply is is for
for usus the the greatest
greatest difficulty
difficulty in in this
this
war.""
war."*' The The funnel-shaped
funnel-shaped nature nature of of the
the theater
theater alsoalso operated against the
operated against the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe..
As the Wehrmacht
As the Wehrmacht moved moved deeperdeeper into into Russia,
Russia, the the front
front widened.
widened. As As aa result,
result, the the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had to to cover
cover greater
greater distances
distances with with forces
forces that that weakened
weakened as as losses
losses
mounted
mounted.. Moreover,Moreover, as as thethe armyarmy spreadspread out, out, the the tendency
tendency became became more more
pronounced
pronounced to to use
use airair units
units as as fire
fire brigades
brigades to to patch
patch up up frontline
frontline difficulties
difficulties.. Air Air
force
force commanders
commanders were were not not necessarily
necessarily happy happy with with such such aa state
state ofof affairs
affairs but but often
often
had
had nono choice
choice otherother than
than to to use
use their
their air
air resources
resources to to support
support the the army
army ..'^ 9° This
This should
should
not
not suggest
suggest that the Luftwaffe
that the Luftwaffe involved
involved itself itself solely
solely in in aiding
aiding ground
ground forces forces.. In In late
late
July
July with
with the the seizure
seizure of of bases
bases near near Smolensk,
Smolensk, itit launched launched major major raidsraids against
against the the
Russian
Russian capitalcapital." .9' Richthofen, Commander of
Richthofen, Commander of Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps VIII,
VIII, expected
expected
great
great results
results from from these attacks and
these attacks and noted
noted hopefully
hopefully on on July
July 1313 that
that thethe first
first massed
massed
attack (erster
attack (erster grosser
grosser Angri)
Angriff) on Moscow "could
on Moscow "could cause cause aa catastrophe
catastrophe.. All All the the
experts
experts calculate
calculate that that aa famine
famine existsexists in in thethe 44 million
million population
population of of the
the capital
capital."'^." 91
When
When transferred
transferred to to the
the north
north in in August,
August, Richthofen
Richthofen ordered ordered aa firebomb
firebomb attack attack on on
Leningrad; the next day, he
Leningrad; the next day, he noted
noted that
that two
two small
small and
and one
one large
large conflagrations,
conflagrations, 1 .5
1.5
kilometers wide, burned in the city's center
kilometers wide, burned in the city's center with
with smoke
smoke clouds
clouds reaching
reaching great
great
height
height." .9' Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, for for the most part,
the most part, the the demands
demands and and tempotempo of of ground
ground
operations kept the Luftwaffe sufficiently occupied to preclude
operations kept the Luftwaffe sufficiently occupied to preclude significant
significant aerial
aerial
attempts at city busting .
attempts at city busting.
The
The air air losses
losses suffered
suffered by by Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps VIII VIII in in twelve
twelve days days (August
(August 10 10 toto 21)21)
while
while supporting
supporting II Army Army Corps Corps in in its
its effort
effort to to cut
cut the the main
main Moscow-Leningrad
Moscow-Leningrad
railroad
railroad dramatizes
dramatizes the the impact
impact of of attrition
attrition on on Lufttivaffe
Luftwaffe strengthstrength.. In In this
this period
period
supporting
supporting the the advance
advance of of one
one army corps, Fliegerkorps
army corps, Fliegerkorps VIII VIII lost
lost 10 10.3.3 percent of
percent of itsits
aircraft
aircraft (destroyed
(destroyed or or written
written off off asas the
the result
result of of operations),
operations), with with 54 54.5 .5 percent of its
percent of its
aircraft damaged but reparable . During this action, the air corps had 3 .9 percent of
aircraft damaged but reparable. During this action, the air corps had 3.9 percent of
its
its flying
flying personnel
personnel killed, killed, 55.7 .7 percent wounded, and 2.9 percent listed as missing
percent wounded, and 2.9 percent listed as missing
for
for aa 12
12.5.5 percent
percent total total casualty
casualty rate .94
rate.'''
Aiding the Luftwaffe in its support of
Aiding the Luftwaffe in its support of the
the army's
army's advanceadvance was was thethe flexible
flexible supply
supply
and
and maintenance
maintenance system system already
already discussed
discussed in in relation
relation to to the
the French
French campaign
campaign.. Units Units
moved
moved forwardforward rapidly rapidly behind
behind advancing
advancing spearheads spearheads;; and and as as thethe campaign's
campaign's
emphasis
emphasis shiftedshifted from from oneone front
front to to another,
another, bomber bomber and and fighter
fighter units
units moved
moved swiftly
swiftly
to
to new
new bases
bases and and areas
areas of of operation.
operation. Such Such flexibility
flexibility allowedallowed the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to give
give
maximum
maximum support support to the armored drives and helped the army push ever deeper into
to the armored drives and helped the army push ever deeper into
Russian
Russian territory
territory.'^ .95 Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the continual
continual movement movement of of units
units across
across the the
Russian
Russian landscape
landscape was was not
not without
without cost cost.. These
These shifts
shifts strained
strained thethe maintenance
maintenance and and
supply
supply system
system to to the
the breaking
breaking point point so so that
that by by late
late fall
fall 1941,
1941, operational
operational aircraftaircraft
ready
ready rates
rates werewere way way down,
down, thereby
thereby havinghaving aa negative
negative impact impact on on thethe whole
whole forceforce
structure.
structure.
After
After considerable
considerable argument argument betweenbetween Hitler Hitler and and his his generals
generals and and after
after aa modicum
modicum
of
of resupply
resupply had occurred, forward
had occurred, forward movement
movement began began again again at the end
at the end of of August
August.. In In
the north,
the north. Field Marshal Ritter
Field Marshal Ritter von von Leeb's forces, supported
Leeb's forces, supported by by mechanized
mechanized units units
detached from
detached from the the central
central front,
front, drove
drove to to thethe suburbs
suburbs of Leningrad and
of Leningrad and isolated
isolated thatthat
city except
city except for a for a tenuous
tenuous link
link across
across Lake
Lake Ladoga
Ladoga. . Hitler
Hitler forbade
forbade Leeb
Leeb from
from taking
taking

884
4
THE
THE TURN
TURN TO
TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

the
the city
city and
and ordered
ordered himhim toto starve
starve itit into submission.. By
into submission By the
the end
end ofof the
the winter,
winter, 11
million civilians within Leningrad had died of famine .96
million civilians within Leningrad had died of famine.'* In
In the
the south,
south, aa more
more
immediate disaster threatened the Russians . Thanks largely to Stalin's military
immediate disaster threatened the Russians. Thanks largely to Stalin's military
ineptitude,
ineptitude, Guderian's
Guderian's Panzer
Panzer Group
Group 22 broke
broke loose
loose from
from the
the central
central front and drove
front and drove
almost
almost straight
straight south
south toto link up with
link up with General
General Ewald
Ewald vonvon Kleist's
Kleist's Panzer
Panzer Group
Group 11.''
. 97
Behind
Behind the encompassing arms
the encompassing arms ofof the
the panzer
panzer armies
armies lay
lay aa vast
vast pocket
pocket of of Soviet
Soviet
troops
troops around
around Kiev.
Kiev. By By the
the time that cleanup
time that cleanup operations
operations had
had ended,
ended, thethe Germans
Germans
claimed
claimed to to have
have taken
taken 655,000
655,000 prisoners
prisoners.. The
The Soviets asserted after
Soviets asserted the war
after the war that
that
only
only 677,000
677,000 Russian
Russian soldiers
soldiers had
had been
been inin the
the region at the
region at the end
end ofof August
August and and that
that
150,000
150,000 managed
managed to to escape
escape before
before resistance
resistance collapsed
collapsed.'*.98 The
The figures
figures are
are
meaningless;; they
meaningless they can
can only
only symbolize
symbolize aa human
human tragedy
tragedy of of unimaginable
unimaginable extent extent..
What
What isis clear
clear is
is that
that the
the Germans
Germans had had torn
torn to
to ribbons
ribbons the
the entire
entire southern
southern theater
theater ofof
operations
operations;; German troops could
German troops could nownow move
move forward
forward as as fast
fast asas their
their vehicles,
vehicles,
supplies,
supplies, and weather conditions
and weather conditions would
would permit.
permit.

THE
THE INVASION
INVASION OF
OF RUSSIA
RUSSIA

BORDER
BORDER 22
22 JUNE
JUNE 1941
1941
DIRECTION OF GERMAN
DIRECTION OF GERMAN
THRUSTS
THRUSTS
JULY
JULY 99.. 1941
1941
. SEP
SEP.. 30,
30. 1941
1941
. . , . . , DEC
DEC.. 55.. 1941
1941
IS MAJOR
MAJOR ENCIRCLEMENT
ENCIRCLEMENT BATTLES
BATTLES

85
85
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

The catalogue
The catalogue of of Russian disasters was
Russian disasters was notnot yetyet complete
complete.. Satisfied Satisfied that that his
his
decision
decision to to divert
divert strength
strength from from Army Army Group Group Center
Center to to thethe army
army groups groups on on the
the
wings
wings had had paidpaid dividends,
dividends, Hitler Hitier returned
returned to to the
the strategy
strategy his his generals
generals had had urged
urged in in
August
August:: aa greatgreat offensive
offensive aimed aimed at at destroying
destroying RussianRussian armies
armies lyinglying in in the
the center
center andand
at
at capturing
capturing Moscow Moscow.. The The operation's
operation's code code name
name waswas "Typhoon
"Typhoon." ." Setting
Setting the the tone
tone
for
for the
the coming
coming weeks, weeks, HitlerHitler issued
issued aa proclamation
proclamation demandingdemanding that that attacking
attacking troops
troops
complete
complete the the work
work of of the
the campaign
campaign and and endend twenty-five
twenty-five years years of of Bolshevism
Bolshevism in in
Russia-a system
Russia—a system of
of rule
rule equalled
equalled only
only by
by capitalistic
capitalistic plutocracy
plutocracy. . ("The
("The support
support of
of
these systems is
these systems is also
also the the same
same in in both
both cases
cases:: thethe Jew
Jew and and only only the the Jew.
Jew.")^") 9
German armored strength concentrated again on the central front, and
German armored strength concentrated again on the central front, and again
again the
the
Soviets allowed wishes
Soviets allowed wishes to
to delude
delude their
their view
view of
of reality
reality. . The
The German
German halt
halt in
in the
the
center
center after
after July,
July, the the diversion
diversion of of armored
armored forces forces to to the
the north
north and and south,
south, as as well
well as as
the lateness of the season persuaded the Russians that they need not
the lateness of the season persuaded the Russians that they need not worry
worry about
about an
an
offensive
offensive against
against MoscowMoscow.. However,
However, Guderian'sGuderian's Panzer Panzer GroupGroup 22 hustled hustled up up from
from
the
the Ukraine
Ukraine.. On On September
September 30, 30, two
two days days before
before the the other
other armies,
armies, Guderian
Guderian began began
his drive towards Orel. On October 2, the other German armies attacked, supported
his drive towards Orel. On October 2, the other German armies attacked, supported
by
by 1,387
1,387 aircraft
aircraft.'"".'°° The
The offensive
offensive caught caught the the RedRed ArmyArmy unaware
unaware;; two two panzer
panzer
armies blasted through the forward positions and moved swiftly to exploit the
armies blasted through the forward positions and moved swiftly to exploit the
breakthrough . On October 3, German tanks, surprising Russian defenses and
breakthrough. On October 3, German tanks, surprising Russian defenses and
passing
passing tramstrams that that werewere still operating, drove
still operating, drove into Orel.. So
into Orel So fast
fast had had thethe Germans
Germans
moved that the Russians could not even begin evacuation of that town's industrial
moved that the Russians could not even begin evacuation of that town's industrial
plant.
plant. By By October
October 6, 6, Bryansk
Bryansk had had fallen,
fallen, and and Russian
Russian command
command and and control
control overover
the entire central front collapsed . 101
the entire central front collapsed.""
The
The advance
advance came came so so swiftly
swiftly and and thethe collapse
collapse so so suddenly
suddenly that that Moscow
Moscow receivedreceived
its
its first
first indications
indications of of disaster
disaster through
through Hitler's
Hitler's speech
speech on on October
October 55 that that spoke
spoke of of aa
"final
"final decisive
decisive offensive
offensive." ." The
The Russians
Russians had had no
no specific
specific knowledge
knowledge of of what
what Hitler
Hitler
was
was speaking
speaking except except for for the
the fact
fact that
that communications
communications no no longer
longer existedexisted with with the
the
Western
Western Army Army Group Group.'"^ . 101 On
On October
October 5, 5, Russian
Russian reconnaissance
reconnaissance pilots pilots reported
reported aa
German
German armoredarmored column column some some 25 25 kilometers
kilometers long long advancing
advancing on on the the great
great highway
highway
from
from Smolensk
Smolensk to to Moscow
Moscow.. Despite Despite efforts
efforts by by the
the NKVD
NKVD (Soviet(Soviet Secret Secret Police)
Police) to to
arrest
arrest the pilots as
the pilots as "panic
"panic mongers,"
mongers," their their reports
reports gavegave Moscow
Moscow its its first
first indication
indication
of
of the
the extent
extent of of the
the collapse
collapse.. 101 '"^ The
The Germans
Germans had had ripped
ripped openopen Soviet
Soviet frontlines
frontlines from from
Bryansk
Bryansk to to Vyazma
Vyazma and and werewere encircling
encircling two two vast
vast groupings
groupings of of Russian
Russian armies armies:: thethe
first
first of of three
three armies
armies around around BryanskBryansk and and thethe second
second of of five
five armies
armies aroundaround
Vyazma
Vyazma.. Officially,
Officially, the the Germans
Germans claimed claimed 658,000
658,000 prisoners
prisoners in in thethe double
double
encirclements
encirclements.'*' . 104 Again,
Again, the the totals
totals areare meaningless
meaningless.. One One can can only
only note note that
that for
for the
the
second
second time time within
within aa little
little over
over aa month,
month, an an immense
immense disaster
disaster had had overtaken
overtaken the the Red
Red
Army
Army.. So So great
great was was thethe booty
booty in in prisoners
prisoners and and materiel
materiel thatthat thethe Reich's
Reich's press press chief,
chief,
at
at the
the instigation
instigation of of Hitler
Hitler and and Goebbels,
Goebbels, announced
announced that that thethe Soviet
Soviet Union Union was was
finished
finished and and thethe war
war virtually
virtually over. 101
over. '"^
Despite
Despite these these catastrophes,
catastrophes, the situation was
the situation was by by no no means
means hopelesshopeless.. The The
Germans
Germans had had begun "Typhoon" with-a
begun "Typhoon" with a minimum
minimum of of supplies
supplies.'* . 10, Even
Even moremore telling
telling
was
was thethe onset
onset of of poor
poor weather
weather in in the
the fall;
fall; the German advance
the German advance slowed slowed to to aa crawl
crawl in in
the last half of October, while
the last half of October, while Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe support
support almost
almost ceased.
ceased. Flying
Flying off
off primitive
primitive

86
86
THE
THE TURN
TURN TO
TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

dirt
dirt strips
Strips located
located at at the
the end
end of of long supply lines,
long supply lines, air air units
units found
found itit as as difficult
difficult to to
provide
provide the the army
army with close air
with close air support
support as as thethe army
army foundfound itit to advance.. From
to advance From aa
level
level ofof over
over 1,000
1,000 sorties
sorties per per dayday before
before the onset of
the onset of bad
bad weather,
weather, the the sortie
sortie raterate
fell to 559 on October 8
fell to 559 on October 8 and
and to
to 269
269 on
on the
the 9th.107
9th."''
The
The threat
threat to to Moscow
Moscow persuaded
persuaded Stalin Stalin to bring Marshal
to bring Marshal Georgi Georgi ZhukovZhukov from from
Leningrad to defend the capital. With a firm hand
Leningrad to defend the capital. With a firm hand in
in control,
control, the
the Soviets
Soviets reknit
reknit their
their
defenses with surprising swiftness as the enemy
defenses with surprising swiftness as the enemy advance
advance bogged
bogged down
down in
in autumn
autumn
mud.
mud. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the onset
onset of of bad
bad weather
weather should should not not obscure
obscure the the fact
fact that
that there
there
was nothing unusual about such weather; if anything, the period of mud lasted for
was nothing unusual about such weather; if anything, the period of mud lasted for aa
shorter period than usual. 101 In retrospect, the Germans should have shut down the
shorter period than usual.'"* In retrospect, the Germans should have shut down the
campaign after the victory of Bryansk/Vyazma . The supply situation had become so
campaign after the victory of Bryansk/Vyazma. The supply situation had become so
difficult that barely enough resupply got through to keep the advance moving .
difficult that barely enough resupply got through to keep the advance moving.
Consequently,
Consequently, there there waswas no no leeway
leeway to to build
build up up reserves
reserves or or toto send
send forward
forward the the
critical winter clothing and equipment that the troops would desperately need when
critical winter clothing and equipment that the troops would desperately need when
winter
winter struck
struck."" . 109 The
The offensive
offensive continued.
continued. The The German
German high high command,
command, in in the
the face
face
of steadily worsening weather, turned reality upside down . It would push the last
of steadily worsening weather, turned reality upside down. It would push the last
battalion of reserves into the front . Unlike the Marne campaign of World War 1,
battalion of reserves into the front. Unlike the Mame campaign of World War I,
German generals assured themselves, this time they would not withdraw . "° While
German generals assured themselves, this time they would not withdraw."" While
those
those at at Army
Army Group Group Center
Center and and inin thethe fieldfield were
were too too close
close to to conditions
conditions to to
underestimate the difficulties of future operations, Hitler and the OKH planned
underestimate the difficulties of future operations. Hitler and the OKH planned
wide
wide ranging
ranging operations
operations deep deep behind
behind Moscow
Moscow for for which
which neither
neither troops
troops nor nor supplies
supplies
existed . This undoubtedly resulted from a poor appreciation for condition in
existed. This undoubtedly resulted from a poor appreciation for condition in thethe
held that, in turn, led to a general overconfidence as to the capabilities of German
field that, in turn, led to a general overconfidence as to the capabilities of German
forces and
forces and aa complete
complete underestimation
underestimation of of Russian
Russian forces forces.'''. "' For
For the
the frontline
frontline troops
troops
advancing
advancing under under dreadful
dreadful conditions,
conditions. Hitler'sHitler's overconfidence
overconfidence showed showed itself itself not not
only in
only in impossible
impossible demands demands but but with
with thethe mid-November
mid-November withdrawal withdrawal of of much
much of of
Luftflotte
Luftflotte 22 for for service
service in in thethe Mediterranean
Mediterranean.. Thus, Thus, supportsupport for for the
the drive
drive on on
Moscow
Moscow almost almost entirely
entirely devolved
devolved on on thethe shoulders
shoulders of Richthofen's Fliegerkorps
of Richthofen's Fliegerkorps
VIII
VIII.. 112
"2
At
At the
the beginning
beginning of of November,
November, the the arrival
arrival of of cold
cold weather
weather brought
brought an an end
end to to the
the
mud,
mud, and and the
the advance
advance began again. By
began again. By now,now, however,
however, under under Zhukov's
Zhukov's inspiring
inspiring
(and
(and ferocious)
ferocious) leadership,
leadership, the the Russians
Russians had had recovered.
recovered. Militia Militia units,
units, divisions
divisions
pulled
pulled from from quiet
quiet segments
segments of of thethe front,
front, and and Siberian
Siberian reinforcements
reinforcements trundled trundled
through
through MoscowMoscow in in aa desperate
desperate effort effort to to keep
keep the the Germans
Germans at at bay
bay outside
outside the the
capital.
capital. The The clawing
clawing resistance
resistance bought bought precious
precious time time until
until full
full winter
winter conditions
conditions set set
in,
in, thus
thus weakening
weakening German German strength
strength further.
further. By By thethe beginning
beginning of of December,
December, the the
Germans
Germans had had reached
reached Moscow's
Moscow's suburbs; suburbs; that that waswas as as far
far as
as they
they got.
got. On On December
December
5,
5, Zhukov
Zhukov counterattacked,
counterattacked, and and in in appalling
appalling winter winter weather
weather the the entire
entire German
German front front
threatened
threatened to to come
come apart.
apart.
The Luftwaffe
The Luftwaffe played played aa decreasingly
decreasingly important important role role as as the
the Battle
Battle of of Moscow
Moscow
approached . Conversely, the
approached. Conversely, the Red
Red Air
Air Force,
Force, once
once thought
thought destroyed,
destroyed, mounted
mounted
increasingly
increasingly effective
effective attacks supporting the
attacks supporting the Moscow
Moscow defenders
defenders.. A A primary
primary reasonreason
was that the fighting on the eastern front had
was that the fighting on the eastern front had brought
brought the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to
to desperate
desperate
straits. Operational
straits. Operational ready ready rates
rates for combat aircraft
for combat aircraft throughout
throughout the the force
force structure
structure
sank towards dangerous levels ; and in conditions
sank towards dangerous levels; and in conditions of
of mud,
mud, bad
bad weather,
weather, and
and
8877
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

increasing
increasing cold cold (not
(not to to mention
mention the the difficulties
difficulties in in supply),
supply), maintenance
maintenance personnelpersonnel
found
found itit almost
almost impossible
impossible to to maintain
maintain aircraft
aircraft.. By By the
the beginning
beginning of of October,
October, the the
in-commission
in-commission rate rate for
for thethe Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's bomber bomber force force hadhad sunk
sunk below
below 40 40 percent,
percent,
while only 58
while only 58 percent
percent of of single-engine
single-engine fighters fighters were were inin commission
commission.. The The rate
rate for
for all
all
aircraft hovered near 53 percent . Further complicating the Luftwaffe's problem of
aircraft hovered near 53 percent.' "3'^ Further complicating the Luftwaffe's problem of
flying missions at the end of tenuous supply lines was the fact that its aircraft were
flying missions at the end of tenuous supply lines was the fact that its aircraft were
flying
flying offoff primitive
primitive dirtdirt strips,
strips, while
while the the Red
Red Air Air Force
Force waswas using
using moremore permanent
permanent
facilities in the vicinity of Moscow .
facilities in the vicinity of Moscow.
Hitler's gamble
Hitler's gamble to to conquer
conquer RussiaRussia in in one
one summer
summer had had failed
failed.. Germany
Germany now now faced
faced
immense commitments in the east with an army and air force that through attrition
immense commitments in the east with an army and air force that through attrition
during
during the the summer
summer and and fallfall had
had lost
lost their
their cutting
cutting edge.
edge. In In fact,
fact, itit was
was onlyonly atat this
this
point
point that
that thethe Germans,
Germans, faced faced withwith the the possibility
possibility of of massive
massive defeatdefeat in in Russia,
Russia,
began
began to to mobilize
mobilize their their economy
economy and and the the national
national economies
economies of of their
their already
already
subjugated foes
subjugated for the
foes for the long
long pull
pull..
To
To addadd to to his
his difficulties
difficulties in in the east. Hitler
the east, Hitler gratuitously
gratuitously declared
declared war war onon the
the
United
United States after the
States after the Japanese
Japanese had had destroyed
destroyed the the American
American battle battle fleet
fleet at
at Pearl
Pearl
Harbor.
Harbor. In In doing
doing this,
this, he he made
made it it virtually
virtually certain
certain that
that American
American resourcesresources and and
military
military power
power would appear in
would appear in Europe
Europe at at the
the earliest
earliest possible
possible hourhour and and would
would addadd
to
to Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht requirements
requirements in in Russia,
Russia, in the Mediterranean,
in the Mediterranean, and and in in the
the west.
west. Why
Why
Hitler
Hitier extended
extended GermanGerman strategic responsibilities at
strategic responsibilities at the
the desperate
desperate hour hour when
when hishis
forces
forces in in front
front ofof Moscow
Moscow were were collapsing
collapsing is is hard
hard toto fathom
fathom.. It It seems
seems most most likely,
likely,
as
as isis so
so often
often the
the case
case in in human
human affairs,
affairs, thatthat Hitler's
Hitler's decision
decision was was an an instinctive,
instinctive,
illogical
illogical reaction
reaction to to aa desperate
desperate situation
situation."" . 114 With
With events
events in in Russia
Russia slipping
slipping beyond
beyond
his
his control,
control, America
America offeredoffered Hitler
Hitler aa psychological
psychological object object at at which
which to to strike
strike..
Undoubtedly
Undoubtedly contributing
contributing to to Hitler's
Hitler's mood mood was was aa sense
sense ofof frustration
frustration that that he
he had
had felt
felt
over
over thethe summer
summer and and fallfall of
of 1941
1941 as as the
the US US Navy
Navy increasingly
increasingly intervened
intervened in in the
the
Battle
Battle of of the
the Atlantic.
Atlantic. Now Now in in December
December 1941, 1941, thethe United
United States,
States, humiliated
humiliated at at
Pearl
Pearl Harbor,
Harbor, presented
presented an an inviting
inviting and and vulnerable
vulnerable target target for
for his
his navy's
navy's submarine
submarine
force.
force. TheThe declaration
declaration of of war
war on on December
December 10, 10, however,
however, allowedallowed the the Roosevelt
Roosevelt
administration
administration to to present
present America's
America's entry entry into into the
the war
war in in aa wider
wider context
context than
than
merely
merely the the surprise
surprise attack
attack on on Pearl
Pearl Harbor,
Harbor, somewhat
somewhat diverting
diverting the the public's
public's clamor
clamor
for
for revenge
revenge against
against Japan.
Japan. Thus,Thus, itit waswas Hitler's
Hitler's actions
actions thatthat provided
provided the the political
political
basis
basis for
for Roosevelt's
Roosevelt's decision
decision to to support
support aa "Germany
"Germany first" first" strategy.
strategy.

PRODUCTION AND STRATEGY,


PRODUCTION AND STRATEGY, 1940-41
1940-41
Between
Between July
July 1940
1940 andand December
December 1941, 1941, the
the Germans
Germans lost lost the
the air
air war
war over
over
Europe for
Europe for 1943
1943 and
and 1944.
1944. Ignoring
Ignoring the
the severe
severe attrition
attrition that
that had
had occurred
occurred even
even in
in
the Battle
the Battle of
of France,
France, they
they paid
paid little
little attention
attention to
to the
the fact
fact that
that their
their aircraft
aircraft industry
industry
had
had changed
changed neither
neither itsits approach
approach nor
nor its
its production
production rate
rate substantially
substantially from
from what
what itit
had
had been
been during
during the the opening
opening months
months of of the
the war.
war. The
The negative
negative impact
impact of of this
this
situation
situation needs
needs no no great
great elaboration
elaboration considering
considering thethe fact
fact that
that aircraft
aircraft loss
loss and
and
replacement rates for 1941 were approximately equal . The impact of aircraft and
replacement rates for 1941 were approximately equal. The impact of aircraft and
crew losses on the Luftwaffe's force structure, the strain of sustained operations on
crew losses on the Luftwaffe's force structure, the strain of sustained operations on

98
THE
THE TURN
TURN TO
TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

the
the maintenance
maintenance and supply systems,
and supply systems, and
and the difficulties encountered
the difficulties encountered in in attempting
attempting
to escalate the
to escalate the Luftwaffe's involvement had
Luftwaffe'^ involvement had aa synergistic
synergistic effect that placed
effect that placed the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in in aa precarious
precarious situation
situation by
by the
the winter
winter ofof 1941-42
1941-42.. Moreover,
Moreover, these
these
interrelated
interrelated factors
factors largely determined the
largely determined the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's fate
fate in
in the
the upcoming
upcoming air air
battles
battles of
of 1943
1943 and
and 1944.
1944.
The
The greatest
greatest strain
strain onon the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe inin 1941 resulted from
1941 resulted from operations
operations conducted
conducted inin
the
the east
east beginning
beginning on on June
June 2222.. Unlike
Unlike the
the Battle
Battle of
of France
France or or the
the Battle
Battle of
of Britain,
Britain,
attrition
attrition in
in Russia
Russia involved
involved low low loss
loss rates
rates combined
combined with
with sustained
sustained operations
operations over
over
an
an extended
extended period
period.. TheThe cumulative
cumulative effect
effect of
of these
these small
small "acceptable"
"acceptable" losses
losses was
was
no
no less
less decisive
decisive in in its
its impact
impact than
than was
was the
the Battle
Battle of
of Britain.
Britain. Table
Table X1111
XIII'"11 gives
gives aa
detailed
detailed picture
picture ofof the
the cumulative
cumulative impact
impact ofof those
those losses
losses through
through thethe fall
fall of
of 1941
1941 onon
the eastern front
the eastern front..
TABLE
TABLE XIII
Xm

Crew and Aircraft


Crew and Aircraft Losses
Losses on
on the
the Eastern
Eastern Front-June
Front—June 22-November
22-November 1,
1, 1941
1941

Average
Average Average
Average Percent
Percent
Average
Average Monthly
Monthly Losses
Losses:: Average
Average Monthly
Monthly Loss
Loss:: Four-
Four-
Monthly
Monthly Damaged
Damaged Crew
Crew Crew
Crew Month
Month
Strength
Strength and
and Destroyed
Destroyed Percent
Percent Strength
Strength Losses
Losses Percent
Percent Period
Period
Close
Close Recce
Recce 323
323 92
92 28 .5
28.5 539
539 51
51 99.5
.5 38
38
Long-Range
Long-Range
Recce
Recce 238
238 54
54 22 .7
22.7 270
270 31
31 11 .5
11.5 46
46
Single-Engine
Single-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 661
661 240
240 36 .3
36.3 800
800 73
73 99.1
.1 36 .4
36.4
Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 77
77 22
22 28 .6
28.6 84
84 11
U 13
13.1.1 52 .4
52.4
Bombers
Bombers 836
836 268
268 32 .1
32.1 901
901 126
126 14
14 56
56
Stukas
Stukas 293
293 60
60 20 .5
20.5 345
345 24
24 77 28
28
Coastal
Coastal 34
34 55 14 .7
14.7 24
24 22 88.3
.3 33 .2
33.2
TOTAL
TOTAL IN IN EAST
EAST 2,462
2,462 741
741 30 .1
30.1 2,963
2,%3 318
318 10
10.7.7 42 .8
42.8

Yet,
Yet, the
the losses
losses inin Russia
Russia through
through November
November 1941
1941 only
only reflect
reflect aa part
part of
of the
the severe
severe
burden
burden that
that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe experienced
experienced in
in 1941
1941 (see
(see Tables
Tables XIV,'
XIV,"' XV, "' XVI,118
16 XV,"^ XVI,"«

and
and XVII' 19) . Due
XVir"). Due to
to the
the "Blitz"
"Blitz" against
against the
the British
British Isles
Isles in
in the
the winter
winter ofof 1941,
1941, the
the
Balkan
Balkan campaign,
campaign, and and air
air commitments
commitments in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean as as well
well asas
"Barbarossa,"
"Barbarossa," the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had
had gone
gone through
through its
its entire
entire inventory
inventory of of aircraft
aircraft in
in just
just
twelve
twelve months
months.. (See(See Table
Table XVIL)
XVII.)

89
TABLE XIV

GERMAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES


GERMAN AIRCRAFT LOSSES 1941 (ALL TYPES)
1941 (ALL TYPES)

BALKAN
BALKAN INVASION
INVASION OF
OF
CAMPAIGN
CAMPAIGN RUSSIA
RUSSIA
30%
30%

20%
20%
16 .1
16.1%

11.6%^ ^^
99.8%
.8% 88.8%
.8% 7.7%
7.7%
10% 77-5%
.5%
77.2%
.2% 7.1%
50.
6.5%1
41.9%
.9% . rte""
3.6%
2.6% _-.^

I I I X X X
JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUN
JUN JUL
JUL AUG
AUG SEP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV
NOV DEC
DEC
TABLE XV
TABLE XV

GERMAN BOMBER
BOIVIBER LOSSES
LOSSES 1941
1941

BALKAN
BALKAN INVASION
INVASION
CAMPAIGN
CAMPAIGN OF
OF RUSSIA
RUSSIA
30%
300/6

N
0
T
20%
20%
18 .4%
18.4% A
' V
A 15 .3%
15.3%
120/.
12% n.vif
12.2% / \ 1
L00
00

A
IA
103o
:
10.3%^^^
10% r
8.60
8.6^^*
/1 fl^'/' 1.6%
5.5%0o00*
5.5%.
4.8%
4.8% C
z
0
J 1 1
i I
1 1 J1 L
1 1 1 1
L 1 1
JL C
c
en
JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUN
JUN JUL
JUL AUG
AUG SEP
SEP OCT NOV DEC
OCT NOV DEC 1»
TABLE
TABLE XVI
XVI

GERMAN FIGHTER LOSSES


LOSSES 1941
1941
BALKAN
BALKAN INVASION
INVASION i
CAMPAIGN
CAMPAIGN Of
Of RUSSIA
RUSSIA

30%
30%

22 .9%
20%

A
14 .2% y
13 .4% A
" `12 .6% L 10.2%
6.49% A "000 0
Z.,

I'1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
JUN JUL
JUL AUG
AUG SEP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV
NOV
THE
THE TURN TO RUSSIA
TURN TO RUSSIA

TABLE
TABLE XVII
XVII

German
German Losses,
Losses, All Causes—1941 (Not
All Causes-1941 (Not Including
Including November)
November)

Aircraft
Aircraft Written
Written Off
Off
Aircraft
Aircraft Actual
Actual Due
Due to
to Not
Not Due
Due Percent
Percent ofof
Authorized,
Authorized, Strength
Strength Enemy
Enemy to
to Enemy
Enemy January
January
Jan 1941
Jan 1941 44.1.41.
.1 .41 . Action
Action Action
Action Total
Total Strength
Strength
Close
Close Recce
Recce 372
372 384
384 165
165 98
98 263
263 68 .5
68.5
Long-Range Recce
Long-Range Recce 276
276 356
356 195
195 95
95 290
290 81 .5
81.5
Single-Engine Fighters
Single-Engine Fighters 1,202
1,202 841
841 622
622 705
705 1,327
1,327 157 .8
157.8
Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine Fighters
Fighters 435
435 384
384 246
246 217
217 463
463 120 .6
120.6
Bombers
Bombers 1,715
1,715 1,339
1,339 1,154
1,154 644
644 1,798
1,798 134 .3
134.3
Stukas
Stukas 467
467 456
456 225
225 141
141 366
366 80 .3
80.3
Transport
Transport 444
444 415
415 159
159 155
155 314
314 75 .7
75.7
Liaison
Liaison 200
200 ** 40
40 56
56 96
96 *
Coastal
Coastal 162
162 122
122 43
43 42
42 85
85 69 .7
69.7
TOTAL
TOTAL 5,273
5,273 4,297
4,297 2,849
2,849 2,153
2,153 5,002
5,002 115%
115%

*Data
*Data not
not available
available..

Aircraft
Aircraft Damaged, 1941 (Not
Damaged, 1941 (Not Including
Including November)
November)

Not
Not Reparable
Reparable at
at Reparable
Reparable at
at
Unit
Unit Level
Level Unit
Unit Level
Level

Due
Due to
to Not
Not Due
Due Due
Due to
to Not
Not Due
Due Total
Total
Enemy
Enemy to
to Enemy
Enemy Enemy
Enemy to Enemy
to Enemy Aircraft
Aircraft
Action
Action Action
Action Total
Total Action
Action Action
Action Total
Total Damaged
Damaged
Close
Close Recce
Recce 21
21 26
26 47
47 76
76 108
108 184
184 231
231
Long-Range
Long-Range
Recce
Recce 16
16 28
28 44
44 20
20 94
94 114
114 158
158
Single-Engine
Single-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 166
166 463
463 629
629 80
80 350
350 430
430 1,059
1,059
Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 38
38 77
77 105
105 23
23 119
119 142
142 257
257
Bombers
Bombers 187
187 439
439 626
626 130
130 538
538 668
668 1,294
1,294
Stukas
Stukas 29
29 56
56 85
85 27
27 74
74 101
101 186
186
Transport
Transport 99 54
54 63
63 38
38 112
112 150
150 213
213
Liaison
Liaison 77 48
48 55
55 55 87
87 92
92 147
147
Coastal
Coastal 22 22 44 33 10
10 13
13 17
17
TOTAL
TOTAL 475
475 1,193
1,193 1,658
1,658 402
402 1,492
1,492 1,894
1,894 3,562
3,562

93
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

By the end
By the end of of 1941,
1941, GermanGerman aircraft
aircraft production
production and and crewcrew training
training programs
programs
could no longer keep up with losses ; and by January 1942, conditions forced
could no longer keep up with losses; and by January 1942, conditions forced
frontline
frontline units
units to to rob
rob transition schools of
transition schools of crews
crews aa monthmonth before before theirtheir scheduled
scheduled
course
course completion
completion.. By By February,
February, the the quartermaster
quartermaster general general no longer knew
no longer knew how how
many
many aircraft
aircraft hehe would
would receivereceive due due to to chaotic
chaotic conditions
conditions in in thethe aircraft
aircraft industry
industry.'^". l2°
Thus,
Thus, by by late
late winter,
winter, the the general
general staff
staff could
could not not accurately
accurately forecast
forecast eithereither how how many
many
aircraft
aircraft oror crews
crews the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe would would receive
receive in in the
the next
next month,month, not not to to mention
mention
succeeding
succeeding months
months.'^' . '2' From
From this this point
point forward,
forward, the the staff
staff wouldwould squeezesqueeze out out ofof
industry
industry andand out
out of of transition
transition schools
schools as as much
much as as possible
possible each each month
month and and shove
shove
new
new crews
crews with
with decreasing
decreasing skill skill levels
levels and and newnew aircraft
aircraft into
into thethe frontline
frontline unitsunits..
Compounding the
Compounding the difficulties
difficulties was was aa supply
supply and and maintenance
maintenance system system that that revealed
revealed
little
little capacity
capacity for for functioning
functioning over over the the long
long distances
distances that that the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe now now
covered What had
covered.. What had sufficed
sufficed within
within the the limited
limited frontiers
frontiers of of prewar
prewar Germany
Germany could could
not
not meet
meet the
the needs
needs of of anan air force committed
air force committed from from thethe Bay
Bay of of Biscay
Biscay to to the
the gates
gates ofof
Moscow
Moscow and and from
from the the North
North CapeCape to to North Africa.. The
North Africa supply system,
The supply system, particularly
particularly
in
in Russia,
Russia, nono longer
longer functioned effectively.. Milch
functioned effectively Milch in in aa visit
visit to to the eastern front
the eastern front
discovered
discovered that that hundreds
hundreds of of inoperable
inoperable aircraft aircraft werewere lying lying about about on on forward
forward
airfields
airfields.. They
They had had either
either broken
broken downdown or or been
been damaged
damaged in in combat,
combat, and and spare
spare parts
parts
were
were not not flowing
flowing forward forward to to repair
repair these these aircraft . 112 Because
aircraft.'^^ Because supply supply and and
maintenance
maintenance were were separate
separate from from operational
operational units, units, aa wide wide gulf gulf had had grown
grown up up
between
between frontline
frontline units units and and their
their logistical
logistical supportsupport establishment
establishment in in thethe Reich.
Reich.
Furthermore,
Furthermore, the the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's organizational
organizational structure structure divorced divorced supply supply and and
maintenance
maintenance from from operations,
operations, thereby thereby hindering
hindering vitalvital communications
communications between between
these
these two
two divisions.
divisions. More More oftenoften thanthan not, not, the
the special
special needs needs of of oneone werewere notnot
meaningfully addressed by the other
meaningfully addressed by the other. . 123
'^^
The
The pressure
pressure of of continuous
continuous air air operations
operations on on thethe Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's maintenancemaintenance
infrastructure also had its effect . Over the winter of 1940-41, the Germans
infrastructure also had its effect. Over the winter of 1940-41, the Germans
experienced a considerable period without combat in which to reconstitute and
experienced a considerable period without combat in which to reconstitute and to to
rebuild flying units strained by the fighting in 1940 . The bombers, however, with
rebuild flying units strained by the fighting in 1940. The bombers, however, with
their
their heavy
heavy commitments
commitments in in the
the night
night offensive
offensive against
against British
British cities,
cities, did did notnot enjoy
enjoy
such
such recuperation
recuperation.. But But beginning
beginning in in April
April 1941,
1941, with
with thethe campaign
campaign in in the
the Balkans,
Balkans,
the
the demands
demands of of far-flung
far-flung campaigns
campaigns burdened burdened the the entire
entire structure.
structure. The The result
result waswas aa
slow
slow butbut steady
steady decline
decline in the Luftwaffe's
in the Luftwaffe's "in-commission"
"in-commission" rates rates to to aa nadir
nadir in in the
the
winter
winter of of 1941-42
1941-42 (see (see Table
Table XVIII114)
XVIII'^")..
Besides
Besides maintaining
maintaining aircraft aircraft "in "in commission,"
commission," the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had thethe
concomitant
concomitant problem
problem of of filling
filling cockpits
cockpits.. The The loss
loss rate,
rate, as as already
already suggested,
suggested, had had
reached
reached the the point
point wherewhere the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe pushed pushed pilots
pilots outout of of training
training schools
schools as as
rapidly
rapidly as as possible
possible to to bring
bring aircrew
aircrew strength
strength to to acceptable
acceptable levels levels.. WhatWhat now now
happened
happened was was that
that operational
operational units units completed
completed what what the the schools
schools could could no no longer
longer
finish . The process in many units involved working new pilots into squadron
finish. The process in many units involved working new pilots into squadron
operations
operations on on aa gradual
gradual basis basis while
while hopefully
hopefully minimizing
minimizing their their exposure
exposure to to
hazardous missions . Then as experience increased, squadrons assigned the pilots to
hazardous missions. Then as experience increased, squadrons assigned the pilots to
more
more dangerous
dangerous tasks tasks until until they
they were
were fully fully combat-ready
combat-ready.'2' .' 25 Such
Such aa systemsystem was was
undoubtedly
undoubtedly the the only
only one one that
that frontline
frontline units units could
could follow
follow given given the the state
state of of pilot
pilot

4
994
TABLE
TABLE XVIII
XVIII

LUFTWAFFE
LUFTWAFFE "IN-COMMISSION"
"IN-COMMISSION" RATES
RATES 1941
1941
ALL AIRCRAFT---
ALL AIRCRAFT-
BOMBERS --------
BOMBERS
FIGHTERS ...... . .... .... .. ..... ...
FIGHTERS

80°i°
80%
" ., ,." ,75%
70% 73%,**,
.,

62°/% %" ~~
60%
60% 63%~
62% 62% , 6p°/ 62% 62%'""".,
X58/u~
57% %
50%
50% "` 4%
50% 52% 52%

45%'*~ 45% xrnm


40%
40% %
38%
30%
30% , • 32%
32%
O
1
X X C
c
JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUN
JUN JUL
JUL AUG
AUG SEP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV
NOV DEC
OEC >
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

training
training.. It had, however,
It had, however, two two pernicious
pernicious side side effects
effects.. The The first
first waswas thatthat itit
maximized the
maximized the exposure
exposure to to danger
danger of of experienced
experienced aircrews, aircrews, thus thus increasing
increasing their their
losses . This,
losses. This, in in turn,
turn, led led to higher percentages
to higher percentages of of untrained
untrained or or partially
partially trained
trained
personnel
personnel in in the
the combat
combat units.units. TheThe second,
second, and and equally
equally disastrous,
disastrous, effect
effect was was that
that
untrained
untrained pilots
pilots in in the
the dangerous
dangerous and and primitive
primitive conditions
conditions of of frontline
frontline airfields
airfields had had aa
higher
higher accident
accident rate rate than normal.. The
than normal The normalnormal rate rate was was highhigh enough
enough givengiven aa lax lax
attitude towards flying safety throughout the war. But the combination of a weak
attitude towards flying safety throughout the war.'^* 116 But the combination of a weak
flying
flying safety
safety program
program along along withwith untrained
untrained and and unskilled
unskilled pilots pilots flying
flying offoff primitive
primitive
airstrips
airstrips waswas deadly
deadly.. As As Table
Table XVII XVII indicates,
indicates, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was was destroying
destroying three three of of
its own aircraft for every four destroyed by the enemy, and the number of damaged
its own aircraft for every four destroyed by the enemy, and the number of damaged
aircraft
aircraft fromfrom noncombat
noncombat accidents accidents was was an an intolerable
intolerable burden burden on on an an already
already
overstrained maintenance system.
overstrained maintenance system.
The
The attrition
attrition over over thethe summer
summer and and fall
fall of 1941 led
of 1941 led to to aa steady
steady deterioration
deterioration in in the
the
experience level of aircrews. From the summer of
experience level of aircrews. From the summer of 1941,
1941, the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe entered
entered aa
period in which losses proceeded at such a pace that a recovery in terms of crew
period in which losses proceeded at such a pace that a recovery in terms of crew
flying experience
flying experience could could onlyonly comecome with
with aa long long halt
halt to operations.. However,
to operations However, failurefailure
in Russia in 1941 virtually insured that the Luftwaffe would never receive a respite .
in Russia in 1941 virtually insured that the Luftwaffe would never receive a respite.
In
In fact,
fact, the
the increase
increase of Allied air
of Allied air efforts
efforts in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean and and west
west meant
meant that that
the demands on the German air force would continually increase, thus exacerbating
the demands on the German air force would continually increase, thus exacerbating
an
an already
already serious
serious situation
situation.. ThisThis deterioration
deterioration of of aircrew
aircrew skill skill level
level shows
shows up up most
most
clearly in Table XIX'27 in the two column summarizing losses not due to enemy
clearly in Table XIX'^' in the two column summarizing losses not due to enemy
action.
action.
The
The most
most dangerous
dangerous trend trend in in 1941
1941 waswas aa production
production program program that that one
one cancan perhaps
perhaps
best
best describe
describe as inadequate.. The
as inadequate The Germans
Germans had entered the
had entered the war with aa surprisingly
war with surprisingly
low
low production
production rate. rate. However,
However, given given the the resource
resource limitations
limitations under under which
which they they
worked,
worked, production
production levels levels reflected
reflected economic
economic reality reality.. The The victories
victories of of 1940,
1940,
however,
however, fundamentally
fundamentally altered altered Germany's
Germany's strategic strategic and and economic
economic situation
situation.. Not Not
only
only hadhad thethe Germans
Germans captured
captured large large stockpiles
stockpiles of of raw
raw materials
materials in in France
France and and the the
Low
Low Countries
Countries but but the
the modern
modem industrial
industrial plant plant of of those
those nations
nations was was nownow under
under their
their
control
control.. Moreover,
Moreover, the the success
success in in the
the westwest made made Eastern
Eastern Europe,
Europe, including
including the the
Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, more more amenable
amenable to to cooperation
cooperation with with the the Reich
Reich;; finally
finally thethe occupation
occupation
of
of France
France gave gave the the Germans
Germans direct direct access
access to to Spanish
Spanish and and Moroccan
Moroccan raw raw material
material
resources
resources (particularly tungsten and
(particularly tungsten and iron
iron ores)
ores)..
With
With these
these resources
resources at at their
their disposal,
disposal, the the Germans
Germans were were in in aa position
position to to organize
organize
the
the newnew conquests
conquests in in tandem
tandem with with their
their own own war war economy
economy in in order
order to to increase
increase
drastically
drastically their their armament
armament production
production.. They They did did no no such thing.'^^ There
such thing."' There were were
several
several basic
basic reasons
reasons for for this failure.. This
this failure This omission
omission did did not,
not, one
one must
must stress,
stress, result
result
from
from aa belief
belief in in aa so-called
so-called "Blitzkrieg"
"Blitzkrieg" strategy strategy.. Rather,Rather, the the Germans
Germans now now
allowed
allowed themselves
themselves to to be deluded by
be deluded by thethe speed
speed of of the
the first
first victories
victories overover Poland
Poland and and
France
France into into believing
believing that that theythey could
could continuecontinue armamentarmament productionproduction at at thethe
prevailing
prevailing low low level.
level. TheThe overconfidence
overconfidence marking marking the the approach
approach to to "Seal
"Seal Lion"
Lion" and and
"Barbarossa"
"Barbarossa" were were symptomatic
symptomatic of of aa wider
wider malaise
malaise:: Nothing
Nothing was was impossibe
impossibe for for the
the
rulers
rulers ofof the
the Third
Third Reich!
Reich\ The The issue
issue herehere is is not
not that
that thethe Germans
Germans built built tanks
tanks or or
artillery
artillery pieces
pieces at at the
the expense
expense of of aircraft,
aircraft, but but rather
rather theythey mademade minimal
minimal alterations
alterations

996
6
TABLE
TABLE XIX
XIX

OF FULLY
%0F FULLY OPERATIONAL
OPERATIONAL CREWS
CREWS JULY
JULY 1941
1941 -- JANUARY
JANUARY 1942
1942

ALL
ALL AIRCREWS
AIRCREWS --
FIGHTER
FIGHTER PILOTS
PILOTS --
BOMBER
BOMBER CREWS
CREWS
70%
70°x°
" 67.7%
"I
679%
67.9% '
.
675% W, `

60.3%
60%
60% - '"., 64 .4°0
59.6%

59 .6% ,
.,,56.5%
" ~. 54.8%
53.9% ":.,.„, ^»«53%
50%
50% •»;
••:, "..,
49.6% '" "" .. .
•■...„../' 47.2%
47.2%
45 .4%
45.4%
40%
40% >

I 1 1 1 1
JULY
JULY AUG
AUG SEP
SEP C
OCT
OCT NOV
NOV DEC
DEC JAN
JAN C/3
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

in
in the
the production
production of of all
all major
major weapon
weapon systems
systems after
after the
the fall
fall of France in
of France in spite
spite of
of aa
radically
radically different
different rawraw material
material andand industrial
industrial situation
situation.. Symptomatic
Symptomatic of of this
this
situation
situation in in the
the summer
summer of of 1940
1940 was
was the
the Army ordnance office's
Army ordnance office's rejection
rejection ofof
Hitler's
Hitler's proposal
proposal thatthat tank
tank production
production be be increased
increased from
from 100100 toto 800
800 per
per month
month
because
because suchsuch aa level
level would
would be too expensive
be too expensive and
and require
require tootoo many
many skilled
skilled
workers .'z 9 But
workers.'^' But as
as late
late as February 1941,
as February 1941, aa major
major economic
economic journal
journal noted
noted that
that
"Germany
"Germany is is entering
entering the the final
final struggle
struggle with so overwhelming
with so overwhelming aa superiority
superiority of of
armament capacity
armament capacity that
that the
the result
result can
can no
no longer
longer be
be in
in doubt."
doubt.''""110
Certainly,
Certainly, the
the losses
losses in
in tanks
tanks and
and aircraft
aircraft in
in the
the French
French campaign
campaign should
should have
have
raised
raised serious
serious doubts
doubts as
as to
to existing
existing rates
rates of
of production
production;; the
the same
same could
could be
be said
said for
for
the
the Battle
Battle of
of Britain.
Britain. However,
However, no no one
one in
in the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, with
with the
the possible
possible exception
exception
of
of Milch,
Milch, became
became particularly
particularly worried
worried over
over the
the continuing
continuing lag
lag in
in production
production.. Only
Only
the
the failure
failure of the Russian
of the Russian campaign
campaign spurred
spurred Hitler
Hitler to
to reorganize
reorganize the
the economy
economy
prompting
prompting aa dramatic
dramatic expansion
expansion of of production.
production. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, thethe Fuhrer
Fuhrer himself
himself
was
was not
not completely
completely at at fault,
fault, since
since few
few senior officials had
senior officials had pushed
pushed for
for major
major
increases
increases in
in production
production..
Further
Further complicating
complicating aa rational
rational utilization
utilization of
of Europe's
Europe's economic
economic resources
resources were
were
the ideological perceptions of the German leadership . Goring indicated the
the ideological perceptions of the German leadership. Goring indicated the
ideological basis coloring the Nazi approach to economic problems when he stated
ideological basis coloring the Nazi approach to economic problems when he stated
in
in 1942
1942::

Basically,
Basically, II consider
consider all all of
of occupied
occupied France
France asas aa conquered country..
conquered country
ItIt seems
seems to
to me
me that
that in
in earlier
earlier times
times the
the thing
thing was
was simpler
simpler.. In
In earlier
earlier
times,
times, youyou pillaged
pillaged.. HeHe who
who had
had conquered
conquered aa country
country disposed
disposed of of
the
the riches
riches of
of that
that country
country.. At
At present,
present, things
things areare done
done inin aa more
more
humane
humane way way.. As As for for myself,
myself, II still
still think
think of
of pillage
pillage
comprehensively
comprehensively."' . 131

The
The problem
problem was that such
was that such anan approach
approach was was counterproductive
counterproductive.. Goring's
Goring's positions
positions
in the Reich (as the Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, as
in the Reich (as the Air Minister and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, as
Minister of the Four-Year Plan, and as a leading confidant ofthe Fuhrer) increased
Minister of the Four-Year Plan, and as a leading confidant of the Fuhrer) increased
the
the probability
probability thatthat his
his views
views guided
guided German
German economic
economic policy
policy.. Thus,
Thus, exploitation
exploitation
of
of the
the French
French economy
economy involved
involved aa looting
looting expedition
expedition in in which
which competing
competing military
military
authorities
authorities (in (in France
France thethe army
army gotgot the
the largest
largest share
share ofof the
the loot
loot asas its
its troops
troops were
were
first on the scene), civil authorities, and industrial firms divided the booty .
first on the scene), civil authorities, and industrial firms divided the booty.
Captured
Captured raw raw materials
materials went
went straight
straight toto the
the Reich
Reich along
along with
with considerable
considerable numbers
numbers
of machine tools . In the latter case, such transfers made no economic sense, '33 for
of machine t32
tools.'" In the latter case, such transfers made no economic sense,'" for
the
the movement
movement of of machine
machine toolstools to
to Germany
Germany couldcould not
not possibly
possibly increase
increase productive
productive
capacity
capacity as as the
the aircraft
aircraft industry
industry waswas already
already underutilized
underutilized withwith most
most factories
factories on on 8-
8-
hour
hour shifts,
shifts, once
once aa dayday.. The looted machine
The looted machine tools
tools went
went into
into storage
storage facilities.
facilities.
Ironically,
Ironically, under
under the
the pressure
pressure of of Allied
Allied air
air attacks
attacks inin 1943
1943 and
and 1944,
1944, the
the Germans
Germans
attempted
attempted to to disperse
disperse thethe aircraft
aircraft industry
industry into
into occupied
occupied countries;
countries; the the looting
looting ofof
1940
1940 andand 1941,
1941, however,
however, proved
proved aa severe
severe hindrance
hindrance as as many
many tools
tools were
were no no longer
longer
available . '34 Moreover,
available.'^"* Moreover, the the failure
failure to
to use
use factories
factories in
in occupied
occupied countries
countries in in 1941
1941 and
and

9988
THE TURN TO
THE TURN TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

1942
1942 meantmeant that that when
when the the Germans
Germans reopened reopened plants,plants, they
they discovered
discovered machinery
machinery and and
facilities
facilities in poor condition
in poor condition..
The
The badly
badly thought-out
thought-out lootinglooting of of occupied
occupied countries
countries stands
stands in in contrast
contrast to to the
the
occupation
occupation of of Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia in in 1939
1939.. WhenWhen the the Germans
Germans seized seized Prague
Prague in in March
March
1939,
1939, economic
economic authorities
authorities refused
refused to to allow
allow the transfer of
the transfer of raw
raw material
material stockpiles
stockpiles
to
to thethe Reich,
Reich, since since this would allow
this would allow Germany
Germany to to maintain
maintain CzechCzech production
production and and to to
utilize
utilize Czechoslovakia's
Czechoslovakia's industrial industrial potential
potential to to the
the fullest
fullest.. They
They werewere correct
correct in in that
that
assumption,
assumption, for for not
not only
only diddid Czech
Czech industry
industry substantially
substantially aid aid German
German armament
armament but but
itit also
also earned
earned substantial
substantial foreign
foreign exchange
exchange up up toto the
the outbreak
outbreak of of war ."' Similarly,
war.'" Similarly,
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe found found Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia extremely extremely useful useful in in supporting
supporting its its own
own
production plans.
production plans. By By thethe end
end of of 1939,
1939, Udet Udet had had placed
placed orders
orders for for 1,797
1,797 Czech
Czech
aircraft.
aircraft. Indeed,
Indeed, the the Czech aircraft industry
Czech aircraft industry provedproved useful
useful in in serving
serving its its new
new
masters
masters.'^' . '36
In the
In the case
case of of France,
France, however,
however, things things worked
worked out out quite
quite differently
differently.. In In all
all ofof
1941,
1941, the the French
French aircraft
aircraft industry
industry produced produced only only 62 62 aircraft
aircraft for for the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
(Holland
(Holland only only 16), 16), while
while Czech
Czech plants plants produced
produced 819 .' 3' The
819.'" The reason
reason is is quite
quite
apparent.
apparent. In In the
the case
case of of Czechoslovakia,
Czechoslovakia, the the Germans
Germans were were still
still inin aa difficult
difficult
strategic
strategic and and economic
economic situation,
situation, and and they,
they, therefore,
therefore, eagerly
eagerly incorporated
incorporated Czech Czech
potential
potential into into their
their economic
economic system system.. The The euphoria
euphoria afterafter victory
victory over over France,
France,
however,
however, led led most
most of of the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's leadership leadership to to disregard
disregard the the lowlow production
production
figures
figures for for German
German industry
industry and and to to ignore
ignore the the possible
possible integration
integration of of western
western
European
European economies,
economies, including
including France,France, into into the
the German
German war war effort
effort..
Exacerbating
Exacerbating all of the
all of production problems
the production problems was was aa major
major labor shortage.. With
labor shortage With so so
many
many GermanGerman men men mobilized
mobilized for for service
service with with the the army,
army, aa large
large deficit
deficit existed
existed in in
manpower
manpower available available for for industry.
industry. In In Britain,
Britain, womenwomen filled
filled manymany of of the
the shortages
shortages
caused
caused by by the the rapid
rapid expansion
expansion of of thethe armed
armed forces."'
forces.'^' However,
However, Germany'sGermany's
ideology interfered directly with economic good sense-Hitler refused to allow
ideology interfered directly with economic good sense—^Hitler refused to allow the the
widespread use of women in the factories as had occurred in World War 1. The
widespread use of women in the factories as had occurred in World War I. The
result
result was was thatthat inin the
the summer
summer and and fall fall ofof 1941,
1941, an an acute
acute shortage
shortage of of workers
workers existed
existed
throughout the armament industry. There were not enough German men to
throughout the armament industry. There were not enough German men to gogo
around. While the Germans had millions of prisoners of war captured in the Polish
around. While the Germans had millions of prisoners of war captured in the Polish
and
and western
western campaigns,
campaigns, most most of of those
those worked
worked in in the
the countryside
countryside to to keep
keep German
German
agricultural production at acceptable levels .
agricultural production at acceptable levels.
But
But there
there was was aa manpower
manpower pool pool of of enormous
enormous potential
potential in in the
the summer
summer of of 1941
1941;: thethe
hundreds
hundreds of of thousands
thousands of of prisoners
prisoners that that were
were falling
falling into
into German
German hands hands as as thethe
Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht surged surged intointo Russia
Russia.. However,
However, ideology ideology intervened
intervened with with aa vengeance
vengeance..
Hitler
Hitler refused
refused to to allow
allow the the transfer
transfer of of any
any ofof these
these prisoners
prisoners to to the
the Reich
Reich for for work
work
either
either on on farms
farms or or inin factories
factories.'" . '39 Thus,
Thus, whilewhile German
German industry
industry was was desperately
desperately
short
short of of workers,
workers, hundreds
hundreds of of thousands
thousands of of Russian
Russian soldiers
soldiers werewere starving
starving to to death
death
in
in inadequate
inadequate WehrmachtWehrmacht prisoner prisoner of of war
war camps
camps.. By By February
February 1942, 1942, of of thethe
3,900,000
3,900,000 Russian Russian soldiers
soldiers that that the the Germans
Germans claimed claimed to to have
have captured,
captured, only only
1,100,000
1,100,000 remained remained alive;alive; of these, only
of these, only 400,000
400,000 were were capable
capable of of being
being moved
moved to to
the
the Reich
Reich to to work
work in in industry
industry.. 140'■" Ciano recorded in
Ciano recorded in his
his diary
diary in in late November 1941
late November 1941
Goring's
Goring's macabremacabre sense sense of humor about
of humor about this this terrible
terrible situation
situation::

999
9
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

Goring
Goring told told meme that
that hunger
hunger among
among the the Russian
Rtissian prisoners
prisoners had
had
reached
reached such such anan extreme
extreme that
that in
in order
order to to start
start them
them toward
toward the
the
interior
interior itit is
is no
no longer
longer necessary
necessary to to send
send them
them under
under armed
armed guard
guard;; itit
is
is enough
enough to to put
put atat the
the head
head ofof the
the column
column of of prisoners
prisoners aa camp
camp
kitchen,
kitchen, whichwhich emits
emits the
the fragrant
fragrant odor
odor of of food
food;; thousands
thousands and
and
thousands
thousands of of prisoners
prisoners trail
trail along
along like
like aa herd
herd ofof famished
famished
animals . 141
animals.''"

As
As Germany's
Germany's chiefchief economic
economic czar,
czar, the
the Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall waswas cognizant
cognizant of
of the
the
shortages in the work force. His remarks underline the callous attitudes toward the
shortages in the work force. His remarks underline the callous attitudes toward the
"Untermensch"
"Untermensch" and and aa frivilous
frivilous approach
approach toto Germany's
Germany's dangerous
dangerous economic
economic
situation
situation..
The
The basic
basic cause
cause of the Luftwaffe's
of the Luftwaffe's production
production problems
problems in in 1941
1941 lay
lay not
not only
only inin
the dilettantism of the higher Nazi leadership but also with a military leadership that
the dilettantism of the higher Nazi leadership but also with a military leadership that
did not
did not understand
understand thethe difficulties
difficulties involved
involved inin producing
producing modern
modem weapons
weapons in in large
large
numbers and who evinced little worry about enemy production capabilities . As
numbers and who evinced little worry about enemy production capabilities. As
mentioned in Chapter I, Goring in 1937 and 1938 had largely removed Milch from
mentioned in Chapter I, Goring in 1937 and 1938 had largely removed Milch from
control
control over
over the
the production
production andand technical
technical aspects
aspects of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. Udet,
Udet, Milch's
Milch's
replacement, possessed neither the temperament nor the technical background to
replacement, possessed neither the temperament nor the technical background to
handle his new responsibilities . Jeschonnek, on the general staff side, showed little
handle his new responsibilities, Jeschonnek, on the general staff side, showed little
interest
interest in the dull
in the dull nonoperational
nonoperational requirements
requirements of of planning
planning and and carrying
carrying through
through aa
production program
production program.. Thus,
Thus, even
even before
before the
the war
war the
the plans
plans of
of the
the general
general staff
staff and
and ofof
Udet's
Udet's production planners had
production planners had diverged
diverged.. Now
Now in in aa war
war in in which
which Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
commitments
conunitments were widening, production
were widening, production figures
figures remained
remained virtually
virtually stationary
stationary..
Table XX
Table XX"*^142 indicates
indicates the
the extent
extent of
of Germany's
Germany's aircraft
aircraft production
production..

TABLE
TABLE XX
XX
Production
Production of
of German
German Aircraft-1939-1941
Aircraft--1939-1941

Fighters
Fighters Bombers
Bombers Transports
Transports Trainers
Trainers Others
Others Total
Total
1939
1939 1,856
1,856 2,877
2,877 1,037
1,037 1,112
1,112 1,413
1,413 8,295
8,295
1940
1940 3,106
3,106 3,997
3,997 763
763 1,328
1,328 1,632
1,632 10,826
10,826
1941
1941 3,732
3,732 4,350
4,350 969
969 889
889 1,836
1,836 11,776
11,776

The
The impact
impact of of these
these levels
levels ofof aircraft
aircraft production
production onon frontline
frontline units
units became
became
obvious
obvious as
as the war continued
the war continued.. German
German industry
industry waswas not
not producing
producing aircraft
aircraft at
at aa rate
rate
sufficient to
sufficient to replace
replace losses
losses at
at the
the front
front and
and inin accidents
accidents.. As
As aa result,
result, the
the difference
difference
between the
between the number
number of aircraft authorized
of aircraft authorized and and actually
actually present
present increased
increased as as
operations attrited frontline strength . In September 1939, combat units had
operations attrited frontline strength. In September 1939, combat units had
possessed
possessed virtually
virtually aa full
full complement
complement of of aircraft.
aircraft. As
As production
production failed
failed to
to keep
keep upup
with
with loss
loss rates,
rates, itit became
became ever
ever more
more difficult
difficult to
to sustain
sustain authorized
authorized levels,
levels, and
and even
even
the
the most favored organizations
most favored organizations hadhad to
to operate
operate well
well below authorized strength
below authorized strength (see
(see
Table
Table XXI'4')
XXI'«)..

100
100
THE
THE TURN TO RUSSIA
TURN TO RUSSIA

TABLE
TABLE XXIXXI
Authorized
Authorized Actual
Actual Strength,
Strength, Combat
Combat Aircraft-
Aircraft-
September 1939-March
September 1939-March 1942
1942

Percent
Percent of
of Authorized
Authorized
Authorized
Authorized Actual
Actual Aircraft
Aircraft
September
September 1939
1939 2,950
2,950 2,916
2,916 98 .9
98.9
December
December 1939
1939 3,313
3,313 3,258
3,258 98 .3
98.3
March
March 1940
1940 4,034
4,034 3,692
3,692 91 .5
91.5
June
June 1940
1940 3,714
3,714 3,327
3,327 89 .6
89.6
September 1940
September 1940 3,547
3,547 3,015
3,015 85 .0
85.0
December 1940
December 1940 3,792
3,792 3,050
3,050 80 .4
80.4
March 1941
March 1941 4,100
4,100 3,853
3,853 94 .0
94.0
June 1941
June 1941 4,228
4,228 3,451
3,451 81 .6
81.6
September 1941
September 1941 4,318
4,318 3,561
3,561 82 .5
82.5
December
December 1941
1941 4,344
4,344 2,749
2,749 63 .3
63.3
March
March 1942
1942 4,623
4,623 2,876
2,876 62 .2
62.2

When
When combined
combined with with thethe operational
operational ready ready rates
rates forfor late
late 1941,
1941, thethe figures
figures in in
Table XXI present a thoroughly depressing picture of the Luftwaffe's combat
Table XXI present a thoroughly depressing picture of the Luftwaffe'% combat
strength
strength.. OneOne aircraft
aircraft typetype in in particular,
particular, the the bomber,
bomber, had had reached
reached the the point
point where
where
the Luftwaffe had hardly any capability left . In December 1941, the bomber force
the Luftwaffe had hardly any capability left. In December 1941, the bomber force
possessed only 47 .1 percent of its authorized strength ; only 51 percent of that force
possessed only 47.1 percent of its authorized strength; only 51 percent of that force
was
was in in commission
commission.. Thus, Thus, from from an an authorized
authorized strength
strength of of 1,950
1,950 bombers,
bombers, the the
Luftwaffe had only 468 in commission on December 6, 1941, or 24 percent of
Lirftwaffe had only 468 in commission on December 6, 1941, or 24 percent of
authorized aircraft . 144
authorized aircraft. ^**
The
The cause
cause of of this
this shortfall
shortfall lay lay directly
directly at at the
the door
door of of Udet's
Udet's poorpoor administration,
administration,
with a sizeable portion of the blame also to be shared among Gbring, Jeschonnek,
with a sizeable portion of the blame also to be shared among Goring, Jeschonnek,
and the aircraft industry . Udet had possessed neither the capability nor background
and the aircraft industry. Udet had possessed neither the capability nor background
to assume responsibility for technical development and production . At one
to assume responsibility for technical development and production. At one point,
point,
he admitted that he understood nothing of industrial processes and even less about
he admitted that he understood nothing of industrial processes and even less about
the engineering of large aircraft .
the engineering of large aircraft. ,45
''•' The result of such a situation was that for
The result of such a situation was that for aa
three-year period, the Air Ministry provided little leadership or guidance to
three-year period, the Air Ministry provided little leadership or guidance to
manufacturers. Udet's offices became involved in producing a series of production
manufacturers. Udet's offices became involved in producing a series of production
plans
plans that
that bore
bore no no relationship
relationship to to whatwhat waswas occurring
occurring in in industry
industry.. After
After each
each
demand for an increase in production, his staff invariably revised downwards plans
demand for an increase in production, his staff invariably revised downwards plans
to
to reflect
reflect the
the results.
results.'"*'46 Moreover,
Moreover, introduction
introduction of of new
new aircraft
aircraft types
types oror new
new models
models
of existing aircraft "meant that the large planned increases were subject to sudden
of existing aircraft ' 'meant that the large planned increases were subject to sudden
and
and sharp
sharp revision
revision downwards,
downwards, even even when when strategy
strategy demanded
demanded otherwise. 11147
otherwise.'''""
Yet,
Yet, the
the top
top leadership
leadership also also bears
bears responsibility
responsibility for for the
the production
production crisiscrisis of
of 1941
1941..
Hitler, despite occasional interest in technical matters, intervened hardly at all
Hitler, despite occasional interest in technical matters, intervened hardly at all in
in
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe production
production during during the the early
early war war years.
years. Contrary
Contrary to to his
his relations
relations with
with the
the
army,
army, Hitler
Hitler delegated
delegated much much authority
authority over over air
air force
force matters
matters to to Gbring
Goring;; and
and while
while
he
he did
did set
set industrial
industrial priorities,
priorities, he he waswas poorly
poorly informed
informed about about what what was
was going
going on on
with Luftwaffe
with Luftwaffe production
production.. While While itit suitedsuited Gbring
Goring to to keep
keep the the Fuhrer
Fiihrer uninformed,
uninformed,
he
he himself
himself also
also possessed
possessed little little knowledge
knowledge through through the the spring
spring of of 1941
1941 of of what
what was
was
happening
happening.. Udet Udet diddid provide
provide aa scapegoat
scapegoat for for subsequent
subsequent production
production failures,148
failures,'"* but
but

101
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

Goring and
Goring and his his staff
staff deserve
deserve aa full full measure
measure of blame for
of blame for their
their concurrence
concurrence with with
production levels
production levels during
during thisthis period
period..
The
The crisis
crisis came
came to to aa head
head in in the
the summer
summer of of 1941
1941.. Udet's
Udet's office
office could
could no no longer
longer
hide
hide thethe growing
growing disparity
disparity betweenbetween planned planned and and actual
actual production
production totals totals whenwhen
Luftwaffe strength in the field reached scandalously low levels.
Luftwaffe strength in the field reached scandalously low levels. To
To help
help overcome
overcome
this
this industrial
industrial shortfall,
shortfall, Goring Goring reinserted
reinserted Milch Milch into into the production process
the production process..
Shortly before the beginning of "Barbarossa," Goring granted the State Secretary
Shortly before the beginning of "Barbarossa," Goring granted the State Secretary
wide
wide powers
powers over over the the aircraft
aircraft industry
industry thatthat included
included the the right
right toto close
close or or toto
requisition factories, to confiscate raw materials, to transfer or dismiss designers,
requisition factories, to confiscate raw materials, to transfer or dismiss designers,
and
and in
in general
general to to reorganize
reorganize industrial
industrial production
production.. As As with
with previous
previous orders
orders fromfrom the
the
Reichsmarschall,
Reichsmarschall, Milch Milch was was to to quadruple production.'*' This
quadruple production.'49 This time,
time, however,
however.
Goring
Goring had had given
given the the brief
brief to to aa man man who who did understand modern
did understand modem production
production
methods
methods and and industrial
industrial practices
practices."" . 'So
Over the summer of 1941, Milch supplanted
Over the summer of 1941, Milch supplanted Udet Udet and and assumed
assumed control
control of of the
the
technical offices that Udet had controlled . "' The gradual exclusion ofUdetfrom the
technical offices that Udet had controlled."' The gradual exclusion of Udetfrom the
centers
centers of of power
power within within the the Air Ministry as
Air Ministry as well
well as as Milch's
Milch's less-than-tactful
less-than-tactful
behavior contributed to the former's suicide in the fall of 1941 . Undoubtedly, the
behavior contributed to the former's suicide in the fall of 1941. Undoubtedly, the
nightmarish
nightmarish situation
situation that that Milch
Milch discovered
discovered in in industry
industry and and within
within these
these offices
offices
contributed
contributed to to Udet's
Udet's death. death. But But before
before hishis death,
death, Udet, Udet, with with Milch's
Milch's backing,
backing,
produced
produced aa plan plan in in July
July 19411941 calling
calling for for aa radical
radical restructuring
restructuring of of German
German industry
industry
to
to accelerate
accelerate production.
production.'" 112 A A more more detailed,
detailed, longer-range
longer-range plan plan came
came out out in in
September
September under under Milch's
Milch's guidance.
guidance. Based Based on on aa change
change in in priorities
priorities after
after the
the
completion
completion of of "Barbarossa,"
"Barbarossa,"'^^ 153 Milch's
Milch's production
production projection projection demanded
demanded nearly nearly
50,000
50,000 aircraft
aircraft from from industry
industry by by March
March 19441944.. For For 1942, 1942, the the so-called
so-called "Goring
"Goring
plan"
plan" asked
asked for for approximately
approximately 33 33 percent
percent more
more aircraft
aircraft than than hadhad been
been produced
produced in in
1941
1941.. For
For fighter
fighter aircraft,
aircraft, the the Goring
Goring plan plan asked
asked for for aa 61 .1 percent
61.1 percent increase
increase in in
monthly
monthly fighter
fighter production
production in in 1942 1942 and and aa 20 20.5 .5 percent
percent increase
increase in in bomber
bomber
production.
production. By By the
the endend of 1943, Milch
of 1943, Milch foresaw
foresaw aa rise rise in in the
the monthly
monthly production
production rate rate
for
for fighters
fighters to to 625
625 (a (a 101
101 percent
percent rise rise over
over the
the 1941
1941 average)
average) and and for
for bombers
bombers to to 656
656
(an
(an increase
increase of of 81
81.2 .2 percent
percent over over 1941 1941 production)
production).'''* . 114
Unlike Udet
Unlike Udet who who had had gloomily
gloomily assumed assumed in in June
June 1941 1941 that that given
given thethe resources,
resources,
the
the work work force, force, and and the the industrial
industrial capacitycapacity then then available,
available, the the
aircraft
aircraft industry
industry could could not not substantially
substantially increaseincrease production
production.'" .", Milch
Milch took took aa
different
different line line.. In In aa speech
speech to to thethe aircraft
aircraft industry's
industry's chief chief industrialists,
industrialists. Milch Milch
outlined
outlined the the production
production increasesincreases enumerated
enumerated in in the
the new new planplan.. He He demanded
demanded that that
the
the industrialists
industrialists judge judge what what waswas possible
possible and and what
what was was not.not. Further,
Further, he he refused
refused to to
allow
allow industry
industry to to proceed
proceed with with serialserial production
production of of newnew aircraft,
aircraft, because
because he he
demanded
demanded the the mass
mass production
production of of existing
existing types
types.'^^. 116 Delays
Delays imposed
imposed by by the
the search
search
for quality were
for quality were aa major major factor
factor in in minimizing
minimizing aircraft aircraft production.
production. Indeed,Indeed, the the
quality
quality versus
versus quantity
quantity dilemmadilemma was was aa factor
factor Milch
Milch never never succeeded
succeeded in in reconciling
reconciling
with
with the German industrial
the German industrial system
system.. Right Right through
tiirough 1,944, 1944, German aircraft possessed
German aircraft possessed
the finest upholstered crew
the finest upholstered crew seats;
seats; thousands
thousands of
of man-hours
man-hours were
were wasted
wasted in
in machining
machining
bulkheads
bulkheads and and minor
minor fittings,
fittings, whilewhile partsparts taking
taking no no strain
strain or or requiring
requiring no no precision
precision
were finished to close tolerances . The
were finished to close tolerances. The completed
completed aircraft
aircraft represented
represented aa finely
finely

102
102
TURN TO
THE TURN
THE TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

finished product compared


finished product compared to to their
their American
American and and British
British counterparts
counterparts;; butbut where
where
there
there were
were hundreds
hundreds of of the
the latter,
latter, one found only
one found only tens
tens of the former
of the former.'"."'
One
One ofof the
the major
major excuses
excuses that that aircraft
aircraft manufacturers
manufacturers had had presented
presented for
for the
the low
low
rate of
rate of aircraft
aircraft production
production in the first
in the first war
war years
years was
was aa lack
lack ofof raw
raw materials,
materials,
especially
especially inin the
the light
light metals
metals sectorsector so so essential
essential to to an
an increase
increase in in production
production..
Sending out
Sending out inspectors
inspectors to to check
check on on industrial
industrial procedures,
procedures, Milch Milch discovered
discovered
widespread
widespread waste
waste ofof raw
raw materials
materials throughout
throughout the the aircraft
aircraft industry
industry:: The
The production
production
of one
of one type
type aircraft
aircraft engine
engine was was wasting
wasting approximately
approximately 1,500 1,500 pounds
pounds of of aluminum
aluminum..
Moreover,
Moreover, industry
industry hadhad built
built up large stockpiles,
up large stockpiles, andand Messerschmitt factories were
Messerschmitt factories were
even using
even using aluminum
aluminum to build tropical
to build tropical shelters
shelters and
and ladders
ladders forfor use
use in
in vineyards
vineyards."*. 158
Milch
Milch was
was able
able toto put
put aa stop
stop toto many
many of of these
these practices,
practices, andand itit was
was soon
soon apparent
apparent to to
those
those in
in charge
charge ofof the
the aircraft
aircraft industry
industry thatthat aa firm
firm hand
hand had
had now
now grasped control..
grasped control
The
The change
change of of responsibility
responsibility within within the the AirAir Ministry
Ministry had, had, fortunately
fortunately for for
Germany's
Germany's opponents,
opponents, come come too too late
late.. For
For 1941,
1941, thethe Western
Westem Powers
Powers had had
outproduced
outproduced Germany's
Germany's aircraftaircraft industry
industry by by aa wide
wide margin
margin (see (see Tables
Tables XXII,'S9
XXII,'''
XXIII,'60 and XXIV'6')
XXIII,i^) and XXIV'*'). .
In
In fighters
fighters alone,
alone, Anglo-American
Anglo-American production
production totals
totals forfor the
the last
last quarter
quarter of
of 1941
1941
were
were nearly
nearly 400
400 percent
percent greater
greater than
than Germany's;
Germany's; in in twin-engine
twin-engine aircraft,
aircraft, the
the lead
lead
was
was 169169 percent; and in
percent; and in four-engine
four-engine aircraft,
aircraft, aa whopping
whopping 4,033 4,033 percent. '62
percent.'*^ The
The
levels
levels for
for 1941,
1941, however,
however, only only reflected small portion
reflected aa small portion of of Germany's
Germany's problem
problem..
The
The British
British and
and Americans
Americans had been planning
had been planning major
major increases
increases in in production
production since
since
the
the summer
summer of of 1940 Considering the
1940.. Considering the potential
potential of of American
American industry,
industry, those
those
preparations
preparations had had been
been onon aa far
far grander
grander scale
scale than Germany could
than Germany could ever
ever consider
consider..
Now
Now in in the
the summer
summer of of 1941,
1941, thethe Germans
Germans beganbegan to to change
change theirtheir approach,
approach, butbut itit
was only
was only after
after Udet's
Udet's suicide
suicide in in November
November 1941 1941 that that Milch
Milch gained
gained general
general
authority.
authority.
Most
Most of of the
the leadership
leadership remained
remained blissfully
blissfully ignorant
ignorant of of the
the terrible
terrible danger
danger facing
facing
the Reich
the Reich.. With
With great
great glee,
glee, Goebbels
Goebbels recorded
recorded every
every Anglo-American
Anglo-American disaster disaster inin
early
early 1942,
1942, while
while dismissing
dismissing as as idle
idle Yankee
Yankee boasting
boasting the the American
American production
production
figures.
figures.'" G6ring casually replied to warnings of the industrial potential of the
'63 Goring casually replied to warnings of the industrial potential of the

United
United States
States that
that Americans
Americans "could
"could only
only produce
produce cars cars and
and refrigerators."'
refrigerators."'^ The
64 The

German
German Embassy
Embassy in Washington sent
in Washington sent aa number
number of of warnings
warnings during during 1940
1940 that
that while
while
America's national
America's national defense
defense was was still
still woefully
woefully lacking
lacking in in nearly
nearly every
every respect,
respect,
production
production would
would represent
represent aa serious
serious threat
threat byby 1941
1941 and and increasingly
increasingly eacheach year
year
thereafter
thereafter.. The
The cautionary
cautionary forebodings
forebodings mademade little
little impression
impression.'" . '65 Milch
Milch was
was not
not so
so
sanguine having
sanguine having seen
seen American
American industry
industry at at work,'
work,'** 66 but
but only
only in in late
late 1941
1941 had
had hehe
gained
gained full
full control
control of
of aircraft
aircraft production
production..

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

For
For the
the second
second year in aa row,
year in the Luftwaffe
row, the Luftwaffe had
had lost
lost nearly
nearly its
its entire
entire complement
complement
of aircraft . The German air force could not look forward, as it had in 1940 after
of aircraft. The German air force could not look forward, as it had in 1940 after the
the
Battle of Britain, to a period of recuperation . The failure in front of Moscow meant
Battle of Britain, to a period of recuperation. The failure in front of Moscow meant

10
1033
2 TABLE
TABLE XXII
XXII

AVERAGE MONTHLY PRODUCTION


AVERAGE MONTHLY PRODUCTION BY
BY HALF YEARS-: nO
HALF YEARS
FIGHTERS
FIGHTERS.. o
d
1200
1200
-GERMANY---
hGERMANY
BRITAIN . ....... . ......... ...... .
BRITAIN ■ ••■■■■•■■■■■iiiiiii
1099
1099
1000
1000 ,UNITED
.UNITED STATES------
.
STATES ♦•
/
/
/ 847
847
800 .
600 ,f ~"
753 .• ,
753
670 "
65e
..S. . . . . .. . .. . . .692~ . .~... ..
692"-/...,""
"I ",, .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ... . . . .. . .
., 666
666
600
553
5 A^-'
491 .,," . "` 500^ 633
633

400 .
400
.»•aun . .... .V.l 411 ...."
. .nm434
434^
00
0
_
500 -
WIN 0-j
y

2 ,.
~ "~ ,.I435

200 ",. as 2474 373

200 /243~ -%
243 .^•^.
156 156 "
l~~0000
—.•- .^^^ 231
231
j~
123;——; 149
149
1940
1940 1940
1940 1941
1941 1941 1942 1942
1ST HALF 2ND HALF 1943
,8I««lf ».».LF ISTKilF
1ST HALF »J'JW
2ND HALF .silL
1ST HALF ^iT^LF
2ND HALF ,^ZL,
1ST HALF
»!%p
1943
2ND HALF 
TABLE
TABLE XXIII
XXIII

AVERAGE
AVERAGE MONTHLY
MONTHLY PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION BY
BY HALF YEARS-
HALF YEARS:
TWIN-ENGINE
TWIN-ENGINE AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT

1200 GERMANY
GERMANY
1200
BRITAIN
BRITAIN " - .- . .
UNITED
UNITED STATES
STATES ..... .. ........
1000
1000

800
800 858
858

7161000 ."op
7'6 -^""'Tn,
.,»«*^ 70
703
600
600 *690
5500
488
488 53a.;><^
53 : 4gp
480
.
423 ''f' " 510 . ... . . . .. . . . . ..
. .... . . 448
...
400
400 402
32 ."" :i::i -459 /
382 382 ~13 I
I
. . ... . ..  H
". ., . .. . . .. 357 360 S
200
200
ra
' 219
219 196
'Se^-o*' 351
351 H
78
C
24
24
24 24
24 ..;.?. z
H
0O
1940
'940 1940
1940 ,94,
1941 1941 1942
z?0
1ST HALF 2ND HALF 1942 1943 1943 C
.ST HALF 2ND HALF 1ST
ISTI^LF
HALF 2NrHW
2ND HALF IsHL
1ST HALF 2NrHL
2ND HALF U""'
1ST
1ST HALF
HALF 2ND
2ND HALF
HALF
a
TABLE
TABLE XXIV
XXIV

AVERAGE
AVERAGE MONTHLY
MONTHLY PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION BY
BY HALF
HALF YEARS
YEARS-: i
FOUR-ENGINE
FOUR-ENGINE AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT so3
D

GERMANY
GERMANY
BRITnlN ,....
BRITAIN "■ .......
•■■■■I... ..
UNITED
UNITED STATES
STATES _---- — .
\2m
1200

1000
1D00

1024
.1024
800
800 k
I
600
600 I
578^
5781
'o I V
400
400
0
283"""
405
200
200 ^^-•: 359
359
..~'
^i53~:,o.."~. ..
~'.rr...."-"'9ii
153»' 211
211
25,,,. 1,53;: "■" •■*' 115
A-/
3 16 38
38 44
44
26
26
1940 1940 1941 1941 1942
1942
1ST HALF
HALF 2ND
2ND HALF
HALF 1ST
1ST HALF
HALF 2N0 HALF
2ND HALF 1942
1942 1943
1943 tnmo
1943
1ST
1ST HALF
HALF 2ND HALF 1ST HALF
HALF ZNoliLF
1ST 2ND HALF
THE
THE TURN TO RUSSIA
TURN TO RUSSIA

that
that the
the warwar in in the
the east
east would
would continue
continue with with its
its ever-vaster
ever-vaster commitments
commitments and and itsits
interminable distances . In the west, after a year and half of frustration, the British
interminable distances. In the west, after a year and half of frustration, the British
were
were beginning
beginning to to acquire
acquire thethe capability
capability needed
needed to to savage
savage German
German citiescities by by night,
night,
while
while the
the first
first units
units ofof the
the American
American Army Army Air Air Forces
Forces would
would soon soon appear
appear over over thethe
daytime
daytime skies
skies of of Western
Western Europe
Europe.. InIn the
the Mediterranean,
Mediterranean, the the Germans
Germans had had virtually
virtually
lost
lost control
control of of the
the skies
skies over
over the Africa Corps
the Africa Corps.. Thus,
Thus, everywhere
everywhere GermanyGermany faced faced
increasing
increasing commitments
commitments with with forces
forces that
that barely
barely reached
reached prewar
prewar levels
levels..
The
The reasons
reasons for for this
this dangerous
dangerous situation
situation are are not
not hard
hard to find. A
to find. A failure
failure to to draw
draw
objective
objective conclusions
conclusions from from thethe attrition
attrition rates
rates ofof 1940,
1940, overweening
overweening pride pride andand
arrogance
arrogance afterafter the
the early
early victories,
victories, andand aa refusal
refusal toto recognize
recognize the the fact
fact that
that modern
modem
war
war ever
ever since
since thethe time
time ofof the
the American
American Civil Civil War
War has
has been
been aa struggle
struggle of of industrial
industrial
production
production as as well
well asas aa conflict
conflict on on thethe battlefield
battlefield allall converged
converged to to weaken
weaken the the
Luftwaffe
Lirftwaffe fatally
fatally.. Combined
Combined with with these
these failings
failings went
went aa regime,
regime, the the criminal
criminal
inclinations
inclinations of which have
of which have rarely
rarely been
been equalled
equalled in in history
history.. Whatever
Whatever political
political
opportunities
opportunities existedexisted in in the
the campaign
campaign againstagainst Russia
Russia which,
which, combined
combined with with
military
military success,
success, might have threatened
might have threatened Stalin's
Stalin's government
government never never camecame to to fruition.
fruition.
Germany
Germany now now faced
faced aa worldwide
worldwide coalition
coalition withwith an
an army
army nearnear defeat
defeat in in Russia
Russia and and
an
an air
air force
force that
that was
was already
already in in serious
serious trouble.
trouble. TheThe fact
fact that
that the
the Reich
Reich recovered
recovered
from
from this
this situation
situation andand managed
managed to to hold
hold onon for
for the
the next
next three
three and
and one-half
one-half yearsyears is is aa
remarkable
remarkable comment
comment on on the
the staying
staying power
power of of the
the German
German people
people and and their
their military
military
institutions,
institutions, if if not
not their
their good
good sense
sense.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the defeat
defeat in in front
front of of Moscow
Moscow
represented
represented the the decisive
decisive military turning point
military turning point ofof World
World War War IIII.. From
From this
this point
point on,
on,
Germany
Germany had had no no chance
chance to to win
win the
the war
war;; and
and with
with her
her inadequate
inadequate production,
production, she she
faced
faced enemies
enemies who who would
would soon
soon enjoy
enjoy overwhelming
overwhelming numerical
numerical superiority
superiority in in the
the air
air
and
and on
on the
the ground
ground..

107
Notes
Notes
11.. Andreas
Andreas Hillgruber,
Hillgruber, Hitlers
Hitlers Strategie
Strategic.. Politik
Politik and Kriegfahrung, 1940-1941
undKriegfUhrung, 1940-1941 (Frankfurt,
(Frankfurt, 1965),
1965), pp..
144
144..
22.. GaleazzoCiano,
Galeazzo Ciano, The CianoDiaries, 1939-1943
TheCianoDiaries, 1939-1943 (New (New York, York, 1946),
1946), pp.. 266266..
33.. Halder,
Haider, Kriegstagebuch,
Kriegstagebuch, entry entry for
for 13 .7 .40 ., Vol
13.7.40., Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 21
21..
44.. See
See Halder,
Haider, Kriegstagebuch,
Kriegstagebuch. entry entry forfor 30 .6 .40 ., Vol
30.6.40., Vol.. I,I, pp.. 375
375.. This
This is is the
the partially subjective view
partially subjective view
of
of the
the author,
author, but but one
one must
must notenote that
that unlike
unlike thethe French
French campaign,
campaign, unlike unlike thethe Balkan
Balkan campaign
campaign of of 1941,
1941,
and
and everyevery succeeding
succeeding campaign,
campaign. Hitler Hitler took
took virtually
virtually no no interest
interest in in the
the day-to-day
day-to-day operations
operations of of the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and and thethe planning
planning preparations
preparations for for "Sea
"Sea LionLion." ." This
This does
does suggest
suggest that that "Sea
"Sea Lion"
Lion" operation
operation
aimed largely
aimed largely at at putting
putting pressure
pressure on on the
the British
British to to end
end thethe war
war.. SeeSee also
also Hillgruber,
Hillgruber, Hitlers
Hitlers Strategie,
Strategic, pp..
171
171..
55.. IMT,
IMT, TMWC, TMWC. Vol Vol.. XXVIII,
XXVIIl, pp pp.. 301-03
301-03..
66.. Halder,
UdiieT, Kriegstagebuch,
Kriegstagebuch, entry entry for
for 13 .7 .40 ., Vol
13.7.40., Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 21
21..
77.. JJ.. RR.. M M.. Butler,
Butler, Grand Strategy. Vol
Grand Strategy, Vol.. II,
11, September
September 1939-June1939-June 1941 1941 (London,
(London, 1957),
1957), pp pp.. 209,
209,
239-41
239-41;; WinstonWinston Churchill,
Churchill, The The Second
Second World World War. War, Vol Vol.. II, II, Their
Their Finest
Finest HourHour (Boston,
(Boston, 1948),
1948), pp pp..
119-72
119-72..
88.. Jodl's
Jodl's testimony,
testimony, IMT, IMT, TMWC,TMWC, Vol Vol.. XV,
XV, pp.. 428428..
99.. Hillgruber,
Hillgruber, HitlersHitlers Strategie,
Strategic, note note 6, p . 146
6, p. 146..
10. Halder, Kriegstagebuch,
m.HfMer, Kriegstagebuch. entry entry for .10 .40 ., Vol
for 33.10.40., Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 124
124..
11
11.. Galeazzo
Galeazzo Ciano, Ciano, Ciano's
Ciano's Diplomatic
Diplomatic PapersPapers (London,
(London, 1948), 1948), pp.. 402
402..
12
12.. For
For details
details of of the
the meeting
meeting between
between Molotov
Molotov and and Ribbentrop,
Ribbentrop, see DGFP, Series
seeDGFP, Series D,D, Vol
Vol.. XI,
XI, Docs
Docs..
#325, 13 .11 .40 . ; #326,
#325,13.11.40.; #326, 16 .11 .40 . ; #328,
16.11.40.; #328, 15 .11 .40 . ; #329,
15.11.40.; #329, 18 .11 .40 .
18.11.40.
13
13.. ForFor aa full
full discussion
discussion of of Soviet
Soviet foreign
foreign policy
policy and and motives
motives duringduring thisthis period,
period, see see Adam
Adam Ulam's
Ulam's
brilliant
brilliant work work Expansion
Expansion and and Coexistence
Coexistence (New (New York,
York, 1974)1974);; see see also
also Gerhard
Gerhard Weinberg,
Weinberg, Germany
Germany and and
the
the Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, 1939-1941
1939-1941 (Leiden,(Leiden, 1954)
1954)..
14
14.. DGFP,
DGFP, Series Series D, D, Vol
Vol.. X,X, Docs
Docs.. #384,
#384, #393 #393..
15
15.. Ibid
Ibid., ., Doc
Doc.. #413
#413..
16.
16. DGFP,
DGFP, Series Series D, D, Vol XI, Doc
Vol.. XI, Doc.. #84,
#84, 21 .9 .40 .
21.9.40.
17
17.. Ibid
Ibid.,., Docs
Docs.. #1, .9 .40 . ; #7,
#1, 11.9.40.; .9 .40 .
#7, 33.9.40.
18
18.. Ibid
Ibid., ., Docs
Docs.. #91,
#91, 23 .9 .40 . ; #142,
23.9.40.; #142, 22.10.40.;
.10 .40 . ; #148, 4 .10 .40 . ; #178,
#148,4.10.40.; #178, 14 .10 .40 . ; #197,
14.10.40.; #197, 19,10
19,10.40..40 .
The
The Germans
Germans did did claim
claim that
that the
the 1,800
1,800 troops
troops remaining
remaining in Finland would
in Finland would be be reduced
reduced to to 100
100 men
men asas soon
soon
as
as the
the move
move had had finished
finished..
19.
19. Ibid
Ibid.,., Doc
Doc.. #532,
#532, 18 .12 .40 .
18.12.40.
20.
20. SeeSee thethe discussion
discussion in in Klaus
Klaus Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vor vor Moskau,
Moskau, Das Das Scheitern
Scheitern der der Strategie
Strategic Hitlers
Hitlers
im
im Winter
Winter 1941142
1941142 (Stuttgart,
(Stuttgart, 1972),
1972), pp pp.. 16-17
16-17..
21
21.. Franklin
Franklin D D.. Roosevelt,
Roosevelt, The The Public
Public Papers
Papers and arul Addresses
Addresses of of Franklin
Franklin D D.. Roosevelt
Roosevelt (London,
(London,
1941),
1941), pp.. 263 263.. ForFor the
the best
best discussion
discussion of of those
those military
military and and political
political factors
factors involved
involved in wartime Italy,
in wartime Italy, aa
country
country that that rivaled
rivaled the the Third
Third Reich
Reich andand Stalin's
Stalin's Russia
Russia in in mendacity
mendacity ifif not not inin competence,
competence, see see Bernard
Bernard
M
M.. Knox's
Knox's brilliant
brilliant dissertation,
dissertation, "1940"1940.. Italy's `Parallel War',
Italy's 'Parallel War', "" Yale Yale University
University dissertation
dissertation (1976)
(1976)..
22
22.. This
This generalization
generalization on on the
the state
state ofof Italian
Italian preparation
preparation isis drawn drawn fromfrom Knox,
Knox, ""1940.1940 . Italy's
Italy's `Parallel
'Parallel
War',
War', "" pp pp.. 21-77,
21-77, and and my my dissertation,
dissertation, "The "The Change
Change in in the
the European
European Balance
Balance of of Power,"
Power," Chapter
Chapter 77..
For
For the the inability
inability of of the
the Italian
Italian airair force
force to to report
report itsits numbers
numbers accurately,
accurately, see see Knox,
Knox, pp.. 57 57.. The
The air
air force
force
Chief
Chief of of Staff
Staff reported
reported to to Mussolini
Mussolini in in April
April 19391939 that
that the
the air
air force
force possessed
possessed 3,000 3,000 aircraft
aircraft;; the
the navy's
navy's
intelligence
intelligence service,service, spying
spying on on the
the air
air force,
force, could
could only
only locate
locate 982 982..
23
23.. Bernard
Bernard M M.. Knox,
Knox, "Fascist
"Fascist Italy
Italy Assesses
Assesses Its Its Enemies,
Enemies, 1935-1940,"
1935-1940," aa paper paper delivered
delivered at at Harvard
Harvard
University,
University, John John F F.. Kennedy
Kennedy SchoolSchool of of Government,
Government, July July 19801980..
24
24.. DGFP,
DGFP, Series SeriesD, D, Vol
Vol.. XI,
XI, Doc
Doc.. #73,
#73, 20 .9 .40 .
20.9.40.
25
25.. Captain
Captain SS.. W W.. Roskill,
Roskill, TheThe WarWar at at Sea,
Sea, Vol
Vol.. II (London,
(London, 1976), 1976), pp pp.. 300-01
300-01..
26
26.. Major
Major General
General II.. SS.. O O.. Playfair,
Playfair, The The Mediterranean
Mediterranean and and thethe Middle
Middle East, East, VolVol.. I,I, The
The Early
Early
Successes
Successes Against Italy (London,
Against Italy (London, 1974),pp
1974), pp..272-93272-93..
27
27.. Kriegstagebuch
Kriegstagebuch des des Oberkommandos
Oberkommandos der der Wehrmacht,
Wehrmacht, (KTB OKW), Vol
(KTB OKW), Vol.. I,I, ed
ed.. bbyy Hans-Adolf
Hans-Adolf
Jacobsen
Jacobsen (Frankfurt
(Frankfurt am am Main,
Main, 1965),
1965), entryentry for for 99.8.40.,
.8 .40 ., pp.. 17 17.. See
See also
also Walter
Walter Warlimont,
Warlimont, InsideInside
Hitler's
Hitler's Headquarters
Headquarters (New (New York, 1964), pp.. 110
York, 1964), 110.. For
For the the Italian
Italian rebuff
rebuff of of German
German offersoffers ofof help,
help, see
see
DGFP,
DGFP, Series SeriesD, D, Vol
Vol.. XI,
XI, Doc
Doc.. # 149, 4 .10 .40 . ; and
#149,4.10.40.; and note
note pp.. 462462..
28 . DGFP, Series
li.DGFP, Series D, D, Vol
Vol.. XI,
XI, Doc
Doc.. #369,
#369, 20 .11 .40 .
20.11.40.
29
29.. Playfair,TheMediterranean
Playfair, The Mediterranean and and the Middle East,
the Middle East, pp pp.. 315-21
315-21..
30
30.. DGFP,
DGFP. Series SeriesD, D, Vol
Vol.. IX,
IX, Doc
Doc.. #583,
#583, 30 .12 .40 . ; see
30.12.40.; also #597,
see also #597, 22.1.41.
.1 .41 .

108
108
THE
THE TURN
TURN TO
TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

31 Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg
31.. Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg to to Defeat,
Defeat, Directive
Directive #22, #22, pp pp.. 53-54
53-54..
32
32.. See,
See, in in particular,
particular, B B.. H H.. Liddell
Liddell Hart,
Hart, History
History of of the
the Second
Second World World WarWar (New
(New York,
York, 1971),
1971), who who
devotes
devotes 103 103 pages
pages to to the North African
the North African campaign
campaign in in 1941-42
1941--42 and and only
only 5353 pages
pages toto the
the German
German campaign
campaign
in
in Russia
Russia in 1941-42..
in 1941-42
33
33.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 II/38,
11/38, Verbindungsstab
Verbindungsstab zur zur italienischen Luftwaffe, Nr
italienischen Luftwaffe, Nr 2212/41,
2212/41, 11 .2 .41 .,
11.2.41.,
"Kriegsgliederung der
"Kriegsgliederung italienischen Fliegertruppe
deritalienischen Fliegertruppe.. Stand St4nd 11 .7 .41 ."
11.7.41."
34
34.. DGFP,
DGFP, Series Series D, D, Vol
Vol.. XI, Doc. #368,
XI, Doc. #368, 20 .11 .40 .
20.11.40.
35.. Martin
35 Martin L L.. van Creveld, Hitler's
van Creveld, Hitler's Strategy
Strategy 1940-1941,
1940-1941, The The Balkan
Balkan ClueClue (Cambridge,
(Cambridge, 1973),1973), pp pp..
114-30
114-30..
36.. JJ.. R
36 R.. M M.. Butler,
Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol
Grand Strategy, Vol.. II,
II, September
September 1939-June
1939-June 1941 1941 (London,
(London, 1957),
1957), pp.. 449
449..
31.. Trevor-Roper,
37 TrewoT-RoipeT, BlitzkriegBlitzkrieg to Defeat, Directive
to Defeat, Directive #25, #25, pp.. 61 61..
38
38.. van Creveld, Hitler's
\imCreve\d, Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941, pp.. 145
Strategy 1940-1941, 145..
39
39.. For
For thethe bestbest concise
concise history
history of of the
the war
war in the Balkans,
in the Balkans, see see George
George Blau, The German
Blau, The German Campaigns
Campaigns
in
in the
the Balkans
Balkans (Spring (Spring 1941)
1941) (Washington,
(Washington, 1953) 1953)..
40
40.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall of ofthe
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 123 123..
41
41.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 7/657,
7/657, Luftflottenkommando
Luftflottenkommando 4, 4, Fuhrungsabteilung
Fuhrungsabteilung la la op
op Nr
Nr 1000/41,
1000/41, Wein,
Wein, 31 .3 .41 .,
31.3.41.,
"Befehl
"Befehl fur fur die
die Luftkriegfuhrung
Luftkriegfiiihrung Jugoslawien
Jugoslawien." ."
42
42.. Irving,
Irving, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of of the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 118 118..
43
43.. For
For the the effect
effect of of air
air operations
operations on on the
the Yugoslav
Yugoslav army, army, see see BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 7/656,
7/656, Auszug
Auszug aus aus dem
dem
Tagebuch
Tagebuch der der jugosl
jugosl.. Obersten
Obersten Heeresleitung
Heeresleitung..
44
44.. KTB
KTB OKW, OKW, Vol Vol.. I,I, entry
entry forfor 18 .4 .41 ., pp.. 382
18.4.41., 382..
45
45.. See
See Blau,
Blau, The German Campaign
The German Campaign in in the
the Balkans
Balkans..
46
46.. See
See Hans-Otto Miihleisen, Kreta
Hans-Otto Mdhleisen, Kreta 1941,
1941, DasDas Unternehmen
Untemehmen 'Merkur' 'Merkur' (Freiburg,
(Freiburg, 1968)
1968)..
47
47.. Ibid
Ibid., ., pp.. 102
102..
48
48.. For
For an an interesting
interesting discussion
discussion of of this
this point,
point, see see vanvan Creveld,
Creveld, Hitler's
Hitler's Strategy
Strategy 1940-1942,
1940-1942, pp pp..
172-78
172-78..
49
49.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 II/1025,
11/1025, Genst Genst.. 66.Abt.
.Abt . (III
(Ill A),
A), Front-Flugzeug-Verluste
Front-Flugzeug-Verluste.. May's May's lossloss rate
rate was
was
distorted
distorted and and considerably
considerably higher higher thanthan shown
shown because
because the the transport
transport losses
losses inin the
the Crete
Crete operation
operation hadhad notnot
yet
yet been
been reported
reported..
50
50.. George
George E. E. Blau,
Blau, The The German
German CampaignCampaign in in Russia-Planning
Russia—Planning and and Operations
Operations (1940-1942)
(1940-1942)
(Washington,
(Washington, 1955), 1955), pp pp.. 6-12
6-12..
51
51.. DGFP,
DGFP, Series Series D, D, Vol
Vol.. XI,
XI, Doc
Doc.. #532,
#532, 18 .12 .40 .
18.12.40.
52
52.. Hillgruber,
Hillgruber, Hiders Hitlers Strategie,
Strategie, pp pp.. 210-11
210-11..
53
53.. Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vor vor Moskau,
Moskau, pp.. 19 19..
54
54.. Blau,
Blau, The The German
German Campaign
Campaign in Russia, pp.. 42
in Russia, 42.. See
See also
also Guderian,
Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp.. 143,
Panzer Leader, 143, forfor his
his
remark
remark that that aa tour
tour of of German
German tank tank production
production facilities
facilities during
during which which thethe Russians
Russians had had claimed
claimed that
that the
the
Germans
Germans were were hiding
hiding bothboth their
their latest
latest tank
tank designs
designs and and other
other factories
factories hadhad alarmed
alarmed himhim..
55
55.. II am am indebted
indebted to to Jdrgen
Jurgen Forster
Forster of of the
the Militdrgeschichtliches
Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt
Forschungsamt for for discussing
discussing his his
work
work withwith me me in in this
this field
field.. HisHis work
work willwill appear
appear in in the
the fourth
fourth volume
volume of of the
the Forschungsamt's
Forschungsamt's historyhistory of of
World
Worid War War II II.. For
For aa summary
summary of of this
this work,
work, the the reader
reader should
should consult
consult "Hitler's
"Hitler's WarWar Aims
Aims Against
Against the the
Soviet
Soviet Union
Union and and the German Military
the German Military Leaders,"
Leaders," Militdrhistorisk
Militdrhistorisk TidskriftTidskrift (Stockholm,
(Stockholm, 1979) 1979)..
56
56.. Haider,
Haider, Kriegstagebuch,
Kriegstagebuch. entry entry forfor 30 .3 .41 ., Vol
30.3.41., Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 337
337..
57
57.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 9/85,
9/85, Kommandeurbesprechung
Kommandeurbesprechung vom vom 18 .6 .41 ., Deutsche
18.6.41,, Deutsche Luftwaffenmission
Luftwaffenmission in in
Rumanien
Rumanien..
58
58.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, R R 31-1/24
31-1/24.. Der Der Befehlshaber
Befehlshaber der der deutschen
deutschen Heeres-Mission
Heeres-Mission in in Ruminien,
Rumanien,
Stabsbesprechung,9
Stabsbesprechung, 9.10.40. .10 .40 .
59 . See,
59. See, in in particular,
particular, Forster's
Forster's "Hitler's
"Hitler's War War AimsAims Against
Against the the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union and and the
the German
German
Military
Military Leaders
Leaders." ." For
For the
the treatment
treatment of of Soviet
Soviet prisoners
prisoners of of war,
war, seesee:: Christian
Christian Streit,
Streit, Keine
Keine Kameraden,
Kameraden,
Die
Die Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht and unddiedie sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945
sowjetischenKriegsgefangenen 1941-1945 (Stuttgart,
(Stuttgart, 1978)
1978)..
60
60.. Quoted
Quoted in in:: Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vorMoskau,
vor Moskau, pp.. 21 21..
61 . Ibid
61. Ibid., ., p.p. 2727.. What
What isis so so surprising
surprising about about all all of
of this
this is
is that
that inin the
the First
First World
Worid War,
War, itit had
had taken
taken thethe
German
German army army three three years
years of of hard
hard fighting
fighting to to beat
beat thethe Russians
Russians;; they they had,
had, thus,
thus, been
been there
there before,
before, and and
post-war
post-war protestations
protestations about about having
having been been surprised
surprised by by conditions
conditions in Russia are
in Russia not credible
are not credible considering
considering
the German experience
the German experience in in World
World War War II..
62
62.. For
For an an interesting
interesting discussion
discussion of of the
the problems
problems of of logistics
logistics and and supply
supply in in the
the Russian
Russian campaign,
campaign, see see
Martin van
Martin van Creveld,
CreweXd, Supplying
Supplying War (Cambridge, 1977),
War (Cambridge, 1977), Chapter
Chapter V V..
63.. Reinhardt,Die
63 Reinhardt,DiV Wende vor Moskau, pp.. 25
Werule vorMoskau, 25..
64.. DGFP,
64 DGFP, Series SeriesD, D, VolVol.. XI,
XI, Doc
Doc.. #532,18 .12 .40 .
#532, 18.12.40.

109
109
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

65
65.. Goring
Goring admitted
admitted as as much
much.. SeeSee the
the speech
speech of of the
the head
head of of the
the Air
Air Mission
Mission in in Rumania
Rumania briefing
briefing senior
senior
officers
officers in in that
that country
country on on the
the contents
contents of of aa meeting
meeting of of senior
senior German
German air air force
force generals
generals at at Karinhall
Karinhall..
BA/MA, RL
BA/MA, RL 9/85,
9/85, Kommandeurbesprechung
Kommandeurbesprechung vom vom 18 .6 .41 . Deutsche
18.6.41. Deutsche Luftwaffenmission
Luftwaffenmission in in Rumdnien
Rumanien..
66
66.. "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe StrengthStrength andand Serviceability
Serviceability Tables,Tables, August
August 1938-April
1938-April 1945,"
1945," AHB,AHB, Translation
Translation No No..
VII/ 107 .
VII/107.
67
67.. Air Ministry, The
Air Ministry, The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 165
165;; see
see also
also for
for similar
similar figures
figures:: Olaf
Olaf
Groehler,
Groehler, "Starke,"Starke, Verteilung
Verteilung and und Verluste
Verluste der der deutschen
deutschen Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe im im zweiten
zweiten Weltkrieg,"
Weltkrieg,"
Militdrgeschichte,
Militdrgeschichte, 1978, 1978, pp
pp.. 322-23
322-23..
68.. Blau,
68 Blau, The The German Campaign in
German Campaign Russia, pp.. 42
inRussia, 42..
69
69.. By
By fall
fall 1941,
1941, losses
losses inin night operations by
night operations by HeHe IIll's
l 1's had
had reached
reached the point where
the point where He He Ill's
Ill's were
were
pulled
pulled offoff of
of operations
operations eveneven at at night
night in in the
the west
west.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/50,
3/50, Kommando
Kommando der der Erprobungsstellen
Erprobungsstellen
der
der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Nr Nr 15520/42
15520/42 gg.. Kdos
Kdos "Gedanken
' 'Gedanken fiber iiber das
das mittlere
mittlere Kampfflugzeug
Kampfflugzeug.'' ."
70
70.. See
See the
the discussion
discussion in in Hinsley,
Hinsley, British Intelligence in
British Intelligence in the
the Second
Second World
World War,War, VolVol.. I,
L pp
pp.. 326-28
326-28..
71
71.. For
For aa fuller
fuller description
description of of the
the course
course of of the
the purges,
purges, see see Robert
Robert Conquest,
Conquest, The The Great
Great Terror,
Terror,
Stalin's
Stalin's Purge
Purge of of the
the Thirties
Thirties (London,
{honion, 1968), 1968), Chapter
Chapter VIIVIL.
72
72.. See
See John
John Erickson,
Erickson, The The Road
Road toto Stalingrad
Stalingrad (New{^tvi York,
York, 1975),
1975), Chapter
Chapter IL.
73
73.. For
For an an interesting
interesting and informed discussion
and informed discussion of of the
the intelligence
intelligence background
background to to "Barbarossa,"
"Barbarossa," see see
Barton
Barton Whale,
Whale, Codeword
Codeword Barbarossa
Barbarossa (Cambridge,
(Cambridge, 1973) 1973)..
74
74.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/49
8/49 Russland-Feldzug
Russland-Feldzug 1941 1941:: VIII
VIII Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps.. See See also
also Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, TheThe Rise
Rise and
and
Fall
Fall ofof the German Air
the German Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 162-65,
162-65, for for the
the movement
movement of of German
German air air units
units toto the
the east
east..
75
75.. Erickson,
Erickson, The The Road
Road to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp pp.. 101-35
101-35..
76
76.. Seymour
Seymour Freiden Freiden and
and William
William Richardson,
Richardson, eds, eds, The Fatal Decisions
The Fatal Decisions (New (New York,
York, 1956),
1956), pp.. 5656..
77
77.. BA/MA
BA/MA,, RL RL 8/31
8/31 Generalkommando
Generalkommando des des IVIV.. Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps Abt Abt.. Ic,
Ic, "Lagebericht
"Lagebericht vv.. 22 .6 .41 . "
22.6.41."
78
78.. Erickson,
Erickson, The The Road
Road to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp.. 118-19
118-19..
79
79.. Albert
Albert Kesselring,
Kesselring, A A Soldier's
Soldier's Record
Record (New (New York,
York, 1953),
1953), pp.. 90
90..
80
80.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL 8/31 Generalkommando
RL 8/31 Generalkommando des des IVIV.. Fliegerkorps
Fliegericorps Abt Abt.. Ic, "Lagebericht vv.. 22
Ic, "Lagebericht .6 .41 ."
22.6.41."
81
81.. Irving,
Irving, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofthe
of the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 123 123..
82
82.. Erickson,
Erickson, The The Road
Road to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp pp.. 150-59
150-59.. Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vor vor Moskau,
Moskau, pp.. 28, 28, gives
gives
the
the following
following figures figures:: 330,000
330,000 prisoners,
prisoners, 3,000 3,000 artillery
artillery pieces,
pieces, and and 3,332
3,332 tankstanks.. Halder,
Haider,
Kriegstagebuch,
Kriegstagebuch, Vol Vol.. III,
Ill, pp.. 56,
56, gives
gives 289,874
289,874 prisoners,
prisoners, 2,585
2,585 captured
captured and and destroyed
destroyed tanks,
tanks, 1,449
1,449
artillery
artillery pieces,
pieces, and and 246
246 aircraft.
aircraft.
83
83.. Blau,
Blau, The The German
German Campaign
Campaign in Russia, pp.. 49
inRussia, 49..
84
84.. Halder,
Haider, Kriegstagebuch,
Kriegstagebuch, Vol Vol.. III,
Ill, pp.. 38
38..
85
85.. van
van Creveld,
Creveld, Supplying
Supplying War,War, pppp.. 168-69
168-69..
86
86.. Halder,
Haider, Kriegstagebuch,
Kriegstagebuch, Vol Vol.. III,
Ill, pp.. 106
106..
87
87.. See,
See, in in particular,
particular, vanvan Creveld,
Creveld, Supplying
Supplying War, War, pppp.. 167-80
167-80..
88
88.. Halder,
Haider, Kriegstagebuch,
Kriegstagebuch, Vol Vol.. III,
IH, pp.. 170
170..
89
89.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/49
8/49 Russland-Feldzug
Russland-Feldzug 1941 1941:: VIII
VIII Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps..
90 . Ibid .
90.Ibid.
91
91.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 10/17
10/17 Auszug
Auszug aus aus dem dem Frontflugbuch
Frontflugbuch des des ehem
ehem.. StffFw
StffFw.. Fritz
Fritz Hoyer,
Hoyer, Stabsstaffel
Stabsstaffel
Kampfgeschwader
Kampfgeschwader 22 vom vom 2424.. Juni
Juni bis
bis 29 .10 .41 .
29.10.41.
92
92.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/49
8/49 Russland-Feldzug
Russland-Feldzug 1941 1941:: VIII
VIII Fliegerkorps
Hiegerkorps..
93
93.. v.
V. Richthofen Tagebuch, entries
RichthofenTagebuch, for 8 .9 .-9 .9 .41 .
entriesfor8.9.-9.9.41.
94
94.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/47
8/47 Generalkommando
Generalkommando II.. A A.. K K.,., Abt,
Abt, la la 545/41,
545/41, 16 .9 .41 ., "Einsatz
16.9.41., "Einsatz des des
Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps VIII VIII vomvom 10 .-21 .8 .41 .," Appendix
10.-21.8.41.," Appendix I, I, Tatigkeit
Tatigkeit desdes VIIIVIII.. Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps bei bei derder
Unterstutzung
Unterstiitzung des des Durchbruchs
Durchbruchs des des II.. A A.. K K.. hisbis zur
zur Eisenbahnlinie
Eisenbahnlinie Leningrad-Moskau
Leningrad-Moskau vom vom
10 .8 .41 .-21 .8 .41 .
10.8.41.-21.8.41.
95.. For
95 the movement
For the movement of of Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe units units on
on the
the eastern
eastern front,
front, see
see particularly
particularly Air Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise
and
and Fall
Fall of the Luftwaffe,
of the Luftwaffe, pp pp.. 167-70
167-70.. See See also
also BA/MA,
BA/MA, RH RH 19II/661D,
19II/661D, "Der Feldzug gegen die Sowjet
"DerFeldzuggegendieSowjet
Union
Union:: Kriegsjahr
Kriegsjahr 1941 1941:: Bearbeitet
Bearbeitet in in der
der Fdhrungsabteilung
Fiihrungsabteilung des des Oberkommandos
Oberkommandos der der Heeresgtuppe
Heeresgruppe
Nord"
Nord";; and and also also Auszug
Auszug aus aus dem
dem Frontflugbuch
Frontflugbuch des des ehem
ehem.. StffFw
StffFw.. FritzFritz Hoyer,
Hoyer, Stabsstaffel
Stabsstaffel
Kampfgeschwader
Kampfgeschwader 22..
96
96.. Harrison
Harrison Salisbury,
Salisbury, TheThe 900
900 Days,
Days, The The Siege
Siege ofofLeningrad
Leningrad (New (New York,
York, 1969),
1969), pp.. 582
582..
97.. Erickson,
97 Erickson, The The Road
Road toto Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp pp.. 198-210
198-210..
98
98.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp.. 210
210..
99.. BA/MA,
99 BA/MA, RH RH 19 III/6561 D,
19III/6561 D, "Der
"Der Feldzug
Feldzug gegen
gegen diedie Sowjet
Sowjet Union: Kriegsjahr 1941
Union: Kriegsjahr 1941:: Bearbeitet
Bearbeitet in in
der Fiihrungsabteilung des
der Fuhrungsabteilung des Oberkommandos
Oberkommandos der der Heeresgruppe
Heeresgruppe Nord ."
Nord.''
100 . Reinhardt,
ICX). Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vor Moskau, pp.. 67
vor Moskau, 67..

110
THE
THE TURN
TURN TO
TO RUSSIA
RUSSIA

101 For aa more


101.. For more complete
complete discussion
discussion of the Kryansk/Vyazma
of the Kryansk/Vyazma disaster, disaster, see Reinhardt, Die
see Reinhardt, Die Wende
Wende vorvor
Moskau,
Moskau. pp. pp . 67-74
67-74;; and and Erickson,
Erickson, The The Road
Road to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp pp.. 214-19
214-19..
102 Lieutenant General
102.. Lieutenant General K K.. FF.. Telegin,
Telegin, "German Breakthrough," quoted
"German Breakthrough," quoted in in Stalin
Stalin and
and HisHis Generals,
Generals,
ed
edby Seweryn Bialer
by Seweryn Bialer (New
(New York,
York, 1969),
1969), pp.. 273
273..
103
103.. Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Wende vor
Die Wende vor Moskau,
Moskau, pp pp.. 68-69;
68-69; and and Erickson,
Erickson, The The Road
Road to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp pp..
216-17
216-17..
104
104.. Blau,
Blau, The German Campaign
The German Campaign in in Russia,
Russia, pp.. 79 79..
105
105.. Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vorvor Moskau,
Moskau, pp pp.. 74-75
74-75..
106
106.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp
pp.. 56-57
56-57..
107
107.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp.. 73
73..
108
108.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pppp.. 78-79
78-79..
109
109.. van
van Creveld,
Creveld, Supplying
Supplying War,War, p. p. 174
174..
110
110.. Kurt
Kurt Assmann, Deutsche Schicksalsjahre (Wiesbaden, 1951),
Assmann,De«McAe5c/u'cfaa/j/a/irc(Wiesbaden, 1951), pp.. 275275..
111
111.. Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vorvor Moskau,
Moskau, pp pp.. 84-86,
84-86,93. 93 .
112
112.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fidl ofof the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 172-73
172-73.. See See also
also Kesselring,
Kesselring,^ A
Soldier's
Soldier's Record,
Record, pp pp.. 107,
107, 115-17
115-17.. Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps VIII VIII was was scheduled
scheduled to to follow
follow Luftflotte
Luftflotte 22 to to the
the
Mediterranean..
Mediterranean
113.. Air
113 Historical Branch,
Air Historical Branch, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and Serviceability Tables,
and Serviceability Tables, August
August 1938-April
1938-ApriI
1945,"
1945," Translation
Translation No No.. VII/107
VII/107..
114
114.. For
For another
another view view of of Hitler's
Hitler's decision,
decision, seesee Hillgruber, Hitters Strategie,
HilignibeT, Hiders Strategie, pp pp.. 553-54
553-54..
115
115.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 2111/715,
2III/715, Gen Gen.. Qu .Abt . (I),
Qu.. 66.Abt. "Dbersicht fiber
(I), "Ubersicht uber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Verluste
Verluste andund
Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Vetbande,"
Verbande," 11.11.41..11 .41 .
116
116.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL 2111/1025, Genst
RL2III/1025, .Abt . (1II
Genst.. 66.Abt. A), Front-Flugzeug-Verluste,
(Ill A), Front-Flugzeug-V-^rluste, 1941 1941..
117
117.. Ibid
Ibid..
118 . Ibid .
118.Ibid.
119
119.. Ibid
Ibid..
120
120.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/717,
III/717, Gen Gen.. QuQu.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (I),
(I), "Ubersicht
"Obersicht fiber iiber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Verluste
Verluste andund
Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande.'' ."
121
121.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/718,
III/718, Gen Gen.. QuQu.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (I),
(I), "Ubersicht
"Ubersicht fiber uber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Verluste
Verluste andund
Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande.'' ."
122
122.. Irving,
Irving, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofof the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwajfe, pp.. 131131..
123
123.. Air Division, Control
Air Division, Control Commission
Commission for for Germany,
Germany, British British Element,
Element, "A "A Study
Study of of the
the Supply
Supply
Organization
Organizationof of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, 1935-1945,"
1935-1945," (June (June 1946)
1946)..
124
124.. AirAir Historical
Historical Branch,
Branch, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability Tables,
Tables, August
August 1938-April
1938-April
1945,"
1945," Translation
Translation No No.. VII/ 107 .
VII/107.
125
125.. Conversation
Conversation with with Lieutenant
Lieutenant General
General Hannes
Hannes Trautloff, . D ., Baden
Trautloff, aa.D., Baden Baden,
Baden, Federal
Federal Republic
Republic of of
Germany,
Germany, November
November 7, 7, 1980
1980..
126
126.. Letter
Letter fromfrom Major
Major General
General HansHans W W.. Asmus,
Asmus, February
February 6, 1981 .
6,1981.
127
127.. The
The following
following percentages
percentages are are drawn
drawn fromfrom RL RL 22 III/715,
III/715, 716,716, 717 717:: Gen
Gen Qu Qu.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (I),
(I),
"Omrsicht
"Ubersicht fiberiiber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Verluste
Verluste and und Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande." ."
128
128.. For
For aa fuller
fiiller discussion
discussion of of the
the economic
economic inadequacies
inadequacies of of German
German production
production in in the
the 1940-1941
1940-1941
period,
period, see see the the discussion
discussion in in Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vor vor Moskau,
Moskau, ChapterChapter 1I.. Reinhardt
Reinhardt accepts
accepts the
the
"Blitzkrieg"
"Blitzkrieg" theory,theory, but but his
his analysis
analysis of of the
the actual
actual production
production situation
situation is is excellent
excellent..
129
129.. Guderian,
Gudeiian, PanzerLeader,
Panzer Leader, p. p. 114
114..
130
130.. The
The United
United StatesStates Strategic
Strategic Bombing
Bombing SurveySurvey (USSBS),
(USSBS), The The Effects
Effects of ofStrategic
Strategic Bombing
Bombing on on the
the
German
German War War Economy
Economy (Washington,
(Washington, 1945), 1945), pp.. 151
151..
131
131.. AA.. SS.. Milward,
Mil ward. The The New
New Order
Order andand the
the French
French Economy
Economy (Oxford,
(Oxford, 1970),1970), pp.. 77
77..
132
132.. For
For the the most detailed examination
most detailed examination of of the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's failurefailure to to utilize
utilize properly
properly the the economic
economic
resources
resources of of Europe,
Eurdpe, see see Richard Overy's outstanding
Richard Overy's outstanding article,
article, "The
"The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and and the
the German
German Economy
Economy
1939-1945,"
1939-1945," Milit4rgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 2/79
MilitargeschichtlicheMitteilungen 2/79..
133
133.. One
One must must note
note thatthat in
in terms
terms of of Nazi
Nazi ideology,
ideology, such such actions
actions mademade excellent
excellent sense
sense given
given the
the
purposes
purposes for for which
which Hitler
Hitler hadhad waged
waged this this war
war..
134
134.. For
For aa fuller
fiiUer discussion
discussion of of these
these points,
points, seesee Overy,
Overy, "The "The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and and the German Economy,"
the German Economy,"
pp.. 66-67
pp 66-67..
135
135.. Deist,
Deist, et al., Das
etal.. Das deutsche
deutscheReich Reich and Weltkrieg, Vol
der Zweite Weltkrieg,
undderZweite Vol.. I,I, pp
pp.. 333-34
333-34..
136
136.. Overy,
Overy, "The "The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and and the
the German
German Economy,"
Economy," p. p . 55
55..
137
137.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp.. 59
59..

Ill
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

138 Although there


138.. Although there were
were limits
limits to to what
what oneone could
could do with this
do with this expedient,
expedient, by by 1943
1943 thethe British
British had
had
virtually
virtually exhausted
exhausted all all their sources for
their sources for workers
workers.. See See John
John Ehrman,
Ehrman, Grand Grand Strategy,
Strategy, Vol Vol.. V,
V, August
August
1943-September
1943-September 1944 1944 (London,
(London, 1956),
1956), pp.. 41 41..
139
139.. Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vor vor Moskau,
Moskau, pp.. 104 104..
140
140.. Ibid ., pp.. 188
Ibid., 188..
141
141.. Ciano,
Ciano, TheThe Ciano
Ciano Diaries,
Diaries, pp.. 411 411..
142
142.. USSBS,
USSBS, The The Effects
Ejfects ofofStrategic
Strategic Bombing
Bombing on on the
the German
German War Economy, Appendix
WarEconomy, Appendix TableTable 102,
102,p.p.
277
277..
143
143.. These
These figures
figures areare drawn
drawn fromfrom Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG, Vol Vol.. IV,
IV, Appendix
Appendix xxviii,
xxviii, pppp..
501-04
501-04..
144
144.. The
The above
above calculations
calculations are are based
based on on figures
figures drawn
drawn fromfrom Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,
SAOAG, Vol Vol..
IV,
IV, Appendix
Appendix xxviii, xxviii, pp.. 502502;; and
and AHB,AHB, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability Tables,
Tables, August
August
1938-April
1938-April 1945,"
1945," Translation
Translation VII/ 107 .
VII/107.
145
145.. EE.. Heinkel,
Heinkel, He He 1000
1000 (London,
(London, 1965),
1965), pp.. 180
180..
146
146.. Irving,
Irving, TheThe Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofof the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 120 120..
147
147.. Overy,
Overy, "German
"German Aircraft
Aircraft Production,
Production, 1939-1942,"
1939-1942," pp.. 34 34.. Overy's
Overy's Cambridge
Cambridge University
University
dissertation
dissertation is is the
the most
most careful
careful examination
examination of of the
the failures
failures involved
involved in in the
the production
production of of aircraft
aircraft inin the
the
early
early war years.. All
war years All ofof the
the points
points discussed
discussed in in the
the above
above analysis
analysis are are examined
examined in in greater
greater detail
detail in
in this
this
admirable
admirable workwork..
148
148.. Goring conference, 99.10.43.,
Goring conference, .10 .43 ., Milch Documents, Imperial
MilchDocuments, Imperial War War Museum,
Museum, Vol . LXIII, pp.. 6309
Vol.LXIII, 6309..
149
149.. Goring
Goring to to Milch,
Milch, June
June 1941,
1941, Milch
Milch Documents,
Documents, Imperial
Imperial War War Museum,
Museum, Vol Vol.. LVII,
LVII, pp.. 3213
3213.. See
See
also
also Richard
Richard Suchenwirth,
Suchenwirth, "Command"Command and and Leadership
Leadership in in the
the German
German Air Air Force"
Force" (Air(Air University,
University,
1969),
1969), pp. .99-101 .
pp.-99-101.
150
150.. Conversation
Conversation with with Generalleutnant
Generalleutnant Hannes Trautloff, aa.D.,
Hannes Trautloff, .D ., Baden
Baden Baden,
Baden, November
November 77 and and 8,
8,
1980
1980.. Trautloff,
Trautloff, who who waswas onon thethe fighter
fighter staff
staff with
with Milch
Milch in in 1944,
1944, described
described Milch
Milch asas "the
"the only
only general
general
director
director we we had-the
had—the only only senior
senior officer
officer who who understood
understood the the problems
problems of of modern
modem industry
industry.''."
151
151.. Irving,
Irving, TheThe Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofthe
of the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Chapter
Chapter VIIIVIII..
152
152.. Overy,
Overy, "German
"German Aircraft
Aircraft Production,
Production, 1939-1942,"
1939-1942," pp pp.. 43-44
43-44..
153
153.. Trevor-Roper,
Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg
Blitzkrieg to to Defeat, Directive #32a,
Defeat, Directive #32a, 14 .7 .41 .
14.7.41.
154
154.. Figures
Figures basedbased on on USSBS,
USSBS, ESBGWE,ESBGWE, AppendixAppendix Table Table 102, 102, "Number
"Number of of German
German aircraft
aircraft
produced by
produced by types,
types, annually
annually 1939-1944
1939-1944 and and monthly
monthly 1941-1944,"
1941-1944," and and BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/999
3/999 CC Amts-
Amts-
Programm,
Programm, "Lieferplan,"
"Lieferplan," 15 .9 .41 .
15.9.41.
155
155.. Irving,
Irving, TheThe Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of
ofthethe Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 124124..
156
156.. Overy,
Oveiy, "German
"German Aircraft
Aircraft Production,
Production, 1939-1942,"
193^1942," pp pp.. 45-46
45-46..
157
157.. Conversation
Conversation with with Oberstleumant
Oberstleutnant ii.G. .G . Werner
Werner Geissinger,
Geissinger, GAF, GAF, Air Air War
War College,
College, Maxwell
Maxwell
AFB,
AFB, March
March 10, 10, 1981
1981..
158
158.. Irving,
Irving, The
The Rise
Rise and Fall of
and Fall of the Luftwaffe, pp.. 126
the Luftwaffe, 126..
159
159.. The
The above
above figures
figures areare based
based on on Appendix
Appendix xxxiv,
xxxiv, Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,
SAOAG, Vol Vol.. IV,
IV, pp..
497
497..
160.Ibid
160.Ibid..
161
161..Ibid
Ibid..
162
162..Ibid
Ibid..
163
163.. Goebbels,
Goebbels, The The Goebbels
Goebbels Diaries,
Diaries, 1942-1943,
1942-1943. ed ed.. byby LL.. Lochner
Lochner (New(New York,
York, 1948),
1948), pp
pp . 41,
41 65,
65
104,
104, 169, 251 .
169,251.
164
164.. Asher
Asher Lee,Lee, Goering,
Goering, Air Air Leader
Leader (New(New York,York, 1972),
1972), pp.. 58 58..
165
165.. See
See among
among othersothers DGFP,
DGf/', Series
Series D, D, Vol
Vol.. XI,
XI, Doc
Doc.. #60,
#60, 14 .9 .40 .
14.9.40.
166
166.. Irving,
Irving, TheThe Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofof the
the Luftwaffe,
Li^twaffe, pp.. 127
127..

112
CHAPTER
CHAPTER IV
IV

ON
ON THE
THE BRINK
BRINK::
JANUARY-OCTOBER
JANUARY-OCTOBER 1942
1942
THE
THE EAST
EAST
As
As with
with 1941,1941, the the eastern
eastern theater
theater of of operations
operations remained
remained the the focus
focus of of Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
operations
operations throughout
throughout 1942.' 1942.' (See (See Table
Table XXVXXV.^) .2) Although
Although the the German
German air air force
force
faced
faced critical
critical deployments
deployments and and tasks
tasks elsewhere,
elsewhere, the the bulkbulk of of German
German aircraftaircraft
remained
remained in in the
the east
east until
until events
events in in the
the fall
fall required
required shiftsshifts in in air
air resources
resources.. The The warwar
in
in the
the east
east in in the
the summer
summer of of 1942
1942 superficially
superficially resembled
resembled the the swift
swift advance
advance of of 1941
1941
with aa rapid
with rapid surgesurge towards
towards the Caucasus and
the Caucasus and Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, but but inherent
inherent supply
supply and and
maintenance
maintenance difficulties
difficulties intensified
intensified as as the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe operatedoperated from from bases
bases deepdeep
inside Russia and
inside Russia and farfar from
from its its sources
sources of of supply
supply.. Moreover,
Moreover, the the attrition
attrition thatthat had
had
occurred
occurred duringduring 1941 1941 forced
forced the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to operate
operate with with considerably
considerably less less
effectiveness
effectiveness because because of of less
less well-trained
well-trained crewscrews than than itit had
had in in 1941
1941.. Finally,
Finally, one one
must
must note
note that
that geographic
geographic and climatic problems,
and climatic problems, complicated
complicated by by difficulties
difficulties facing
facing
ground
ground forcesforces that that werewere outnumbered
outnumbered and and losing
losing their their qualitative
qualitative superiority,
superiority,
precluded
precluded the the Lufhvaffe
Luftwaffe from from developing
developing any any new
new role role inin the
the east
east other
other than
than helping
helping
extricate
extricate the the army
army out out ofof increasingly
increasingly dangerous
dangerous situations
situations.. Perhaps,
Perhaps, considering
considering
the
the balance
balance of of forces
forces in in the
the east,
east, ground
ground and and air,
air, there
there waswas no no other
other choice
choice.. Overall,
Overall,
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe attrition
attrition rates
rates forfor the
the year
year showed
showed an an alarming
alarming rise rise over
over those
those of of 1941
1941 (see
(see
Tables
Tables XXVI,3
XXVI,^ XXVII, XXVII,"4 and and XXVIIIS).
XXVIIP).
As
As indicated
indicated in in Chapter
Chapter III, III, the
the German
German failure
failure in in front
front of of Moscow
Moscow in in December
December
1941
1941 andand Russian
Russian counterattacks
counterattacks provoked provoked aa crisiscrisis in in the
the German
German high high command
command
and
and threatened
threatened the the collapse
collapse of of the
the eastern
eastern front.
front. The The Russian
Russian counteroffensive
counteroffensive
caught
caught the the Germans
Germans on on the
the point
point of of final
final exhaustion,
exhaustion, short short of of supplies,
supplies, and and with
with few
few
preparations
preparations to to meet
meet the the winter weather.. Hitler
winter weather Hitler excused
excused his his and
and thethe high
high command's
command's
culpability
culpability by by claiming
claiming that that severe
severe winter
winter weather
weather had had come
come surprisingly
surprisingly early,bearly,* but
but
such claims did little to help troops that were fighting in temperatures 20° below
such claims did little to help troops that were fighting in temperatures 20° below
zero.
zero. AsAs thethe collapse
collapse threatened
threatened to to become
become general,
general, the the Fuhrer
Fuhrer sacked sacked Brauchitsch
Brauchitsch
and
and other
other senior
senior commanders
commanders and and assumed
assumed the the position
position of of Commander
Commander in in Chief
Chief ofof
the
the army
army himself.'
himself.'
Weather
Weather conditions accelerated the
conditions accelerated the attrition
attrition of of men through frostbite
men through frostbite and and of of
equipment through
equipment through cold.cold. By December 16,
By December 16, Panzer
Panzer GroupGroup 22 was was down
down to 40 tanks
to 40 tanks inin
operable condition.. Sixth
operable condition Sixth Panzer Division possessed
Panzer Division possessed only only 350350 riflemen
riflemen and and no no tanks
tanks
by
by the
the 13th,
13th, whilewhile 7th7th Panzer
Panzer Division
Division had combat strength
had aa combat strength of barely 200
of barely 200 men men.*.' In
In
such
such conditions,
conditions, Russian
Russian attacks
attacks threatened
threatened to
to destroy
destroy the
the army
army in
in the
the east.
east. This
This
eventuality did
eventuality did not
not occur
occur for two reasons
for two reasons.. The first was
The first was thatthat the
the vast blood letting
vast blood letting ofof
had left the Russian army with limited resources to achieve its
the summer and fall
the summer and fall had left the Russian army with limited resources to achieve its
objectives.. The
objectives second factor
The second dovetailed with
factor dovetailed with the first.. After
the first After the the first
first flush
flush of of

113
TABLE XXV

GERMAN
GERMAN LOSSES
LOSSES JUN-DEC
JUN-DEC 1942
1942 BY
BY THEATER
THEATER
i5
EASTERN
EASTERN FRONT---
FRONT. STALINGRAD
STALINGRAD H

600
OTHER FRONTS
OTHER FRONTS -----
- . TORCH
TORCH

500
438
436 I
00 0
04, I
408
400
350
" go 388 332 388
00 371 I. 324

300

".."I_
`2oa2
200 " 224
206

100 r

JUNE
JUNE JULY
JULY AUG
AUG 8EP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV
NOV OEC
DEC +m

TABLE
TABLE XXVI
XXVI

GERMAN
GERMAN AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT LOSSES
LOSSES 1942
1942 (ALL
(ALL TYPES)
TYPES)
HEAVY
HEAVY FIGHTING
FIGHTING IN
IN STALINGRAD
STALINGRAD
RUSSIA
RUSSIA TORCH
TORCH
EL
EL ALAMEIN
ALAMEIN
30%
30%

20%
20%

13.6%
13.6%
12 7%
12.7%
11 .9%
11.9% e, 12 .2%
12.2% '
10%
10% 11 .3%0
",^' "
10% - 8.7%
1.7%
" 8.10/ ~'- /
6.6%
6.6% 6.4%
6.4% 000'* " 6.7%
^^.7% 7.3%
7-3%
" Wool
§
J' '1 1 1
I L
I
J1 11 1L 1 J1 1L
JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUN
JUN JUL
JUL AUG
AUG SEP
SEP OCT NOV DEC
OCT NOV DEC
TABLE
TABLE XXVII
XXVII 5
o
■<
GERMAN
GERMAN BOMBER LOSSES 1942
BOMBER LOSSES 1942 •a
O

HEAVY
HEAVY FIGHTING
FIGHTING STALINGRAD
STALINGRAD
IN RUSSIA
IN RUSSIA TORCH
TORCH
EL
EL ALAMEIN
ALAMEIN
30%
30%

23 .3%
23.3%
4

20%
20% 19
19.3%
.3% N
N /
" 0
/>^*N
15.6% ]i.2J^
15 .6%
?
^^^ 14 .2
T /
/
. ' A
"^13.3%
.0000-0
v%
!^s /
13.3% A ~
A " .~./
^S^
IC/o 9.4%
lL 11.7%
11 .7% 11 .7%
11.7%
A
8.2% ^_g„/^ 9.1% B
L
E
X J L 1 Jl1 1
I 1
L 1 ±1
JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUN
JUN JUL
JUL AUG
AUG SEP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV
NOV DEC
DEC
TABLE
TABLE XXVIII
XXVIII

GERMAN FIGHTER LOSSES


GERMAN FIGHTER LOSSES 1942
1942

HEAVY
HEAVY FIGHTING
FIGHTING STALINGRAD
STALINGRAD
IN
IN RUSSIA
RUSSIA TORCH
TORCH
EL ALAMEIN
EL ALAMEIN
30%
30%

20%
20% N
N
18 .9%
18.9% 0
0
16.7%
16.7% T 15 .8%
15.8%
14.2°/.

11 .4% /
11.4% h,%
13 .8%
13.8%
10% r
. ,1000*0 LL ,,_9 .4%
%9.4% 8.7%
IT//
6 .9% 0-,~ AA
6.1% ^-.<^ 9.7%
9-7% BB
" LL §
z
°

EE Hx
1 ±
1 1 J1 1-
I 1l_JL
1 1I 1
L_ 1 J1 1L

JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUN
JUN JUL
JUL AUG
AUG SEP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV
NOV DEC
OEC 1113 z
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

victories
victories in in December,
December, Stalin became overconfident
Stalin became overconfident;; overruling overruling Zhukov, Zhukov, he he setset
wide-ranging
wide-ranging strategicstrategic goals goals that that were beyond the
were beyond the capabilities
capabilities of of his
his forces
forces.' .' The
The
result
result was that everywhere
was that everywhere Soviet Soviet forces
forces succeeded
succeeded in in pushing
pushing the the Germans
Germans back; back;
nowhere
nowhere did they succeed
did they succeed in in fully
fully exploiting
exploiting the the situation
situation.'« .'° Further
Further complicating
complicating
German
German difficulties
difficulties at at the
the front
front waswas aa collapse
collapse of of the
the Wehrmacht's
Wehrmacht's supply supply system.
system.
In the cold, railroad
In the cold, railroad engines
engines froze
froze up
up and
and those
those still
still in
in working
working condition
condition moved
moved
with great difficulty
with great difficulty through
through drifting
drifting snows
snows. . Railroad
Railroad authorities
authorities warned
warned Army
Army
Group Center
Group Center that
that in
in temperatures
temperatures below
below -15°
-15° Centigrade,
Centigrade, over
over 50
50 percent
percent of its
of its
supplies would not get through, and
supplies would not get through, and in
in heavy
heavy snow
snow the
the entire
entire supply
supply system
system might
might
cease
cease toto function
function." ."
Yet
Yet despite
despite the the desperate
desperate situation,
situation, the the Germans
Germans held held the the critical
critical points
points and and
prevented
prevented aa general
general collapse
collapse.. In In February
February 1942, 1942, the the Russians
Russians opened opened aa hundred-
hundred-
mile
mile gapgap between
between Army Army Group Group North North and and Army
Army Group Group Center.
Center. Russian
Russian forces forces
failed
failed to to exploit
exploit theirtheir advantage,
advantage, however, however, and and the the Germans
Germans escaped escaped the the full
full
consequences
consequences of of the breakthrough.. Nevertheless,
the breakthrough Nevertheless, this this time
time thethe RedRed Army
Army managed
managed
to
to isolate
isolate two
two pockets
pockets of of German
German troops troops:: thethe first
first of of approximately
approximately brigade brigade strength
strength
around Kholm, the second containing the better part of two army corps (six
around Kholm, the second containing the better part of two army corps (six
divisions with 100,000 men) near Demyansk . 12
divisions with 100,000 men) near Demyansk.'^ Hitler
Hitier ordered
ordered the
the forces trapped to
forces trapped to
hold in what was optimistically termed the Demyansk "fortress."" The
hold in what was optimistically termed the Demyansk "fortress."'^ The
responsibility
responsibility for for resupplying
resupplying the beseiged forces
the beseiged forces fell fell onon thethe Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's already already
overburdened shoulders .
overburdened shoulders.
By the
By the time
time thatthat the
the spring
spring thaw thaw arrived
arrived in in late
late March,
March, the the immediate
immediate crisis crisis waswas
over. .
over Both sides wearily faced each other with armies that had fought themselves to
Both sides wearily faced each other with armies that had fought themselves to
exhaustion . Attrition of the German army, however, insured that it would never
exhaustion. Attrition of the German army, however, insured that it would never
again
again reach
reach the the level
level of of efficiency
efficiency that that itit had had displayed
displayed at at the
the beginning
beginning of of
"Barbarossa ." On March 25, 1942, Halder recorded German losses in the east as
"Barbarossa." On March 25, 1942, Haider recorded German losses in the east as
32,485 officers and 1,040,581 NCOs, and men from forces that had numbered 3 .2
32,485 officers and 1,040,581 NCOs, and men from forces that had numbered 3.2
million
million at at the
the start
start ofof the
the invasion
invasion (33 .52 percent)
(33.52 percent).''* . '4 This
This total
total did
did not
not include
include those
those
reporting sick. Considering that these totals included support troops, attrition of
reporting sick. Considering that these totals included support troops, attrition of
combat units had undoubtedly exceeded 50 percent . Equipment losses were on aa
combat units had undoubtedly exceeded 50 percent. Equipment losses were on
similar
similar scale
scale.. By By March
March 1942, 1942, tanktank losses
losses had had reached
reached 3,486 3,486 from from aa tank tank force
force
numbering 3,350 in June 1941, and which had received only 873 replacement
numbering 3,350 in June 1941, and which had received only 873 replacement
tanks."
tanks." Not Not surprisingly,
surprisingly, the the number
number of of tanks
tanks readyready for for action
action on on the
the eastern
eastern front
front
on
on March
March 30, 30, 1942,
1942, was was 140 140.'* .'6 Losses
Losses in in artillery,
artillery, trucks,
trucks, and and support
support vehicles
vehicles were were
comparable
comparable..
The
The winter
winter crisis
crisis only
only intensified
intensified Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe problem
problem areas areas (inadequate
(inadequate production
production
and
and maintenance,
maintenance, and and declining
declining crew crew capabilities)
capabilities).. The The failure
failure to to defeat
defeat Russia,
Russia,
unlike
unlike thethe situation
situation the the previous
previous year, meant that
year, meant that the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe faced faced inescapable
inescapable
commitments
commitments with with no no possibility
possibility of of aa lull in operations
lull in operations during during which which itit could
could
rehabilitate
rehabilitate exhausted
exhausted flying flying units.units. Generally,
Generally, however, however, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was was better
better
prepared
prepared for for cold
cold weather
weather than than thethe army.
army. The The air air transport
transport systemsystem enabled
enabled itit to to
evade
evade supply
supply bottlenecks
bottlenecks and and to to move
move winter
winter clothing
clothing forward forward to to its units in
its units in Russia.
Russia.
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the weather
weather was was no no kinder
kinder to the Luftwaffe's
to the Luftwaffe's ground ground transportation
transportation
system;
system; by by January
January 1942, 1942, only only 15 15 percent
percent of of thethe 100,000
100,000 air air force
force vehicles
vehicles in in the
the

118
ON THE
ON THE BRINK
BRINK

east
east remained
remained in working condition
in working condition.'^ ." Vehicle
Vehicle shortages
shortages forced
forced some
some units
units to
to use
use
shovels
shovels and
and peasant sleds to
peasant sleds to clear
clear snow
snow fromfrom airfields
airfields.. The
The cold
cold itself
itself presented
presented
numerous
numerous problems
problems from from starting
starting aircraft
aircraft toto performing
performing simple
simple maintenance
maintenance..
Mechanics
Mechanics had had to to preheat
preheat tools
tools before
before beginning
beginning workwork andand repeat
repeat the the heating
heating
operation several times thereafter while working in the open ." Special weather
operation several times thereafter while working in the open.'* Special weather
conditions
conditions inin Russia
Russia demanded
demanded special
special procedures
procedures and and the
the development
development of of specific
specific
equipment
equipment items,
items, most
most ofof which could not be available until the following winter .
which could not be available until the following winter.
Moreover,
Moreover, the the army's
army's plight
plight forced
forced air air force
force commanders
commanders to to commit
commit their
their
resources to aid
resources to aid frontline
frontline crises,
crises, while
while heavyheavy losses
losses ofof artillery
artillery increased
increased demands
demands
for
for close
close air support.. The
air support The fact
fact that
that the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe possessed
possessed few few ground
ground support
support
aircraft
aircraft led to the
led to the use
use of
of bombers
bombers in in this
this role,
role, thus
thus increasing
increasing their
their loss
loss rate.
rate. This
This
tactical
tactical misuse
misuse of of bombers
bombers continued
continued unabated
unabated throughout
throughout the the war,
war, but
but the
the
imperatives
imperatives of of the
the ground
ground situation
situation often
often offered
offered nono other
other choice
choice.. Not
Not only
only was
was this
this
an
an inefficient
inefficient use
use of
of aircraft
aircraft but
but each
each bomber
bomber lossloss involved
involved thethe wastage
wastage of of more
more
crew,
crew, more
more instruments,
instruments, more
more engines,
engines, and and more
more rawraw materials
materials than
than inin the
the case
case of
of aa
single-engine
single-engine ground
ground attack
attack aircraft
aircraft.". 19
In
In the
the desperate
desperate battles
battles on on the
the eastern
eastern front,
front, Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe antiaircraft
antiaircraft units,
units,
especially
especially those equipped with
those equipped with 88mm
88nmi antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns,
guns, played
played aa valuable
valuable partpart in
in
fighting Russian tanks . Because partisan activity made rear areas insecure and
fighting Russian tanks. Because partisan activity made rear areas insecure and
Russian
Russian breakthroughs
breakthroughs threatened
threatened forward
forward operating
operating fields,
fields, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe usedused
support and staff personnel in January
support and staff personnel in January 1942
1942 to defend airfields . But what was
to defend airfields. But what was
defensible as necessity soon became indefensible as common practice. Deciding
defensible as necessity soon became indefensible as common practice. Deciding
that
that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was was overmanned
overmanned with with maintenance
maintenance and and support
support personnel,
personnel.
Goring ordered establishment of Luftwaffe field divisions for frontline service. Led
Goring ordered establishment of Luftwaffe field divisions for frontline service. Led
by untrained officers and NCOs, such units suffered disproportionately heavy
by untrained officers and NCOs, such units suffered disproportionately heavy
casualties.
casualties. Moreover,
Moreover, such such shortsightedness,
shortsightedness, which which characterized
characterized so so much
much of of the
the
Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's approach,
approach, resulted
resulted in
in the
the enlistment
enlistment of of maintenance
maintenance and and service
service troops
troops
for
for duty
duty asas frontline
frontline riflemen.z°
riflemen.^" Thus,
Thus, at at the
the same
same timetime that
that Milch
Milch and and hishis staff
staff
prepared for a rapid expansion in aircraft strength, Goring was squandering the
prepared for a rapid expansion in aircraft strength. Goring was squandering the
expertise of trained technicians who already were having difficulty in keeping
expertise of trained technicians who already were having difficulty in keeping
sufficient
sufficient numbers
numbers ofLuftwaffe
of Luftwaffe aircraft flying..
aircraft flying
The
The aerial
aerial resupply
resupply of of beleaguered
beleaguered ground
ground forces
forces in in the
the Kholm
Kholm and and Demyansk
Demyansk
pockets
pockets added
added to commitments, while
to commitments, while the
the success
success of of aerial
aerial resupply
resupply set set aa dangerous
dangerous
precedent
precedent for for the
the following
following fallfall.. In
In this
this case,
case, aerial
aerial supply
supply worked worked because
because aa
variety of factors were different from those involved in the Stalingrad relief
variety of factors were different from those involved in the Stalingrad relief
operation
operation.. First,
Fkst,, the
the front
ixovX stabilized
stabilized nearnear the
the pocket,
pocket, and and forward
forward operating
operating
airfields were thus
airfields were thus only
only aa short
short distance
distance from
firom the
the troops
troops they supplied.. Moreover,
they supplied Moreover,
these forward operating
these forward operating bases
bases were
were accessible
accessible to airfields in
to airfields in the
the former
former Baltic
Baltic
countries
countries andand werewere tied directly to
tied directly to the
the Luftwaffe's infrastructure in
Luftwaffe's infrastructure in Germany
Germany..
Consequently,
Consequently, itit was was relatively easy to
relatively easy to move
move aircraft
aircraft and supplies forward
and supplies forward..
Unfortunately for
Unfortunately for the Luftwaffe, itit had
the Luftwaffe, had never possessed the
never possessed the resources
resources to build aa
to build
sizeable independent transport
sizeable independent force; rather
transport force; significant percentage
rather aa significant percentage of transport
of transport
aircraft served
served to
to transition
transition future
future bomber
bomber pilots
pilots from
from single
single to
to multiengine
multiengine aircraft
aircraft..
aircraft

119
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

Thus, the only


Thus, the only wayway to to build
build up up airlift
airlift capability
capability for emergency situations
for emergency situations like like
Demyansk
Demyansk and
and Stalingrad
Stalingrad was
was to
to strip
strip training
training establishments
establishments of
of instructors,
instructors, pupils,
pupils,
and
and aircraft;
aircraft; in other words,
in other words, to to shut schools down.
shut schools down. But But thethe losses
losses in in training
training
resources,
resources, particularly
particularly in
in instructor
instructor pilots,
pilots, were
were not
not only
only irreplaceable
irreplaceable but
but were
were
enormous in their cumulative impact. Nevertheless,
enormous in their cumulative impact. Nevertheless, in
in the
the short
short term,
term, both
both the
the
Kholm and Demyansk airlifts succeeded in
Kholm and Demyansk airlifts succeeded in their
their narrow
narrow tactical
tactical goals
goals. . The
The pockets
pockets
held until relieving
held until relieving forces
forces broke
broke through
through in in May The airlift
May.. The airlift in
in support
support of of the
the
Demyansk
Demyansk pocketpocket flew
flew 14,455
14,455 missions,
missions, moved
moved 24,303
24,303 tonstons of of weapons
weapons and and
supplies and 15,445
supplies and 15,445 soldiers
soldiers intointo the
the pocket,
pocket, and 22,093 wounded
and 22,093 wounded out: out: aa
performance that averaged between 100 and 150 missions and 265 tons per day
performance that averaged between 100 and 150 missions and 265 tons per ."
day.2'
But the cost was inordinately high . By the time the army relieved the pocket May
But the cost was inordinately high. By the time the army relieved the pocket in
in May
1942,
1942, the Luftwaffe had
the Luftwaffe had lost
lost 265
265 transport
transport aircraft,
aircraft, or
or 30 percent of
30 percent of its
its transport
transport
force at the end of February .22 The negative impact on training was,
force at the end of February." The negative impact on training was, of
of course,
course,
substantial
substantial..
Having weathered the
Having weathered the last
last crises
crises in
in late
late winter,
winter, the the Germans
Germans now now faced
faced the
the
problem
problem of of what
what their
their strategy
strategy should
should be be for
for the
the coming
coming year.
year. Halder,
Haider, whowho hadhad
remained as
remained as Chief
Chief of
of Staff,
Staff, argued
argued for
for aa defensive
defensive strategy
strategy inin the
the east
east in
in which
which the
the
army
army would
would launch
launch nono major
major offensives
offensives butbut rather
rather husband
husband and and rebuild
rebuild itsits
strength . 23 Hitler,
strength.^' Hitler, convinced
convinced that that hehe alone
alone had
had prevented
prevented aa disaster
disaster during
during the
the
winter,
winter, disagreed
disagreed.. Ever
Ever the
the gambler,
gambler, he he determined
determined to to knock
knock the
the Soviets
Soviets out
out of
of the
the
war
war.. But
But this
this decision
decision would
would prove
prove difficult
difficult to
to execute
execute given
given the
the extent
extent ofof losses
losses
since
since "Barbarossa"
"Barbarossa" had had begun.
begun. In In fact,
fact, only
only by by tasking
tasking their
their allies-the
allies—the
Hungarians,
Hungarians, the the Italians,
Italians, and
and the
the Rumanians-to
Rumanians—to defend defend large
large segments
segments of of the
the front
front
were
were the
the Germans
Germans able
able to build up
to build up their
their forces
forces for
for the
the summer
summer offensive
offensive..
The
The condition
condition ofof the
the German
German army army gave
gave little
little cause
cause for
for optimism.
optimism. At At the
the end
end ofof
March
March 1942,
1942, OKH
OKH reported
reported that that out
out of
of 162
162 divisions
divisions in in the
the east,
east, 88 were
were suitable
suitable forfor
offensive
offensive operations,
operations, 33 could
could be be brought
brought up up toto full
full offensive
offensive capability
capability after
after aa short
short
rest,
rest, and
and 47
47 could
could perform
perform limited
limited offensive
offensive tasks.
tasks. The
The rest
rest were
were only
only suitable
suitable for for
defensive warfare . 24 In
defensive warfare.^ In an effort to
an effort to upgrade
upgrade the the combat
combat capability
capability ofof deficient
deficient
divisions,
divisions, thethe army
army reorganized
reorganized itselfitself.. The
The results,
results, however,
however, were were less
less than
than
satisfactory.
satisfactory. Army
Army Groups
Groups NorthNorth andand Center
Center lost
lost virtually
virtually all
all motor
motor vehicles
vehicles so so that
that
their
their divisions
divisions were
were nono longer
longer capable
capable of of even
even limited
limited mobile
mobile operations
operations.^*.2s Of 65
Of 65
divisions
divisions detailed
detailed for
for the
the coming
coming offensive,
offensive, onlyonly 21 21 either
either had
had trained
trained as
as new
new units
units
or
or had
had received
received rehabilitation
rehabilitation in in rear
rear areas
areas.. The The remaining
remaining 44 44 divisions
divisions had had
reinforced
reinforced and
and rehabilitated
rehabilitated whilewhile serving
serving in in the
the frontline
frontline.. Shortages
Shortages of of vehicles
vehicles and and
horses
horses severely limited the
severely limited the mobility
mobility of of infantry
infantry divisions,
divisions, while
while the
the spearhead
spearhead
divisions
divisions ofof panzer
panzer andand motorized
motorized infantry
infantry possessed
possessed only only 8080 percent
percent ofof their
their
authorized
authorized motor
motor vehicles
vehicles.^*. 26
On
On April
April 5,
5, 1942,
1942, Hitler
Hitler issued
issued Directive
Directive #41
#41 forfor the
the summer
summer offensive
offensive.. Army
Army
Group
Group Center
Center would
would remain
remain on
on the defensive, and
the defensive, and Army
Army Group
Group North
North would
would
undertake
undertake aa limited
limited offensive
offensive against
against Leningrad
Leningrad toto link
link upup with
with Finland
Finland.. The
The main
main
effort
effort lay
lay in
in the
the south,
south, "with
"with the
the aim
aim of
of destroying
destroying the the enemy
enemy before
before the
the Don
Don
[River],
[River], in
in order
order to
to secure
secure the
the Caucasian
Caucasian oiloil fields
fields andand the
the passes
passes through
through the
the

120
120
ON
ON THE
THE BRINK
BRINK

Caucasus mountains
Caucasus mountains themselves.
themselves."" "21 The
The primary
primary strategic
strategic aim aim ofof the the campaign
campaign was was
oil . Considering Germany's serious oil shortage, the emphasis on oil made sense .28
oil. Considering Germany's serious oil shortage, the emphasis on oil made sense.^*
What
What did not make
did not make sensesense was was thethe belief
belief that
that German
German forces forces possessed
possessed the the strength
strength
and
and logistical
logistical capacity
capacity to to reach
reach thethe mainmain oil
oil fields,
fields, toto seize
seize them
them undamaged,
undamaged, and and to to
hold
hold them
them long
long enough
enough to to allow
allow exploitation
exploitation of of their
their production
production..
The
The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's task task waswas to bolster the
to bolster the army's
army's advance
advance.. It It would
would provide
provide air air
cover
cover for for ground
ground redeployments
redeployments in in support
support of of operation
operation "Blau" "Blau";; should should the the enemy
enemy
seek
seek to to strengthen
strengthen defending
defending forces, forces, German
German bombers bombers were were to to attack
attack his his
transportation
transportation system. system. When When the the offensive
offensive began,
began, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe would would seek seek to to
maintain
maintain air air superiority
superiority while while attacking
attacking enemy enemy ground
ground forces.forces. Early Early in in Directive
Directive
#41,
#41, Hitler
Hitler suggested
suggested that that thethe purpose
purpose of of the
the offensive
offensive was was "to"to wipe
wipe out out the
the entire
entire
defensive
defensive potential
potential remaining
remaining to to the
the Soviets
Soviets and and to
to cut
cut them
them off,
off, as as far
far as
as possible,
possible,
from
from their
their most
most important
important centers centers of of war
war industry
industry."^^ . "29 However,
However, Hitler Hitler cast
cast his his
strategy
strategy so so asas to
to achieve
achieve the the capture
capture of of the
the Soviet
Soviet Union's
Union's oil oil production
production region, region, aa
goal
goal which-as
which—as already already suggested-was
suggested—was virtually virtually unattainable
unattainable given given the the forces
forces
available
available.. Thus,
Thus, there
there waswas no no possibility
possibility of of cutting
cutting the the Soviets
Soviets offoff "from"from theirtheir most
most
important
important centers
centers of of war
war industry"
industry" except except to to deprive
deprive RussiaRussia of of aa limited
limited percentage
percentage
of her
of her oiloil production
production.. Nowhere
Nowhere in in his
his directive
directive did did the the Fuhrer
Fuhrer suggest suggest usingusing the the
Lufhvaffe
Luftwaffe to to strike Soviet industry
strike Soviet industry or or petroleum
petroleum productionproduction;; given given the the
megalomaniacal
megalomaniacal extent extent of of Hitler's
Hitler's summersummer aims aims and
and the the weaknesses
weaknesses of of the
the ground
ground
forces,
forces, thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe wouldwould be be completely
completely employed
employed in in supporting
supporting the the army's
army's drive.
drive.
Before
Before the the main summer offensive
main summer offensive began, began, Hitler
Hitler decided
decided to to eliminate
eliminate SovietSoviet
forces
forces on on thethe Crimea
Crimea Peninsula
Peninsula.. On On MayMay 8, 8, Eleventh
Eleventh Army, Army, supportedsupported by by
Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps IV IV andand VIII,
VIII, attacked
attacked the the Russians
Russians on on thethe Kersch
Kersch Peninsula
Peninsula.. Aided Aided by by
aa continuous
continuous flow flow of of close
close air air support,
support, Manstein's
Manstein's ground ground forces
forces broke broke through
through
Russian
Russian positions
positions and and routed
routed substantial
substantial SovietSoviet forces
forces.. On On May
May 19, 19, Halder
Haider recorded
recorded
the
the successful
successful completion
completion of of operations
operations and and thethe capture
capture of of 150,000
150,000 prisoners
prisoners with with
considerable
considerable equipment
equipment.^^ . 3° While
While the the Germans
Germans moppedmopped up up Kersch,
Kersch, the the Russians
Russians
launched
launched aa spoiling
spoiling offensive
offensive on on thethe southern
southern frontfront.. They They hopedhoped to to dislocate
dislocate
German
German preparations
preparations by by capturing
capturing the the critical
critical transportation
transportation center center of of Kharkov.
Kharkov.
After
After initial
initial success,
success, the the Russians
Russians ran ran into
into strong
strong resistance
resistance.. SovietSoviet infantry
infantry pressed
pressed
Sixth
Sixth ArmyArmy back back on on Kharkov,
Kharkov, but but thethe Russians
Russians hesitated
hesitated to to unleash
unleash their their armor.
armor.
Having
Having hesitated,
hesitated, they they lost
lost the
the opportunity
opportunity.. The The Germans
Germans had had reserves
reserves in in the
the area;
area;
Kleist's
Kleist's First First Panzer
Panzer Army, Army, supportedsupported by by Richthofen's
Richthofen's "Stukas," "Stukas," sliced sliced
northwards
northwards and and inin one
one great
great sweeping
sweeping thrust thrust isolated
isolated the the Izyum
Izyum salient
salient and and attacking
attacking
Russian
Russian forces forces.. OnceOnce again, again, StalinStalin turned
turned aa serious
serious military
military situation
situation into into
catastrophe
catastrophe.. He He refused
refused to to allow
aVlow aa withdrawal
withdraw a\ until
uni\\ too
too late By the
\ate.. By the end end ofof May,
May, the the
Germans had destroyed two
Germans had destroyed two Russian
Russian armies
armies and
and badly
badly mauled
mauled three
three others
others. . Two
Two
hundred thousand prisoners
hundred thousand prisoners marchedmarched westward
westward to to workwork in in German
German slave slave labor
labor
camps ; probably as many lay dead in the
camps; probably as many lay dead in the wreckage
wreckage of
of defeat
defeat. . Not
Not only
only had
had the
the
Germans eliminated Russian reserves on the
Gennans eliminated Russian reserves on the southern
southern front
front but
but the
the Russians
Russians had
had lost
lost
the better
the better part
part ofof their armored forces
their armored forces ." ?^
One final
One preparatory operation
final preparatory operation came came before
before the the summer
summer offensive offensive began.began.
Richthofen's "Stukas" returned from
Mainstein regrouped his forces, while
Mainstein regrouped his forces, while Richthofen's "Stukas" returned from

121
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

Kharkov
Kharkov,: their target, the
their target, the fortress
fortress city city of Sevastapol.. On
of Sevastapol On JuneJune 2, 2, the
the German
German air air
and
and artillery bombardment began
artillery bombardment began and and continued without interruption
continued without interruption for for thethe next
next
five
five days
days.. Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps VIII flew up
VIII flew up to to 1,000
1,000 sorties
sorties per per day,
day, while
while Manstein's
Manstein's
troops fought their
troops fought their way through the
way through Russian forts
the Russian forts andand defensive
defensive systemsystem." .32 On the
On the
19th, Richthofen noted
19th, Richthofen noted with with satisfaction
satisfaction that that the
the city's
city's center
center was was aa sea sea of of flames
flames
from
from air
air attacks
attacks with smoke clouds
with smoke clouds reaching
reaching 1,500 1,500 meters
meters and and stretching
stretching from from
Sevastapol
Sevastapol to the Sea
to the Sea ofof Azov
Azov and and the Kersch Peninsula
the Kersch Peninsula." .33 By
By the
the beginning
beginning ofJuly, of July,
resistance
resistance had collapsed;; Richthofen's
had collapsed Richthofen's Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps VIII VIII moved
moved north north to to support
support
the
the main
main summer
summer offensive
offensive..
Many
Many historians
historians havehave argued
argued that that thethe summer
summer and and fallfall ofof 1942
1942 represented
represented the the
decisive
decisive turning
turning point
point inin the
the history
history of of World
World War War 11 II.. The
The evidence
evidence does does not not support
support
such
such aa contention.
contention. The The surgesurge forward
forward of of German
German armies armies in in Russia
Russia and and in in the
the
Mediterranean
Mediterranean region region represented
represented the the last
last spasmodic
spasmodic advances advances of Nazi military
of Nazi military
power;
power; there
there waswas nono prospect
prospect of of achieving
achieving aa decisive
decisive strategic
strategic victory.
victory. By By the the spring
spring
of 1942, attrition
of 1942, attrition had
had reduced
reduced both
both sides
sides in
in Russia
Russia to
to desperate
desperate straits
straits. . While
While the
the
Germans enjoyed a small
Germans enjoyed a small qualitative
qualitative edge,
edge, the
the explanation
explanation for
for their
their successes
successes in
in the
the
summer
summer lay lay inin the
the Soviet
Soviet blunders
blunders in in the
the Crimea
Crimea and and at at Kharkov
Kharkov in in thethe spring
spring..
However,
However, the numerical scales
the numerical scales werewere rapidly
rapidly turning
turning against
against the the Wehrmacht,
Wehrmacht, as as
Soviet production hit full stride and as Western aid reached Russia in
Soviet production hit full stride and as Western aid reached Russia in increasing
increasing
quantities
quantities.. In In the
the Mediterranean,
Mediterranean, the the scales
scales hadhad already
already tilted
tilted against
against the the Germans
Germans;;
the British collapse in North Africa in May is explicable only in terms of
the British collapse in North Africa in May is explicable only in terms of gross
gross
military incompetence .
military incompetence.
We
We have
have already
already delineated
delineated the the weaknesses
weaknesses of of ground
ground forces forces available
available for for the
the
summer; the Luftwaffe presented a similar depressing picture. The Lufiwaffe
summer; the Luftwaffe presented a similar depressing picture. The Luftwaffe
deployed
deployed approximately
approximately 2,750 2,750 aircraft
aircraft in in the
the east,
east, the
the bulk
bulk being
being assigned
assigned to to Army
Army
Group South for the summer offensive . But major commitments in the Arctic as
Group South for the summer offensive. But major commitments in the Arctic as
well as the need to aid the hard-pressed and equipment-starved northern and center
well as the need to aid the hard-pressed and equipment-starved northern and center
army
army groups
groups required
required significant
significant numbersnumbers of of aircraft
aircraft.. As As aa result,
result, onlyonly 1,500 1,500
aircraft were available to support the main drive. 3a
aircraft were available to support the main drive.^^
On June
On June 28, 28, the
the summer
summer offensive
offensive began began as as Fourth
Fourth PanzerPanzer and and Second
Second Army Army
jumped off. Three armored, three motorized infantry, and nine infantry divisions
jumped off. Three armored, three motorized infantry, and nine infantry divisions
led
led the
the opening
opening phase phase thatthat hithit the
the Bryansk
Bryansk Front Front.. Led Led by by "Stukas"
"Stukas" and and other
other
bombers from Fliegerkorps VIII, German armor broke through and raced for
bombers from Fliegerkorps VIII, German armor broke through and raced for
Voronezh ." By July 2, the Germans had advanced 80 kilometers ; and as the official
Voronezh.35 By July 2, the Germans had advanced 80 kilometers; and as the official
Russian
Russian history
history suggests,
suggests, the the situation
situation was was near
near disaster
disaster.^* . 36 Meanwhile
Meanwhile on on June
June 30, 30,
Sixth
Sixth Army
Army attacked
attacked fromfrom northnorth of of Kharkov
Kharkov to to complete
complete aa pincer pincer movement
movement south south
of
of Voronezh
Voronezh.. This This time,
time, however,
however, the the pincer
pincer armsarms closed
closed around
around few few Russians
Russians.. The The
Soviet
Soviet high
high command
command had had finally
finally absorbed
absorbed the the lessons
lessons of of the
the past
past year;
year; when when
threatened
threatened with with encirclement,
encirclement, itit pulled pulled troops
troops back back without hesitation.. This
without hesitation This
response
response to to German breakthroughs characterized
German breakthroughs characterized Soviet Soviet strategy
strategy throughout
throughout the the
summer,
summer, and prompt withdrawals
and prompt withdrawals denied denied the the Germans
Germans the the successes
successes they they had had
enjoyed
enjoyed thethe previous
previous summer
summer.^^ .3'
Now
Now in in early Hitler divided
July, Hitler
early July, divided Army Army Group Group South South into into two two separate
separate
commands,
commands, Army Army Group
Group B B inin the sector and
northern sector
the northern Army Group
and Army Group A A inin the
the southern
southern

12
1222
ON
ON THE
THE BRINK
BRINK

THE
THE GERMAN
GERMAN SUMMER SUIVIMER OFFENSIVE
OFFENSIVE:: 1942
1942
--J'
;—^ GERMAN OFFENSIVE -■ FIRST
GERMAN OFFENSIVE FIRST STAGE
STAGE
^J^ GERMAN GERMAN OFFENSIVE
OFFENSIVE -- SECOND
SECOND STAGE
STAGE
FRONT MAY
FRONT MAY 30
30.. 1942
1942
JULY 22
. . . . . . JULY 22
__ __NOV NOV 1818

TAGANROG JSlKMf?^
SEA OF AZOV .^.-^^il^^^Oirr

CASPIAN
SEA

'• GROZNY

sector
sector.. He
He also
also made
made major
major changes
changes in in the
the command
command structure
structure to to facilitate
facilitate hishis
control
control over
over operations
operations.. While
While Army
Army Group
Group BB moved
moved south
south from
from Voronezh
Voronezh to to clear
clear
out
out the
the Don
Don River
River bend,
bend, Army
Army Group
Group A, A, spearheaded
spearheaded by by First
First Panzer
Panzer Army,
Army, drove
drove
east
east toto Voroshilovgrad
Voroshilovgrad and and then
then southeast
southeast to to seize
seize the
the Don Don bridges
bridges at at
Konstantinovskaya
Konstantinovskaya." .38 As
As the
the advance
advance gathered
gathered momentum,
momentum, some some of of the
the signs
signs of
of aa
collapse
collapse inin the
the command
command and and control
control system
system that
that had
had existed
existed the
the previous
previous summer
sunmier
reappeared
reappeared on on thethe Russian
Russian side.'9
side.^' Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, although
although losing
losing muchmuch of of its
its
equipment
equipment in in the
the process,
process, most
most of
of the
the Red
Red Army
Army managed
managed to to escape.
escape.
Hitler's
Hitler's baleful
baleful influence
influence waswas soon
soon apparent
apparent.. In
In mid
mid July,
July, he
he fired
fired Bock,
Bock, while
while
relations
relations between
between the the Fuhrer
Fuhrer and and the
the army's
army's Chief
Chief of of Staff
Staff were
were increasingly
increasingly
strained
strained.. Haider,
Haider, recognizing
recognizing the the limited
limited nature
nature of
of German
German fighting
fighting strength,
strength, waswas
not
not fooled
fooled byby the initial success
the initial success.. Hitler,
Hitler, however,
however, waswas nownow thinking
thinking in in grandiose
grandiose
terms
terms.. Further
Further encouraging
encouraging his his dreams
dreams waswas his
his own
own serious
serious underestimation
underestimation of of the
the
Soviet's
Soviet's ability
ability toto resist
resist further
further German
German advances.
advances. As As the
the OKW
OKW WarWar DiaryDiary noted
noted onon
June
June 25,
25, Hitler
Hitler believed
believed that
that Russian
Russian resistance
resistance would
would be be considerably
considerably less less than
than in
in
1941,
1941, and
and that
that Army
Army GroupGroup South
South could
could execute
execute the
the phases
phases for
for operation
operation "Blau"
"Blau"
with
with less
less difficulty
difficulty and and more
more quickly
quickly than
than originally
originally planned
planned."*. 40 In
In late
late July,
July, hehe
demanded
demanded that that Army
Army Group
Group A A "occupy
"occupy the the entire
entire eastern
eastern coastline
coastline of of the
the Black
Black
Sea,
Sea, force
force aa passage
passage of of the
the Kuban,"
Kuban," drivedrive towards
towards Grozny,
Grozny, and and thrust
thrust through
through to to
the
the Caspian
Caspian Sea Sea inin the
the Baku
Baku area.
area. Simultaneously,
Simultaneously, ArmyArmy GroupGroup BB was was toto "thrust
"thrust

12
1233
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

forward
forward to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, smash smash the the enemy
enemy forces forces concentrated
concentrated there, there, .. .. .. ,,
and . . . block . . . land communications
and . . . block . . . land communications between
between the
the Don
Don and
and the
the Volga
Volga [Rivers],
[Rivers],
as well as the Don itself.
as well as the Don "4'
itself."*' Thus, not only did Hitler direct the advance along
Thus, not only did Hitler direct the advance along
widely diverging axes but the objectives of Army Group A were so diverse that the
widely diverging axes but the objectives of Army Group A were so diverse that the
attempt to gain all insured that German forces would gain none. Hitler also made
attempt to gain all insured that German forces would gain none. Hitler also made
clear
clear his
his growing
growing interest interest in in Stalin's
Stalin's city,city, forfor one
one ofof the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's major major tasks
tasks was was
to
to insure
insure "the "the early
early destruction
destruction ofthe of the citycity ofof Stalingrad
Stalingrad." ."
The
The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's mission mission in in this
this last
last great,
great, wide-ranging
wide-ranging German German offensive
offensive of of the
the
war
war represented
represented aa replay replay of of the
the previous
previous year. year. By By and
and large,
large, itsits units
units maintained
maintained air air
superiority
superiority over over the the entire
entire front
front and and severely
severely hampered
hampered Soviet Soviet reconnaissance
reconnaissance and and
bombing efforts
bombing efforts.''^ .4z German
German aircraft
aircraft played
played an an important
important role role inin breaking
breaking up up Soviet
Soviet
counterattacks
counterattacks in in the the first
first days
days of of "Blau
"Blau." ." The
The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's interdiction
interdiction of of Soviet
Soviet
forces
forces disrupted
disrupted supplies supplies and, and, in in oneone case,
case, caught
caught two two reserve
reserve divisions
divisions in in the
the
open-150
open—150 kilometers kilometers east east of of Stalingrad-and
Stalingrad—and butchered butchered them. them. Richthofen
Richthofen
trumpeted
trumpeted in in his
his diarydiary about
about aa "beautiful
"beautiful bloodbath
bloodbath (Tolles (Tolles Blutbad!)"
Blutbad!)"*^ 43 During
During
this
this period,
period, most most assigned
assigned aircraft
aircraft supported
supported the the army's
army's advanceadvance.. For For July
July andand
August,
August, Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe reports reports to to OKW
OKW headquarters
headquarters contained
contained the the constant
constant refrain
refrain thatthat
battle
battle emphasis
emphasis in in the
the east
east laylay "in"in supporting
supporting the the army's
army's advance
advance (Schwerpunkt
(Schwerpunkt
Kampfeinsatz
Kampfeinsatz zur zur Unterstutzung
Unterstiitzung derAngrisarmeen)
der Angriffsarmeen).. "44 '"^
As
As in in 1941,
1941, the the Germans
Germans inflicted
inflicted heavyheavy aerial
aerial losses
losses on on their
their Russian
Russian opponents,
opponents,
while
while losing
losing relatively
relatively few few aircraft
aircraft themselves.
themselves. But But aa constant
constant attrition
attrition of of air
air units
units
took
took place,
place, and and the the cumulative
cumulative effect effect of of such
such losses
losses was was devastating
devastating.. From From May May
through
through September
September 1942, 1942, Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe bomber bomber units units in in the
the east
east lost
lost approximately
approximately 120 120
bombers
bombers per per month,
month, while while fighter
fighter losses
losses werewere almost
almost exactly
exactly the the same
same.. Aircraft
Aircraft
losses
losses on on the eastern front
the eastern front were
were approximately
approximately 60 60 percent
percent of of all
all Luftwaffe losses for
Luftwaffe losses for
all
all theaters
theaters (see (see Table XXV45). For
Table XXV"). bomber squadrons,
For bomber squadrons, monthly monthly losseslosses represented
represented
approximately
approximately 15 15 percent
percent of of total
total actual
actual strength
strength for for all all theaters
theaters.. Fighter
Fighter losses
losses
averaged
averaged nearly nearly 20 20 percent
percent per per month
month.''* .46 In
In spite
spite ofof this
this steady
steady attrition
attrition lasting
lasting overover
five
five months,
months, the Germans maintained
the Germans maintained unit unit aircraft
aircraft strength
strength on on the
the eastern
eastern front
front at at aa
uniform
uniform level level.. In In August
August and and September,
September, the the general
general staff staff withdrew
withdrew aa numbernumber of of
long-range
long-range bomber bomber wings wings that that hadhad suffered
suffered particularly
particularly heavy heavy losses,
losses, butbut prompt
prompt
replacement
replacement by by rehabilitated
rehabilitated and and refreshed
refreshed units units from
from the the zone
zone of of the
the interior
interior keptkept
frontline
frontline strength strength at at the
the same
same level level.'*'.4' But
But improved
improved supply supply and and replacement
replacement
procedures
procedures designed designed for for maintaining
maintaining strength strength should
should not not disguise
disguise the the overall
overall state
state ofof
the Luftwaffe
the Luftwaffe in in the the east-a
east—& state state which
which as as early
early as as June
June 26, 26, the
the OKW
OKW War War Diary
Diary
described
described as "strained . "48
as "strained.""*
Adding
Adding to to Luftwaffe
Lirftwaffe difficulties
difficulties was was thethe fact
fact that
that asas the
the army
army hurtled
hurtled forward,
forward, the the
distances
distances over over whichwhich suppliessupplies movedmoved rapidly rapidly increased
increased.. Army Army Group Group SouthSouth was was
already
already the the farthest
farthest removedremoved of of the
the armyarmy groups
groups from from the the supply
supply system
system.. As As Sixth
Sixth
Army,
Army, with with its its supporting
supporting flak flak andand airair force
force units,
units, approached
approached Stalingrad
Stalingrad in in August,
August,
the
the nearest
nearest supply supply system railhead was
system railhead was 350 350 kilometers
kilometers behind behind in in Stalino
Stalino.. With With
severe
severe shortages
shortages of of motorized
motorized transport,
transport, the the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht faced faced an an increasing
increasing
logistical
logistical problemproblem as the advance
as the advance continued
continued."' .49 At
At the
the endend of of July,
July, thethe drive
drive intointo the
the
Caucasus ran out of fuel; and while Luftwaffe transport units
Caucasus ran out of fuel; and while Luftwaffe transport units helped
helped to
to alleviate
alleviate

124
124
ON THE BRINK
ON THE BRINK

some
some shortages,
shortages, the
the bulk nature of
bulk nature of fuel
fuel made
made itit impossible
impossible to to alter
alter fundamental
fundamental
supply realities.s°
supply realities.'" Consequently,
Consequently, thethe utilization
utilization rate
rate began
began to to fall
fall as units deployed
as units deployed
forward
forward to new airfields
to new airfields to
to support advancing ground
support advancing ground forces
forces.. Poor
Poor communications
communications
and
and the
the slow
slow arrival of supplies,
arrival of supplies, as
as well
well asas the primitive conditions
the primitive conditions found
found on
on
forward operating bases, added to
forward operating bases, added to the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's problems .
problems.'' 51
As
As German
German forces
forces surged
surged into
into the
the Caucasus,
Caucasus, Hitler
Hitler undercut
undercut their
their efforts
efforts.. He
He was
was
now
now entranced
entranced with
with Stalingrad
Stalingrad andand onon August
August 11 ordered
ordered thethe transfer
transfer of of Fourth
Fourth
Panzer
Panzer Army (two German
Army (two German and and Rumanian
Rumanian Corps,
Corps, thethe equivalent
equivalent of of eight
eight divisions)
divisions)
from
from Army
Army Group
Group A A toto Army
Army Group
Group B B.. By
By mid-August,
mid-August, the the Germans
Germans had had cleared
cleared
out the Don bend and were
out the Don bend and were preparing
preparing to
to cross
cross the
the Don
Don and
and to
to seize
seize Stalingrad
Stalingrad. . On
On
the
the 23rd, General von
23rd, General von Wietersheim's
Wietersheim's panzer
panzer corps
corps crossed
crossed that
that river
river in
in aa surprise
surprise
attack
attack and
and within
within one
one day
day had
had advanced
advanced to the Volga
to the Volga north
north of Stalingrad, aa distance
of Stalingrad, distance
of 60 kilometers . Aerial support provided
of 60 kilometers. Aerial support provided by
by Fliegerkorps
FUegerkorps VIII,
VIII, 1,600
1,600 sorties,
sorties,
1,000 tons of
1,000 tons of bombs,
bombs, with the loss of only 3 aircraft (and a claim of 91 Russian
with the loss of only 3 aircraft (and a claim of 91 Russian
aircraft
aircraft shot
shot down)
down) facilitated
facilitated thethe rush
rush forward.
forward. That
That afternoon,
afternoon, Richthofen,
Richthofen, now now
Commander of Luftflotte 4, launched massive aerial attacks on the city itself." For
Commander of Luftflotte 4, launched massive aerial attacks on the city itself." For
the next week, Stalingrad felt the fury of German air attacks as the Luftwaffe
the next week, Stalingrad felt the fury of German air attacks as the Luftwaffe
supported
supported the army by
the army by trying
trying to to break
break the
the will
will of
of Stalingrad's
Stalingrad's defenders
defenders and and
population .
population.
From
From this
this point
point forward,
forward, the the NaziNazi effort
effort centered
centered on on the
the struggle
struggle forfor
Stalingrad-a struggle minimizing the flexibility and adaptability of German units
Stalingrad—a struggle minimizing the flexibility and adaptability of German units
while
while maximizing
maximizing the the dogged
dogged determination
determination of of their
their Russian
Russian opponents.
opponents. TheThe
house-to-house struggle sucked more and more troops into the dying city . What
house-to-house struggle sucked more and more troops into the dying city. What
German
German strategy
strategy had
had once
once viewed
viewed as as aa blocking
blocking position
position for
for the
the advance
advance into
into the
the
Caucasus now became the focal point for Hitler . By the end of October, the
Caucasus now became the focal point for Hitler. By the end of October, the
Germans
Germans had had captured
captured most
most of
of the
the city,
city, but
but Russian
Russian resistance
resistance clung
clung tenaciously
tenaciously to to
the
the banks
banks of
of the
the Volga.
Volga. In
In the
the south,
south, Army
Army Group
Group A A remained
remained halted
halted at
at the
the end
end of
of
its
its long
long supply
supply lines.
lines. Everywhere
Everywhere on on the
the eastern
eastern front,
front, the
the Germans
Germans now now lay
lay in
in
overextended
overextended positions.
positions. Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, their their Russian
Russian opposition,
opposition, unlike
unlike the
the previous
previous
year,
year, had
had conserved
conserved andand built
built up
up its
its strength
strength.. Beginning
Beginning in in mid-October,
mid-October, increasing
increasing
numbers
numbers of of Soviet
Soviet aircraft
aircraft challenged
challenged the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. By
By early
early November,
November, Russian
Russian
aerial interdiction efforts
aerial interdiction efforts were
were seriously
seriously interfering
interfering with
with Sixth
Sixth Army's
Army's supplies
supplies."."

Even
Even rising
rising aircraft
aircraft production
production in in Germany
Germany had had little
little impact
impact on on the
the force
force
structure, because commitments and opposition that the Luftwaffe faced were
structure, because commitments and opposition that the Luftwaffe faced were
extracting
extracting an
an even
even higher
higher price.
price. The
The attrition
attrition on
on the
the eastern
eastern front
front from
from May
May through
through
October 1942
October 1942 represented
represented aa major
major portion
portion of the Luftwaffe's
of the Luftwaffe's overall
overall strength
strength.. In
In this
this
time
time frame,
frame, bomber
bomber losses
losses (aircraft
(aircraft written
written off)
off) in
in Russia
Russia equalled
equalled 5151 percent
percent of
of all
all
bombers
bombers at at the
the end
end of
of April,
April, while
while the
the corresponding
corresponding figurefigure for
for single-engine
single-engine
fighters
fighters was
was 48 .6 percent.
48.6 14
percent.'* Thus,
Thus, Hitler's
Hitler's decision
decision to to defeat
defeat thethe Soviet
Soviet Union
Union in in
1942
1942 insured
insured that
that neither the Luftwaffe
neither the Luftwaffe nornor the
the army
army would
would receive
receive aa respite
respite toto
recuperate
recuperate from
from the
the winter
winter defeats
defeats of
of 1942
1942.. Perched
Perched precariously
precariously at at the
the end
end of
of long
long
lines
lines of
of communications
communications and and with
with its strength severely
its strength severely attrited, the Wehrmacht
attrited, the Wehrmacht
awaited
awaited the
the crushing
crushing Russian
Russian counterblow.
counterblow.

125
125
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

THE
THE MEDITERRANEAN
MEDITERRANEAN
As
As inin 1941,
1941, the the Mediterranean
Mediterranean had had remained
remained aa side side show
show forfor the
the Germans
Germans
through
through most
most ofof 1942.
1942. Air and ground
Air and ground forces
forces deployed
deployed in in North
North Africa
Africa represented
represented
the
the minimum
minimum required
required to to fend
fend off
off the
the British
British.. TheThe fact
fact that
that Rommel
Rommel with with these
these
forces
forces had
had won
won great
great tactical
tactical victories
victories is is aa tribute to his
tribute to his genius
genius.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, his his
success
success inevitably
inevitably led led toto aa rise
rise in
in the
the forces
forces deployed
deployed against
against him
him onon the
the ground
ground as as
well
well asas in
in the
the air
air..
The
The British,
British, saddled
saddled with with aa series
series of incompetent commanders
of incompetent commanders on on the
the ground,
ground,
were
were well
well served
served in in the
the air
air.. From
From MayMay 1941,1941, ArthurArthur Tedder,
Tedder, oneone of
of the
the outstanding
outstanding
airmen
airmen of of the
the war,
war, commanded
commanded the the RAF
RAF in in the
the Middle
Middle East,
East, while
while hishis deputy,
deputy, SirSir
A.
A. "Mary"
"Mary" Coningham,
Coningham, led led the
the air
air forces
forces assigned
assigned to to support
support Eighth
Eighth Army.
Army. Tedder
Tedder
and
and Coningham
Coningham built built up up aa force
force in in the
the 1941-42
1941-42 period
period that
that showed
showed extreme
extreme
versatility
versatility inin its
its employment
employment in in close
close airair support,
support, airair superiority,
superiority, and and short-
short- and
and
long-range
long-range interdiction
interdiction missions
missions.. While
While the the RAFRAF inin the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean gainedgained
numerical
numerical and and qualitative
qualitative superiority
superiority over over the the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, difficulties
difficulties complicated
complicated
the
the execution
execution of of aa successful
successful British
British air air strategy
strategy.. Perhaps
Perhaps the the most
most daunting
daunting were
were
the
the enormous
enormous distances
distances that that British
British forces
forces had had toto traverse
traverse within
within this
this theater
theater.. The
The
distance
distance between Tripoli and
between Tripoli and El
El Alamein
Alamein was was 1,500
1,500 kilometers,
kilometers, equal
equal to to that
that from
from
East
East Prussia
Prussia toto Moscow
Moscow.. Moreover,
Moreover, supply supply lines lines reached
reached fromfrom Britain
Britain around
around the
the
African
African continent,
continent, while while the aircraft ferrying
the aircraft ferrying system,
system, although
although involving
involving lessless
distance,
distance, crossed
crossed Central
Central Africa
Africa and and thus thus presented
presented considerable
considerable logistical
logistical
difficulties .
difficulties.
Moreover,
Moreover, the the British suffered from
British suffered from interservice
interservice coordination
coordination problems
problems.. Early
Early inin
his
his command,
command. TedderTedder recognized
recognized the the interrelationship
interrelationship betweenbetween thethe efforts
efforts of
of the
the
three
three services
services andand that,
that, without
without aa strategic
strategic conception,
conception, British
British armed
armed forces
forces could
could
not
not achieve
achieve decisive
decisive results
results.. As
As hehe noted
noted in in his
his memoirs:
memoirs:
The campaign
The campaign in in North
North Africa
Africa provide
provide aa prime
prime example
example of of the
the
complementary roles
complementary roles played
played inin the
the Second
Second World
World War War byby all
all three
three
services
services.. The
The brunt of the
brunt of the desert
desert battles
battles fell
fell upon
upon the the Army
Army andand the
the
Royal Air
Royal Air Force;
Force; the
the eventual
eventual intention
intention was
was toto turn
turn out
out of
of North
North
Africa,
Africa, bag bag and
and baggage,
baggage, the the Italian
Italian and
and German
German forces forces.. ByBy
seeming
seeming paradox,
paradox, this
this object
object could
could not
not be
be achieved
achieved without
without success
success
at
at sea . . By
sea.. .... By aa further
further paradox,
paradox, such
such superiority
superiority at at sea
sea could
could after
after
1941
1941 be be secured
secured only
only byby the
the exercise
exercise of of airpower
airpower and and could
could
certainly
certainly not
not be
be secured
secured byby surface
surface forces
forces alone . 55
alone.''
Tedder
Tedder found
found itit difficult
difficult to
to cooperate
cooperate withwith the
the army
army which
which could
could notnot understand
understand thethe
particular
particular advantages
advantages as as well
well as
as limitations
limitations of of the
the air
air weapon
weapon.'* . 56 On
On one
one occasion
occasion in in
1942,
1942, he
he wrote
wrote home
home that
that the
the army's
army's performance
performance resulted
resulted from
from "an"an excess
excess of of
bravery
bravery and
and aa shortage
shortage ofof brains ." 57 The
brains."" The result
result ofof such
such failings
failings in in army
army training,
training,
doctrine,
doctrine, andand leadership
leadership largely
largely nullified
nullified British
British air
air superiority
superiority over over the
the desert
desert
battlefteld .58
battlefield.'* It
It was
was one
one matter
matter to
to control
control the
the airspace
airspace over
over the
the battlefield
battlefield;; it
it was
was
another to translate that superiority
another to translate that superiority into
into direct
direct success
success when
when cooperation
cooperation with
with the
the
army broke down or if ground commanders
army broke down or if ground commanders consistently
consistently lost
lost to
to inferior
inferior forces.
forces.
British
British air
air and naval forces
and naval forces operating
operating from Malta were
from Malta were aa thorn
thorn for
for the
the Italian
Italian
logistics to North Africa from the onset of the
logistics to North Africa from the onset of the Mediterranean
Mediterranean war.
war. By
By late
late 1941,
1941,

126
126
ON
ON THE
THE BRINK
BRINK

what
what had began as
had began as aa nuisance
nuisance had had now become aa strategic
now become strategic threat
threat.. In
In September
September
1941, the
1941, British sank
the British sank 38 38.5.5 percent
percent of of the
the tonnage
tonnage sent sent from
from Italy
Italy to Libya.. In
to Libya In
October, the
October, the figure
figure reached
reached 63 63 percent
percent and and in November an
in November an astonishing
astonishing levellevel ofof 77
77
percent
percent.''.59 British
British forcesforces undoubtedly
undoubtedly received received considerable
considerable help help from
from "Ultra"
"Ultra"
decrypts
decrypts of of Axis
Axis cypher
cypher traffic,
traffic, making
making convoyconvoy operations
operations relatively
relatively easyeasy to to
pinpoint
pinpoint andand attack
attack.. ThisThis intolerable
intolerable pressure
pressure on on Rommel's
Rommel's logistical
logistical system
system helpshelps
explain
explain thethe sudden
sudden transfer
transfer of of Luftflotte
Luftflotte 22 intointo the
the theater
theater in November.. The
in November The fact
fact
that these forces
that these forces represented
represented aa substantial
substantial portion
portion of
of the
the aircraft
aircraft supporting
supporting the
the
advance on Moscow does, however, raise an interesting question about
advance on Moscow does, however, raise an interesting question about the
the OKW's
OKW's
strategic
strategic priorities
priorities..
Indeed the
Indeed the arrival
arrival of of new
new air air units
units in in Sicily
Sicily in in December
December 1941 1941 allowed
allowed the the
Germans to clear the waters around
Germans to clear the waters around Malta
Malta and
and protect
protect Axis
Axis convoys
convoys from
from British
British
interference
interference.. Shipping
Shipping losseslosses fellfell toto aa more acceptable level
more acceptable level of 20-30 percent
of 20-30 percent..
However, until logistical preparations had been accomplished, Kesselring could not
However, until logistical preparations had been accomplished, Kesselring could not
launch an aerial offensive aimed at destroying Malta.b° Beginning
launch an aerial offensive aimed at destroying Malta.*" Beginning in
in early
early April
April
1942, the
1942, the air
air offensive
offensive on on Malta
Malta began.
began. By By May
May 10, 10, Second
Second Air Air Fleet
Fleet hadhad flown
flown
11,000 sorties against the island fortress and placed the garrison and local
11,000 sorties against the island fortress and placed the garrison and local
population in desperate straits ." The question now facing the Germans was whether
population in desperate straits." The question now facing the Germans was whether
to
to proceed
proceed with with an an airborne
airborne and and naval
naval invasion
invasion.. After
After considerable
considerable debate
debate within
within
the Axis' high commands, Hitler vetoed the operation . In retrospect, given the
the Axis' high commands. Hitler vetoed the operation. In retrospect, given the
enormous logistical difficulties in the theater, Malta's capture would only have
enormous logistical difficulties in the theater, Malta's capture would only have
made
made aa marginal
marginal difference
difference to to the
the North
North African
African situation
situation.*^ .b2 Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the
failure to seek a decision forced the Luftwaffe to leave strong forces in Sicily to
failure to seek a decision forced the Luftwaffe to leave strong forces in Sicily to
harass Malta-a further dispersal of limited air resources ."
harass Malta—a further dispersal of limited air resources.*^
In
In the
the summer
summer of 1942, despite
of 1942, despite Rommel's brilliant successes
Rommel's brilliant successes in in the
the spring,
spring, thethe
Mediterranean
Mediterranean balance balance was was shifting
shifting against
against the the Axis
Axis.. On On the
the ground,
ground, the the British
British
were
were accumulating
accumulating aa numerical numerical superiority
superiority that that outweighed
outweighed whatever whatever qualitative
qualitative
superiority
superiority the the Germans
Germans still still enjoyed
enjoyed.. Even Even moremore important
important was was the
the fact
fact that
that inin
July,
July, Eighth
Eighth Army Army acquired
acquired aa commander
commander who who refused
refused to to tolerate
tolerate thethe "nice
"nice chap"
chap"
syndrome
syndrome that that had had so so hampered
hampered the the British
British armyarmy." .64 By
By October,
October, the the British
British
possessed an
possessed an impressive
impressive numerical
numerical superiority.
superiority. AlthoughAlthough the the Mediterranean
Mediterranean
campaign operated
campaign operated on on aa smaller
smaller scale,scale, thethe similarities
similarities between between the the strategic
strategic
situation
situation in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean and and those
those existing
existing in in Russia
Russia are are striking
striking.. German
German air air
and
and ground
ground units units at at the
the end
end of of long
long lines
lines ofof communications
communications faced faced massive
massive enemyenemy
buildups
buildups withwith little
little prospect
prospect of of reinforcement
reinforcement.. The The situation
situation represented
represented aa recipe
recipe for
for
strategic
strategic disaster.
disaster.

THE WEST
THE WEST:: BRITISH
BRITISH EFFORTS 65
EFFORTS*'
With
With the
the outbreak
outbreak ofof war
war inin September
September 1939,
1939, the
the British
British government
government placed
placed
severe
severe limitations
limitations on Bomber Command's
on Bomber Command's freedom
freedom of of action;
action; itit forbade
forbade RAF
RAF
bombers
bombers from
from attacking
attacking anyany target that might
target that might involve
involve civilian
civilian casualties .66
casualties.**
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the
the British learned much
British learned much from
from the
the "Phony
"Phony War
War."." The
The first
first lesson,
lesson,
one
one that
that burned
burned itself
itself into
into British sensibilities for
British sensibilities the remainder
for the remainder ofof the
the war,
war, was
was the
the

12
1277
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

massacre
massacre of of "Wellington"
"Wellington" bombers bombers by by German
German fightersfighters inin December
December 1939 1939.. After
After
this disaster, most
this disaster, most RAF RAF senior commanders were
senior commanders were dubious
dubious aboutabout the
the potential
potential of of
daylight bomber
daylight bomber operations
operations over over well-defended
well-defended airspaces airspaces.*^ .61 The
The second
second lesson
lesson
involved problems
involved problems associated
associated with with badbad weather
weather and and long-range
long-range flyingflying byby British
British
bombers over
bombers over hostile
hostile territory
territory inin night
night leaflet
leaflet raids-raids
raids—raids that that "Bomber"
"Bomber" Harris Harris
provided the
claimed provided
claimed the Germans
Germans with with their
their toilet
toilet paper
paper needs
needs for
for much
much of of the
the war . 61
war.**
The German invasion
The German invasion of of France
France and and thethe Low Low Countries
Countries in in May
May 1940
1940 removed
removed
most
most restrictions
restrictions on on bomber
bomber activity.69
activity.** For For thethe next
next ten
ten months,
months, Bomber
Bomber Command
Command
launched
launched itsits aircraft
aircraft against
against specific
specific targets
targets in in Germany,
Germany, especially
especially oil oil plants
plants andand
transportation
transportation systems
systems.. The The initial
initial hope
hope was was thatthat "the
"the accuracy
accuracy of of night
night bombing
bombing
[would]
[would] differ
differ little
little from
from daylight
daylight bombing
bombing."'° . "'° ByBy the
the spring
spring of of 1941,
1941, the
the nature
nature of of
the
the problem
problem had had emerged.
emerged. In In August
August of of that
that year,
year, anan analysis
analysis of of mission
mission
photographs
photographs indicated
indicated that that only
only oneone inin three
three British
British aircraft
aircraft waswas hitting
hitting within
within 75 75
square
square miles
miles ofof its
its target
target.^'." In
In fact,
fact, given
given the the lack
lack of of navigational
navigational aids,aids, Bomber
Bomber
Command
Command had had aa difficult
difficult time
time inin hitting
hitting cities.
cities. On On October
October 1, 1, 1941,
1941, with
with Karlsruhe
Karlsruhe
and
and Stuttgart
Stuttgart asas targets,
targets, British
British bombers
bombers "were "were reported
reported over over Aachen,
Aachen, Eupen,
Eupen,
Malmedy,
Malmedy, Coblenz,
Coblenz, Neuwied,Neuwied, Kreuznach,
ICreuznach, Frankfurt Frankfurt am am Main,
Main, Wiesbaden,
Wiesbaden,
Limburg,
Limburg, Darmstadt,
Darmstadt, Mainz, Mainz, Worms,
Worms, Trier, Trier, Offenburg,
Offenburg, Saarfels,
Saarfels, Nuremberg,
Nuremberg,
Erlangen, Bamberg,
Erlangen, Bamberg, Bayreuth,Bayreuth, Coburg,
Coburg, Pegnitz, Aschaffenburg, Schweinfurt,
Pegnitz, Aschaffenburg, Schweinfurt,
Wurzburg,
Wiirzburg, Regensburg,
Regensburg, Weiden, Weiden, and and Chemnitz
Chemnitz.. "72 "'^
The weight of such evidence pushed Bomber Command and
The weight of such evidence pushed Bomber Command and thethe Air
Air Stafftowards
Staff towards
"area" bombing, a euphemism for what was to be a "city busting" campaign . But
"area" bombing, a euphemism for what was to be a "city busting" campaign. But
if
if the
the considerable
considerable difficulties
difficulties in hitting targets at night pointed in this direction, the
in hitting targets at night pointed in this direction, the
doctrinal frame of reference established before the war made "area" bombing an
doctrinal frame of reference established before the war made "area" bombing an
attractive strategy . As early as September 11, 1940, Sir Charles Portal-still
attractive strategy. As early as September 11, 1940, Sir Charles Portal—still
Commander
Commander of of Bomber
Bomber Command-urged
Command—^urged his his government
government to to announce
announce the the names
names
of 20 German cities targeted for reprisal raids "for each night of indiscriminate
of 20 German cities targeted for reprisal raids "for each night of indiscriminate
bombing
bombing by by the
the enemy
enemy.''" ."" In
In May
May 1941,
1941, Churchill
Churchill circulated
circulated to to the
the Cabinet
Cabinet aa paper
paper
by Trenchard . The former Chief of Air Staff (CAS) argued that Germany's
by Trenchard. The former Chief of Air Staff (CAS) argued that Germany's
population
population waswas "particularly
"particularly susceptible
susceptible to to air
air bombing
bombing." ." Admitting
Admitting that that only
only 11
percent of the bombs dropped hit their target, he concluded that:
percent of the bombs dropped hit their target, he concluded that:

This
This means
means that
that if
if you
you are
are bombing
bombing aa targettarget at
at sea,
sea, then
then 9999 percent
percent
of
of your
your bombs
bombs are
are wasted,
wasted, butbut not
not only
only 9999 percent
percent ofof the
the bombs
bombs are
are
wasted
wasted but but 99
99 percent,
percent, too,
too, ofof the
the pilots
pilots and
and ofof the
the training
training which
which
went
went to to produce
produce them
them.. ....
. . If,
If, however,
however, our our bombs
bombs are are dropped
dropped inin
Germany,
Germany, then then 99
99 percent
percent which
which missmiss the the military
military target
target all
all help
help to
to
kill,
kill, damage,
damage, frighten,
frighten, or
or interfere
interfere with with Germans
Germans in in Germany,
Germany, and and
the
the whole
whole 100100 percent
percent ofof the
the bomber
bomber organization
organization is is doing
doing useful
useful
work
work andand not
not merely
merely 11 percent
percent of of itit..

Such
Such aa policy,
policy, Trenchard
Trenchard admitted, might involve
admitted, might involve heavy
heavy casualties
casualties in
in aircraft
aircraft and
and
crews,
crews, "but
"but the
the counting
counting of
of our
our losses
losses hashas nothing
nothing to do with
to do with the
the soundness
soundness of of the
the
plan once you accept the
plan once you accept the view
view that
that the
the nation
nation can
can stand
stand their
their casualties
casualties. . The
The pilots
pilots
in
in the
the last
last war
war stood
stood it, and the
it, and the pilots
pilots of
of this
this war are even
war are even better,
better, and,
and, II feel,
feel, would
would
welcome a policy of this
welcome a policy of this description.
description.'"1'''*
^

128
128
ON
ON THE
THE BRINK
BRINK

This
This movement
movement towards
towards the
the use
use of "area" bombing
of "area" bombing received
received its
its final
final impetus
impetus inin
March 1942 when
March 1942 when Churchill's
Churchill's scientific
scientific advisor,
advisor, Lord
Lord Cherwell,
Cherwell, presented
presented the
the
Prime
Prime Minister
Minister with
with aa carefully
carefully structured argument in
structured argument in favor
favor of
of aa systematic
systematic attempt
attempt
to destroy German cities . The heart of Cherwell's argument lay in his belief that
to destroy German cities. The heart of Cherwell's argument lay in his belief that the
the
destruction of housing was the best method to break German resistance .
destruction of housing was the best method to break German resistance.

Investigation seems to
Investigation seems to show
show that
that having
having one's
one's house
house demolished
demolished is is
most
most damaging
damaging to morale.. People
to morale seem to
People seem to mind
mind itit more
more than
than having
having
their
their friends
friends oror even
even relatives
relatives killed
killed.. At
At Hull,
Hull, signs
signs of
of strain
strain were
were
evident
evident though
though only
only one-tenth
one-tenth ofof the
the houses
houses were
were demolished
demolished.. On On
the
the above
above figures,
figures, we
we should
should be be able
able to
to do
do ten
ten times
times as
as much
much harmharm
to
to each
each of the 58
of the 58 principal
principal German
German townstowns.. There
There seems
seems little
little doubt
doubt
that
that this
this would
would break
break the
the spirit
spirit of
of the
the people . 75
people.'^

The
The basic
basic problem
problem for for Cherwell's
Cherwell's argumentation
argumentation was was that
that Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand was was
already
already suffering
suffering serious
serious losses
losses atat night,
night, while
while other
other theaters
theaters were
were making
making demands
demands
on
on bomber
bomber production.
production. The The raid
raid ofof November
November 7, 7, 1941,
1941, underscored
underscored the the damage
damage thatthat
the
the Reich's
Reich's night
night defenses
defenses could
could inflict
inflict onon British
British bombers.
bombers. From From aa forceforce of
of 400
400
aircraft,
aircraft, Bomber
Bomber Command
Command lost lost 37,
37, or or 99.25
.25 percent
percent.. Aircraft
Aircraft attacking
attacking specific
specific
targets
targets suffered
suffered even
even higher
higher losses
losses:: bombers
bombers attacking
attacking Berlin
Berlin lost
lost 12.5
12.5 percent
percent of of
their
their number,
number, at at Mannheim
Mannheim 13 13 percent,
percent, and and inin the
the Ruhr
Ruhr Valley
Valley 2121 percent
percent.. Night
Night nono
longer
longer provided
provided an an impenetrable
impenetrable veil veil for
for bomber
bomber operations
operations;; as as itit turned
turned out,
out, this
this
would
would notnot bebe the
the last
last time
time that
that circumstances
circumstances would would force
force Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand to to
rethink
rethink its
its basic
basic strategy
strategy andand tactics
tactics.™. 76
In
In January
January 1942,
1942, disenchantment
disenchantment with with the
the results
results of
of the
the bombing
bombing offensive
offensive thus
thus
far
far led
led to
to the
the appointment
appointment of of Sir
Sir Arthur
Arthur HarrisHarris as as leader
leader ofof Bomber
Bomber Command.
Command.
Hams
Harris possessed
possessed an an unshakeable
unshakeable belief belief that,
that, with
with the
the necessary
necessary resources,
resources, his his
command
command could could winwin thethe warwar by by itself.
itself. Fortified
Fortified by by aa strong
strong personality
personality and and
intolerant
intolerant of of differing
differing views,
views, Harris
Harris was was anan ideal
ideal leader
leader toto shake
shake thethe lethargy
lethargy from
from
the
the command
command.. Interestingly,
Interestingly, itit was was not not until
until late
late 1942
1942 that
that Harris
Harris became
became aa
complete
complete convert
convert to to an
an "area"
"area" bombing
bombing strategystrategy."." Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, as as suggested
suggested
above,
above, thethe realities
realities were
were already
already pushing
pushing him him in in that
that direction.
direction.
Harris
Harris established
established excellent
excellent relations
relations with with thethe Prime
Prime Minister,
Minister, and and over
over the
the
course
course of of the
the spring
spring and and summer
summer of of 1942,
1942, he he bombarded
bombarded ChurchillChurchill withwith
memoranda
memoranda.'* .78
In
In these
these he he argued
argued forcefully
forcefully that that only
only aa resolute
resolute and and sustained
sustained
bombing
bombing offensive
offensive could
could defeat
defeat Germany
Germany and and that
that diversion
diversion of of aircraft
aircraft to to protect
protect
British
British shipping,
shipping, to to support
support thethe army,
army, or or to
to attack
attack Axis
Axis forces
forces inin the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean
was
was aa gross
gross misuse
misuse of of airpower
airpower.'' .'9 Harris
Harris became
became especially
especially vociferous
vociferous over over the
the
diversion
diversion of of aircraft
aircraft toto support
support the the war
war onon submarines
submarines..

The
The strength
strength ofof Coastal
Coastal Command,
Command, which which isis composed
composed largely
largely ofof
suitable
suitable bomber
bomber types,
types, isis today
today almost
almost thethe equal
equal ofof Bomber
Bomber
Command
Command.. It It achieves
achieves nothing
nothing essential,
essential, either
either to our survival
to our survival or or to
to
the
the defeat
defeat of
of the
the enemy
enemy.. ItIt abates
abates little,
little, not
not even
even thethe possessiveness
possessiveness
of
of the
the Admiralty
Admiralty.. ItIt aids
aids byby preventing
preventing aa few
few shipping
shipping losses-a
losses—a
very
very few
few.. These
These few
few losses
losses wewe can
can bear
bear awhile
awhile if if we
we do
do not
not further
further
embarrass
embarrass ourour shipping
shipping position
position by
by adding
adding to to our
our difficulties
difficulties the
the
transportation
transportation and support of
and support of vast
vast armies
armies overseas
overseas.. .. .. .. Coastal
Coastal

129
129
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
FOR DEFEAT

Command
Command is therefore merely
is therefore merely an an obstacle
obstacle to to victory
victory.. By
By redirecting
redirecting
Coastal
Coastal Command
Command to to the offensive, itit could,
the offensive, could, in
in conjunction
conjunction with
with
Bomber
Bomber Command,
Conmiand, do do .. .. .. more
more harm
harm to to the
the enemy
enemy naval
naval situation
situation
and the
and the enemy
enemy war
war situation
situation as as aa whole
whole thanthan itit can
can do
do or
or has
has in
in
years of
years of waste
waste and
and misemployment
misemployment in in its
its present
present wrong
wrong and
and mainly
mainly
futile occupations
futile . 80
occupations.*"

As
As aa new
new commander,
commander, Harris understood that
Hairis understood his command
that his command desperately
desperately neededneeded
operational
operational successes
successes for for its
its morale
morale as as well
well as as for
for the
the survival
survival of of its
its primary
primary mission
mission
as
as aa city
city buster
buster in in view
view of of the
the pressures
pressures to to divert
divert four-engine aircraft to
four-engine aircraft to other
other tasks.
tasks.
The
The appearance
appearance of of the the first
first significant navigational aid,
significant navigational aid, Gee, aided the
Gee, aided the
accomplishment
accomplishment of of this
this task
task.. The
The first
first demonstration
demonstration of of Gee's
Gee's effectiveness
effectiveness came came in in
early
early March
March 1942, 1942, when British bombers
when British bombers devastated
devastated the the Renault armament factory
Renault armament factory
near
near Paris
Paris.*'." The
The second
second demonstration
demonstration came came later
later inin the
the month
month with with aa low
low level
level
attack
attack onon Lubeck,
Lubeck, described
described by by Harris
Harris as as "built
"built more
more likelike aa firelighter
firelighter than
than aa human
human
habitation
habitation." ." Post-raid
Post-raid photo photo reconnaissance
reconnaissance indicated indicated that that thethe bombing
bombing had had
destroyed
destroyed 40 40 to 50 percent
to 50 percent of of the
the city
city.. At
At the
the end
end of of April,
April, thethe command
command blastedblasted
Rostock
Rostock and and aa nearby Heinkel factory.
nearby Heinkel factory.^^ 81
But
But Harris'
Harris' greatest triumph of
greatest triumph of the
the year
year came
came in in May.
May, By By scratching
scratching together
together
every
every aircraft
aircraft in in the command and
the command and in in its
its operational
operational training
training units,
units, hehe put
put 1,000
1,000
aircraft
aircraft over
over Cologne
Cologne and and swamped
swamped the night defenses
the night defenses to to achieve
achieve an an unheard
unheard of of
bombing
bombing concentration
concentration.. The The raid
raid was success.. With
was aa success With aa relatively
relatively low low loss
loss rate
rate (40
(40
bombers
bombers or or 3.8
3.8 percent
percent of of the
the attacking forces). Bomber
attacking forces), Bomber CommandCommand destroyed
destroyed much much
of
of the
the city.
city. Later
Later photo
photo reconnaissance
reconnaissance indicatedindicated that that the
the attack
attack hadhad destroyed
destroyed 600 600
acres
acres of of Cologne
Cologne of of which
which 300 300 lay
lay inin the
the center.
center. The The greatest
greatest success
success of of the
the raid
raid
may,
may, however,
however, have have rested
rested inin the
the political
political capital
capital itit provided
provided Harris.
Harris. TheThe next
next 1,000
1,000
bomber
bomber raid, raid, following
following soon soon after
after Cologne,
Cologne, again again underlined
underlined the the limitations
limitations under
under
which
which the the command
command operated.operated. In In early
early June,
June, Harris
Harris sent
sent hishis bombers
bombers against
against Essen;
Essen;
and
and with
with lessless favorable
favorable conditions,
conditions, the the bombers
bombers achieved
achieved no no concentration
concentration.. In In fact,
fact,
the
the German
German high high command
command only only reported
reported "widespread
"widespread raids raids overover WestWest
Germany
Germany."*' . "8s
While
While one one more
more 1,0001,000 bomber
bomber raid raid occurred
occurred in in 1942,
1942, Harris,
Hams, having
having macemaoe his nis
point,
point, now
now beganbegan the the long
long process
process of of building
building up up his
his command
command.. The The introduction
introduction of of
the
the "Lancaster"
"Lancaster" bomber, bomber, furtherfurther aids aids forfor blind
blind bombing,
bombing, and and creation
creation of of aa
pathfinder
pathfinder force force (the
(the latter
latter with
with considerable
considerable opposition
opposition from from Harris)
Harris) resulted
resulted in in aa
gradual
gradual rise
rise in in the
the command's
command's destructive
destructive potential
potential.. ButBut as as the
the British
British advanced,
advanced, so so
too
too did
did the
the Germans
Germans.. By By August,
August, the the Germans
Germans were were jamming
jamming Gee, Gee, and and the
the newnew
pathfinder
pathfinder force force faced
faced the the same
same navigational
navigational and and target-finding
target-finding problems
problems that that hadhad
for
for so
so long
long plagued
plagued the the command
command.. Not Not only
only that,
that, but
but there
there were
were no no target-marking
target-marking
bombs
bombs available.
available.*'' If the results from 1942 failed to achieve another striking
14 If the results from 1942 failed to achieve another striking

success, the command at


success, the command at least
least built
built up up itsits strength
strength and and gathered
gathered invaluable
invaluable
experience for 1943 .
experience for 1943.
The
The British
British did did not confine their
not confine their efforts
efforts solely
solely to to night
night bombing
bombing.. The The RAFRAF
expended considerable effort throughout 1941 and 1942 in daylight operations,
expended considerable effort throughout 1941 and 1942 in daylight operations,
although
although therethere was
was somesome doubt concerning the
doubt concerning the bomber's
bomber's abilityability toto survive
survive without
without
fighter protection . Nevertheless, after the start of "Barbarossa," some senior
fighter protection. Nevertheless, after the start of "Barbarossa," some senior

13
1300
ON
ON THE
THE BRINK
BRINK

British
British officers
officers hoped
hoped that the RAF
that the RAF could
could launch
launch dayday bombing
bombing sorties,
sorties, protected
protected by by
fighters,
fighters, against
against targets
targets onon the
the continent
continent such
such asas airfields
airfields and
and important
important factories
factories.. In
In
this
this way,
way, the the RAF
RAF would would force
force the
the Germans
Germans to to fight.
fight. Code
Code name
name for for these
these
operations
operations was was "Circus
"Circus." ." Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, the the results
results did
did not
not meet expectations.. The
meet expectations The
Germans
Germans withdrew
withdrew fighter
fighter units
units from
from the
the coast
coast toto airfields
airfields deep
deep inin France
France andand
Belgium
Belgium.. There,
There, theythey could
could choose
choose whether
whether to to fight
fight oror not,
not, and
and British
British fighter
fighter
forces,
forces, operating
operating at at extreme
extreme ranges,
ranges, faced
faced the
the problem
problem that that Bf
Bf 109's
109's had
had confronted
confronted
in
in 1940.
1940. Moreover,
Moreover, there there were
were relatively
relatively few
few targets
targets ofof importance
importance to to the
the Nazi
Nazi war
war
effort
effort;; therefore,
therefore, thethe Germans
Germans fought
fought only
only when
when circumstances
circumstances favored
favored them."
them.*'
There
There was,
was, ofof course,
course, aa solution
solution:: either
either extend
extend thethe range
range ofof existing
existing fighters
fighters oror
design
design aa long-range fighter specifically
long-range fighter specifically to
to protect
protect deep
deep penetration
penetration raids
raids.. But
But the
the
RAF
RAF showed little interest
showed little interest in
in drop
drop tanks, and the
tanks, and the Air
Air Staff
Staff dismissed
dismissed thethe notion
notion that
that
British
British industry
industry could
could develop
develop aa long-range
long-range fighter
fighter ofof sufficient
sufficient capability
capability toto take
take onon
German
German fighters.
fighters. In In March
March 1940,
1940, prodded
prodded by by Dowding
Dowding who who argued
argued that
that the
the RAF
RAF
needed
needed aa long-range
long-range fighter
fighter to
to protect
protect international
international trade,
trade. Air
Air Vice
Vice Marshal
Marshal W. W. SS..
Douglas,
Douglas, Assistant
Assistant Chief
Chief ofAir
of Air Staff,
Staff, suggested:
suggested:
It
It must,
must, generally
generally speaking,
speaking, be
be regarded
regarded as as axiomatic
axiomatic that that the
the long-
long-
range
range fighter
fighter must must bebe inferior
inferior in
in performance
performance to to the
the short-range
short-range
fighter.
fighter. .. .. .. The
The question
question had
had been
been considered
considered manymany times,times, and
and the
the
discussion
discussion had had always
always tended
tended to
to go
go in circles.. .. .. .. The
in circles The conclusion
conclusion
had
had been
been reached
reached thatthat the
the escort
escort fighter was really
fighter was myth.. A
really aa myth A fighter
fighter
performing
performing escort escort functions
functions would,
would, in in reality,
reality, have
have to be aa high
to be high
performance and
performance and heavily
heavily armed
armed bomber
bomber.**. 86

Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, Douglas'
Douglas' view
view reflected
reflected most
most views
views in
in the
the Air
Air Ministry
Ministry.. Portal
Portal
informed
informed Churchill
Churchill inin June
June 1941
1941 that
that aa long-range
long-range fighter
fighter could
could never
never hold
hold its
its own
own
against
against short-range
short-range fighters;
fighters; thus,
thus, the
the former
former could
could never
never fly
fly where
where they
they could
could
expect opposition
expect opposition from
from the
the latter.
latter. Churchill's
Churchill's response
response to
to this
this gloomy
gloomy conclusion
conclusion
was
was that
that such
such aa view
view closed
closed "many
"many doors.
doors."*'"8'

Confirming
Confirming the the Prime
Prime Minister's
Minister's assessment
assessment were
were disastrous
disastrous losses
losses suffered
suffered inin
1942
1942 by
by RAF
RAF bombers
bombers during
during unaccompanied
unaccompanied daylight
daylight operations
operations into
into Germany
Germany.. In In
April
April 1942,
1942, 12 12 "Lancasters"
"Lancasters" made made aa low
low level,
level, deep
deep penetration
penetration attack
attack onon the
the
M.A.N.
M.A.N. WorksWorks in in Augsburg
Augsburg.. The The RAFRAF initiated
initiated heavy
heavy fighter
fighter sweeps
sweeps and and
bombings
bombings of of coastal targets to
coastal targets to distract
distract German
German fighters.
fighters. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, overover northern
northern
France,
France, 2020 to 30 Bf 109's jumped the "Lancasters" and shot down 4. The bombers
to 30 Bf 109's jumped the "Lancasters" and shot down 4. The bombers
encountered
encountered no no further
further fighters
fighters but
but lost
lost three
three more
more aircraft
aircraft to
to flak
flak in
in the
the target
target area,
area,
while
while the
the remaining
remaining fivefive aircraft
aircraft received damage.. In
received damage In December
December 1942, 1942, aa major
major
attack
attack onon the
the Phillips
Phillips Radio
Radio Works
Works in in Eindhoven
Eindhoven lost 16 percent
lost 16 percent ofof the
the attacking
attacking
force
force of
of 93
93 bombers,
bombers, while
while aa further
further 57
57 percent
percent were
were damaged
damaged.** ."
Thus far,
Thus far, we
we have
have highlighted the attrition
highlighted the attrition of
of German
German air air units
units in World War
in World War II.
II.
One must
One must emphasize,
emphasize, however,
however, that
that such
such losses
losses were
were endemic
endemic to
to all
all air
air forces.
forces.
From
From May
May toto September
September 1942, Bomber Command
1942, Bomber Command lost lost 970 aircraft. In
970 aircraft. In May,
May, the
the
command's average strength
command's average strength had
had been
been 417
417 aircraft
aircraft.. Thus,
Thus, the
the loss
loss rate
rate works
works out
out to
to
approximately 233 percent in a
approximately 233 percent in a five-month
five-month period
period.*'."

131
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

In August 1942,
In August 1942, another
another air
air force
force entered
entered the
the lists against the
lists against the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. Flying
Flying at
at
23,000 12 B-17's
feet, 12
23,000 feet, B-17's attacked
attacked the
the marshalling
marshalling yards
yards at Rouen, while
at Rouen, while 66 others
others flew
flew
against aa diversionary
against target . Four
diversionary target. Four "Spitfire"
"Spitfire" squadrons
squadrons provided
provided protection
protection on on the
the
run-in, while
run-in, while five "Spitfire" squadrons
five "Spitfire" squadrons covered
covered the the withdrawal
withdrawal.'" .9° No
No losses
losses
occurred;
occurred; andand by October 1942,
by October 1942, General
General IraIra Eaker
Eaker informed
informed General
General Carl
Carl "Tooey"
"Tooey"
Spaatz
Spaatz that
that this
this experience indicated that
experience indicated that the
the B-17
B-17 couldcould "cope
"cope with
with the
the German
German
day
day fighter ." In
fighter." In November,
November, Eaker,Eaker, onon the
the basis
basis ofof the
the first
first 1,100
1,100 missions,
missions, claimed
claimed
that
that German
German fighters
fighters werewere no match for
no match close formations
for close formations of of American
American bombers
bombers;;
losses
losses onon those
those first
first 1,100
1,100 missions
missions hadhad totalled
totalled only
only 11.6.6 percent
percent.. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately,
what Eaker left
what Eaker left unsaid
unsaid was
was the
the fact
fact that
that most
most missions
missions had
had enjoyed
enjoyed intensive
intensive fighter
fighter
support . Those
support. Those attacks,
attacks, however,
however, that
that had
had flown
flown to
to the
the fringes
fringes or
or beyond
beyond of
of fighter
fighter
range had
range had suffered
suffered a
a loss
loss rate
rate of
of 6.4
6.4 percent,
percent, and
and no
no missions
missions had
had yet
yet reached
reached the
the
Reich .9' Thus, daylight
Reich.^^ Thus, daylight and
and unaccompanied
unaccompanied bomber
bomber attacks
attacks on
on Germany
Germany remained
remained
very
very much
much inin question.
question.

THE GERMAN RESPONSE:


THE GERMAN RESPONSE: AIR
AIR WAR
WAR IN
IN THE
THE WEST
WEST
Germany
Germany had had entered
entered the the war
war with large fighter
with large fighter andand flak
flak forces.
forces. However,
However, the the air
air
defense
defense system,
system, although
although not not intended
intended to to protect
protect the the civilian population, was
civilian population, was behind
behind
the
the British
British.. This
This reflected
reflected the the fact
fact that
that German
German strategy
strategy was by definition
was by definition aggressive
aggressive
and
and offensively
offensively oriented
oriented.. The Luftwaffe trained
The Luftwaffe trained itsits fighter
fighter forces
forces for for offensive
offensive
operations
operations in in enemy
enemy airspace
airspace.. Consequently,
Consequently, the the burden
burden of of defending
defending the the Reich
Reich fell
fell
on
on the
the flak
flak units
units.. However,
However, the the relative
relative freedom
freedom with with which
which RAF
RAF bombers
bombers crossed
crossed
the
the night
night skies
skies over
over Germany
Germany during during the the summer
summer of of 1940
1940 raised
raised serious
serious questions
questions..
As
As aa result,
result, at almost the
at almost the same
same time
time asas the
the British,
British, the
the Germans
Germans beganbegan workwork onon the
the
problem
problem of of night
night controlled,
controlled, aerial
aerial interception
interception..
From
From thethe beginning,
beginning, the the Germans
Germans had emphasized the
had emphasized the role
role of
of flak
flak inin the
the defense
defense
of
of the
the Reich
Reich.. ThisThis partially
partially resulted
resulted from
from aa misreading
misreading ofthe of the lessons
lessons of of Spain
Spain where
where
antiaircraft
antiaircraft hadhad proven
proven effective
effective against
against low low flying
flying aircraft,
aircraft, the
the profile
profile ofof most
most
missions
missions in in that
that war . 92 But
war.'^ But despite
despite the
the relative
relative ineffectiveness
ineffectiveness of of flak
flak against
against high
high
altitude
altitude targets,
targets, thethe Germans
Germans continued
continued to to place
place strong
strong emphasis
emphasis on on flak
flak throughout
throughout
the
the war
war for
for use
use against
against enemyenemy aircraft
aircraft.. TwoTwo factors
factors played
played aa role
role inin this
this crucial
crucial
decision
decision.. Hitler
Hitler found
found antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns
guns more more congenial
congenial thanthan aircraft
aircraft andand more
more
within
within his
his frame
frame of of reference
reference.. Also Also important
important was was thethe fact
fact that
that antiaircraft
antiaircraft guns,
guns,
blasting into the
blasting into the night,
night, provided
provided thethe population
population with with aa psychological
psychological crutch crutch no no
matter how
matter how ineffective
ineffective the the weapons
weapons mightmight be. be. Goebbels,
Goebbels, withwith support
support fromfrom thethe
Gauleiters (Nazi
Gauleiters (Nazi district
district leaders),
leaders), berated
berated MilchMilch as as late
late asas 1943
1943 because
because there
there were
were
insufficient antiaircraft guns
insufficient antiaircraft guns for
for defense
defense of of the
the cities
cities.'^ The use of antiaircraft guns,
.93 The use of antiaircraft guns,

however,
however, did did involve
involve diversion
diversion of of scarce
scarce aluminum
aluminum resources
resources thatthat would
would havehave been
been
better
better spent
spent on on aircraft
aircraft.'".94
In
In July
July 1940,
1940, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe established
established the the 1st
1st Night
Night Fighter
Fighter Division
Division in in Brussels
Brussels
under
under General
General JosephJoseph Kammhuber
Kammhuber.'' .95 The
The general
general staff combined various
staff combined various units,
units,
including a few flights
including a few flights of
of Bf
Bf 109's,
109's, a
a flight
flight of
of Do
Do 17's,
17's, and
and one
one combined
combined flak-
flak-
searchlight regiment.
searchlight regiment. Initially,
Initially, defense
defense of
of the
the Reich
Reich involved
involved a
a combination
combination of
of

13
1322
ON
ON THE
THE BRINK
BRINK

intruder
intruder attacks
attacks on British bases
on British bases withwith aa searchlight
searchlight zone zone over
over thethe Reich
Reich for for fighter
fighter
aircraft to attack illuminated bombers . The
aircraft to attack illuminated bombers. The first
first tactic
tactic showed
showed promise,
promise, but
but Hitler
Hitler
halted intruder operations in the summer of 1941 in view of mounting
halted intruder operations in the summer of 1941 in view of mounting bomber
bomber losses
losses
against Russia . Thereafter, he rarely allowed German night fighters or bombers to
against Russia. Thereafter, he rarely allowed German night fighters or bombers to
attack RAF bombers in their lair. Thus, from 1941, Germany's air defense
attack RAF bombers in their lair. Thus, from 1941, Germany's air defense
emphasized
emphasized passive passive operations
operations with with fewfew offensive
offensive thrusts
thrusts..
To
To help
help defend
defend the the fatherland,
fatherland, Kammhuber's
Kammhuber's defensive measures involved
defensive measures involved the the
extensive
extensive use use of of searchlight
searchlight belts belts in in western
western Germany
Germany working
working in in tandem
tandem with with Bf Bf
109's.
109's. At At the
the beginning,
beginning, these these efforts
efforts depended
depended on on accoustical
accoustical devicesdevices to to locate
locate
approaching
approaching bombers bombers.. Not Not surprisingly,
surprisingly, the the fighters
fighters achieved
achieved few few successes
successes since since
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fighters
fighters could could hardly hardly locate
locate the the bombers,
bombers, aa situation
situation quitequite analogous
analogous to to
the
the RAF's
RAF's inability
inability to to find
find German
German cities.cities. Beginning
Beginning in in October
October 1940, 1940, thethe Germans
Germans
introduced
introduced Wurzburg
Wiirzburg radar radar unitsunits into
into the
the struggle
struggle withwith the
the first
first set
set inin Holland
Holland.. By By
late 1941,
late 1941, Kammhuber
Kammhuber had had established
established aa belt belt ofof radar
radar stations
stations reaching
reaching from from
Denmark
Denmark to to Holland
Holland and and thenthen south
south through
through Belgium
Belgium and and northern
northem France.
France. The The
system
system provided
provided early early warning
warning as as well
well as as ground
ground control
control intercept
intercept (GCI)(GCI) stations
stations to to
support
support aa growing
growing force force of of night
night fighters
fighters withwith their
their own
own radar
radar sets.
sets. Kammhuber
Kammhuber
established
established aa tight tight systemsystem in in which
which each each GCI station controlled
GCI station controlled one one fighter
fighter
operating
operating in in aa designated
designated area area thatthat waswas aa portion
portion of of the
the larger
larger belt.
belt. Helped
Helped
substantially
substantially by by the the experimentation
experimentation of Major W.
of Major W. Falk,
Falk, Kammhuber's
Kammhuber's air air defense
defense
forces
forces represented
represented aa formidable formidable threat threat to to Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's operations operations by by the
the
start
start ofof 1942.
1942. What What had had been been aa thin thin line
line inin front
front ofof the
the Ruhr
Ruhr in in early
early 19411941 hadhad
become
become aa defensive
defensive system system of of considerable
considerable depth depth and and extent
extent by by thethe following
following
year.96
year.'* TheThe system
system did did havehave one one obvious
obvious weakness.
weakness. With With onlyonly oneone German
German GCI GCI
station
station andand fighter
fighter over over aa givengiven area,
area. Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand was was in in aa position
position to to swamp
swamp
the
the defenses
defenses if if itit could
could feed feed its its aircraft
aircraft through
through the the German
German defensive
defensive system
system in in aa
concentrated
concentrated stream stream..
Unfortunately for
Unfortunately for Germany's
Germany's cities, cities, these
these efforts
efforts raised
raised only
only occasional
occasional interest
interest
in
in the
the high
high command
command or or in the Luftwaffe's
in the Luftwaffe's generalgeneral staff.
staff. Throughout
Throughout 1941 1941 andand 1942,
1942,
most
most eyes
eyes remained
remained centered centered on on Russia
Russia.. There
There werewere admittedly
admittedly some some nasty
nasty shocks
shocks
in the spring
in the spring of of 1942.
1942. HeavyHeavy air air raids
raids onon Lubeck
Lubeck and and Rostock
Rostock disturbed
disturbed some some in in the
the
high
high command,
command, and and Goebbels
Goebbels found found timetime to to rage
rage inin his
his diary
diary about
about thethe destruction
destruction
of
of art
art byby British
British barbarians
barbarians.'^ .9' Lubeck,
Lubeck, however,
however, was was hardly
hardly of of decisive
decisive importance
importance
for
for Germany
Germany;; and and whilewhile the the OKWOKW noted noted the the attacks
attacks on on Rostock,
Rostock, itit gavegave thethe raids
raids no no
particular
particular significance
significance.'* .98
The
The attack
attack on on Cologne
Cologne was was another
another matter
matter.. The The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's underestimation
underestimation of of
the
the attacking
attacking force force and and aa miscalculation
miscalculation of of Hitler's
Hitler's mood mood exacerbated
exacerbated the the
impression
impression created created by by thethe destruction
destruction." ." Calculating
Calculating that that airair defense
defense forcesforces had had
accounted
accounted for for 37
37 British
British bombers
bombers (in (in fact
fact the
the British
British lost
lost 40'°°),
40"»), the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe urged urged
that
that inin view
view of of what
what it it termed
termed aa 50-percent
50-percent success,
success, the the Reich's
Reich's propaganda
propaganda servicesservices
issue
issue aa victory
victory bulletin
bulletin.. Not Not onlyonly did did Hitler
Hitler refuse
refuse thethe request
request in in sharp
sharp terms
terms but but hehe
pointedly
pointedly remarked
remarked that that thethe bomber
bomber force force contained
contained aa higher
higher number
number of of aircraft
aircraft thanthan
estimated
estimated.. Disregarding
Disregarding enemy enemy propaganda
propaganda claims, claims. Hitler
Hitler argued,
argued, the the damage
damage on on
the
the ground
ground indicated
indicated that that something
something extraordinary
extraordinary had had occurred
occurred..

133
133
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

On
On JuneJune 3, 3, Hitler received Jeschonnek
Hitler received Jeschonnek and and gave
gave the the Chief
Chief of of Staff
Staff aa severesevere
dressing down. He ridiculed Luftwaffe estimates on the bomber force attacking
dressing down. He ridiculed Luftwaffe estimates on the bomber force attacking
Cologne
Cologne and and its its efforts
efforts to to "gloss
"gloss over over or or toto describe
describe what what was was aa catastrophe
catastrophe as as aa
defensive
defensive victory victory." ." InIn the
the conversation,
conversation. Hitler Hitler made made two two further
further comments
comments fraught fraught
with
with significance
significance for for Germany's
Germany's future future.. First,
First, he he suggested
suggested that that thethe only
only reply
reply to to
such
such "terror"
"terror" raids raids waswas retaliation
retaliation in in kind
kind.. Also,Also, Hitler
Hitler pointed
pointed out out quite
quite correctly
correctly
that
that these
these raids
raids signaled
signaled an an attempt
attempt to to establish
establish an an aerial
aerial second
second front.
front. He He concluded
concluded
his
his discussions
discussions with with Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek by by remarking
remarking that that:: "I
"I never
never hide hide from
from the the truth,
truth, butbut
II must
must see see clearly
clearly in in order
order to to be
be able
able to to draw
draw correct
correct conclusions
conclusions.. "'°' "'*"
Fortunately
Fortunately for for Bomber
Bomber Command, Command, despite despite efforts
efforts to to launch
launch further
further 1,000 1,000 plane
plane
raids,
raids, itit diddid not again in
not again in 19421942 achieve
achieve the the success
success of of the
the Cologne
Cologne attack. attack. Thus,Thus,
Hitler
Hitler did did not not drawdraw the the correct
correct conclusions
conclusions.. As As the the OKWOKW War War Diary Diary reported
reported
British
British failures
failures in in descriptions
descriptions of of widely
widely dispersed
dispersed efforts,
efforts, the threat slipped
the threat slipped from from
German
German consciousness
consciousness.'"^ . 102 Consequently,
Consequently, Kammhuber's Kammhuber's night night defense
defense forces forces
received
received only only minimal
minimal reinforcements
reinforcements.. From From 116 116 aircraft
aircraft assigned
assigned to to night
night air air
defense
defense in in September
September 1940, 1940, the the force
force grew
grew to to 250
250 aircraft
aircraft in in September
September 1941 1941 and and toto
345
345 aircraft
aircraft in in September
September 1942 1942.'"'.'°s However,
However, had had further
further Colognes
Colognes occurred occurred in in
1942,
1942, Kammhuber
Kammhuber might might have have received
received the the resources
resources in in late
late 1942
1942 and and early
early 19431943
that
that the
the night
night defenses
defenses received received in in response
response to to the
the Hamburg
Hamburg catastrophe
catastrophe of of July
July
1943,
1943, which
which ultimately
ultimately enabledenabled them them to to decimate
decimate BomberBomber Command Command in in early
early 1944.
1944.
In
In reaction
reaction to to the
the spring
spring raids raids of of 1942,
1942, the the Germans
Germans launched launched aa series series of of night
night
retaliatory
retaliatory raids raids against
against BritishBritish cities
cities.. Shortly
Shortly after after thethe Rostock
Rostock raid, raid, aa member
member of of
the
the German
German foreign foreign office
office announced
announced that that the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, using using the the Baedecker
Baedecker tourist tourist
guide,
guide, wouldwould strike strike the the name name of of each
each British
British city city destroyed
destroyed off off thethe list.'°'
list.'"^ TheThe
British
British in in response
response termed termed these these summer
summer 1942 1942 night
night raids,
raids, "Baedecker"
"Baedecker" raids. raids. In In
reality,
reality, the the raidsraids achieved
achieved little little significant
significant damage damage;; bomber bomber losses losses were were high,high,
particularly
particularly in in training
training unitsunits which which lost lost heavily
heavily amongamong instructional
instructional crews.' crews.'"' °5 Not
Not
only
only hadhad further
further attrition
attrition taken taken placeplace in in the
the hard-pressed
hard-pressed bomber bomber forces forces but but once
once
again
again thethe Germans
Germans had had sacrificed
sacrificed long-range
long-range interests,
interests, the the training
training of of future
future combat
combat
aircrews,
aircrews, for for short-term
short-term expedience.
expedience.
In
In March
March 1941, 1941, Goring
Goring held held aa major major conference
conference for for units
units in in the
the west.
west. AfterAfter
describing
describing in in detail
detail thethe coming,
coming air air offensive
offensive against
against Britain,
Britain, he he secretly
secretly admitted
admitted to to
Adolf
Adolf Galland
Galland and and Werner
Werner M61ders Molders that that "there's
' 'there's not not aa word
word of of truth
truth in in itit."
." Forces
Forces
would
would transfer
transfer from from France
France to to the
the Russian
Russian theater
theater leaving
leaving only only aa few few fighters
fighters in in the
the
west.
west.'"* 106 Although
Although only only approximately
approximately two two fighter
fighter wings
wings remained
remained in in thethe west
west for for
the
the next
next yearyear and and aa half,
half, many many of of the
the best
best fighter
fighter crews
crews remained
remained in in that
that theater
theater..
Similarly,
Similarly, the the best
best equipment
equipment went went to to the west; industry
the west; industry supplied
supplied the the Fw Fw 190's
190's to to
the western theater first, and only the latest model Bf 109's fought over France and
the western theater first, and only the latest model Bf 109's fought over France and
Belgium
Belgium.'"' .101 Small
Small in in numbers
numbers (no (no more
more thanthan 180 180 aircraft),
aircraft), the western fighter
the western fighter forces
forces
were among the best in the Luftwaffe .
were among the best in the Luftwaffe.
The
The daylight
daylight aerial aerial defense
defense of of the
the west
west soonsoon pulled
pulled backback to to bases
bases deep deep in in France
France
and
and Belgium
Belgium from from which
which German German fightersfighters met met thethe "Circus" operations on
"Circus" operations more or
on more or
less
less equal
equal terms.terms. At At the
the farthest
farthest extension
extension of of "Spitfire"
"Spitfire" range, range, the the Germans
Germans could could
choose
choose whether
whether to to fight
fight or or not.
not. Although
Although numerically
numerically superior superior in in operations
operations over over

13
1344
ON THE
ON THE BRINK
BRINK

western
western Europe,
Europe, the the British
British at at no time dominated
no time dominated the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. When When they they wished
wished
to
to dodo so,
so, thethe Germans
Germans could could challenge
challenge the the RAF
RAP in in most
most effective
effective fashionfashion.. Two
Two
examples-the
examples—the breakout breakout of of thethe Scharnhorst
Scharnhorst and and Gneisenau,
Gneisenau, and and thethe Dieppe
Dieppe raid
raid of
of
August
August 1942-underline
1942—underline the the conditions
conditions of of the
the 1942 western air
1942 western air battle
battle..
In
In the
the first
first case,
case, the the two
two battle
battle cruisers
cruisers had had lain
lain inin French
French ports ports forfor nearly
nearly aa year
year
under
under attack
attack fromfrom British
British bombers
bombers.. Worried Worried by by thethe possible
possible loss loss ofof oneone oror both
both ofof
these
these ships
ships to
to air
air attack
attack and
and afraid
afraid that
that the
the Allies
Allies might
might invade
invade Scandinavia,
Scandinavia, Hitler
Hitler
ordered
ordered the the ships
ships to break through
to break through the the Channel
Channel to to Germany
Germany from from whence
whence they they could
could
eventually move to northern waters . In charge of the air cover, Galland drew on two
eventually move to northern waters. In charge of the air cover, Galland drew on two
fighter wings in France as well as one from Germany ; he began the operation with
fighter wings in France as well as one from Germany; he began the operation with
approximately
approximately 250 250 fighters
fighters.. In In aa well-coordinated
well-coordinated effort, effort, the the Germans
Germans brought brought thethe
ships home . Despite the fact that mines damaged both battle cruisers, German
ships home. Despite the fact that mines damaged both battle cruisers, German
fighter
fighter aircraft
aircraft kept kept the
the RAF
RAF from from intervening
intervening in in aa decisive
decisive fashion
fashion.'"* . 101
The Dieppe tragedy does not need a full recapitulation here, but
The Dieppe tragedy does not need a full recapitulation here, but the
the airair action
action that
that
day is worthy of note. In August 1942, Allied forces raided the port of Dieppe ; the
day is worthy of note. In August 1942, Allied forces raided the port of Dieppe; the
purpose ofthe attack was to seize the port and test planning theories for an eventual
purpose of the attack was to seize the port and test planning theories for an eventual
invasion
invasion of of thethe continent
continent.. The The raid raid itself
itself waswas aa dismal
dismal tactical failure.. Canadian
tactical failure Canadian
troops never got past the sea wall ; most were butchered on the beaches . As
troops never got past the sea wall; most were butchered on the beaches. As naval
naval
units struggled to get the survivors off, the Luftwaffe intervened in rising numbers
units struggled to get the survivors off, the Luftwaffe intervened in rising numbers
and
and aa major
major air air battle
battle took
took placeplace.. By By thethe endend of of the
the operation,
operation, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had
written
written off off 21 21 fighters
fighters (4 (4 BfBf 109's
109's and and 17 17 FwFw 190's)
190's) and and 27 27 bombers
bombers (7 (7 Ju
Ju 88's,
88's, 11
He
He 111,HI, and and 19 19 Do Do 217's)
217's)."'' .'°9 TheThe British,
British, however,
however, in in addition
addition to to considerable
considerable
ground
ground losses,
losses, lost lost 11 destroyer
destroyer to to air
air attack
attack and and 106 106 aircraft
aircraft."" . "° While
While the the direct
direct
impact
impact of of Dieppe
Dieppe was was of of little
little importance,
importance, the the raid's
raid's strategic
strategic lessons
lessons had had aa critical
critical
effect
effect on on the
the war's
war's future.
future. The The Germans
Germans drew drew the the wrong
wrong conclusions
conclusions and and believed
believed
that
that Dieppe
Dieppe indicated
indicated that that at at its
its start
start thethe coming
coming AlliedAllied invasion
invasion would would attempt
attempt to to
seize
seize aa major
major port."'
port.'" SuchSuch aa conclusion
conclusion greatly greatly aided
aided deception
deception plans plans surrounding
surrounding
"Overlord
"Overlord." ." OnOn the the Allied
Allied side,side, British
British and and American
American commanders
commanders concluded concluded thatthat
seizure
seizure of of aa builtup
builtup area, area, such such as as aa port port city,
city, represented
represented too too hazardous
hazardous an an
operation
operation.. Thus, Thus, they they determined
determined to to taketake the
the port
port with
with themthem (the (the "Mulberry"
"Mulberry"
harbors)
harbors).. The The second
second vital
vital lesson
lesson drawndrawn was was that
that local
local airair superiority
superiority over over western
western
France and
France and the the LowLow Countries
Countries was was insufficient
insufficient for for the
the success
success of of such
such aa complex
complex
operation . Rather,
operation. Rather, the the Allies
Allies needed
needed complete
complete air air superiority
superiority over over western
western Europe,
Europe,
aa circumstance
circumstance that that only
only the
the defeat
defeat ofthe
of the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could could achieve
achieve..
There
There is is one
one parenthetical
parenthetical aspect aspect of of thethe air
air war
war that
that touches
touches tangentially
tangentially on on this
this
study
study and and that
that is is the
the role
role ofof aircraft
aircraft in in the
the war
war on on trade.
trade. Fortunately
Fortunately for for Britain,
Britain, the
the
war
war at at sea
sea raised
raised minimal
minimal interest
interest in Goring.. Thus,
in Goring Thus, despite
despite aa greatgreat opportunity,
opportunity, the the
Reichsmarschall's
ReichsmarschaU's willingness willingness to to cooperate
cooperate with with the the navy navy was was almost
almost
nonexistent
nonexistent."^ . "2 The
The general
general staff staff diddid select
select two two bomber
bomber wings wings in in thethe summer
summer of of
1939
1939 to to operate
operate againstagainst British
British trade, trade, while while thethe seizure
seizure of of Narvik
Narvik in in April
April 1940
1940
revealed
revealed the the long-range
long-range potential
potential of of thethe Fw Fw 200,200, thethe "Condor
"Condor." ." Nevertheless,
Nevertheless,
despite
despite the the timetime required
required to to train
train bomber
bomber crews crews in in navigation
navigation over over water,
water, Goring
Goring
used
used these
these specialized
specialized crews crews in in the
the bombing
bombing offensive
offensive against
against Britain
Britain in in the
the summer
summer
and
and fall
fall ofof 1940.
1940. By By March
March 1941, \9A\, FliegerfiihrerAtlantik
Fliegerfuhrer Atlantik (air (air commander,
commander, Atlantic) Atlantic)

135
135
STRATEGY FOR
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DEFEAT

possessed aa total
possessed total ofof 8383 aircraft
aircraft (21
(21 "Condors,"
"Condors," 26 26 He He 111's,
Ill's, 24 24 HeHe 115
115 torpedo
torpedo
bombers, and 12 Ju
bombers, and 12 Ju 88/Me
88/Me 110
110 reconnaissance
reconnaissance aircraft)
aircraft). . By
By July,
July, the
the number
number had
had
increased to 155 aircraft, a
increased to 155 aircraft, a force
force hardly
hardly capable
capable of
of inflicting
inflicting decisive
decisive damage
damage on
on
British convoys . Despite the scarcity of aircraft, long-range "Condors" had aa
British convoys. Despite the scarcity of aircraft, long-range "Condors" had
serious
serious impact
impact on on thethe naval
naval war.
war. InIn January,
January, German
German aircraft
aircraft sank
sank 20 20 ships
ships for
for aa
total of 78,517 tons, while U-boats sent to the bottom 21 vessels (126,782 tons) .
total of 78,517 tons, while U-boats sent to the bottom 21 vessels (126,782 tons).
The
The following
following month,
month, "Condors"
"Condors" sank sank 27 ships (89,305
27 ships tons); thereafter,
(89,305 tons); thereafter, British
British
countermeasures
countermeasures restrictedrestricted the the threat
threat."^."' Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, these these successes
successes by by aa small
small
number
number of of aircraft
aircraft indicate
indicate whatwhat the the Germans
Germans mightmight have have achieved
achieved with with more
more
resources
resources..
In
In 1942,
1942, the efforts of
the efforts of the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe'& antishipping
antishipping forcesforces centered
centered on on northern
northern
waters
waters.. Failure
Failure in in the east led
the east led the
the Germans
Germans to to make
make aa major major effort
effort to
to shut
shut offoff
western
western aid aid reaching
reaching RussiaRussia through
through Murmansk
Murmansk.. In In 1941,
1941, the the Germans
Germans had had
constructed
constructed aa series series of of airfields
airfields in in northern
northern Norway
Norway to to support
support ground
ground forces
forces
operating
operating in in the
the Arctic
Arctic.. These
These fields
fields proved
proved useful
useful when
when the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe turned
turned to to
attacking
attacking North
North CapeCape convoys
convoys.. The
The first
first aerial
aerial attacks,
attacks, launched
launched against
against convoy
convoy PQ PQ
16, managed
16, managed to to sink
sink 77 out of 34
out of 34 ships
ships.. The next operation,
The next operation, against
against PQ PQ 17,
17, was
was more
more
successful
successful and and resulted
resulted in in destruction
destruction of of 23
23 out of 34
out of 34 ships.
ships. ForFor thethe Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, thisthis
attack
attack represented
represented its its last
last major
major success
success against
against Allied
Allied shipping.
shipping. The The next
next
Murmansk
Murmansk convoy convoy in the fall
in the fall possessed
possessed aircraft
aircraft carrier
carrier protection,
protection, and and British
British
fighters extracted heavy
fighters extracted heavy losses
losses from
from attacking
attacking aircraft
aircraft.. SoonSoon thereafter,
thereafter, however,
however,
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe shut shut down
down operations
operations in in Arctic waters because
Arctic waters because the the invasion
invasion of of North
North
Africa
Africa resulted
resulted in in the
the transfer
transfer ofof antishipping
antishipping unitsunits from
from the the North
North CapeCape to to the
the
Mediterranean
Mediterranean."'' ." 4 In
In the
the final
final analysis,
analysis, German
German efforts
efforts to to attack
attack British
British shipping
shipping by by
air
air achieved
achieved disproportionate
disproportionate successes successes for for the
the level
level of of effort
effort expended
expended..
Nevertheless, while
Nevertheless, while suggesting
suggesting whatwhat the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe might
might have have accomplished
accomplished with with
more
more resources,
resources, the the war
war against
against Allied
Allied commerce
commerce never never aroused
aroused Gbring's
Goring's interest,
interest,
and
and the
the opportunity
opportunity vanished
vanished..

GERMAN
GERMAN PRODUCTION,
PRODUCTION, 1942
1942:: PERFORMANCE
PERFORMANCE AND
AND IMPLICATIONS
IMPLICATIONS
Milch's 1942
Milch's 1942 production
production program,
program, the
the so-called
so-called "Goring
"Goring program,"
program," hadhad largely
largely
been
been predicated
predicated onon the
the winning
winning ofof the
the Russian
Russian campaign
campaign.'" "s
. TheThe army's
army's failure
failure in
in
front
front of
of Moscow
Moscow raised
raised serious
serious difficulties
difficulties for
for the
the possibility
possibility of
of increasing
increasing aircraft
aircraft
production
production.. Heavy
Heavy equipment
equipment losses
losses inin Russia,
Russia, combined
combined withwith ongoing
ongoing military
military
operations
operations in
in the
the east,
east, gave
gave Hitler
Hitler no
no choice
choice but
but to
to switch
switch industrial
industrial priorities
priorities back
back
to
to army
army production
production."*."' Three
Three weeks
weeks after
after Hitler's
Hitler's decision,
decision. Milch
Milch noted
noted to
to
Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek what
what the
the impact would be:
impact would be:

(a)
(a) Instead
Instead of
of aa transfer of workers
transfer of workers from
from the
the army
army toto
Luftwaffe
Lifiwcffe tasks,
tasks, aa heavy
heavy withdrawal
withdrawal of of air force workers
air force [in favor
workers [in favor
of the
of the army]
army]..
(b) Industrial capacity
(b) Industrial capacity already
already surrendered
surrendered by the army
by the army
to
to the
the air
air force
force to
to be returned..
be returned

13
1366
ON
ON THE
THE BRINK
BRINK

(c)
(c) Unexpectedly strong limitations
Unexpectedly strong limitations on
on raw
raw material
material
allocations-for
allocations—for example,
example, only
only one-half
one-half of
of expected copper..
expected copper
(d)
(d) Extraordinary
Extraordinary reductions
reductions in construction projects
in construction projects in
in
support
support of
of weapons
weapons and
and industry
industry..
(e) Similar
(e) Similar difficulties
difficulties and
and no
no adjustments
adjustments with
with the
the
machine tool
machine tool industry . 117
industry."^

Thomas
Thomas estimated
estimated that that production
production priorities
priorities would
would meanmean thatthat thethe aircraft
aircraft industry
industry
could complete only 60 percent ofthe "Goring program .
could complete only 60 percent of the "Goring program.""* ""s
In fact,
In fact, no no such
such reduction
reduction occurred
occurred.. Despite
Despite the the fact
fact that
that thethe aircraft
aircraft industry
industry
possessed the same work force and aluminum allocation that it had had in 1941,
possessed the same work force and aluminum allocation that it had had in 1941,
aircraft production began a dramatic acceleration that would continue into 1943 and
aircraft production began a dramatic acceleration that would continue into 1943 and
1944. From an average monthly production of 981 aircraft in 1941 (311 fighters and
1944. From an average monthly production of 981 aircraft in 1941 (311 fighters and
363 bombers), German production rose to 1,296 per month in 1942, a 32 percent
363 bombers), German production rose to 1,296 per month in 1942, a 32 percent
increase
increase (434(434 fighters,
fighters, 39 39.5.5 percent;
percent ; andand 545545 bombers,
bombers, 50 50 percent)
percent).. In In December
December
1942, production reached 1,548 aircraft, a 58 percent increase over December
1942, production reached 1,548 aircraft, a 58 percent increase over December
1941, including 554 fighters (110 percent) and 674 bombers (69 percent) . 1 '9 As
1941, including 554 fighters (110 percent) and 674 bombers (69 percent)."' As
suggested earlier, this dramatic increase was largely due to one man, Erhard Milch.
suggested earlier, this dramatic increase was largely due to one man, Erhard Milch.
To
To begin
begin with,with, Milch
Milch established
established aa close close working
working relationship
relationship with with the the new
new
armaments
armaments czar, czar, Albert
Albert Speer,
Speer, who who had had succeeded
succeeded Dr. Dr. Fritz
Fritz Todt
Todt afterafter the
the latter's
latter's
death
death inin anan aircraft
aircraft crash
crash.. In In addition
addition to to Todt's
Todt's powers,
powers, Speer
Speer received
received far far wider
wider
latitude
latitude than
than Todt
Todt hadhad ever
ever possessed
possessed.. OnlyOnly thethe Luftwafe
Luftwaffe remained
remained independent
independent of of
Speer's
Speer's direct
direct control, although cooperation
control, although cooperation betweenbetween SpeerSpeer and and MilchMilch removed
removed
much of
much of the
the friction characterizing previous
friction characterizing previous relationships
relationships.'^" . '2° Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the
army's
army's desperate
desperate condition
condition in in the
the east and high
east and high ammunition
ammunition expenditures
expenditures in in the
the
great
great land
land battles
battles on on the
the eastern
eastern front
front forced
forced Milch
Milch to to make-do
make-do with with what
what the the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had received
received in in previous
previous yearsyears..
While
While the the Germans
Germans possessedpossessed significant
significant resources
resources of of aluminum,
aluminum, aircraft aircraft
production
production faced faced serious
serious competition
competition from from other
other users
users.. In In 1941,
1941, 5,116 5,116 tonstons ofof
aluminum
aluminum per per month
month (16 (16 percent
percent of of all
all allocations)
allocations) went went toto ammunition
ammunition production production
for
for the
the three
three services
services (for(for fuses,
fuses, incendiaries,
incendiaries, tracers,
tracers, etc .) . Milch
etc.). Milch noted noted to to Goring
Goring
that
that this
this equalled
equalled the the aluminum
aluminum necessary
necessary to to produce
produce 1,000
1,000 Do Do 217's217's or or 4,000
4,000 Bf Bf
109's.'2
109's.'^'I Altogether,
Altogether, aircraft aircraft construction
construction received
received 74 74 percent
percent of of aluminum
aluminum
production
production.. '22 '22 From
From the the last
last quarter
quarter of of 1941,
1941, allocations
allocations to to aircraft
aircraft production
production began began
to
to run
run seriously
seriously in in arrears
arrears and and that
that situation
situation remained
remained constant
constant throughout
throughout 1942.' 1942.'" 23
While
While Milch
Milch waged waged aa runningrunning battlebattle toto increase
increase aluminum
aluminum allocations
allocations for for the
the
aircraft
aircraft industry,
industry, he he undertook
undertook substantive
substantive measures
measures to to improve
improve manufacturing
manufacturing
efficiency.
efficiency. First,First, hehe cracked
cracked down down on wasteful practices
on wasteful practices that that had had characterized
characterized
German
German industry;
industry; aluminum
aluminum allocations
allocations to to manufacturers
manufacturers now now depended
depended on on actual
actual
use
use inin the
the production
production of of each
each aircraft
aircraft rather
rather than
than an an absurdly
absurdly high high industry-wide
industry-wide
average
average set set byby thethe Air
Air Ministry
Ministry.. By By 1943,
1943, recycling
recycling of of scrap
scrap aluminum
aluminum as as well
well asas
crashed
crashed aircraft
aircraft had had increased
increased available
available aluminum
aluminum by by 57
57 percent
percent.. Also, Also, important
important
was
was thethe fact
fact that
that substitute
substitute materials,
materials, such such as as steel
steel alloys
alloys and and wood,wood, stretched
stretched
aluminum
aluminum allocations.
allocations.'2" Success was dramatic . In 1942, with 15,000 fewer tons of
'24 Success was dramatic. In 1942, with 15,000 fewer tons of

13
1377
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

aluminum,
aluminum, German German industry industry produced
produced 3,780 3,780 more more aircraft
aircraft weighing
weighing aa total total of of
28,628 more tons
28,628 more tons.'" . izs
On
On thethe labor
labor sideside of of aircraft
aircraft production,
production, Milch Milch and and industry
industry leaders leaders achieved
achieved
similar results
similar Through 1941,
results.. Through 1941, the the aircraft industry had
aircraft industry received aa disproportionate
had received disproportionate
share
share of of labor
labor resources,
resources, undoubtedly
undoubtedly because because of of Goring's
Goring's position
position as as leader
leader of of the
the
Four
Four YearYear Plan.
Plan. In In late
late 1941,
1941, however,
however, Hitler Hitler ended ended the the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe'& favored favored
position
position;; and and over
over the the course
course of of 1942 despite aa massive
1942 despite massive influx influx of of foreign
foreign laborers
laborers
into
into Germany,
Germany, the the aircraft
aircraft industry
industry received
received few few new new workers
workers.'^' . 126 Beginning
Beginning in in the
the
summer
summer of of 1941,
1941, Milch Milch had had demanded
demanded that that the the aircraft
aircraft industry
industry rationalize
rationalize
production
production methodsmethods and and useuse rawraw material
material allocations
allocations as as wellwell as as itsits work
work force force
better
better.. The
The result
result of of such
such pressure
pressure was was aa steady
steady increase
increase in in productivity
productivity from from 1941 1941
through
through 1943 1943 (although
(although not not nearly
nearly as as marked
marked as as inin the
the United
United States)States) as as German
German
industry
industry introduced
introduced mass mass production
production methods methods.'^' . '2' But
But no no matter
matter how how revolutionary
revolutionary
the
the newnew methods
methods were were in in terms
terms of of German
German industrialindustrial practices,practices, aircraft aircraft
manufacturers
manufacturers never
never came
came close
close to
to equalling
equalling what
what occurred
occurred in
in the
the United
United States
States
where,
where, as as one
one historian
historian of of the
the strategic
strategic bombing
bombing offensiveoffensive has has noted,
noted, American
American
industry
industry waswas turning
turning out aircraft like
out aircraft like "cans
"cans ofbeans.
of beans."'^^ "I"
Despite Milch's drive to increase production, there
Despite Milch's drive to increase production, there remained
remained considerable
considerable
skepticism in the general staff as to the size of the proposed program . As
skepticism in the general staff as to the size of the proposed program. As latelate as as
March 1942, Jeschonnek objected to Milch's urgings for a rapid increase in fighter
March 1942, Jeschonnek objected to Milch's urgings for a rapid increase in fighter
production
production.. He He remarked,
remarked, "I "I dodo notnot know
know whatwhat II shouldshould do do with
with moremore than than 360 360
fighters!""' By June, the Chief of Staff had modified his opinion and written Milch
fighters!"'^' By June, the Chief of Staff had modified his opinion and written Milch
that the general
that the general staff foresaw aa need
staff foresaw need for for aa monthly
monthly production
production of of atat least
least 900900 fighters
fighters
by the winter of 1943-44 .'3° Nevertheless, in view ofthe attrition rates of 1940 and
by the winter of 1943-44.'^" Nevertheless, in view of the attrition rates of 1940 and
1941, Jeschonnek's March comment can only be described as remarkable .
1941, Jeschonnek's March comment can only be described as remarkable.
The
The impact
impact of of Milch's
Milch's success
success was was favorable
favorable for for the
the shortshort run run.. Given
Given the the
difficulties that the Luftwaffe had experienced at the end of 1941, this was not
difficulties that the Luftwaffe had experienced at the end of 1941, this was not
surprising.. With
surprising With heavy
heavy commitments
commitments in in Russia,
Russia, indicators
indicators such such as as unit
unit strength
strength as as aa
percentage of
percentage of authorized
authorized strengthstrength underwent
underwent gradual gradual improvement
improvement over over thethe spring
spring
and summer of
and summer of 1942.'
1942.'"3' Encouraging
Encouraging also also for
for frontline
frontline commanders
commanders was was the the fact
fact
that operational
that operational ready ready rates rates also
also began
began aa slow slow climbclimb from from the the depths
depths of of winter
winter
1941-42
1941^2.. From From aa low low of of 39
39 percent
percent for for all
all combat
combat aircraft
aircraft (44 (44 percent
percent for for fighters
fighters
and 31
and 31 percent
percent for for bombers)
bombers) in in late
late January
January 1942,1942, the the in-commission
in-commission rate rate hadhad risen
risen
to
to 69
69 percent
percent for for combat
combat aircraft
aircraft by by late
late June
June (75(75 percent
percent for for fighters
fighters and and 66 66 percent
percent
for
for bombers)
bombers).. Thereafter,
Thereafter, however,however, heavy heavy operations
operations in in the
the east
east and and commitments
commitments
over
over great
great distances
distances resulted
resulted in in aa fall
fall inin overall
overall operational
operational ready ready ratesrates to to asas low
low as as
59
59 percent
percent and and no no higher
higher thanthan 65 65 percent
percent for for the
the remainder
remainder of of thethe year
year.'". 132 IfIf the
the
Lufhvaffe
Luftwaffe had had recovered
recovered some some strength,
strength, the the patient
patient was was still
still inin serious
serious condition
condition..
The
The most
most discouraging
discouraging of of the
the 1942 indicators confronting
1942 indicators confronting the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was was thethe
fact
fact that
that increased
increased aircraft
aircraft losses
losses accompanied
accompanied rising rising production
production.. In In fact,
fact, by by June
June
1942
1942 the Luftwaffe possessed
the Luftwaffe possessed only only 60 60 more
more combat
combat aircraft
aircraft than than one one yearyear earlier
earlier
(June
(June 21,
21, 1941 4,882 aircraft
1941:: 4,882 aircraft;; June
June 20, 20, 1942:
1942: 4,942 aircraft).. For
4,942 aircraft) For the the remainder
remainder of of
1942 as
1942 as commitments
commitments multiplied,
multiplied, aircraft
aircraft strength
strength fell
fell until
until by
by the
the end
end of
of the
the year
year
the
the Germans
Germans had had less less than
than 4,400
4,400 combat aircraft ."' Thus,
combat aircraft.'" Thus, not not onlyonly were were the the

13
1388
ON
ON THE
THE BRINK
BRINK

Germans
Germans losing
losing more
more aircraft
aircraft inin numerical
numerical terms
terms but
but attrition
attrition in
in absolute
absolute terms
terms now
now
took
took place
place at
at aa faster
faster rate
rate than
than in
in 1941
1941.. The
The attrition
attrition taking
taking place
place through
through October
October
1942
1942 (see
(see Table
Table XXIX13^)
XXIX"") underscores
underscores thethe demands
demands on on the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe asas the
the
Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht mademade itsits last
last lunge
lunge forward
forward.. By
By the
the end
end of
of October,
October, in in terms
terms of
of its
its
operational
operational ready
ready rate,
rate, its
its force
force structure,
structure, and
and its
its attrition
attrition thus
thus far
far in
in the
the year,
year, the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was
was dangerously
dangerously overextended
overextended..

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
The
The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe'& problems
problems in in 1942
1942 directly
directly reflected
reflected thethe catastrophic
catastrophic failure
failure of
of
German
German grand
grand strategy
strategy inin Russia
Russia.. In In aa larger
larger sense,
sense, however,
however, the the root
root of
of those
those
problems
problems laylay in
in the
the unjustified
unjustified overconfidence
overconfidence that that had
had marked
marked German
German strategic
strategic
and
and industrial
industrial planning
planning after
after the
the stunning
stunning victory
victory over
over France.
France. Because
Because thethe Germans
Germans
had
had done
done soso little
little to
to expand
expand production
production despite
despite control
control over
over most
most ofof Europe,
Europe, thethe
Reich's
Reich's ground
ground and and air
air forces
forces faced
faced enemies
enemies whowho possessed
possessed aa growing
growing material
material
superiority
superiority.. Hitler's
Hitler's gamble
gamble in in the
the summer
summer of of 1942
1942 in in the
the east
east further
further exacerbated
exacerbated
German
German numerical
numerical inferiority
inferiority.. ForFor the Luftwaffe, the imbalance was becoming
the Luftwaffe, the imbalance was becoming
unmanageable.
unmanageable. Disregarding
Disregarding the the difficulties
difficulties in
in Russia,
Russia, thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe confronted
confronted in in
the
the west
west an
an Anglo-American
Anglo-American industrialindustrial capacity
capacity that
that in
in the
the last
last quarter
quarter of
of 1942
1942
outproduced
outproduced Germany
Germany by by 250
250 percent
percent in in single-engine
single-engine fighters,
fighters, by by 196
196 percent
percent inin
twin-engine
twin-engine aircraft,
aircraft, and
and by
by 20,077.7
20,077.7 percent
percent in
in four-engine
four-engine bombers
bombers.. While
While some
some
of
of the
the West's
West's production
production went went toto the
the Pacific
Pacific and
and to
to Russia,
Russia, the
the rising
rising wave
wave ofof Allied
Allied
production
production waswas becoming
becoming clear."'
clear.'" It It would
would soonsoon swamp
swamp Germany's
Germany's aerial
aerial
defenders .
defenders.

139
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

TABLE
TABLE XXIX
XXIX
German Losses,
German All Causes-January-October
Losses, All Causes—January-October 1942
1942

Aircraft Written
Aircraft Written Off
Off

Average
Average Due
Due to
to Not
Not Due
Due Percent
Percent of
of
Strength,
Strength, Enemy
Enemy to
to Enemy
Enemy January
January
Jan
Jan 1942
1942 Action
Action Action
Action Total
Total Strength
Strength

Close Recce 280 70


70 73
73 143
143 51%
51%
Close Recce 280
Long-Range
Long-Range
Recce
Recce 400
400 236
236 136
136 372
372 93%
93%

Single-Engine
Single-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 1,500
1,500 868
868 866
866 1,734
1,734 115 .6%
115.6%

Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 490
490 331
331 244
244 575
575 117 .3%
117.3%

Bombers
Bombers 1,750
1,750 1,101
1,101 648
648 1,749
1,749 99 .9%
99.9%

Stukas
Stukas 440
440 315
315 162
162 477
477 108 .4%
108.4%

Transport
Transport 970
970 250
250 256
256 506
506 52 .2%
52.2%

Liaison
Liaison 270
270 73
73 91
91 164
164 60 .7%
60.7%

Coastal
Coastal 230
230 33
33 40
40 73
73 31 .7%
31.7%

TOTAL
TOTAL 6,330
6,330 3,277
3,277 2,516
2,516 5,793
5,793 91 .5%
91.5%

Aircraft Damaged
Aircraft January-October 1942
Damaged:: January-October 1942

Not
Not Reparable
Reparable Reparable;atIt
Reparable
at
at Unit
Unit Level
Level Unit Level
Unit Level

Due
Due to
to Not
Not Due
Due Due
Due to
to Not
Not Due
Due Total
Total
Enemy
Enemy to
to Enemy
Enemy Enemy
Enemy to
to Enemy
Enemy Aircraft
Aircraft
Action
Action Action
Action Total
Total Action
Action Action
Action Total
Total Damaged
Damaged

Close
Close Recce
Recce 43
43 34
34 77
77 37
37 49
49 86
86 163
163

Long-Range
Long-Range
Recce
Recce 47
47 116
116 163
163 20
20 38
38 58
58 221
221

Single-Engine
Single-Engine
Fighters
Fighters 202
202 681
681 883
883 133
133 470
470 603
603 1,486
1,486

Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine
88 181 269
269 39
39 118
118 157
157 426
426
Fighters
Fighters 88 181
329 566 895
895 90
90 294
294 384
384 1,279
1,279
Bombers
Bombers 329 566
83 129 28
28 50
50 78
78 207
207
Stukas
Stukas 46
46 83 129
111 23 143
143 166
166 277
277
Transport
Transport 21
21 90
90 HI 23
101 14
14 65
65 79
79 180
180
Liaison
Liaison 10
10 91
91 101
33 22 44 66 99
Coastal
Coastal 00 33
386 1,231 1,617
1,617 4,248
4,248
TOTAL
TOTAL 786
786 1,845
1,845 2,631
2,631 386 1,231

140
140
Notes
Notes
11.. KTB
fCTB OKW,
OfCW, Vol Vol 11,
II, ed
ed.. by Andreas Hillgruber,
by Andreas Hillgruber, pp.. 166 166..
22.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22III/1181-1185,
III/1181-1185, Flugzeugunfalle
Flugzeugunfalleund and Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den fliegenden
fliegenden VerWnden
Verbanden..
33.. BA/MA
BA/MA,, RL RL 2111/1025,
2111/1025, 66.Abt. (Ill A),
.Abt . (III A), Front-Flugzeug-Verluste,
Front-Hugzeug-Verluste, 1942 1942..
44.. Ibid
Ibid..
55.. Ibid
Ibid..
66.. Trevor-Roper,
Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg
Blitzkrieg to to Defeat,
Defeat, Directive
Directive #39, #39, 88.12.41.,
.12 .41 ., pp.. 107
107..
77.. Albert
Albert Seaton,
Seaton, The The Russo-German
Russo-German War, War, 1941-45
1941-45 (New (New York,
York, 1971),
1971), pp.. 212
212..
88.. Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vor Moskau, pp
vorMoskau, pp.. 206,
206, 210
210..
99.. Erickson,
Erickson, The The Road
Road to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp pp.. 297-98
297-98;; see see also
also Kurt
Kurt von
von Tippelskirch,
Tippelskirch, Geschichte
Geschichte des des
Zweiten
Zweiten Weltkrieges
Weltkrieges (Bonn,(Bonn, 1951),
1951), pp.. 237237..
10.
10. SeeSee Halder,
Haider, Kriegstagebuch,
^riegitogefcMc/i, Vol Vol.. III,
Ill, entries
entries for 29 .12 .41 ., 30
for29.12.41., .12 .41 ., 31
30.12.41., .12 .41 ., 22.1.42.,
31.12.41., .1 .42 ., which
which
begin
begin with with the the following
following comments
comments;: 29 .12 . : "Ein
29.12.; "Ein sehr
sehr schwerer
schwerer Tag!" Tag!";; 30 .12 . : "Wieder
30.12.; "Wieder ein ein schwerer
schwerer
Tag!"
Tag!";; 31 .12 . : "Wieder
31.12.: "Wieder ein ein schwerer
schwerer Tag!" Tag!";; and and 22.1.:
.1 . : "Ein
"Ein Tag
Tag wilder
wilder Kampfe
Kampfe." ."
11
11.. Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vor vor Moskau,
Moskau, p. p . 216
216..
12
12.. Hermann
Hermann Plocher,
Plocher, The The German
German Air Air Force
Force Versus Russia, 1942,
Versus Russia, 1942, USAF Historical Study
USAF Historical Study No No.. 154
154
(Air
(Air University,
University, 1967), 1967), pppp.. 69-70
69-70..
13.. Halder,
13 Kriegstagebuch, Vol
Haider, Kriegstagebuch, Vol.. III,
Ill, entry
entry forfor 22 .2 .42 ., pp.. 405
22.2.42., 405..
14. Ibid.,., entry
14. Ibid entry for 25 .3 .42 ., pp.. 418
for 25.3.42., 418..
15
15.. Burkhart
Burkhart Mullet-Hillebrand,
Miiller-Hillebrand, Das Das Heer
Heer 1933-1945,
1933-1945, Vol Vol.. III,
Ill, Der
Der Zweifrontenkrieg
Zweifrontenkrieg (Frankfurt
(Frankfurt am am
Main,
Main, 1969), 1969), Table
Table 22 "Verluste,
"Verluste, Panzerkampfwagen,"
Panzerkampfwagen," Blau, Blau, TheThe German
German Campaign
Campaign in in Russia,
Russia, pp.. 41 41;;
and
and Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vor Moskau, pp.. 258
vorMoskau, 258..
16
16.. Reinhardt,
Reinhaidt, Die Die Wende
Wende vor vor Moskau,
Moskau, pp.. 258 258..
17
17.. Irving,
Irving, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofthe
of the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 144 144..
18
18.. Plocher,
Plocher, The The German
German Air Air Force
Force Versus Russia, 1942,
Versus Russia, 1942, pp pp.. 105,
105, 107
107..
19 . Ibid ., p.
19.Ibid., p . 13
13..
20
20.. Ibid ., pp
Ibid., pp.. 68,
68, 139-40
139-40.. See See also
also vonvon Richthofen's
Richthofen's order order forfor the
the combing
combing out out ofof 30 percent of
30 percent of rear
rear
service
service personnel,
personnel, BA/MA,BA/MA, RL8/49,RL8/49, Korpsbefehl
Korpsbefehl des des komm
komm.. General
General des VIII.. Fl
des VIII Fl.. K
K.,., 25 .2 .42 . ; and
25.2.42.; and
Richthofen's
Richthofen's disapproval
disapproval in in October
October 1942 1942 of of Gbring's
Goring's intention
intention to to establish
establish 20 20 Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe field field divisions
divisions::
"Luftflotte
"Luftflotte 44 vor vor Stalingrad
Stalingrad:: unter
unter GenGen.. Oberst
Oberst FrhrFrhr.. vv.. Richthofen,"
Richthofen," AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K 113 .309-3, vv.. 9,
113.309-3, 9,
diary
diary entryentry forfor 15 .10 .42 .
15.10.42.
21
21.. "Versorgung
"Versorgung Demjansk Demjanskund and Cholm,"
Cholm," Morzik Nr 227, 22.2.56.,
MoizikNr227, .2 .56 ., AFSHRS
AFSHRS:: K K 113 .3018-4 .
113.3018-^.
22
22.. "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability Tables,Tables, August
August 1938-April
1938-April 1945," 1945," AHB,AHB, Translation
Translation No. No.
VII/107
VII/107..
23
23.. Seaton,
Seaton, The The Russo
Russo German
German War, War, pp.. 258258..
24.
24. Hans-Adolf
Hans-Adolf Jacobsen,
Jacobsen, Der Der Zweite
Zweite Weltkrieg
Weltkrieg in in Chronik
Chronik and und Dokumenten
Dokumenten (Darmstadt,
(Darmstadt, 1962), 1962), pp..
690
690..
25
25.. Reinhardt,
Reinhardt, Die Die Wende
Wende vor Moskau, pp.. 259
vorMoskau, 259..
26
26.. Blau,
Blau, The The German
German Campaign
Campaign in in Russia,
Russia, p. p. 138
138..
27
27.. Trevor-Roper,
Trevor-Roper, Hitler Hitler Directs
Directs the the War,
War, Directive
Directive #41, #41, 55.4.42.,
.4 .42 ., pp.. 116
116.. There
There was,was, of of course,
course, aa
corollary
corollary objective
objective in in gaining
gaining control
control of of the
the oil
oil.. Seizure
Seizure of of the
the oil
oil in
in the
the Caucasus
Caucasus would would denydeny that
that oil
oil to
to
the
the Russians
Russians..
28
28.. Shortages
Shortages in in diesel
diesel fuel
fuel for
for the
the navy
navy had become so
had become so acute
acute by by the
the end
end of of 1941
1941 thatthat one
one author
author hashas
described the
described the 1942
1942 period
period as as one
one ofof "crisis"
"crisis" in in which
which thethe navy,
navy, including
including the the U-boat
U-boat forces,
forces, lived
lived "hand
"hand
to
to mouth
mouth." ." SeeSee Wilhelm
Wilhelm Meier-Domberg,
Meier-Domberg, Die Die Olversorgung
Olversorgungder der Kriegsmarine
Kriegsmarine 1935 1935 bisbis 1945
1945 (Freiburg,
(Freiburg,
1973),
1973), pp pp.. 68-71
68-71..
29 . Trevor-Roper, Hitler Directs
19.iKvot-Ko'pex,Hitler Directs the War, Directive
theWar, Directive #41, #41, 55.4.42.,
.4 .42 ., p.
p. 116
116..
30
30.. Halder,
YKMN, Kriegstagebuch,
Kriegstagebuch, Vol Vol.. III,
m, entry
entry forfor 19 .5 .42 ., pp.. 444
19.5.42., 444..
31.. Erickson,
31 Erickson, The The Road
Road to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp pp.. 345-47
345-47..
32.. The
32 The Great
Great Patriotic
Patriotic War War of of the
the Soviet Union 1941-1945,
Soviet Union 1941-1945, AA General General Outline
Outline (Moscow,
(Moscow, 1974), 1974), pp pp..
119-20
119-20..
33
33.. Richthofen,
Richthofen, "Kriegstagebuch,"
"Kriegstagebuch," 12 .7 .42 .
12.7.42.
34.. Air
34 Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 178-79
178-79..
35
35.. Blau,
Blau, The German Campaign
The German Campaign in Russia, pp.. 143
inRussia, 143..
36
36.. TheThe Great
Great Patriotic
Patriotic War War of of the
the Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, pp.. 125 125..
37 Tippelskirch, Geschichte
37.. Tippelskirch, Geschichte des des Zweiten
Zweiten Weltkrieges,
Weltkrieges, pp.. 283 283..

141
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

38 Blau, The
38.. Blau, The German
German Campaign
Campaign in Russia, pp
inRussia, pp.. 146-48
146-48..
39
39.. The Great Patriotic
TheGreat Patriotic WarWar of ofthethe Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, pp.. 126 126..
40
40.. KTB
KTB OKW, OKW, Vol Vol.. 11, entry for
II, entry for 25 .6 .42 ., pp.. 448
25.6.42., 448..
41 . Trevor-Roper, Blitzkrieg
4\.TTevoT-Roper, Blitzkrieg to Defeat, Directive
to Defeat, Directive #45, #45, 23 .7 .42 ., pp.. 129
23.7.42., 129..
42
42.. Erickson,
Erickson, The The Road
Road to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp.. 356 356..
43
43.. Richthofen,
Richthofen, "Tagebuch,"
"Tagebuch," entry entry for for 21 .8 .42 . ; "Luftflotte
21.8.42.; "Luftflotte 44 vor vor Stalingrad
Stalingrad:: unter
unter Gen Gen.. Oberst
Oberst
Frhr.. vv.. Richthofen,"
Frhr Richthofen," AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K 113 .309-3, vv.. 99..
113.309-3,
44
44.. KTBKTB OKW,OKW, Vol Vol.. II,
II, entries
entries for for 22.7.42., .7 ., 9 .7 ., 10
.7 .42 ., 66.7.,9.7., .7 ., 13
10.7., .7 ., 14
13.7., .7 ., 16
14.7., .7 ., 17
16.7., .7 ., 18
17.7., .7 ., 19
18.7., .7 .,
19.7.,
20
20.7.,.7 ., 24 .7 ., 26
24.7., .7., 27
26.7., .7 ., 28
27.7., .7 .
28.7.
45
45.. These
These tabulations
tabulations are are based
based on on the the author's calculation of
author's calculation of losses
losses reported
reported to to the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
quartermaster
quartermaster general general in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 III/1181,
III/1181, 1182, 1182, 11831183.. These
These reports
reports indicate
indicate the the day
day on on which
which
aircraft
aircraft were were lost,lost, although
although the the monthly
monthly loss loss reports
reports the the quartermaster
quartermaster general general submitted
submitted to to the
the general
general
staff
staff reflected
reflected the the day
day on
on which
which the the loss
loss report
report arrived
arrived in in Berlin
Berlin.. There
There was was generally
generally aa four-day
four-day to to one-
one-
month
month slippageslippage betweenbetween the the actual
actual lossloss andand its its report
report to to Berlin
Berlin.. Thus,
Thus, the the author's
author's retabulation
retabulation for for the
the
1942-43
1942-43 period period represents
represents the the most accurate picture
most accurate picture thatthat one
one cancan get
get ofof actual
actual losses
losses when
when they occurred..
they occurred
One
One must must add add that,
that, asas in
in allall administrative organizations, not
administrative organizations, not every
every lossloss was
was reported,
reported, although
although the the
incentive
incentive to to dodo so so was
was strong
strong since
since itit waswas on on the
the basis
basis ofof these
these loss
loss reports
reports thatthat the
the supply
supply service
service issued
issued
replacement
replacement aircraft aircraft.. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, direct direct lossloss tables
tables forfor 1944
1944 seemseem to to have
have been
been lost;
lost; consequently,
consequendy,
some
some figures figures for for 1944
1944 are are more
more difficult
difficult to to specifically
specifically tabulate
tabulate.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, drawingdrawing on on thethe
information
information contained contained in in other
other tables,
tables, one one can can establish
establish aa clear
clear trend
trend to to Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe losseslosses.. We We shall,
shall, ofof
course,
course, do do soso in in succeeding
succeeding chapters
chapters..
46
46.. Percentages
Percentages based based on on average
average numbernumber of of squadrons
squadrons serving
serving on on thethe eastern
eastern front,
front, August
August 1942 1942::
KTB
KTBOKW, OKW, Vol Vol.. II,
II, entries
entries forfor 13 .8 .42 ., 17
13.8.42., .8 .42 ., 22
17.8.42., .8 .42 .
22.8.42.
47
47.. AirAir Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and and Fall
Fall of ofthe
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 178-79
178-79..
48
48.. KTBKTB OKW,OKW, Vol Vol.. II,
II, entry
entry for for 26 .6 .42 ., pp.. 452
26.6.42., 452..
49
49.. See,See, in in particular,
particular, vv.. Richthofen's
Richthofen's discussion discussion with with those
those in in charge
charge of of the
the supply
supply systemsystem in in
"Luftflotte
"Luftflotte 44 vor vor Stalingrad
Stalingrad unterunter Gen Gen.. Oberst
Oberst Frhr Frhr.. vv.. Richthofen,"
Richthofen," entry entry forfor 15 .8 .42 ., AFSHRC
15.8.42., AFSHRC:: K K
113 .309-3, vV.. 99..
113.309-3,
50
50.. Tippelskirch,
Tippelskirch, Geschichte
Geschichte des des Zweiten
Zweiten Weltkrieges,
Wettkrieges, pp.. 285 285;; andand Blau,
Blau, The The German
German Campaign
Campaign in in
Russia,
Russia, pp pp.. 155-56
155-56..
51
51.. Plocher,
Plocher, The The German
German Air Air Force
Force Versus
Versus Russia,
Russia, pp pp.. 217,
217, 229229..
52.
52. "Luftflotte
"Luftflotte 44 vor vor Stalingrad
Stalingrad unter unter Gen Gen.. Oberst
Oberst Frhr Frhr.. vv.. Richthofen,"
Richthofen," entry entry for for 23 .8 .42 .,
23.8.42.,
AFSHRC:
AFSHRC:K113.309-3, K 113 .309-3, vV.. 99..
53
53.. Manfred
Manfred Kehrig, Kehrig, Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, Analyse Analyse and Dokumentation einer Schlacht (Stuttgart, 1974),
undDokumentationeinerSchlacht(Saittgatt, 1974), pp.. 120 120..
54
54.. German
German bomber bomber losses
losses for for this
this period
period were were:: 676676 aircraft
aircraft written
written off, off, including
including 633 633 fighters
fighters..
German
German strength strength on on April
April 30 30 was
was:: 1,3191,319 bombers
bombers and and 1,302
1,302 fighters
fighters.. These
These figures
figures are are based
based on on the
the
author's
author's calculations
calculations of of Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe loss loss tables
tables in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 III/1181,
III/l 181, 1182,1182, 1183,
1183, and and AirAir Historical
Historical
Branch,
Branch, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability Tables, Tables, August
August 1938-April
1938-April 1945," 1945," Translation
Translation No. No.
VII/
VII/107.107 .
55
55.. Marshal
Marshal of of the
the Royal
Royal Air Air Force
Force Lord Lord Tedder,
Tedder, With With Prejudice
Prejudice (London,
(London, 1966),1966), p. p. 244
244..
56
56.. Ibid
Ibid., ., pp
pp.. 106-07,
106-07, 116, 116, 163,
163, 194 194..
57
57.. Ibid
Ibid., ., pp.. 217
217..
58
58.. Why Why the the British
British armyarmy shouldshould have have had had exceeding
exceeding difficulty
difficulty isis examined
examined in in Brian
Brian Bond's
Bond's
scrupulously
scrupulously accurate accurate account
account of of thethe interwar
intenvar period period:: British
British Military
Military Policy
Policy Between
Between the the Two
Two World
World
Wars
Wars (Oxford,(Oxford, 1980) 1980).. For
For another
another participant's
participant's evaluation
evaluation of of the
the British
British armyarmy in in 1941-42,
1941^2, see see Erwin
Erwin
Rommel,
Rommel, The The Rommel
Rommel Papers,
Papers, ed ed.. bbyB.y B. H H.. Liddell
Liddell HartHart (London,
(London, 1953), 1953), pp pp.. 132,
132, 185, 211, 222, 262,
185,211,222, 262
298,308,332,341,366,519-20,523
298, 308, 332, 341, 366, 519-20, 523..
59
59.. Richard
Richard Suchenwirth,
Suchenwirth, Historical
Historical Turning Turning Points Points in in the
the German
German Air Air Force
Force War War Effort,
Effort, USAF USAF
Historical
Historical Studies Studies No No.. 89
89 (Maxwell
(Maxwell AFB, AFB, 1959), 1959), pp.. 90 90..
60
60.. Kesselring,
Kesselring, AA Soldier'sSoldier's Record,
Record, pp pp.. 123-24
123-24..
61
61.. KTB
KTB OKW, OKW, Vol Vol.. II,
II, entry
entry for for 10 .5 .42 ., pp.. 348
10.5.42, 348..
62
62.. This
This is is especially
especially true considering the
true considering the fact that Rommel's
fact that Rommel's supply supply lines
lines ran
ran from
from Greece
Greece to to Bengasi
Bengasi
in
in thethe summer
summer of 1942.. For
of 1942 For German
German logistical difficulties in
logistical difficulties in the
the theater,
theater, see see van Creveld, Supplying
van Creveld, Supplying War, War,
Chapter
Chapter VI VI..
63 . KTB OKW, Vol
eS.KTBOiCW, II, pp.. 348
Vol.. 11, 348..
64.. See,
64 See, in in particular, Tedder's comments
particular. Tedder's comments in in With Prejudice, pp.. 313
With Prejudice, 313..
65.. The
65 The following summary of
following summary events is
of events is based
based on on the
the account
account in in Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG, Vol Vol..
I,I, and Anthony Verrier,
and Anthony Venier, The Bomber Offensive
The Bomber Offensive (London,
(London, 1968) 1968).. For For aa discussion
discussion of of the development of
the development of
British
British and American air
and American air doctrines,
doctrines, see Appendix II..
see Appendix

14
1422
ON
ON THE
THE BRINK
BRINK

66
66.. Sir
Sir Arthur
Arthur Harris, Bomber Offensive
Harris, Bomber Offensive (New(New York, York, 1947),
1947), pp.. 36 36..
67
67.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,SAOAG. Vol Vol.. I,I, pp.. 195
195..
68
68.. Harris,
Harris, Bomber
Bomber Offensive,
Offensive, pp.. 36 36..
69 The change
69.. The change in in Prime
Prime Minister
Minister from from Neville
Neville Chamberlain
Chamberlain to to Winston
Winston Churchill
Churchill undoubtedly
undoubtedly
contributed
contributed to to the
the decision
decision for for aa more
more ruthless
ruthless bombing
bombing policypolicy..
70
70.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG, Vol Vol.. I,I, pp.. 216
216..
71
71.. For
For the
the full
full Butt
Butt report,
report, see see Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG, Vol Vol.. IV, Appendix 13,
IV, Appendix 13, report
report by by MrMr..
Butt
Butt toto Bomber
Bomber Command
Command on on his
his examination
examination of of night
night photographs,
photographs, 18 .8 .41 .
18.8.41.
72
72.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG. Vol Vol.. I,I, pp.. 185
185..
73.. PRO
73 PRO AIR AIR 14/1925, letter from
14/1925, letter from Portal
Portal to to the
the Under
Under Secretary
Secretary of of State,
State, AirAir Ministry,
Ministry, 11 . 9 .40 .
11.9.40.
74
74.. PRO
PRO PREMPREM 3/31, 3/31, COS COS (41)(41) 8686 (0),
(0), 28 .5 .41 ., "The
28.5.41., "The Present
Present War War Situation
Siniation Mainly
Mainly Insofar
Insofar as as itit
Relates to
Relates to Air."
Air."
75
75.. PRO
PRO AIR AIR 8/440,
8/440, Lord Lord Cherwell
Cherwell to to thethe Prime
Prime Minister,
Minister, 30 .3 .42 . See
30.3.42. See Verrier,
Verrier, The The Bomber
Bomber
Offensive, pp
Offensive, pp.. 97-98,
97-98, for for the
the failure
failure ofof the
the British
British Cabinet
Cabinet to seriously Lord
consider seriously
to consider Lord Tizard's
Tizard' s objections
objections
to Cherwell's
to Cherwell's calculations
calculations..
76
76.. Frankland
Frankland and and Webster,
Webster, SAOAG,SAOAG, Vol Vol.. I,
I, pppp.. 185-86
185-86..
77
77.. Ibid ., pp.. 346
Ibid., 346..
78
78.. See particularly the
Seeparticularly the Hams
Harris memoranda
memoranda of of 17 .6 .42 ., 28
17.6.42., .6.42 ., and
28.6.42., and 33.9.42.,
.9 .42 ., as
as well
well asas Leo
Leo Amery's
Amery's
sharp
sharp analysis
analysis of of the
the weaknesses
weaknesses in in Harris'
Harris' arguments
arguments (letter (letter to
to Churchill, .9 .42 .) in
Churchill, 11.9.42.) in PRO
PRO PREMPREM 3/19 3/19..
79
79.. For
For Hams'
Harris' outrage
outrage at at the
the diversion
diversion of of bomber
bomber aircraft
aircraft to to the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean as as well
well as as Tedder's
Tedder's
reply, see
reply, see Tedder,
Tedder, With With Prejudice,
Prejudice, pp pp.. 253-54
253-54..
80
80.. PRO
PRO PREMPREM 3/19, 3/19, Harris
Harris memorandum
memorandum 17 .6 .42 . This
17.6.42. This isis indeed
indeed aa remarkable
remarkable miscalculation
miscalculation of of the
the
role of
role of Coast
Coast Command
Command in in winning
winning the the Battle
Battle of of the
the Atlantic
Atlantic.. For For that
that task,
task, see
see Slessor,
Slessor, The The Central
Central
Blue,
S/«t, Chapter
Chapter XVIIXVII..
81
81.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG, Vol Vol.. I,
I, pppp.. 387-88
387-88..
82
82.. Ibid ., pp.. 391-94
Ibid., 391-94..
83
83.. Ibid ., pp.
Ibid., pp. 406-11
406-11..
84
84.. Ibid ., pp.. 432
Ibid., 432..
85
85.. Ibid pp.. 235-36
., pp
Ibid., 235-36..
86
86.. PRO
PRO AIR AIR 16/1024,
16/1024, Minutes
Minutes of of thethe 20th
20th Meeting
Meeting of of the
the Air
Air Fighting
Fighting Committee,
Committee, held held at at Air
Air
Ministry, White
Ministry, Hall, 12
White Hall, .3 .40 .
12.3.40.
87
87.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG. Vol Vol.. I,
I, pp.. 177
177..
88
88.. Ibid ., pp
Ibid., pp.. 439-13
439^3..
89
89.. This calculation isis based
This calculation based on on the
the figures
figures available
available in in Table
Table A A of of Max
Max Hasting's
Hasting's Bomber
Bomber Command
Command
(New
(New York,
York, 1979),
1979), and and Appendix
Appendix 39 39 of
of Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG, Vol Vol.. IV,
IV, pp.. 428428..
90
90.. Wesley
Wesley FF.. Craven
Craven and and James
James LL.. Cate,Cate, The Army Air
The Army Air Forces
Forces in in World
World War War Jl,II, Vol
Vol.. II (Chicago,
(Chicago,
1948),
1948), pp pp.. 663-64
663-64..
91
91.. Thomas
Thomas A A.. Fabyanic,
Fabyanic, "A "A Critique
Critique of of AirAir WarWar Planning,
Planning, 1941-44,"
1941-44," (Saint (Saint Louis
Louis University
University
dissertation,
dissertation, 1973),
1973), pp pp.. 125-27
125-27..
92
92.. "Auswirkung
"Auswirkung der der Erfahrungen
Erfahrungen in in Spanien,"
Spanien," Aus Aus einer
einer Ausarbeitung
Ausarbeitung von von Generallt
Generallt.. Galland
Galland uber fiber
die
die Luftverteidigung
Luftverteidigung des des Reiches,
Reiches, 1946, 1946, AFSHRC
AFSHRC:: K K 113 .302, vv.. II..
113.302,
93
93.. Goebbels,
Goebbels, The The Goebbels
Goebbels Diaries,
Diaries, entryentry for for 10 .4 .43 ., pp.. 322
10.4.43., 322.. ForFor Hitler's
Hitler's demand
demand that that heavy
heavy
emphasis
emphasis remain
remain on on the
the flak
flak program,
program, see see BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/603/60 Besprechungsnotiz
Besprechungsnotiz nr nr 46/42,
46/42, 66.3.42.
.3 .42 .
Karinhall,
Karinhall, Goring,
Goring, Milch, Jeschonnek, vv.. Brauchitsch
Milch, Jeschonnek, Brauchitsch (Haupt) (Haupt)..
94
94.. For
For aa further
further discussion
discussion of of this
this point,
point, seesee thethe following
following section
section..
95
95.. The
The following
following discussion
discussion of of German
German night night fighter
fighter tactics
tactics isis drawn
drawn from from thethe extensive
extensive review
review of of
night
night airair defense
defense written
written for the RAF
for the RAF by by General
General Josef Josef Kammhuber
Kammhuber at at the
the end
end of of the
the war,
war, hereafter
hereafter
referred
referred to to as
as "Development
' 'Development of of Night
Night Fighting
Fighting.'' ."
96
96.. See
See the
the maps
maps delineating
delineating the the expansion
expansion of of the
the system
system in in Verrier,
Verrier, The The Bomber
Bomber Offensive,
Offensive, pp.. 175 175..
For
For aa study
study discussing
discussing the the expansion
expansion of of the
the night
night defense
defense system
system as as well
well asas requirements
requirements for for equipment,
equipment,
see
see:: BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 7/579,
7/579, "Denkschrift
"Denkschrift fiber uber die
die Luftverteidigung
Luftverteidigung Herbst Herbst and und Winter
Winter 1941/42
1941/42 im im Bereich
Bereich
Luftwaffenbefehlshaber
Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte," Mitte," Luftwaffenbefehlshaber
Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte, Mitte, Fiihrungsabteilung
Fuhrungsabteilung I,I, 116 116 Nr
Nr.. 2500/41,
2500/41,
11.8.41.
.8 .41 . See
See also
also Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The Rise am/f
r/ieRwe and Fall of the German
a//Q^rtc German Air AirForce,
Force, pp pp.. 185-92
185-92
97 . Goebbels,
97. Goebbels, The The Goebbels
Goebbels Diary, Diary, pp. pp. 154,
154, 155,155, 158,
158, 160,
160, 186,
186, 193193..
98
98.. KTB
KTB OKW,OKW, Vol Vol.. 11,
II, entries
entries forfor 25 .4 ., 26
25.4., 26.4.,.4 ., and
and 27 .4 .42 ., pp
27.4.42., pp.. 328-29
328-29..
99
99.. The
The following
following account
account is is based
based on on KTB
KTB OKW, OKW, Vol Vol.. II,
II, entries
entries for
for 31 .5 ., 22.6.,
31.5., .6 ., and
and 33.6.42.,
.6 .42 ., pppp..
394,398-400
394, 398-400..

143
143
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

100
100.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, 5A0/IG, Vol Vol.. I,I, pp.. 407
407..
101
101.. KTB
KTB OKW,OKW, Vol Vol.. II,
II, entry
entry for for 33.6.42.,
.6 .42 ., p.p . 400
400.. See
See also
also Nicolaus
Nicolaus von von Below,
Below.Als Als Hitters
Hitlers Adjutant
Adjutant
1937-1945
/9i7-/94J (Mainz,
(Mainz, 1980),1980), pp pp.. 311-12
311-12..
102
102.. Beginning
Beginning in in July
July 1942,
1942, Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe reportsreports werewere recorded
recorded in in the
the OKW
OKW War War Diary
Diary.. ForFor the
the general
general
aimlessness
aimlessness of of the
the British
British attacks,
attacks, see see KTB
KTB OKW, OKW, Vol Vol.. II,
II, entries
entries beginning
beginning withwith 11.7.42.,
.7 .42 ., pppp.. 467ff
467ff..
103
103.. AHB,
AHB, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability Tables,"
Tables," Translation
Translation No No.. VII/107
VII/107..
104
104.. Goebbels,
Goebbels, The The Goebbels
Goebbels Diaries,Diaries, pp pp.. 200-01
200-01..
105
105.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall of ofthe German Air
the German Air Force,
Force, pp.. 196196..
106
106.. Galland,
Galland, The The First
First and
and the the Last,
Last, pp pp.. 54-55
54-55..
107
107.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG, Vol Vol.. I,I, p.
p. 490
490..
108
108.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/252,
8/252, "Erfahrungsbericht
"Erfahrungsbericht uber (iber Vorbereitung
Vorbereitung and und Durchfuhrung
Durchfiihrung des des Unternehmens
Untemehmens
Donnerkeil,"
Donnerkeil," Generalmajor
Generalmajor Max Max Ibel,Ibel, aa.D,;
.D . ; see
see also
also Galland,
Galland, The The First
First and
and thethe Last,
Last, pp pp.. 96-108
96-108..
109
109.. Based
Based on on the
the figures
figures in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 III/1182
III/l 182 Genst
Genst.. Gen
Gen.. Qu Qu.. (6
(6.. Abt .), Hugzeugunfalle
Abt.), Flugzeugunfalle and und
Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden,
Verbanden, August August 1941 1941..
110.
110. Roskill,
Roskill, TheThe WarWar at at Sea,
Sea, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 250-52
250-52..
111
111.. Friedrich
Friedrich Ruge,
Ruge, Der Der Seekrieg,
Seekrieg, 1939-1945
1939-1945 (Stuttgart,
(Stuttgart, 1954),
1954), pp 36-38..
pp.. 36-38
112
112.. The
The following
following discussion
discussion on on the
the air
air war
war against
against British
British trade
trade isis drawn
drawn fromfrom thethe Air
Air Ministry's
Ministry's The The
Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofof the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 110-19
110-19..
113
113.. Roskill,
Roskill, TheThe War at Sea, Vol
WaratSea, Vol.. I,I, pp
pp.. 362-63
362-63..
114
114.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall of of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 114-15
114-15.. To To be be accurate,
accurate, one one must
must
note
note that
that German submarines and
German submarines and the the threat
threat of of surface
surface units
units were
were alsoalso involved
involved in in the
the attacks
attacks onon thethe
Murmansk
Murmansk convoysconvoys..
115
115.. See
See Der
Der Staatssekretiir
Staatssekretar der der Luftfahrt
Luftfahrt and und Generalinspekteur
Generalinspekteur der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Betr Betr.:. : Steigerung
Steigerung der der
Rdstung,
Rustung, gst gst.. Nr.
Nr. 675/41
675/41,, An An denden Herm
Herm Generalquartiermeister,
Generalquartiermeister, 15 .10.42 ., AFSHRC:
15.10.42., AFSHRC: K K 113 .82, vv.. 22..
113.82,
116
116.. Georg
Georg Thomas,
Thomas, Geschichte
Geschichte der der deutschen
deutschen Wehr- Wehr- and Riistungswirtschaft 1918-1943/5
undRiistungswirtschaft 1918-194315 (Boppard (Boppard
am
am Rhein,
Rhein, 1966),
1966), Thomas
Thomas to to Keitel,
Keitel, BetrBetr.:. : Forderungen
Forderungen an an die
die Rdstung,
Rustung, 23 .12 .41 ., pp.. 470,
23.12.41., 470, andand Hitler:
Hitler.
Denkschrift,
Denkschrift, 33.1.42.,
.1 .42 ., pp.. 478478.. See See alsoalso BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL/315, RL/315, Oberkommando
Oberkommando der der Wehrmacht,
Wehrmacht, Wi Wi Rd Ru
Amt/Ru
Amt/Ru (Ila),
(Ila), NrNr 130/42
130/42 BertBetr.;. : Rdstung
Rustung 1942, 1942, 14 .1 .42 .
14.1.42.
117
117.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/864,
3/864, Der Der Staatssekretar
Staatssekretar der der Luftfahrt
Luftfahrt and und Generalinspekteur
Generalinspekteur der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe,
144/42,
144/42, geh,
geh, Kdos
Kdos., ., 23 .1 .42 ., An
23.1.42., An den
den Herm
Herm Chef Chef desdes Generalstabes
Generalstabes..
118
118.. Thomas,
Thomas, Geschichte
Geschichte der der deutschen
deutschen Wehr-undWehr-und Riistungswirtschaft,
Riistungswirtschaft, Thomas Thomas to to Keitel,
Keitel, Betr
Betr.:. :
Forderungen
Forderungen an an die
die Rdstung,
Rustung, 23 .12 .41 .
23.12.41.
119
119.. Figures
Figures for for German
German aircraft
aircraft production
production drawn drawn from from USSBS,
USSBS, The The Effects
Effects ofStrategic
of Strategic Bombing
Bombing on on
the
the German
German War War Economy,
Economy, Appendix
Appendix Table Table 102 102..
120
120.. Albert
Albert Speer,
Speer, Inside
Inside thethe Third
Third Reich
Reich (New (New York,York, 1970),
1970), pp pp.. 203,
203, 244,
244, 265,
265, 275,
275, 276,
276, 336,
336, 339
339..
121
121.. See
See BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/50,
3/50, Der Der Staatssekretar
Staatssekretar der der Luftfahrt
Luftfahrt andund Generalinspekteur
Generalinspekteur der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Nr Nr
118/41
118/41 g. g . Kdos
Kdos.,., Dem
Dem Herrn Reichsmarschall, 24
HermReichsmarschall, .10 .41 .
24.10.41.
122
122.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/64,
3/64, Industrierat
Industrierat des des Reichsmarschalls
Reichsmarschalls fur fiir die
die Fertigung
Fertigung von von Luftwaffengerdten,
Luftwaffengeraten,
Umstellausschuss,
Umstellausschuss, Stand Stand derder Umstellarbeiten
Umstellarbeiten Mitte Mitte November
November 1942, 21 .11 .41 ., Anlage
1942,21.11.41., Anlage 11..
123
123.. See
See the
the excellent
excellent discussion
discussion in in Overy,
Overy, "German
"German AircraftAircraft Production,"
Production," pp pp.. 197-99
197-99 .
124
124.. Ibid ., pp
Ibid., pp.. 201-02
201-02..
125
125.. USSBS,
USSBS, The The Effects
Effects of of Strategic
Strategic Bombing
Bombing on on the
the German
German War War Industry,
Industry, Appendices
Appendices Tables Tables 101, 101
102
102..
126
126.. Overy,
Overy, "German
"German AircraftAircraft Production,"
Production," pp pp.. 206-10
206-10..
127
127.. Richard
Richard JJ.. Overy,
Overy, The The AirAir WarWar 1939-1945
1939-1945 (London, (London, 1980),
1980), pp pp.. 168-70
168-70..
128
128.. Verrier,
Verrier, TheThe Bomber
Bomber Offensive,
Offensive, pp.. 326 326..
129
129.. Irving,
Irving, The The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall of of the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 148 148;; Irving
Irving cites
cites much
much supporting
supporting evidence
evidence for for
Milch's
Milch's frustration
frustration at at the
the low
low level
level of of fighter
fighter production
ptodviction that thai Ieschonnek
Se&choimeVL was suggesting.. There
was suggesting "n\ere were
were
some
some In in German
German industry
industry who who recognized
recognized the the danger
danger that America's industrial
that America's industrial potential
potential represented
represented for for
the
the Reich
Reich andand urged
urged major increases in
major increases in German
German aircraft production.. See
aircraft production See BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/54,
3/54, Fr ., W
Fr., W..
Siebel,
Siebel, Wehrwirtschaftsfdhrer,
Wehrwirtschaftsfuhrer, An An Generaloberst
Generaloberst Udet, Udet, 77.10.40.; and Der
.10 .40 . ; and Der Leiter
Leiter der
der Wirtschaftsgruppe
Wirtschaftsgruppe
Luftfahrt-Industrie,
Luftfahrt-Industrie, Pr. 312/41 La/Wp,
Pr. 312/41 La/Wp, 24 .12 .41 ., von
24.12.41., Rohden Collection,
vonRohden Collection, NARSNARS T-971/68-
T-971/68.
130.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/865, Generalquartiermeister, 66.. Abt
Generalstab, Generalquartiermeister,
3/865, Generalstab, Abt.. Nr.
Nr. 3474/42
3474/42,, 23 .6 .42 ., Betr
23.6.42., Betr.: .:
130
Flugzeug-Forderungen,
Flugzeug-Forderungen, An An den Staatssekretar and
den Staatssekretdr und Generalinspekteur
Generalinspekteur der der Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe..
131
131 . See
See the
the figures
figures in Webster and
in Webster Frankland, SAOAG,
and Frankland, SAOAG, Vol Vol.. IV,
IV, pppp.. 501-04
501-04..
132. Figures based
132 . Figures based on on totals
totals for for 24 .1 .42 . in
24.1.42. in AHB, "Luftwaffe Strength
AHB, "Luftwaffe Strength and Serviceability Tables,
and Serviceability Tables,
August 1938-April 1945,"
August 1938-April 1945," Translation
Translation No No.. VII/ 107 .
VII/107.

1444
14
ON
ON THE
THE BRINK
BRINK

133 .Ibid .
133.Ibid.
134
134.. Based
Based onon figures
figures in
in the
the quartermaster loss returns
quartermaster loss returns for
for aircraft
aircraft losses
losses:: BA/MA, RL 22 111/1025,
BA/MA, RL III/1025,
66.Abt.
.Abt . (III
(Ill A)
A) Front-Flugzeug-Verluste,
Front-Hugzeug-Verluste, 19421942..
135
135.. Based
Based on
on the
the table
table in
in Webster
Webster and
and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,
SAOAG. VolVol.. IV,
IV, Appendix
Appendix XXIV,
XXIV, pp.. 497
497..

145
CHAPTER V
CHAPTER V

Attrition
Attrition on the Periphery
on the Periphery::
November 1942-August 1943
November 1942-August 1943
The
The German successes in
German successes in the
the spring
spring andand summer
summer of of 1942
1942 deceived
deceived the the
participants
participants at that time
at that time asas thoroughly
thoroughly as as they
they have
have historians since.. For
historians since For the
the British,
British,
Rommel's
Rommel's advance
advance to to El
El Alamein represented aa part
Alamein represented part of
of German strategy in
German strategy in which
which aa
second
second great
great pincer
pincer arm advancing from
arm advancing from the
the Caucasus
Caucasus would
would link
link upup with
with thethe Africa
Africa
Corps
Corps inin the
the Middle
Middle East.' Such megalomania
East.' Such megalomania was, was, ofof course,
course, partpart and
and parcel
parcel ofof
Hitler's
Hitler's approach
approach to to grand strategy, but
grand strategy, but the
the means
means simply
simply did did not
not exist
exist for for such
such
wide-ranging
wide-ranging aims.zaims.^ Arguments between Hitler
Arguments between Hitler and
and hishis generals
generals in in the
the summer
summer
reflected
reflected aa divergence
divergence betweenbetween the the latter's
latter's more
more realistic
realistic assessments
assessments and and the
the
Fuhrer's intuitive
Fuhrer's intuitive dreams
dreams.. There
There was, was, however,
however, no no showdown
showdown;; HitlerHitler removed
removed
those
those who
who raised
raised uncomfortable
uncomfortable issues Thus, German
issues.. Thus, German strategy
strategy in in 1942
1942 was
was entirely
entirely
of
of his
his own
own making
making (unlike
(unlike the the previous
previous year) and in
year);; and in November,
November, Hitler's Hitler's
miscalculation
miscalculation of of the
the balance
balance in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean and and inin the east led
the east led him
him to to make
make
major
major strategic
strategic mistakes
mistakes.. These
These decisions
decisions forced
forced the Wehrmacht to
the Wehrmacht to fight
fight on on the
the
periphery against
periphery against enemies
enemies who
who enjoyed
enjoyed a
a rising
rising numerical
numerical superiority
superiority. . For
For the
the
Luftwaffe, Hitler's
Luftwaffe, Hitler's resolve
resolve was catastrophe, for
was aa catastrophe, for he
he committed
committed his his air
air force
force to to an
an
avoidable battle of
avoidable battle of attrition
attrition under
under great
great disadvantages
disadvantages. . The
The impact
impact of
of the
the resulting
resulting
attrition
attrition was
was immediate
immediate and and direct Not only
direct.. Not only did
did these
these air
air battles
battles savage
savage frontline
frontline
squadrons but aerial
squadrons but aerial transport
transport operations
operations to
to supply
supply Stalingrad
Stalingrad and
and Tunisia
Tunisia
mortgaged the entire training program .
mortgaged the entire training program. For
For losses
losses suffered
suffered in
in various
various theaters
theaters in
in
1943, see
1943, see Tables
Tables XXX' and
XXX^ and XXX14.
XXXP.

THE
THE WAR
WAR IN
IN THE
THE EAST:
EAST: NOVEMBER
NOVEMBER 1942-AUGUST
1942-AUGUST 1943
1943
While
While the
the advance
advance into
into the
the Caucasus
Caucasus slowed
slowed because
because of of logistical
logistical difficullties
difficullties
and while
and while Sixth
Sixth Army
Army exhausted
exhausted itself
itself at
at Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, the the Soviets
Soviets built
built upup their
their
reserves
reserves and
and prepared
prepared for
for aa great
great counteroffensive.
counteroffensive. Unlike Unlike thethe previous
previous winter
winter
during which
during which the
the Red
Red Army
Army hadhad sought
sought after
after far-reaching
far-reaching goals goals and
and as
as aa result
result had
had
achieved
achieved none
none of
of them,
them, the
the Russians
Russians nownow planned
planned aa limited
limited offensive:
offensive: its
its target,
target, the
the
German
German Sixth
Sixth Army
Army.. Despite
Despite the
the desperate
desperate situation
situation ofof Stalingrad's
Stalingrad's defenders,
defenders, the the
Soviets fed
Soviets fed in
in minimal
minimal replacements,
replacements, enough
enough to to keep
keep the the defenders
defenders going
going butbut no
no
more.'s
more.
Soviet
Soviet intentions
intentions and
and capabilities
capabilities remained
remained veiled
veiled toto the
the Germans
Germans.. Hitler
Hitler was
was
confident
confident that
that his
his summer
summer offensive
offensive hadhad broken
broken the the RedRed Army
Army and and that
that the
the
Wehrmacht could
Wehrmacht could go
go over
over to
to the defensive without
the defensive without fear.
fear. OnOn October
October 14,14, hehe signed
signed
"Operational
"Operational Order
Order Nr.
Nr. 11"
" inin which
which he he argued
argued that
that the
the Soviets
Soviets could
could no no longer
longer
rebuild
rebuild their
their shattered
shattered forces
forces and
and that
that the
the German
German armyarmy mustmust hold
hold the
the line
line over
over the
the

147
TABLE XXX a

GERMAN
GERMAN LOSSES BY THEATER
LOSSES BY THEATER JAN-NOV
JAN-NOV 1943
1943
30so
EASTERN
EASTERN FRONT
FRONT ----
MEDITERRANEAN
MEDITERRANEAN ------ SICILY
SICILY INVASION
INVASION 2N0
2ND
a-~
WEST
WEST && AIR DEFENSE .......,..., . .
AIR DEFENSE KURSK
KURSK OF ITALY
OF ITALY SCHWEINFURT
SCHWEINFURT
800
800
REICH
REICH 1ST SCHWEINFURT
1ST SCHWEINFURT

7111"
71
700
700 STALINGRAD
STALINGRAD TUNISIA
TUNISIA
I "\ 625
625
t \
600
600 572
572
/ 558 V''*** \ 530
530 „,

500
500 482
482 A I ir*\\
I /526 ^N^
''''
503
•<"""
529
""■"•

I \/ \ \ 412
47?Sy
X'ff' \
400
400 "
333 .
331k333
1 4r ~= ><331 313
1331 ". ..., 313*1
\/ 338 V V
;285
285
300
300 321
321
., 318 ^'308^
" -'J08 ,«.^
.0-
^. „ J
282~~
282 ~" all 9
2; _ 279
" 40 ,",'`256 ~. 194
200
200 238
235
235
■"■•■iiiiiii*^''
176 162
162
100
100 i.
JL JL
JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUNE
JUNE JULY
JULY AUG
AUG SEP
SEP 0
OCTT NOV
NOV
TABLE
TABLE XXXI
XXXI

GERMAN
GERMAN FIGHTER
FIGHTER LOSSES
LOSSES 1943
1943
(NUMBER
(NUMBER OF
OF AIRCRAFT)
AIRCRAFT)
335
335
EASTERN
EASTERN FRON-FRONT
T
300
MEDITERRANEANN ------
MEDITERRANEA
294
284
II .. 276
"/. u'"
nu~too ... . rn8 291
?,l'
WESTERN
Whu I cHN FR NT
rnONT ■■ / 246
246 ''-248 ....«•*'
247
247;. > •

/ /2OI
X20 \
ZOO '00
i " 167
15 7 //Ni au 0%
140 0 *0
a
124
124
140
13\3
110
110 ^^31 / ^\ \
100 / .94 o
z
.7
87
87 ^'i»,fy,'io
" . /100
` "~ "~~
99
99 4 ozoz
85
85
77
\"
97
9' 92 x
85
85 54 m
rn
63
63 67
45
1I 1 1 1 1 ±1 1 1I 1 1I 1 x
m
JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUN
JUN JUL
JUL AU6
AUG SEP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV
NOV 5
,'
1247
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

winter
winter "to "to create
create the conditions necessary
the conditions necessary for for thethe final
final destruction
destruction of of our
our most
most
116 But Hitler was hopelessly optimistic. Sixth Army was
dangerous opponent .
dangerous opponent."* But Hitler was hopelessly optimistic. Sixth Army was
enmeshed in
enmeshed in Stalingrad
Stalingrad and
and was
was seriously
seriously short
short of
of ammunition,
ammunition, fuel,
fuel, and
and reserves
reserves.^ .'
These shortages
These shortages severely
severely limited
limited that
that army's
army's strategic
strategic and
and tactical
tactical mobility.
mobility. Even
Even
more
more threatening
threatening was was the the fact
fact that
that both
both flanks
flanks werewere up up in in the
the air
air.. To
To the
the south
south laylay
the Fourth Rumanian Army with few reserves and little German support . To the
the Fourth Rumanian Army with few reserves and little German support. To the
north, on the great flank sweeping from the Russian city of Voronezh along the
north, on the great flank sweeping from the Russian city of Voronezh along the
Don, lay three allied armies, the Second Hungarian, Eighth Italian, and
Don, lay three allied armies, the Second Hungarian, Eighth Italian, and Third
Third
Rumanian,
Rumanian, with with the barest corseting
the barest corseting of of German
German troops troops.. Nowhere
Nowhere on on the
the southern
southern
front did the Germans possess a strategic reserve, while tactical reserves along the
front did the Germans possess a strategic reserve, while tactical reserves along the
entire
entire front
front were
were few.few.
In
In explaining
explaining Stalingrad
Stalingrad and and the
the refusal
refusal to to allow
allow aa breakout,
breakout, one one mustmust understand
understand
the
the relationship
relationship among among theaterstheaters.. At At thethe beginning
beginning of of November
November 1942, 1942, Hitler's
Hitler's
attention
attention centered
centered on on thethe Mediterranean
Mediterranean.. The The front
front at at El
El Alamein
Alamein had had collapsed
collapsed;;
and
and onon November
November 2, 2, Rommel
Rommel informed
informed OKW OKW that that he he could
could no no longer
longer hold.hold. A A
failure
failure to to inform
inform Hitler Hitler immediately
immediately caused caused aa blowup,'
blowup,* but but Hitler's
Hitler's tantrum
tantrum couldcould
not restore the
not restore the situation
situation.. Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, intelligence
intelligence reportedreported aa massive
massive movement
movement of of
Allied
Allied shipping
shipping into into the the Mediterranean
Mediterranean.. No No one one in in OKWOKW was was suresure of of Allied
Allied
intentions,
intentions, but but Hitler
Hitler and and Goring
Goring ruled
ruled outout thethe possibility
possibility of of aa strike
strike against
against French
French
Northwest
Northwest Africa Africa.' . 9 In
In the
the following
following week, week, disaster
disaster piled
piled upon upon disaster:
disaster: Rommel's
Rommel's
retreat
retreat continued,
continued, Anglo-American
Anglo-American forces forces landed
landed in in Algeria
Algeria and and Morocco,
Morocco, French French
resistance
resistance collapsed,
collapsed, and and events
events forced
forced the the Germans
Germans to to occupy
occupy VichyVichy France
France.. In In
this
this desperate
desperate situation,
situation, Hitler's
Hitler's attention
attention remained
remained glued glued on on the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean as as
German
German forcesforces seized
seized Tunisia
Tunisia to counter Allied
to counter occupation of
Allied occupation of Algeria
Algeria and and Morocco
Morocco..
For
For ourour purposes
purposes here, here, one
one need
need onlyonly note
note these
these distractions
distractions on on Hitler
Hitler when
when the the
storm
storm in in the
the east
east broke-and
broke—and break break itit did! did! On On November
November 19 19 after
after aa hurricane
hurricane
bombardment,
bombardment, four four Soviet
Soviet armies
armies led led byby thethe Fifth
Fifth TankTank Army, Army, smashed
smashed into into the
the
Third
Third Rumanian
Rumanian Army. Army. By By early
early afternoon,
afternoon, the the Rumanians
Rumanians had had collapsed
collapsed and and
Russian
Russian armor armor was was driving
driving rapidly
rapidly to to the
the southeast
southeast.'" . 10 Soviet
Soviet tanks
tanks swamped
swamped the the
22nd
22nd Panzer
Panzer Division
Division and and the
the 1st
1st Rumanian
Rumanian Armored Armored Division Division (the (the only
only reserves
reserves
available).
available). By By afternoon,
afternoon, OKW OKW headquarters-located
headquarters—located with with the Fiihrer near
the Fuhrer near
Berchtesgaden-had
Berchtesgaden—^had received received "alarming
"alarming reports"reports" from from army army headquarters,
headquarters, still still in
in
East
East Prussia."
Prussia." On On the the following
following day,day. Fifty-seventh
Fifty-seventh and and Fifty-first
Fifty-first Russian
Russian Armies
Armies
attacked
attacked the the Rumanian
Rumanian VI VI Corps
Corps south
south of of Stalingrad.
Stalingrad. The The Rumanians
Rumanians collapsed
collapsed in in aa
welter
welter of of confusion
confusion.. Thus, Thus, within
within two two daysdays both both of of Sixth
Sixth Army's
Army's flanks flanks had had
dissolved
dissolved.. At At this
this juncture,
juncture, the the only
only hope
hope was was aa swift
swift withdrawal
withdrawal.. Hitler Hitler refused
refused to to
give
give permission
permission for for aa retreat,
retreat, while
while Generaloberst
Generaloberst Friedrich Friedrich PaulusPaulus wouldwould not not take
take
the
the initiative
initiative himself
himself.. On On the
the 21st,
21st, Hitler
Hitler ordered
ordered Sixth Sixth Army Army to to stand,
stand, but but for
for the
the
next
next several
several days days vacillated
vacillated.. On On the the 23rd,
23rd, Russian
Russian spearheads
spearheads completed
completed the the
encirclement;
encirclement; Hitler Hitler sealedsealed thethe pocket's
pocket's fate fate onon the
the next
next day day when
when he he ordered
ordered Paulus
Paulus
to
to hold Stalingrad and
hold Stalingrad and assured
assured him
him thatthat an an airlift
airlift could
could meet meet Sixth
Sixth Army's
Army's supplysupply
needs.
needs.
Two
Two days days before,
before, on on November
November 21, 21, Sixth
Sixth ArmyArmy had had examined
examined the the possibility
possibility of of
aerial resupply should an encirclement occur
aerial resupply should an encirclement occur. . However,
However, Luftflotte
Luftflotte 44 immediately
immediately

150
150
ATTRITION ON THE
ATTRITION ON THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

warned Paulus
warned Paulus and
and his
his staff that the
staff that the Luftwaffe
Luftwajfe diddid not possess the
not possess the transport
transport capacity
capacity
for such an effort . On the 21st,
for such an effort. On the 21st, Richthofen
Richthofen cautioned
cautioned both
both Sixth
Sixth Army
Army and
and the
the
general staff that such an effort was not
general staff that such an effort was not in
in the
the offing.
offing. On
On the
the next
next day,
day, Luftwaffe
Luftwajfe
commanders on
commanders on the
the southern
southern front
front again warned Sixth
again warned Sixth Army
Army thatthat they
they could
could not
not
support an encircled army by air . However, Paulus' Chief of Staff commented that
support an encircled army by air. However, Paulus' Chief of Staff commented that
there was no
there was no other
other choice
choice other
other than aerial resupply.
than aerial resupply.'^ 'z While
While the
the warning
warning signals
signals at
at
the front were
the front were unambiguous,
unambiguous, the the situation
situation was
was farfar from clear in
from clear in the
the high
high command
command..
Despite
Despite notice
notice from
from Richthofen
Richthofen to to the
the OKW
OKW thatthat unfavorable
unfavorable weather
weather conditions
conditions in in
concert with
concert with Russian
Russian numerical
numerical superiority
superiority would
would make
make an an airlift
airlift doubtful,"
doubtful," Hitler
Hitler
received Goring's assurance
received G6ring's assurance thatthat the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could
could supply the encircled
supply the encircled forces.
forces.
When
When thethe army's Chief of
army's Chief Staff, Kurt
of Staff, Kurt Zeitzler,
Zeitzler, objected,
objected, G6ring
Goring would not knuckle
would not knuckle
under
under andand reported that his
reported that his staff
staff knew
knew Sixth
Sixth Army's
Army's needs
needs and and believed
believed the the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could
could meet
meet them . 14 G6ring's
them.'" Goring's promise
promise seems
seems to to have resulted from
have resulted from aa hope
hope
of
of restoring
restoring his tattered prestige
his tattered prestige.. TheThe success
success ofof the
the Demyansk
Demyansk and and Kholm
Kholm efforts
efforts in
in
the
the previous
previous winter
winter also
also bolstered
bolstered the the hope
hope that
that air
air supply
supply could
could maintain
maintain Sixth
Sixth
Army
Army..
While
While G6ring
Goring was
was the main culprit,
the main culprit, Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek and and the
the general
general staff
staff agreed
agreed to
to
the
the airlift
airlift with
with scarcely
scarcely aa comment
comment on on its
its long-range
long-range impact
impact on
on the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe ."
J^ On
On
the
the 24th,
24th, Richthofen
Richthofen noted
noted aa series of conversations
series of conversations withwith Zeitzler,
Zeitzler, Field
Field Marshal
Marshal
Maximilian von Weichs (Army Group
Maximilian von Weichs (Army Group B),
B), and
and Jeschonnek;
Jeschonnek; he
he urged
urged an
an immediate
immediate
breakout
breakout by by Sixth
Sixth Army.
Army. Weichs
Weichs asas well
well asas Zeitzler agreed. Jeschonnek,
Zeitzler agreed. Jeschonnek, however,
however,
Richthofen noted, had no opinion ." The result of Jeschonnek's silence was
Richthofen noted, had no opinion.'* The result of Jeschonnek's silence was that
that
OKH received no air staff support in its effort to persuade Hitler to abandon
OKH received no air staff support in its effort to persuade Hider to abandon
Stalingrad
Stalingrad.. The
The Fuhrer
Fuhrer held
held his
his belief that the
belief that the Sixth
Sixth Army
Army could
could hold
hold the
the banks
banks of
of
the Volga with air supply . The Lufhvaffe thus received an impossible task.
the Volga with air supply. The Luftwaffe thus received an impossible task.
Moreover,
Moreover, the the Russian
Russian winter
winter offensive
offensive caught
caught the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe inin an
an exposed
exposed and and
difficult
difficult situation
situation.. Beginning
Beginning in in late
late August,
August, aa diminution
diminution of of German
German air air strength
strength in
in
the east
the east in
in favor
favor of
of other
other theaters
theaters had had taken
taken place
place.. Between
Between mid-August
mid-August and and early
early
November,
November, the the eastern
eastern front front lost
lost four
four and
and two-thirds
two-thirds bomber
bomber Gruppen
Gruppen
(approximately
(approximately 140 140 bombers)
bombers) and and five
five and
and one-third
one-third fighter
fighter Gruppen
Gruppen (160(160 fighers)
fighers)..
The
The collapse
collapse in in Egypt
Egypt and
and the the invasion
invasion ofof French
French Northwest
Northwest Africa
Africa caused
caused aa
withdrawal
withdrawal of of further
further three
three and and one-third
one-third bomber
bomber Gruppen
Gruppen (100
(100 bombers)
bombers) and and one
one
and one-third
and one-third fighter
fighter Gruppen
Gruppen (40 (40 fighters) ." Much
fighters)." Much of of the
the withdrawal
withdrawal came
came from
from
Richthofen's
Richthofen's Luffotte
Luftflotte 4,
4, thereby
thereby diminishing
diminishing airair support
support for
for forces
forces fighting
fighting around
around
Stalingrad.
Stalingrad. Further
Further weakening
weakening Luftflotte
Luftflotte 44 was
was the
the fact
fact that
that the
the general
general staff
staff created
created
aa needless
needless headquarters,
headquarters, Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe Command
Command Don, Don, toto provide
provide anan air
air assignment
assignment forfor
one
one of
of its
its favored officers.. 's'*
favored officers
The
The collapse
collapse of
of Sixth
Sixth Army's
Army's flanks
flanks enabled
enabled the
the Russians
Russians toto complete
complete aa deep
deep
encirclement
encirclement around
around Stalingrad
Stalingrad.. Soviet
Soviet troops
troops seized
seized the
the airfields
airfields that
that Luftflotte
Luftflotte 44
had
had prepared
prepared for
for winter
winter operations
operations and
and pushed
pushed many
many support
support and
and maintenance
maintenance
personnel
personnel into
into the
the pocket.
pocket. As As aa result,
result, Richthofen's
Richthofen's units
units had
had toto establish
establish
themselves
themselves onon new
new airfields
airfields that
that were
were soon
soon overcrowded
overcrowded andand did
did not
not possess
possess the
the
support
support needed
needed for
for the
the operations
operations nownow beginning
beginning.. The
The arrival
arrival of
of transport
transport and
and

151
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

bomber squadrons only


bomber squadrons only exacerbated
exacerbated these these difficulties
difficulties." ." Moreover,
Moreover, Richthofen's
Richthofen's
flying units faced intense
flying units faced intense demands
demands to
to support
support hard-pressed
hard-pressed ground
ground forces.
forces.
Appalling weather conditions contributed to the
Appalling weather conditions contributed to the losses
losses and
and strain
strain on
on flying
flying
squadrons .
squadrons.
On
On November
November 23, 23, at at G6ring's
Goring's behest,behest, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe staff staff began
began the the task
task of of
improvising an air transport force to supply Sixth Army. From the start, it was
improvising an air transport force to supply Sixth Army. From the start, it was
apparent
apparent thatthat only
only in in the
the best
best circumstances
circumstances was was an an airlift
airlift capability
capability of of 350
350 tonstons perper
day possible (Sixth Army estimated it needed 600 tons) . However, only by stripping
day possible (Sixth Army estimated it needed 600 tons). However, only by stripping
training units of
training units all aircraft
of all aircraft andand byby removing
removing transport
transport aircraft
aircraft assigned
assigned to to duty
duty in in
Germany could the Luftwaffe reach such a level . An assortment of Ju 52's, Ju 86's,
Germany could the Luftwaffe reach such a level. An assortment of Ju 52's, Ju 86's,
and
and He
He I111 l 1's
's (now
(now being
being assigned
assigned to to some
some transport
transport units)
units) moved
moved from from the the Reich
Reich to to
support
support the the airlift .2° In
airlift.^" In addition,
addition, the the first
first operational
operational GruppeGruppe of of He He 177's
177's and and
several
several He He 111111 bomber
bomber Gruppen
Gruppen joinedjoined the the force."
force.^' TheThe former
former aircraft
aircraft proved
proved itself itself
as
as dangerous
dangerous to to crews
crews in combat as
in combat as itit has
has proven
proven in in testing
testing..
The
The distance
distance from from Berlin
Berlin to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, 2,225 2,225 kilometers,
kilometers, exacerbated
exacerbated the the
problem
problem.. To To reach
reach forward
forward operating
operating bases, bases, transport
transport crews-many
crews—many new new to to flying
flying
and few with
and few with experience
experience in in Russia-had
Russia—^had to to fly
fly nearly
nearly 2,000
2,000 kilometers
kilometers to to the
the front.
front.
Crew
Crew inexperience,
inexperience, the the weather,
weather, and and marginal
marginal airfield
airfield conditions
conditions caused caused aa high high
accident
accident rate.rate. Perhaps
Perhaps the the only
only mitigating
mitigating aspect aspect of of such
such bad bad weather
weather was was thatthat
operational
operational ready ready rates
rates rarely
rarely reached
reached 50 50 percent,
percent, with with most
most remaining
remaining at at the
the 30 30 to
to
40
40 percent
percent level,level, thusthus limiting
limiting flying
flying opportunities
opportunities for for inexperienced
inexperienced crews crews.. In In
some
some cases,
cases, when when the the weather
weather was was particularly
particularly atrocious,
atrocious, in-commission
in-commission rates rates sanksank
to
to the
the 10 10 to to 20 percent range.
20 percent range.^^ 22 Landing
Landing possibilities
possibilities in in the
the pocket
pocket provedproved
unsatisfactory,
unsatisfactory, because because not not only
only did did Sixth
Sixth ArmyArmy fail fail toto maintain
maintain the the airfields
airfields
adequately
adequately but but also
also Russian
Russian fighters
fighters often
often attacked
attacked the the transports
transports on on landing
landing..
The
The airlift
airlift operation remained under
operation remained under Richthofen's
Richthofen's control,
control, but but Berlin
Berlin gave gave little
little
latitude
latitude.. While
While admitting
admitting that "an order
that "an order waswas an an order,"
order," Richthofen
Richthofen noted noted bitterly
bitterly
on November 25
on November 25 that
that he he was was little
little moremore thanthan "a "a highly
highly paid paid noncommissioned
noncommissioned
officer
officer.'. "23 Luftflotte 44 received
'^^ Luftflotte received transport
transport reinforcements
reinforcements from from Germany
Germany at at aa slow
slow
rate;
rate; not
not until December 22 did
until December did the
the number
number of of transports
transports reachreach 200 200 aircraft,
aircraft, and and itit
was
was notnot untiluntil December
December 88 that that aircraft
aircraft strength reached 300
strength reached 300.. Thereafter,
Thereafter,
reinforcements
reinforcements barely barely prevented
prevented aa collapse
collapse in in unit
unit strength
strength.^" .2' Throughout
Throughout the the airlift,
airlift,
transport
transport squadrons
squadrons remained
remained well well below
below authorized
authorized strength,
strength, whichwhich undoubtedly
undoubtedly
distorted
distorted Berlin's
Berlin's view view of of thethe situation
situation.. Richthofen
Richthofen was was closeclose to to despair
despair over over
differences
differences between
between himselfhimself and and senior
senior commanders
commanders removed removed from from the the front.
front. On On
December
December 18, 18, hehe noted:
noted :

Important
Important conversations
conversations take take place
place at at Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and and OKWOKW
headquarters
headquarters.. One One talks
talks about
about the
the Duce!-no
Duce!—no one one isis available
available that
that II
seek.
seek. II especially
especially no no longer
longer telephone
telephone Jeschonnek,
Jeschonnek, sincesince all
all my
my
recommendations
recommendations are are rejected
rejected or,
or, after
after oral
oral agreement,
agreement, something
something
else
else is
is ordered.
ordered. Moreover,
Moreover, II now now have
have irrefutable
irrefutable proof
proof that
that certain
certain
things
things that
that II have
have said
said have
have been
been turned
turned around
around andand passed
passed along
along.. II
now send only
now send only teletype
teletype messages,
messages, today
today oneone four
four pages
pages longlong about
about
the
the situation.
situation. In In itit II ask
ask for
for orders
orders for
for the
the conduct
conduct of of operations,
operations,

15
1522
THE
THE SOVIET
SOVIET COUNTER
COUNTER ATTACK
ATTACK::
22 HUNGARIAN
HUNGARIAN
Stalingrad
Stalingrad
ARMY
ARMY
v

0 MOROZOYSK
&
TATSINKAYA
TATSINKAYA

FRONT
FRONT -- NOV 19
NOV 19
^^ SOVIET
SOVIET ATTACKS
ATTACKS - NOV 19-20 o
z
FRONT
FRONT - NOV
NOV 30
30
4TZ"
^E SOVIET
SOVIET -- DEC
DEC ATTACKS
ATTACKS
S
yL GERMAN
GERMAN TRANSPORT BASES
TRANSPORT BASES
silty
+
%
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

because recently II received


because recently received only
only criticism
criticism rather
rather than
than directives
directives..
Probably,
Probably, they
they [the
[the staff
staff in Berlin] were
in Berlin] were themselves
themselves without
without aa sense
sense
of
of what
what to
to do. 25
do.^'

Under
Under these
these conditions,
conditions, itit is is not
not surprising
surprising thatthat the
the airlift
airiift failed
failed.. OnOn only only three
three days,
days,
(December
(December 7, 7, 21, and 331)
21, and 1) did
did the
the transports
transports fly fly over
over 300 300 tons
tons into
into Stalingrad.
Stalingrad. On On
most days, the effort hovered around
most days, the effort hovered around the
the 100-ton
100-ton level;
level; on
on some
some days,
days, it
it sank
sank to
to no
no
deliveries at all
deliveries at all.^*
.26

In
In mid-December,
mid-December, the the Germans mounted aa relief
Germans mounted relief expedition
expedition towardstowards Stalingrad.
Stalingrad.
The forces were only of corps strength
The forces were only of corps strength but
but did
did surprisingly
surprisingly well
well. . By
By December
December 19,
19,
LVII Panzer Corps reached Mishkova, only 35 miles from the pocket . Manstein
LVII Panzer Corps reached Mishkova, only 35 miles from the pocket. Manstein
urged
urged Hitler
Hitler to to allow
allow aa breakout
breakout;; Hitler
Hitler refused
refused to to make decision, while
make aa decision, while Paulus
Paulus
would not disobey the Fishrer .2' In response, the Russians launched a major
would not disobey the Fuhrer?'^ In response, the Russians launched a major
offensive along the Don . The Soviet's
offensive along the Don. The Soviet's Sixth
Sixth Army
Army quickly
quickly broke
broke through
through the
the
Italians, and the deteriorating situation along the Don threatened the
Italians, and the deteriorating situation along the Don threatened the entire
entire southern
southern
front.
front. OnOn December
December 24, 24, the
the Russian
Russian advance
advance overran
overran the the forward
forward operating
operating field field at at
Tatsinskaya and brought the other major airlift field at Morozovskaya under
Tatsinskaya and brought the other major airlift field at Morozovskaya under
artillery
artillery fire. Goring refused
fire. G6ring refused permission
permission to to abandon
abandon the the airfield
airfield until
until underunder tank tank fire;
fire;
only the flying units barely escaped and many supplies were destroyed .28 On
only the flying units barely escaped and many supplies were destroyed.^* On
December 26, flying units at Morozovskaya broke up Russian tank forces that
December 26, flying units at Morozovskaya broke up Russian tank forces that
approached
approached within within 66 kilometers
kilometers of of the airfield.. Goring's
the airfield Goring's interference
interference and and
minimization of the threat so embittered Manstein and Richthofen that the former
minimization of the threat so embittered Manstein and Richthofen that the former
urged
urged Hitler
Hitler to to give
give the
the Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall control control of Luftflotte 44 and
of Luftflotte and Army
Army Group Group
Don,
Don, "since
"since he he always
always asserts
asserts that
that the situation neither
the situation neither here here nornor in in Stalingrad
Stalingrad is is as
as
strained
strained as as isis reported
reported.. Motto:
Motto: The The optimistic
optimistic leader
leader at at the
the place,
place, over over which
which he he isis
optimistic!
optimistic!"^' '' 29
By
By the
the first
first weekweek of of January
January 1943,1943, thethe Germans
Germans had had lost
lost Morozovskaya,
Morozovskaya, and and
transport
transport squadrons
squadrons were were operating
operating from from Novocherkassk-350
Novocherkassk—350 kilometers kilometers from from
Stalingrad.
Stalingrad. Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, the the situation
situation within
within the the pocket
pocket was was deteriorating
deteriorating.. On On
January
January 10, 10, the the Russians
Russians attacked
attacked the the encircled
encircled defenders
defenders.. Within Within two two days,
days, the the
pocket's
pocket's majormajor airfield
airfield had
had fallen,
fallen, andand landing
landing supplies
supplies becamebecame an an increasingly
increasingly
difficult
difficult task.
task. Henceforth,
Henceforth, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe relied
relied almost
almost exclusively
exclusively on on airdrops.
airdrops. By By
mid-January,
mid-January, the the maintenance
maintenance situation
situation waswas desperate
desperate.. On On January
January 18, 18, less than 77
less than
percent
percent of of Ju
Ju 52's
52's were
were in in commission,
commission, 33 33 percent
percent of of the
the HeHe I111l 1's,'s, 00 percent
percent of of the
the
Fw
Fw 200's,
200's, and and 35 35 percent
percent of of the
the HeHe 177's
llTs.^ .3° At
At this
this moment,
moment. Milch Milch arrived.
arrived. He He
brought
brought somesome reliefrelief toto the
the hard-pressed
hard-pressed Luftflotte
Luftflotte 4, 4, and
and thethe field
field marshal
marshal got got along
along
well
well with
with Richthofen.
Richthofen.3'3' His His managerial
managerial skills skills raised
raised operational
operational ready ready rates rates and and
supplies
supplies to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, but but the
the situation
situation had had been
been hopeless
hopeless from from the the beginning
beginning.. The The
final
final collapse
collapse came came in in late
late January
January.. On On February
February 2, 2, the
the last
last Germans
Germans surrendered,
surrendered,
and
and Paulus,
Paulus, aa recently
recently promoted
promoted field field marshal,
marshal, was was thethe first
first German
German officer officer of of that
that
rank
rank captured
captured by by anan enemy.
enemy. HitlerHitler waswas more
more upset
upset overover Paulus'
Paulus' capturecapture than than the the
fate
fate of
of the
the 200,000
200,000 other Germans killed
other Germans killed oror captured
captured in in the
the pocket.
pocket.^^ 12

In
In every
every sense,
sense, Stalingrad
Stalingrad was was aa grievous
grievous defeat.
defeat. Beside
Beside the the boostboost to to Russian
Russian
morale
morale and and thethe blow
blow to to the
the German
German army's
army's strength,
strength, itit hadhad no no less
less of of anan impact
impact on on
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. The The airair transport
transport forces
forces suffered
suffered devastating
devastating losses losses.. By By February
February 3, 3,

154
154
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

the Luftwaffe
the Luftwaffe had had lost
lost 269269 JuJu 52's,
52's, 169 169 HeHe I111l 1's,
's, 99 Fw
Fw 200's,
200's, 11 Ju Ju 290,
290, 55 HeHe 177's,
177's,
and
and 4242 JuJu 86's,
86's, for for aa grand
grand totaltotal of of 495
495 aircraft
aircraft." ." These
These losses
losses represented
represented the the
equivalent
equivalent of of five
five flying
flying wings
wings or or an entire Fliegerkorps
an entire Fliegerkorps.^^ . 34 Perhaps
Perhaps as as important
important
was
was the the negative
negative impact impact on on training
training programs,
programs, especiallyespecially those those training
training
multiengine
multiengine pilots pilots.. Particularly
Particularly devastating
devastating were were crew crew losses
losses among among instrument
instrument
instructors
instructors..
During
During the the resupply
resupply efforteffort to Stalingrad, Luftwaffe
to Stalingrad, Luftwaffe bomber bomber and and fighter
fighter unitsunits
engaged
engaged in in heavy
heavy fighting
fighting to to support
support ground ground forces
forces.. These
These missions,
missions, compounded
compounded
by
by bad
bad weather,
weather, resulted
resulted in in aa steady
steady attrition
attrition ofof aircraft The Luftwaffe
aircraft.. The Luftwaffe helpedhelped keep keep
the
the escape
escape route
route through
through RostovRostov open open for for First
First Panzer
Panzer Army,Army, while while along
along the the Don
Don
the
the collapse
collapse of of allied
allied armies
armies caused
caused aa desperate
desperate situation."
situation." By By mid-February,
mid-February, the the
Soviet
Soviet offensive
offensive was was in full flood;
in full flood; itit now now aimed
aimed at at encompasing
encompasing destruction destruction of of the
the
entire
entire southern
southern front.
front. First
First Panzer
Panzer Army Army heldheld along
along the the Mius
Mius River,
River, but but to
to thethe north
north
aa yawning
yawning gap gap opened
opened between
between Army Army GroupGroup South South (now(now renamed
renamed from from Army Army
Group
Group Don) Don) and and Army
Army Group Group Center
Center.. RussianRussian spearheads
spearheads approached
approached the the city
city of
of
Dnepropetrovsk
Dnepropetrovsk;; Soviet Soviet troops
troops retook retook Kharkov
Kharkov and and pushed
pushed the the Germans
Germans back back
towards
towards Poltava,
Poltava, while while thethe Germans
Germans lost lost their
their last
last hold
hold on on the
the DonDon nearnear Voronezh
Voronezh..
But
But asas in
in the previous year,
the previous year, the the Russian
Russian winterwinter offensive
offensive overextended
overextended itself, itself, and
and
the
the Germans
Germans recovered
recovered their their balance.
balance. Moreover,Moreover, Hitler Hitler waswas somewhat
somewhat chastened
chastened
and
and moremore openopen to to suggestions
suggestions and and advice
advice.. As As aa result,
result, Manstein
Manstein obtainedobtained greatergreater
operational
operational freedomfreedom than than had had senior
senior commanders
commanders in in 1942
1942.. Rather
Rather than than attempt
attempt aa
patched-together
patched-together response, response, he he waited
waited until until substantial
substantial forces forces formedformed up up under
under
Generaloberst
Generaloberst Hermann Hermann Hoth's Hoth's Fourth Fourth PanzerPanzer Army Meanwhile, Luftwaffe
Army.. Meanwhile, Luftwaffe
capabilities
capabilities underwent
underwent aa remarkable
remarkable recovery recovery from from January's
January's difficulties
difficulties.. The The end
end
of
of the
the Stalingrad
Stalingrad relief
relief operation
operation freed freed considerable
considerable bomber bomber and and fighter
fighter strength
strength for for
tasks
tasks other
other thanthan supporting
supporting the the airlift,
airlift, while
while Richthofen
Richthofen completed
completed aa thorough thorough
reorganization
reorganization of of his
his forces
forces in in early
early February
February.. He He ended
ended aa confusing
confusing welter welter of of
different
different commands,
commands, all all competing
competing for for resources,
resources, and and withdrew
withdrew aa number number of of
depleted
depleted formations
formations for for rest
rest and
and refit.
refit. Their
Their flying
flying personnel
personnel returned
returned to to Germany
Germany to to
form
form new new units,
units, but but their
their support
support personnelpersonnel and aircraft transferred to other
and aircraft transferred to other
squadrons.
squadrons. Thus, Thus, maintenance
maintenance capabilities capabilities and and squadron
squadron strength strength improved
improved
considerably
considerably.. Finally,
Finally, the the Germans
Germans were were now now operating
operating off off more
more permanent
permanent fields fields
and
and were
were closer
closer to to supply
supply depots . 16 Milch's
Milch's visitvisit also
also did
did much
much to to shape
depots.3* shape up Luftflotte
upLuftflotte
4's
4's rear rear area
area organization
organization.. Several Several less less competent
competent commanders,
commanders, including including
Richthofen's
Richthofen's Chief of Chief of Staff,
Staff, von
von Rohden,
Rohden, lost lost their
their jobs
jobs." ." Milch
Milch characterized
characterized the the
situation
situation whenwhen he he warned
warned his his subordinates
subordinates that, that, "It"It isis aa great
great error
error to to suppose
suppose that that
we
we possess
possess aa ground
ground organization
organization.' . "38
'3«
Luftflotte
Luftflotte 4's 4's capabilities
capabilities improvedimproved dramatically
dramatically.. In In Janaury,
Janaury, the the airair fleet
fleet
managed only
managed only 350 sorties350 sorties per per day.
day. However,
However, from from February
February 20 20 through
through MarchMarch 15, 15,
Richthofen's
Richthofen's forces forces averaged
averaged 1,000 1,000 combat combat sortiessorties daily
daily with with overover 1,2001,200 on on
February
February 23 23.. Aiding
Aiding the the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's task task was
was the the fact
fact that
that Russian
Russian advances
advances had had
carried
carried themthem far far beyond
beyond their their airfields
airfields and and supply
supply organization
organization.'' . 39 Thus,
Thus, thethe Russian
Russian
air
air force
force had
had little
little impact
impact on on operations
operations now now taking place; Luftflotte
taking place; Luftflotte 44 couldcould give give
undivided
undivided attention
attention to to supporting
supporting ground ground forcesforces.. For For command
command of of airair units
units

155
155
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

supporting
supporting the the counteroffensive,
counteroffensive, Richthofen
Richthofen kept long-range bomber
kept long-range bomber units units directly
directly
under
under himself, Fliegerkorps 1,I, Fliegerkorps
himself; Fliegerkorps Fliegerkorps IV, IV, andand Fliegerdivision
Fliegerdivision Donetz Donetz divided
divided
up
up close
close air air support
support duties,
duties, but Richthofen remained
but Richthofen remained flexible,
flexible, transferring
transferring available
available
assets
assets back back and and forth
forth between
between commands
commands as as the
the situation
situation changed.^°
changed."**
In
In the
the last
last ten
ten days
days of February, the
of February, the German
German counterattack
counterattack rolled rolled into
into high
high gear.
gear.
By
By the the endend of of February,
February, First Panzer Army
First Panzer Army was was driving
driving the the Russians
Russians in in confusion
confusion
.41 Luftflotte 4 played a significant role
back
back to to the Donets River
the Donets River."' Luftflotte 4 played a significant role in in delaying
delaying and and
softening up
coftening up Russian
Russian armor
armor until
until ground
ground forces
forces could
could counterattack.4z
counterattack."^ The
The more
more
important
important drive drive came came fromfrom Hoth's
Hoth's Fourth
Fourth Panzer
Panzer ArmyArmy.. This This force
force contained
contained aa
number of the Wehrmacht's
number of the Wehrmacht's best
best divisions
divisions and
and included
included SS
SS divisions
diwisions Das
Das Reich
Reich and and
Totenkopf.
Totenkopf. Beginning Beginning near near Dnepropetrovsk,
Dnepropetrovsk, Hoth's Hoth's forces
forces sliced
sliced to to the
the northeast
northeast
towards
towards Kharkov.Kharkov. By March 14,
By March 14, they
they had retaken that
had retaken city; by
that city; by March
March 18, 18, the
the
Germans had retaken Belgograd, but
Germans had retaken Belgograd, but the
the spring
spring thaw
thaw ended
ended operations
operations."' .43
Richthofen's aircraft substantially aided the
Richthofen's aircraft substantially aided the advance
advance and
and managed
managed to
to destroy
destroy large
large
Soviet
Soviet forces
forces attempting
attempting to to escape
escape."" .44 The
The counterattack
counterattack represented
represented aa major major victory
victory
for German arms and restored the highly dangerous situation that had existed at
for German arms and restored the highly dangerous situation that had existed at the
the
end of January. It was, however, the Wehrmacht's last meaningful victory in the
end of January. It was, however, the Wehrmacht's last meaningful victory in the
east .
east.
The
The victory
victory in in late
late winter
winter did did not
not come
come without
without cost cost.. InIn mid-February,
mid-February, aircraft aircraft
strength in the east had totalled 275 dive bombers, 484 bombers, and 454 fighters .4s
strength in the east had totalled 275 dive bombers, 484 bombers, and 454 fighters."^
Losses
Losses in February and
in February and March,
March, mostly
mostly in in support
support of of the
the counteroffensive,
counteroffensive, were were 56 56
dive bombers, 217 bombers, and 163 fighters .46 As a percentage of the Luftwaffe's
dive bombers, 217 bombers, and 163 fighters."* As a percentage of the Luftwaffe's
total
total strength
strength at at the
the end
end of of January,
January, such such losses
losses represented
represented 17 .1 percent
17.1 percent of of
available dive bombers, 12 .3 percent of fighters, and 17 .2 percent of bombers.47
available dive bombers, 12.3 percent of fighters, and 17.2 percent of bombers."'
Yet,
Yet, the the fighting
fighting in in southern
southern Russia
Russia needneed notnot obscure
obscure the the fact
fact that
that combat
combat was was
occurring
occurring elsewhereelsewhere on on the
the eastern
eastern front.
front. TheThe results
results werewere lessless spectacular
spectacular but but
certainly
certainly of of importance
importance.. For the Luftwaffe,
For the Luftwaffe, thisthis aerial
aerial combat,
combat, like like the
the daily
daily wastage
wastage
on
on the
the western
western front front in
in the
the First World War,
First World War, imposed
imposed aa steadysteady and and wearing
wearing pressure
pressure
on its
on its capabilities
capabilities.. The The battle
battle around
around Velikiye
Velikiye Luki Luki on on the
the upper
upper Lovat
Lovat River
River from
from
November
November 25 25 through
through January
January 15 15 indicates
indicates thisthis factor
factor.. InIn late
late November,
November, RussianRussian
forces
forces had had isolated
isolated 7,0007,000 troops
troops in in that
that undistinguished
undistinguished town town.. By By the
the time
time that
that the
the
Germans
Germans brought brought out out aa fewfew hundred
hundred survivors
survivors in in mid-January,48
mid-January,"^ supportingsupporting air air
squadrons
squadrons had had lostlost 55
55 aircraft
aircraft destroyed
destroyed (including
(including 33 Ju Ju 87's,
87's, 88 BfBf 109's,
109's, and
and 2020 HeHe
I111
l 1's)
's) and
and 26 26 aircraft
aircraft damaged.49
damaged."' The The strategic
strategic result
result waswas virtually
virtually nil,
nil, but
but aa further
further
attrition
attrition had had taken
taken place
place..
For
For thethe next
next three
three months,
months, groundground operations
operations slowed
slowed as as both
both sides
sides prepared
prepared for for
the
the summer
summer.. For For thethe Luftwaffe,
Luftwc^e, however,however, the the period
period was was anything
anything but but quiet.
quiet.
Hitler's
Hitier's inability
inability to to tailor
tailor strategy
strategy to to the
the means
means at at hand
hand forced
forced needless
needless
commitments
commitments on on overstrained
overstrained air air squadrons
squadrons.. The The DonDon collapse
collapse in in January
January had had
finally
finally convinced
convinced him him to to withdraw
withdraw from from thethe Caucasus
Caucasus;; but but while
while First
First Panzer
Panzer Army
Army
pulled
pulled back back through
through Rostov,
Rostov, Seventeenth
Seventeenth Army Army remained
remained on on the
the Kuban
Kuban Peninsula
Peninsula
across
across from from the Crimea.. The
the Crimea The battle
battle to to hold
hold this
this useless
useless territory, which Hitler
territory, which Hitler hoped
hoped
would
would serve serve as as aa jumping
jumping off off point
point forfor another
another offensive
offensive into into the
the Caucasus,
Caucasus, tied tied
down
down ground ground and and airair forces
forces desperately
desperately neededneeded elsewhere
elsewhere and and contributed
contributed to to aa

156
156
ATTRITION ON THE
ATTRITION ON THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

heavy
heavy attrition rate throughout
attrition rate throughout the period.'" Elsewhere,
the periods° Elsewhere, fighter fighter sweeps,
sweeps, bomber
bomber
interdiction
interdiction missions,
missions, and and close
close airair support
support attrited
attrited air air units despite an
units despite an absence
absence of of
major ground
major ground operations
operations. . From
From April
April to
to June,
June, the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe lost
lost 256
256 fighters,
fighters, 245
245
bombers,
bombers, and and 115 dive bombers
115 dive bombers in in the
the east."
east." As As aa percentage
percentage of of total
total air
air strength
strength
(all theaters), these losses represented
(all theaters), these losses represented 18
18.3.3 percent
percent of
of fighters,
fighters, 17
17 percent
percent ofof
bombers, and 31 .8 percent of dive bombers on
bombers, and 31.8 percent of dive bombers on hand
hand at
at the
the beginning
beginning of
of April
April." . 5z
What seems to have happened is that, despite a
What seems to have happened is that, despite a lower
lower scale
scale of
of combat
combat and
and aa chance
chance
to
to relieve
relieve thethe pressure
pressure on on thethe flying
flying units,
units, the the Germans
Germans found found the the urge
urge to
to use
use their
their
air assets in insignificant operations irresistible .
air assets in insignificant operations irresistible.
The
The spring
spring thaw
thaw raised
raised thethe question
question of of strategy
strategy for for the
the coming
coming summer summer.. Manstein
Manstein
later claimed that he
later claimed that he urged
urged a
a defensive/offensive
defensive/offensive strategy
strategy: : The
The Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht would
would
adapt a defensive posture
adapt a defensive posture and
and allow
allow the
the Russians
Russians the
the first
first move
move. . Then
Then using
using the
the
armored reserves that were
armored reserves that were rebuilt
rebuilt by
by rising
rising tank
tank production,
production, the
the Germans
Germans would
would
slam
slam the
the door
door shut."
shut." Such
Such aa strategy
strategy was was too too risky
risky forfor Hitler
Hitler and and certainly
certainly diddid not
not
appeal to his aggressive instincts . If the
appeal to his aggressive instincts. If the Germans
Germans were
were to
to attack,
attack, however,
however, the
the
question was where, when, and with what. On
question was where, when, and with what. On January
January 23,
23, 1943,
1943, armored
armored strength
strength
on
on the
the eastern
eastern front
front totalled
totalled onlyonly 495 useable tanks
495 useable tanks."*. 54 Considerable
Considerable resupply resupply took took
place over the next months, but operations in late
place over the next months, but operations in late winter
winter caused
caused heavy
heavy losses
losses. . Hitler
Hitler
initially
initially considered
considered three possible spoiling
three possible spoiling attacks,
attacks, but but by by the the end
end of of April
April had had
settled on "Operation Citadel," aimed at clearing the Kursk salient . 51
settled on "Operation Citadel," aimed at clearing the Kursk salient." Manstein
Manstein had
had
suggested this possibility as a means of inflicting such heavy losses
suggested this possibility as a means of inflicting such heavy losses on
on the
the Russians
Russians
as
as toto prevent summer offensive
prevent aa summer offensive.. Instead
Instead of of launching
launching "Citadel" "Citadel" in in May,
May,
Manstein's suggested date, Hitler postponed it, eventually choosing July 5 in order
Manstein's suggested date. Hitler postponed it, eventually choosing July 5 in order
to strengthen
to strengthen his his armored
armored forces
forces in in the east..
the east
By June, troops
By June, troops preparing
preparing forfor the
the offensive
offensive had
had received
received 900
900 tanks
tanks and
and 300
300 self-
self-
propelled guns,56 but by then "Citadel" had raised serious doubts . On June 18,
propelled guns,'* but by then "Citadel" had raised serious doubts. On June 18,
OKW staff urged Hitler to cancel the offensive and to establish an operational
OKW staff urged Hitler to cancel the offensive and to establish an operational
reserve
reserve in
in Germany
Germany to to meet
meet any any reverse
reverse inin the
the Wehrmacht's
Wehrmacht's three three theaters
theaters."."
Guderian argued strenuously that the Russians had built up their defenses, and
Guderian argued strenuously that the Russians had built up their defenses, and even
even
Hitler
Hitier admitted
admitted that
that thinking
thinking about
about thethe pending
pending offensive
offensive made
made himhim sick
sick toto his
his
stomach ." But he did not cancel the offensive . Perhaps the rhetoric of his April
stomach." But he did not cancel the offensive. Perhaps the rhetoric of his April
operational
operational order
order for
for "Citadel,"
"Citadel," announcing
announcing that
that aa "victory
"victory atat Kursk
Kursk must
must serve
serve asas
aa beacon
beacon for
for the
the world,"
world," indicates
indicates the the underlying
underlying reason
reason for
for his
his decision.59
decision.'' HeHe
could not
could not publicly
publicly admit
admit that
that the
the initiative
initiative had
had slipped
slipped from
from his
his hands.
hands.
The
The pause
pause toto build
build up
up armored
armored strength allowed the
strength allowed the Russians
Russians time
time to
to prepare
prepare.. The
The
Central
Central Front,
Front, on
on the
the northern
northern half
half of
of the
the Kursk
Kursk bulge,
bulge, controlled
controlled nono less
less than
than six
six
Russian
Russian armies
armies and
and on
on the
the critical
critical northern
northern neck
neck ofof the
the salient
salient deployed
deployed three
three armies
armies
in
in two
two echelons
echelons.. The
The Voronezh
Voronezh Front
Front onon the
the southern
southern halfhalf of
of the
the salient
salient held
held the
the
line
line with
with four
four Russian
Russian armies with aa second
armies with second echelon
echelon ofof two
two armies
armies behind
behind the
the neck.
neck.
Three
Three Soviet
Soviet armies
armies lay
lay in
in reserve
reserve within
within the
the salient,
salient, while
while three
three more
more armies
armies lay
lay
north
north of
of Orel
Orel and
and one
one to
to the
the south
south of
of Kursk.
Kursk. InIn addition,
addition, the
the Russians
Russians hadhad dug
dug two
two
or
or three
three lines
lines of
of trenches
trenches inin the
the main
main zone
zone ofof resistance,
resistance, andand to
to the
the rear
rear were
were
second
second and
and third
third zones
zones constructed
constructed in in the
the same
same fashion .10
fashion.*"

15
1577
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

By July,
By there was
July, there was no no hope
hope of surprise.. The
of surprise The greatest
greatest land land battle
battle of of the
the warwar opened
opened
on
on July
July 5; 5; Soviet
Soviet artillery inflicted heavy
artillery inflicted heavy casualties
casualties on on German
German infantryinfantry moving
moving into into
jumpoff
jumpoff positions.
positions. What What now occurred was
now occurred was aa greatgreat battle
battle of of attrition
attrition.*' .,' The
The
Germans
Germans slowly slowly fought
fought through
through the the first
first lines
lines ofof defense
defense;; only only in in the
the south
south did did they
they
make significant
make significant gains, gains, although
although at at great
great cost.
cost. On On July
July 12, 12, the
the Russians,
Russians, sure sure that
that
the raging Kursk battle had entangled German reserves, attacked the
the raging Kursk battle had entangled German reserves, attacked the northern
northern side
side
of
of the Orel salient
the Orel salient.. Their
Their offensive
offensive posed posed an an immediate
immediate threat threat to to thethe German
German
northern pincer . That move, combined with the invasion of Sicily on July 10,
northern pincer. That move, combined with the invasion of Sicily on July 10,
caused Hitler to shut down "Citadel .
caused Hitler to shut down "Citadel."*^ "62 Troop withdrawals to both Sicily and to
Troop withdrawals to both Sicily and to
support a desperate situation developing
support a desperate situation developing south
south of
of Kursk
Kursk forced
forced an
an abandonment
abandonment of
of
the Orel salient . In fact, the most dangerous situation arose in the region south of
the Orel salient. In fact, the most dangerous situation arose in the region south of
Kursk
Kursk.. At At the
the beginning
beginning of of August,
August, Soviet
Soviet armies
armies went went overover to to the
the offensive
offensive.. The The
cities of Belgorod and Kharkov soon fell, and the entire German position along the
cities of Belgorod and Kharkov soon fell, and the entire German position along the
Donets unraveled . By the beginning of September, Army Group South was in
Donets unraveled. By the beginning of September, Army Group South was in
headlong retreat; its withdrawal carried it to the Dneper by early October .63
headlong retreat; its withdrawal carried it to the Dneper by early October.*'
The
The Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's role role inin these
these events
events was was symptomatic
symptomatic of of the
the decline
decline in in German
German
power . As with army preparations for "Citadel," the air force gave top priority to
power. As with army preparations for "Citadel," the air force gave top priority to
rebuilding units scheduled for the offensive . But the effect of high attrition and the
rebuilding units scheduled for the offensive. But the effect of high attrition and the
drop
drop in in training
training hours hours for for newnew pilots
pilots hadhad an an obvious
obvious impact impact on on combat
combat
effectiveness
effectiveness.. A A rueful Jeschonnek admitted
rueful Jeschonnek admitted to to G6ring
Goring that that despite
despite high high deliveries
deliveries
of
of aircraft
aircraft to fighter units,
to fighter units, losses
losses duedue toto noncombat
noncombat causes causes were were severely
severely affecting
affecting
capabilities.,°
capabilities.** A A substantial
substantial portionportion of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe strength
strength still still remained
remained on on thethe
Russian
Russian frontfront.. Of Of the
the total
total aircraft
aircraft available
available at at the
the end
end ofJune,
of June, 38.7 38.7 percent
percent were were in in
the
the east;
east; more
more specifically,
specifically, 84 84.5.5 percent
percent of of all
all dive
dive bombers,
bombers, 27 27 percent
percent of of allall
fighters,
fighters, and and 33 33 percent
percent of of all
all bombers
bombers were were serving
serving in in the
the east.6s
east.*' For
For the
the offensive,
offensive,
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe concentrated
concentrated nearly nearly allall this
this strength
strength in in the
the twotwo Lufotten
Luftflotten deployed
deployed
near
near Kursk
Kursk.. In In the
the north, Luftflotte 66 possessed
north, Luftflotte possessed 750 750 aircraft,
aircraft, whilewhile Luftflotte
Luftflotte 44
controlled
controlled 1,100 1,100 aircraft
aircraft to to support
support the the southern
southern drive.
drive.** 66

The
The air air fleets
fleets opened
opened the the offensive
offensive with with aa massive
massive strike strike.. On On thethe first
first day,
day,
German
German aircraftaircraft flew flew 3,000
3,000 sorties,
sorties, and and some
some "Stuka"
"Stuka" pilots pilots flewflew up up to to sixsix
missions.
missions. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, unlike unlike previous
previous years,years, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe did did notnot gaingain air air
superiority
superiority.*' .,' IfIf German
German pilots pilots inflicted
inflicted heavyheavy losseslosses on on Soviet
Soviet fighters
fighters and and
bombers, their
bombers, their opponents
opponents simply simply put put up up more
more aircraft,
aircraft, while while German
German losses losses
inexorably mounted.
inexorably mounted. Soviet Soviet "Sturmoviks"
"Sturmoviks" struck struck German
German ground ground forces,
forces, whilewhile
Russian
Russian bombersbombers hit hit transportation
transportation points points.. Moreover,
Moreover, the the subsequent
subsequent German German
failure
failure at at Kursk
Kursk and and thethe Russian
Russian summersummer offensive
offensive then then forced
forced the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to
divide
divide its its assets
assets to to meet
meet the the desperate
desperate situation
situation on on the
the ground
ground.. The The retreat
retreat fromfrom
Orel,
Orel, the the Kharkov
Kharkov battle,battle, and and aa massive
massive SovietSoviet offensive
offensive along along the the lower
lower Donets
Donets
made extensive
made extensive demands
demands on on Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe resources
resources in in three
three widely
widely separated
separated areas.areas. As As
aa result,
result, the the large
large striking
striking force assembled for
force assembled for "Citadel"
"Citadel" now now became
became three three small
small
forces
forces engaged
engaged in bolstering the
in bolstering the situation
situation on on the
the ground
ground.. For For thethe remainder
remainder of of the
the
war,
war, as as Russian
Russian offensives
offensives rippedripped German defenses to
German defenses to shreds,
shreds, this this was
was to to be
be the
the fate
fate
of
of the Luftwaffe.. With
the Luftwaffe With decreasingly
decreasingly skilled skilled pilots
pilots butbut increasing
increasing commitments,
commitments, the the
eastern Luftflotten became the
eastern Luftflotten became the backwater
backwater of
of German
German efforts
efforts in
in the
the air.
air.

15
1588
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

The
The losses
losses that
that Luftflotten
Luftflotten 44 and and 66 suffered
suffered inin July
July and
and August
August underline
underline the the
Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's overcommitment
overcommitment.. In In this two-month period,
this two-month period, thethe Germans
Germans lost lost 1,030
1,030
aircraft
aircraft in
in the east, 16
the east, 16 percent
percent of of their
their total
total force
force structure
structure as as of
of June
June 30,
30, 1943
1943 (351(351
fighters, 19 percent of all
fighters, 19 percent of all fighters;
fighters; 273
273 bombers,
bombers, 16 .4
16.4 percent
percent of
of all
all bombers
bombers; ; and
and
202 dive bombers, 38.6 percent of available dive bombers) . But the losses should
202 dive bombers, 38.6 percent of available dive bombers). But the losses should
not
not be
be viewed
viewed in in isolation
isolation since
since the
the air
air battle
battle in
in Russia
Russia waswas only
only one
one ofof the
the three
three
massive commitments that the Luftwaffe faced in the summer . While we shall
massive commitments that the Luftwaffe faced in the summer. While we shall
discuss the implications of fighting on three major fronts simultaneously at the end
discuss the implications of fighting on three major fronts simultaneously at the end
of this chapter, one must note that total losses for all theaters in July and August
of this chapter, one must note that total losses for all theaters in July and August
were
were 3,213
3,213 aircraft
aircraft (50
(50.6.6 percent)
percent) and 1,313 fighters
and 1,313 fighters (71
(71 percent)
percent).**." This
This was
was aa loss
loss
rate
rate that no air
that no air force
force could
could sustain
sustain.. Consequently,
Consequently, the Luftwaffe had
the Luftwaffe had toto cut
cut its
its losses
losses
and
and commitments
commitments;; to meet the
to meet the threat
threat at
at home,
home, itit surrendered
surrendered air air superiority
superiority on on the
the
periphery
periphery to to Allied
Allied air
air forces
forces..

THE
THE MEDITERRANEAN
MEDITERRANEAN
In.
In the
the summer
summer of of 1942,
1942, Churchill
Churchill and and Roosevelt
Roosevelt settled
settled on on aa Mediterranean
Mediterranean
strategy
strategy.. American
American planners,planners, however,
however, gave heavy emphasis
gave heavy emphasis to to landings
landings in in
Morocco,
Morocco, whilewhile the British pushed
the British pushed for for aa landing
landing as as far
far east
east along
along thethe coast
coast ofof Africa
Africa
as
as possible
possible to to prevent German move
prevent aa German move in in Tunisia
Tunisia.*' .b9 The
The compromise
compromise between between thesethese
views
views insured
insured that
that the Allies would
the Allies would gaingain control
control of of Algeria
Algeria butbut could
could notnot prevent
prevent the the
Germans
Germans fromfrom seizing
seizing Tunisia
Tunisia..
The
The OKWOKW did did not
not have
have aa clear
clear picture
picture ofof Allied
Allied intentions
intentions as as the
the invasion
invasion convoy
convoy
sailed
sailed into
into the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean.. Once, Once, however,
however, the the landings
landings occurred,
occurred, the the Germans
Germans
acted
acted with
with usual
usual dispatch.
dispatch. Ju Ju 52's
52's flew
flew paratroopers
paratroopers into into Tunis;
Tunis; thethe French
French governor
governor
general collapsed, and
general collapsed, and thethe Germans
Germans rapidly
rapidly established
established control
control throughout
throughout the the
country
country.. Jodl
Jodl buttressed
buttressed Hitler's
Hitler's decision
decision to to hold
hold North
North Africa
Africa.. At At the
the end
end of of
November,
November, he he argued
argued thatthat "North
"North Africa
Africa is is the
the glacis
glacis of of Europe
Europe and and must,
must,
therefore,
therefore, be be held
held under
under allall circumstances
circumstances."™ . "'° Hitler
Hitler himself
himself suggested
suggested two two factors
factors
motivating
motivating his his decision
decision to to maintain
maintain an an Axis
Axis presence
presence in in Africa
Africa:: fear
fear that
that itsits
abandonment
abandonment would would cause cause an an Italian
Italian collapse
collapse and and aa desire
desire to to keep
keep the the
Mediterranean
Mediterranean closed closed to to Allied
Allied shipping."
shipping.^' The The Germans
Germans rushedrushed in in paratroopers,
paratroopers,
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fieldfield troops,
troops, and and soldiers
soldiers from
from replacement
replacement pools, pools, butbut at at the
the end
end of of
November
November more more structured
structured reinforcements
reinforcements began began arriving.
arriving. Tenth
Tenth Panzer
Panzer Division
Division
was
was in in place
place by by thethe end
end ofof the
the month;
month; and and in in early
early December,
December, ColonelColonel General
General
Jurgen
Jiirgen vonvon Arnim
Amim assumedassumed command
command of of what
what was was euphemistically
euphemistically called called Fifth
Fifth
Panzer
Panzer ArmyArmy.^2 .'z
In
In retrospect,
retrospect, the the decision
decision to to hold
hold in in Africa
Africa was was aa dreadful
dreadful mistake
mistake.''^.'3 AtAt
Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, Russian
Russian armiesarmies had had executed
executed aa massive
massive encircling
encircling movement
movement to to trap
trap
Sixth
Sixth Army.
Army. In In Tunisia,
Tunisia, thethe Germans
Germans werewere in in an
an equally
equally indefensible
indefensible position
position withwith
tenuous
tenuous supply
supply lines
lines from
from Sicily
Sicily and
and the
the mainland
mainland.. Since Since the
the Italian
Italian navy
navy waswas in in no
no
position
position to to defend
defend convoys,
convoys, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had toto assume
assume the the burden
burden of of protecting
protecting
supplies
supplies moving
moving by by sea
sea as
as well
well asas the
the aerial
aerial movement
movement of of men
men andand materiel
materiel sent
sent into
into
Tunisia
Tunisia.. Finally,
Finally, Luftflotte
Luftflotte 22 faced
faced increasingly
increasingly powerful
powerful Allied
Allied airair forces
forces closing
closing in in

15
1599
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

from
from the
the east as well
east as well as
as the
the west.
west. The
The result,
result, as
as we
we shall
shall see,
see, was
was aa thoroughly
thoroughly
needless attrition of German air strength. The ground forces and materiel eventually
needless attrition of German air strength. The ground forces and materiel eventually
lost were, arguably, replaceable . Losses in aircraft and pilots were not .
lost were, arguably, replaceable. Losses in aircraft and pilots were not.
The
The deteriorating
deteriorating position
position at at ElEl Alamein
Alamein led led to to aa significant augmentation in
significant augmentation in
Luftflotte 2's
Luftflotte 2's air strength . In
air strength. In the
the three
three months
months of of July,
July, August,
August, and and September
September 1942, 1942,
Rommel
Rommel had had received
received 40,00040,000 troops troops and and 4,000
4,000 tons tons of of supplies
supplies by by air
air.. The
The
exhaustion of
exhaustion of crews
crews andand aircraft,
aircraft, the the collapse
collapse of of seasea supply
supply lines lines to to Libya
Libya as as
"Ultra" information allowed
"Ultra" information allowed the the Allies
Allies to devastate convoys,
to devastate convoys, and and thethe combination
combination
of
of the
the Africa
Africa Corps'
Corps' defeat
defeat and and "Torch"
"Torch" forced forced the Luftwaffe to
the Luftwaffe to send
send 150150 JuJu 52's
52's to to
the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean in in early
early November;
November; and and anan additional
additional 170 170 followed
followed at at the end of
the end of
the
the month
month.. This This movement
movement of of transport
transport aircraft,
aircraft, combined
combined with with the the Stalingrad
Stalingrad
airlift,
airlift, effectively
effectively shut shut downdown instrument
instrument and and bomber
bomber transition
transition schoolsschools.^*.74 The
The
development
development into into the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean also also explains
explains why why thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe found found itit
difficult
difficult to to transfer
transfer more
more transport
transport aircraft
aircraft to to Luftflotte
Luftflotte 44 and and the
the Stalingrad
Stalingrad supply
supply
effort.
effort. In In November
November and and December,
December, transport transport squadrons
squadrons flew flew in in 41,768
41,768 troops,
troops,
8,614
8,614.8 .8 tons
tons of of equipment
equipment and and supplies,
supplies, and and 1,472
1,472.8 .8 tons
tons of of fuel
fuel.. The
The cost,
cost,
however, was prohibitive.
however, was prohibitive. The
The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe lost
lost no
no less
less than
than 128
128 Ju
Ju 52's
52's in
in November
November
and
and December,
December, with with anan additional
additional 36 36 destroyed
destroyed in in January
January (13 (13.9 .9 percent
percent of of the
the
Luftwaffe's total transport strength) . When combined with those lost at Stalingrad,
Luftwaffe's total transport strength). When combined with those lost at Stalingrad,
the Germans had
the Germans had managed
managed to to lose
lose 659659 transport
transport aircraft
aircraft (56(56 percent
percent of of the
the transport
transport
force as of November 10) by the end ofJanuary ."
force as of November 10) by the end of January.''
The
The German
German response
response to to "Torch"
"Torch" led led to
to aa major
major transfer
transfer of of bombers
bombers and and fighters
fighters
into
into the
the theater.
theater. As As early
early as as November
November 4, Luftflotte 44 gave
4, Luftflotte gave up up aa fighter
fighter group
group to to the
the
Mediterranean
Mediterranean.'* .16 Moreover,
Moreover, the the North
North African
African invasion
invasion forced
forced the the Germans
Germans to to shut
shut
down
down attacks
attacks on on the
the Murmansk
Murmansk convoys convoys and and to
to send
send additional
additional antishipping
antishipping units units
into
into the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean." ." German
German bomber bomber and and fighter
fighter forces
forces operating
operating from from
Tunisia,
Tunisia, Sicily,
Sicily, and
and Sardinia
Sardinia inflicted
inflicted considerable
considerable damage damage on on Allied
Allied shipping
shipping and and
ground
ground forces.
forces. The The Allies
Allies faced
faced two two problems
problems in in bringing
bringing airpower
airpower to to bear
bear onon the
the
bridgehead.
bridgehead. The The first
first was
was one one of of logistics
logistics.. Tedder's
Tedder's air air forces,
forces, still still located
located on on
Egyptian
Egyptian bases,bases, were
were tootoo far far away
away to to intervene
intervene effectively,
effectively, while while the the bases
bases that
that
Eighth
Eighth ArmyArmy captured
captured in in itsits march
march alongalong the the North
North African
African littoral
littoral took
took time
time to to
repair
repair andand stockpile.
stockpile. Similarly,
Similarly, the the airair forces
forces in in Algeria
Algeria and and Morocco
Morocco found found itit
difficult
difficult toto marshal
marshal the the logistical
logistical effort effort needed
needed in in eastern
eastern Algeria
Algeria where where itit counted
counted..
The
The second
second problem
problem involved
involved command command and and control
control.. Anglo-American
Anglo-American units units in in
French
French Northwest
Northwest Africa Africa operated
operated under under different
different procedures,
procedures, while while Tedder's
Tedder's
forces
forces in in Middle
Middle East East Command
Command operated operated differently
differently.. The The solution
solution to to the
the first
first
problem
problem was was aa matter
matter of of time.
time. By By early
early January
January 1943,
1943, Allied
Allied airair forces
forces from
from Algeria
Algeria
were
were intervening
intervening with with greater
greater effectiveness,
effectiveness, and and Tedder's
Tedder's forces
forces soonjoined
soon joined up up..
The
The second problem was
second problem was also
also easily
easily solved As early
solved.. As as December
early as December 19,19, the
the
naval commander,
Mediterranean naval
Mediterranean commander. Sir Andrew Cunningham,
Sir Andrew Cunningham, cabled
cabled London
London that,
that,
"There
"There is
is one
one solution
solution and that is
and that is to
to put
put Tedder
Tedder in here." Eisenhower
in here." Eisenhower brought
brought
"Tooey" Spaatz out
"Tooey" Spaatz out from
from England
England asas his
his deputy,
deputy, but at Casablanca
but at Casablanca the
the Combined
Combined
appointed Tedder
Chiefs appointed
Chiefs as Commander
Tedder as Commander of Allied Mediterranean
of Allied Air Forces
Mediterranean Air ."
Forces.'«

160
160
THE MEDITERRANEAN
THE IVIEDiTERRANEAN

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3
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

Thus,
Thus, began partnership between
began aa partnership between Eisenhower
Eisenhower and and two two of of the premier airmen
the premier airmen of of
the
the war,
war, Spaatz
Spaatz and Tedder..
and Tedder
Allied
Allied air air commanders
commanders in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean proved proved themselves
themselves pragmatic,
pragmatic,
willing, and eager to draw on battlefield experience . Such attitudes enabled Tedder,
willing, and eager to draw on battlefield experience. Such attitudes enabled Tedder,
Spaatz,
Spaatz, andand their
their staffs
staffs (in(in the
the American
American case, case, particularly
particularly Doolittle,
Doolittle, Norstad,
Norstad, and and
Quesada)
Quesada) to critical issues
address critical
to address issues in in realistic
realistic terms
terms.'' ." By By the the spring
spring of of 1943,
1943,
Doolittle
Doolittle waswas already
already pressing
pressing for for long-range
long-range fighters
fighters to to support
support medium
medium and and heavy
heavy
bombers.
bombers. He argued that
He argued that thethe presence
presence of of such
such fighters
fighters would would significantly
significantly reduce
reduce
bomber
bomber casualties,
casualties, while while their their useuse "as"as intruders
intruders would would greatly
greatly increase
increase the the
effectiveness
effectiveness of of our
our strategic
strategic operations
operations."*" ." 8° The
The result
result of of such
such leadership
leadership waswas soon
soon
felt
felt.. Tedder
Tedder and and Spaatz
Spaatz used used their
their air
air resources
resources in in aa coherent
coherent campaign
campaign to to gain
gain airair
superiority in
superiority in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean.. Their Their strategy
strategy aimed aimed at at supporting
supporting the the overall
overall
theater
theater objective
objective of of destroying
destroying Axis Axis forces
forces in in Tunisia
Tunisia rather rather thanthan aa more
more cavalier
cavalier
"independent"
"independent" air air strategy
strategy.. As As was
was the
the case
case throughout
throughout the the war,
war, air air strategy
strategy proved
proved
most
most effective
effective whenwhen integrated
integrated into an overall
into an overall strategy
strategy in in which
which air, air, land,
land, and
and naval
naval
forces worked
forces closely together
worked closely together.. This This does
does notnot mean
mean that that Mediterranean
Mediterranean air air forces
forces
were
were subordinated
subordinated to to naval
naval and and ground
ground forces,
forces, rather
rather they they werewere subordinated
subordinated to to aa
general strategic
general framework within
strategic framework which all
within which all three
three services
services workedworked..
In
In February,
February, the Germans launched
the Germans launched aa spoiling
spoiling attack attack at at Kasserine
Kasserine Pass,Pass, butbut
growing pressure
growing pressure aroundaround the the Tunisian pocket stretched
Tunisian pocket stretched German German ground ground forces
forces to to the
the
limit. Allied
limit. Allied air air units
units played
played an important role
an important role inin disrupting
disrupting the the Kasserine
Kasserine attack,
attack,
while
while thethe shock
shock of of the
the German
German offensive
offensive resulted
resulted in in considerable
considerable improvements
improvements in in
cooperation
cooperation between between AmericanAmerican ground ground and and air air forces
forces.*' ." Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, Allied Allied
antishipping
antishipping strikes,
strikes, attacks
attacks on on harbors,
harbors, and and mine
mine layinglaying operations
operations added added to to the
the
difficulty
difficulty of of bringing
bringing convoysconvoys over over from
from Sicily
Sicily.. By By February,
February, Allied Allied air
air operations
operations
so
so impeded
impeded the the supply
supply situation
situation for for Axis
Axis forces
forces that that mostmost German
German fighters
fighters werewere
limited
limited to protecting ports
to protecting ports and and convoy
convoy routes
routes;; this
this growing
growing failure failure of of sea
sea transport
transport
forced the
forced the Germans
Germans to to depend
depend increasingly
increasingly on aerial resupply
on aerial resupply.*^ ." Allied
Allied air
air and
and naval
naval
forces were creating
forces were creating aa situation
situation analogous
analogous to Stalingrad, except
to Stalingrad, except thatthat in
in the
the case
case of of
Tunisia, the
Tunisia, the agony
agony lastedlasted longer
longer and and imposed
imposed aa higher higher attrition
attrition on on Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
assets ."
assets.*'
In
In March,
March, the the German's
German's desperatedesperate situation
situation in in North
North Africa Africa became
became hopeless
hopeless..
The
The growing
growing quantitative
quantitative superiority
superiority of of Allied
Allied fighters
fighters reducedreduced the the survivability
survivability of of
"Stukas,"
"Stukas," while while the the deteriorating
deteriorating ground ground situation
situation resulted
resulted in in more
more calls
calls for
for air
air
support.
support. As As aa result,
result, German
German bombers bombers ceasedceased attacks
attacks on on Allied
Allied ports
ports soso asas toto
support
support thethe hard-pressed
hard-pressed troops troops at at the
the fronf.
fron{. This
This change
change in in bomber
bomber strategy
strategy not not
only
only eased
eased Allied supply troubles
Allied supply troubles but but also
also probably
probably increased increased GermanGerman bomber
bomber
losses
losses as as well
well as as being
being of of doubtful
doubtful utility
utility forfor the
the ground
ground situation.$°
situation.*" Moreover,
Moreover,
Allied
Allied airair and
and naval
naval attacks
attacks on on convoys
convoys from from Sicily
Sicily halted
halted navalnaval movement
movement by by the
the
end
end ofof March.
March. Making
Making the the supply
supply of of Tunisia,
Tunisia, in in the
the face
face of of overwhelming
overwhelming Allied Allied airair
and naval superiority, almost impossible was the fact the "Ultra" provided Anglo-
and naval superiority, almost impossible was the fact the "Ultra" provided Anglo-
American
American commanders
commanders with with accurate
accurate and and timely
timely information
information on on military
military convoys
convoys
from
from Sicily
Sicily.. So So well
well prepared
prepared were were Allied
Allied air air forces
forces that that Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps Tunis Tunis
concluded
concluded in in mid-March
mid-March "that ' 'that the
the course
course forfor convoys
convoys D D andand C C were
were betrayed
betrayed to to the
the

16
1622
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

enemy.""
enemy."*' The The Germans,
Germans, however,
however, refused
refused to to believe
believe toto the
the end
end ofof the
the war
war that
that the
the
problem
problem might
might lie
lie in
in their
their electronic
electronic communication
communication signals.signals.
There
There was,
was, then,
then, nono other
other choice
choice forfor the
the Germans
Germans but but to
to fall
fall back
back on on airlift
airlift.. This
This
aerial
aerial supply
supply of of Tunisia
Tunisia in in the
the spring
spring represented
represented the the third
third disaster
disaster for for thethe
Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's transport
transport fleet
fleet within
within aa six-month
six-month periodperiod.. In
In April
April andand the
the first
first week
week of of
May,
May, asas the
the Tunisian
Tunisian pocket
pocket burned itself out,
burned itself out, the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe lostlost 177
177 more
more Ju Ju 52's,
52's,
along
along with
with aa number
number of of specialized
specialized aircraft
aircraft such
such asas the
the Me
Me 323,
323, thethe "Giant
"Giant."** .' 116
Particularly noteworthy was the loss of 6 "Giants" and 25 Ju 52's flying to
Particularly noteworthy was the loss of 6 "Giants" and 25 Ju 52's flying to
Tunisia
Tunisia ferrying
ferrying 800800 German
German troops ." The
troops.*' The third
third slaughter
slaughter of of German
German transport
transport
aircraft
aircraft within
within aa six-month
six-month period
period had
had aa wider
wider impact
impact thanthan just
just onon the
the transport
transport
force.
force. As
As one
one ranking
ranking officer
officer told
told another
another after
after capture
capture:: "You
"You cannot
cannot imagine
imagine how how
catastrophic
catastrophic thethe air
air personnel
personnel [situation]
[situation] is. is. We
We have
have no no crews;
crews; allall the
the instructor
instructor
crews
crews were
were shot
shot down
down in in the
the Junkers
Junkers.'. "$a
'**
The
The impact
impact of of the
the Tunisian
Tunisian campaign
campaign on on the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe farfar outweighed
outweighed whatever
whatever
strategic
strategic advantage
advantage the the Germans
Germans gained
gained in in closing
closing the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean for for six
six more
more
months
months.. InIn the
the period
period between
between November
November 1942 1942 and
and May
May 1943,
1943, thethe Germans
Germans lost lost
2,422
2,422 aircraft
aircraft inin the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean theatertheater (40 .5 percent
(40.5 percent of of their
their total
total force
force
structure
structure asas of November 10,
of November 10, 1942). Table XXXII89
1942). Table XXXII*' gives
gives the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean losses losses
in
in terms
terms ofof major
major aircraft
aircraft types
types during
during thethe period
period andand suggests
suggests their
their significance
significance for for
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe..

TABLE
TABLE XXXII
XXXII

German
German Aircraft
Aircraft Losses,
Losses, Mediterranean
Mediterranean
Theater-November
Theater—November 1942-May
1942-May 1943
1943

Percent
Percent of
of Total
Total Force
Force Structure
Structure
Aircraft
Aircraft Losses
Losses 10 .11 .4 2 .
10.11.42.
Fighters
Fighters 888
888 62 .6
62,6
Bombers
Bombers 734
734 58 .3
58.3
Twin-Engine
Twin-Engine Fighters
Fighters 117
117 41 .1
41.1
Dive
Dive Bombers
Bombers 128
128 35 .2
35.2
Transports
Transports 371
371 31 .5
31.5

What
What makes
makes such losses so
such losses so appalling
appalling isis the
the fact
fact that
that Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe strength
strength in in the
the
Mediterranean varied from 200 to 300 fighters and from 200 to 300 bombers
Mediterranean varied from 200 to 300 fighters and from 200 to 300 bombers
throughout
throughout thethe period .9° Thus,
period.'* combat wastage
Thus, combat wastage was was well
well over
over 200200 percent
percent of of unit
unit
strength
strength.. Admittedly,
Admittedly, some
some losses
losses were
were unavoidable
unavoidable.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the impression
impression
left
left by
by the
the North
North African
African debacle
debacle isis that
that had
had thethe Germans
Germans cut cut their
their losses
losses atat Libya,
Libya,
they
they could
could have
have defended
defended Sicily
Sicily with
with ground
ground forces
forces deployed
deployed to to Tunisia
Tunisia.. In
In the
the air,
air,
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could
could have
have used
used the
the strategy
strategy itit had
had waged
waged so so successfully
successfully in in western
western
Europe
Europe over
over the
the past
past year
year and
and aa half:
half: fighting
fighting only
only on
on its
its own
own terms
terms or or for
for aa decisive
decisive
strategic
strategic object.
object. However,
However, the the commitment
commitment to to Tunisia
Tunisia placed
placed thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in in aa
position
position where
where itit had
had to
to fight
fight at
at great
great disadvantage
disadvantage with with aa resulting
resulting high
high rate
rate of
of
attrition
attrition..

16
1633
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

Germany's
Germany's troubles troubles in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean were were not not yet over.. At
yet over At Casablanca,
Casablanca,
Allied statesmen and
Allied statesmen and military
military commanders
commanders had
had determined
determined that
that after
after Tunisia,
Tunisia, their
their
forces would invade Sicily
forces would invade Sicily and
and give
give the
the Italians
Italians a
a shove
shove that
that would
would take
take them
them out
out of
of
the war. For Hitler, the problem was where the blow would come . The Axis
the war. For Hitler, the problem was where the blow would come. The Axis
collapse
collapse in in Tunisia
Tunisia destroyed
destroyed the the fewfew good
good remaining
remaining Italian divisions, while
Italian divisions, while the the
Germans lost heavily enough to prevent establishment of a significant reserve in
Germans lost heavily enough to prevent establishment of a significant reserve in
the Mediterranean . "Citadel" held the priorities, and Allied deception efforts
the Mediterranean. "Citadel" held the priorities, and Allied deception efforts
persuaded
persuaded the the Fuhrer
Fiihrer that that the
the next
next attack
attack would
would be be in
in the
the Balkans
Balkans." . 9' Nevertheless,
Nevertheless,
he
he did
did notnot rulerule out
out thethe possibility
possibility that that thethe blow
blow might
might fall fall closer
closer to to thethe Italian
Italian
homeland
homeland.. Kesselring
Kesselring formed formed German
German troops troops awaiting
awaiting shipment
shipment to to Tunisia
Tunisia into into
three scratch divisions.
three scratch divisions. DespiteDespite Mussolini's
Mussolini's demand demand for for equipment
equipment rather rather than than
soldiers,
soldiers, two two new new panzer
panzer grenadier
grenadier (motorized
(motorized infantry)
infantry) and and two two new new panzer
panzer
divisions
divisions moved moved into into the
the peninsula
peninsula during during JuneJune 1943 1943.'^ .92 As
As all all had
had just
just received
received
equipment
equipment and and men,
men, theythey hardly
hardly represented
represented aa combat-tested
combat-tested military military force.
force. AgainAgain
the
the temptation,
temptation, which which proved
proved irresistible,
irresistible, would would be be toto use
use thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to bolster
bolster
weak
weak ground
ground forces forces..
While Allied
While Allied armies
armies rested
rested and and trained,
trained, Anglo-American
Anglo-American air air forces
forces attacked
attacked
German
German bases bases in in Sicily
Sicily and and Sardinia
Sardinia and and raided
raided coastal
coastal targets
targets to to soften
soften up up
defenses
defenses.. Beginning
Beginning in in mid-May,
mid-May, Allied Allied air air forces
forces beganbegan aa bombardment
bombardment of of the
the
Italian
Italian island
island of of Pantelleria,
Pantelleria, located
located 70 70 miles
miles southwest
southwest of of Sicily
Sicily.. After
After threethree
weeks,
weeks, Italian
Italian forces
forces surrendered
surrendered before before landing
landing operations
operations began; began; the the only
only casualty
casualty
was
was aa soldier
soldier bitten
bitten by by aa jackass
jackass.'^ .93 While
While Pantelleria
Pantelleria providedprovided aa base base to to extend
extend
fighter
fighter coverage
coverage to to Sicily,
Sicily, itsits real
real value
value laylay inin conditions
conditions itit provided
provided for for the
the study
study of of
the effects
the effects of of aerial bombardment.94 Allied
aerial bombardment.''' Allied airmen,
airmen, usingusing the the recommendations
recommendations of of
scientists
scientists in in these
these airair operations,
operations, particularly
particularly over over Sicily
Sicily and and Sardinia,
Sardinia, gave gave no no
respite
respite to to the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. Germany's
Germany's June June fighter
fighter losses
losses werewere 131, 131, while
while aa further
further 72 72
bombers were
bombers lost.'' July
were lost.95 July brought
brought the the invasion
invasion of of Sicily
Sicily and and thethe greatest
greatest air air battle
battle of of
the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean war war..
The
The Tunisian
Tunisian defeat defeat caused
caused aa reorganization
reorganization of of German
German air air forces
forces in in the
the south
south..
Luftflotte
Luftflotte 22 divided
divided in in two,
two, with
with Luftflotte
Luftflotte SouthSouth EastEast controlling
controlling the the Balkans
Balkans and and aa
new
new Luftflotte
Luftflotte 22 controlling
controlling Italy, Italy, Sardinia,
Sardinia, Corsica,
Corsica, and and Sicily
Sicily.. A A general
general
replacement
replacement of of commanders
commanders also also occurred
occurred.. Richthofen
Richthofen arrived arrived as as Luftflotte
Luftflotte 22
commander,
commander, accompaniedaccompanied by by aa number
number of of staff
staff officers
officers and and commanders
commanders from from the the
eastern
eastern front
front.. Galland,
Galland, now now inspector
inspector of of fighters,
fighters, wentwent to to Sicily
Sicily to to control
control fighter
fighter
operations.
operations. Along Along with with these
these changes,
changes, considerable
considerable reinforcements
reinforcements arrived arrived in in the
the
theater
theater.. Fighter
Fighter bombers transferred from
bombers transferred from operations
operations against
against the the British
British Isles,
Isles, while
while
the number of
the number of fighters
fighters increased
increased from from 190 190 in in mid-May
mid-May to to 450
450 in in early
early July July..
Considering
Considering the the heavy
heavy losses
losses inin May
May and and June,
June, suchsuch transfers
transfers were were eveneven heavier
heavier
than
than the
the above
above figures suggest.. Close
figures suggest Close to to 40
40 percent
percent of of all
all fighter
fighter production
production from from
May
May 1
1 through
through July 15 went to the Mediterranean and
July 15 went to the Mediterranean and two
two newly formed wings,
newly formed wings,
probably
probably scheduled
scheduled for for Germany's
Germany's defense,defense, went went southsouth.'* .96 Yet,
Yet, thethe movement
movement of of
fighters to redress Allied superiority achieved nothing more than to cause
fighters to redress Allied superiority achieved nothing more than to cause a
a rise
rise in
in
German losses-a reflection of how overwhelming the superiority
German losses—a reflection of how overwhelming the superiority of
of Allied
Allied
production
production had had become
become..

164
164
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

At
At the
the endend of June, air
of June, air operations
operations in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean heated heated up up.. The
The Germans
Germans
launched a number of
launched a number of bomber
bomber and
and fighter
fighter bomber
bomber sorties
sorties against
against Allied
Allied shipping
shipping. . In
In
addition, they attempted to neutralize
addition, they attempted to neutralize the
the air
air forces
forces building
building up
up on
on Malta
Malta and
and
Pantelleria
Pantelleria;; such such efforts
efforts required
required strong fighter support
strong fighter support.. Facing
Facing numerical
numerical
superiority, German fighters had difficulty in fending off enemy fighters much
superiority, German fighters had difficulty in fending off enemy fighters much lessless
protecting
protecting bombers
bombers and and fighter
fighter bombers
bombers.. The The air air struggle
struggle soon soon turned
turned into into aa battle
battle
for
for air
air superiority
superiority over over Sicily
Sicily and and Sardinia.91
Sardinia.*^ By By thethe start
start of
of Operation
Operation "Husky""Husky" on on
July
July 10,
10, the the Allies
Allies had had achieved
achieved general general air air superiority
superiority over over the
the island
island.. German
German
fighters
fighters had had trouble
trouble protecting
protecting their their ownown airfields
airfields fromfrom highhigh and
and lowlow level
level attack.
attack.
Sorties
Sorties against
against the the invasion achieved little
invasion achieved little and
and suffered
suffered exorbitant
exorbitant losses
losses.. Within
Within aa
week,
week, much much of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had withdrawn
withdrawn to to the
the mainland
mainland and and used
used Sicilian
Sicilian bases
bases
only
only as as forward
forward operating
operating areas." areas.'* Losses
Losses for for the
the month
month were were heavy
heavy.. In In July,
July, thethe
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe lost lost 711 aircraft (10
711 aircraft (10 percent
percent of of the
the German
German air air force
force at at the
the endend of of June)
June) of of
which
which 246 246 werewere fighters
fighters (13 (13.3 .3 percent
percent of of all fighters) and
all fighters) and 237237 bombers
bombers (14 (14.4 .4
percent
percent of of all
all bombers)
bombers).. In In August,
August, Allied Allied air forces, now
air forces, now operating
operating from from Sicily,
Sicily,
pounded
pounded southernsouthern Italy Italy and and inflicted
inflicted aa further further 321 321 losses.
losses."9 At At thisthis point,
point,
reinforcements and
reinforcements and resupply
resupply to to units
units in in Italy
Italy dried
dried up,up, while
while aa number
number of of squadrons
squadrons
(with
(with total
total complement
complement of of 210210 aircraft)
aircraft) withdrew
withdrew from from Italy
Italy after
after aa severe
severe mauling
mauling
over
over Sicily
Sicily.. Only
Only one one unit
unit returned
returned to the Mediterranean
to the Mediterranean;; the the rest
rest remained
remained at at home
home
to
to help
help defend
defend the the Reich
Reich.^^ . 100
Irrationality
Irrationality marked marked Hitler'sHitler's conductconduct of of operations
operations during during the the Tunisian
Tunisian and and
Sicilian
Sicilian withdrawals
withdrawals.. In In both
both cases,cases, he he forbade
forbade retreat
retreat until
until thethe lastlast possible
possible
moment
moment.. As As aa result,
result, groundground crews crews escaped
escaped from from Tunisia
Tunisia by by the the desperate
desperate
expedient
expedient of of packing
packing two two to to three
three individuals
individuals behind behind the the pilot's
pilot's seat
seat inin fighters.
fighters."" 101 InIn
Sicily,
Sicily, ground
ground personnel
personnel fled fled across
across the the straits
straits ofof Messina
Messina by by ferry.
ferry. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless,
the
the Fahrer's
Fiihrer's order order that that no no withdrawal
withdrawal preparations
preparations occur occur forced
forced retreating
retreating
squadrons
squadrons to to abandon
abandon nearly nearly all all their
their maintenance
maintenance equipment equipment and and most most sparespare
parts . 102
parts.'"2
These
These victories
victories in in the Mediterranean played
the Mediterranean played aa critical
critical role
role inin the
the winning
winning of of the
the
war
war.. They
They provided
provided AmericanAmerican ground ground forces forces with with an an invaluable
invaluable lesson lesson on on the the
quality
quality and and competence
competence of of their
their opponent
opponent.. WithoutWithout that that experience,
experience, bought bought at at high
high
but
but not
not exorbitant
exorbitant cost, cost, itit is is hard
hard to to imagine
imagine aa successful
successful lodgment
lodgment on on thethe coast
coast of of
France
France.'"3.'°3 Also
Also important
important for for eventual
eventual victoryvictory was was the the attrition
attrition of of Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
strength.
strength. Admittedly,
Admittedly, the the Germans
Germans themselves
themselves aided aided and and abetted
abetted that that process
process by by
placing
placing theirtheir Mediterranean
Mediterranean forces forces in in strategically
strategically indefensible
indefensible positions
positions.. They They thusthus
insured
insured that that thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe would would fight fight atat aa disadvantage
disadvantage.. Much Much of of this
this failure
failure was
was
directly
directly attributable
attributable to to Adolf
Adolf Hitler Hitler.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, Germany's Germany's Mediterranean
Mediterranean
command
command deserves deserves its its share
share of of responsibility
responsibility.. Kesselring's
Kesselring's optimistic
optimistic reporting
reporting
throughout
throughout the the period
period misledmisled both both the the OKW
OKW and and Hitler .104 By
Hitler."^ By the
the summer
summer of of 1943,
1943,
even
even the the Fuhrer
Ftihrer seems seems to to have
have had had doubts.
doubts. He He refused
refused to to believe
believe "smiling"smiling
Albert's"
Albert's" assurrance
assurrance that that Mussolini's
Mussolini's overthrow
overthrow did did not
not indicate
indicate aa shiftshift in in Italy's
Italy's
attitude
attitude towards
towards the the war.
war. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, Kesselring Kesselring remained
remained in in aa position
position of of high
high
responsibility
responsibility to to the
the end;
end; the the fact Keitel was
that Keitel
fact that was the the only
only other
other ofof the
the field
field marshals
marshals
created
created in in July
July 1940 1940 stillstill around
around at at the
the end end of of thethe war
war is is ample
ample testimony
testimony to to
Kesselring's
Kesselring's integrity
integrity and and realism
realism.. His His messages
messages to to the
the hard-pressed
hard-pressed air air units
units inin the
the
165
165
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

spring
spring campaign
campaign summarize
summarize hishis brand
brand of
of leadership.
leadership. InIn March,
March, he he threatened
threatened
"court-martial
"court-martial proceedings
proceedings owing
owing to the negligence
to the negligence inin the
the escort
escort provided
provided for
for
valuable
valuable merchant
merchant vessels,"
vessels," while
while earlier
earlier in
in the
the campaign
campaign he he suggested to his
suggested to his
aircrews
aircrews that
that Japanese
Japanese fanaticism was an
fanaticism was an excellent
excellent example
example asas to
to how
how they
they should
should
fight.'°s
fight.'"' Such
Such attitudes
attitudes hardly
hardly fit
fit most
most definitions
definitions of
of leadership,
leadership, but
but they
they certainly
certainly
fit
fit within
within Hitler's.
Hitler's.

THE
THE AIR
AIR WAR
WAR IN
IN THE
THE WEST: THE COMBINED
WEST: THE COMBINED BOMBER
BOMBER OFFENSIVE
OFFENSIVE
Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's 1942 1942 performance
performance had had atat best
best been
been spotty.
spotty. It had achieved
It ifif had achieved
successes
successes in in attacking
attacking at at Lubeck,
Liibeck, Rostock,
Rostock, and and Cologne,
Cologne, the the vulnerability
vulnerability of of those
those
cities
cities was
was due due to to their
their location
location and and construction
construction rather rather thanthan toto theirtheir overall
overall
importance
importance to to the
the war
war effort
effort.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, those those successes
successes provided
provided Harris Harris with
with the the
time
time and
and political
political clout
clout to to turn
turn his
his command
command into into anan effective
effective weapon,
weapon, although
although the the
1942
1942 campaign
campaign bought bought that that time
time at at considerable
considerable cost. cost. TheThe command's
command's strength strength
seems
seems to to have
have varied
varied between
between 400 400 andand 500500 aircraft
aircraft in in 1942;'°6
1942;'"* losses
losses for for the
the year
year
were
were 1,404
1,404 aircraft
aircraft shot
shot down
down and and 2,724
2,724 damaged
damaged.. Air Air raids
raids during
during 1942 1942 directed
directed
against
against Essen
Essen in in which
which British
British bombers
bombers caused caused no no significant
significant damage
damage cost cost Bomber
Bomber
Command
Command no no less than 201
less than 201 bombers
bombers,'"^ . 101 Of
Of the
the newnew four-engine
four-engine bombers bombers now now
reaching frontline
reaching frontline squadrons,
squadrons, the the British
British wrotewrote off off 228228 "Stirlings,"
"Stirlings," 249 249
"Halifaxes,"
"Halifaxes," and and 202
202 "Lancasters
"Lancasters."'"' ."tos
Despite
Despite these depressing statistics,
these depressing statistics. Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand entered entered 1943 1943 on on an an
upswing
upswing.. Squadrons
Squadrons were were receiving
receiving four-engine
four-engine bombers bombers in in quantity,
quantity, and and
introduction
introduction of of Oboe,
Oboe, aa directional
directional aid, aid, H2S,
H2S, aa radarradar target
target locator,
locator, and and target
target
marking
marking techniques
techniques in in the
the pathfinder
pathfinder force
force gavegave British
British bombers
bombers the the capability
capability to to
place
place bombs
bombs in in the
the area
area ofof thethe target
target under
under certain
certain conditions
conditions.. As As Harris
Harris laterlater noted,
noted,
the
the command
command was was "at"at long
long lastlast .. .. .. ready
ready andand equipped
equipped."'* ."' 0' But
But he he had
had little
little
intention
intention of of integrating
integrating its its operations
operations with with others
others except
except on on his
his own
own terms,terms, an an
attitude
attitude he he had had displayed
displayed since since thethe war's
war's beginning
beginning."" ."° Harris,
Harris, by by now now aa firm firm
advocate
advocate of of "area"
"area" bombing,
bombing, would would wage wage his his campaign
campaign in in 1943
1943 with with ruthless
ruthless
determination
determination..
Beginning
Beginning in in March
March 1943 1943 and and forfor the
the following
following three three months,
months, Harris' Harris' forces
forces
battered
battered thethe Ruhr.
Ruhr. As As the
the official
official historians
historians note,note, this
this attack
attack "marked
"marked the the beginning
beginning
of
of aa famous
famous BattleBattle in in the
the course
course of of which
which Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand was was to to show
show itself
itself
capable
capable of of achieving
achieving not not onlyonly an an occasional
occasional victory,
victory, as as had
had previously
previously been been the the
case,
case, but
but aa whole
whole series
series of of consistent
consistent and and pulverizing
pulverizing blows blows among
among which which the the
failures were
failures were much much rarerrarer than than thethe successes
successes."'" .""' Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, while while British
British
bombers inflicted
bombers inflicted serious
serious damage
damage on German cities, mission failures pointed up
on German cities, mission failures pointed up the
the
limitations
limitations on operations . Two separate attacks against the Skoda works (beyond
on operations. Two separate attacks against the Skoda works (beyond
the
the range
range of of navigational
navigational aids) aids) achieved
achieved nothing
nothing.. The The first
first mistook
mistook aa lunatic
lunatic asylum
asylum
for the works, while the second attack in May achieved an excellent bombing
for the works, while the second attack in May achieved an excellent bombing
concentration
concentration in in open
open fields
fields 22 miles
miles to to the
the north . 112
north.''^
While the May 1943 raids on the dams in the Ruhr
While the May 1943 raids on the dams in the Ruhr Valley
Valley paved
paved the the way
way for for
subsequent successful operational developments in 1944, Bomber Command
subsequent successful operational developments in 1944, Bomber Command

16
1666
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

overall
overall in in 1943
1943 could
could only only act act as as aa bludgeon
bludgeon.. It possessed the
It possessed the ability
ability to to hit
hit large
large
cities with devastating blows; but with the exception of Essen and a few other cities,
cities with devastating blows; but with the exception of Essen and a few other cities,
German industry lay
German industry lay on on thethe outskirts
outskirts of of major
major towns.
towns. In In fact,
fact, itit is is probably
probably an an
accurate estimate of the command's capabilities to say that it did more collateral
accurate estimate of the command's capabilities to say that it did more collateral
damage
damage to to industrial
industrial targets
targets in in the
the 1943
1943 "area"
"area" bombing
bombing than than would
would have have been
been the the
case had itit waged
case had waged aa campaign
campaign directly directly aimedaimed at at destroying
destroying German German industryindustry.. The The
dams
dams raidsraids point
point out out aa major major factorfactor in in thethe failure
failure of of bombing
bombing to to achieve
achieve
decisive
decisive results
results.. Luck
Luck eliminated
eliminated most most of the aircraft
of the aircraft ordered
ordered to to take
take outout thethe critical
critical
Sorpe
Sorpe Dam;Dam; as as aa result,
result, only only the the M6hne
Mohne and and less
less important
important Eder Eder DamsDams received
received
damage
damage.. To To their
their surprise,
surprise, the the Germans
Germans were were ableable to to repair
repair the the M6hne
Mohne Dam Dam by by thethe
fall
fall ofof 1943
1943 with with no interference against
no interference against the the vulnerable
vulnerable reconstruction
reconstruction work."' work.'"
Allied
Allied airair commanders
commanders still still tended
tended to to overestimate
overestimate raid raid damage
damage and and underestimate
underestimate
German recuperative
German recuperative powers powers..
Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand pounded pounded Germany Germany in in the
the spring
spring of of 19431943 at at aa terrible
terrible cost
cost to to
itself
itself.. Losses
Losses in in the
the "Battle
"Battle of of the
the Ruhr"
Ruhr" reached
reached the the point
point where where Harris'
Harris' forces
forces
flirted with
flirted with defeat.
defeat. In In 4343 major attacks, the
major attacks, the RAF
RAF lost lost 872 872 bombers
bombers with with 2,126
2,126
damaged
damaged.. Despite
Despite these losses, frontline
these losses, frontline strength
strength rose rose from
from 593 593 crews
crews and and aircraft
aircraft
in February
in February to to 787
787 in August—a reflection
in August-a reflection of of the
the massive
massive production
production and and crew
crew
training
training programs
programs."" .114 These
These heavy heavy losses prompted the
losses prompted the British
British to to introduce
introduce
"Window"
"Window" (the (the useuse of of chaff)
chaff) to to confuse
confuse GermanGerman radar radar.. The The British
British official
official
historians
historians have have criticized
criticized the the fact
fact that
that "Window"
"Window" was was introduced
introduced at at such
such aa latelate
date;
date; whatever
whatever the the merits
merits of of the
the case,
case, one one can
can still
still doubt
doubt whether
whether "Window's"
"Window's" use use
at an
at an earlier
earlier date
date would
would have have equaled
equaled the the stunning
stunning effecteffect thatthat its its introduction
introduction had had in in
late July
late July 1943.
1943.'" "5
"Window" enabled
"Window" enabled Bomber Bomber Command Command to to deal
deal the the Germans
Germans aa series series of of
devastating blows
devastating blows at at the
the endend of of July
July.. TheThe mostmost terrible
terrible of of these,
these, code-named
code-named
appropriately "Gomorrah,"
appropriately "Gomorrah," began began on on July
July 24 24 with
with an an attack
attack on on Hamburg
Hamburg..
"Window"
"Window" blinded blinded the the entire
entire defense
defense system,
system, and and intercept
intercept operatorsoperators of of `Y' 'Y'
Service listened to the rising frustration of German controllers and radar operators,
Service listened to the rising frustration of German controllers and radar operators,
attempting to
attempting to make
make sensesense of radar screens
of radar screens that that indicated
indicated thousands
thousands of of bombers
bombers."* .' 16
But the destruction of Hamburg came not from any one raid but from the cumulative
But the destruction of Hamburg came not from any one raid but from the cumulative
effect
effect ofof several
several raids
raids conducted
conducted under under perfect
perfect weather
weather conditions
conditions."^ ."' OnOn July
July 25,25,
three American bomb groups attacked the city with the aim of plastering the Blohm
three American bomb groups attacked the city with the aim of plastering the Blohm
and
and Voss
Voss U-boat
U-boat yard yard and and thethe Klockner
Klockner aircraft
aircraft engine
engine factory
factory.. On On thethe following
following
day,
day, another
another attack
attack by by four
four bomb
bomb groupsgroups addedadded to to the
the destruction
destruction within within the the city,
city,
but
but both American attacks had difficulty in finding their targets . In the first case,
both American attacks had difficulty in finding their targets. In the first case,
smoke
smoke fromfrom the the still-smoldering
still-smoldering fires fires obscured
obscured much much of of the
the city;
city; in in the
the second
second raid,raid,
the Germans laid a smoke screen as the bombers began their approach .
the Germans laid a smoke screen as the bombers began their approach.
On
On the
the evening
evening of of July
July 27, 27, the the second
second greatgreat RAF RAF attack
attack occurred
occurred.. This This time
time
destruction took place on a wholly different scale from anything in previous
destruction took place on a wholly different scale from anything in previous
experience
experience.. Much Much of of the
the fire-fighting
fire-fighting force force waswas on on the
the city's
city's western
western side side toto fight
fight
smoldering coke and coal fires; this factor, combined with the occurrence of warm,
smoldering coke and coal fires; this factor, combined with the occurrence of warm,
dry
dry weather
weather and and thethe disruption
disruption of of the
the water
water system
system by by the the previous
previous bombing,bombing,
created
created thethe right conditions for
right conditions for thethe start
start ofof aa massive
massive fire fire storm
storm.. WithinWithin 20 20 minutes
minutes

16 7
167
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

MAJOR
MAJOR TARGETS:
TARGETS:
The Strategic
The Strategic Bombing
Bombing
Offensive
Offensive

DRANIENSURG

*V BERLIN
CkSERLIH
T" ,OSNABRUCK BRUNSWICK
BRUHSWICK

MUNSTER " " HANOYEP


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MAGDEBURG
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STUTTGART

j .. SCHLEISSHEIM
SCHLEISSHEIM
"•MUNICH,
MUNICH

of
of the
the raid's
raid's start,
start, aa growing
growing area-probably
area—probably centeredcentered around
around aa timber
timber yard
yard in
in the
the
city's
city's center-exploded
center—exploded.. Further Further bombing
bombing spread
spread thethe fire
fire storm
storm to to the
the northeast
northeast as as
the
the phonomena
phonomena of of "creep
"creep back"
back" occurred
occurred (late
(late bombers
bombers dumping
dumping their their loads
loads short
short
of
of the
the first
first bombings)
bombings).. By By thethe next
next morning,
morning, firefire had
had burned
burned an an enormous
enormous 4- 4-
square-mile
square-mile holehole in in the
the city
city with
with considerable
considerable peripheral
peripheral damage
damage to to areas
areas adjacent
adjacent
to
to the
the great
great fire . Between
"N
fire."« Between 30 30 andand 40,000
40,000 people
people perished.
perished."' "9 Yet,
Yet, the
the ordeal
ordeal was
was
not
not over.
over. On
On the
the evening
evening of of July
July 29,29, aa third
third great
great raid
raid occurred
occurred.. Bomber
Bomber Command
Command
again
again heavily
heavily bombed
bombed the the city;
city; material
material damage
damage came came close
close toto that
that ofof the
the July
July 27
27
raid.
raid. Loss
Loss ofof life,
life, however,
however, was was considerably
considerably less;less; no
no fire
fire storm
storm occurred,
occurred, andand the
the
Gauleiter-the
Gauleiter—the Nazi Nazi Party's
Party's official
official on on the
the scene-had
scene—had begun begun aa substantial
substantial
evacuation
evacuation of of the
the population.
population.'^o 'z° One
One final
final raid
raid followed
followed early
early in in August,
August, butbut bad
bad
weather
weather spared
spared Hamburg
Hamburg further
further devastation
devastation..
Bomber
Bomber Command
Command achievedachieved this this terrible
terrible success
success at at little
little cost.
cost. The
The missing
missing rates
raxes
in
in the
the four
four raids
raids on on Hamburg
Hamburg were were 11.5.5 percent, 2.2 percent, 3 .5 percent, and 44
percent, 2.2 percent, 3.5 percent, and
percent . The rise in losses did reflect a surprisingly
percent. The rise in losses did reflect a surprisingly quick
quick recovery
recovery by by the
the defenses,
defenses,
but aircraft losses were fewer than those suffered during the Battle of the Ruhr.
but aircraft losses were fewer than those suffered during the Battle of the Ruhr. "'
'^'
The destruction was the greatest success that Bomber Command would achieve for
The destruction was the greatest success that Bomber Command would achieve for
the
the next
next year
year and
and aa half.
half. It
It represented
represented "area""area" bombing
bombing in in its
its most
most devastating
devastating andand
awesome aspects . Out of 122,000 apartments, the raids
awesome aspects. Out of 122,000 apartments, the raids destroyed
destroyed or
or damaged
damaged
40,000
40,000 and
and out
out of 450,000 houses,
of 450,000 250,000.. Seventy-five
houses, 250,000 Seventy-five percent
percent of of the
the electric
electric
works, 60
works, 60 percent
percent of the water
of the water system,
system, andand 90 90 percent
percent of of the
the gas system were
gas system were

16
16g8
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

knocked
knocked out
out of commission.. The
of commission The fall
fall off
off in
in industrial production was
industrial production was considerable:
considerable:
40
40 percent
percent for
for large firms and
large firms and 80
80 percent
percent for
for medium
medium andand small concerns.. "I
small concerns '^^
The
The impact
impact on on German
German leadership
leadership was considerable. Goebbels
was considerable. Goebbels could could not not believe
believe
the first reports
the first reports of
of the
the second
second raid's
raid's effects
effects.'".'" Speer
Speer informed
informed Hitler
Hitler that
that six
six more
more
attacks on this scale would "bring Germany's armaments production to a halt."
attacks on this scale would "bring Germany's armaments production to a halt."
Hitler,
Hitler, however,
however, repliedreplied thatthat Speer
Speer would
would straighten
straighten things
things out . 'z° In
out.'^" In retrospect,
retrospect,
Hitler was correct, not because Speer was wrong in an estimate that six
Hitler was correct, not because Speer was wrong in an estimate that six more
more
Hamburgs would halt armament production, but because Hamburg was a unique
Hamburgs would halt armament production, but because Hamburg was a unique
success,
success, depending
depending on on peculiar circumstances:: aa period
peculiar circumstances period of of warm,
warm, dry dry weather
weather;; the the
blinding of German defenses; and the location of the city on the Elbe estuary which
blinding of German defenses; and the location of the city on the Elbe estuary which
gave
gave an an excellent
excellent radarradar echo.
echo. TheThe success,
success, however,
however, was misleading for
was misleading for the
the
conditions
conditions rarely rarely reoccurred.
reoccurred. For Harris, Hamburg
For Harris, Hamburg represented
represented the the final
final
confirmation
confirmation that that his
his "area"
"area" bombing
bombing campaign
campaign was was on on the right track
the right track.. He He would
would
persevere
persevere on on this
this course
course and take his
and take his command
command and and crews
crews down down aa long, long, darkdark
corridor
corridor in in the
the Battle
Battle of of Berlin
Berlin..
Bomber Command's subsequent
Bomber Command's subsequent success
success in in smashing
smashing the the rocket
rocket experimental
experimental
station at Peenemunde indicated both the dangers ahead as well as the possibility
station at Peenemiinde indicated both the dangers ahead as well as the possibility of of
other avenues . For the first time in a major attack on Germany, the command used aa
other avenues. For the first time in a major attack on Germany, the command used
"master
"master bomber,"
bomber," who who remained
remained over over thethe target
target throughout
throughout the the raid
raid andand controlled
controlled
the
the bombing.
bombing. A A new
new andand improved
improved markermarker bombbomb also also contributed
contributed to to the
the success
success..
Whatever
Whatever the the delay
delay thethe raid
raid caused
caused thethe rocket
rocket programs,
programs, and and there
there isis some
some question
question
on
on this
this point,'"
point,'^' there
there isis no no question
question that that the
the new
new methods
methods contributed
contributed to to anan
accurate,
accurate, well-placed
well-placed bomb bomb pattern
pattern.. However,
However, the the German
German defenses
defenses were were already
already
on
on the
the road
road to to recovery
recovery;; the the raiding
raiding force
force of of 597
597 aircraft
aircraft lostlost 40 40 bombers
bombers (6.7 (6.7
percent)
percent) withwith aa further
further 32 32 damaged
damaged (for (for aa loss
loss and
and damage
damage rate rate of of 12.1
12.1 percent)
percent).'^* . 126
Thus,
Thus, at at the
the end
end ofof August,
August, BomberBomber Command
Command was was fresh
fresh from
from its its great
great triumphs
triumphs of of
high
high summer,
summer, but but additional
additional problems
problems and and questions
questions arosearose that
that required
required resolution
resolution
before
before Harris
Harris could
could be be proven
proven correct
correct in in his
his belief
belief that
that "strategic"
"strategic" bombing bombing would would
be
be the
the decisive
decisive factorfactor inin the
the war.
war.
While
While Bomber Command was
Bomber Command was posing
posing an an increasing
increasing threat to the
threat to the security
security ofof
Germany's
Germany's cities
cities at
at night,
night, American
American daylight
daylight "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing forces
forces were
were also
also
building
building up
up in
in England
England.. By By late
late spring
spring 1943,
1943, considerably
considerably later later than
than Allied
Allied planners
planners
had
had hoped,
hoped, American
American bombers
bombers were were ready
ready toto try
try out
out thethe theories
theories of of precision
precision
bombing attacks by
bombing attacks by self-defending
self-defending formations
formations in in the
the skies
skies over
over the
the Reich.
Reich. TheThe
considerable
considerable delay
delay inin the
the launching
launching of of this
this offensive
offensive resulted
resulted fromfrom the
the siphoning
siphoning offoff
of
of American
American airair resources
resources to to the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean in in November
November 1942 1942.. The
The forces
forces
remaining
remaining in in England
England represented
represented aa fraction
fraction of of what
what American
American airmen
airmen felt
felt they
they
needed
needed toto accomplish
accomplish their
their campaign
campaign.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, as as suggested
suggested earlier,
earlier, Eaker
Eakerhadhad
seen
seen nothing
nothing in in the
the first
first operations
operations that that suggested
suggested that that daylight,
daylight, precision,
precision,
unescorted
unescorted bombing
bombing was was notnot aa viable
viable proposition
proposition.. InIn fact,
fact, Eaker
Eaker firmly
firmly believed
believed that
that
Eighth
Eighth Air Force could
Air Force could eventually dispense with
eventually dispense fighter protection
with fighter protection andand operate
operate inin
the depths of the Reich in great unescorted
the depths of the Reich in great unescorted formations
formations. . In
In October
October 1942,
1942, he
he wrote
wrote
Spaatz
Spaatz that:
that:

16
1699
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

The
The second
second phase, phase, which
which we we are about to
ate about to enter,
enter, isis the
the
demonstration that
demonstration that day
day bombing
bombing can can be be economically
economically executed
executed
using general
using general fighter
fighter support
support ..... . in
in getting
getting through
through the the German
German
defensive
defensive fighter
fighter belt
belt and
and to help our
to help our cripples
cripples home
home through
through this
this
same
same belt
belt;; the
the third
third phase
phase will
will include
include deeper
deeper penetrations
penetrations intointo
enemy
enemy territory,
territory, using
using long-range
long-range fighter
fighter accompaniment
accompaniment of of the
the
P-39
P-38 type
type in in general
general support only and
support only and continuing
continuing the the use
use of
of short-
short-
range
range fighters
fighters at at critical
critical points on aa time
points on time schedule
schedule;; thethe fourth
fourth phase
phase
will
will be
be aa demonstration
demonstration that that bombardment
bombardment in force—a minimum
in force-a minimum of of
300
300 bombers
bombers—can can effectively
effectively attack
attack any German, target and
any Germantarget and return
return
without
without excessive
excessive or or uneconomical
uneconomical losseslosses.. This
This later
later phase
phase relies
relies
upon
upon mass
mass and and thethe great
great firepower
firepower of of the
the large
large bombardment
bombardment
formations
formations.'^' . 127
With
With limited
limited numbers
numbers of of aircraft
aircraft and
and beset
beset by
by maintenance
maintenance problems,
problems, Eighth
Eighth Air Air
Force
Force launched
launched relatively
relatively weak weak raids
raids onto
onto the
the continent
continent.. Between
Between November
November 1942 1942
and
and mid-March
mid-March 1943, 1943, onlyonly twotwo attacks
attacks numbered
numbered more more thanthan 100
100 bombers
bombers.'^^. 'ZS Only
Only
May 1943 did its
in May 1943 did force structure allow Eighth to launch
in its force structure allow Eighth to launch 200
200 bombers on a regular
bombers on a regular
basis
basis.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, in in the
the early
early spring
spring of of 1943,
1943, American
American bombers
bombers beganbegan moremore
dangerous forays into continental airspace . These first raids quickly indicated the
dangerous forays into continental airspace. These first raids quickly indicated the
price that German fighter forces could extract . On April 17, 115 aircraft attacked
price that German fighter forces could extract. On April 17, 115 aircraft attacked
the
the Focke
Focke WulfWulf factory
factory near near Bremen
Bremen;; the the Germans
Germans shot shot down
down 16 16 bombers
bombers (13 .9
(13.9
percent) and damaged 46 (40 percent) . 119 The sortie loss rate in May dropped
percent) and damaged 46 (40 percent).'^ The sortie loss rate in May dropped
because
because the the targets
targets werewere less
less dangerous
dangerous and and because
because the the number
number of of available
available aircraft
aircraft
climbed faster than losses inflicted by the Germans . Finally, in late spring of 1943,
climbed faster than losses inflicted by the Germans. Finally, in late spring of 1943,
Eaker received reinforcements that raised his dispatchable strength to 300-plus
Eaker received reinforcements that raised his dispatchable strength to 300-plus
bombers-a
bombers—a level level which
which he he and
and other
other Eighth
Eighth AirAir Force
Force commanders
commanders believed
believed would
would
allow daylight, unescorted missions into the heart of the Reich. As Eaker had
allow daylight, unescorted missions into the heart of the Reich. As Eaker had
written Spaatz in October 1942, his senior officers were "absolutely convinced that
written Spaatz in October 1942, his senior officers were "absolutely convinced that
300
300 bombers
bombers can can attack
attack anyany target in Germany
target in Germany with with less
less than
than 44 percent
percent losses.
losses.''"°
"'3o

As
As with
with the
the concept
concept of of deep
deep penetration,
penetration, unescorted
unescorted raids,raids, American
American target target
selection
selection showed
showed the the imprint
imprint of of prewar
prewar doctrine
doctrine as as well
well asas ongoing
ongoing war-time
war-time
experience
experience.. In In the
the former
former case,case, the
the size
size ofof deep
deep penetration
penetration formations
formations showed
showed aa
great increase
great increase overover prewar
prewar estimates
estimates as as to
to what
what waswas necessary
necessary to to insure
insure the
the survival
survival
of bombers
of bombers.. In In the
the latter
latter case,
case, the
the target
target priority
priority list
list laid
laid down
down by by the
the Combined
Combined
Bomber Offensive
Bomber Offensive (CBO) (CBO) Plan Plan was
was aa mixture
mixture ofof doctrine
doctrine and and reality
reality.. Because
Because the the
discussions
discussions leading
leading to to selection
selection of of bombing
bombing priorities
priorities have have received
received attention
attention
elsewhere,"'
elsewhere,'" an an examination
examination of of the
the final
final list
list will
will serve
serve ourour purposes
purposes.. The The priority
priority
list
list of
of targets
targets inin the
the final
final plan
plan was:
was:
(1)
(1) Intermediate
Intermediate Objectives:
Objectives;
German
German fighter
fighter strength
strength..
(2)
(2) Primary Objectives::
Primary Objectives
German submarine yards
German submarine yards and
and bases
bases..
The
The remainder
remainder of the German
of the German aircraft
aircraft industry
industry..
Ball
Ball bearings
bearings..
Oil (contingent
Oil upon attacks
(contingent upon attacks against Ploesti from
against Ploesti from
Mediterranean)
Mediterranean)..
(3) Secondary
(3) Secondary Objectives
Objectives::
Synthetic rubber and
Synthetic rubber and tires
tiies..
Military
Military motor transport vehicles.
motor transport vehicles. 132
"^

170
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON THE PERIPHERY
ON THE PERIPHERY

The
The placement
placement of of German fighter strength
German fighter strength at at the
the top
top ofof the
the listlist was
was aa recognition
recognition that that
the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe'^ fightersfighters represented
represented aa critical
critical threat
threat to to thethe daylight
daylight bomberbomber.. The The
targeting
targeting of U-boat yards
of U-boat yards and bases reflected
and bases reflected thethe military
military reality
reality of of the
the Battle
Battle of of the
the
Atlantic
Atlantic in in which
which Allied
Allied sea sea and
and air
air forces
forces were
were onlyonly nownow beginning
beginning to to dominate
dominate the the
submarine . Further, the presence of petroleum,
submarine. Further, the presence of petroleum, synthetic
synthetic rubber,
rubber, and
and ball
ball bearing
bearing
industries drew
industries drew directly
directly from from prewar theories which
prewar theories which had had attempted
attempted to to identify
identify
"bottleneck" industries, the destruction of
"bottleneck" industries, the destruction of which
which would
would cause
cause the
the failure
failure of
of the
the
whole economic structure . The ball bearing industry itself was
whole economic structure. The ball bearing industry itself was the
the classic
classic weak
weak link
link
posited
posited by by American
American Air Air Corps
Corps Tactical
Tactical School
School thinkers.
thinkers. This This isis notnot toto say that the
say that the
selection of ball bearings was entirely an American idea; there were important
selection of ball bearings was entirely an American idea; there were important
figures within
figures within the the AirAir Ministry
Ministry who who argued
argued persuasively
persuasively in in 1943
1943 that that Bomber
Bomber
Command also should attack the ball bearing factories .
Command also should attack the ball bearing factories.'" '33

In
In June
June 1943,1943, Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force
Force launched
launched two two majormajor raidsraids into into German
German airspaceairspace
beyond fighter escort range . The first, on June 13, attacked two targets : the main
beyond fighter escort range. The first, on June 13, attacked two targets: the main
force, Bremen ; and a smaller force, Kiel . Of the 228 aircraft dispatched, Eighth
force, Bremen; and a smaller force, Kiel. Of the 228 aircraft dispatched. Eighth
lost 26
lost 26 (a
(a loss
loss rate
rate of
of 1111.4.4 percent)
percent).. Nine days later,
Nine days later, B-17's
B-17's and and B-24's
B-24's struck struck the the
I .G . Farben
I.G. Farben synthetic
synthetic rubber
rubber plantplant at Hiils.. While
at Huls While the the main
main and and secondary
secondary forces forces
lost
lost 20
20 bombers
bombers (6.7 (6.7 percent),
percent), the raid was
the raid was oneone of of the
the more
more successful
successful in in the
the war.
war. It It
shut
shut down
down the the plant
plant for
for aa full
full month
month and and reduced
reduced rubberrubber stocksstocks to to aa one-and-a-half
one-and-a-half
month supply
month supply.. As As with
with the the Mohne
Mohne Dam, Dam, Allied
Allied bombers
bombers did did not
not return
return and and the the
Germans repaired
Germans repaired the the damage
damage.. In In March
March 1944,1944, Huls Huls reached
reached peak peak production
production for for
the
the war . 'J4
war.''''
For
For most
most of of July,
July, weather
weather conditions
conditions prevented
prevented Eighth Eighth Air Air Force
Force from
from attacking
attacking
Germany . In
Germany. In the
the month's
month's last last week,
week, however,
however, excellent
excellent flying flying conditions
conditions occurred
occurred
and Eaker
and Eaker mounted
mounted his his most
most ambitious
ambitious operations.
operations. Eighth Eighth attacked attacked Hamburg
Hamburg on on
July
July 25 25 and
and againagain on on thethe 26th
26th (along
(along withwith Hanover)
Hanover).. On On July July 28 28 andand 30th,
30th, the the
American
American bombersbombers hit hit Kassel
Kassel and and assorted
assorted targets
targets and and on on thethe 29th
29th attacked
attacked Kiel Kiel andand
Warnemunde
Wamemiinde.. These These operations
operations did did notnot comecome lightlylightly.. Ferocious
Ferocious German German
opposition
opposition cost cost Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force
Force 87 87 bombers.
bombers.'" '35
Despite
Despite the the losses,
losses, these
these operations
operations
signalled
signalled the arrival of
the arrival of American
American fightersfighters as as aa factor
factor in in the
the air air battle
battle.. On On July
July 28, 28,
P-47's,
P-47's, equipped
equipped for for thethe first
first time with drop
time with drop tanks,
tanks, caught caught GermanGerman fighters fighters
attacking
attacking B-17 B-17 stragglers;
stragglers; on on the
the 30th,
30th, escort
escort fighters
fighters again again caughtcaught the the Germans
Germans
and
and inflicted
inflicted heavyheavy losses.
losses. While
While these
these first
first drop
drop tanks
tanks only
only extended
extended P-47 P-47 range
range by by
30-plus
30-plus miles,
miles, the the presence
presence of of American
American fighters
fighters deeper
deeper on on the the continent
continent portended
portended
serious
serious implications
implications for for German
German defenses.
defenses. '36 "*
Extensive
Extensive operations
operations at at the
the end
end ofof July
July exhausted
exhausted and and attrited
attrited Eighth's
Eighth's forcesforces so so
that
that available
available strength
strength fellfell below
below 300;300; notnot until
until August
August 12 12 did
did the the Americans
Americans return return
to
to skies over the
skies over the Reich
Reich.. The The attack
attack on on the
the Ruhr
Ruhr indicated
indicated no no weakening
weakening of of German
German
opposition
opposition;; 25 25 bombers
bombers out out ofof 330
330 dispatched
dispatched fell fell (a(a 77.5 .5 percent
percent loss loss rate)
rate).'". 117 On
On
August
August 17, 17, Eaker
Eaker launched
launched his his bombers
bombers against
against Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt and and Regensburg
Regensburg in in one
one
of
of the
the most
most famous famous and and costly
costly raids
raids ofof thethe war.
war. The The latter latter attacks
attacks aimed aimed at at
destroying
destroying the the Messerschmitt
Messerschmitt complex-ancomplex—an obvious obvious efforteffort to to strike
strike at at the
the source
source of of
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fighter
fighter strength
strength.. Within
Within Schweinfurt,
Schweinfurt, three three major
major concernsconcerns produced
produced 45 45
percent
percent of of thethe ball
ball bearings
bearings used used by German industry
by German industry (52 (52.5 .5 percent
percent in in terms
terms of of net
net

171
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

ESCORT
ESCORT FIGHTER
FIGHTER RANGE
RANGE

;un~m[A j,
HAMBU*,
HANOV .1
BERLIN
KASSE L
COLOGNE 0 LEIPZIG "
i "

FRANKFURT~ I SCHWEINFU

NUREMBERG
KARLSRU

6139

'UiZ}i 1944, ^:^ ^^

172
ATTRITION ON
ATTRITION ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

worth)
worth)."*."' The Schweinfurt-Regensburg attack
The Schweinfurt-Regensburg attack waswas the the most
most ambitious
ambitious and and deepest
deepest
penetration
penetration by by Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force
Force thusthus far far in the war.
in the war. Its Its results
results shattered
shattered the the theory
theory
that
that the
the German
German defensive
defensive system system lacked
laciced depth.
depth.
Both
Both formations
formations suffered
suffered heavy heavy losses
losses.. The The Regensburg
Regensburg force force lost
lost 2424 bombers
bombers
out of 146 dispatched (16 .4 percent) and only the fact that they flew on to North
out of 146 dispatched (16.4 percent) and only the fact that they flew on to North
Africa, thereby disconcerting German defenses,
Africa, thereby disconcerting German defenses, prevented
prevented heavier
heavier losses . 119 fact,
losses."' In
In fact,
the number of aircraft written off was higher than 24, for the Regensburg forces left
the number of aircraft written off was higher than 24, for the Regensburg forces left
approximately 20 B-17's in North Africa when they returned to Europe . The
approximately 20 B-I7's in North Africa when they returned to Europe.""' '4° The

second
second force,
force, attacking Schweinfurt, received
attacking Schweinfurt, received no no benefit
benefit fromfrom the the first
first attack
attack
because bad weather had delayed its departure . As a result, German fighters
because bad weather had delayed its departure. As a result, German fighters
savaged
savaged itit as thoroughly as
as thoroughly they had
as they had the the Regensburg
Regensburg force force.. OutOut of of 230
230 bombers,
bombers, the the
Schweinfurt groups lost 36 (15 .7 percent) . The loss of 60 bombers in one day
Schweinfurt groups lost 36 (15.7 percent). The loss of 60 bombers in one day
represented
represented the the loss
loss of of 10.3
10.3 percent
percent of of the aircraft in
the aircraft in Eighth's
Eighth's operational
operational units units and
and
percent of its crew strength."*' '4'
17.5 percent of its crew strength. By themselves these percentages explain why
17.5 By themselves these percentages explain why
Eighth
Eighth diddid not
not go go back
back to to Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt until until thethe following
following October October.. While While the the
attacking
attacking force inflicted substantial
force inflicted substantial damagedamage on on the ball bearing
the ball bearing works,
works, the the bombing
bombing
concentration
concentration and and thethe number
number of of aircraft
aircraft attacking
attacking were were insufficient
insufficient to to eliminate
eliminate
Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt as as aa production
production center center..
The
The conduct
conduct of of the
the Schweinfurt/Regensburg
Schweinfurt/Regensburg attack attack raises
raises interesting
interesting questions
questions..
The
The size
size of
of the
the attacking
attacking force force andand dual
dual targets
targets reflect
reflect an an overestimation
overestimation ofboth of both thethe
accuracy
accuracy and and effectiveness
effectiveness of of bombing.
bombing.'''^ 142
Thus,
Thus, there there was was aa tendency
tendency to to
underestimate
underestimate the the aircraft
aircraft needed
needed to to destroy
destroy aa target
target and and to to overestimate
overestimate the the damage
damage
inflicted
inflicted.. A A second
second point point hashas to to do
do with with the
the ineffectual
ineffectual cooperation
cooperation between between the the
British
British and
and American
American strategicstrategic bombing
bombing forces forces in in England
England.. Despite Despite the the friendship
friendship
between
between Eaker
Eaker and and Harris,
Harris, and and Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force's
Force's earlier
earlier cooperation
cooperation in in thethe assault
assault
on
on Hamburg
Hamburg on on July
July 25 25 and
and 26th,
26th, BomberBomber Command
Command headquartersheadquarters showed showed no no
interest
interest inin supporting
supporting the the precision
precision bombing bombing offensive
offensive by by hitting
hitting at at night
night whatwhat
Eaker's
Eaker's forces
forces hadhad hithit inin the
the dayday.. ItIt isis worth
worth noting
noting that that the
the Air
Air Staff's
Staff's Director
Director of of
Bombing
Bombing Operations,
Operations, Air Commander SS.O.
Air Commander .O . Bufton,
Bufton, was was strongly
strongly urging
urging in in the
the
summer
summer of of 1943
1943 that that Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand follow follow up up any
any American
American attack attack on on
Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt.. He He suggested
suggested that that RAFRAF crews crews be be told
told that
that history
history might
might "prove
' 'prove thatthat
tonight's
tonight's operation,
operation, in in conjunction
conjunction with with the the day
day attack
attack which
which is is taking
taking place
place at at this
this
moment,
moment, will will bebe oneone of of the
the major
major battlesbattles of of this
this war.war. If If both
both operations
operations are are
successful,
successful, German
German resistance
resistance may may be be broken
broken and and thethe warwar ended
ended sooner
sooner than than could
could
be
be possible
possible in in any
any other
other way . "143 But
way.""*^ But Harris
Harris hadhad set set hishis face
face against
against bombing
bombing any any
"panacea"
"panacea" target,target, and and Eight
Eight Air Air Force
Force went went down
down the the dark
dark roadroad to to Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt
twice
twice inin 1943-alone.
1943—alone.
The
The heavy
heavy losseslosses that that American
American bombers bombers sufferedsuffered in in the
the summer
summer directly directly
reflected
reflected thethe insufficient
insufficient range range of of escorting
escorting fighters
fighters.. This This was was aa result
result of of Anglo-
Anglo-
American
American attitudes
attitudes that that regarded
regarded the the use use ofof long-range
long-range fighter fighter aircraft
aircraft not not only
only asas
technologically
technologically impossible
impossible but but in in some
some cases cases as as notnot really
really necessary
necessary.. As As late
late asas
mid-June,
mid-June, even after the
even after the heavy
heavy losses
losses on on the
the Kiel
Kiel raid,
raid, Eakerplaced
Eaker placed range range extension
extension
tanks
tanks forfor fighters
fighters fourthfourth on on hishis listlist of of priorities
priorities.. In In fairness
fairness to to Eaker,
Eaker, his his
conversations
conversations with with Robert
Robert Lovett,
Lovett, Assistant
Assistant Secretary
Secretary of of War
War for for Air,
Air, led
led the the latter
latter

17
1733
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

to give
to give the
the long-range
long-range fighterfighter escort program strong
escort program strong support
support when when he he returned
returned to to
Washington
Washington.'"^ ."' Such
Such lassitude
lassitude and and lacklack ofof direction
direction markedmarked the the drop
drop tank
tank
engineering
engineering program
program in the United
in the United States
States that
that VIII
VIII Fighter
Fighter Command
Command and and VV Fighter
Fighter
Command, operating in New Guinea, had developed rough and workable tanks
Command, operating in New Guinea, had developed rough and workable tanks
before the engineers at Wright-Patterson . 141 The results for the bombers of Eighth
before the engineers at Wright-Patterson.'"' The results for the bombers of Eighth
Air
Air Force
Force show
show clearly
clearly in in Tables
Tables XXXIII'
XXXIII'"* 4b and
and XXXIV
XXXIV.'"^ . 141 As
As we
we shall
shall see
see in
in the
the
next section, the loss rate for Luftwaffe units in the west was equally appalling . The
next section, the loss rate for Luftwajfe units in the west was equally appalling. The
question
question was was who who could
could best best stand
stand upup to
to the
the attrition
attrition.. InIn the
the high
high summer
summer of of 1943,
1943,
the
the answer
answer was was still
still in
in doubt
doubt..
While
While Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force
Force mounted
mounted increasingly
increasingly powerful
powerful raids, raids, American
American air air
forces
forces in the Mediterranean
in the Mediterranean entered entered the the struggle
struggle over
over Europe
Europe.. On On August
August 1, 1, Ninth
Ninth
Air
Air Force
Force launched
launched five five B-24B-24 groups,
groups, 177 177 bombers,
bombers, against
against Rumanian
Rumanian oil oil fields
fields
and
and refineries
refineries near near Ploesti
Ploesti.. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, due due to to errors,
errors, the the attack
attack suffered
suffered from
from
bad
bad timing
timing and and alerted
alerted the the defenses
defenses.. While
While damage
damage was was considerable,
considerable, bomber
bomber
losses
losses were
were so heavy, 41
so heavy, 41 due
due toto enemy
enemy action
action (23 .2 percent)
(23.2 percent) and and 54 overall (30
54 overall (30.5.5
percent),
percent), that
that American
American air air commanders
commanders could could not not intensify
intensify the the damage
damage with with
further
further raids . 141 Thus,
raids.'"* Thus, the the Germans
Germans repaired
repaired critical
critical areas
areas and and utilized
utilized capacity
capacity notnot
in
in use
use.. On
On August
August 13, 13, these
these five
five groups,
groups, diminished
diminished in in strength,
strength, struck
struck the
the Wiener
Wiener
Neustadt
Neustadt aircraft
aircraft assembly
assembly plant plant inin Austria
Austria.. Catching
Catching the the defenses
defenses by by surprise,
surprise, they
they
inflicted
inflicted serious
serious damage
damage with with the
the loss
loss of
of only
only two
two aircraft.149
aircraft.'"' The The Germans
Germans were
were on on
notice
notice that
that American
American aircraft
aircraft based
based in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean could could strike
strike deep
deep onto
onto the
the
continent .'S° The
continent.''" The situation
situation wouldwould become
become increasingly
increasingly serious serious forfor the
the Reich
Reich as as
Allied
Allied armies
armies invaded
invaded the the Italian
Italian mainland
mainland and and captured
captured airfields
airfields in in southern
southern Italy
Italy..

THE
THE DEFENSE
DEFENSE OF
OF THE
THE REICH
REICH

The
The period
period with
with which
which thisthis chapter
chapter deals
deals waswas aa time
time when
when quitequite literally
literally the
the roof
roof
over
over the
the Reich
Reich caved
caved in. in. How
How Germany's
Germany's defenses defenses andand its its leaders
leaders responded
responded
determined
determined the the fate
fate of
of the
the Reich's
Reich's cities
cities and
and the the length
length ofof the
the war.
war. While
While military
military
events
events and
and production
production decisions
decisions takentaken inin the
the 1940-41
1940-41 time
time frame
frame had had sealed
sealed Nazi
Nazi
Germany's
Germany's fate,fate, strategic
strategic decisions
decisions taken
taken in in 1943
1943 determined
determined how how events
events would
would
unfold
unfold.. With
With the
the exception
exception of of the
the Battle
Battle of of Britain,
Britain, thethe western
western air air war
war had
had
remained
remained aa peripheral
peripheral theater,
theater, arousing
arousing the the interest
interest ofof Hitler
Hitler andand the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe staff
staff
only
only after
after aa particularly
particularly egregious
egregious British
British success
success such
such asas the
the MayMay 1942
1942 Cologne
Cologne
raid
raid.. However,
However, the the threat
threat in in the
the west
west remained
remained no no more
more than that for
than that for the
the remainder
remainder
of
of 1942.
1942. There
There were
were some
some who who recognized
recognized the the danger.
danger. However,
However, in in the
the fall
fall of
of 1942,
1942,
the Germans had
the Germans had accepted
accepted battle
battle onon the
the periphery,
periphery, and and as as aa result
result the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
suffered
suffered enormous
enormous losses
losses on on the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean and and Russian
Russian frontsfronts.. But
But inin the
the
summer
summer of of 1943,
1943, and
and for
for the
the first
first time
time since
since 1940,
1940, aircraft
aircraft losses
losses inin the
the west
west reached
reached
aa sizeable
sizeable proportion
proportion of of total
total losses
losses..
Before examining
Before examining the the conduct
conduct of of the
the Reich's
Reich's air defense, the
air defense, the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's
organizational
organizational structure
structure in in the west deserves
the west deserves attention
attention.. That
That structure
structure diddid not
not reflect
reflect
the
the strategic
strategic needs
needs ofof 1943 but the
1943 but the bureaucratic
bureaucratic growth
growth of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe after
after the
the
French
French collapse
collapse and
and the
the invasion
invasion of
of Russia
Russia. . In
In 1941,
1941, Luftflotte
Luftflotte 3
3 remained
remained behind
behind in
in

174
174
TABLE XXXIII

AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT WRITTEN
WRITTEN OFF:
OFF: EIGHTH
EIGHTH AIR
AIR FORCE
FORCE
1943
1943 (HEAVY
(HEAVY BOMBERS)
BOMBERS)
PERCENTAGE LOSS --
PERCENTAGE LOSS — '1057
12 .6%
BOMBERS
BOMBERS ON
ON HAND,
HAND. TACTICAL
TACTICAL UNITS
UNITS
TOTAL
TOTAL WRITTEN
WRITTEN OFF
OFF
30%
21.3%
20.3%
20 .3% i I '
21.5%
21 .5% 1 ?il 582) I
20%
12.1% / 459«''
16.4% ■ X F
^.. "90 I 12.6%/340
13.5%^ S.p^ / V n
•^ ^ ^ i^ 231 ^ '-
10% k-155 146 128 o
2
73 93
29
21

JAN FEB
24 23

MAR APR MAY


L JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV OEC
I
X
m
TABLE XXXIV

CREW LOSSES
LOSSES EIGHTH AIR FORCE
FORCE 1943
■<

CREW EIGHTH AIR 1943 ■n


O
50
a
(HEAVY
(HEAVY BOMBERS)
BOMBERS] m
en
>
949

PERCENTAGE OF CREWS LOST-


NUMBER OF CREWS LOST\\\\\\\

700
37 .6% &36

1."

140 1 .! 1
too
K

85

WIN

JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUN
JUN JUL A U6 8EP OCT NOV DEC
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON THE PERIPHERY
ON THE PERIPHERY

the
the west
west to to handle
handle the the British
British and and to to defend
defend the the skies
skies over
over occupied
occupied France France;; itit also
also
held
held responsibility
responsibility for for Belgium
Belgium and and Holland Meanwhile, in
Holland.. Meanwhile, in 1941,
1941, the the Germans
Germans
established
established aa catch-allcatch-all organization
organization in in northern
northern Germany,
Germany, whose whose commander
commander
received
received the the lengthy
lengthy and and imposing
imposing title title "Luftwaffenbefehlshaber
"Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte ."'s' This
Mitte."^^^ This
command
command was was responsible
responsible for for defending
defending Berlin Berlin and and controlled
controlled the the night
night fighter
fighter
division
division and and flak flak divisions
divisions throughout
throughout northern northern GermanyGermany.. However, However, for for
bureaucratic reasons the general
bureaucratic reasons the general staff
staff turned
turned two
two air
air districts
districts (Luftgau)
(Luftgau) in
in south
south
Germany
Germany over over to to Field
Field Marshal
Marshal Hugo Hugo Sperrle,
Sperrle, Commander
Commander of of Luftflotte
Luftflotte 3, 3, in
in order
order
'S2 From the first,
not to disturb his vanity . From the
not to disturb his vanity."^ first, creation
creation oftwo
of two authorities
authorities responsible
responsible for
for
air defense in the west proved mistaken . As early as the fall of 1941, Molders
air defense in the west proved mistaken. As early as the fall of 1941, Molders
argued
argued forfor aa unified
unified fighter
fighter command
command to to defend
defend western
western Europe
Europe.'" . 's' In
In 1943,
1943, MilchMilch
urged Goring to unify under one commander all the Luftwaffe's air defense assets, aa
urged Goring to unify under one commander all the Luftwaffe's air defense assets,
system
system whichwhich he he suggested
suggested would would possesspossess similarity
similarity to to thethe British
British Fighter
Fighter
Command . Goring, however, refused . As a result, until the collapse in France in
Command."" 'S4 Goring, however, refused. As a result, until the collapse in France in
August
August 1944 1944 effectively
effectively eliminated
eliminated Luftflotte
Luftflotte 3, 3, the
the Reich's
Reich's air defense remained
air defense remained
split
split between
between two competing organizations
two competing organizations.. While While thisthis splitting
splitting of of responsibility
responsibility
presented
presented seriousserious problems
problems for for day
day fighter operations, itit really
fighter operations, really exacerbated
exacerbated the the
difficulties
difficulties of of coordinating
coordinating operations
operations of of scarce
scarce nightnight fighter
fighter forces
forces between
between two two
separate
separate commands,
commands, adding adding enormously
enormously to to the
the burden
burden of of an
an effective
effective night night defense
defense..
While
While the the German
German high high command
command had had ignored
ignored BomberBomber Command's
Command's depredations depredations
in
in 1942,
1942, itit could
could not not dodo soso in in 1943.
1943. The The attacks
attacks on on the
the Ruhr
Ruhr in in March
March and and April
April
pointed
pointed out out thatthat Germany
Germany faced faced an an extraordinary
extraordinary threat threat to to her
her cities.
cities. Hitler
Hitler was was
furious at the Luftwaffe's failure to protect the Ruhr, and Goring's prestige was
furious at the Luftwaffe's failure to protect the Ruhr, and Goring's prestige was
nearly
nearly exhausted
exhausted as as the Fahrer made
the Fiihrer made clear clear to to Goebbels.I"
Goebbels.'" The The response
response of of many
many
German
German leaders
leaders to to the
the March
March attacks
attacks was was that
that Germany
Germany must must launch
launch reprisal
reprisal raids
raids at at
such
such aa level
level that the British
that the British wouldwould call call offoff Bomber
Bomber Command.
Command. Even Even Milch,
Milch, who who
throughout
throughout 1943 1943 was was thethe most clear headed
most clear headed on on the
the need
need forfor anan effective
effective air air defense,
defense,
called
called inin March
March for for reprisal raids . As
reprisal raids. As he he told
told his
his staff,
staff, "Our
"Our entire
entire armaments
armaments effort effort
....
. . isis dependent
dependent on on whether
whether we we can can clear
clear our our ownown skiesskies by by carrying
carrying out out thethe
appropriate
appropriate attacksattacks on on the
the British
British home home base--either
base—either on on their
their airfields
airfields or or on
on their
their
industry
industry or or on on their
their civilians
civilians and and cities . "156 Hitler's
cities.""* Hitler's immediate
immediate response response to to the
the
British
British attacks
attacks was was to to demand
demand that that the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe drastically
drastically strengthen
strengthen the the flak
flak
forces
forces despite
despite objections
objections from from his his airair force
force adjutant."'
adjutant.'" That That debatedebate continued
continued
throughout
throughout the the year.
year.
Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's ability ability to to swamp
swamp the the night
night fighter
fighter defenses
defenses of of the
the tightly
tightly
controlled
controlled Kammhuber
Kammhuber line line led led several
several Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe officers
officers to to suggest
suggest radical
radical
changes
changes.. In In late
late spring,
spring. Major
Major Hajo Hajo Herrmann,
Herrmann, aa former former bomberbomber pilot, pilot, pushed
pushed aa
scheme
scheme to to concentrate
concentrate aa force force of of dayday fighters
fighters directly
directly overover aa targettarget and and to to use
use
searchlights
searchlights as as well
well as as light
light reflecting
reflecting from from the the bombing
bombing to to attack
attack the the bomber
bomber
stream
stream.. SuchSuch aa tactic,tactic, he he suggested,
suggested, would would allow allow nightnight defenses
defenses to to throw
throw aa
concentration
concentration of of force
force at at the
the bomber
bomber stream stream at at the
the point
point wherewhere itit was was mostmost
vulnerable
vulnerable to to visual
visual interception
interception."^ . 'se In
In aa late
late June
June report
report on on fighter
fighter defenses
defenses in in the
the
west,
west. Milch
Milch supported
supported Herrmann
Herrmann and and suggested
suggested that that the
the night
night fighter
fighter corpscorps receive
receive
responsibility
responsibility for for the
the night
night defense
defense over over France.'"'
France."' Others Others arguedargued for for aa more
more basicbasic

177
177
GERMAN
GERMAN AIR DEFENSE -- OCT
AIR DEFENSE OCT 1943
1943
LUFTFLOTTE
LUFTFLOTTE BOUNDARIES
BOUNDARIES ^ ~
\ ^C:!?^ 0
z
2 FIGHTER
2 DIVISION>'^\r
IGHTER DIVISION 0D
-..1
a

4 FIGHTER DIVISION

LUFTFLOTTE REICH

3 FIGHTER DIVISI6N'''-\
5 FIGHTER DIVISIO

1132
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

restructuring
restructuring of of the defenses.. Shortly
the defenses Shortly beforebefore Hamburg,
Hamburg, Goring's Goring's staff staff waswas
requesting
requesting betterbetter radar
radar sets
sets toto support pursuit force
support aa pursuit force thatthat would
would not not be be tied
tied directly
directly
to GCI
to GCI sites
sites but
but would
would search
search out out andand follow
follow the the bomber
bomber stream stream.'^ . ' 6°
The
The useuse of of "Window"
"Window" over over Hamburg
Hamburg forced forced the the Germans
Germans to to restructure
restructure the the
defense
defense systemsystem far far more quickly than
more quickly than they
they wouldwould have have otherwise
otherwise.. Herrmann Herrmann
already
already had begun to
had begun gather and
to gather and to to train
train his
his force
force before
before the the raids;
raids; the the collapse
collapse of of the
the
night
night defense
defense system
system caused
caused the the Luftwaffe
Luftwcffe to to commit
commit his his small
small unit unit on on the
the night
night of of
the
the fire
fire storm
storm.. A A number
number of of night
night fighters
fighters also also freelanced
freelanced over over the the burning
burning city.city.
Unfortunately
Unfortunately for for the
the Germans,
Germans, these these forces
forces werewere not not numerous
numerous enough enough to to inflict
inflict
substantial
substantial damage
damage on the bomber
on the bomber force, force, although
although raid raid losses
losses did did increase
increase from from 11.5 .5
percent
percent to 2.2 percent
to 2.2 percent.. However,
However, many many German
German night night fighters
fighters in in their
their boxes
boxes to to the
the
north
north andand toto the
the south
south of of the
the inferno
inferno were were notnot allowed
allowed to to freelance
freelance despite despite the the fact
fact
that
that they
they could
could see see bombers
bombers.'*' . 161
Substantial
Substantial reformsreforms were were soon soon in in motion Herrmann's force
motion.. Herrmann's force rapidly
rapidly increased
increased in in
size. As early as July 27, a staff paper urged creation of a large night fighter force in
size. As early as July 27, a staff paper urged creation of a large night fighter force in
Holland
Holland that that controllers
controllers would would vectorvector into into the
the bomber
bomber stream stream.. ItIt wouldwould then fly with
then fly with
the
the bombers,
bombers, shooting
shooting down down British
British aircraft
aircraft until
until itit ran
ran out
out of of ammunition
ammunition or fuel.. '61
or fuel '*^
This
This tactic,
tactic, soonsoon known
known by by the the code
code name name "Tame"Tame Sow," Sow," eventually
eventually became became the the
keystone
keystone of the Reich's
of the defense system
Reich'% defense system.. The The possibilities
possibilities of of the
the newnew systemsystem showed
showed
clearly
clearly in the Peenemfinde
in the Peenemiinde raid raid of of August
August 17 17.. Because
Because German German controllers
controllers fell fell for
for
an
an RAF
RAF spoof spoof and and reported
reported that Berlin was
that Berlin was the the mainmain target,
target, they they vectored
vectored the the
defending
defending forces forces to to the capital . Not
the capital. Not until
until the
the last
last minutes
minutes of of thethe raid raid diddid fighters
fighters
arrive
arrive over
over thethe target
target.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, they they shot
shot downdown 24 24 bombers
bombers over over Peenemfinde
Peenemiinde
and
and aa further
further 16 16 elsewhere
elsewhere along along the the raid's
raid's path.
path.'" 163

Along with
Along with the the British
British nightnight offensive,
offensive, the the Germans
Germans now now faced faced an an American
American
daylight
daylight offensive
offensive.. Because
Because of of aa desperate
desperate shortage
shortage of of day
day fighters,
fighters, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
threw
threw itsits night
night fighter
fighter force
force intointo the the battles against Eighth
battles against Eighth Air Air Force.
Force. The The useuse ofof the
the
night
night fighters
fighters to to meet
meet the the American
American threat threat typified
typified the the short-sighted,
short-sighted, short-range short-range
calculation
calculation of of much
much of of the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's effort effort in in the
the latter
latter period
period of of the
the war.
war. Night
Night
fighter
fighter aircraft
aircraft represented
represented aa sizeable sizeable investment
investment in in terms
terms of of equipment,
equipment,
technology,
technology, training,training, and and the the specialized
specialized skills skills needed
needed by by the the crews
crews.. The The
commitment
commitment of of the
the night
night force
force to to daylight
daylight operations
operations brought brought with with itit corresponding
corresponding
high
high losses.
losses. As As early
early as as April,
April, an an "Ultra"
"Ultra" intercept
intercept indicated
indicated aa willingness
willingness to to use
use
night
night fighters
fighters during
during daytime
daytime when when Goring
Goring forbade
forbade the the use
use of of night
night pilotspilots with
with more
more
than
than 20 victories on
20 victories on day
day operations
operations.'*^ .' 64 Anglo-American
Anglo-American attacks attacks on on August
August 17 17 and
and
18th
18th caused
caused the the loss
loss of
of 3030 night
night fighters
fighters withwith 35 35 more
more damaged
damaged.. Twenty-one Twenty-one were were
lost
lost in
in daylight
daylight operations
operations alone, alone, and and aa senior
senior staff
staff officer
officer remarked
remarked that that the
the BfBf 110
110
should
should not not bebe usedused in in daytime
daytime when when itit might
might come come into into contact
contact with with British
British or or
American
American fighters-a
fighters—a remark remark that that might
might havehave had had somesome uniqueness
uniqueness in in the
the summer
summer
of 1940 but
of 1940 but seems
seems somewhat
somewhat out out ofplace
of place in 1943 .' 61
in 1943.'*^
Hamburg
Hamburg brought brought to to the
the fore
fore the the question
question of of Germany's
Germany's response response.. On On July
July 30,
30,
Milch
Milch warned
warned his his staff
staff inin the
the AirAir Ministry
Ministry that that Germany
Germany could could only only look look forward
forward to to
an
an intensification
intensification of of the
the enemy's
enemy's air air offensive
offensive.. "What "What has has happened
happened in in Hamburg
Hamburg
had
had never
never before
before happened
happened [in [in air war] ." If
air war]." If Germany
Germany could could not not master
master the the threat,
threat.

179
179
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

she
she would
would face desperate situation
face aa desperate situation.. Milch Milch further
further announced
announced that that Hitler
Hitler hadhad putput
top
top priority
priority on on airair defense
defense and and on production of
on production of day
day and and night
night fighters
fighters as as well
well asas the
the
flak
flak.. Fighter
Fighter productions
productions was was to to rise
rise to to 2,000
2,000 aircraft
aircraft per per month
month by by the
the summer
summer of of
1944,
1944, andand the eastern front
the eastern front would
would have have to to make-do
make-do until until the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe mastered
mastered the the
air
air threat . '66 Milch
threat.'** Milch had had earlier
earlier in in the
the warwar not found his
not found his desire
desire for for increased
increased fighter
fighter
production
production to
to the
the liking
liking of
of everyone
everyone on
on the
the Air
Air Staff.
Staff. He
He now
now discovered
discovered a
a less-
less-
than-unanimous agreement with his emphasis on the defense
than-unanimous agreement with his emphasis on the defense of
of the
the Reich.
Reich. One
One
colonel suggested that a diversion of
colonel suggested that a diversion of Bf
Bf 110's
llO's from
from the
the front
front to
to night
night fighters
fighters was
was
"unthinkable ." Milch replied that the
"unthinkable." Milch replied that the front
front would
would have
have to
to make-do-the
make-do—^the threat
threat was
was
over
over Germany
Germany.'*^ . '61
Milch and other advocates
Milch and other advocates of of air defense faced
air defense faced more more substantial
substantial opposition
opposition to to
their policies from Hitler's natural inclinations . As
their policies from Hitler's natural inclinations. As suggested
suggested above,
above, the
the Fuhrer
Fuhrer
had become increasingly
had become increasingly upset upset in in the
the spring
spring of of 1943
1943 overover the the scale
scale andand success
success of of
RAF raids . He warned his military aides shortly after the first Hamburg
RAF raids. He warned his military aides shortly after the first Hamburg attack:
attack:
"Terror
"Terror can can onlyonly be be broken
broken with with terror
terror." ." Attacks
Attacks on German airfields
on German airfields made made no no
impression on him, he commented, but the
impression on him, he commented, but the smashing
smashing of
of the
the Reich's
Reich's cities
cities was
was
another matter.
another matter. It was the
It was the same
same thing thing withwith the the enemy
enemy.. "The "The German
German people people
11161 Hitler's attitudes had a disasterous impact on air strategy
demanded reprisals .
demanded reprisals."'** Hitler's attitudes had a disasterous impact on air strategy
after
after August
August 1943, 1943, but but his line of
his line argument was
of argument was already
already clear.clear. Moreover,
Moreover, efforts efforts to to
build up the night fighter force were further complicated by Goring's sheer
build up the night fighter force were further complicated by Goring's sheer
ignorance . It
ignorance. It is
is worth
worth noting
noting that that byby late
late August,
August, the the Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall was was doubting
doubting
whether night
whether night fighters
fighters were were worth
worth the the considerable
considerable expenditures
expenditures in in man-hours
man-hours and and
`69 Considering that his staff was wasting daylight operations,
operations, one
materials.
materials.'*' Considering that his staff was wasting them them in in daylight one
can only
can only wonder
wonder at at the
the muddle
muddle at at the
the toptop..
As
As forfor daylight
daylight operations,
operations, the the Allies-for
Allies—^for the the first
first time-placed
time—^placed significantsignificant
pressure on
pressure on thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. The The fighter
fighter sweeps
sweeps of of Fighter
Fighter Command,
Command, accompaniedaccompanied
by
by American
American fightersfighters in in large
large numbers,
numbers, had had combined
combined with with Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force's
Force's
bomber operations
bomber operations to to make
make Western
Western Europe Europe the the critical
critical theater
theater of of air
air operations
operations by by
the
the late
late summer
summer of of 1943
1943.. Neither
Neither Goring Goring nor nor many
many of of his
his more
more sober
sober commanders
commanders
had
had expected
expected this development.. In
this development January 1943,
In January 1943, the the Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall suggested suggested
increases
increases in in the
the day
day fighter
fighter forces
forces but but not
not because
because of of worries
worries over over Allied
Allied aircraft
aircraft
production,
production, rather rather the the emphasis
emphasis was was on on fighters
fighters for for thethe fighter
fighter bomber
bomber missionmission.'™ . "°
Even
Even Galland,
Galland, who who was was pushing
pushing for for aa major
major increase
increase in in the
the fighter
fighter force,
force, diddid notnot
appear
appear to to recognize
recognize the the threat
threat in in the
the west.
west. In In January,
January, he he predicted
predicted that that the
the main
main
weight
weight of of the
the airair war
war would
would lie lie inin the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean throughout throughout the the year."'
year.'" Thus,
Thus,
the
the heavy
heavy commitment
commitment of of fighter
fighter forces
forces to to the
the defense
defense of of Tunisia,
Tunisia, Sicily,Sicily, andand Italy
Italy
received
received support
support from from the the man
man who who laterlater inin the
the yearyear became
became one one of of the
the strongest
strongest
advocates
advocates of of beefing
beefing up up the
the Reich's
Reich's defenses
defenses.. Why Why Galland
Galland held held such
such aa position
position is is
clear
clear from
from aa remark
remark he he made
made in in February
February that that his
his fighters
fighters had had solved
solved the the problem
problem of of
fighting
fighting four-engine
four-engine bombers bombers (by (by day).
day).'''^ What the Luftwaffe had not yet faced was
'72 What the Luftwaffe had not yet faced was

the
the problem
problem of of dealing
dealing with with hundreds
hundreds of of bombers
bombers that that American
American industry industry wouldwould
throw
throw at at the
the Reich
Reich in in the
the summer
summer of of 1943
1943 as as well
well as as the
the thousands
thousands in in 1944.
1944.
In
In early
early 1943,
1943, the Luftrvaffe with
the Luftwaffe with major
major commitments
commitments in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean and and
on
on the
the eastern
eastern frontfront left
left the
the day
day defense
defense of of the
the west
west on on the
the same
same basisbasis on on which
which itit

180
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

had
had rested
rested in in previous
previous years years.. Some
Some 250 250 toto 300 fighters, scattered
300 fighters, scattered from from Holland
Holland to to
Brittany, scrambled in
Brittany, scrambled in small
small formations
formations to to meetmeet the the American
American thrusts thrusts."^."' TheThe
resulting
resulting lack lack of of fighter
fighter concentration
concentration made made itit difficultdifficult to to dent
dent the the "Fortress"
"Fortress"
formations
formations and and putput thethe Germans
Germans at at considerable
considerable disadvantage
disadvantage in in fending
fending off off Allied
Allied
fighters.
fighters. By By June,
June, the the western
western fighter
fighter defenses
defenses were were breaking
breaking down down as as Luftflotte
Luftflotte 33
reported
reported that that itsits fighters
fighters were were suffering
suffering heavyheavy losses losses in in intercepting
intercepting "Fortress" "Fortress"
formations
formations accompanied
accompanied by by numerous
numerous fighters
fighters.'^'' . "^ In mid-June, Milch
In mid-June, Milch reported
reported after after
aa trip
trip to
to the
the west
west thatthat morale
morale among among the the fighter
fighter pilotspilots was was excellent,
excellent, but but the
the number
number
of
of available
available aircraft
aircraft was was "much
"much too too weak."
weak." He He urgedurged that the Luftwaffe
that the Luftwaffe quadruple
quadruple
fighter
fighter forces
forces in in thethe westwest and and that
that as as aa minimum
minimum aa full full month's
month's production
production of of BfBf
109's and Fw 190's go to units in western
109's and Fw 190's go to units in western Europe
Europe.''' . "s
Fighter
Fighter losses
losses in in the
the west
west showed
showed an an alarming
alarming rise rise as as early
early as as March,
March, and and in in that
that
month
month the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe began began to to transfer
transfer experienced
experienced pilots pilots from from the the easteast to to
compensate
compensate for for its
its losses
losses in in the
the west
west.. The
The real
real pressure
pressure arrived arrived in in late
late spring
spring withwith
the
the first
first penetrations
penetrations into into German airspace.. 176
German airspace '^^ TheThe rise rise inin fighter
fighter losses
losses showed
showed aa
direct correlation with Eighth
direct correlation with Eighth Air
Air Force
Force operations
operations. . By
By June,
June, it
it was
was clear
clear that
that the
the
American bombers represented a very different threat to Germany than
American bombers represented a very different threat to Germany than did
did Bomber
Bomber
Command
Command.. The The attack
attack on on Huls
Hiils suggested
suggested that that the American bombers
the American bombers were were goinggoing
after specific segments of the German economy . By the end of the month,
after specific segments of the German economy. By the end of the month,
Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek recommended
recommended that that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe request
request an an updated
updated list list from
from Speer
Speer as as to
to
the critical points in the economy needing additional air defense protection. "'
the critical points in the economy needing additional air defense protection. '^^
Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force's
Force's operations
operations in in July
July and
and August August created created aa crisis. crisis. For For July,
July,
Luftflotte 3 noted that the size and defensive power of bomber formations
Luftflotte 3 noted that the size and defensive power of bomber formations
penetrating
penetrating into into its
its airspace
airspace had had reached
reached aa level
level where where the the only
only possibility
possibility of of attack
attack
required a timely, massed concentration of German fighter forces . Arguments
required a timely, massed concentration of German fighter forces.'^* 171 Arguments

over
over exactly
exactly how how many many aircraft
aircraft B-17 B-17 and and B-24B-24 gunners gunners shot shot down down in in defending
defending
themselves have obscured what really occurred in these air battles . First, itit isis clear
themselves have obscured what really occurred in these air battles. First, clear
bomber crews claimed many more aircraft than in fact they shot down, but the
bomber crews claimed many more aircraft than in fact they shot down, but the
cumulative
cumulative effect effect of German fighter
of German fighter losses
losses in in these
these battles
battles was was impressive.
impressive. In In July,
July,
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe lost lost 335 335 single-engine
single-engine fighters fighters in in thethe westwest."' . 179 Admittedly,
Admittedly, aa
percentage
percentage of of these
these losseslosses was was notnot directly
directly attributable
attributable to to combat,
combat, but but the
the pressure
pressure
of
of stepped-up
stepped-up air air operations
operations and and losses forced the
losses forced the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to rely
rely increasingly
increasingly on on
partially
partially trained
trained pilotspilots.. Thus,Thus, noncombat
noncombat losses losses reflected
reflected the the pressures
pressures of of combat
combat
attrition
attrition.. July's
July's losseslosses in in the
the west
west represented
represented 18.1 18.1 percent
percent of of allall single-engine
single-engine
fighter
fighter strength
strength on on July
July 1, 1, reflecting
reflecting not not only
only the the impact
impact of of the
the heavy
heavy daytime
daytime raidsraids
but
but also
also the
the factfact that
that dropdrop tanks
tanks on on the
the P-47's
P--47's had had extended
extended escort escort rangerange.. WithWith new new
range
range capability,
capability, AmericanAmerican fighters fighters couldcould catch
catch German German pilots pilots deeper
deeper withinwithin the the
Reich's
Reich's airspace.
airspace. This This escalation
escalation in in the
the level
level of of fighting
fighting over over German
German airspace airspace had had
an
an effect
effect onon allall theaters
theaters.. By By thethe end
end of of July,
July, thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had putput limitations
limitations on on thethe
employment
employment of of fighter
fighter aircraft
aircraft on on tasks
tasks other
other than than defense
defense of of thethe Reich,
Reich, while while itit
pulled
pulled Bf Bf 110110 squadrons
squadrons out out ofof Brittany
Brittany and and the the Battle
Battle of of the
the Atlantic
Atlantic to to return
return to to
Germany
Germany.'*" .'8o
July's
July's efforts
efforts placed
placed aa great great strain
strain on on Eighth's
Eighth's capabilities,
capabilities, and and in in August
August the the
aircraft
aircraft dispatched
dispatched to to targets
targets in in Germany
Germany showed showed aa significant significant drop."' drop.'*' Losses,
Losses,

181
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

depressingly for
depressingly for the the crews
crews involved,
involved, showedshowed no no such such decline
decline.. The The
Schweinfurt/Regensburg
Schweinfurt/Regensburg disaster disaster added
added measurably
measurably to to the
the month's
month's losses,
losses, and and for
for
the
the third
third straight
straight month
month crew crew losses
losses were
were in in excess
excess of of 30 30 percent
percent (see(see Table
Table
XXXIV)
XXXIV).. The The German
German situation
situation waswas notnot much better.. August
much better August 17 cost the
17 cost the Germans
Germans
no
no less than 24
less than 24 single-engine
single-engine fighters
fighters shot
shot down,
down, 12 12 BfBf 110's
UO's destroyed,
destroyed, plus plus anan
additional
additional 10 10 single-engine
single-engine fighters
fighters and and 22 Bf
Bf 110's
1 lO's written
written offoff because
because of of battle
battle
damage.
damage. Thus,
Thus, the
the Germans
Germans lost no less
lost no less than 48 fighters
than 48 fighters destroyed
destroyed with with aa further
further 25 25
damaged.
damaged. The The German
German success over Schweinfurt
success over Schweinfurt had had not
not come
come cheaply
cheaply nor nor did
did
fighter
fighter operations
operations overover the
the course
course ofof the month.. By
the month By the
the end
end ofof August,
August, thethe Germans
Germans
had
had lost
lost 248
248 single-engine
single-engine fighters
fighters (16(16.2.2 percent
percent ofof their then available
their then available total
total single-
single-
engine
engine fighter
fighter force)
force) along
along with
with 86 twin-engine fighters
86 twin-engine fighters (11(11.6.6 percent
percent of the twin-
of the twin-
engine
engine and
and night
night fighter
fighter force)
force) in in air
air battles
battles in
in the
the west.
west.'*^ "I InIn fact, the whole
fact, the whole
emphasis in
emphasis in the
the European
European air air warwar hadhad shifted radically away
shifted radically away from from aa
contest
contest on on thethe periphery
periphery to to aa massive
massive battle
battle of of attrition
attrition over over thethe Reich
Reich..
Concurrently,
Concurrently, Allied
Allied fighter
fighter forces
forces were
were feeling
feeling their
their way
way deeper
deeper intointo the
the Reich
Reich andand
consequently restricting the area over
consequently restricting the area over which
which German
German fighters
fighters could
could intercept
intercept the
the
bombers . Thus, at the end of August,
bombers. Thus, at the end of August, the
the daylight
daylight air
air war
war in
in the
the west
west was
was peaking
peaking
with
with each side inflicting
each side inflicting serious
serious damage
damage on on the
the other
other.. ItIt still
still remained
remained an an open
open
question as to which air force could last
question as to which air force could last the
the course
course. .

LOSSES,
LOSSES, PRODUCTION,
PRODUCTION, AND
AND STRATEGY
STRATEGY

On
On August
August 18, 18, 1943,
1943, the Luftwaffe's Chief
the Luftwaffe's Chief ofof Staff,
Staff, Jeschonnek,
Jeschonnek, placed
placed aa gungun toto
his temple and blew his brains out. His suicide was the direct result of the two
his temple and blew his brains out. His suicide was the direct result of the two
massive
massive blowsblows Allied
Allied bombers
bombers had had launched
launched the the previous
previous day day and and evening
evening
(Schweinfurt/Regensburg and Peenemiinde) . While neither raid represented aa
(Schweinfurt/Regensburg and Peenemunde). While neither raid represented
decisive
decisive blow,
blow, together
together they they clearly
clearly indicated
indicated thethe bankruptcy
bankruptcy of of Germany's
Germany's air air
strategy . If there were others who deserved a significant share of the blame, and
strategy. If there were others who deserved a significant share of the blame, and
Hitler
Hitier asas well
well as
as Goring
Goring spring
spring readily
readily to to mind,
mind, then
then Jeschonnek's
Jeschonnek's role role typified
typified thethe
part that so many of the officer corps had played in Germany's fate. Like too many
part that so many of the officer corps had played in Germany's fate. Like too many
of
of his
his brother
brother officers,
officers, Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek had had ignored
ignored the the industrial,
industrial, logistical,
logistical, andand
technical basis on which modern war between industrialized states since the
technical basis on which modem war between industrialized states since the
American Civil War has been fought . That curious blindness which led him in early
American Civil War has been fought. That curious blindness which led him in early
1942
1942 toto wonder
wonder whatwhat thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe would
would do do with
with 360360 fighters
fighters had
had now
now ledled his
his air
air
force
force andand nation
nation into
into aa hopeless
hopeless situation
situation.. TheThe battles
battles on on the
the periphery
periphery had had quite
quite
literally stripped the
literally stripped the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe of of whatever
whatever chance
chance itit had
had toto build
build up
up aa reserve,
reserve, andand
Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek had had accepted
accepted those
those commitments
commitments with with scarcely
scarcely aa murmur
murmur..
In addition,
In addition, itit is
is worth
worth taking
taking aa closer
closer look
look atat the
the general
general picture
picture of of German
German
losses
losses;; they
they reveal
reveal that
that in
in this
this period
period thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had suffered
suffered aa terrible
terrible rate
rate of
of
attrition
attrition throughout
throughout the the force
force structure
structure.. From
From January
January through
through June
June 1943,
1943, the the
average
average monthly
monthly attrition
attrition rate
rate for
for all
all aircraft
aircraft was
was 13
13.6.6 percent
percent.. For
For combat
combat aircraft,
aircraft,
the
the statistics
statistics were
were even
even more
more depressing:
depressing: the the bomber
bomber attrition
attrition rate
rate was
was 16 16 percent
percent
per
per month
month and and for
for fighters
fighters itit was
was 19.919.9 percent
percent.'"."' Crew
Crew losses
losses werewere no no less
less
significant
significant andand more
more dangerous
dangerous.. While
While one one can
can replace
replace aircraft,
aircraft, crew
crew replacements
replacements

18
1822
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

and skill level


and skill level became
became increasingly
increasingly difficultdifficult to to maintain
maintain.. This This waswas the the fourth
fourth
straight year in
straight year in which
which heavy heavy attrition
attrition had had taken
taken place place.. ItIt is,is, therefore,
therefore, remarkable
remarkable
that
that the Germans maintained
the Germans maintained the the level
level of of tenacity
tenacity and and competence
competence that that theythey showed
showed
throughout
throughout the year. While
the year. While pilot pilot losses
losses for for most most aircraft
aircraft types
types are are difficult
difficult to to
determine
determine because
because crew crew lossloss reports
reports included
included all all flying
flying personnel,
personnel, the the situation
situation with with
regards
regards to to single-engine
single-engine aircraft aircraft indicates
indicates what what was was happening
happening to to the the force
force
structure
structure.. For For the
the firstfirst three months of
three months of 1943,
1943, fighterfighter pilot pilot losses
losses ran ran at at aa fairly
fairly
constant rate
constant rate ofof between
between 66 percent percent and and 99 percent
percent per per month.
month. However,
However, as as aa result
result ofof
heavy
heavy fighting
fighting in in Tunisia,
Tunisia, pilot pilot losses
losses climbed
climbed to to over
over 12 12 percent
percent in in May May and and byby
July
July were
were 16 16 percent
percent.. Thus, Thus, in in the
the first
first half
half of of thethe year,
year, fighter
fighter pilot
pilot losses
losses equalledequalled
67 percent
67 percent of of the
the crewscrews present
present at at the the beginning
beginning of of the
the year.'84
year.'** For For overall
overall loss loss
trends, see
trends, see Tables
Tables XXXV,'
XXXV,'«' 85 XXXVI,'eb
XXXVI,'*^ XXXVII, XXXVII,'^^ 117 and
and XXXVIII
XXXVIIL'^s ."I
This
This attrition
attrition was was onlyonly aa foretaste
foretaste of of what
what happened
happened in in July
July andand August
August.. In In those
those
two
two months,
months, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fought three great
fought three great air air battles
battles and and onon each
each one
one of of the
the three
three
fronts
fronts thethe Germans
Germans lost lost more
more thanthan 1,0001,000 aircraft
aircraft.'*' . 119 In combat units,
In combat units, the the attrition
attrition
rate
rate reached
reached aa level level that that no no military
military force force could
could long sustain.. Fighter
long sustain Fighter losses losses were were
31 .2 percent
31.2 percent for for JulyJuly and and 36 36 percent
percent for for August,
August, while while bomber
bomber losseslosses were were 27 .3
27.3
percent
percent in in July
July and and 32 32 percent
percent in in August
August."** . '9° As As withwith the the January
January throughthrough June June
period,
period, onlyonly fighter
fighter pilot pilot losses
losses are are readily
readily attainable
attainable.. They They are are clear
clear enough
enough:: In In
July,
July, the
the Germans
Germans lost lost 16 16 percent
percent of of single-engine
single-engine fighter fighter pilots
pilots available
available on on July
July 11;;
in
in August,
August, they they lost lost 15 15.6.6 percent
percent.'" . 191 The
The impact
impact of of the
the pressure
pressure exerted
exerted by by three
three
different
different fronts
fronts forced
forced the the Germans
Germans to to shut
shut thethe air air war
war downdown somewhere.
somewhere. Given Given the the
threat
threat posed
posed by by the
the American
American bombers,
bombers, there there was was no no other
other alternative
alternative but but to to defend
defend
the
the Reich
Reich.. Thus,
Thus, the the air
air warwar inin the
the easteast andand in in the
the Mediterranean,
Mediterranean, with with one one final
final
gasp
gasp inin September
September to to meet
meet the the invasion
invasion of of Italy,
Italy, became
became subsidiary
subsidiary theaters
theaters for'the for'the
Lufwaffe.
Luftwaffe. AlliedAllied air air forces
forces dominated
dominated the the skies
skies over over and and behind
behind these
these two two fronts,
fronts,
and
and the
the German
German soldiersoldier wouldwould see see little
little of his air
of his air force
force for for the
the remainder
remainder of of the
the war.
war.
The disastrous rate of attrition was a reflection both of combat losses and
The disastrous rate of attrition was a reflection both of combat losses and
numerous aircraft
numerous losses through
aircraft losses through noncombat
noncombat causes causes.. In fact, the
In fact, the Lufwaffe
Luftwaffe seems seems to to
have almost been in a race with its opponents to see who could destroy the most
have almost been in a race with its opponents to see who could destroy the most
German
German aircraft
aircraft.. AfterAfter aa fairly respectable showing
fairly respectable showing in in 1940,
1940, fromfrom 1941 1941 throughthrough
1944
1944 the
the Lufwaffe
Luftwaffe lost lost between
between 40 40 percent
percent and and 45 45 percent
percent of of its
its total
total losses
losses through
through
noncombat
noncombat causes causes.. '92 "^ The
The surprising
surprising element element in in such
such an an accident
accident raterate is is the
the fact
fact that
that
until
until the
the spring
spring of of 1944,
1944, few few in in the
the general
general staff staff seemseem to to have
have been
been particularly
particularly
worried
worried about
about the the implication
implication of of such
such aa level level of of noncombat
noncombat losses losses.. At At thatthat point,
point,
however,
however, aa numbernumber of of authorities
authorities awoke awoke and and beganbegan to to examine
examine the the problem
problem in in
detail . '99 The
detail."^ The German
German safety safety record,
record, however,
however, deserves deserves no no smugness
smugness from from an an
American
American audience
audience.. The The Army Army Air Air Forces
Forces managed
managed in in 1943
1943 to to have
have no no less
less than
than
20,389
20,389 major
major accidents
accidents in in the
the continental
continental United United States States with with 2,264
2,264 pilots
pilots and and 3,339
3,339
other aircrew members
other aircrew members killed killed.. The The recordrecord for for 19441944 was was notnot much
much better better withwith
16,128
16,128 major
major accidents
accidents (1,936 (1,936 pilots
pilots and and 3,037
3,037 other other aircrew
aircrew killed)
killed)."". The ability
'94 The ability

of
of crews
crews transitioning
transitioning into into B-26's
B-26's to to destroy
destroy their their aircraft
aircraft andand themselves
themselves resulted resulted
in a couplet still current among flying crews at MacDill AFB, Florida "One aa day
in a couplet still current among flying crews at MacDill AFB, Florida: : "One day
in Tampa Bay."
in Tampa Bay."'" ° 191

183
183
TABLE
TABLE XXXV
XXXV

GERMAN
GERMAN AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT LOSSES
LOSSES 1943
1943 (ALL
(ALL TYPES)
TYPES)
3
STALINGRAO
STALINGRAD TUNISIA
TUNISIA KURSK 1ST
^ST 2ND
2ND D
KURSK
SICILY
SICILY SCHWEINFURT
SCHWEINFURT SCHWEINFURT
SCHWEINFURT
30%
30% HAMBURG
HAMBURG INVASION OF
INVASION OF
ITALY
ITALY

24%
24%
;.9% "
2001.
' `22,6%
.
18 .1 %
20%
13.:% ` 14.5%

10.9%/ -"
14%
I0% . "wo. .mm " 12.8%
10.8%

1 1 ` 1 1 1 1 1 1
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN
JUN JUL
JUL AUG
AU6 SEP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV
NOV DEC
DEC
1374
TABLE
TABLE XXXVI
XXXVI

GERMAN BOMBER
BOMBER LOSSES
LOSSES 1943
1943
STALINGRAD
STALINGRAD TUNISIA
TUNISIA KURSK
KURSK
SICILY
SICILY
40%
40% .

32%
32%
300/6
30%
°
24%
27 .3%/
27.3%^ ^^ ~*^ 24%

21 .%
21.%
20%
20% 20.1%
18.9% \
\ 14 .8%
14.8% L
- A 20%
20% o
z
B
144%
.
14.4% m
131
.
13.1% 13 . %
'S
I I I
JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
fMAR APR
Jl L
APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP
P OCT
OCT NOV
NOV DEC
DEC
TABLE
TABLE XXXVII
XXXVII
o
GERMAN
GERMAN FIGHTER
FIGHTER LOSSES
LOSSES 1943
1943
i
D

STALINGRAD
STALINGRAD TUNISIA
TUNISIA KURSK
KURSK 1ST
1ST 2ND
2ND
SICILY
SICILY SCHWEINFURT
SCHWEINFURT SCHWEINFURT
SCHWEINFURT
40% ^#: 4iJi%

36% ^

31.2% jT
30% N
0
T

A 22 J%
20 .4e/e
20.4% 20 .6%
20.6% VA
, 19.9%
19.9% . ~~. .
20% 20 .6%
20.6% L 21%
19% 19%

1 J1 1L --1-L
Jl 1L 1 1 1 J1 1L
JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUN
JUN JUL
JUL AUG
AUG SEP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV
NOV DEC
OEC
TABLE XXXVIII
TABLE XXXVIII

FIGHTER PILOT
FIGHTER PILOT LOSS
LOSS -- JAN
JAN -- AUG
AUG 1943
1943
% OF
OF PILOTS
PILOTS LOST EACH MONTH
LOST EACH MONTH (ALL
(ALL CAUSES)
CAUSES)
NUMBER OF PILOTS LOST EACH MONTH (ALL CAUSES) l
NUMBER OF PILOTS LOST EACH MONTH (ALL CAUSES)

20%.

10% .

z
0
z

ro
to
b
x
JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUN
JUN JUL
JUL AUG
AUG
I
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

The
The defeat
defeat in in the
the air
air war
war represented
represented by by the above figures
the above figures isis perhaps
perhaps aa fairer
fairer
evaluation of Jeschonnek's
evaluation of Jeschonnek's failure
failure than
than the
the Schweinfurt/Regensburg
Schweinfurt/Regensburg and
and
Peenemunde attacks. Jeschonnek and
Peenemiinde attacks. Jeschonnek and his
his staff
staff had
had ignored
ignored the
the mess
mess that
that Udet
Udet made
made
of production
of production and and had
had asas aa result
result voiced
voiced no no alarm about continued
alarm about continued production
production
stagnation as the Luftwaffe prepared to attack Russia. The growing gap between
stagnation as the Luftwaffe prepared to attack Russia. The growing gap between
German and
German and Allied
Allied production
production began
began to to emerge
emerge in in devastating
devastating form
form in in the
the attrition
attrition
battles of summer
battles of summer 1943.1943. Since
Since late 1942, Milch
late 1942, Milch had had indeed
indeed done
done wonders
wonders with
with
German production.
German production. In In 1943,
1943, the
the aircraft industry produced
aircraft industry produced 64 64 percent
percent more
more aircraft
aircraft
than
than in
in 1942,
1942, with with aa dramatic
dramatic increase
increase of of 125 .2 percent
125.2 percent in in fighter
fighter production
production and and
31 .4 percent
31.4 percent in bombers.. By
in bombers By May
May 1943,1943, industry produced 1,000
industry produced 1,000 fighters
fighters for
for the
the
first
first time;
time; by by July, production reached
July, production reached 1,263 .'96 ItIt was
1,263."* was not enough.. The
not enough The attrition
attrition
was
was such
such that
that for
for the first half
the first half of
of the
the year,
year, there
there was
was aa slow
slow but steady increase
but steady increase in in
fighter
fighter and
and bomber strength.. However,
bomber strength However, in in July
July and
and August, despite production
August, despite production
efforts,
efforts, the
the number
number of of aircraft in frontline
aircraft in frontline units
units began
began toto decline
decline noticeably
noticeably.. In In
addition,
addition, the the percentage
percentage of authorized aircraft
of authorized aircraft also
also began
began to to fall
fall (see
(see Table
Table
XXXIX'
XXXIX"^). 97) .

TABLE
TABLE XXXIX
XXXIX
Fighter
Fighter and
and Bomber
Bomber Strength
Strength in Frontline Units
in Frontline Units

Fighters
Fighters Bombers
Bombers
Authorized
Authorized Present
Present Percentage
Percentage Authorized
Authorized Present
Present Percentage
Percentage

Feb
Feb 28,
28, 1943
1943 1,660
1,660 1,336
1,336 80 .5
80.5 2,025
2,025 1,443
1,443 71 .3
71.3
Mar
Mar 31,
31, 1943
1943 1,712
1,712 1,535
1,535 89 .7
89.7 2,025
2,025 1,522
1,522 75 .2
75.2
Apr
Apr 30,
30, 1943
1943 1,848
1,848 1,582
1,582 85 .6
85.6 2,034
2,034 1,574
1,574 77 .4
77.4
May 31,
May 31, 1943
1943 2,016
2,016 1,786
1,786 88 .6
88.6 2,109
2,109 1,588
1,588 75 .3
75.3
Jun
Jun 30,
30, 1943
1943 2,172
2,172 1,849
1,849 85 .1
85.1 2,111
2,111 1,663
1,663 78 .8
78.8
Jul 31,1943
Jul31,1943 2,172
2,172 1,528
1,528 70 .3
70.3 2,122
2,122 1,419
1,419 66 .9
66.9
Aug
Aug31,31, 1943
1943 2,228
2,228 1,581
1,581 71
71 2,025
2,025 1,134
1,134 56
56

As
As had
had happened
happened in in 1942,
1942, increased
increased production
production made
made little
little difference;
difference; losses
losses atat the
the
front
front swallowed
swallowed whatwhat industry
industry produced
produced..
Milch
Milch again
again stands
stands outout in
in his recognition of
his recognition of the
the danger.
danger. HeHe seems
seems toto have
have made
made aa
sustained
sustained effort
effort to
to make
make Hitler
Hitler as
as well
well as
as Goring
Goring understand
understand thethe problem
problem."* . Hitler,
'98 Hider,

however,
however, remained
remained unconvinced
unconvinced.. In In early
early July,
July, Kammhuber
Kammhuber presented
presented himhim with
with aa
proposal
proposal forfor aa radical
radical restructuring
restructuring of of Germany's
Germany's air air defenses
defenses toto meet
meet massive
massive
Allied
Allied airair production
production.. Hitler,
Hitler, however,
however, demanded
demanded the the origin
origin of
of these
these "crazy
"crazy
numbers"
numbers" and and added
added thatthat "if
"if the
the numbers
numbers on on Allied
Allied production
production were
were correct,
correct, then
then
he
he would
would have
have toto stop
stop the
the offensive
offensive in in the
the east
east and
and concentrate
concentrate everything
everything on on air
air
defense
defense." ." The
The figures,
figures, however,
however, he he assured
assured Kammhuber
Kammhuber were were false. 199 Milch did
false.'^ Milch did
get
get Hitler's
Hitler's approval
approval for for an
an infusion
infusion of of aircraft
aircraft into
into western
western airair defenses
defenses in in July
July but
but
was
was unable
unable toto get
get aa firm
firm commitment
commitment from from the
the Fuhrer
Fuhrer to to build
build up
up air
air defenses
defenses for for
the
the long
long term.
term. Hitler's
Hitler's response
response to to Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's devastating
devastating attacks
attacks was
was that
that
the
the only
only way
way to
to get
get the
the British
British toto cease
cease the
the destruction
destruction of of Germany's
Germany's cities
cities was
was toto
pay
pay them
them back
back in in kind.
kind. Thus,
Thus, any any suggestion
suggestion thatthat industry
industry increase
increase fighter
fighter

18
1888
ATTRITION ON THE
ATTRITION ON THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

production
production at at the
the expense
expense of of bombers
bombers was was doomed
doomed to to failure
failure.. Interestingly,
Interestingly, there there
was
was aa recognition
recognition for for aa time
time on on the
the part
part ofof some
some bomber
bomber commanders
commanders that that their
their air
air
units
units might
might find better employment
find better employment in in defending
defending the the Reich
Reich thanthan in in raiding
raiding Britain .2°°
Britain.^""
Hitler's
Hitler's emphasis
emphasis on on retaliation
retaliation rather
rather thanthan airair superiority
superiority led led the
the Germans
Germans into into
another
another serious
serious error.
error. The The army army and and air
air forces
forces werewere bothboth about
about to to produce
produce their their own
own
retaliation
retaliation weapons
weapons:: the the army
army with with the
the A-4A-4 (later
(later called
called the the V-2)
V-2) and and thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
with
with the
the V-1
V-1.. TheThe V-2 V-2 was was aa triumph
triumph of of German
German engineering
engineering but but certainly
certainly was was notnot
aa monument
monument to to goodgood sense sense.. As As aa weapon,
weapon, itit represented
represented extremely extremely complex complex
technology,
technology, itit was was expensive,
expensive, itit used used scarce
scarce raw raw materials,
materials, and and its its production
production
overloaded
overloaded the the instrument
instrument and and electrical
electrical components
components industry industry.. However,
However, the the V-1,
V-1, aa
simpler
simpler piece
piece of of technology,
technology, was was inexpensive
inexpensive and and did did not
not place
place aa serious
serious strain strain onon
German
German industrial
industrial production.
production. In In addition,
addition, because
because of of its
its vulnerable
vulnerable launch launch and and
flight
flight characteristics,
characteristics, itit provided provided aa much much greater
greater distraction
distraction to to British
British defenders
defenders.^*" .2°'
The
The last
last point
point deserves
deserves further further elaboration
elaboration:: ThereThere was was no no defense
defense againstagainst the the V-2
V-2..
However,
However, the the V-1
V-1 with with its its requirement
requirement for for both
both aa launching
launching ramp ramp and and its its vulnerable
vulnerable
flight path kept a significant portion of
flight path kept a significant portion of Allied
Allied air forces busy in
air forces busy in 1944
1944 bombing the
bombing the
European continent and chasing V- I's through the skies over Great Britain.
European continent and chasing V-l's through the skies over Great Britain.
Unfortunately
Unfortunately for Germany's cities,
for Germany's cities, the
the critical
critical production
production choices choices that that German
German
air strategy faced in the summer and fall of 1943 were made by individuals who did
air strategy faced in the summer and fall of 1943 were made by individuals who did
not possess the background to make intelligent decisions . Hitler, while he knew
not possess the background to make intelligent decisions. Hitler, while he knew
much
much aboutabout army army weaponry
weaponry and and the the conduct
conduct of of ground
ground operations,
operations, did did notnot
understand the technology or conduct of the air war. The fact that he consistently
understand the technology or conduct of the air war. The fact that he consistently
relied
relied onon Goring
Goring did did nothing
nothing to to enhance
enhance his his knowledge,
knowledge, for for the
the Reichsmarschall's
ReichsmarschaWs
technical expertise was severely lacking . Having once admitted that
technical expertise was severely lacking. Having once admitted that he he diddid not
not
know how to turn on his radio, he exhibited his scientific knowledge for his staff in
know how to turn on his radio, he exhibited his scientific knowledge for his staff in
discussing German radar sets: "I have frequently taken a look inside such sets. It
discussing German radar sets: "I have frequently taken a look inside such sets. It
does not look all that imposingjust some wires and a few other bits and pieces-
does not look all that imposing—just some wires and a few other bits and pieces—
and
and the
the whole
whole apparatus
apparatus is is remarkably
remarkably primitive
primitive even even then.
then. .. .. .."^^"2°2 InIn another
another case case
in
in February
February 1943 1943 afterafter Milch
Milch urgedurged the the inclusion
inclusion of of more
more womenwomen in in the
the production
production
process,
process, Goring
Goring suggested
suggested that that perhaps
perhaps the the best
best method
method to to include
include women women in in the
the
war
war effort would be
effort would be toto allow
allow themthem to do the
to do the work
work at at home
home wherewhere they they would
would also also bebe
able
able to
to watch
watch their
their children
children.. A A somewhat
somewhat flabergasted
flabergasted Milch Milch could could only
only reply reply that
that
German industry
German industry was was moremore advanced
advanced than than that. 203 The
that.^"' The failure
failure to to understand
understand modern modem
production
production and and technical
technical problemsproblems resulted
resulted in in aa failure
failure to to include
include fully fully scientists
scientists
and technicians
and technicians in in the
the war war effort
effort.. The
The services
services often often drafted
drafted highly highly trained
trained and and
skilled individuals
skilled individuals and and used
used themthem in in positions
positions in in which
which their
their gifts
gifts and
and expertise
expertise were were
minimized
minimized.^"* .2°4 Finally,
Finally, there there was was often
often aa failure
failure of of designers
designers to to talk
talk to to production
production
people
people.. The The mast
rnpst remarkable
remarkable example example of of this
this waswas the the interaction
interaction between between the the
developers
developers of of the
the A-4 A-4 rocketrocket and and those
those who who were were attempting
attempting to to get get itit into
into
production
production.^"' .2°s The
The lack lack of of cooperation
cooperation between between these these twotwo groups
groups may, may, in in fact,
fact, have
have
been
been more
more damaging
damaging to to the
the rocket's
rocket's progress
progress than than thethe raid
raid onon Peenemunde.
Peenemunde.
As
As this
this study
study has has suggested
suggested at at several
several points,
points, one one of of the
the critical
critical elements
elements in in
modern
modem warfare
warfare is is the
the productive
productive capacitycapacity of of industry
industry and and itsits use
use.. ByBy thethe summer
summer of of
1943,
1943, German
German strategy
strategy was was already
already severely
severely hampered
hampered by by the
the choices
choices and and decisions
decisions

189
189
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

made
made in the 1940-41
in the 1940-41 period period that that hadhad failed
failed to to mobilize
mobilize the European economy
the European economy for for aa
great struggle .
great struggle. Now
Now in
in the
the summer
summer of
of 1943,
1943, German
German leaders
leaders faced
faced the
the choice
choice of
of
either radically
either radically restructuring
restructuring the
the aircraft
aircraft industry
industry for
for aa massive
massive output
output of
of day
day and
and
night
night fighters
fighters at at the
the expense
expense of of other
other types
types or or facing
facing defeat
defeat in in the
the air
air over
over thethe Reich.
Reich.
Milch himself had suggested a target of 5,000 fighters per month to Hitler in
Milch himself had suggested a target of 5,000 fighters per month to Hitier in
March .2°6 But the top leadership was unwilling to address a military threat with aa
March.^"^ But the top leadership was unwilling to address a military threat with
military
military response
response.. In In fact,
fact, the the real
real triumph
triumph and and impact
impact of of Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's
"area" bombing campaign in 1943 was the fundamental distortion it caused
"area" bombing campaign in 1943 was the fundamental distortion it caused in in
German armaments programs. The anger and desire for a retaliation strategy was
German armaments programs. The anger and desire for a retaliation strategy was
particularly
particularly clear clear in in thethe casecase of Hitler, but
of Hitler, but even
even as as intelligent
intelligent and and rational
rational an an
individual as Speer could not resist the attraction of paying the British back in kind.
individual as Speer could not resist the attraction of paying the British back in kind.
At
At the
the endend of of May
May 1943,1943, the Armaments Minister
the Armaments Minister suggested
suggested to to aa most
most enthusiastic
enthusiastic
and
and appreciative
appreciative audience
audience in in the
the Ruhr
Ruhr that that while "German mills
while "German mills ofretribution
of retribution may may
often seem
often seem to to grind
grind too too slowly,
slowly, they they do do grind
grind very
very fine.
fine. ...." Speer had
. ." Speer had just
just seen
seen aa
successful firing
successful firing of of an an A-4,
A-4, and and his his continued
continued support
support for for the the rocket
rocket program
program
throughout
throughout 1943 1943 andand 19441944 caused
caused aa major major diversion
diversion ofGerman production capacity
of German production capacity
and raw
and raw materials
materials that that would
would have have been been farfar better
better spentspent in in defending
defending German German
airspace
airspace.^"'.2°'
While
While in in aa larger
larger sense,
sense, the the moral
moral questions
questions involved
involved in in the
the "strategic"
"strategic" bombingbombing
offensives
offensives can can never
never be satisfactorily answered,
be satisfactorily answered, the the question
question of of the
the military
military utility
utility
of the campaigns
of the campaigns is, is, however,
however, easier easier to to address
address.. By By late
late summer
summer 1943, 1943, British
British
"area"
"area" bombing
bombing attacks attacks and and thethe American
American precision
precision bombing
bombing campaigncampaign were were
having
having aa major
major impact
impact on on the
the war.
war. In the first
In the first case,
case, thethe real
real contribution
contribution of of Bomber
Bomber
Command
Command was was indirect,
indirect, even though itit caused
even though caused more direct damage
more direct damage to to the
the German
German
nation
nation.. TheThe problem
problem was was the the fact
fact that
that so much of
so much of German
German industry
industry lay lay on on the
the fringe
fringe
areas
areas of of the cities that
the cities that thethe command
command was was blasting
blasting into
into rubble
rubble.. ThisThis distortion
distortion that that
the
the campaign
campaign caused caused in in the
the German
German war war effort,
effort, however,
however, was was enormous
enormous.. Not Not only
only
did
did itit result
result in in such
such highly
highly unproductive
unproductive efforts efforts asas the
the A-4
A-4 program
program but but itit pushed
pushed the the
Germans
Germans into into continuing
continuing production
production of of bombers
bombers for for retaliatory
retaliatory raids raids farfar too
too long.
long.
Moreover,
Moreover, the the A-4
A-4 program
program kept kept thethe Germans
Germans from from everever properly
properly investigating
investigating aa
promising
promising antiaircraft
antiaircraft rocketrocket system
system.^"* .101 Also
Also important
important was was the
the fact
fact that
that thethe growing
growing
number
number of of British
British raids
raids caused
caused aa substantial
substantial distortion
distortion in in the
the manufacturing
manufacturing process process
for
for artillery
artillery and and ammunition
ammunition.. By By summer
summer 1943, 1943, no no less
less than
than 89 89 flak
flak batteries
batteries
defended
defended Berlin Beriin.^*^ .209 The
The growth
growth from from 1940 1940 in in the
the number
number of of flak
flak batteries
batteries was was
sizeable
sizeable.. FromFrom aa levellevel of of 791
791 heavy
heavy batteries
batteries (88's,
(88's, 105's,
105's, and and 128's)
128's) in in 1940,
1940, to to
967
967 in in 1941,
1941, to to 1,148
1,148 in in 1942,
1942, and and to to 2,132
2,132 in in 1943,
1943, German
German flak flak forces
forces
represented
represented an an enormous
enormous investmentinvestment in in equipment
equipment and and manpower
manpower.^'o .210 All
AH of of these
these
batteries
batteries expended
expended prodigious prodigious amounts amounts of of ammunition
ammunition 24 24 hours
hours aa day. day.
Unfortunately
Unfortunately for for thethe Germans,
Germans, the the results
results werewere moremore visually
visually spectacular
spectacular than than
damaging
damaging.. The The 88mm 88mm flak flak 36 36 weapon
weapon seems seems to to have
have required
required an an average
average
expenditure
expenditure of of 16,000-plus
16,000-plus shells shells to to bring
bring down
down one one aircraft
aircraft flying
flying at at high
high altitude,
altitude,
and
and that
that was
was the the weapon
weapon with with which
which most most flakflak batteries
batteries werewere equipped
equipped.2" .2"
As
As for for the
the Allied
Allied effort,
effort, American
American daylight daylight precision
precision bombing
bombing had had notnot yetyet
achieved
achieved the the spectacular
spectacular results results thatthat Bomber
Bomber Command
Command had had thus
thus farfar caused.
caused. In In fact,
fact,

190
190
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

the American campaign


the American campaign had had only
only recently
recently begun
begun andand waswas in
in serious
serious trouble,
trouble,
considering
considering American
American losses
losses in in deep
deep penetration
penetration raids.
raids. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, Eighth's
Eighth's
forces
forces represented
represented aa more
more immediate
immediate threat
threat toto German
German armament
armament production
production as as well
well
as a longer range danger to the Luftwaffe as an effective military force. In the first
as a longer range danger to the Luftwaffe as an effective military force. In the first
case, as the Germans recognized early on, the Americans were going after critical
case, as the Germans recognized early on, the Americans were going after critical
elements
elements within
within their
their economic
economic structure
structure.. The
The attack
attack on
on the
the rubber
rubber factory
factory at at Hiils
Htils
had
had underscored
underscored this
this intent
intent.. Speer
Speer found
found thethe August
August attack
attack on
on Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt even even
more
more dangerous
dangerous.. AsAs hehe told
told RAF
RAF investigators
investigators after
after the
the war,
war, aa concentrated
concentrated
offensive
offensive on
on the
the ball
ball bearings
bearings industry
industry would
would have
have had
had the
the following
following results
results::

Armaments
Armaments production
production would
would have
have been
been crucially
crucially weakened
weakened after
after
two
two months,
months, andand after
after four
four months
months would
would have
have been
been brought
brought
completely
completely to
to aa standstill
standstill.. This,
This, to
to be
be sure,
sure, would
would have
have meant:
meant:
One:
One: All
All our
our ball
ball bearing
bearing factories
factories (in
(in Schweinfurt,
Schweinfurt, Steyr,
Steyr,
Erkner,
Erkner, Cannstatt,
Cannstatt, and
and in
in France
France and
and Italy)
Italy) had
had been
been attacked
attacked
simultaneously
simultaneously..
Two:
Two: These
These attacks
attacks had
had been
been repeated
repeated three
three or
or four
four times,
times,
every
every two
two weeks,
weeks, no
no matter
matter what
what the
the pictures
pictures of
of the
the target
target area
area
showed
showed..
Three:
Three: Any
Any attempt at rebuilding
attempt at rebuilding these
these factories
factories hadhad been
been
thwarted
thwarted by
by further
further attacks,
attacks, spaced
spaced at
at two-month
two-month intervals . 212
intervals.^'-^

The
The difficulty
difficulty waswas that
that no
no matter
matter what
what the
the prospects,
prospects. Eighth
Eighth diddid not
not have
have sufficient
sufficient
strength to carry out such an offensive even had it done nothing except bomb ball
strength to carry out such an offensive even had it done nothing except bomb ball
bearing factories . One Schweinfurt every two months came close to destroying it as
bearing factories. One Schweinfurt every two months came close to destroying it as
an
an effective
effective force
force.. Another
Another Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt in in this
this period
period might
might have
have ended
ended Eighth's
Eighth's
entire
entire daylight
daylight offensive
offensive.. Thus,
Thus, the
the August
August raidraid warned
warned thethe Germans
Germans to to look
look for
for
alternative sources of supply ; the second attack in October redoubled their efforts at
alternative sources of supply; the second attack in October redoubled their efforts at
dispersal and substitution . The February 1944 bombing by the RAF did more
dispersal and substitution. The February 1944 bombing by the RAF did more
damage
damage than than thethe American
American raidsraids but
but came
came wellwell after
after Speer's
Speer's precautionary
precautionary
measures
measures had had taken
taken effect
effect..
The
The assault
assault on on the
the German
German aircraft
aircraft industry
industry was was probably
probably in in retrospect
retrospect more
more
damaging
damaging to to the
the war
war effort
effort.. The
The July-August
July-August attacks
attacks onon factories
factories producing
producing aircraft
aircraft
resulted
resulted in in aa fail
fall off
off in
in production
production of of approximately
approximately 200 200 fighters
fighters.. By
By November,
November,
fighter
fighter production
production was was 300
300 under
under peak
peak production
production in in July. 2 " Also
July.^" Also important
important waswas the
the
attrition
attrition that
that Eighth's
Eighth's attacks
attacks were
were already
already imposing
imposing on on thethe defending
defending fighter
fighter
forces
forces.. If for the
If for the short
short run
run itit was
was questionable
questionable as as to
to who
who was
was taking
taking the
the more
more severe
severe
beating,
beating, there
there waswas nono question
question thatthat in
in the
the long
long runrun Eighth
Eighth AirAir Force
Force had
had better
better
prospects
prospects.. AndAnd month
month by by month,
month, American
American fighters
fighters were
were extending
extending their
their range
range to to
the
the east.
east.

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
The
The period between November
period between 1942 and
November 1942 and August
August 1943
1943 was
was thethe last
last opportunity
opportunity
that
that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had
had in
in the
the war
war to
to build
build up
up aa reserve
reserve so
so that
that itit could
could maintain
maintain air
air
superiority
superiority atat least
least over
over the
the Reich
Reich.. The
The unwillingness
unwillingness of of Germany's
Germany's leaders,
leaders.

191
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

however,
however, toto trade
trade space
space for
for time
time forced
forced the Luftwaffe into
the Luftwaffe into aa battle
battle of
of attrition
attrition on
on the
the
periphery
periphery.. The
The results
results ofof those
those battles bled the
battles bled the German
German air force white
air force white.. At the very
At the very
moment
moment when
when thethe air
air battles
battles in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean andand in
in the
the east
east peaked,
peaked, aa terrible
terrible
new
new danger appeared in
danger appeared in the
the west.
west. While
While the German war
the German war economy
economy couldcould bear
bear the
the
damage
damage that
that Bomber
Bomber Command
Command meted meted outout to
to German
German cities
cities (except
(except perhaps
perhaps in in
psychological
psychological terms),
terms), thethe bomber
bomber thrusts
thrusts of
of Eighth
Eighth Air For6e aimed
AirFor6e aimed at at the
the industrial
industrial
heart
heart.. The
The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had no no choice
choice but
but to
to come
come up and to
up and to fight.
fight. In
In the
the process,
process, its
its
destruction
destruction had
had already
already begun.
begun.

192
Notes
Notes

11.. Michael
Michael Howard,
Howard, Grand Grand Strategy,
Strategy. Vol.Vol. IV,W, August
August 1942-September
1942-September 1943 1943 (London,
(London, 1972),
1972), p. p. 46
46..
22.. This
This diddid not
not prevent
prevent the the German
German high command from
high command from contracting
contracting for for maps
maps andand pamphlets
pamphlets in in Persian
Persian
that
that aa German
German printer
printer was
was still
still turning
turning outout in
in 1944-no
1944—no one one hadhad bothered
bothered to to cancel
cancel thethe order.
order. See See Speer,
Speer,
Inside
Inside the the Third
Third Reich,
Reich, p. p. 238.
238.
33.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/1185-I
III/l 185-1195, 195, Genst.
Genst. Gen.
Gen. Qu Qu.. (6 .Abt .), "Flugzeugunfalle
(6.Abt.), "Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den
fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden
Verbanden.'' ."
44.. Ibid
Ibid..
55.. The
The origins
origins andand conduct
conduct of of operations
operations around
around Stalingrad
Stalingrad are are discussed
discussed in in aa number
number of of significant
significant
works
works;; among among the the best
best are:
are: Erickson,
Erickson, The The Road
Road to to Stalingrad
Stalingrad:; Kehrig,
Kehrig, Stalingrad;
Stalingrad; Earl Earl F.F. Ziemke,
Ziemke,
Stalingrad
Stalingrad to to Berlin
Berlin:: The
The German
German DefeatDefeat in in the
the East
East (Washington,
(Washington, 1968). 1968).
6.
6. KTBKTB OKW,OKW. Vol. Vol. 11,
II, Document
Document #26, #26, Operationsbefehl
Operationsbefehl Nr Nr.. 11 vom
vom 14 14.. Oktober
Oktober 1942 1942 Betr
Betr.:. : Weitere
Weitere
Kampffuhrung
Kampffiihrung im im Osten,
Osten, p. p. 130.
130.
77.. For
For the
the transport
transport and supply problems
and supply problems of of Sixth
Sixth Army,
Army, see: see: Kehrig,
Kehrig, Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp pp.. 6911'.
69ff.
88.. KTB
KTB OKW,OKW, Vol. Vol. II,
II, entry
entry forfor 33.11.42.,
.11 .42., pppp.. 894-96.
894-96 .
9.
9. Walter
Walter Warlimont,
Warlimont, Inside Inside Hitler's
Hitler's Headquarters,
Headquarters. 1939-1945 1939-1945 (New (New York,
York, 1964),
1964), pp pp.. 270-71
27CK71..
Hitler
Hitler did did regale
regale Speer
Speer with
with comments
comments about what he
about what he would
would do do were
were hehe in
in command
command of of Allied
Allied forces
forces.. SeeSee
Speer,
Speer, InsideInside the
the ThirdReich,
Third Reich, p. p. 246.
246.
10
10.. TheThe following
following account
account of of ground
ground operations
operations is is drawn
drawn from from Ziemke,
Ziemke, Stalingrad
Stalingrad to to Berlin,
Berlin, pp pp..
52-55;
52-55; Erickson,
Erickson, The The Road
Road to to Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp pp.. 464-72
464-72;; and and Kehrig,
Kehrig, Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, pp pp.. 131-60
131-60.. Kehrig's
Kehrig's
account
account is is particularly
particularly enlightening
enlightening becausebecause itit is
is accompanied
accompanied by by an
an outstanding
outstanding set set of
of maps
maps..
11
11.. KTB
KTB OKW,OKW, Vol Vol.. II,
II, entry
entry forfor 19 .11 .42., p.
19.11.42., p. 988.
988.
12
12.. Luftflotte
Luftflotte 44 vor vor Stalingrad
Stalingrad:: unterunter Gen.
Gen. Oberst
Oberst Frhr,
Frhr, v. v. Richthofen,"
Richthofen," notations
notations for for 21 .11 .42. and
21.11.42. and
22 .11 .42 . with
22.11.42. with quotation
quotation from from Richthofen's
Richthofen's diarydiary from
from 21 .11 .42., AFSHRC
21.11.42., AFSHRC;: K K 113 .309-3, v.
113.309-3, v. 9;9; and
and
Feldgericht
Feldgericht des des VIII
VIII.. Fliegerkorps,
Fliegerkorps, Br Br.. B.
B. Nr Nr.. 7/43
7/43,, ImIm Felde,
Felde, denden 26 .1 .43. ; and
26.1.43.; and Abschrift
Abschrift Wolfgang
Wolfgang
Pickert,
Pickert, Paderborn,
Paderbom, 11 . 1 .56., AFSHRC:
11.1.56., AFSHRC : K K 113.309-3,
113.309-3, v.9 v.9..
13 . KTB OKW, Vol . 11,
U.KTBOKW,Vo\. II, entry
entry forfor 25 .11 .42., p.
25.11.42. p. 1019
1019..
14
14.. "Generaloberst
"Generaloberst ZeitzlerZeitzler fiberiiber das
das Zustandekommen
Zustandekommen des des Entschlusses,
Entschlusses, Stalingrad
Stalingrad aus aus der
der LuftLuft zuzu
versorgen,"
versorgen," letter letter from
from Zeitzler
Zeitzler to to Professor
Professor Suchenwirth,
Suchenwirth, 11 .3 .55., AFSHRC
11.3.55., AFSHRC:: K K 113 .3018-4 .
113.3018-4.
15
15.. Suchenwirth,
Suchenv/inh, Historical
Historical Turning
Turning Points
Points in in the
the German
German Air Air Force
Force War
War Effort,
Effort, pp pp.. 102-03
102-03..
16
16.. "Luftflotte
"Luftflotte 4 4 vor
vor Stalingrad
Stalingrad:: unter
unter Gen.
Gen. Oberst
Oberst FrhrFrhr.. v.v. Richthofen,"
Richthofen," notation
notation from
from Richthofen's
Richthofen's
dairy
dairy from from 24 .11 .42 ., AFSHRC:
24.11.42., AFSHRC: K K 113.309-3,
113.309-3, vv.. 9. 9.
17
17.. KTB
KTB OKW,OKW, vol vol.. II,
II, entries
entries forfor 17 .8 .42., 6.11
17.8.42., .42., and
6.11.42., and 21 .11 .42 ., pp
21.11.42., pp.. 601,
601,911,911, and
and 999999.. Figures
Figures
given
given in in these
these entries
entries list
list aircraft
aircraft that
that were
were "startbereit
"startbereit." ." Since
Since operational
operational ready
ready rates
rates were
were running
running at at
approximately
approximately 60 60 percent,
percent, the the figures
figures somewhat
somewhat distort
distort total
total strength,
strength, although
although they they do do reflect
reflect actual
actual
capabilities
capabilities..
18
18.. Suchenwirth,
Suchenwirth, Historical
Historical Turning
Turning Points
Points inin the
the German
German Air A ir Force
Force War
War Effort,
Effort, pp.. 101
101..
19
19.. Ploeher,
Plocher, The The German
German AirForce
Air Force Versus
Versus Russia,
Russia, 1942,1942. pp pp.. 280-81
280-81..
20
20.. Kehrig,
Kehrig, Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, p. p. 219
219..
21
21.. Russlandkrieg,
Russlandkrieg, "Die "Die Luftversorgung
Luftversorgung Stalingrads,"
Stalingrads," 10 .3 .56., AFSHRC
10.3.56., AFSHRC:: K K 113 .309-3, v.
113.309-3, v. 99..
22
22.. See See Kehrig,
Kehrig, Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, p. p. 287
287;; and
and Plocher,
Plocher, The The German
German Air Air Force
Force Versus
Versus Russia,
Russia. 1942,
1942, pp pp.
320-21
320-21..
23
23.. Richthofen
Richthofen diary diary entry
entry forfor 25 .11 .42., quoted
25.11.42., quoted in in "Luftflotte
"Luftflotte 4 4 vor
vor Stalingrad
Stalingrad:: unter
unter Gen.
Gen. Oberst
Oberst
Frhr
Frhr.. v. v. Richthofen,"
Richthofen," AFSHRCAFSHRC:: K K 113
113.309-3,
.309-3, v. v. 9.
9.
24 . For
24. For aa complete
complete listinglisting of of transport
transport aircraft
aircraft authorized
authorized strength,
strength, actual
actual strength,
strength, and and tonnage
tonnage
provided
provided Stalingrad
Stalingrad on on aa day-to-day
day-to-day basis,basis, see:
see: "Luftversorgung
"Luftversorgung der der 6.6. Armee
Armee vom vom 24 24.1111 .42.42 bisbis
3.2 .43.," NARS
3.2.43.," NARS T-321/18/4758846
T-321/18/4758846..
25 . Richthofen
25. Richthofen diary diary entry
entry forfor 18 .12.42., quoted
18.12.42., quoted in "Luftflotte 44 vor
in "Luftflotte vor Stalingrad
Stalingrad:: unter
unter Gen.
Gen Oberst Oberst
Frhr
Frhr.. v. v. Richthofen,"
Richthofen," AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K 113.309-3,
113.309-3, v. v. 9.
9.
26
26.. "Luftversorgung
"Luftversorgung der der 6.6. Armee
Armee vom vom 24 .11 .42. bis
24.11.42. bis 33.2.43.,"
.2 .43.," NARSNARS T-321/18/4758846
T-321/18/4758846..
27
27.. Ziemke,
Ziemke, Stalingrad
Stalingrad to to Berlin,
Berlin, pp pp.. 64-65
64-65..
28
28.. SeeSee particularly
particularly "Tagebuch,
"Tagebuch, Generalleumant
Generalleumant Fiebig, Fiebig, Kommandeur
Kommandeur VIII VIII.. Flieger
Flieger Korps,"
Korps," entry entry for
for
24 .12.42 ., for
24.12.42., for aa description
description of of the
the wild
wild conditions
conditions involved
involved in in abandonment
abandonment of of Tatsinskaya,
Tatsinskaya, AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K
113.309-3,
113.309-3, v. V. 9;
9; see
see also
also "Luftflotte
"Luftflotte 44 vor vor Stalingrad
Stalingrad:: unter
unter Gen.Gen. Oberst
Oberst Frhr
Frhr.. von
von Richthofen,"
Richthofen " entries entries
for
for 2323.. andand 24 .12.42.
24.12.42.

193
193
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

29 "Luftflotte 44 vor
29.. "Luftflotte vor Stalingrad
Stalingrad:: unterunter Gen
Gen,. Oberst
Oberst FrhrFrhr.. vonvon Richthofen,"
Richthofen," entry entry forfor 26 .12 .42 .,
26.12.42.,
AFSHRC:
AFSHRC.Kl K 113 .309-3, vV.. 99..
13.309-3,
30
30.. "Luftversorgung
"Luftversorgung der der6. Armee vom
6 . Armee vom 24 .11 .42 . bis
24.11,42. 3 .2 .43 .," NARS
bis3.2.43.," NARS T-321/18/4758846
T-321/18/4758846..
31
31.. For
For aa somewhat
somewhat colored colored account
account of of Milch's
Milch's activities,
activities, see see Irving,
Irving, The The Rise
Rise and and Fall
Fall of
of the
the
Luftwaffe, Chapter
Z.Mfi^ajg'e, Chapter 13 13..
32.
32. Ziemke,
Ziemke, Stalingrad
Stalingrad to to Berlin,
Berlin, pp pp.. 78-79
78-79..
33
33.. "Luftversorgung
"Luftversorgungder6. Armee vom
der 6 . Armee vom 24 .11 .42 . bis
24.11.42. bis 33.2,43,,"NARS
.2 .43 .," NARS T-321/18/4758846
T-321/18/4758846..
34
34.. "Auswirkung
"Auswirkung der der Luftversorgung
Luftversorgung Stalingrad
Stalingrad auf auf die
die Luftwaffe,"
Luftwaffe," aus aus einer
einer Ausarbeitung
Ausarbeitung von von Gen
Gen..
aa.. D
D.. Plocher,
Plocher, AFSHRCAFSHRC:: K K 113 .309-3, vv.. 99..
113.309-3,
35
35.. For
For thethe fullest
fullest discussion
discussion of of operations
operations in late winter,
in late winter, seesee Ziemke,
Ziemke, Stalingrad
Stalingrad to to Berlin,
Berlin, Chapter
Chapter V V..
See also Erich
See also Erich von von Manstein, Verlorene Siege
Manstein, Verlorene Siege (Bonn,
(Bonn, 1955) 1955)..
36
36.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of ofthe
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp 227-28,.
pp.. 227-28
37
37.. Irving,
Irving, TheThe RiseRise andand Fall
Fall ofof the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 189 189..
38
38.. Milch
Milch was was referring
referring to to the
the weather
weather organization,
organization, but but itit is
is clear
clear that
that hehe felt
felt the
the same
same way way about
about much
much
of the Luftwaffe's
of the Luftwaffe's ground ground support
support organization
organization in in the
the east
east:: see
see "Bodenorganisation
"Bodenorganisation and und Wetterdienst
Wetterdienst im im
Osten 1942/1943,"
Osten 1942/1943," aus aus GL-Besprechung
GL-Besprechung am am 16 .2 .43 ., AFSHRC:
16.2.43., AFSHRC: K K 113 .309-3, vv.. 13
113.309-3, 13..
39
39.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall ofof the German Air
the German Force, pp.. 231
Air Force, 231;; seesee also
also "Ultra,
"Ultra, History
History ofof the
the
US
US Strategic
Strategic Air Air Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs German
German Air Force," June
Air Force," June 1945,
1945, SRH-013,
SRH-013, pp.. 51, 51, for
for aa message
message on on the
the
number
number of of sorties
sorties flown
flown on on February
February 21 21..
40
40.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp.. 228
228..
41
41.. KTB
WB OKW, OKW, Vol Vol.. III, entry for
Ill, entry for 27 .2 .43 ., pp.. 164
27.2.43,, 164..
42
42.. "Das
"Das VIIIVIII.. Flieger-Korps
Flieger-Korps im im Osteinsatz
Osteinsatz 1943,"1943," AFSHRC
AFSHRC:: K K 113 .309-3, vv.. 11
113.309-3, 11;; "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe im im
Osten
Osten 1943, 1943, 11.3.43.-13.9.43.,"
.3 .43 .-13 .9 .43 .," Auz6ge Auzuge aus aus KTB KTB LFLA,LFL.4, Marz-August
Marz-August 1943 1943 alsals Arbeitsunterlage,
Arbeitsunterlage,
AFSHRC
AFSHRC:: K K 113 .309-3, vv.. 12
113.309-3, "Luftflottenkoramando 44.,
12;; "Luftflottenkommando ., Kriegstagebuch
Kriegstagebuch and und personliche
personliche
Aufzeichnungen
Aufzeichnungen des des Ob Ob.. der
der Luftflotte
Luftflotte 4" 4";; and
and BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 7/487,
7/487, Lw Lw.. Fuhrungsstab
Fuhrungsstab la Nr.. 01130/43,
la Nr 01130/43,
22 .3 .43 ., "Zusitze
22.3,43,, ' 'Zusatze Chef Luftflotte 44zumBefehldes
Chef Luftflotte zum Befehl des Herrn Herm Reichsmarschalls
Reichsmarschallsvom5,3.43."vom 5 .3 .43 ."
43
43.. Ziemke,
Ziemke, Stalingrad
Stalingrad to to Berlin,
Berlin, pp pp.. 96-97
96-97..
44
44.. "Das
"Das VIIIVIII.. Flieger-Korps
Flieger-Korps im im Osteinsatz
Osteinsatz 1943,"1943," AFSHRC
AFSHRC:: K K 113 .309-3, vv.. 11
113.309-3, 11;; "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe im im
Osten
Osten 1943,1943, 11.3.43.-13.9.43.,"
.3 .43 .-13 .9 .43 .," AuszdgeAuszuge aus aus KTBKTB LFLA,LFL.4, Marz-August
Marz-August 1943 1943 als
als Arbeitsunterlage,
Arbeitsunterlage,
AFSHRC
AFSHRC:: K K 113 .309-3, vv.. 12,
113,309-3, 12, "Luftflottenkommando
"Luftflottenkommando 44,, ., Kriegstagebuch
Kriegstagebuch and und personliche
personliche
Aufzeichnungen
Aufzeichnungen des des Ob Ob.. der
der Luftflotte
Luftflotte 4" 4";; and
and BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 7/487,
7/487, Lw Lw.. F6hrungsstab
Fuhrungsstab la la Nr
Nr.. 01130/43,
01130/43,
22 .3 .43 ., "Zusitze
22.3.43,, ' 'Zusatze Chef Chef Luftflotte
Luftflotte 44 zum zum Befehl
Befehl des des Herm
Herm Reichsmarschalls
Reichsmarschalls vom vom 55.3.43."
.3 .43 ."
45
45.. Zuteilung
Zuteilung von von fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden
Verbanden an an die
die Ostfront,
Ostfront, StandStand 20 .2 .43 ., AFSHRC
20.2.43., AFSHRC:: K K 113 .309-3, vv..
113.309-3,
13
13..
46
46.. Based
Based on on lossloss reports
reports in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 III/1186,
III/1186, 1187, 1187, GenstGenst,. Gen Gen,. Qu Qu.. (6 .Abt .),
(6.Abt.),
"FlugzeugunfOle
"Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden
Verbanden." ."
47
47.. Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe strength
strength on on 31 .1 .43 . in
31.1.43. in Air
Air Historical
Historical Branch,
Branch, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe StrengthStrength and and Serviceability
Serviceability
Table,
Table, August
August 1938-April
1938-April 1945," 1945," Translation
Translation No No.. VII/ 107 .
VII/107.
48
48.. Ziemke,
Ziemke, Stalingrad
Stalingrad to to Berlin,
Berlin, pp pp.. 108-09
108-09..
49
49.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 7/549,
7/549, Luftwaffenkommando
Luftwaffenkommando Ost, Ost, Fiihrungsabteilung
Fiihrungsabteilung Ia la op,op, 26 .3 .43 .,
26.3.43.,
"Gefechtsbericht
' 'Gefechtsbericht fiber uber diedie Schlacht
Schlacht um um VelVel.. Luki
Luki vomvom 24 .11 .42 . bis
24.11.42. bis 19 .1 .43 ."
19.1.43."
50
50.. See
See Hermann
Hermann Plocher,Plocher, The German Air
The German Air Force
Force Versus
Versus Russia,
Russia, 1943 1943 (Maxwell
(Maxwell AFB, AFB, Alabama,
Alabama,
1967),
1967), Chapter
Chapter 22..
51
51.. Based
Based on on loss
loss reports
reports in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/1188,
III/1I88, 1189,1189, 1190,1190, and and succeeding
succeeding volumes,
volumes, Genst
Genst..
Gen
Gen.. Qu Qu.. (6 .abt .), "Flugzeugunfalle
(6.abt.), "Flugzeugunfalle und and Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden
Verbanden." ."
52
52.. Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe strengthstrength on on 31 .3 .43 . in
31.3.43. in Air
Air Historical
Historical Branch,
Branch, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability
Tables, August
Tables, August 1938-April
1938-April 1945," 1945," Translation
Translation No No.. VII/107
VII/IO?..
53
53.. Manstein,
Manstein, Verlorene
Verlorene Siege,Siege, pp pp.. 480-82
480-82,.
54
54.. KTB
KTBOKW. OKW, Vol Vol,. 111,
III, entry
entry for
for 23 .1 .43 ., pp.. 66
23.1.43., 66,.
55
55.. For
For thethe most
most complete
complete account
account of of the
the Battle
Battle of of Kursk,
Kursk, see see EE.. Klink,
Klink, Das Das Gesetz
Gesetz des des Handelns,
Handelns,
'Zitadelle'
•Zitadelle' 1943 1943 (Stuttgart,
(Stuttgart, 1966)1966)..
56
56.. Ziemke, Stalingrad to
Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin,
Berlin, pp.. 131
131..
57
57.. Warlimont,
Warhmotit, Inside Inside Hitler's
Hitler's Headquarters,
Headquarters, p. p . 333
333,.
58
58.. Guderian,
Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp.. 309
Panzer Leader, 309..
59
59.. KTB
KTB OKW, OKW, Vol Vol,. 111,
III, Document
Document #10, #10, "Operationsbefehl
"Operationsbefehl Nr Nr,. 66 (Zitadelle)
(Zitadelle) vom vom 15 .4 .43 .," pp..
15.4.43.,"
1425
1425..
60
60.. The
The Great
Great Patriotic
Patriotic War War of of the Soviet Union,
the Soviet Union, 1941-1945,
1941-1945, pp pp.. 179-80
179-80..
61
61.. For
For aa view
view of of the
the battle's
battle's terrible
terrible impact
impact on on thethe frontline
frontline infantry
infantry (in (in this
this case
case thethe army's
army's Gross
Gross
Deutschland
Deutschland division),
division), see see:: Guy
Guy Sager,
Sager, TheThe Forgotten
Forgotten Soldier
Soldier (New (New York,
York, 1971)1971)..

19
1944
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

62
62.. Ziemke,
Ziemke, Stalingrad
Stalingrad to to Berlin,
Berlin, p. p. 137
137..
63
63.. Ibid
Ibid.,., Chapter
Chapter VIII VIII..
64
64.. ""iJberlegungen
Uberlegungen des des OKL iiber den
OKL fiber Kraftebedarf fur
den Kraftebedarf das Untemehmen
fur das Untemehmen Zitadelle Zitadelle 1943 1943 an an der
der
Ostfront,"
Ostfront," Auszug aus einer Besprechungsnotiz vom
AuszugauseinerBesprechungsnotiz 26 .6 .43 ., AFSHRC
vom26.6.43., AFSHRC:K : K 113 .309-3, vv.. 10
113.309-3, 10..
65
65.. Based
Based on on "Einsatz fliegender Verbande der
"EinsatzfliegenderVerbande der deutschen
deutschen Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe an an der
der Ostfront
Ostfront 1943,
1943, 30 .6 .43 .,"
30.6.43.,"
AFSHRC
AFSHRC:: K K 113 .309-3, vv.. 13
113.309-3, 13;; and
and AirAir Historical
Historical Branch,
Branch, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability
Tables,
Tables, AugustAugust 1938-April
1938-April 1945," 1945," Translation
Translation No No.. VII/107
VII/I07..
66
66.. Plocher,
Plocher, The The German
German Air Air Force
Force Versus
Versus Russia,
Russia, 1943,
1943, pp pp.. 77-79
11-19..
67
(tl.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall ofof the German Air
the German Air Force,
Force, pp.pp. 234-35
234-35..
68
68.. TheThe aboveabove tabulations
tabulations are are based
based on on loss returns for
loss returns July and
for July August 1943
and August 1943 in BA/MA, RL
in BA/MA, RL 22
111/1191,
III/1191, 1192, 1192, Genst Genst.. Gen Gen.. Qu Qu.. (6 .Abt .), "Flugzeugunfalle
(6.Abt.), "Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste bei bei denden fliegenden
fliegenden
Verbanden"
Verbanden";; and and Air Air Historical
Historical Branch,
Branch, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability Tables,
Tables, AugustAugust
1938-April
1938-April 1945," 1945," Translation
Translation No No.. VII/ 107 .
VII/107.
69
69.. For
For aa clear,
clear, fairminded
fairminded discussion
discussion of of the
the issues
issues involved,
involved, see see Howard,
Howard, GrandGrand Strategy,
Strategy, Vol Vol.. IV,
IV,
pp
pp.. 244ff
244ff..
70
70.. See
See Warlimont,
Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters,
Inside Hitler's Headquarters, pp.. 282 282;; and
and KTB
KTB OKW,
OKW, Vol Vol.. 11,
II, entry
entry forfor 11.12.42.,
.12 .42 .,
pp.. 1062
1062..
71
71.. Howard,
Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol
Grand Strategy, Vol.. IV,
IV, pp.. 355
355..
72
72.. 1.I. SS.. OO.. Playfair,
Playfair, The The Mediterranean
Mediterranean and and Middle East, Vol
Middle East, Vol.. IV, The Destruction
IV, The Destruction of ofAxis
Axis Forces
Forces in in
Africa
A/nca (London,
(London,1966), 1966), pp pp.. 172, 184 .
172,184.
73
73.. ForFor another
another view, view, see see Howard,
Howard, Grand Grand Strategy,
Strategy, Vol Vol.. IV,
IV, pp.. 355
355;; oror Kesselring,
Kesselring, AA Soldier's
Soldier's
Record,
Record, pp pp.. 161-88
161-88..
74
74.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofof the German Air
the German Air Force,
Force, pp. 158-59..
pp. 158-59
75
75.. Based
Based on on thethe quartermaster
quartermaster general's
general's lossloss tables
tables for
for November-December
November-December 1942, 1942, and and January
January
1943,
1943, BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/1184,
III/l 184, 1185,
1185, Genst
Genst.. GenGen.. Qu Qu.. (6 .Abt), "Flugzeugunfalle
(6.Abt), "Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den
fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden
Verbanden." ."
76
76.. "Ultra,
"Ultra, History History of of the
the USUS Strategic
Strategic Air Air Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," June June 1945,
1945,
SRH-013,
SRH-013, pp pp.. 32-33
32-33.. This This is is an
an extremely
extremely important
important sourcesource forfor the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, since
since itit isis based
based on on
"Ultra"
"Ultra" intercepts
intercepts and and quotes
quotes many
many of of them
them at at length
length..
77
77.. See
See Chapter
Chapter IV IV ofof this book, pp.. 136
this book, 136..
78
78.. Howard,
Howard, Grand Grand Strategy,
Strategy, Vol Vol.. IV,
IV, pppp.. 185-86
185-86..
79
79.. See
See thethe particularly
particularly revealing
revealing discussions
discussions in in Sully
Solly Zuckerman,
Zuckerman, From From ApesApes toto Warlords
Warlords (London,
(London,
1978),
1978), pp pp.. 173-96
173-96..
80
80.. Letter
Letter from from Doolittle,
Doolittle, Subject
Subject:: Escort
Escort Fighters
Fighters;; To:To: Commanding
Commanding General, General, US US Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces;;
Thru
Thru:: Commanding
Commanding General, General, Northwest
Northwest AfricanAfrican Air Air Forces,
Forces, 22 .5 .43 ., Xerox
22.5.43., Xerox copycopy of of the
the letter
letter in
in
possession
possession of of thethe author
author.. ForFor anan interesting
interesting discussion
discussion of of the
the development
development of of fighter
fighter escort
escort forfor bomber
bomber
formations
formations in in thethe Mediterranean
Mediterranean and and the
the early
early conclusion
conclusion of of Doolittle
Doolittle about
about thethe importance
importance of of fighter
fighter
escort,
escort, see see:: Bernard
Bernard Boylan, Boylan, "The "The Development
Development of of the
the Long-Range
Long-Range Escort Escort Fighter,"
Fighter," unpublished
unpublished
manuscript
manuscript (Maxwell (Maxwell AFB, AFB, 1955), AFSHRC, pp
1955), AFSHRC, pp.. 74-76
74-76..
81
81.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, TheThe Army
Army AirAir Forces
Forces in in World
World War War II, Vol.. 11,
II, Vol II, pp
pp.. 153-61
153-61..
82
82.. Air
Air Historical
Historical Branch, Branch, "The "The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in in the
the Battle
Battle for
for Tunis,
Tunis, A A Strategical
Strategical Survey,"
Survey," aa studystudy
prepared
prepared by by thethe 8th8th Abteilung,
Abteilung, 17 .10 .44 ., Translation
17.10.44., Translation No No.. VII/v
VII/v..
83
83.. ForFor thethe steady
steady attrition
attrition of of Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe forces
forces bothboth in in combat
combat andand through
through accidents,
accidents, see see the
the daily
daily
reports
reports of of FF.d.L.
. d . L . Tunis
Tunis for for November,
November, December,
December, and and January
January in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 7/30,
7/30, 31,
31, 3232..
84
84.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The Rise and
The Rise and Fall
Fall ofof the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pppp.. 252-53
252-53..
85
85.. "Ultra,
"Ultra, History History of of the
the USUS Strategic
Strategic Air Air Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," June June 1945,
1945
SRH-013, pp.. 54
SRH-013, 54..
86
86.. Losses
Losses for for transports
transports basedbased on the loss
on the loss tables
tables of of the
the quartermaster
quartermaster general
general forfor April
April andand MayMay 1943
1943
in
in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/1188,
III/l 188, 1189,
1189, Genst
Genst.. GenGen.. Qu Qu.. (6 .Abt .), "Flugzeugunfalle
(6.Abt.), "Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den
fliegenden
fliegenden VerbandenVerbanden.'' ."
87
87.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/262,
8/262, Gen Gen.. Lt Lt.. aa.D.
.D . Osterkamp,
Osterkamp, "Vorbemerkungen
"Vorbemerkungen zum zum Einsatz
Einsatz des des
`Jagdfliegerfiihrer Sizilien'
'Jagdfliegerfuhrer Sizilien'.. "''
88
88.. "Ultra,
"Ultra, HistoryHistory of of the
the US
US Strategic
Strategic Air Air Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," pp.. 6262..
89
89.. Based
Based on on the the loss
loss tables
tables ofof the
the quartermaster,
quartermaster, BA/MA, BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/
III/l1184,
184, 1185,
1185, 1186,
1186, 1187,
1187, 1188,
1188,
1189,
1189, Genst Genst.. Gen Gen.. Qu Qu.. (6 .Abt .), "Flugzeugunfalle
(6.Abt.), "Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden"
Verbanden";; and and
Air
Air Historical
Historical Branch, Branch, "Luftwaffe
"Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability Tables,
Tables, August
August 1938-1945,"
1938-1945," Translation
Translation
No
No.. VII/107
VII/107..
90
90.. See See the the figures
figures on on Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe strength
strength in in "Die
"Die deutsche
deutsche Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe auf auf demdem Mittelmeer-
Mittelmeer-
Kriegsschauplatz,"
Kriegsschauplatz," USAF US AF Historical
Historical Study #161, AFSHRC
Study #161, AFSHRC..

19 5
195
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

91
91.. See
See Ewan
Ewan Montagu,
Montagu, The The Man
Man Who Who Never
Never Was Was (London,
{London, 1953) 1953).. ForFor thethe success
success of of these
these deception
deception
efforts,
efforts, see see KTB
Arra OKW, OKW, Vol Ill, Doc
Vol.. III, Doc.. #12,
#12, pp.. 1429,
1429, OKW/WFST/OP
OKW/WFST/OP Nr. Nr. 661055/93,
661055/93, 12 .5 .43 ., which
12.5.43., which
gave
gave priority
priority to to the
the defense
defense of of Sardinia
Sardinia andand Greece
Greece..
92.. Warlimont,
92 Warlimont, Inside Inside Hitler's
Hitler's Headquarters,
Headquarters, pp pp.. 332-33
332-33..
93.. Craven
93 Craven and and Cate,
Gate, TheThe Army
Army AirAir Forces
Forces in in World
World War War II,
II, Vol
Vol.. 111,
Ill, pp.. 428
428..
94
94.. See Zuckerman, From
See Zuckerman, From ApesApes to to Warlords,
Warlords, Chapter
Chapter 10, 10, and
and particularly
particularly pp.. 195 195 for
for Spaatz's
Spaatz's reaction
reaction..
See
See also
also Tedder,
Tedder, With With Prejudice,
Prejudice, pp pp.. 440--44
440-44..
95
95.. Based
Based on on thethe loss
loss tables
tables ofof the
the quartermaster
quartermaster generalgeneral (6(6.. Abteilung)
Abteilung) for for June
June 1943,
1943, BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22
111/1189,
III/l 189, "Flugzeugunfalle
"Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden
Verbanden." ."
96.. Air
96 Ministry, The
Air Ministry, The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall ofof the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 257-58
257-58..
97 BA/MA, RL
97.. BA/MA, RL 8/262,
8/262, Gen Gen.. Lt Lt.. a.D
a.D.. Osterkamp,
Osterkamp, "Vorbemerkungen
"Vorbemerkungen zum zum Einsatz
Einsatz des des
`Jagdfliegerfiihrers
'Jagdfliegerfiihrers Sizilien' Sizilien'." ."
98.. Air
98 Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofof the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 260-61
260-61;; see see also
also "Ultra,
"Ultra, History
History of of
the
the US Strategic Air
US Strategic Air Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," pp.. 76 76..
99
99.. Based
Based on on the the loss
loss tables
tables ofof the
the quartermaster
quartermaster general general (6 (6.. Abteilung)
Abteilung) for for July
July andand August
August 1943,
1943,
BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL 2111/1190, 1191,
RL2III/1I90, 1191, "Flugzeugunfalle
"Flugzeugunfalleund and Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden
Verbanden." ."
100
100.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise and Fall
Rise and Fall ofthe
of the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 261 261..
101
101.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/262,
8/262, Gen Gen.. Lt Lt.. aa.D. Osteikarap, "Vorbemerkungen
.D . Osterkamp, "Vorbemerkungen zum zum Einsatz
Einsatz des des
`Jagdfliegerfuhrers
'Jagdfiiegerfuhrers Sizilien' Sizilien'." ."
102 . Galland, The
102.Galland, The First
First andand the
the Last,
Last, pp 146-47..
pp.. 146-47
103
103.. See
See John
John Grigg,Grigg, Invasion 1943 : The
Invasion 1943: The Invasion
Invasion that that Never
Never Was Was (London,
(London, 1980),1980), for for aa restatement
restatement
of
of the
the old
old but
but fallacious
fallacious argument
argument that that without
without the the diversion
diversion intointo the
the Mediterranean,
Mediterranean, the the Allies
Allies could
could have
have
landed
landed in in France
France in in 1943
1943..
104
104.. ForFor aa critique
critique of of Kesselring's
Kesselring's leadership,
leadership, see see the
the study
study by by General
General von von Senger
Senger and und Etterlin,
Etterlin,
"Liaison Activities
"Liaison Activities with with Italian
Italian 6th
6th Army-A
Army—A Post-War Post-War Study,"
Study," AHB, AHB, Translation
Translation VII/166
VII/166;; see see also
also
Below, Als
Below, Als Hitters
Hitlers Adjutant,
Adjutant, pp.. 333, 333, forfor Kesselring's
Kesselring's optimistic
optimistic reports,
reports, but but more
more sober
sober on on the
the scene
scene
analysis
analysis..
105
105.. "Ultra,
" Ultra, History
History of of USUS Strategic
Strategic AirAir Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs Geman
Geman Air Air Force,"
Force," pp pp.. 33,
33, 53-54
53-54..
106 Webster and
106.. Webster and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,S-40/1G, Vol Vol.. IV,
IV, Appendix
Appendix 39, 39, pp.. 428
428..
107 . Ibid ., Vol . II,
107.Ibid.,Vol. p . 91
II,p. 91..
108
108.. PRO
PRO AIR AIR 22/203,
22/203, War War Room
Room Manual
Manual of of Bomber
Bomber Command
Command Ops Ops 1939/1945,
1939/1945, compiled
compiled by by Air
Air
Ministry
Ministry War War Room (Statistical Section),
Room (Statistical Section), pp.. 99..
109
109.. Harris,
Hams, BomberBomber Offensive,
Offensive, pp.. 144 144..
110
110.. InIn commenting
commenting on on the the plans
plans coming
coming out out ofof Casablanca
Casablanca for for aa combined
combined bomberbomber offensive,
offensive, HamsHarris
noted
noted in in his
his memoirs
memoirs that that "the
"the new
new instructions
instructions therefore
therefore mademade no no difference
difference." ." Ibid ., pp.. 144
Ibid., 144..
111
111.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,SAOAG, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 108
108..
112
112.. Ibid ., pp.. 133
Ibid., 133..
113 Speer, Inside
113.. Speer, Inside the the Third
Third Reich,
Reich, pp pp.. 280-81
280-81;; see see also
also MaxMax Hastings'
Hastings' BomberBomber Command
Command (New (New
York,
York, 1979),
1979), pp.. 208, 208, for
for Barnes
Barnes Wallis'
Wallis' frustration
frustration on on this
this point
point..
114
114.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,SAOAG, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp
pp.. 110-11
1 lO-11..
115
115.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp
pp.. 143-46
143-46.. For For the
the arguments
arguments about about the use of
the use of "Window,"
"Window," see see inin particular
particular Jones,
Jones,TOeThe
Wizard
Wizard War, War, Chapter
Chapter 33 33..
116
116.. Clayton,
Clayton, The Enemy isisLislening,
The Enemy Listening, pp.. 269269..
117
117.. For
For the
the most most complete
complete account
account of of the
the Hamburg
Hamburg raid, raid, seesee Martin
Martin Middlebrook's
Middlebrook's excellent
excellent study,
study.
The
The Battle
Battle ofHamburg,
of Hamburg, Allied Allied Bomber
Bomber Forces
Forces Against
Against aa German
German City City inin 1943
1943 (London,
(London, 1980) 1980)..
118 . Ibid
118. ., Chapter
Ibid., Chapter 15 15..
119 . See
119. See among
among others, others, Hans Hans Rumpf,
Rumpf, The The Bombing
Bombing of of Germany
Germany (London,(London, 1963),1963), pp pp.. 82-83
82-83;;
Middlebrook,
Middlebrook, The The Battle
Battle of of Hamburg,
Hamburg, pp.. 272 272;; andand OKW
OKW Wehrwirtschaftsstab,
Wehrwirtschaftsstab, "Erfahrungen "Erfahrungen bei bei
Luftangriffen,"
Luftangriffen," von von Oberst
Oberst Luther,
Luther, WWiWWi D/WKD/WK Kdo Kdo X, X, 15 .1 .44 ., NARS
15.1.44., NARS T-79/81/000641
T-79/81/000641.. Milch Milch on on
30 .7 .43 . estimated
30.7.43. estimated the the dead
dead in in Hamburg
Hamburg as as high
high as as 50,000
50,000:: "Ansprache
"Ansprache Milchs Milchs am am 3030.. Juli
Juli 1943
1943 uber
uber
verstarkten
verstiirkten Jagereinsatz
Jagereinsatz im im Heimatkriegsgebiet,"
Heimatkriegsgebiet," Generalluftzeugmeister-Besprechung,
Generalluftzeugmeister-Besprechung, AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K
113 .312-2 vv.3.
113.312-2 .3 .
120
120.. Middlebrook,
Middlebrook, The The Battle
Battle ofofHamburg,
Hamburg, pp pp.. 290-93
290-93..
121
121.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,SAOAG. Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp
pp.. 155-56
155-56..
122
122.. OKW
OKW Wehrwirtschaftsstab,
Wehrwirtschaftsstab, "Erfahrungen "Erfahrungen bei bei Luftangriffen,"
Luftangriffen," von von Oberst
Oberst Luther,
Luther, WWi WWi O/WKO/WK
Kdo
KdoX, X, 15 .1 .44 ., NARS
15.1.44., NARS T-79/81/000641
T-79/81/000641..
123
123.. Goebbels,
Goebbels, The The Goebbels
Goebbels Diaries,
Diaries. pp.. 419
419..
124
124.. Speer,
Speer, Inside
Inside the the Third
Third Reich,
Reich, pp.. 284
284..
125
125.. See
See Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,SAOAG. Vol. Vol . II,11, pp
pp.. 282-83
282-83..

19 6
196
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON THE PERIPHERY
ON THE PERIPHERY

126
126.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp.. 159
159..
127.. Letter
127 Letter fromfrom EakerBaker toto Spaatz,
Spaatz, October
October 1942,1942, quoted
quoted in in Fabyanic,
Fabyanic, "A Critique of
"A Critique of United
United States
States Air Air
War
War Planning,
Planning, 1941-1944,"
1941-1944," pp pp.. 129-30
129-30..
128
128.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, The Army Air
The Army Air Forces
Forces in in World
World.War .War II,II, Vol
Vol.. II,
II, pppp.. 842-44
842-44.. TheThe dates
dates werewere
December
December 66 and and 20 20..
129
129.. Ibid ., pp.. 330
Ibid., 330..
130
130.. Quoted
Quoted by by Boyland,
Boyland, "The "The Development
Development of the Long-Range Escort
oftheLong-Range Escort Fighter,"
Fighter," pp.. 6868..
131
131.. See,
See, in Craven and
particular, Craven
in particular, Cate, The
and Cate, The Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World
World War War II,II, Chapter
Chapter II II;; Webster
Webster
and
and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp
pp.. 10-21
10-21..
132
132.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, The
The Army
Army Air Forces in
Air Forces in World
World War War II,II, Vol
Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 367
367..
133
133.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland, SAOAG, Vol
Frankland, SAOAG, Vol.. II,
II, pp
pp.. 59-64
59-64..
134
134.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, The
The Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World
World War War If,II, Vol
Vol.. II,
II, pp
pp.. 670-72
670-72..
135
135.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pppp.. 846-47
846-47..
136
136.. Ibid
Ibid., ., pp
pp.. 79-81
79-81;; see
see also
also Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force,
Force, "Tactical
"Tactical Development,
Development, August August 1942-May
1942-May 1945," 1945,"
copy
copy inin possession
possession of of the
the author.
author.
137
137.. Ibid
Ibid., ., pp.. 847
847..
138
138.. USSBS,
USSBS, "The "The German
German Anti-Friction
Anti-Friction Bearings
Bearings Industry,"
Industry," January
January 1947, 1947, pp.. 1818;; for
for aa detailed
detailed
analysis
analysis of of the the German
German ball ball bearing
bearing industry
industry from from aa more more historical
historical perspective,
perspective, see see particularly
particularly
Friedhelm Golucke, Schweinfurt
FiiedhelmGoiucke, Schweinfurt and undder der strategische Luftkrieg 1943
stralegischeLuftkrieg 1943 (Paderbom,
(Paderbom, 1980), 1980), Chapter
ChapterII. II .
139
139.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, The
The Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World
World War War 1I,II, Vol
Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 848
848..
140 LeMay, Mission
140.. LeMay, Mission With LeMay, pp.. 296
WithLeMay, 296..
14 1 . Percentages
141. Percentages based based on the losses
on the losses as as established
established in in Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, The The Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World
World
War
War 11, II, pp.. 848,
848, and and operational
operational and and crewcrew strength
strength in in "Statistical
"Statistical Summary
Summary of of Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force
Force
Operations,
Operations, European
European Theater,Theater, 17 .8 .42-8 .5 .45 .," AFSHRC
17.8.42-8.5.45.," AFSHRC..
142
142.. For
For aa particularly
particularly interesting
interesting discussion
discussion of of thethe problem
problem of of evaluating
evaluating bombing
bombing accuracy
accuracy in in the
the
drawing
drawing up up of of plans
plans for for the Combined Bomber
the Combined Bomber Offensive,
Offensive, see see:: Fabyanic,
Fabyanic, "A "A Critique
Critique of of United
United States
States
Air
Air War
War Planning
Planning." ."
143
143.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,
SAOAG, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 62
62.. The
The British
British official
official historians
historians claim
claim that
that "Eighth
"Eighth
Air
Air Force
Force chose
chose aa full-moon
full-moon period
period to to make their first
make their attack on
first attack on August
August 19 19 [sic],
[sic], and,
and, though
though they
they carried
carried
incendiary
incendiary bombsbombs in in the
the hopes
hopes of lighting the
of lighting the target
target for for aa night
night attack,
attack, itit must
must have
have been
been obvious
obvious that that
Bomber
Bomber Command
Command could could scarcely
scarcely carry
carry itit out
out inin such
such circumstances
circumstances." ." ItIt isis worth
worth noting
noting that
that on on thethe
evening
evening of of August
August 17th 17th when
when Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force
Force bombed
bombed Schweinfurt,
Schweinfurt, Bomber Bomber Command
Command was was overover
Peenemiinde
Peenemiinde.. Even Even should
should thethe moonlit
moonlit night night have
have beenbeen an an obstacle
obstacle to to an
an attack
attack in in central
central Germany,
Germany, some some
other
other date
date could
could have have beenbeen arranged
arranged had had Harris
Harris wished
wished to to dodo so
so..
144
144.. Boyland,
Boyland, "The "The Development
Development of the Long-Range Fighter
oftheLong-Range Fighter Escort,"
Escort," pp pp.. 90-91,
90-91, 121 121..
145
145.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp.. 3030..
146
146.. Based
Based on on figures
figures in in "Statistical
"Statistical Summary
Summary of of Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force
Force Operations,
Operations, European
European Theater,
Theater,
17 .8 .42 .-8 .5 .45 .," AFSHRC
17.8.42.-8.5.45.," AFSHRC..
147 .Ibid .
147.Ibid.
148
148.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, The
The Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World
World War War 11,II, Vol
Vol.. II, pp.. 480-83
II, pp 480-83..
149
149.. Ibid ., pp.
Ibid., pp . 483-84
483-84..
150
150.. For
For G6ring's
Goring's worries worries on this, see
on this, see BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL 3/63, Besprechungsnotiz
RL3/63, BesprechungsnotizNr. Nr . 85/43,
85/43, gg.. Kdos
Kdos.. vom vom
27 .8 .43 ., Rigerhof, pp.. 7061
27.8.43.,jagerhof, 7061..
151
151.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofthe German Air
of theGerman Force, pp.. 186
Air Force, 186..
152
152.. ForFor Hitler's
Hitler's care care over
over Sperrle's welfare, see
Sperrle's welfare, see Below,
Below, Als Als Hitlers
Hitlers Adjutant,
Adjutant, pp.. 341,
341, for for aa RM RM
50,000
50,000 gift gift that
that the the Fuhrer
Fiihrer provided
provided the the Field
Field Marshal
Marshal in in early
early July
July 1943
1943.. Sperrle,
Sperrle, who
who hadhad aa reputation
reputation
for
for aa love
love of of goodgood living
living notnot short
short of of G6ring's,
Goring's, was was not not to to be
be found
found atat his his headquarters
headquarters but but rather
rather
vacationing
vacationing on on thethe Atlantic
Atlantic coast
coast south
south of of Biarritz
Biarritz..
153 . Golucke,
153. Go\\icke, Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt and undder der strategische Luftkrieg 1943,
strategischeLuftkrieg 1943, pp pp.. 106-07
106-07..
154 . BA/MA,
154. BA/MA, RL RL 3/50,
3/50, Der
Der Staatssekretar
Staatssekretar der der Luftfahrt
Luftfahrt and und Generalinspekteur
Generalinspekteur der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, gst gst.. Nr
Nr..
847/43
847/43,, 29 .6 .43 ., "Bericht
29.6.43., "Bericht uberuber Besichtigungsreise
Besichtigungsieise 77.6. .6 . bisbis 12 .6 .43 ." See
12.6.43." See also
also BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/88,
8/88,
Generalkommando
Generalkommando XII XII.. Fliegerkorps,
Fliegerkoips, la la Nr Nr.. 2700/43
2700/43 Korpsgefechtsstand,
Korpsgefechtsstand, 12 .9 .43 . Betr:
12.9.43. Betr:
TBtigkeitsbericht
latigkeitsbericht and und Erfahmngsbericht
Erfahrungsbericht des des Generalkommandos
Generalkommandos XII XII.. Fliegerkorps
Fliegerkorps im im August
August 1943, 1943, pp..
59
59..
155
155.. Goebbels,
Goebbels, The The Goebbels
Goebbels Diary,
Diary, entryentry for
for 77.3.43.,
.3 .43 ., pp.. 277,
277, andand especially
especially entry
entry for
for 99.3.43.,
.3 .43 ., pp pp..
278-91
278-91,.
156
156.. Quoted
Quoted in in Irving,
Irving, TheThe Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall ofof the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 208 208..
157
157.. Below,
Be\ov/, Als Als Hitlers
Hitlers Adjutant,
Adjutant, pp pp.. 335-36
335-36..
158
158.. Tag-und
Tag-und Nachtjagd,
Nachtjagd, Besprechungsnotiz
Besprechungsnotiz Nr Nr.. 63/43
63/43 am am 27 .6 .43 ., Obersalzberg,
27.6.43., Obersalzberg, AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K

197
197
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

113 .312-2, vV.. 33;; see


113.312-2, see also
also BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/45,
3/45, Der
Der Staatssekretitr
Staatssekretar der der Luftfahrt
Luftfahit and und Generalinspekteur
Generalinspekteur der der
Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, St/GL St/GL490/43 Bericht Nr
490/43 Bericht Nr.. 80
80 fiber
uber die
die Amtschefbesprechung
Amtschefbesprechung am am 66.7.43.
.7 .43 .
159
159.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/50,
3/50, Der Staatssekretar der
Der Staatssekretdr der Luftfahrt
Luftfahrt and und Generalinspekteur
Generalinspekteur der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Gst,Gst,
Nr
Nr.. 847/43,
847/43, "Bericht fiber Besichtigungsreise 77.6
"Bericht iiberBesichtigungsreise .6 bis
bis 12 .6 .43 ."
12.6.43."
160
160.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/54,
3/54, DerDer Reichsminister
Reichsminister der der Luftfahrt
Luftfahrt and und Oberbefehlshaber
Oberbefehlshaber der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Br Br.. 21
21
Nr
Nr.. 8731/43, 21 .7 .43 ., Betr
8731/43,21.7.43., Betr.;. : "Sofortmassnahmen
"Sofortmassnahmen fiir fiir Verfolgungsnachtjagd
Verfolgungsnachtjagd uber uber grossere
grossere Raume
RaUme." ."
161
161.. Middlebrook,
Middlebrook, The The Battle
Battle ofHamburg,
of Hamburg, pp pp.. 244-48
244-48..
162
162.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/54,
3/54, "Vorschlag fiir eine neue Nachtjagdtaktik," 27
"VorschlagfiireineneueNaditjagdtaktik," .7 .43 .
27.7.43.
163
163.. Auszug
Auszug aus aus der
der G .L . Besprechung
G.L. Besprechung am am 20 .8 .43 . im
20.8.43. im RLM,
RLM, "Der "Der erste
erste grosse
grosse Einsatz der 'wilden
Einsatz der 'wilden
Sau,'
Sau,' ""AFSHRC:K113.312-2,
AFSHRC : K 113 .312-2, vV.. 33..
164
164.. "Ultra,
"Ultra, History
History of of US
US Strategic
Strategic Air Air Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs German
German Air Force," pp.. 59
Air Force," 59..
165
165.. Auszug
Auszug aus aus der
der G .L .-Besprechung am
G.L.-Besprechung am 20 .8 .43 . im
20.8.43. im RLM,
RLM, "Der "Der erste
erste grosse
grosse Einsatz
Einsatz der
der 'wilden
'wilden
Sau',
Sau', ""AFSHRC:K113.312-2,
AFSHRC : K 113 .312-2, vV.. 33..
166
166.. Generalluftzeugmeister-Besprechung,
Generalluftzeugmeister-Besprechung, "Ansprache "Ansprache Milchs Milchs am am 30 .7 .43 . uber
30.7.43. iiber verstarkten
verstarkten
Jagereinsatz im Heimatkriegsgebiet," AFSHRC
JagereinsatzimHeimatkriegsgebiet," AFSHRC:: K K 113 .312-2, vv.. 33..
113.312-2,
167
167.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/45,
3/45, Der
Der Staatssekretar
Staatssekretar der der Luftfahrt
Luftfahrt and und Generalinspekteur
Generalinspekteur der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, ST/GIST/GI
551/43,
551/43, Bericht
Bericht Nr. Nr . 8383 fiber
iiber die
die Amtschefbesprechung
Amtschefbesprechung am am 16 .7 .43 .
16.7.43.
168 "Hitler zur
168.. "Hitler zur Frage
Frage der der Gegenmassnahmen
Gegenmassnahmen zur zur Beantwortung
Beantwortung der der alliierten
alliierten Luftangriffe,"
Luftangriffe,"
25 .7 .43 ., AFSHRC : K 113
25.7.43.,AFSHRC:K .312-2, vV.. 33..
113.312-2,
169
169.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/63,
3/63, "Besprechungsnotiz
"Bespiechungsnotiz Nr Nr.. 85/43
85/43 gg.Kdos,
.Kdos, vom vom 27 .8 .43 ., Jagerhof
27.8.43., Jagerhof." ."
170
170.. BA/MA,
B/VMA, RL RL 3/60,
3/60, Besprechungsnotiz
Besprechungsnotiz Nr Nr.. 8/43, 25 .1 .43 .
8/43,25.1.43.
171
171.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall ofthe
of the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 219219..
172
172.. Oberst
Oberst Vorwald,
Vorwald, Chef Chef des des Technischen
Technischen Amtes, Amtes, 19 .2 .43 . "Kurzer
19.2.43. "Kurzer Bericht iiber die
Bericht uber die Besprechung
Besprechung
beim
beim Herm
Herm Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall mit mit den
den Flottenchefs
Flottenchefs vom vom 15 15.. his
bis 1717.. February
February 1943 1943.''."
173
173.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall ofthe
of the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 287287..
174
174.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 7/112,
7/112, Luftflottenkommando
Luftflottenkommando 3, 3, Fdhrungsabteilung
Fuhrungsabteilung (1) (I) Nr.
Nr. 8480/43,
8480/43, 12 .7 .43 .,
12.7.43.,
"Tatigkeitsbericht
' 'Tatigkeitsbericht der der Luftflotte
Luftflotte 33 fur fiir den
den Monat
Monat JuniJuni 1943
1943.''."
175
175.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/50,
3/50, DerDer Staatssekretdr
Staatssekretar der der Luftfahrt
Luftfahrt and und Generalinspekteur
Generalinspekteur der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Gst, Gst,
Nr.
Nr. 847/43, 29 .6 .43 . "Bericht
847/43, 29.6.43. "Bericht uber uber Besichtigungsreise
Besichtigungsreise 77.6. .6 . bis
bis 12 .6 .43 ."
12.6.43."
176
176.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL 2 111/1187, 1188,
RL2III/1187, Genst . Gen
1188,Genst. Gen.. Qu Qu.. (6 .Abt .), "Flugzeugunfalle
(6.Abt.), "Flugzeugunfalleund and Verluste bei den
Verlustebeiden
fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden,"
Verbanden," March March and and April
April 1943
1943 andand "Ultra,
"Ultra, History
History of of US
US Strategic
Strategic Air Air Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs
German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," MarchMarch and and April 1943 .
April 1943.
177
177.. Besprechungsnotiz
Besprechungsnotiz Nr Nr.. 63/43
63/43 am am 27 .6 .43 . Obersalzberg,
27.6.43. Obersalzberg, AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K 113 .312-2, vv.. 33..
113.312-2,
178
178.. BA/MA,
B/V/MA, RL RL 7/113,
7/113, Luftflottenkommando
Luftflottenkommando 33 Fuhrungsabteilung
Fuhrungsabteilung (1), (I), Ic
Ic NrNr.. 9960/43,
9960/43, 13 .8 .43 .
13.8.43.
"Tatigkeitsbericht
' 'Tatigkeitsbericht der der Luftflotte
Luftflotte 33 far fiir den
den Monat
Monat JuliJuli 1943
1943.''."
179
179.. The
The following
following figures
figures are are based
based on on my
my calculations
calculations of of the
the loss
loss tables
tables inin BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 III/1191,
III/l 191,
1192,
1192, Genst
Genst.. Gen Gen.. Qu.
Qu . (6 .Abt .), "Flugzeugunfalle
(6.Abt.), "Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden,"
Verbanden," July July
and
and August
August 1943 1943..
180
180.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/61,
3/61, Generalmajor
Generalmajor Galland, Galland, 28 .7 .43 ., Aktennotiz
28.7.43., Aktennotiz fiberiiber Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Herm
Herm
Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am 26 ./27 .7 .43 .
26./27.7.43.
181
181.. See
See the
the sorties dispatched for
sorties dispatched for July
July and
and August
August in in Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, The
The Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World
World
War
IVar//,11, Vol
Vol.. II,
II, pp
pp.. 846-48
846-^8..
182
182.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 III/1192,
Ill/l 192, 1193,
1193, Genst
Genst.. Gen.
Gen . Qu.Qu . (6 .Abt .), "Flugzeugunfalle
(6.Abt.), "Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste beibei den
den
fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden,"
Verbanden," August-September
August-September 1943 1943;; and AHB, "Luftwaffe
and AHB, "Luftwaffe Strength
Strength and and Serviceability
Serviceability
Tables,
Tables, August
August 1938-April
1938-April 1945,"1945," Translation
Translation Nr Nr.. VI1/107
VW107..
183
183.. Based
Based on on the
the figures
figures in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 III/1025,
III/1025, Gen Gen.. Qu Qu.. 66.Abt.
.Abt . (III(Ill A),
A), "Front-Flugzeug-
"Front-Flugzeug-
Verluste,"
Veriuste," January-June
January-June 1943. 1943 .
184
184.. Based
Based on on figures
figures of of fighter
fighter pilotpilot strength
strength and and losses
losses in in the
the tables
tables in
in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/722,
III/722, 723,
723,
724,
724, 725,725, GenGen.. Qu Qu.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (I),(I), "Obersicht
"Ubersicht fiber uber Soil, Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft,
Soil, Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste Verluste and und
Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande.'' ."
185
185.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111,III, Gen
Gen.. Qu Qu.. 66.Abt.
.Abt . (III
(Ill A),
A), "Front-Flugzeug-Verluste,"
"Front-Fiugzeug-Veriuste," January-December January-December
1943
1943..
186 . Ibid .
186.Ibid.
187
187..Ibid
Ibid..
188
188.. BA/MA,
B/VMA, RL RL 22 111/722,
III/722, 723, 723, 724,
724, 725,
725, 726,726, GenGen.. Qu Qu.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (I), "Ubersicht fiber
(I), "Obersicht iiber Soil,
Soil,
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft,
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste Verluste and und Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande." ."
189
189.. Based
Based on on the author's tabulation
the author's tabulation of of the
the losses
losses in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL 111/1191, 1192,
RL 22 III/1191, 1192, 1193,
1193, Genst
Genst..
Gen
Gen.. Qu Qu.. (6 .Abt .), "Flugzeugunfdlle
(6.Abt.), "Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste bei bei denden fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden,"
Verbanden," July, July, August,
August,
September
September 1943 1943..

198
198
ATTRITION
ATTRITION ON
ON THE
THE PERIPHERY
PERIPHERY

190.
190. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 11/1025,
11/1025, Gen Gen.. Qu Qu.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (III
(Ill A),
A), "Front-Flugzeug-Verluste,"
"Front-Flugzeug-Verluste," July July -August
-August
1943
1943..
191
191.. Based
Based on on figures
figures of of fiehter
fiehter pilot
pilot strength
strength andand losses
losses inin the
the tables
tables in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/725,
III/725, 726,
726,
Gen
Gen.. QuQu.. 66.. Abt Abt.. (I),
(I), "Obersicht
"Ubersicht fiber uber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft,
Einsatzbereitschaft, VerlusteVerluste andund Reserven
Reserven der der
fliegenden
fliegenden Verbiinde."
Verbande.''
192
192.. Based
Based on on the
the figures
figures in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 III/1025,
III/1025, Gen Gen.. Qu Qu.. 66.. ANAbt.. (III
(Ill A),
A), "Front-Flugzeug-
"Front-Flugzeug-
Verluste,"
Verluste," 1941-19441941-1944.. The The percentages
percentages of of noncombat
noncombat losses losses work
work outout asas follows
follows:: Jan-Jun
Jan-Jun 1941,1941, 4444.5.5
percent;
percent; Jul-Dec
Jul-Dec 1941, 1941, 39 39.5.5 percent;
percent; Jan-Jun
Jan-Jun 1942,1942, 45 45 percent;
percent; Jul-Dec
Jul-Dec 1942, 1942, 4040.9.9 percent
percent;; Jan-Jun
Jan-Jun
1943,
1943, 45 45 percent;
percent; Jul-Dec
Jul-Dec 1943, 1943, 44 44.6.6 percent
percent;; Jan-Jun
Jan-Jun 1944,1944, 37 37.2.2 percent
percent.. TheThe decrease
decrease in in the
the last
last
period
period seemsseems to to have
have been
been thethe result
result of of the
the fact
fact that
that Allied
Allied fighters
fighters were
were shooting
shooting downdown German
German aircraft
aircraft
faster
faster than
than their
their pilots
pilots could
could crash
crash them
them..
193
193.. Among
Among other other items,
items, see see:: BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 11/181,
11/181, OKL,
OKL, Fuhrungsstab,
Fuhrungsstab, Ia/ Ausb . Nr
la/Ausb. Nr.. 999/44
999/44,,
11 .4 .44 ., "Herabsetzung
11.4.44., "Herabsetzung von von Flugzeugunfallen"
Flugzeugunfallen";; Ia/Ausb la/Ausb., ., 25 .7 .44 ., "Verhfitung
25.7.44., "Verhiitung von von
Flugzeugverlusten
Flugzeugverlusten ohne ohne Feindeinwirkung"
Feindeinwirkung";; OKL OKL Generalquartiermeister,
Generalquartiermeister, A2 A2 52 52 bb 1010 Nr
Nr.. 1370/44,
1370/44,
"Tote
"Tote and und Verletzte
Verletzte der der Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe im im Flugbetrieb
Flugbetrieb ohne ohne Feindeinwirkung"
Feindeinwirkung";; la/Ausb la/Ausb.. (IIIA),
(IIIA), "Studie,
"Studie,
Herabsetzung
Herabsetzung der der Flugzeugverluste
Flugzeugverluste ohne ohne Feindeinwirkung,"
Feindeinwirkung,' '30.9.44. 30 .9 .44 .
194.. The
194 The above
above figures
figures werewere provided
provided by by the
the Office
Office of of Flying
Flying Safety,
Safety, Norton
Norton AFB, California..
AFB, California
195
195.1 . I am
am indebted
indebted to to Colonels
Colonels Thomas
Thomas Fabyanic
Fabyanic (Ret)(Ret) and
and Kenneth
Kenneth Alnwick,
Alnwick, USAF,USAF, for for this
this item.
item.
196
196.. USSBS,
USSBS, ESBGWE,
ESBGWE, Appendix Appendix Table Table 102,
102, pp.. 277277.. German
German figures
figures werewere calculated
calculated on on aa quite
quite
different
different basis basis than
than American
American and and British
British figures
figures.. Aircraft
Aircraft that
that received
received major
major battle
battle damage
damage but but which
which
were
were still
still reparable
reparable were were counted
counted in in production
production figures
figures after
after they
they had
had been
been repaired
repaired.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, an an
analysis
analysis of of frontline
frontline strength,
strength, production
production figures,
figures, and and loss
loss tables
tables creates
creates the the impression
impression thatthat there
there was
was
some
some double
double bookkeeping
bookkeeping going going on on..
197
197.. Based
Based on on figures
figures in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 2111/723,
2 III/723, 724, 725, and
724,725, and 726,
726, GenGen.. QuQu.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (I)
(I).. "Obersicht
"Ubersicht
fiber
fiber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft,
Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste Verluste and und Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande." ."
198
198.. See
See Irving's
Irving's account
account of of the
the Milch-Hitler
Milch-Hitler conversation
conversation occurring
occurring early
early inin March,
March, TheThe Rise
Rise and
andFall
Fall
of the Luftwaffe . pp
oftheLuftwaffe, pp.. 201-03
201-03..
199.. Golucke,
199 Goliicke, Schweinfurt
Schweirfurt and und derder strategische
strategische Luftkrieg
Li^krieg 1943, J943, pp.. 115115..
200
200.. Irving,
Irving, The The Rise
Rise and Fall of
and Fall the Luftwaffe,
ofthe Luftwaffe, pp.230..230. Obviously,
Obviously, the the bomber
bomber force
force would
would provide
provide
crews
crews for for the
the night
night fighter
fighter forces,
forces, especially
especially the the "wild
"wild sow"sow" force
force..
201
201.. For For further
further discussion
discussion of of these
these points,
points, seesee David
David Irving,
Irving, The The Mare's
Mare's Nest Nest (Boston,
(Boston, 1964),
1964), pppp..
229-60
229-60..
202
202.. Irving,
Irving, The The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall of the Luftwaffe,
ofthe Luftwe^e, pp.. 210 210..
203
203.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/60,
3/60, Stenografische
Stenografische Niederschrift
Niederschrift der der Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall fiber fiber
Flugzeug-Programm-Entwurf,
Flugzeug-Programm-Entwurf, 22 .3 .43 ., pp.. 66
22.3.43., 66..
204
204.. See See in in particular
particular BA/MA,BA/MA, RL RL 3/56,
3/56, Der Der Leiter
Leiter der der Fachgliederung
Fachgliederung Elektrotechnik
Elektrotechnik im im
Reichsforschungsrat,
Reichsforschungsrat, 23 .10 .42 .
23.10.42.
205
205.. SeeSee Irving's,
Irving's, The The Mare's
Mare's Nest,Nest, pp.pp . 30,
30, 222
222..
206
206.. Irving,
Irving, The The Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall ofof the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 202202..
207
207.. Irving,
Irving, The The Mare's
Mare's Nest,Nest, pp pp.. 58-59,
58-59, 87-90
87-90..
208
208.. Golucke,
Golucke, Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt and und derder strategische
strategischeLuftkrieg
Li^ikrieg 1943,1943, pp.. 157157..
209
209.. Irving,
Irving, The The Mare's
Mare's Nest,Nest, pp.. 109109..
210.
210. Golficke,
Golficke, Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt and und der
der strategische Luftkrieg 1943,
strategischeLuftkrieg 1943, pp.. 153153..
211
211.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp.. 156
156.. For
For other
other German
German high high altitude
altitude cannons,
cannons, the the average
average ammunition
ammunition expenditure
expenditure was was
as
as follows
follows:: 88mm 88mm flak flak 41 41:: 8,000
8,000 shells;
shells; 105mm
105mm flak flak 39:39: 6,000
6,000 shells
shells;; and
and the
the 128mm
128mm flakflak 4040:: 3,000
3,000
shells
shells..
212
212.. Speer,
Speer, Inside
Inside thethe Third
Third Reich,
Reich, pp.. 285 285..
213
213.. Figures
Figures are are based
based on on the
the calculations
calculations made made at at Karlsruhe
Karlsruhe afterafter the
the war
war byby Germans
Germans working
working for for the
the
historical project
historical project on on the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe in World War
in World War IIII:: "Alliierte
"Alliierte Luftangriffe
Luftangriffe im im Jahre
Jahre 1943
1943 auf
auf Werke
Werke derder
deutschen Flugzeugindustrie,"
deutschen Flugzeugindustrie," AFSHRC AFSHRC;: K K 113-2,
113-2, vv.. 33..

199
Field
Field Marshal
Marshal Erhard
Erhard Milch
Milch visiting
visiting the
the 55th
55th Bomb
Bomb Wing
Wing
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: AFSHRC)
AFSHRC)

V
V

•3

B-17
B-17 formation
formation attacking
attacking Brunswick
Brunswick
(Photo Credit:
(Photo Credit: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

20
2000
■t.fViSWffll

'**'^lfe*S^i

B-17's
B-I7's under
under attack
attack by
by Fw 190, 29
Fw 190, 29 Nov
Nov 1943,
1943, target
target:: Bremen
Bremen
(Photo Credit:: Official
(Photo Credit Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

The
The cost
cost:: B-17
B-17 straggler
straggler under
under the
the guns
guns of an Fw
of an Fw 190
190
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit;: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

20
2011
The
The cost
cost
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

The
The cost
cost:: B-17
B-17 falling
falling out
out of
of formation
formation
(Photo Credit : Official
(Photo Credit: Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

20
2022
The
The cost
cost:: B-17
B-17 munition
munition handling
handling accident
accident
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

The
The defenders
defenders:: Galland
Galland and
and Hermann
Hennann at
at war
war game
game with
with 1st
1st Fighter
Fighter Wing,
Wing, Nov-Dec
Nov-Dec 1943
1943
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: AFSHRC)
AFSHRC)

203
203
The
The defenders
defenders:: the
the Fw
Fw 190
190
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

The
The defenders
defenders:: mainstay
mainstay of
of the
the night fighter force-the
night fighter force—the Bf
Bf 11 llOG
OG
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

20
2044
Air
Air superiority
superiority:: American
American fighters
fighters over
over B-17
B-17 formation
formation
(Photo
(Photo Credit:
Credit: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

Attrition:
Attrition: destruction
destruction of
of aa Bf
Bf 109
109
(Photo
(Photo Credit:
Credit; Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

205
"•W'^'^^if

i/^jH

Attrition
Attrition:: Bf
Bf 109
109 pilot
pilot bales
bales out
out
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

Air superiority:: He
Air superiority He 177
177 under
under strafing
strafing attack
attack
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit;: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

206
206
u . ..,t .. . . ,
Defeat:
Defeat: occupied
occupied German
German airfield,
airfield, 1945
1945
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit:: Official
Official USAF
USAF Photo)
Photo)

Goring
Goring in
in defeat
defeat:: the
the Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall removes
removes his medals for
his medals for his
his American
American captors
captors
(Photo
(Photo Credit
Credit;: Courtesy
Courtesy of
of Colonel
Colonel Max
Max van
van Rossum
Rossum Daum,
Daum, USAF,
USAF, Retired)
Retired)

2077
20
CHAPTER
CHAPTER VI
VI

Attrition Over the


Attrition Over the Reich
Reich::
September 1943-March 1944
September 1943-March 1944
Jeschonnek's
Jeschonnek's suicide suicide in in August
August 1943 1943 waswas symbolic
symbolic of of the
the collapse
collapse of of Germany's
Germany's
air
air strategy
strategy.. The
The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had committed
committed itself itself toto supporting
supporting ground ground forces
forces deep
deep in in
Russia
Russia and and thethe Mediterranean,
Mediterranean, and and the the sustained
sustained combat combat on on thethe periphery
periphery had had
decimated
decimated its forces.. Meanwhile,
its forces Meanwhile, the the RAF's
RAF's night night offensive
offensive and and thethe growing
growing threat
threat
of
of Eighth
Eighth AirAir Force
Force represented
represented aa direct direct challenge
challenge to to Nazi
Nazi Germany's
Germany's survival
survival.. The
The
homes
homes and and lives
lives of the German
of the German people people became
became hostagehostage to to British bombers, while
British bombers, while
B-17's
B-17's and and B-24's
B-24's posed
posed aa direct
direct threat
threat to to industry.
industry. Admittedly,
Admittedly, the the nature
nature of of the
the
American
American threatthreat was was just
just emerging,
emerging, but but itit had
had already
already influenced
influenced production
production of of
fighter
fighter aircraft.
aircraft. Thus,
Thus, thethe Combined
Combined Bomber Bomber Offensive
Offensive represented
represented aa dangerdanger that
that
the
the Germans
Germans had had toto meet.
meet. TheThe response,
response, however,
however, was was inin nono sense
sense aa clear-headed
clear-headed
analysis
analysis of of thethe Reich's
Reich's strategic
strategic situation
situation.. Rather,
Rather, itit was was aa hodgepodge
hodgepodge of of
expedients
expedients to to defend
defend Germany's
Germany's airspace,
airspace, combined
combined with with an an effort
effort toto find
find aa method
method
of
of retaliation
retaliation..
At
At night,
night, these
these expedients
expedients sufficedsufficed to to winwin aa tactical
tactical victory
victory over over Bomber
Bomber
Command
Command by by March
March 19441944.. However,
However, attrition
attrition of of the
the day
day fighter
fighter force,
force, already
already high
high
in
in the
the summer
summer of of 1943,
1943, continued
continued unabated
unabated throughout
throughout the year;; and
the year and then
then inin 1944
1944 as as
American fighters flew deeper into the Reich, it reached a level that literally
American fighters flew deeper into the Reich, it reached a level that literally
destroyed
destroyed the Luftwaffe's fighter
the Luftwaffe's fighter forces.
forces. As As aa result,
result, the the Americans
Americans won won air air
superiority over Europe . For the German fighter pilot, there was no magic number
superiority over Europe. For the German fighter pilot, there was no magic number
of
of sorties
sorties or
or hours,
hours, thethe completion
completion of of which
which guaranteed
guaranteed aa return return home
home.. He He waswas
already home, and in the skies over the Reich he faced an opponent who enjoyed
already home, and in the skies over the Reich he faced an opponent who enjoyed
overwhelming
overwhelming superiority
superiority.. If If hehe survived
survived the the first
first missions
missions and and hishis skills
skills reached
reached
those of his opponents, he would fly until fatigue and strain led to a mistake that was
those of his opponents, he would fly until fatigue and strain led to a mistake that was
more often than not fatal .
more often than not fatal.
Jeschonnek's
Jeschonnek's death death resulted
resulted in in Gunther
Giinther Korten's
Korten's appointment
appointment as as Chief
Chief of of Staff.
Staff.
He possessed a better grasp of Germany's desperate situation, and his approach
He possessed a better grasp of Germany's desperate situation, and his approach
aimed
aimed at at two
two strategic
strategic objectives
objectives:: building
building up up the
the airair defenses
defenses and and establishing
establishing aa
"strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing force force to to attack
attack critical
critical elements
elements in in Russia's
Russia's economy
economy.'.' The The
latter
latter strategy
strategy wouldwould hopefully
hopefully hinder hinder Soviet
Soviet armaments
armaments productionproduction and and relieve
relieve
hard-pressed
hard-pressed ground ground forces
forces in in the
the east.
east. Korten
Korten established
established himselfhimself as as aa man
man of of
authority
authority andand strength,
strength, and and Hitler
Hitler relied
relied increasingly
increasingly on on the
the Chief
Chief of of Staff.
Staff. Goring
Goring
remained
remained in in the
the background
background in in partial
partial disgrace
disgrace.^ .'
Korten, however,
Korten, however, faced faced an an impossible
impossible task, task, forfor the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had already
already lostlost its
its
chance
chance forfor aa successful
successful aerial
aerial defense
defense of of the Reich. While
the Reich. While Hitler
Hitler had
had indicated
indicated somesome
interest
interest in defending Germany
in defending Germany against against Allied
Allied bombing,
bombing, he he refused
refused to to give
give toptop
priority
priority to to increased
increased fighter production. Hitler's
fighter production. Hitler's refusal
refusal reflected
reflected aa basic basic

209
209
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
FOR DEFEAT

unwillingness,
unwillingness, even
even at this late
at this late date,
date, to
to look
look atat the
the major
major reason
reason behind
behind Germany's
Germany's
desperate
desperate plight
plight:: overwhelming
overwhelming Allied productive superiority
Allied productive superiority.. Hitler
Hitler andand Goring
Goring
dredged
dredged upup many
many excuses
excuses to to explain
explain why
why Allied
Allied bombers
bombers were
were flying
flying deep
deep inside
inside
the Reich, but
the Reich, but one
one recurring
recurring theme
theme was
was that
that of
of the
the cowardice
cowardice of of Germany's
Germany's fighter
fighter
pilots
pilots and their refusal
and their refusal to to press
press home
home attacks
attacks on on bombers
bombers.' .' Korten
Korten himself
himself
discovered
discovered during
during the
the winter
winter ofof 1943-44
1943-44 that
that the
the desperate
desperate ground
ground situation
situation in
in the
the
east
east as
as well
well as
as the
the temptation
temptation to to use
use the
the bomber
bomber forces
forces for
for retaliatory
retaliatory attacks
attacks on
on
Britain
Britain made
made creation
creation of of aa "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing forceforce totally
totally impractical
impractical.. Thus,
Thus,
although
although Korten
Korten accomplished
accomplished aa majormajor restructuring
restructuring of of the
the air
air staff,
staff, he
he could
could not
not
alter fundamental
alter fundamental misconceptions
misconceptions governing
governing thethe conduct
conduct of
of the
the air
air war
war.*.4

NIGHT DEFENSE
NIGHT DEFENSE OF OF THE
THE REICH
REICH
Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's effortsefforts continued
continued full full scale
scale inin the
the fall
fall ofof 1943
1943.. In In
September and October, Harris' forces launched a series of devastating attacks on
September and October, Harris' forces launched a series of devastating attacks on
towns
towns and and cities
cities in
in western
western and and northern
northern Germany
Germany.. On On September
September 5, 5, British
British
bombers
bombers achieved
achieved aa heavy
heavy concentration
concentration on on the
the Mannheim-Ludwigshafen
Mannheim-Ludwigshafen area area and
and
destroyed
destroyed bothboth towns.
towns. On On October
October 4, 4, the
the command
command pulverized
pulverized Frankfurt
Frankfurt am am Main
Main
and
and on on October
October 88 destroyed
destroyed mostmost ofof Hannover's
Hannover's city city center
center.. The
The most
most damaging
damaging
attack
attack came
came on on October
October 22 22 against
against Kassel
Kassel when
when the the pathfinders
pathfinders dropped
dropped target
target
indicators
indicators so so accurately at least
that at
accurately that least 86
86 percent
percent of of attacking
attacking crews bombed within
crews bombed within 33
miles
miles ofof the
the aiming
aiming point
point.. The
The resulting
resulting concentration
concentration created
created aa second
second fire
fire storm
storm
within
within aa three-month
three-month period
period.. Seven
Seven days
days later, fires still
later, fires still burned
burned.'.s Despite
Despite these
these
successes,
successes, whenwhen weather
weather conditions were bad
conditions were bad and
and pathfinders
pathfinders relied
relied onon H2S
H2S toto find
find
and
and toto mark
mark targets
targets in
in cloud
cloud cover,
cover, results
results were
were less
less satisfactory
satisfactory.. In
In fact,
fact, outside
outside the
the
range
range of Oboe, British
of Oboe, bombers found
British bombers found itit almost
almost impossible
impossible to to achieve
achieve accurate,
accurate,
concentrated
concentrated bombing
bombing in in bad
bad weather
weather..
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, despite
despite problems
problems in in the
the fall,
fall, Hams
Harris embarked
embarked on on what
what hehe regarded
regarded
as aa war
as war winning
winning strategy
strategy.. The
The lengthening
lengthening nights
nights provided
provided hishis forces
forces with
with the
the
darkness
darkness needed
needed forfor the
the long,
long, deep
deep penetrations
penetrations to to Berlin
Berlin.. Harris
Harris decided
decided to to destroy
destroy
the
the German
German capital
capital and in early
and in early November
November pennedpenned aa note
note toto Churchill
Churchill in in which
which hehe
underlined
underlined his his successes
successes and
and future
future strategy.
strategy. He He listed
listed 1919 German
German cities,
cities, including
including
Hamburg,
Hamburg, Cologne,
Cologne, Essen,
Essen, Dortmund,
Dortmund, Dusseldorf,
Dusseldorf, Hannover,
Hannover, Mannheim,
Mannheim,
Rostock,
Rostock, and and Kassel,
Kassel, asas virtually
virtually destroyed
destroyed;; 19 19 cities
cities as
as seriously
seriously damaged
damaged;; and and aa
further
further 99 asas damaged
damaged.. "From
"From the the above,"
above," he he minuted,
minuted, "you"you will
will see
see that
that the
the Ruhr
Ruhr
is
is largely
largely `out,'
'out,' and
and that
that much
much progress
progress hashas been
been made
made towards
towards thethe elimination
elimination of of
the
the remaining
remaining essentials
essentials of
of German
German war war power.
power.''" He He concluded
concluded::
II feel
feel certain
certain that
that Germany
Germany must must collapse
collapse before
before thisthis
programme,
programme, which which isis more
more than
than half
half concluded
concluded already,
already, has has
proceeded
proceeded much further..
much further
WeWe have not much
have not much further
further to to go
go.. But
But wewe must
must get get the
the
USAAF
USAAF to to wadewade in in greater
in in greater force
force.. If If they will only
they will only get get going
going
according
according to plan and
to plan and avoid
avoid such disastrous diversions
such disastrous diversions as as
Ploesti
Ploesti.. .. .,., we
we can get through
can get through with very quickly
with itit very quickly..
We
We can
can wreck Berlin from
wreck Berlin ftom end end to
to end
end if
if the USAAF will
the USAAF will
come
come in on itit.. It
in on It will
will cost
cost us between 400-500
us between aircraft.. ItIt will
400-500 aircraft will cost
cost
Germany
Germany the the war .6
war.*

21
2100
w

d
0zoz
0o<
mz
H
x
H
as
w
N z
w
Ctf

n
x
s
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

Hams
Harris was considerably underestimating
was considerably underestimating the
the cost. As Table
cost. As Table XL'XL' indicates,
indicates, bomber
bomber
losses in 1943 had been very heavy ; and with the quick
losses in 1943 had been very heavy; and with the quick recovery
recovery of
of German
German night
night
defenses from the effects of "Window," there was little prospect that matters
defenses from the effects of "Window," there was little prospect that matters
would
would improve
improve in
in the
the coming
coming year.
year.

TABLE
TABLE XLXL
Bomber
Bomber Command
Command Strength
Strength and
and Aircraft
Aircraft Losses-1943
Losses—1943

Present for
Present for Duty
Duty in
in
Aircraft
Aircraft Frontline
Frontline Squadrons,
Squadrons, Aircraft
Aircraft Written
Written
Type
Type January
January 1943
1943 Off,
Off. 1943
1943
Wellington
Wellington 186
186 328
328
Mosquitoe
Mosquitoe 34
34 62
62
Stirling
Stirling 93
93 411
411
Halifax
Halifax 195
195 838
838
Lancaster
Lancaster 256
256 1,112
1,112
TOTAL
TOTAL 764
764 2,751
2,751

Harris' approach raises


Harris' approach raises the
the question
question as as to his interest
to his interest in
in integrating
integrating science
science and
and
analysis into
analysis into the night bombing
the night bombing effort
effort.. He
He hadhad displayed
displayed little
little interest
interest in
in the
the
scientific
scientific war in 1942,
war in 1942, and and asas one
one historian
historian of of the
the bomber
bomber offensive
offensive noted
noted:: "The
"The
short
short point
point is
is this
this.. When
When the Bomber Command
the Bomber Command missing missing rate
rate started
started getting
getting into
into
double figures,
double figures, then
then itsits chiefs
chiefs got
got interested
interested in in the
the scientific
scientific war
war of
of wits,
wits, but
but not
not
before . "I By
before."* By 1943,
1943, conditions
conditions had had forced
forced Harris
Harris to to use
use scientists
scientists but
but only
only on
on his
his
terms
terms.. Solly
Solly Zuckerman,
Zuckerman, one one of
of Britain's leading scientists,
Britain's leading scientists, relates
relates aa remarkable
remarkable
story
story about
about meeting
meeting HarrisHarris in in early
eariy 1944.
1944. Portal
Portal sent Zuckerman to
sent Zuckerman to High
High
Wycombe,
Wycombe, Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's headquarters,
headquarters, to to pass
pass along
along his
his scientific
scientific work
work onon
bombing
bombing in in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean theater.
theater. A A bizarre
bizarre evening
evening began
began with
with Harris
Harris bitterly
bitterly
denouncing
denouncing Eaker's
Baker's transfer
transfer andand characterizing
characterizing the the American
American as as aa man
man whowho
"understood
"understood .... . . the
the vital
vital importance
importance of of the
the strategic
strategic bombing
bombing of of Germany,
Germany, which
which
he
he thought
thought that
that Spaatz
Spaatz appreciated
appreciated not not at
at all ." During
all." During thethe entire
entire evening
evening during
during
which
which reconnaissance
reconnaissance photographs
photographs of of bombed-out
bombed-out German German towns
towns appeared,
appeared, Harris
Harris
asked
asked notnot one
one question
question about
about Zuckerman's
Zuckerman's studiesstudies.. The
The next
next morning,
morning, Harris
Harris
finally
finally brought
brought upup the
the subject
subject of of the
the war
war in
in the
the south
south..

He
He had
had only
only one
one question to put,
question to put, he
he said,
said, and
and he
he wanted
wanted aa straight
straight
answer,
answer, "yes
"yes or
or no-nothing
no—nothing moremore."." "Could
"Could heavy
heavy bombers
bombers bebe
used
used to
to bomb
bomb coastal
coastal defenses?"
defenses?" I1 paused
paused aa second,
second, and
and then
then said,
said,
"yes ." It
"yes." It was
was clearly
clearly not
not the
the answer
answer he he wanted,
wanted, and
and no
no further
further
word
word [on
[on the
the subject]
subject] was
was spoken
spoken.' .9

One
One has
has the
the feeling
feeling that
that Harris
Harris embarked
embarked onon the
the "area"
"area" bombing
bombing of of Berlin
Berlin as
as aa
matter of faith . Science and research were useful only insofar as they supported his
matter of faith. Science and research were useful only insofar as they supported his
campaign and arguments .
campaign and arguments.
In retrospect,
In retrospect, itit appears
appears that
that Harris
Harris hoped
hoped to
to win the war
win the in the
war in the winter of 1943-44
winter of 1943-44
with Bomber
with Bomber Command
Command alonealone.. He
He told
told one senior commander
one senior commander at at the
the time
time that
that his
his
(Harris') forces would have to show the world . t° Unfortunately, there comes a point
(Harris') forces would have to show the world.'" Unfortunately, there comes a point
where the maintenance
where the maintenance of of the objective crosses
the objective crosses the
the fine line between
fine line between realistic
realistic

21
2122
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

perserverance
perserverance and and stubborn
stubborn adherence
adherence to to preconceived
preconceived ideas." ideas." Haig Haig had had crossed
crossed
that line in 1917 ; Harris now also crossed that
that line in 1917; Harris now also crossed that line.
line. In
In fairness
fairness to
to the
the Air
Air Marshal,
Marshal,
one
one must
must note
note that
that nono other
other commander
commander in the war
in the war borebore greater
greater strain.
strain. Every
Every night
night
from February 1942 through spring 1945, Harris decided whether his command
from February 1942 through spring 1945, Harris decided whether his command
would
would strike
strike or or not,
not, aa decision
decision on on which
which rested
rested the the lives
lives and and welfare
welfare of his crews.
of his crews.
In
In the
the 1942-43
1942-43 period,
period, that that strain
strain waswas particularly
particularly heavy heavy in in view
view of of difficulties
difficulties
facing
facing Bomber
Bomber Command.
Command. By By the the fall
fall of
of 1943,
1943, HarrisHarris had had held
held hishis position
position for for aa
year
year and
and three-quarters
three-quarters;; he he was
was tired
tired and
and under
under greatgreat stress
stress.. Thus
Thus far,far, he
he hadhad waged
waged
his
his campaign
campaign for for the
the most
most partpart with
with skill,
skill, and
and itit isis difficult
difficult to to imagine
imagine the the bombing
bombing
effort
effort achieving
achieving the the samesame degree degree of of success
success under under another
another commander
commander..
Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the Battle
Battle of of Berlin
Berlin suggests
suggests that that aa new new commander
commander in in late
late 1943
1943
might
might havehave shown greater flexibility
shown greater flexibility (never
(never Harris'
Harris' strongest
strongest attribute),
attribute), thereby
thereby
avoiding
avoiding the the worst aspects of
worst aspects of thethe defeat
defeat thatthat now now took took placeplace.. However,
However, Harris' Harris'
popularity
popularity with with the
the public
public and and aircrews
aircrews mademade his his position
position invulnerable
invulnerable..
Harris
Harris could
could notnot have
have selected
selected aa more more difficult
difficult targettarget.. Berlin
Berlin laylay deep
deep in in central
central
Germany
Germany and and thus
thus demanded
demanded that that anan attacking
attacking force force fly fly aa considerable
considerable distancedistance and and
time
time over
over hostile
hostile territory
territory.. On On thethe long
long run
run in in and
and out,out, the the bomber
bomber streamstream provided
provided
aa concentrated
concentrated target target to to which
which GermanGerman night night fighters
fighters could could react.
react. The The factfact that
that
Berlin
Berlin was was aa great
great metropolitan
metropolitan center center exacerbated
exacerbated the the difficulties
difficulties confronting
confronting its its
attackers
attackers.. It was easy
It was easy to to bomb
bomb withinwithin city
city limits
limits;; itit waswas another
another matter
matter to to achieve
achieve
the
the concentration
concentration on on which
which "area" "area" bombing
bombing depended.depended. Moreover, Moreover, Berlin Berlin was was
beyond
beyond most most British
British navigational
navigational and and target-finding
target-finding aids, aids, while
while thethe city
city itself
itself was
was
too
too large
large andand had
had tootoo few
few terrain
terrain features
features forfor H2S
HIS to to bebe asas effective
effective as as itit had
had proved
proved
in
in the
the Hamburg
Hamburg and and Peenemunde
Peenemiinde attacks. attacks. Finally,
Finally, the the months
months of of darkness
darkness occurred
occurred
precisely
precisely during
during those
those months
months of of dreadful
dreadful weather
weather conditions
conditions over over central
central Europe
Europe..
Thus,
Thus, the the Berlin
Berlin raids
raids took took placeplace during
during inclement
inclement weather weather that that forced
forced the the
pathfinders
pathfinders to to mark
mark and and the
the main
main force
force to
to bomb
bomb through
through heavy heavy overcast.
overcast. In In fact,
fact, the
the
cloud
cloud covercover overover Berlin
Berlin from from November
November 1943, 1943, when when the the offensive
offensive began, began, until
until
mid-February
mid-February 1944 1944 allowed
allowed reconnaissance
reconnaissance aircraft aircraft to to photograph
photograph the the results
results only
only
twice
twice.'^ ." Yet daunting as
Yet daunting as these
these difficulties
difficulties were,
were, the the British
British faced
faced aa German
German night night
fighter
fighter force
force that
that was
was recovering
recovering rapidly rapidly fromfrom the the defeat
defeat suffered
suffered over over Hamburg
Hamburg..
Thus,
Thus, HarrisHarris embarked
embarked on on aa strategy
strategy thatthat was
was direct
direct and and obvious,
obvious, that that maximized
maximized
the
the exposure
exposure of of his
his bombers
bombers to to fighter
fighter attack,
attack, that that minimized
minimized the the potential
potential of of
evasion,
evasion, and and that
that took
took place
place during
during the the year's
year's worst
worst weather
weather..
On
On thethe other
other side
side of of the
the hill,
hill, thethe German
German night night fighter
fighter forces
forces alsoalso faced
faced serious
serious
problems
problems.. They They tootoo hadbad 'to
to fly
fly during
during bad bad weather
weather.. They They not not only
only faced
faced "Window"
"Window"
but
but aa host
host of of countermeasures
countermeasures and and spoof
spoof raids
raids designed
designed to to mislead
mislead the the defenses.
defenses.
Finally,
Finally, they did not
they did not receive
receive undivided
undivided support
support from from aa high high command
command that that found
found thethe
temptation
temptation to to use
use them
them in in daylight
daylight operations
operations almostalmost overwhelming
overwhelming.. Despite Despite thesethese
difficulties,
difficulties, the the night
night fighter
fighter force
force inflicted
inflicted on on itsits opponent
opponent one one of of the
the fewfew tactical
tactical
victories won by German armed forces in the last years of the war.
victories won by German armed forces in the last years of the war.
The
The inception
inception of of the
the "wild
"wild sow" sow" tactic
tactic inin mid-August
mid-August did did not
not prove
prove particularly
particularly
auspicious . German controllers, misled by a "Mosquitoe" feint, concentrated
auspicious. German controllers, misled by a "Mosquitoe" feint, concentrated
Herrman's
Herrman's force force andand most
most of of the
the night
night fighters
fighters over over Berlin
Berlin.. Antiaircraft
Antiaircraft gunners gunners

21
2133
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

blasted
blasted away
away at at the
the accumulation
accumulation of of aircraft
aircraft over
over the
the capital
capital which
which they
they mistook
mistook forfor
bombers, while
bombers, while fighters
fighters fired
fired off
off recognition
recognition signals
signals atat each
each other.
other. The
The evening's
evening's
proceedings
proceedings ended with aa pileup
ended with pileup on on the
the Brandenburg-Briest
Brandenburg-Briest airfield airfield."." AA few
few night
night
fighters
fighters werewere notnot fooled
fooled and
and arrived
arrived overover Peenemunde
Peenemiinde to to wreak
wreak havoc
havoc among
among thethe
last
last bomber
bomber wave. wave.'"'4 The
The Peenemunde
Peenemiinde operationoperation pointed
pointed up up thethe limitations
limitations under
under
which
which night
night forces
forces operated
operated throughout
throughout the the battle
battle.. Without
Without timely
timely information
information as as to
to
the
the main
main force's
force's course
course andand target,
target, night
night fighters
fighters could
could not not get
get atat the
the bomber
bomber
stream
stream.. IfIf the
the controllers
controllers fell
fell for
for aa spoof
spoof raid, German night
raid, German night fighters
fighters were
were in
in for
for aa
long,
long, unproductive
unproductive evening
evening chasing "Mosquitoes," while
chasing "Mosquitoes," while the the main
main force
force pounded
pounded
some
some unfortunate
unfortunate city. city. Conditions
Conditions limitedlimited the the "wild
"wild sow"
sow" force force ofof day
day fighters
fighters
even
even more
more.. InIn single-engine,
single-engine, short-range
short-range fighters,
fighters, they
they had
had to to receive
receive aa vector
vector to
to the
the
correct
correct citycity as
as limited
limited range
range and
and lack
lack ofof radar
radar gave
gave them
them little
little chance
chance of of intercepting
intercepting
the
the bomber
bomber stream
stream.. Almost
Almost from
from thethe first,
first, the
the British
British caught
caught on on toto the
the "wild
"wild sow"
sow"
tactics
tactics.. Their
Their response
response waswas twofold
twofold.. First,
First, they
they launched
launched more more spoof
spoof missions
missions toto
confuse
confuse and and mislead
mislead defenses,
defenses, and and deception
deception tactics
tactics became
became more more complicated
complicated as as
the year continued
the year continued.. The second response
The second response reduced
reduced timetime over
over target
target toto aa minimum
minimum.. In In
October,
October, the the British
British scheduled
scheduled no no raid
raid to
to last
last more
more than
than 26
26 minutes
minutes over over target ." As
target.'^ As
aa result,
result,''"wild
wild sow"
sow'' fighters
fighters had
had little
little time
time toto identify
identify and
and toto attack
attack bombers
bombers..

If
If "wild
"wild sow" sow" tactics
tactics represented
represented an an expedient,
expedient, the the Germans
Germans were were moving
moving
rapidly to redress the balance between bomber and fighter . In particular, they
rapidly to redress the balance between bomber and fighter. In particular, they
solved
solved thethe "Window"
"Window" problem
problem.. In In the
the summer,
summer, German
German scientists
scientists had
had been
been
developing aa new
developing new radar
radar set,
set, the
the "SN2."
"SN2." It It operated
operated onon aa longer
longer wavelength
wavelength than than
older radars; and although it could lock on to targets at a relatively long range, it had
older radars; and although it could lock on to targets at a relatively long range, it had
the disadvantage of an excessive minimum range . However, "Window" had little
the disadvantage of an excessive minimum range. However, "Window" had little
effect
effect on its wavelength,
on its wavelength, and and thus
thus itit could
could distinguish
distinguish targets
targets inin the
the clouds
clouds of of
aluminum strips.
aluminum strips. The Luftwaffe immediately
The Luftwaffe immediately began began aa crash
crash program
program to to re-equip
re-equip
night fighters.'*
night fighters." As As with
with all
all new
new systems,
systems, there
there were
were teething
teething troubles
troubles with
with thethe
device,
device, and
and frontline
frontline units
units squabbled
squabbled withwith industry
industry asas to
to who
who was
was atat fault
fault for
for initial
initial
failures
failures.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, by by mid-winter,
mid-winter, technicians
technicians hadhad resolved
resolved most
most defects
defects." ." InIn
addition, some Ju
addition, some Ju 88's
88's and
and HeHe 219's
219's began
began to to appear
appear inin the
the force
force asas replacements
replacements
for
for outdated
outdated Bf Bf 110's
llO's.. But
But thethe re-equipment
re-equipment program
program stillstill lagged
lagged because
because
night
night fighters
fighters received
received lower
lower priority
priority than
than the
the bomber
bomber force
force.. Therefore,
Therefore, despite
despite its its
limitations,
limitations, thethe Bf
Bf 110
110 remained
remained the the backbone
backbone of of night
night fighters
fighters..

One
One other
other major
major equipment
equipment change
change occurred
occurred that
that had
had aa major
major impact
impact onon bomber
bomber
losses
losses towards
towards thethe end
end of
of the
the Battle
Battle of
of Berlin
Berlin.. Frontline
Frontline squadrons
squadrons developed
developed an an
upward firing cannon called schrdge Musik . By aligning himself under and slightly
upward firing cannon called schrdge Musik. By aligning himself under and slightly
behind
behind the
the wing
wing of
of an
an enemy
enemy bomber,
bomber, aa night
night fighter
fighter pilot
pilot could
could destroy
destroy the
the engines
engines
and
and set
set the
the fuel tanks on
fuel tanks on fire.
fire. Given
Given the
the loads
loads of of fuel
fuel and
and explosives
explosives that
that British
British
bombers
bombers carried
carried and
and their
their lack
lack of
of defensive
defensive armor,
armor, anyany attack
attack was
was dangerous
dangerous.. The
The
only possibility
only possibility ofof survival
survival was
was instantaneous,
instantaneous, violent
violent evasion
evasion.. The
The new
new schrage
schrdge
Musik allowed
Musik allowed fighters to approach
fighters to approach bombers
bombers unobserved
unobserved from from underneath,
underneath, as as there
there
were
were no
no turret
turret gunner
gunner on the underside
on the underside ofof most
most British
British bombers
bombers.'^." RAF
RAF intelligence
intelligence
remained ignorant
remained ignorant of
of the
the new
new tactics since debriefing
tactics since debriefing officers
officers refused
refused toto believe
believe the
the

21
2144
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

few
few reports
reports that that German
German fightersfighters werewere firing
firing upwards
upwards while while flyingflying underneath
underneath the the
bombers .
bombers.
One
One critical
critical factor
factor facing
facing the the night
night fighter
fighter force
force was was thethe level
level of of attrition
attrition taking
taking
place in frontline units. In October, Kammhuber warned Goring at a meeting of
place in frontline units. In October, Kammhuber warned Goring at a meeting of
fighter
fighter generals
generals that that crew
crew losses
losses were
were approaching
approaching unacceptable
unacceptable levels levels.. In In June,
June, the the
night
night fighter
fighter force force had had lostlost onlyonly 12 12 crews
crews.. FromFrom then then on, on, losses
losses had had climbed
climbed
rapidly
rapidly.. In In July,
July, itit lost
lost 38 38 crews
crews (6.8(6.8 percent),
percent), in in August
August 57 57 (9(9.8.8 percent),
percent), and and in in
September
September 53 53 (7.7
(7.7 percent)
percent)." ." These
These risingrising losses
losses among
among night night fighters
fighters reflected
reflected
their use
their use during
during daytimedaytime as as well
well asas the pressure of
the pressure of operations
operations against against the the British
British
homeland
homeland.. The The assembled
assembled generals generals found found the the losses
losses worrisome,
worrisome, and and General
General
Martini
Martini commented
commented that that thethe night
night fighter
fighter defenses
defenses were were eating
eating into into their
their capital
capital..
Goring,
Goring, however,
however, was was notnot upset
upset.. He He remarked
remarked that that "today,
"today, there there is is aa war
war on"
on" and and
that
that losses
losses were were inevitable.
inevitable. Noting Noting the the loss
loss of of 160160 crewscrews in in four
four months
months
(including
(including June'sJune's figures
figures and and missing
missing the the significance
significance of of the rise of
the rise of crew
crew losses),
losses).
Goring
Goring tooktook comfort
comfort in in the
the fact
fact that
that this
this worked
worked out out to
to only
only oneone and and one-third
one-third crews
crews
lost
lost per
per night.
night. He He claimed
claimed that that this
this rate
rate was was not shocking when
not shocking when compared
compared to to the
the loss
loss
of
of life
life caused
caused by by the British bombardment
the British bombardment.. As As toto the
the efforts
efforts to to get more equipment
get more equipment
for
for training
training units, units, the Reichsmarschall lamely
the Reichsmarschall lamely suggested
suggested that that perhaps
perhaps booty booty seized
seized
in
in Italy
Italy afterafter its surrender might
its surrender might compensate
compensate for for some
some of of the the equipment
equipment
deficiencies
deficiencies.^" .2°
At the end of
At the end of August
August and and beginning
beginning of of September,
September, lengthening
lengthening nights nights allowed
allowed
Bomber Command to attack Berlin again . The results of three raids and the losses
Bomber Command to attack Berlin again. The results of three raids and the losses
suffered should have served warning for future strategy. Out of 1,179 aircraft
suffered should have served warning for future strategy. Out of 1,179 aircraft
claiming
claiming to to have
have bombed
bombed the the capital,
capital, only only 27 27 onon examination
examination of of night
night camera
camera
photographs got within 3 miles of the aiming point . Losses showed a significant rise
photographs got within 3 miles of the aiming point. Losses showed a significant rise
over the Hamburg raids: The Germans shot down no less than 123 bombers (an
over the Hamburg raids: The Germans shot down no less than 123 bombers (an
overall loss rate of 7 .2 percent) . 2' By the end of September, Goring felt optimistic
overall loss rate of 7.2 percent).^' By the end of September, Goring felt optimistic
enough
enough to to congratulate
congratulate his his night
night fighter
fighter commanders
commanders and and crews
crews for for their
their successful
successful
recovery and the losses they were inflicting .
recovery and the losses they were inflicting.^^ 22
The
The real
real offensive
offensive againstagainst BerlinBerlin opened
opened in in November
November with with fourfour major
major raids
raids.. The
The
losses in the first stage of the battle were surprisingly low (4 percent of sorties
losses in the first stage of the battle were surprisingly low (4 percent of sorties
launched
launched on on Berlin
Berlin and and 33.6 .6 percent
percent for for the
the overall
overall sortie
sortie loss
loss rate)
rate).. Churchill
Churchill offered
offered
congratulations
congratulations to to Portal
Portal and and Harris
Harris.^'.23 But
But loss
loss rates
rates were
were misleading
misleading.. November's
November's
weather
weather conditions
conditions were were dreadful
dreadful;; and and during
during somesome raids,raids, German
German fighters fighters could
could
not
not get
get off
off thethe ground
ground.. The The corollary
corollary to the safety advantage that such conditions
to the safety advantage that such conditions
offered was
offered was aa corresponding
corresponding drop drop in in bombing
bombing accuracyaccuracy.. Conditions
Conditions made made it it
impossible to
impossible to mark
mark or or toto identify
identify targets,
targets, and and crews
crews had had no no choice
choice but but toto drop
drop their
their
loads
loads higgledy-piggledy
higgledy-piggledy over over Berlin
Beriin.. Considerable
Considerable damage damage was was done,done, but but no no
concentrated
concentrated bombing bombing on on the
the scale
scale ofof Hamburg
Hamburg and and Kassel
Kassel took took place
place..
The
The damage
damage did did shake
shake Speer's
Speer's confidence,
confidence, however, however, and and Goebbels
Goebbels after after aa major
major
raid
raid noted
noted that that:: "The
"The situation
situation has has become
become ever ever more
more alarming
alarming in in that
that one
one industrial
industrial
plant
plant after
after another
another has has been
been set set on
on fire.
fire. .. .. .. The
The skysky above
above BerlinBerlin is is bloody,
bloody, deep deep
red,
red, and
and of of an an awesome
awesome beauty beauty.. II just
just can't stand looking
can't stand looking at at itit."
." Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the
Propaganda
Propaganda Minister Minister comforted
comforted himself himself in British overestimations
in British overestimations of of raid
raid damage
damage
and
and forbade
forbade any any denials
denials in in the
the hope
hope that
that thethe "sooner
"sooner LondonLondon is is convinced
convinced that that there
there
21
2155
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

is
is nothing
nothing left left of
of Berlin,
Berlin, the the sooner
sooner will will they stop their
they stop their offensive
offensive against against the the Reich's
Reich's
capital .
capital."^" "24 The Germans confined post-bombing damage better
The Germans confined post-bombing damage better than
than in
in earlier
earlier raids
raids
through lessons learned at Hamburg . Goebbels ordered evacuation of nearly 11
through lessons learned at Hamburg. Goebbels ordered evacuation of nearly
million
million Berliners
Berliners in in August
August and instituted aa massive
and instituted massive program
program throughout
throughout the the Reich's
Reich's
cities
cities toto beef
beef up air raid
up air raid andand fire
fire prevention
prevention forces forces.. In In Berlin,
Berlin, such such efforts
efforts helped
helped to to
.25
hold
hold down
down casualties
casualties and and damage
damage.^^
In December,
In December, Bomber Bomber Command's
Command's losses began to
losses began to rise
rise.. The
The first
first raid
raid on on Berlin
Berlin
saw
saw 88.7 .7 percent
percent of of the
the attacking
attacking force force missing
missing with with an average loss
an average loss of of 44.8.8 percent
percent of of
sorties dispatched for
sorties dispatched for allall four
four attacks
attacks on on the capital.. Disaster
the capital Disaster struck struck in in January
January..
Harris launched
Harris launched nine nine major
major operations
operations against against Germany,
Germany, six six against
against Berlin,
Berlin, and and oneone
each
each against Stettin, Brunswick,
against Stettin, Brunswick, and and Magdeburg
Magdeburg.. The The lossloss rates
rates werewere terrible
terrible.. The The
missing
missing rate rate onon six Berlin raids
six Berlin raids averaged
averaged 66.1 .1 percent
percent of of sorties dispatched, while
sorties dispatched, while
attacks
attacks on on other
other cities lost 77.2
cities lost .2 percent
percent of their aircraft
of their aircraft.. TheThe least
least costly
costly raid was on
raid was on
Stettin
Stettin.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, even though the
even though the German
German controller
controller was was fooled
fooled intointo believing
believing
Berlin
Berlin was was the the main attack, the
main attack, the raid
raid still
still lost
lost 44.2.2 percent
percent of of aircraft
aircraft dispatched
dispatched.^* . 26
Total
Total bombers
bombers lost lost for
for the
the month
month came came to to 316
316 aircraft,
aircraft, aa rate rate in in terms
terms of of materiel
materiel
and manpower that
and manpower that nono air
air force
force could
could long support..
long support
These
These losses
losses reflected
reflected the the German
German successsuccess in in rebuilding
rebuilding the the night
night defenses.
defenses. New New
aircraft,
aircraft, newnew radar
radar sets,
sets, and
and above
above all all aa new
new system
system of of command
command and and control
control tippedtipped
the
the balance
balance against
against thethe bomber.
bomber. As As early
early as the end
as the end of of September,
September, General General Schmid,
Schmid,
now
now Commander
Commander of of the
the II Jagdkorps
Jagdkorps (I (I Fighter
Fighter Corps),
Corps), felt that the
felt that the "wild
"wild sow" sow"
tactics had
tactics had reached
reached their
their optimum
optimum and
and would
would not
not gain
gain any
any greater
greater success
success.^'' ."
Herrmann's
Herrmann's system system depended
depended on on aa centralized
centralized control control to to give
give day day fighters
fighters the the
location
location of of the
the attack.
attack. During
During the the fall
fall of
of 1943,
1943, that that control
control system
system evolved
evolved into into aa
running
running commentary
commentary by
by the
the chief
chief German
German controller
controller as
as to
to the
the course
course and
and progress
progress of
of
the
the bomber
bomber stream stream.. Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, "wild "wild sow"sow" and and "tame
"tame sow" sow" radar-equipped
radar-equipped
fighters
fighters scrambled
scrambled.. The The controller
controller vectored
vectored them them to to beacons
beacons located located throughout
throughout
Germany from which they could then move
Germany from which they could then move into
into the
the bomber
bomber stream
stream. . The
The fighter
fighter
beacons for "wild sow" aircraft were flashing high-powered lights on the ground,
beacons for "wild sow" aircraft were flashing high-powered lights on the ground,
while
while radioradio beacons
beacons provided
provided concentration
concentration points points for for thethe twin-engine,
twin-engine, radar- radar-
equipped fighters. Bad winter weather, however, made it possible to concentrate
equipped fighters. Bad winter weather, however, made it possible to concentrate
"wild
"wild sow"
sow" forces,
forces, as as Schmid
Schmid had had suspected
suspected would would be be the
the case.
case.^* 28
The
The "tame
"tame sow" sow" aircraft
aircraft andand thethe controllers
controllers becamebecame increasingly
increasingly adept adept at at earlier
earlier
interception
interception of of raids
raids andand at at feeding
feeding nightnight fighters
fighters directly
directly into into thethe bomber
bomber stream stream..
The
The development
development of of aa number
number ofnewof new devices
devices aidedaided the the defense
defense.. The The first
first step
step came
came
with
with the
the useuse ofof British
British identification,
identification, friend friend or or foe
foe (IFF)
(IFF) transmissions
transmissions to to determine
determine
the
the bomber
bomber stream's
stream's course
course.. WhenWhen the the British
British caught
caught on on andand shutshut offoff such
such signals
signals
over
over thethe continent,
continent, the the Germans
Germans moved moved to to other
other transmissions
transmissions that that thethe bombers
bombers
made.
made. British
British scientists
scientists developed
developed aa device, device, code-named
code-named "Monica," "Monica," to to warn
warn
bombers that German airborne radar was scanning them ; the Germans captured such
bombers that German airborne radar was scanning them; the Germans captured such
aa device
device early early onon and
and turned
turned it. it. With
With the the "Flensburg"
"Flensburg" apparatus, apparatus, night night fighters
fighters
homed
homed in in directly
directly on on bombers
bombers using using "Monica
"Monica." ." InIn addition,
addition, the the Germans
Germans providedprovided
fighters with a device called "Naxos," which homed in on H2S transmissions . Not
fighters with a device called "Naxos," which homed in on HIS transmissions. Not
all
all such
such measures
measures were were German
German.. The British began
The British began to to use
use fake
fake controllers,
controllers, first first inin

21 6
216
ATTRITION OVER THE
ATTRITION OVER THE REICH
REICH

England and
England and then
then airborne
airborne in specially built
in specially built "Lancasters
"Lancasters." ." They
They confused
confused and and gave
gave
contradictory information
contradictory information to to German
German fighters
fighters.^^ .z9 When
When that that nono longer
longer worked,
worked, the the
British jammed the
British jammed the frequencies
frequencies used used by by German
German controllers
controllers.^" .3° Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the
general
general impression
impression of of scientific
scientific war war in in this
this period
period is is that the defense
that the defense had had thethe upper
upper
hand.
hand.
By
By January,
January, German German night night fighters
fighters werewere flying
flying outout into
into the
the North
North SeaSea toto intercept
intercept
the bombers ." Their successes in that month forced the British to take drastic
the bombers." Their successes in that month forced the British to take drastic
action. Raid planning became more complex with a number of spoofraids launched
action. Raid planning became more complex with a number of spoof raids launched
with the
with the main
main effort
effort to to deceive defenses.. Pathfinders
deceive defenses Pathfinders no no longer
longer laid
laid route
route markers
markers to to
guide the bombers nor could markers indicate course turning points . Such marking
guide the bombers nor could markers indicate course turning points. Such marking
devices
devices had had pointed
pointed out out thethe raid's
raid's direction
direction to to German
German fighters
fighters and and drew
drew themthem
directly
directly intointo the
the bomber
bomber stream.stream. While While suchsuch changes
changes helpedhelped keep
keep losses
losses down,
down, theythey
decreased
decreased bombing
bombing accuracy accuracy.. By By January,
January, German
German commanders
commanders had had recognized
recognized
that
that "tame
"tame sow" sow" tacticstactics were were proving
proving most most effective,
effective, although
although some some problems
problems
remained
remained with with thethe "SN2"
"SN2" radar radar.^^. 12
The
The German
German successsuccess in in January
January was was such
such that had virtually
that itit had virtually won
won the the Battle
Battle of of
Berlin, although Harris did not admit defeat until March . Nevertheless, Bomber
Berlin, although Harris did not admit defeat until March. Nevertheless, Bomber
Command's
Command's operations operations in in February
February suggestsuggest High High Wycombe's
Wycombe's recognition
recognition that that
Berlin had become a dangerous target . Most of February's attacks were against less
Berlin had become a dangerous target. Most of February's attacks were against less
dangerous objectives in southern and western Germany . The two missions along the
dangerous objectives in southern and western Germany. The two missions along the
northern route through the heart of the German defenses suffered heavily . The first
northern route through the heart of the German defenses suffered heavily. The first
lost
lost 4.8
4.8 percent,
percent, whilewhile the the second
second lost lost 9.5
9.5 percent
percent of aircraft dispatched
of aircraft dispatched.. Not Not until
until
March
March 24 24 did
did aa major
major raid raid against
against Berlin
Berlin recur
recur.. Night
Night fighter
fighter defenses
defenses thus thus forced
forced
the
the British
British to to deflect
deflect the the offensive
offensive from from Berlin
Berlin to to attack
attack what
what Harris
Harris regarded
regarded as as
subsidiary
subsidiary targets
targets.^' ." Among
Among these these was was aa heavy
heavy raid raid on on Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt.. After After great
great
wrangling
wrangling betweenbetween the the AirAir Staff's
Staff's Director
Director of of Bomber
Bomber Operations
Operations and and Harris,
Harris,
Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand finally finally attacked
attacked the the ball
ball bearing
bearing plantsplants seven
seven months
months after after the
the
first
first American
American raid . 34
raid.^"
For
For thethe first
first part
part of of March,
March, Bomber Bomber Command's
Command's efforts efforts centered
centered on on attacking
attacking
targets
targets in in southern
southern GermanyGermany.. Moreover,Moreover, the the commitment
commitment to to the
the invasion
invasion had had
already
already begunbegun to to draw
draw attention
attention to to targets
targets in in France.
France. At At the
the endend ofof the
the month,
month,
however,
however, the the British
British mounted
mounted several several majormajor deep
deep penetration
penetration raids raids into
into Germany
Germany..
They
They brought
brought aa sudden
sudden and and costly
costly end end to
to the
the Battle
Battle of of Berlin
Berlin.. The
The first
first on
on March
March 24 24
hit
hit the
the German
German capitalcapital withwith one one last
last massive blow . Losses
massive blow. Losses were were heavy,
heavy, 73 73 bombers
bombers
were
were destroyed
destroyed for for aa missing
missing rate rate of of 9.1
9.1 percent
percent of of aircraft
aircraft dispatched
dispatched." .35 On
On the
the
26th,
26th, Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand again again devastated
devastated EssenEssen in in an
an accurate
accurate OboeOboe attack
attack carried
carried
out
out through
through dense dense cloud
cloud cover cover.. German
German defenses
defenses were were offoff balance,
balance, and and thethe British
British
lost
lost only
only ninenine bombers
bombers.'* .16
The
The accurate
accurate bombing
bombing of of Essen,
Essen, however,
however, underlined
underlined
again
again howhow dependent
dependent Bomber Bomber Command Command was was on on navigational
navigational devicesdevices to to achieve
achieve
accurate
accurate bombing
bombing patterns patterns.. In In oneone raid
raid against
against Stuttgart
Stuttgart (beyond
(beyond the the range
range of of
Oboe) earlier
Oboe) earlier in the month,
in the month, not not one
one aircraft
aircraft dropped
dropped its its bombs within city
bombs within city limits
limits."."
On
On March
March 30, 30, Bomber
Bomber Command Command launched launched its its last
last deep penetration raid
deep penetration raid for
for aa
considerable period of time as preparations for
considerable period of time as preparations for "Overlord"
"Overlord" were
were about
about to
to begin
begin. .

21
2177
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

This was
This was indeed
indeed "a"a curious
curious operation
operation.."""3* ItIt reflected
reflected serious
serious errors
errors in
in judgment
judgment
which,
which, when
when combined
combined with
with circumstances
circumstances such
such as
as weather
weather and
and decisions
decisions made
made by
by
German
German controllers
controllers early
early in
in the
the raid,
raid, caused
caused a
a disaster.
disaster. In
In the
the sense
sense that
that chance
chance lay
lay
largely on
largely on Germany's
Germany's side,
side, the
the Nuremberg
Nuremberg raid raid was
was on
on the
the opposite
opposite end
end of
of the
the
spectrum from the Hamburg raids of July and August 1943.
spectrum from the Hamburg raids of July and August 1943.

Hams
Harris initiated
initiated the
the mission
mission inin the
the early
early morning
morning hours
hours ofof March
March 30 30.. Weather
Weather was was
not
not favorable
favorable and and thethe moon
moon would
would not not set
set until
until nearly
nearly 0200
0200 hours
hours.. However,
However, most most
dangerous
dangerous for for the
the bombers'
bombers' survival
survival was was the
the routing
routing that
that High
High Wycombe
Wycombe selected
selected
for
for the
the attacking
attacking force.
force. Turning
Turning south
south of of Brussels,
Brussels, the
the bomber
bomber stream
stream would
would fly
fly aa
route
route that
that 55 Group
Group advocated
advocated:: aa straight
straight in,in, straight
straight out
out flight
flight plan
plan with
with few
few course
course
alterations
alterations.. TheThe long
long leg
leg after
after the turn south
the turn south ofof Brussels
Brussels would
would carry
carry the
the bombers
bombers
between
between the the Ruhr
Ruhr and and Colbenz
Colbenz FlakFlak concentrations
concentrations,. - ^fortunately,
1fortunately, thisthis gap
gap lay
lay
immediately
immediately in in front
front of of night
night fighter
fighter beacons,
beacons, "Ida"
"Ida" pd nd "Otto."
"Otto." There
There waswas
nothing
nothing surprising
surprising aboutabout the
the bomber stream passing
bomber stream passing clo,seitiy
close^by such
such beacons
beacons thatthat now
now
existed
existed throughout
throughout Germany
Germany.. What
What was surprising was
was surprising was the
the fact
fact that
that the
the bombers
bombers
after
after their
their turn
turn south
south of of Brussels
Brussels flew
flew straight
straight at
at those
those beacons
beacons forfor 25
25 minutes
minutes and and
then
then continued
continued on on the
the same
same course
course for for aa further
further 35
35 minutes
minutes.. Bennett
Bennett objected
objected to to the
the
route
route inin strong
strong terms.'9
terms.^' He He later
later suggested
suggested thatthat there
there was
was aa near
near mutiny
mutiny among
among his his
pathfinder
pathfinder crews
crews when
when theythey saw
saw the
the routing .40
routing.'"'
At
At 2322
2322 hours,
hours, thethe bomber
bomber stream
stream crossed
crossed the the coast
coast.. Within
Within 20 20 minutes,
minutes, the the
German
German controller
controller ordered
ordered fighters
fighters to to concentrate
concentrate at at "Ida.
"Ida.""'"4' Adding
Adding to to the
the doom
doom
awaiting
awaiting the the bombers
bombers werewere unusual
unusual weather
weather conditions
conditions.. For For nearly
nearly the
the entire
entire length
length
of
of the
the long
long leg,
leg, the
the skies
skies remained
remained clear clear with
with few few clouds
clouds.. Moreover,
Moreover, strong strong
contrails
contrails formed
formed at at the
the bombers'
bombers' altitude,
altitude, aa rarerare occurrence
occurrence considering
considering the the
relatively
relatively low low height
height atat which
which Bomber
Bomber Command
Conrniand operated
operated.''^.42 In
In such
such conditions,
conditions,
the
the bombers
bombers were were inin aa hopeless
hopeless position.
position. German
German fighters,
fighters, vectored
vectored to to the
the "Ida"
"Ida"
beacon
beacon from
from thethe west,
west, found
found themselves
themselves in in the
the bomber
bomber streamstream even
even before
before reaching
reaching
station
station.. Upon
Upon arrival
arrival atat the
the beacon,
beacon, fighters
fighters from
from the the north
north andand the
the westwest were
were
among
among the the bombers
bombers.. All All then
then flew
flew with
with thethe main
main force
force to to Nuremberg,
Nuremberg, while while moremore
fighters
fighters linked
linked up up and
and slaughter
slaughter of of the
the bombers
bombers tooktook place
place.. InIn Britain,
Britain, `Y'
'Y' Service's
Service's
listening
listening stations
stations picked
picked upup with
with distressing
distressing frequency
frequency interception
interception plots
plots and
and victory
victory
calls
calls byby German
German fighter
fighter pilots ." By
pilots.'*' By the
the time
time the
the bombers
bombers turnedturned south
south on on the
the attack
attack
leg,
leg, they
they had
had lost
lost 6161 of
of their
their aircraft
aircraft.. ByBy the
the raid's
raid's completion,
completion, they they had had lost
lost aa
further
further 47,
47, aa total
total of
of 108
108 altogether
altogether.. TheThe "Halifaxes"
"Halifaxes'' of of 44 Group
Group had had aa particularly
particularly
rough
rough night
night with
with 2020 aircraft
aircraft missing
missing and and aa loss
loss rate
rate ofof 20.6
20.6 percent .44 As
percent."* As aa fitting
fitting
end
end toto the
the disaster,
disaster, notnot only
only did
did thethe attacking
attacking forces
forces fail
fail to
to achieve
achieve aa concentration
concentration
on
on Nuremberg
Nuremberg but but many
many aircraft
aircraft blown
blown offoff course
course bombed
bombed Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt.'*' .41
Losses
Losses over
over Nuremberg,
Nuremberg, when combined with
when combined with those
those earlier
earlier in
in the
the week,
week, meant
meant
that
that Bomber
Bomber Command
Command had had lost
lost 190 -bombers in
190~bombers in seven
seven days (73 in
days (73 in Berlin,
Berlin, 99 in
in
Essen,
Essen, and
and 108
108 in
in Nuremberg).
Nuremberg). These
These were
were unsupportable
unsupportable losses
losses and
and reflected
reflected not
not
only
only the
the recovery
recovery of German defenses
of German defenses but
but also
also the
the heavy operations and
heavy operations and losses
losses
suffered over the past year (see Table
suffered over the past year (see Table XLI46).
XLI'^).

21
2188
F' .OTS ON
F'.OTS ON BOMBERS
BOMBERS PASSED OVER R/T
PASSED OVER R/T &
&
W/T
W/T TO
TO NIGHTFIGHTERS
NIGHTFIGHTERS..
RAID
RAID ON
ON NUREMBURG
NUREMBURG

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Q
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

TABLE
TABLE XLI XLI
Bomber
Bomber Command
Command Losses, January 1943-March
Lxjsses, January 1943-March 1944
1944
Losses,
Losses, All
All
Causes
Causes (Night)
(Night)
January
January 1943
1943 86
86
February
February 1943
1943 101
101
March
March 1943
1943 161
161
April
April 1943
1943 253
253
May
May 1943
1943 234
234
June
June 1943
1943 275
275
July
July 1943
1943 188
188
August
August 1943
1943 275
275
September
September 1943
1943 191
191
October
October 1943
1943 159
159
November
November 1943
1943 162
162
December
December 1943
1943 170
170
January
January 1944
1944 314
314
February
February 1944
1944 199
199
March
Match 1944
1944 283
283
TOTAL
TOTAL 5,881
5,881

In
In the
the five
five months
months ofof the
the Battle
Battle ofof Berlin,
Berlin, Harris'
Harris' forces
forces lost
lost 1,128
1,128 aircraft,
aircraft,
nearly
nearly all
all four-engine
four-engine bombers
bombers.. These
These losses
losses were
were only
only marginally
marginally above
above the the 813
813
bombers
bombers lostlost during
during the
the Battle
Battle ofof Hamburg
Hamburg and and the
the 923
923 lost
lost during
during the
the Battle
Battle ofof the
the
Ruhr
Ruhr.. The
The results,
results, however,
however, achieved
achieved over
over winter
winter 1943-44
1943-44 were were not
not close
close to
to those
those
of
of the
the earlier
earlier two
two battles
battles.. That
That alone
alone contributed
contributed to to aa fall
fall in
in morale:
morale: One
One can
can face
face
terrible
terrible odds
odds if if the
the results
results are
are commensurate
commensurate.. In In the
the Battles
Battles ofof the
the Ruhr
Ruhr and and
Hamburg,
Hamburg, the the achievements
achievements were were obvious
obvious andand palpable
palpable.. The
The crews
crews could
could not
not miss
miss
what
what waswas happening
happening below
below to to Essen,
Essen, Hamburg,
Hamburg, and and Kassel
Kassel.. For
For the
the Battle
Battle of of
Berlin,
Berlin, there
there waswas nono similar
similar runrun of
of successes
successes.. Bomber
Bomber Command
Command was was close
close to to
burning
burning itself
itself out.
out. The losses in
The losses in the
the Battle
Battle of
of Berlin
Berlin were
were an an indication
indication ofof the
the scale
scale
of
of losses
losses that
that the
the Command
Command would would suffer
suffer in
in 1944.
1944. Table
Table XL1147
XLII"^ indicates
indicates the
the extent
extent
ofBritish
of British bomber
bomber losses
losses for
for the
the year.
year.

TABLE
TABLE XLII
XLII
British
British Bomber
Bomber Losses-1944
Losses—1944

Present
Present for
for Duty
Duty in
in
Frontline
Frontline Squadrons,
Squadrons, Aircraft
Aircraft Written
Written
Type
Type Aircraft
Aircraft January
January 1944
1944 Off
Off in
in 1944
1944
Wellington
Wellington 15
15 22
22
Mosquitoe
Mosquitoe 116
116 223
223
Stirling
Stirling 134
134 77
77
Halifax
HaUfax 307
307 920
920
Lancaster
Lancaster 652
652 1, 978
1,978
TOTALS
TOTALS 1,224
r;224 3,220
3;220

Another
Another factor
factor contributed
contributed to
to aa decline
decline in
in morale
morale.. Sustained
Sustained operations
operations had
had now
now
continued
continued for
for over
over aa year
year and
and few
few crews
crews completed
completed their
their 30
30 mission
mission obligation.
obligation.
January's
January's losses
losses turned
turned squadrons
squadrons into
into short
short one-way
one-way houses
houses for
for crews
crews on
on the
the way
way to
to

220
220
ATTRITION OVER THE
ATTRITION OVER THE REICH
REICH

their
their deaths
deaths.'" .41 The
The dropdrop in in morale
morale resulted
resulted in in more
more earlyearly returns
returns and and more
more aircrew
aircrew
members
members cashiered
cashiered for for LMF (lacking moral
LMF (lacking moral fibre)
fibre).. It It also
also caused
caused some some crews crews to to
pickle their
pickle their "cookies"
"cookies" (the (the 4,000-pound
4,000-pound blockbuster)
blockbuster) over over thethe North
North Sea Sea to to gain
gain
the
the relative
relative safety safety of higher altitudes
of higher altitudes.. Air Air ViceVice Marshal
Marshal D.C D.C.T. .T. Bennett,
Bennett,
commander
commander of of the
the pathfinders,
pathfinders, somewhat
somewhat uncharitably
uncharitably called called such such crews
crews "fringe
"fringe
merchants
merchants."*' . -49 ButBut Bennett
Bennett was was as as hard
hard on on himself
himself as as hehe was
was on on hishis crews.
crews. UnlikeUnlike
other
other group
group commanders,
commanders, he he had
had flown
flown aa tour tour on
on operations
operations and and hadhad been
been shotshot down
down
over
over Norway
Norway in in 1942.
1942. He He walked
walked out out to to Sweden
Sweden.. Recently,
Recently, he he observed
observed that that one
one ofof
the
the great
great failings
failings in in Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's leadership leadership was was that
that nono other
other senior
senior officer
officer
besides himself
besides himself had had anyany grasp
grasp ofthe
of the operational
operational conditions
conditions under under which
which theirtheir crews
crews
fought, because they had not flown combat missions in this
fought, because they had not flown combat missions in this war
war.'°.1 o
In
In retrospect,
retrospect, the the Battle
Battle of of Berlin
Berlin was was aa mistake-one
mistake—one in in which
which Hams Harris camecame closeclose
to wrecking his command . The objective
to wrecking his command. The objective was
was obvious
obvious and
and at
at the
the outer
outer limits
limits of
of
bomber range. The pathfinder force lost approximately 150 percent of its strength ;
bomber range. The pathfinder force lost approximately 150 percent of its strength;
and
and asas Bennett
Bennett notes,notes, the the battle
battle "had
"had been been thethe worst
worst thingthing that
that could
could havehave happened
happened
to the Command ."" Thus, at the end of March, Hams had arrived at the same point
to the Command."" Thus, at the end of March, Harris had arrived at the same point
that Eaker had reached in October 1943 . At night, unescorted bomber formations on
that Eaker had reached in October 1943. At night, unescorted bomber formations on
deep penetrations suffered prohibitive losses . As the official historians suggest :
deep penetrations suffered prohibitive losses. As the official historians suggest:
"The
"The implication
implication was was equally
equally clear.
clear. The
The German
German fighter
fighter force
force had had interposed
interposed itself itself
between Bomber Command and its strategic objective. . . ." For Harris, the
between Bomber Command and its strategic objective. ..." For Harris, the
message was unambiguous : His forces needed the "provision of night fighter
message was unambiguous: His forces needed the "provision of night fighter
support
support onon aa substantial
substantial scale. "'^ Yet,
scale. "1z Yet, Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's defeat defeat may may havehave had had aa
beneficial side effect . Harris, who so often balked at the Air Ministry's directives,
beneficial side effect. Harris, who so often balked at the Air Ministry's directives,
followed
followed his his orders
orders to to the
the letter
letter whenwhen itit camecame to to "Overlord,"
"Overlord," and and Bomber
Bomber
Command
Command provided provided essentialessential support
support.. Whether
Whether or or notnot hehe did
did so so willingly,
willingly, Harris Harris
had
had nono choice
choice.. Night Night raidsraids deep
deep intointo Germany
Germany were were no no longer
longer possible
possible exceptexcept at at
prohibitive
prohibitive cost cost..
Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's losses losses during
during this this period
period should
should not not obscure
obscure the the fact
fact that
that the
the
German
German night night fighters
fighters also also were
were having
having aa difficult time.. Bad
difficult time Bad weather,
weather, the the lowlow level
level
of skill
of skill among
among new new crews,
crews, and and defensive
defensive fire fire from
from the the bombers
bombers all all took
took their
their toll
toll..
The
The worst
worst enemyenemy of of night
night fighter
fighter crews
crews seems seems to to have
have beenbeen themselves
themselves.. In In aa
twelve-day
twelve-day period period (March(March 15 15 to 26th), Nachtgeschwader
to 26th), Nachtgeschwader 66 with with two two Gruppen
Gruppen (a (a
total
total strength
strength of of between
between 50 50 and
and 6060 aircraft)
aircraft) lostlost 66 aircraft
aircraft thatthat ran
ran outout ofof fuel,
fuel, hadhad 22
aircraft
aircraft damaged
damaged by by belly
belly landings,
landings, and and hadhad 11 aircraft
aircraft force-land
force-land in in Switzerland
Switzeriand..
Only
Only two
two aircraft
aircraft were were lostlost in
in combat
combat." . 53 Crew
Crew losses
losses ran ran at
at aa steady
steady rate,rate, close
close to to 15
15
percent
percent for for thethe first
first three
three months
months of of 1944.14
1944.'" While
While such such losses
losses were were not not light,
light,
German
German crewscrews gained
gained the the impression
impression that that they
they were
were inflicting
inflicting serious
serious damagedamage on on the
the
enemy.
enemy. Moreover,
Moreover, they they were were defending
defending German German citiescities fromfrom the the British
British bombers,
bombers,
and
and as
as aa result
result their
their lossloss rate
rate was
was probably
probably easier easier to bear.. By
to bear By spring
spring 1944, 1944, the the night
night
defenses
defenses had had won won aa substantial
substantial victory
victory over over their
their opponent.
opponent. They They had had mademade the the
skies
skies over
over thethe Reich
Reich so so dangerous
dangerous that that the the British
British could
could onlyonly infrequently
infrequendy risk risk the
the
losses
losses involved
involved in in deep
deep penetration
penetration raids raids.. What
What the the Germans
Germans were were not not able
able to to do,
do,
however,
however, was was to to transfer
transfer their success to
their success to the
the skies
skies over over the the occupied
occupied western western
countries.
countries. In In that
that region,
region, Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand posed posed aa different
different threat threat andand would
would

22
2211
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

soon show that


soon show that it
it could
could inflict
inflict important damage on
important damage on those
those Germans
Germans preparing
preparing to
to
meet
meet the
the invasion
invasion..

THE
THE DAY
DAY BATTLE: VICTORY, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER
BATTLE: VICTORY, SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1943
1943

We
We left left our account of
our account of Eighth
Eighth Air Force's campaign
Air Force's campaign after after thethe shattering
shattering
experience of the Schweinfurt/Regensburg
experience of the Schweinfurt/Regensburg attack.
attack. Eaker's
Eaker's strength
strength had
had declined
declined to
to
the point where he had to allow a
the point where he had to allow a major
major lull
lull in
in operations.
operations. In
In September,
September, only
only one
one
major
major raidraid penetrated
penetrated deep deep into into German airspace;; the
German airspace the results
results duplicated
duplicated what what had had
happened
happened over over Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt in August.. Forty-five
in August Forty-five bombers
bombers and and crews
crews were
were listed
listed as as
missing
missing out out of
of 338
338 aircraft dispatched to
aircraft dispatched to attack
attack the the bearing
bearing and and aircraft
aircraft factories
factories
near
near Stuttgart
Stuttgart." .55 For
For the the remainder
remainder of of the
the month,
month, Eighth licked its
Eighth licked its wounds
wounds and and
attacked
attacked the the occupied
occupied districtsdistricts of of western
western EuropeEurope.. There,There, Allied
Allied fighters
fighters kept kept
bomber
bomber losses
losses within
within tolerable
tolerable limitslimits.. Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, the the flow
flow of of aircraft
aircraft andand crews
crews
from
from thethe States
States swelled
swelled Eighth's
Eighth's groups:
groups: Its Its effective
effective aircraft
aircraft strength
strength climbed
climbed over over
the
the 300
300 mark,
mark, while
while the the number
number of of available
available aircrews
aircrews went went overover 400, both for
400, both for the
the
first
first time.56
time.'*
In October,
In October, the the daylight
daylight air air battle
battle peaked,
peaked, and and American
American losses losses in in deep
deep
penetration,
penetration, unescorted
unescorted raids raids ended
ended illusions
illusions thatthat bomber
bomber formations
formations could could protect
protect
themselves
themselves.. Defeat
Defeat over over Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt sounded sounded the the death
death of of prewar
prewar doctrine
doctrine and and the
the
assumptions
assumptions on on which
which itit had had been built . Yet
been built. Yet if if October
October was was aa serious
serious setback,
setback, the the
cost
cost paid
paid dividends
dividends.. By By carrying
carrying the the war
war to to Germany,
Germany, the the daylight
daylight bombers
bombers forced forced
the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to come
come up up andand toto fight
fight.. InIn the
the short
short run,
run, bomber
bomber casualties
casualties reached
reached
unacceptable
unacceptable levels, levels, but German fighter
but German fighter losses,
losses, relatively
relatively speaking,
speaking, were were even even
more
more costly
costly asas to
to their
their long-term
long-term effectseffects.. In In essence,
essence. Eighth's
Eighth's operations
operations imposed
imposed aa
high
high enough
enough attrition
attrition rate
rate to to prevent
prevent the the recovery
recovery of of Germany's
Germany's fighter fighter armarm after
after thethe
losses
losses suffered
suffered over
over the
the summer
summer. .
Eighth's
Eighth's October
October operations
operations began began on on thethe 8th8th with
with an an attack
attack on on Bremen
Bremen and and
Vegesack.
Vegesack. The The attacking
attacking formations
formations lost lost 3030 bombers
bombers with with aa further
further 26 26 receiving
receiving
major
major damage
damage.. Three-quarters
Three-quarters of of the
the 1st
1st Bombardment
Bombardment Division's Division's aircraft
aircraft received
received
flak damage . This attack initiated a week of heavy operations culminating with
flak damage. This attack initiated a week of heavy operations culminating with aa
second
second greatgreat attack
attack on on Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt on October 14.
on October 14. On
On October
October 9, 9, Eighth's
Eighth's bombers
bombers
flying
flying overover Denmark
Denmark and and the the Baltic
Baltic hit
hit Danzig
Danzig and Marienburg, and
and Marienburg, and aa diversionary
diversionary
force
force hithit the
the Arado
Arado factory
factory at at Anklam
Anklam.. Both Both the the Arado
Arado worksworks and and the
the Focke
Focke Wulf Wulf
plant
plant in in Marienburg
Marienburg receivedreceived extensive
extensive damage,
damage, while while the the depth
depth and and extent
extent of of the
the
raid
raid surprised
surprised German
German defensive
defensive forcesforces.. The
The mainmain force
force lost
lost only
only 10 10 aircraft
aircraft with
with 18 18
more
more shotshot down
down in in diversionary
diversionary attacks."
attacks." On On October
October 10, 10, Eighth
Eighth bombed
bombed Munster
Munster..
Relays
Relays of of German
German fighters
fighters attacked
attacked the the first
first task
task force
force on on the
the wayway in in and
and out,
out, andand
blasted
blasted the the lead
lead formation
formation flown flown by by the
the 100th
100th Bombardment
Bombardment Group Group out out of
of the
the sky
sky..
Not
Not oneone ofof the
the 1212 aircraft
aircraft returned.
returned. All All told,
told, out out ofof 119
119 bombers
bombers in in the
the first
first wave,
wave,
the
the Germans
Germans shot shot down
down 29 29 (24.4
(24.4 percent)
percent).'* ." The loss of 1 more aircraft on the
The loss of 1 more aircraft on the
second
second wave wave brought
brought total total losses
losses to to 30
30.. So
So in in three
three days
days ofof major
major operations,
operations. Eighth Eighth
had lost
had lost 8888 heavy
heavy bombers
bombers.. This This represented
represented no no less
less than
than 1818.4.4 percent
percent of of available
available
crews
crews." .s9 For
For the
the next three days,
next three days, thethe command
command stood stood down . On the 14th, itit went
down. On the 14th, went

22
2222
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

back
back toto Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt and and suffered terrible mauling
suffered aa terrible mauling.. German German fightersfighters and and flakflak shot
shot
down
down 60 60 ofof its its bombers,
bombers, 17 17 received
received major damage, while
major damage, while 121 121 aircraft
aircraft were were
damaged
damaged but but reparable
reparable.. The The loss rate was
loss rate was 2020.7 .7 percent
percent and and thethe damage
damage rate rate 47 47.4.4
percent
percent.*".6° Thus
Thus for for the week, Eighth
the week, Eighth Air Air Force
Force had had lostlost 148148 bombers
bombers in in deep
deep
penetration raids
penetration raids into into Germany
Germany.. Even Even by by American
American standards standards that that represented
represented
unacceptable
unacceptable attrition
attrition..
The
The Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt losses losses caused
caused an an outcry
outcry in in the
the United
United States.
States. "Hap""Hap" Arnold Arnold
announced
announced to to the
the American
American press press thatthat "now
"now we have got
we have got Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt." ." Arnold's
Arnold's
assertion,
assertion, however,
however, could could not not cover
cover up up what
what Allied economic analysts
Allied economic analysts soon soon
recognized
recognized:: that that more
more sustained
sustained bombingbombing of of thethe ball
ball bearings
bearings works works was was needed
needed
almost immediately
almost immediately.*' .6' Yet,
Yet, asas suggested
suggested earlier,
earlier, the the first
first attack
attack on on Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt had had
alarmed
alarmed Speer;
Speer; but but the the second
second raid, raid, with
with 67 67 percent
percent of of Schweinfurt's
Schweinfurt's productionproduction
knocked out,
knocked out, was was eveneven moremore disturbing
disturbing.*^ .62 The
The Armaments
Armaments Minister Minister established
established aa
crash
crash program
program to
to disperse
disperse the
the bearings
bearings industry
industry and
and to
to substitute
substitute alternative
alternative roller
roller
bearings forball bearings where possible .63
bearings for ball bearings where possible.*^ But
But Speer
Speer was
was worried
worried that
that the
the bombing
bombing
would
would soon
soon recur
recur.. However,
However, no no matter
matter whatwhat the the target's
target's value,
value. EighthEighth Air Air Force
Force
could not return
could not return until
until fighter
fighter escort
escort could
could reach
reach Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt. . Harris,
Harris, involved
involved in
in his
his
offensive against Berlin, had no intention of attacking a "panacea"
offensive against Berlin, had no intention of attacking a "panacea" target
target. . By
By
February,
February, thosethose conditions
conditions had had changed
changed;; Eighth
Eighth possessed
possessed fighterfighter protection
protection that that
could take it all the way to Schweinfurt, while Harris was more amenable to
could take it all the way to Schweinfurt, while Harris was more amenable to
attacking ball bearings after the losses over Berlin . By then, however, the raids had
attacking ball bearings after the losses over Berlin. By then, however, the raids had
to
to begin
begin all
all over
over again
again the the process
process of of damaging
damaging the the production
production of of ball
ball bearings.
bearings.
The disaster at Schweinfurt ended the nonsense about unescorted bomber
The disaster at Schweinfurt ended the nonsense about unescorted bomber
formations . The losses over the summer had caused a rising chorus of demands for
formations. The losses over the summer had caused a rising chorus of demands for
increased fighter range as well as a true long-range escort. The battles in October
increased fighter range as well as a true long-range escort. The battles in October
brought matters to
brought matters to aa headhead.. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, the the development
development and and production
production of of
suitable drop tanks involved considerable muddle, particularly in the United States.
suitable drop tanks involved considerable muddle, particularly in the United States.
While
While some
some in in Washington
Washington recognized recognized the the importance
importance of of range
range extension
extension tanks, tanks,
there
there existed
existed aa lacklack of of communication
communication between between EighthEighth and and procurement
procurement officials officials at at
home.
home. American
American drop drop tanktank production
production had had progressed
progressed satisfactorily
satisfactorily in in early
early 1943,
1943,
but supply authorities
but supply authorities later later in in the
the year
year mistakenly
mistakenly believed believed that that production
production in in
Britain
Britain could
could meet meet Eighth's
Eighth's needs.6°
needs.*^ Meanwhile
Meanwhile in in England,
England, BritishBritish industry
industry could could
not
not produce
produce the the numbers
numbers that that procurement
procurement desired, desired, while while Eaker,
Eaker, somewhat
somewhat as as aa
result
result of
of his
his own
own emphasis,
emphasis, was was leftleft holding
holding aa rather
rather emptyempty bag bag..
On
On October
October 14, 14, Eaker
Eaker wrotewrote Air Air Marshal
Marshal Wilfrid
Wilfrid FreemanFreeman at at the
the Ministry
Ministry of of
Aircraft
Aircraft Production
Production to to complain
complain of of shortfalls
shortfalls in in drop
drop tanktank production.
production. Not Not yetyet aware
aware
of
of Schweinfurt's
Schweinfurt's casualties,
casuahies, Eaker Eaker suggested
suggested that that of of 3030 bombers
bombers lost lost over
over Munster
Miinster
on
on the
the 10th,
10th, the the availability
availability of of drop
drop tanks
tanks might might have have savedsaved as as many
many as as 20 20..
Freeman's
Freeman's reply reply was was aa modelmodel of of restraint
restraint.. HeHe admitted
admitted delaysdelays but but pointed
pointed out out that
that
current
current production
production would would cover cover the the shortfall
shortfall by by early
early November
November.. This This deficit,
deficit,
however,
however, in in hishis opinion,
opinion, was was not not entirely
entirely the the fault
fault of of the
the Ministry
Ministry of of Aircraft
Aircraft
Production
Production since since British
British industry
industry had had not
not received
received approval
approval for for the
the required
required fittings
fittings
until
until early
early October
October.. FreemanFreeman pointedpointed to to his
his February
February warning warning that that British
British industry,
industry,
severely overstrained,
severely overstrained, could could not not complete
complete aa rush rush orderorder forfor tanks
tanks.. OnlyOnly in in June
June had had

22
2233
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

.65 Now after Schweinfurt,


Eighth sought large
Eighth sought large numbers
numbers of of workable
workable drop drop tanks
tanks.*^ Now after Schweinfurt,
everyone pushed the drop tank program, and British production,
everyone pushed the drop tank program, and British production, helped helped by by
American efforts, made them available in rising quantities . From November 1943,
American efforts, made them available in rising quantities. From November 1943,
Eighth
Eighth felt its way
felt its way into into Germany,
Germany, but but itit would
would go go nono deeper
deeper thanthan its its fighter
fighter escort
escort
could
could fly
fly;; as
as the
the escort
escort range
range rose,rose, the noose tightened
the noose tightened..
One
One other
other element
element of of the
the escort
escort program deserves attention
program deserves attention:: thethe development
development of of aa
true
true long-range
long-range escort escort fighter,
fighter, the the "Mustang
"Mustang." ." Like
Like the the "Mosquitoe,"
"Mosquitoe," the the P-51
P-51
was
was an an orphan
orphan at at birth
birth.**. 61 North
North American
American developeddeveloped the the "Mustang"
"Mustang" in in aa rush
rush to to
land
land aa contract
contract with with the the British
British.. The initial variant,
The initial variant, with with an an Allison
Allison engine,
engine,
possessed good
possessed good low low altitude
altitude characteristics
characteristics but but lacked
lacked power power to to work
work at at higher
higher
elevations.
elevations. In In the
the summer
summer of 1942, British
of 1942, British engineers,
engineers, after after studying
studying the the aircraft,
aircraft,
decided that
decided that with
with aa better better engine,
engine, the the "Mustang"
"Mustang" would would possess
possess excellent
excellent
characteristics
characteristics at at higher
higher altitudes
altitudes.. By By October,
October, "Merlin""Merlin" engines engines had had been
been
installed
installed andand thethe first test flights
first test flights conducted
conducted.. As As things
things turned
turned out,out, thethe Allies
Allies hadhad
developed
developed the the hottest
hottest piston
piston engineengine fighterfighter of of the
the warwar.. TheThe road
road to to production,
production,
however,
however, was was not not easy;
easy; there
there was was reluctance
reluctance to push its
to push its development,
development, since since itit was
was
not
not entirely
entirely aa home-grown
home-grown product product.. However,
However, tests tests conducted
conducted in in the
the early
early summer
summer
of 1943 indicated
of 1943 indicated the the P-51's
P-Sl's potential
potential as as aa combat
combat fighterfighter andand suggested
suggested that that the
the
aircraft
aircraft did
did have
have the the capability
capability to to provide
provide long-range
long-range escort escort for for the
the bombers
bombers.*^ ." Tests
Tests
and
and modification
modification over over the the summer
summer added added an an 85-gallon
85-gallon internal
internal tanktank to to the
the fighter
fighter
which
which placed
placed its its range
range without
without drop drop tankstanks at at over
over 400 400 miles
miles.. Problems
Problems remainedremained
concerning
concerning engine engine modifications
modifications and and otherother design
design changes,
changes, but but beginning
beginning in in
November
November 1943 1943 "Mustangs"
"Mustangs" began began to to reach
reach the the United
United Kingdom
Kingdom.** .68

Meanwhile,
Meanwhile, the the air
air battles
battles in in July
July and and August
August forced forced the the Germans
Germans to to adjust
adjust their
their
air
air strategy
strategy.. They
They couldcould no no longer
longer support
support the the attrition
attrition of of those
those months,
months, while while thethe
American threat
American threat forced
forced them
them to
to cut
cut commitments
commitments in
in the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean and
and Russia
Russia. .
Defense
Defense of the Reich
of the Reich became
became the the top top priority,
priority, and and beginning
beginning in in July
July the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
transferred Gruppen from
transferred Gruppen Russia to
from Russia to the
the west.
west. The The process
process continued
continued throughout
throughout late late
summer
summer as the east
as the east andand Mediterranean
Mediterranean lost lost their
their fighter
fighter cover.
cover. TheThe situation
situation was was so so
critical
critical that
that transferred
transferred units units received
received no no time
time to to transition
transition into into the
the western
western defense
defense
system.. The
system The III III Gruppe
Gruppe of of the "Udet" Geschwader
the "Udet" Geschwader left left the
the eastern
eastern frontfront on on August
August
22.. Arriving
Arriving at at Munster-Handorf,
Munster-Handorf, the the unit
unit met
met its its new
new commander
commander who who announced
announced
his
his intention
intention to to make
make them them combat-ready
combat-ready as as soon
soon as as possible
possible.. Within
Within four four days,
days, thethe
Gruppe
Gruppe had had flown
flown its its first
first mission
mission and and on on the
the following
following day day was
was declared
declared combat-
combat-
ready.b9
ready.*' Fighter
Fighter strength
strength in in Germany
Germany rapidly rapidly roserose.. FromFrom barely
barely 600600 aircraft,
aircraft, fighter
fighter
numbers
numbers rose rose to to 800800 by by July
July and and nearly
nearly 1,0001,000 by by early
early October
October.'" .'° In addition,
In addition,
substantial
substantial numbers
numbers of of twin-engine
twin-engine fighters fighters redeployed
redeployed to to the
the Reich
Reich so so that
that by
by mid-
mid-
October
October the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had nearly
neariy 200 200 of of them
them available
available in in Germany
Germany of of which
which 50 50
percent
percent werewere "in "in commission.""
commission."'• Finally, Finally, GermanGerman commanders
commanders still still used
used night
night
fighters
fighters during
during the the dayday despite
despite the the heavy
heavy loss loss of of aircraft,
aircraft, radar
radar equipment,
equipment, and and
skilled crewmembers .
skilled crewmembers.
Along
Along with
with aa redistribution
redistribution of of fighters,
fighters, substantial
substantial changeschanges took took placeplace in in the
the
defending
defending forces'
forces' tactics
tactics and and weaponry
weaponry.. By By September,
September, the the Germans
Germans had had refined
refined
the
the defense
defense system
system created
created in in the
the summer
summer to to meet
meet the the dayday threat
threat.. Twin-engine
Twin-engine

224
224
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

fighters,
fighters, equipped
equipped withwith 21cm
21cm rocket
rocket mortars,
mortars, flewflew atat the
the edge
edge of of the
the B-17's
B-17's
defensive armament and
defensive armament and fired
fired rockets
rockets into
into the
the formations
formations to
to break
break them
them up.
up. The
The
Germans had altered the armament of the Bf 109's and Fw190's, and their new
Germans had altered the armament of the Bf 109's and Fwl90's, and their new
heavier
heavier armament
armament made made them
them aa greater
greater threat
threat toto the
the bombers
bombers.. The The single-engine
single-engine
fighters
fighters launched
launched head-on
head-on and and stern
stem attacks
attacks in in large
large groups,
groups, their
their cannon
cannon fire fire
dangerous
dangerous to to slow-moving
slow-moving bombersbombers.. As As forfor logistics,
logistics, thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe stocked
stocked aa
number
number of of bases
bases throughout
throughout western
western andand central
central Germany
Germany with with ammunition,
ammunition, fuel, fuel,
and
and ground
ground crews
crews for
for quick
quick fighter
fighter turnaround,
turnaround, thereby
thereby increasing
increasing their
their sortie
sortie rate
rate
against
against bomber
bomber formations
formations.^^.'z Interestingly,
Interestingly, the the Germans
Germans were were also
also using
using drop
drop tanks
tanks
on
on their
their fighters
fighters toto extend
extend the range and
the range and time
time that
that the
the fighters
fighters could
could remain
remain
airborne
airborne.. In
In October,
October, however,
however. G6ring
Goring scotched
scotched the the tactic
tactic and
and suggested
suggested thatthat even
even
the
the Americans
Americans would
would notnot be
be so wasteful of
so wasteful of material
material.. HeHe suggested
suggested that
that crews
crews notnot
drop
drop tanks
tanks when
when empty
empty but
but only
only inin combat
combat.'^ ." AnAn intercepted
intercepted "Ultra"
"Ultra" message
message on on
October
October 12 12 warned
warned fighter
fighter crews
crews that
that they
they should
should only
only drop
drop tanks
tanks inin the
the most
most
desperate
desperate circumstances .74
circumstances.'''
This
This refined
refined andand reinforced
reinforced defense
defense system enabled the
system enabled the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to win
win aa series
series
of
of substantial
substantial tactical
tactical victories Warned by
victories.. Warned by radar
radar of of an
an American
American raid, raid, German
German
scrambled and
fighters scrambled
fighters and concentrated.
concentrated. Twin-engine
Twin-engine fighters fighters firedfired rockets
rockets into
into thethe
formations
formations to
to break
break up
up flying
flying cohesion
cohesion and
and to
to hit
hit aircraft
aircraft. . Single-engine
Single-engine fighters
fighters
individually and
individually and in in groups
groups attacked
attacked from
from all all directions.
directions. The The aimaim waswas to to break
bre<iK
formation
formation integrity
integrity; ; once
once German
German fighters
fighters had
had done
done that,
that, individual
individual B-17's
B-17's were
were
easy prey,
easy prey, while
while damaged
damaged aircraft
aircraft that
that fell
fell behind
behind were
were in
in a
a hopeless
hopeless situation
situation. . The
The
defensive system proved remarkably effective
defensive system proved remarkably effective in
in October,
October, but
but it
it did
did contain
contain
weaknesses . Above
weaknesses. Above all, all, itit depended
depended on on the fact that
the fact that no American fighters
no American fighters werewere
present. Operations in July,
present. Operations in July, when
when American
American fighters,
fighters, using
using primitive
primitive drop
drop tanks,
tanks,
had pushed
had pushed deeper
deeper into into thethe Reich
Reich and and caught German fighters
caught German fighters by by surprise,
surprise,
underlined
underlined this
this factor.
factor. Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fighters
fighters would
would only
only engage
engage American
American bombers
bombers out
out
of range of Allied fighter support . Using this rule of engagement, much of western
of range of Allied fighter support. Using this rule of engagement, much of western
Europe now
Europe now hadhad targets
targets that that were
were relatively
relatively freefree ofof Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe coverage
coverage.. German
German
success in
success in the
the fall
fall also
also depended
depended on on close
close cooperation
cooperation betweenbetween the the single-engine
single-engine
and
and twin-engine
twin-engine fighters,
fighters, with with the
the heavier
heavier fighters
fighters playing
playing aa key key role
role in breaking up
in breaking up
the
the integrity
integrity of of American
American formations
formations.. Without
Without such such support,
support, the the single-engine
single-engine
fighters
fighters faced
faced aa much
much more more difficult
difficult task,
task, but
but the
the Bf
Bf 110110 had
had no no chance
chance of of survival
survival
against enemy fighters . Thus defense of the Reich's airspace depended on
against enemy fighters. Thus defense of the Reich's airspace depended on thethe
continued
continued existence
existence of of aa zone
zone over
over which
which Allied
Allied fighters
fighters could
could notnot operate
operate because
because
of
of their
their inadequate
inadequate range.range. There There were
were already
already signssigns that
that this
this situation
situation waswas breaking
breaking
down
down..
German
German successes
successes inin September
September and and October
October were
were won,
won, moreover,
moreover, atat aa high
high cost
cost
to
to themselves
themselves.. The
The Germans
Germans lost lost 276
276 fighters
fighters in
in the
the west
west in
in September
September (17 .4
(17.4
percent
percent of
of the
the total
total fighter
fighter force
force as
as of
of September
September 1) 1) and
and 284
284 more
more in
in October
October (17 .2
(17.2
percent)."
percent).^5 Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt itself
itself cost
cost the
the Germans
Germans (see (see Table
Table XL11171)
XLIir*") 31 31 aircraft
aircraft
destroyed,
destroyed, 1212 written
written off,
off, and
and 34
34 damaged
damaged.. AsAs aa percentage,
percentage, this
this was
was between
between 3.5 3.5
percent
percent and
and 44 percent
percent ofof total
total fighter
fighter aircraft
aircraft available
available inin the
the west
west..

22
2255
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

TABLE
TABLE XLIII
XLIII
Aircraft Losses, Schweinfurt-October
Aircraft Losses, Schweinfuit—October 1943
1943

100
100 Percent
Percent 60-100 Percent
60-100 Percent 40--60
40-60 Percent
Percent 0,40
0-40 Percent
Percent
Me
Me 410
410 22 ' ~ 1i
Bf109
Bfl09 24
24 11
11 44 17
17
Bf 110
BfllO 33 66
Fw
Fw 190
190 22 11 22 44

Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe records
records indicate that the
indicate that the Germans
Germans lost lost nono less
less than
than 41 .9 percent
41.9 percent of
of their
their
fighter
fighter force
force (destroyed
(destroyed or or written
written off) in October
off) in October.'^ ." Table
Table XLIV'
XLIV*8 indicates
indicates the
the
losses
losses among
among German
German fighter
fighter pilots
pilots in
in late
late 1943.
1943.
The level
The level ofof attrition for both
attrition for both Germany's
Germany's fighter
fighter forces
forces asas well
well asas Eighth
Eighth Air
Air
Force during September
Force during September and
and October
October bordered
bordered on
on the
the point
point where
where both
both were
were close
close to
to
losing cohesion and
losing cohesion and effectiveness
effectiveness as
as combat
combat forces
forces. . In
In the
the long
long run,
run, considering
considering the
the
massive
massive influx of bombers,
influx of bombers, fighters,
fighters, and
and crews
crews already
already swelling
swelling American
American bases
bases in
in
England, Eighth held the strategic
England, Eighth held the strategic advantage
advantage. . It
It was,
was, of
of course,
course, difficult
difficult for
for the
the
crews
crews who
who flew to Schweinfurt
flew to Schweinfurt to to recognize
recognize that
that advantage
advantage..

THE
THE DAY
DAY BATTLE:
BATTLE: THE
THE PAUSE, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1943
PAUSE, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1943
Historians
Historians ofof airpower,
airpower, like
like other
other military
military historians,
historians, tend
tend to
to see
see their
their topics
topics in
in
terms
terms ofof decisive
decisive battles
battles and
and clear-cut
clear-cut turning
turning points.
points. The
The reality,
reality, however,
however, is is
usually
usually more
more complex.
complex. Thus,
Thus, Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt often
often appears
appears asas aa decisive
decisive defeat,
defeat,
followed
followed by by aa lull
lull in
in operations
operations until
until February
February 1944
1944 when
when Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force's
Force's
bombers
bombers supported
supported by by long-range fighters smashed
long-range fighters smashed thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe during
during "Big
"Big
Week
Week." ." Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt was,
was, of of course,
course, aa turning
turning point
point and
and forced
forced fundamental
fundamental
changes
changes in in American
American doctrine
doctrine and
and strategy.
strategy. For
For the Germans, however,
the Germans, however, the the pressure
pressure
eased
eased only
only marginally
marginally after
after Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt.. Moreover,
Moreover, from from thethe Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's
perspective,
perspective, October
October 14 14 did
did not
not appear
appear asas important
important or
or decisive
decisive asas itit did
did for
for the
the
Americans
Americans.. TheThe debate
debate within
within the
the high
high command
command continued
continued unabated,
unabated, and and Goring
Goring
and
and Hitler-as
Hitler—as they
they had
had throughout
throughout the the summer-proved
summer—proved unwilling
unwilling to to address
address
fundamental
fundamental strategic
strategic questions
questions..
In
In early
early November,
November, Galland
Galland warned
warned thethe fighter
fighter forces
forces of
of Goring's
Goring's dissatisfaction
dissatisfaction
with
with their
their October
October achievements:
achievements:

The
The fighter
fighter and
and heavy
heavy formations
formations havehave notnot been
been able
able to to
secure
secure decisive
decisive success
success in in air
air defense
defense against
against American
American four- four-
engined formations.. The
engined formations The introduction
introduction of of new
new weapons
weapons .. .. .. has
has not not
appreciably
appreciably changed
changed thethe situation
situation.. The
The main
main reason
reason forfor the
the failure
failure isis
that
that the Kommandeure and
the Kommandeure Kapitane [sic]
and Kapitane [sic] dodo notnot succeed
succeed in in
securing
securing attacks
attacks in in close
close formation
formation up to the
up to the shortest ranges.. .. .. ..
shortest ranges
The Reichsmarschall has,
The Reichsmarschall has, therefore,
therefore, ordered
ordered the the setting
setting
up of
up of an
an assault Staffel (Sturmstaffel)
assault Staffel (Sturmstaffel).. ItsIts tasks
tasks will
will bebe to
to break
break up up
the enemy
the enemy by using more
by using more heavily armored fighters
heavily armored fighters in in all-out
all-out .. .. ..
attacks . .. .. .. Then
attacks. Then there
there is
is no
no need
need toto discuss
discuss here
here whether
whether this
this isis to
to
be
be done
done by by shooting
shooting down
down the the enemy
enemy at at the
the closest
closest range,
range, by by
employing
employing aa new new type
type of
of weapon,
weapon, or or by
by ramming
ramming.'' . 79

22
2266
TABLE
TABLE XLIV
XLIV

FIGHTER PILOT
PILOT LOSSES
LOSSES -- SEPT
SEPT -- DEC
DEC 1943
1943
% OF
OF PILOTS
PILOTS LOST
LOST EACH
EACH MONTH
MONTH (ALL
(ALL CAUSES)
CAUSES) ~~
NUMBER
NUMBER OF
OF PILOTS
PILOTS LOST
LOST EACH
EACH MONTH
MONTH (ALL
(ALL CAUSES)
CAUSES)
TOTAL
TOTAL FIGHTER
FIGHTER PILOT
PILOT LOSSES
LOSSES 1943
1943 2967
2961
AVERAGE
AVERAGE STRENGTH
STRENGTH 1943
1943 2105
2105
% LOSS
LOSS 1943
1943 141
141%
20%.

15.7%
14.5%
343

300
10.4%
10%-

200
200

100
100
o

ra
to SEP
SEP OCT
OCT NOV DEC
8148
n
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

Goring's
Goring's counsel
counsel of of despair reflected an
despair reflected an essentially
essentially negative
negative attitude
attitude expressed
expressed
frequently
frequently throughout
throughout the period:: The
the period The day day fighters
fighters werewere notnot doing
doing enough
enough..
Speaking
Speaking to to an
an assemblage
assemblage of of senior
senior officers
officers at at Obersalzberg,
Obersalzberg, he he announced
announced that that the
the
people
people andand frontline
frontline soldiers
soldiers had
had lost
lost faith
faith in in the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe.. TheyThey could
could understand
understand
the
the difficulty
difficulty of of finding
finding British
British bombers
bombers at at night,
night, but
but the the sight
sight of of American
American
formations flying
formations flying through
through Germany's
Germany's skies skies was was too
too much."°
much.*" Hitler's
Hitler's bitter
bitter
reproaches
reproaches undoubtedly
undoubtedly contributed
contributed to to the the Reichsmarschall's
ReichsmarschalV% disquiet. disquiet. But But
misconceptions dotted Goring's
misconceptions dotted Goring's speeches
speeches. . For
For Goring,
Goring, the
the solution
solution for
for the
the Reich's
Reich's
defense
defense lay lay notnot in increased fighter
in increased fighter production
production or or more
more crewscrews but but rather
rather in in aa
fanatical "National
fanatical "National Socialist"
Socialist" approach
approach to
to air
air defense
defense; ; supposedly,
supposedly, German
German spirit
spirit
and
and morale
morale couldcould beat
beat superiority
superiority in in numbers
numbers on on which
which the the materialistic
materialistic Anglo-
Anglo-
Saxons depended. Such an attitude helps explain
Saxons depended. Such an attitude helps explain Goring's
Goring's refusal
refusal to
to recognize
recognize the
the
danger that the loss of fighter pilots posed ."' The Reichsmarschall expanded his
danger that the loss of fighter pilots posed." The Reichsmarschall expanded his
message in a series of conferences throughout the remainder of
message in a series of conferences throughout the remainder of the
the year.
year. He
He was
was
even
even willing
willing to to speak
speak in in such
such terms
terms to to hishis fighter
fighter pilots
pilots.. OnOn November
November 23, 23, he he
reproached the day crews of 3rd Jagddivision that he had brought them back from
reproached the day crews of 3rd Jagddivision that he had brought them back from
the
the front
front to to defend
defend the the Reich They, however,
Reich.. They, however, had had disappointed
disappointed him, him, while
while thethe
German people could not understand what was happening and were embittered.
German people could not understand what was happening and were embittered.
Intermixed
Intermixed with with suchsuch remarks
remarks were were eveneven less less tasteful
tasteful comments
comments about about the the
cowardice of the assembled pilots .s
cowardice of the assembled pilots.*^2
Yet,
Yet, the
the real
real problem
problem lay lay beyond
beyond Goring
Goring at at the
the highest
highest level
level.. While
While Hitler
Hitler hadhad
left
left the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to Goring
Goring earlier
earlier in in the
the war,
war, he he waswas nownow enmeshed
enmeshed in in itsits
decisionmaking process . The Reichsmarschall served as a buffer to reality and
decisionmaking process. The Reichsmarschall served as a buffer to reality and
presented the
presented the FiArer's
Fiihrer's latest
latest demands
demands to to his
his subordinates.
subordinates. He He admitted
admitted as as much
much in in
the
the fall when, in
fall when, in exasperation
exasperation to to his
his staff's
staffs gloomy
gloomy reports,
reports, he he exploded
exploded::
II could
could also
also go
go toto the
the Fuhrer
Fiihrer and
and to
to whatever
whatever he he wished,
wished, say
say;: No,
No,
mein
mein Fuhrer,
Fiihrer, this
this can't be done
can't be done oror that
that can't
can't be
be done,
done, this
this isis
impossible
impossible or that is
or that is impossible, . . or
impossible, .... that would
or that would cost
cost too
too many
many
losses,
losses, oror that
that would exhaust the
would exhaust Lufiwcffe.. Thus,
the Luftwaffe Thus, could
could II speak,
speak,
[and]
[and] II could
could always
always contradict
contradict what
what he
he had
had proposed . "3
proposed.*'

Goring's
Goring's approach
approach went went inin another
another direction
direction and and his
his replies
replies were
were punctuated
punctuated withwith
the refrain of "Jawohl, mein Fuhrer ." But perhaps the truly insurmountable
the refrain of "Jawohl, mein Fiihrer." But perhaps the truly insurmountable
problem
problem waswas thatthat Hitler's
Hitler's interest
interest toto thethe end
end centered
centered on on the
the ground
ground battle
battle..
Consequently,
Consequently, he he regarded
regarded the the air
air war
war as as an
an embarrassment,
embarrassment, threatening
threatening armsarms
production
production andand the
the ability
ability to
to hold
hold off
off his
his enemies
enemies on on the
the ground
ground.. AtAt one
one point,
point, he
he
even
even argued
argued that
that destruction
destruction of of Germany's
Germany's cities cities "actually
"actually worksworks inin our
our favor,
favor,
because
because itit is
is creating
creating aa body
body of of people
people with with nothing
nothing to to losepeople
lose—^people who who will
will
therefore
therefore fight
fight on
on with
with utter
utter fanaticism
fanaticism.' . 1181
'*''
Such
Such attitudes
attitudes explain
explain why
why the the leadership
leadership placed
placed little
little emphasis
emphasis onon air
air defense
defense.. AA
conversation
conversation between
between Goring
Goring and and Milch
Milch in in November
November furtherfurther amplifies
amplifies this
this point
point
and
and underscores
underscores the the dread
dread thatthat aa defeat
defeat in in Russia
Russia inspired
inspired throughout
throughout German
German
society
society in
in late
late 1943.
1943. Milch
Milch suggested
suggested thatthat alongside
alongside thethe life-and-death
life-and-death question
question ofof
the eastern front,
the eastern front, hehe was
was equally
equally worried
worried aboutabout what
what the homeland would
the homeland would do do when
when
American fighters
American fighters came
came in the spring
in the spring of
of 1944.
1944. Goring
Goring replied: "When every
replied: "When every city
city in
in

228
228
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

Germany
Germany has has been
been smashed
smashed to to the
the ground,
ground, the the German
German people people would
would still still live
live.. ItIt
would
would certainly
certainly be be awful,
awful, but but the
the nation
nation hadhad lived
lived before
before there
there were
were cities."
cities." Milch
Milch
then
then suggested
suggested thatthat such
such an an occurrence
occurrence might might affect
affect armsarms production,
production, but but Goring
Goring
was
was not
not listening
listening.. He
He asked
asked whatwhat was
was thethe greater
greater danger,
danger, Berlin's
Berlin's destruction
destruction or or the
the
arrival of the Russians . The latter he noted was the "number one danger
arrival of the Russians. The latter he noted was the "number one danger."*' ."es
Thus,
Thus, interest
interest atat the top in
the top in air
air defense
defense was was butbut aa fleeting
fleeting occurrence.
occurrence. One One cancan
question
question whether
whether thethe Reich's
Reich's air air defense
defense everever received
received the the emphasis
emphasis promised
promised by by
Hitler
Hitler in
in response
response to to Hamburg
Hamburg.. In In October,
October, Goring
Goring suggested
suggested to to his
his staff
staff that
that the
the
German
German people
people did
did not
not care
care whether
whether the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe attacked
attacked British
British airfields
airfields.. "All
"All
they
they wished
wished to to hear
hear when
when aa hospital
hospital oror aa children's
children's home home in in Germany
Germany isis destroyed
destroyed isis
that
that we
we have
have destroyed
destroyed the the same
same in in England
England;; then then theythey are
are satisfied
satisfied."*'."" With
With
Hitler's
Hitler's predilection
predilection for for retaliation,
retaliation, therethere was
was no no chance
chance of of altering
altering aircraft
aircraft
production
production in in favor
favor ofof fighters.
fighters. In In fact,
fact, conferences
conferences between between Milch
Milch and and Goring
Goring
indicate
indicate thethe Reichsmarschall's
ReichsmarschalVs definite definite bias
bias towards
towards bombers.
bombers. In In October,
October, "der "der
Dicke"
Dicke" bitterly
bitterly reproached
reproached Milch for placing
Milch for placing tootoo muchmuch emphasis
emphasis on on thethe Reich's
Reich's
defense
defense and and for
for robbing
robbing production
production from from the
the bomber
bomber forces forces.. Goring
Goring could could notnot
believe
believe that
that American
American production
production could could everever reach
reach estimated
estimated levels,
levels, because
because so so
many
many menmen andand so
so much
much material would be
material would be required
required.*' ."
Further
Further conversations
conversations in in November
November confirmed
confirmed the the leadership's
leadership's desire
desire forfor bomber
bomber
production
production.. On On the
the 23rd,
23rd, Goring
Goring underlined
underlined the the importance
importance of of using
using fighters
fighters as as
fighter
fighter bombers
bombers.. When
When the the discussion
discussion turned
turned to to the
the distribution
distribution of of future
future Ju Ju 388
388
production
production between
between night
night fighter
fighter and
and bomber
bomber forces,
forces, he he expressed
expressed himself
himself in in favor
favor
of
of the
the latter ." On
latter.*' On the
the 28th,
28th, Goring
Goring went went even
even further
further and and decided
decided to to hold
hold down
down
future
future fighter
fighter production
production in in favor
favor ofof bombers.
bombers. The The Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall commentedcommented to to
Fritz
Fritz Sauckel,
Sauckel, Gauleiter
Gauleiter and and slave
slave labor
labor procurer
procurer for for the
the Reich,
Reich, that
that the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
had
had to
to have
have bombers
bombers..
Goring
Goring:: II cannot
cannot remain
remain onon the
the defensive
defensive;; we
we must
must also
also have
have an
an
offensive
offensive.. That
That isis the
the most
most decisive
decisive..
Sauckel:
Sauckel: The
The only
only argument
argument that
that makes
makes an an impression
impression on
on aa racial
racial
89
cousin [the
cousin [the British]
British] is
is that
that of
of retaliation.
retaliation.*'
Two
Two factors
factors were
were working
working against
against the
the defense
defense.. First,
First, Hitler
Hitler andG6ring
andGoring refused
refused to
to
consider
consider an
an emergency
emergency effort
effort to
to build
build fighters
fighters.. This
This had
had particular
particular significance
significance in
in
view
view of
of American
American attacks
attacks on
on aircraft
aircraft factories
factories.. Those
Those raids,
raids, beginning
beginning in in the
the
summer
summer ofof 1943,
1943, had
had already
already caused
caused aa serious
serious drop
drop inin fighter
fighter production
production (see
(see Table
Table
XLV9°).
XLVO).
TABLE
TABLE XLV
XLV
Production
Production of
of New
New and
and Reconditioned
Reconditioned Fighter
Fighter
Aircraft-June-December
Aircraft—June-December 1943
1943

Fighter
Fighter Prod uction
Production
June
June 1943
1943 1,134
1,134
July
July 1943
1943 1,263
1,263
August
August 1943
1943 1,135
1,135
September
September 1943
1943 1,072
1,072
October
October 1943
1943 1,181
1,181
November
November 1943
1943 985
985
December
December 1943
1943 687
687

22
2299
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

Thus,
Thus, November's
November's production
production from
from factories
factories and
and repair
repair depots
depots was
was only
only 78
78 percent
percent
of
of July's,
July's, while
while production
production in
in December
December fell
fell to
to 54.4
54.4 percent
percent of
of the
the July
July figure.
figure. This
This
decline
decline came
came at
at the
the same
same time
time that
that the Luftwaffe was
the Lufttivaffe was suffering
suffering aa high
high rate
rate of
of
attrition
attrition.. New
New production
production was
was even
even more
more affected
affected as
as aa result
result of
of Eighth
Eighth and
and Ninth
Ninth
Air
Air Forces'
Forces' efforts
efforts against
against the
the Messerschmitt
Messerschmitt andand Focke
Focke Wulf
Wulf factories
factories (see
(see Table
Table
XLV19t)
XL VI")..

TABLE
TABLE XLVI
XLVI
Production
Production of
of New
New Fighters
Fighters

Bf
Bf 109
109 Fw 190
Fwl90 Total
Total
June
June 1943
1943 663
663 109
109 772
772
July 1943
July 1943 704
704 169
169 873
873
August
August 1943
1943 515
515 159
159 674
674
September 1943
September 1943 525
525 167
167 682
682
October 1943
October 1943 556
556 127
127 683
683
November
November 1943
1943 472
472 114
114 576
576
December 1943
December 1943 350
350 313
313 663
663

The
The combination
combination of of declining production and
declining production and attrition
attrition left
left Galland
Galland with
with aa thin
thin
reed
reed with
with which
which to to defend
defend the Reich. While
the Reich. While the the pressure
pressure eased
eased somewhat
somewhat in in
November,
November, the the Germans
Germans still still faced
faced aa substantial
substantial threat
threat.. The
The shadow
shadow of of American
American
escort
escort fighters
fighters and
and the the gradual
gradual extension
extension of of their
their range
range lay
lay over
over all
all Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
counterbomber
counterbomber operations
operations.. By By early
early October,
October, German
German intelligence
intelligence had
had reported
reported thatthat
American
American fighters
fighters werewere accompanying
accompanying bombers
bombers as as far
far as
as Hamburg
Hamburg.'^ .9z Eighth's
Eighth's
losses
losses in October led
in October led the
the Germans
Germans to to conclude
conclude that
that during
during good
good weather
weather American
American
bombers
bombers would have to
would have to have
have fighter
fighter escort,
escort, and
and that
that because
because ofof the
the P-47's
P-47's limited
limited
range
range the
the Americans
Americans would would switch more of
switch more of their
their operations
operations to to bad
bad weather
weather.'^. 93 AA
December
December intelligence
intelligence evaluation
evaluation warned
warned that
that dayday operations,
operations, supported
supported by by
fighters,
fighters, were
were already
already reaching
reaching the the middle
middle ranges
ranges.. TheThe authors
authors suggested,
suggested,
moreover,
moreover, thatthat the
the Americans
Americans were were hard
hard at
at work
work developing
developing aa true
true long-distance
long-distance
fighter. 94 In
fighter.** In the
the immediate
immediate future,
future, the
the Germans
Germans estimated
estimated thatthat Eighth
Eighth would
would extend
extend
the
the range
range of of "Lightnings"
"Lightnings" and and "Thunderbolts"
"Thunderbolts" by by increasing
increasing the
the capacity
capacity ofof their
their
drop
drop tanks
tanks.. The
The solution,
solution, however,
however, would
would have
have to to await
await development
development of of aa true
true
long-range
long-range fighter .95
fighter.'^

German intelligence
German intelligence had
had no
no idea
idea how
how close
close the
the Americans
Americans were
were to
to aa solution.
solution.
From
From the
the beginning
beginning of November, however,
of November, however, P-47's
P-47's and
and P-38's,
P-38's, now
now equipped
equipped with
with
better
better drop
drop tanks,
tanks, flew
flew deeper
deeper into
into the Reich.. Goring
the Reich Goring had
had no
no desire
desire to
to recognize
recognize the
the
implications .
implications. In
In early
early September,
September, American
American fighters
fighters had
had reached
reached Aachen
Aachen and
and
Galland
Galland reported the occurrence
reported the occurrence toto Hitler When Goring
Hitler.. When Goring got
got wind
wind ofof Galland's
Galland's
report, he was enraged . Speer
report, he was enraged. Speer recounts
recounts the
the ensuing
ensuing discussion:
discussion:

230
230
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

"What's the
"What's the idea
idea of
of telling
telling the
the Fiihrer
Fiihrer that
that American
American
fighters have penetrated
fighters have penetrated into
into the
the territory
territory of
of the
the Reich?"
ReichV Goring
Goring
snapped
snapped... . .. ..

"Herr
"Herr Reichsmarschall,"
Reichsmarschall," Galland
Galland replied
replied with
with
imperturbable
imperturbable calm,
calm, "they
"they will
will soon
soon be
be flying
flying even
even deeper."
deeper.''

Goring
Goring spoke
spoke even
even more
more vehemently
vehemently:: "That's
"That's
nonsense,
nonsense, Galland,
Galland, what
what gives
gives you
you fantasies?
fantasies? That's
That's pure
pure bluff!"
bluff!"

Galland
Galland shook
shook hishis head
head.. "Those
"Those are
are the
the facts,
facts, Herr
Herr
Reichsmarschall!
Reichsmarschall! .. .. .. American fighters have
American fighters have been
been shot
shot down
down
over
over Aachen
Aachen.. There
There is
is no
no doubt
doubt about
about it!"
it!"

Goring obstinately held


Goring obstinately held his
his ground
ground:: "That
"That is
is simply
simply not
not
true,
true, Galland
Galland.. It's
It's impossible ."
impossible."

Galland
Galland reacted
reacted with
with aa touch
touch of
of mockery
mockery:: "You
"You might
might
go and
go and check
check it it yourself,
yourself, sir
sir;; the
the downed
downed planes
planes are
are there
there at
at
Aachen ." .. .. ..
Aachen."

Goring finally declared


Goring finally declared:: "What
"What must
must have
have happened
happened isis
that
that they
they were
were shot down much
shot down much farther
farther to
to the
the west
west.. II mean,
mean, if
if they
they
were
were very
very high
high when
when they
they were
were shot
shot down they could
down they could have
have glided
glided
quite
quite aa distance
distance farther
farther before
before they
they crashed ."
crashed.''

Not
Not aa muscle
muscle moved
moved inin Galland's
Galland's face
face.. "Glided
"Glided to
to the
the
east, sir?
east, sir? If
If my
my plane
plane were
were shot up .. .. ."96
shot up ."

Now
Now in in November
November 1943, 1943, escort
escoit support
support forfor bomber
bomber formations
formations reached
reached deeper
deeper
into
into the
the Reich
Reich.. OnOn the
the 3rd,
3rd, despite
despite bad bad weather,
weather, fighters
fighters escorted
escorted thethe bombers
bombers to to
Wilhelmshaven
Wilhelmshaven.. Using radar control
Using radar control H2X,
H2X, an an American
American modification
modification of of the
the H2S
H2S
system,
system, thethe force
force bombed
bombed through
through thethe clouds
clouds.. TwoTwo things
things were
were significant
significant about
about thethe
raid
raid.. First,
First, thethe number
number of of bombers
bombers involved,
involved, 539, 539, points
points up up how
how quickly
quickly the the
pipeline
pipeline of of crews
crews and
and aircraft
aircraft from
from the
the United
United States
States had
had compensated
compensated for for October's
October's
losses
losses;; second,
second, escort
escort fighter
fighter support
support kept
kept thethe bomber
bomber losses
losses down
down to to 77 (with
(with
only
only 33 due due to to enemy
enemy fighters)
fighters)." ." The
The Germans
Germans found found the the appearance
appearance of of
American
American fighters
fighters atat this
this range
range most
most alarming
alarming.. German
German losses
losses were
were soso heavy
heavy thatthat
Galland
Galland held held aa special
special meeting
meeting with with II Jagdkorps'
Jagdkorps' division
division commanders
commanders on on
November
November 4.11 4.'* Contributing
Contributing to to the day fighter losses was the fact that many German
the day fighter losses was the fact that many German
fighters
fighters did
did notnot possess
possess direction
direction finders
finders toto locate
locate their
their bases
bases inin bad
bad weather
weather.''.99 The
The
Wilhelmshaven
Wilhelmshaven raid raid resulted
resulted inin several
several changes
changes.. Generaloberst
Generaloberst Weise,Weise, commander
commander
of the
of the central
central airair district
district (Befehlshaber
(Befehlshaber Mitte),Mine), thought
thought thatthat the
the single-engine
single-engine
fighters
fighters must
must engage
engage protecting
protecting fighters
fighters so
so that
that thethe heavier
heavier fighters
fighters (Bf(Bf 110's)
1 lO's) could
could
close
close with
with thethe bombers
bombers.. He He recognized
recognized how how dangerous
dangerous the the air
air environment
environment over over
central
central Germany
Germany had had become
become and and suggested
suggested that that many
many heavy
heavy fighter
fighter squadrons
squadrons
should
should re-equip
re-equip withwith single-engine
single-engine fighters.
fighters. Finally,
Finally, he he admitted
admitted thatthat the
the only
only force
force
available to protect the "Destroyers" (Bf 110's) was Herrmann's single-engine
available to protect the "Destroyers" (Bf UO's) was Herrmann's single-engine
night
night fighter
fighter force (the "wild
force (the "wild sow"
sow" fighters) . 100
fighters).'*
Over
Over thethe next
next days,
days, conferences
conferences among among the the leading
leading fighter
fighter generals
generals seconded
seconded
Weise's suggestions . One colonel urged that the entire force possess single-engine
Weise's suggestions. One colonel urged that the entire force possess single-engine

23
2311
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

fighters.
fighters. The
The conclusions,
conclusions, however,
however, were were that
that five
five light Gruppen were
light Gruppen were adequate
adequate toto
engage enemy fighter forces . General Weise asked whether the lighter fighters
engage enemy fighter forces. General Weise asked whether the lighter fighters
could
could hold
hold off
off the
the supporting
supporting escorts
escorts soso that
that the
the "Destroyers"
"Destroyers" could could attack
attack the
the
unprotected bombers
unprotected bombers.. General
General Schmid
Schmid thought
thought notnot since
since there
there were
were insufficient
insufficient
fighters.'°'
fighters."" OnOn the
the next
next day,
day, the Jagdkorps II decided
the Jagdkorps decided that
that the
the "wild
"wild sow"
sow" force
force
would also
would also have
have toto support
support thethe Bf Bf 110's
llO's during
during thethe day
day.. The
The decision
decision came
came
immediately before an
immediately before an interesting
interesting discussion
discussion over
over the
the fate
fate of
of II./JGS
II./JGS which
which hadhad
suffered heavy losses
suffered heavy losses during
during the
the preceding
preceding week.
week. Colonel
Colonel von von Lutzow
Lutzow suggested
suggested
that II./JGS
that II./JGS bebe pulled
pulled out
out of
of the
the line
line for
for rehabilitation
rehabilitation.. Another
Another officer,
officer, however,
however,
urged
urged that
that in
in view
view ofof shortages
shortages throughout
throughout the the western
western fighter
fighter forces,
forces, the
the unit
unit be
be
broken
broken up up and
and its
its personnel
personnel and and aircraft
aircraft divided
divided among
among other
other squadrons
squadrons in in the
the
west.'°z Given the
west.'^^ Given the German's
German's emphasis
emphasis on on unit
unit cohesion,
cohesion, this this represented
represented an an
important
important departure
departure inin policy
policy andand an an admission
admission thatthat severe
severe frontline
frontline shortages
shortages of of
pilots
pilots and
and aircraft
aircraft existed
existed.. On
On November
November 20, 20, Schmid
Schmid warned
warned his
his commanders:
commanders:

One
One can
can estimate
estimate that
that for
for the
the foreseeable
foreseeable future,
future, the
the provision
provision of of
aircraft
aircraft will
will bebe numerically
numerically so so small
small soso that
that for
for the
the future
future our
our
inferiority
inferiority compared
compared to to the
the British
British and
and Americans
Americans will
will remain
remain.. ItIt isis
> therefore
therefore the
the responsibility
responsibility of of the commander to
the commander to act
act so
so that
that with
with the
the
aircraft
aircraft on
on hand
hand .. .. .. every possible loss
every possible loss will
will be
be avoided
avoided.. With
With
enemy
enemy attacks,
attacks, itit is
is important
important that
that the
the 3rd
3rd Division
Division carries
carries out
out
timely
timely aerial
aerial reconnaissance
reconnaissance to to report
report where
where the
the enemy
enemy formations
formations
are
are flying
flying and
and whether
whether theythey are
are accompanied
accompanied by by fighters
fighters.. ByBy such
such
action,
action, wewe will
will bebe able
able to
to avoid
avoid feeding
feeding night
night fighters
fighters against
against
enemy
enemy dayday fighters,
fighters. 103
'"^

On
On November
November 13, 13, Eighth
Eighth wentwent all
all the
the way
way toto Bremen
Bremen with with fighter
fighter escort
escort asas 345
345
P-47's
P-47's andand 4545 P-38's
P-38's supported
supported the 143 bombers
the 143 bombers.. The The P-47's
P-47's provided
provided the the short-
short-
range
range cover
cover while
while thethe P-38's,
P-38's, withwith two
two 150-gallon
150-gallon drop drop tanks,
tanks, heldheld off
off German
German
fighters
fighters near
near the
the target
target.. The
The attacking
attacking bombers
bombers lost
lost 1616 aircraft
aircraft butbut only
only 22 to
to German
German
fighters. 104 A
fighters.'"^ A more
more massive
massive attack
attack onon Bremen
Bremen thirteen
thirteen daysdays later,
later, despite
despite fighter
fighter
support,
support, costcost the
the attackers
attackers 25 25 bombers
bombers;; butbut considering
considering bomber bomber strength,
strength, 491 491
aircraft,
aircraft, losses
losses were
were only
only 55.1
.1 percent
percent.. That
That was
was anan attrition
attrition rate
rate that
that Eighth
Eighth could
could
accept
accept.. The
The November
November 26 26 raid
raid isis important
important because
because for for the
the first
first time,
time, Eighth
Eighth
dispatched
dispatched 600 600 bombers
bombers (128 (128 aircraft
aircraft also
also attacked
attacked Paris)
Paris).. In
In December,
December, despitedespite thethe
weather,
weather. Eighth
Eighth launched
launched eight
eight major
major raids
raids against
against the the continent
continent.. The The size
size of
of these
these
raids,
raids, in
in some
some cases,
cases, came
came close
close toto doubling
doubling and,and, in in many
many cases,
cases, actually
actually diddid
double
double October's
October's attack
attack onon Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt.. On On December
December 11, 11, 523
523 bombers
bombers hit hit Emden;
Emden;
on
on December
December 13, 13, 649
649 bombers
bombers attacked
attacked aa number
number of of targets
targets in in Germany;
Germany; on on
December 16, 535 hit Bremen; on December 20, 472 attacked Bremen again ; on
December 16, 535 hit Bremen; on December 20, 472 attacked Bremen again; on
December
December 22, Eighth hit
22, Eighth hit Osnabruck
Osnabriick and and Munster
Miinster;; andand finally
finally on the 30th,
on the 30th, 650650
bombers
bombers hit Ludwigshafen.. The
hit Ludwigshafen The losses
losses inin these
these raids
raids (162)
(162) approached
approached those those of of
October (179), but Eighth with fighter escorts and with the influx of
October (179), but Eighth with fighter escorts and with the influx of new
new aircraft
aircraft
and crews could
and crews could stand
stand such
such attrition much better
attrition much . t°s
better.""
This activity shows that the pressure on the Luftwaffe in
This activity shows that the pressure on the Luftwaffe in the
the last two months
last two months of of
1943 had eased only marginally. While much of Germany still lay
1943 had eased only marginally. While much of Germany still lay beyond
beyond escort
escort

23
2322
ATTRITION OVER THE
ATTRITION OVER THE REICH
REICH

range,
range, American
American operations
operations reaching further to
reaching further the east
to the east caused
caused the the Germans
Germans serious
serious
embarrassment
embarrassment and heavy losses
and heavy losses.. The
The December
December 13 13 mission
mission against
against KielKiel andand
Hamburg suggests the
Hamburg suggests the increasing
increasing complexity
complexity and and success
success of of the
the fighter
fighter range
range
extension
extension program
program.. Six Six hundred
hundred forty-eight
forty-eight heavy
heavy bombers
bombers flewflew thethe mission
mission withwith
394 fighter
394 fighter escorts,
escorts, 41 41 of
of which
which werewere P-51's
P-Sl's.. Flying
Flying inin relays
relays that
that met
met contact
contact
points
points along
along thethe route,
route, thethe fighters
fighters provided
provided continuous
continuous and and effective
effective support
support;;
Eighth lost
Eighth lost only
only five
five bombers.
bombers.'"* '06 German
German fighter
fighter formations
formations refused
refused to to tangle
tangle with
with
bomber formations supported by large numbers of fighters
bomber formations supported by large numbers of fighters. .
At
At the
the end
end of of December,
December, Galland
Galland and the staff
and the staff of Jagdkorps II concluded
of Jagdkorps concluded that that their
their
new tactics against supported bomber formations had failed .
new tactics against supported bomber formations had failed. The
The causes
causes were
were "(a)
"(a)
the weather, (b) the considerable inferiority of German strength, (c) the
the weather, (b) the considerable inferiority of German strength, (c) the
impossibility of gathering sufficient strength in an area because oftime and distance
impossibility of gathering sufficient strength in an area because of time and distance
limitations
hmitations;; result
result:: weak
weak and and dispersed
dispersed fighter
fighter attacks ."'°' Moreover,
attacks.""" Moreover, German German
fighter losses, although dropping from October's high point, were still high enough
fighter losses, although dropping from October's high point, were still high enough
to cause considerable worry . In November, the Germans had to
to cause considerable worry. In November, the Germans had to write
write off
off 21
21 percent
percent
of
of their
their fighter
fighter aircraft
aircraft because
because of of battle
battle damage
damage and and noncombat
noncombat causes causes.. In In
December, that percentage rose to 22.8 percent . 101 In normal times, such losses
December, that percentage rose to 22.8 percent.'"* In normal times, such losses
would
would have
have been
been catastrophic
catastrophic.. Compared
Compared withwith October
October andand thethe summer,
summer, this this loss
loss
rate did provide some relief to the fighter force. Nevertheless, this continued
rate did provide some relief to the fighter force. Nevertheless, this continued
expenditure,
expenditure, combined
combined with with declining
declining production,
production, explains
explains why why there
there was was no no
numerical recovery of the day fighter force at year's end (see Table XLVII .
numerical recovery of the day fighter force at year's end (see Table XLVII'"').1"9)

TABLE
TABLE XLVII
XLVII
Frontline
Frontline Strength
Strength and
and Operational
Operational Ready
Ready Rate,
Rate, Fighter
Fighter Force-
Force—
August-December
August-December 1943
1943
Fighters
Fighters Actually
Actually Operationally
Operationally Operationally
Operationally
Authorized
Authorized Present
Present Percent
Percent Ready
Ready Ready,
Ready, Percent
Percent
August
August 31,
31, 1943
1943 2,228
2,228 1,581
1,581 71 .0
71.0 1,019
1,019 64 .4
64.4
September
September 30,
30, 1943
1943 2,228
2,228 1,646
1,646 73 .9
73.9 1,080
1,080 65 .6
65.6
October
October 31,
31, 1943
1943 2,288
2,288 1,721
1,721 75 .2
75.2 1,193
1,193 69 .3
69.3
November 30,
November 30, 1943
1943 2,244
2,244 1,789
1,789 79 .7
79.7 1,140
1,140 63 .7
63.7
December 31,
December 31, 1943
1943 2,244
2,244 1,561
1,561 69
69.6.6 1,095
1,095 70 .1
70.1

Losses of
Losses of fighter
fighter pilots
pilots inin November
November and and December
December alsoalso showed
showed aa decline
decline from
from
the
the high
high point
point reached
reached in in the
the July-October
July-October period
period.. They,
They, however,
however, remained
remained at at aa
level
level which
which under
under other
other conditions
conditions would
would have
have represented
represented aa crippling
crippling drain.
drain. InIn
November,
November, nearly
nearly 10 10 percent
percent of of the
the fighter
fighter pilots
pilots were
were lost,
lost, and
and in
in December
December there
there
was aa slight
was slight rise
rise to
to 10 .4 percent
10.4 percent.. That
That increase
increase reflected
reflected American
American pressure
pressure and
and
heralded
heralded thethe attrition
attrition that
that would
would occur
occur in
in coming
coming months
months."" ."' In 1943, the
In 1943, the fighter
fighter
force
force had
had averaged
averaged 2,105
2,105 full
full and
and partially
partially operational
operational ready
ready pilots
pilots present
present for
for duty
duty
each
each month
month.. Over
Over thethe year,
year, aa total
total of 2,967 fighter
of 2,967 fighter pilots
pilots were
were killed,
killed, wounded,
wounded, or or
missing
missing in in action ."' The
action.'" The fighter
fighter force's
force's weaknesses
weaknesses at at the
the turn
turn of
of the
the year
year and
and its
its
defeat
defeat inin the
the spring
spring of 1944 can
of 1944 can only
only bebe understood
understood in in the
the context
context of
of past
past attrition
attrition
rates
rates.. Table
Table XLVIII"z
XLVIII"^ suggests
suggests what
what these
these losses
losses meant
meant for
for aa frontline
frontline unit.
unit.

23
2333
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

TABLE
TABLE XLVIII
XLVIII
Losses
Losses in
in Jagdgeschwader
Jagdgeschwader 26
26
Pilots
Pilots Killed
Killed
1939
1939 22
1940
1940 51
51
1941
1941 64
64
1942
1942 69
69
1943
1943 149
149
1944
1944 249
249
1945
1945 110
110
TOTAL
TOTAL 694
694

DEFEAT:
DEFEAT: JANUARY-MARCH
JANUARY-MARCH 1944
1944
In
In January
January 1944,
1944, the
the tempo
tempo of
of operations
operations picked
picked up.
up. American
American production
production now
now
swamped
swamped Germany's
Germany's defenders
defenders.. The
The growth
growth in
in Eighth's
Eighth's combat strength for
combat strength for both
both
bombers
bombers and
and fighters
fighters was
was phenomenal
phenomenal (see
(see Tables
Tables XLIX
XLIX"'"3 and
and L' l4) .
L"*).
TABLE
TABLE XLIX
XLIX
Bomber and Fighter
Bomber and Fighter Strength,
Strength, Eighth
Eighth Air
Air Force
Force
Heavy
Heavy Bombers
Bombers
AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT CREWS
CREWS 1
Date
Date I Assigned
Assigned to
to On
On Hand
Hand Oper
Oper Fully
Fully Operational
Operational Effective
Effective Com-
Com-
Air
Air Force
Force Tactical
Tactical Units
Units Tactical Units
Tactical Units Assigned
Assigned Available
Available bat
bat Strength
Strength
Sep
Sep 1943
1943 881
881 656
656 461
461 661
661 409
409 373
373
Oct
Oct 1943
1943 1,000
1,000 763
763 535
535 820
820 479
479 417
417
Nov
Nov 1943
1943 1,254
1,254 902
902 705
705 1,085
1,085 636
636 578
578
Dec
Dec 1943
1943 1,503
1,503 1,057
1,057 752
752 1,556
1,556 949
949 723
723
Jan 1944
Jan 1944 1,630
1,630 1,082
1,082 842
842 1,644
1,644 1,113
1,113 822
822
Feb
Feb 1944
1944 1,852
1,852 1,481
1,481 1,046
1,046 1,683
1,683 1,155
1,155 981
981
Mar
Mar 1944
1944 1,872
1,872 1,497
1,497 1,094
1,094 1,639
1,639 1,063
1,063 960
960
Apr1944
Apr 1944 1,952
1,952 1,661
1,661 1,323
1,323 1,776
1,776 1,148
1,148 1,049
1,049
May
May 1944
1944 2,507
2,507 2,070
2,070 1,655
1,655 2,180
2,180 1,430
1,430 1,304
1,304
Jun 1944
Jun 1944 2,755
2,755 2,547
2,547 2,123
2,123 2,863
2,863 2,034
2,034 1,855
1,855

Fighters
Fighters

AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT I CREWS
I Assigned
CREWS 1
Date
Date Assigned to
to On
On Hand
Hand Oper-Fully
Oper Fully Operational
Operational I Effective
Effective Com-
Com-
Air
Air Force
Force Tactical
Tactical Units
Units Tactical
Tactical Units
Units Assigned
Assigned Available
Available bat
bat Stren gth
Strength
Sep1943
Sep 1943 372
372 274
274 533
533 398
398 274
274
Oct
Oct 1943
1943 559
559 426
426 749
749 591
591 426
426
Nov
Nov 1943
1943 635
635 478
478 771
771 631
631 478
478
Dec
Dec 1943
1943 725
725 565
565 865
865 664
664 565
565
Jan
Jan 1944
1944 1,163
1,163 909
909 707
707 1,028
1,028 810
810 707
707
Feb
Feb 1944
1944 1,138
1,138 883
883 678
678 1,177
1,177 888
888 678
678
Mar
Mar 1944
1944 1,197
1,197 1,016
1,016 720
720 1,252
1,252 998
998 720
720
Apr
Apr 1944
1944 1,305
1,305 1,060
1,060 784
784 1,279
1,279 953
953 775
775
May
May 1944
1944 1,465
1,465 1,174
1,174 882
882 1,449
1,449 1,053
1,053 856
856
Jun
Jun 1944
1944 1,243
1,243 1,112
1,112 906
906 1,703
1,703 1,230
1,230 885
885

23
2344
TABLE
TABLE L
L

AIRCRAFT WRITTEN
WRITTEN OFF:
OFF: EIGHTH
EIGHTH AIR
AIR FORCE
FORCE
1944 (HEAVY
(HEAVY BOMBERS)
BOMBERS)
PERCENTAGE
PERCENTAGE LOSS
LOSS -
BOMBERS
BOMBERS ON
ON HAND
HAND TACTICAL
TACTICAL UNITS
UNITS \\\\
;^$$$^
TOTAL
TOTAL WRITTEN
WRITTEN OFF
OFF mm
NUMBER
NUMBER OF
OF CREWS
CREWS AVAILABLE
AVAILABLE 2547
zsoo
23.3%
24 .6%
20.2'x. " 2070
- 2000
1661

1481 1499
1500
a
z
- 1000 0
oz
z
0Q
z
x
z
?8
m
AUG
x
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

In addition
In addition to
to Eighth's fighters, there
Eighth's fighters, there were
were so so many tactical fighters
many tactical fighters and
and
intermediate-range bombers
intermediate-range bombers in in England
England that new air
that aa new air force,
force, the
the Ninth,
Ninth, was
was
established. Finally, RAF
established. Finally, RAF Fighter
Fighter Command
Command offered
offered substantial
substantial support
support over
over the
the
occupied
occupied countries
countries so
so that
that Eighth's
Eighth's long-range
long-range escorts
escorts only
only had
had to
to cover
cover bomber
bomber
formations
formations deep
deep inin German
German airspace
airspace.. Earlier
Earlier in
in the
the war,
war, America's
America's announced
announced
production plans had met
production plans had met either
either derision
derision from
from the
the Reich's
Reich's propaganda
propaganda service
service or
or
amused disdain from military leaders Now in
amused disdain from military leaders.. Now in early
early 1944,
1944, the
the Germans
Germans discovered
discovered
what Americans meant
what Americans meant byby aa real
real battle
battle of materiel..
of materiel

At
At year's
year's end,
end, America's
America's European
European air air forces
forces underwent
underwent major
major command
command
changes . At Eisenhower's insistence, Spaatz and Doolittle arrived in England from
changes. At Eisenhower's insistence, Spaatz and Doolittle arrived in England from
the
the Mediterranean,
Mediterranean, the the latter
latter as
as Eaker's
Baker's replacement
replacement.. Eaker,
Eaker, disappointed
disappointed at at
leaving
leaving an
an Eighth
Eighth receiving
receiving massive
massive reinforcements,
reinforcements, tooktook over
over command
command of of Allied
Allied
Mediterranean
Mediterranean air
air forces
forces.. His
His responsibilities
responsibilities included
included the
the newly
newly formed
formed Fifteenth
Fifteenth
Air
Air Force
Force that
that would
would launch
launch "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing attacks
attacks on
on Germany
Germany from from the
the
south.
south. Eaker's
Baker's replacement
replacement may may have
have reflected
reflected dissatisfaction
dissatisfaction with
with his
his conduct
conduct ofof
the
the campaign.
campaign. ItIt is
is more
more probable
probable that
that the
the close
close relationship
relationship between
between Eisenhower,
Eisenhower,
Tedder,
Tedder, Spaatz,
Spaatz, and
and Doolittle
Doolittle played
played aa major
major role
role in
in the
the command
command changes
changes..

January's
January's weather
weather diddid not
not cooperate
cooperate with
with American
American commanders
commanders who who had
had hoped
hoped
to
to launch
launch their
their air
air forces
forces against the Reich
against the Reich to to win
win air
air superiority
superiority.. Arnold
Arnold made
made clear
clear
in
in aa Christmas
Christmas message
message what what he he expected
expected to to be
be accomplished
accomplished in in 1944.
1944. The
The
overriding
overriding aim
aim was
was destruction
destruction of of the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe:: "Destroy
"Destroy the the enemy
enemy airair force
force
wherever
wherever you
you find
find them,
them, inin the
the air,
air, on
on the
the ground,
ground, andand inin the factories [emphasis
the factories [emphasis inin
original] .""' Nevertheless,
original]."'" Nevertheless, conditions
conditions werewere sufficient
sufficient to to allow
allow the
the Germans
Germans aa
glimpse
glimpse ofof what
what theythey could
could expect
expect.. As As early
early asas the
the start
start of
of 1944,
1944, Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
intelligence
intelligence gave
gave aa clear
clear picture
picture ofof the
the pattern
pattern ofof upcoming
upcoming day day raids.
raids. They
They noted
noted
the
the following
following characteristics
characteristics.. First,
First, fighter
fighter bombers
bombers and and twin-engine
twin-engine aircraft,
aircraft, such
such
as "Mosquitoes,"
as "Mosquitoes," "Mitchells,"
"Mitchells," and and "Marauders,"
"Marauders," would would attack
attack targets
targets
throughout
throughout France
France and and the
the LowLow Countries
Countries.. Concurrently,
Concurrently, four-engine
four-engine bomber
bomber
formations
formations would
would sweep
sweep into
into Germany
Germany while
while clouds
clouds ofof fighters,
fighters, upwards
upwards of of 1,000,
1,000,
would
would accompany
accompany the the raids
raids.. Finally,
Finally, the
the B-17
B-17 and
and B-24
B-24 formations
formations would
would attack
attack aa
number
number ofof targets
targets to
to divide
divide and
and to
to confuse
confuse the
the defenders
defenders."' . "6
Because
Because ofof bad
bad weather,
weather, nearly
nearly all
all of
of the
the day
day raids
raids in in January
January used used radar
radar for
for
bombing.. In
bombing In mid-month,
mid-month, conditions
conditions cleared
cleared for for aa short
short period,
period, and and Eighth
Eighth
dispatched
dispatched its
its forces
forces deep
deep into
into Germany
Germany against
against the
the aircraft
aircraft industry.
industry. Although
Although only
only
one-third
one-third of
of the
the 663
663 bombers
bombers dispatched
dispatched bombed
bombed the primary targets,
the primary targets, aa major
major airair
battle did develop . Out of 174 bombers
battle did develop. Out of 174 bombers attacking
attacking the
the A.G.O
A.G.O. . Flugzeugwerke
Flugzeugwerke at
at
Oschersleben, the Germans shot down
Oschersleben, the Germans shot down 34
34.. The
The day's
day's losses
losses reached
reached the
the level
level of
of the
the
attacks
attacks on
on Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt in in 1943-60
1943—60 bombers.
bombers. The The cause
cause of of such
such losses were two-
losses were two-
fold: the masssive Luftwaffe opposition and the
fold: the masssive Luftwaffe opposition and the fact
fact that
that only
only one
one group
group of
of P-51
P-51's 's
could provide the deep support that such a raid
could provide the deep support that such a raid required
required.'". I" The
The attack
attack again
again showed
showed
the Germans
the Germans the the importance
importance thatthat Eighth
Eighth Air Air Force
Force attached
attached to to destroying
destroying
Germany's aircraft
Germany's industry.. A
aircraft industry decrypted "Ultra"
A decrypted message
"Ultra" message noted: noted :

23
2366
ATTRITION OVER
ATTRITION OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

The
The attack
attack against Oschersleben carried
against Oschersleben out beyond
carried out beyond the
the effective
effective
range of
range of fighter
fighter escort,
escort, for
for which
which the
the enemy must have
enemy must have counted
counted on on
having heavy
having heavy losses, again underlies
losses, again underlies the
the importance
importance attached
attached toto the
the
diminution
diminution of of German fighter aircraft
German fighter aircraft production
production.. .. . . .. The
The
crushing
crushing of of the
the attack
attack and
and the very considerable
the very considerable losses
losses will
will
presumably
presumably limit
limit American
American daylight
daylight activity
activity for
for some
some time
time toto the
the
range
range of
of escort
escort formations
formations.". 118*

A
A sharp
shaq) rise
rise inin Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe aircraft
aircraft andand crew losses immediately
crew losses immediately reflected
reflected thethe
pressure that Allied day operations
pressure that Allied day operations exerted
exerted on
on defending
defending forces
forces. . In
In January
January 1944,
1944,
the
the fighter
fighter forces
forces wrote
wrote off
off 30
30.3.3 percent
percent of of their
their single-engine fighters and
single-engine fighters and had
had lost
lost
"9 This high attrition of pilots resulted
16.9 percent of their crews by month's end .
16.9 percent of their crews by month's end."' This high attrition of pilots resulted
not
not only
only from
from combat
combat operations
operations butbut also
also from
from the
the continued
continued dilution
dilution of of the
the force
force byby
inexperienced, ill-trained pilots, who in winter's bad weather conditions were as
inexperienced, ill-trained pilots, who in winter's bad weather conditions were as
dangerous to themselves as enemy fighters . One fighter Gruppe at month's end
dangerous to themselves as enemy fighters. One fighter Gruppe at month's end
scrambled
scrambled 21 21 aircraft
aircraft for
for aa second
second sortie
sortie atat an
an American
American bomberbomber formation
formation.. The The
Germans achieved two victories but had four aircraft missing, one crash landing
Germans achieved two victories but had four aircraft missing, one crash landing
(pilot
(pilot killed),
killed), three
three pilots
pilots abandoning
abandoning their their aircraft
aircraft by by parachute,
parachute, one one aircraft
aircraft
damaged after a belly landing, and three aircraft crashing on takeoff. On January
damaged after a belly landing, and three aircraft crashing on takeoff.'^"'2°
On January
29, the
29, the III
III Gruppe
Gruppe of of the
the Jagdgeschwader
Jagdgeschwader Udet Udet claimed
claimed 12 12 bombers,
bombers, but but out
out ofof 28
28
German aircraft taking off, at least 5 and probably 6 were destroyed ; 2 pilots were
German aircraft taking off, at least 5 and probably 6 were destroyed; 2 pilots were
killed
killed and
and 11 wounded
wounded whilewhile 33 parachuted
parachuted to to safety.
safety.'2''2' For
For the
the overall
overall trends,
trends, see
see
Tables 22
LI,'^^ LII,'" 124
Tables LI,' LII,' 21 LIII, and LIV'
LIII.'^* and LIV".21 .

At
At month's
month's end, end, thethe Germans
Germans still still believed
believed thatthat theythey need
need notnot worry
worry about
about
American
American escort
escort fighters
fighters accompanying
accompanying the the bombers
bombers to to Berlin
Berlin because
because they
they doubted
doubted
whether
whether escort
escort fighters
fighters could
could gogo as
as far
far as Braunschweig.. 126
as Braunschweig '^* In
In fact,
fact, their
their assumption
assumption
that
that part
part of
of the
the Reich
Reich would
would lielie beyond
beyond escort
escort fighters'
fighters' range
range soon
soon proved
proved false
false.. The
The
delay
delay that
that January's
January's and and February's
February's bad bad weather
weather imposed
imposed on on American
American operations
operations
probably
probably workedworked in in favor
favor ofof the
the Allies'
Allies' coming
coming offensive
offensive.. Before
Before the the endend of
of
February,
February, aa crashcrash program
program had had transitioned
transitioned aa significant
significant numbernumber of of pilots
pilots into
into
P-51's
P-5I's.. By By mid-month,
mid-month. EighthEighth possessed
possessed 539 539 P-38J's,
P-38J's, 416 416 P-47D's,
P-47D's, and and 329
329
P-5IB's
P-51B's.'" . 121 Toward
Toward the the end
end of
of February,
February, the the extended
extended periodperiod of of bad
bad weather
weather broke
broke
and
and thethe greatest
greatest airair battle
battle ofof World
Worid War War IIII began.
began. At At this
this point,
point, Doolittle
Doolittle released
released
his
his fighters
fighters from
from earlier
earlier restrictions
restrictions thatthat had
had tied
tied escort
escort fighters
fighters close
close toto bomber
bomber
formations."'
formations.'2« Fighters
Fighters nownow attacked
attacked German
German fighters
fighters on on sight,
sight, and
and Eighth
Eighth went went
after
after the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe wherever
wherever it it existed
existed.. With
With drop
drop tanks
tanks that
that would
would carry P-51's to
carry P-5I's to
Berlin,
Berlin, American
American operations
operations attacked
attacked production
production facilities
facilities throughout
throughout the the Reich.
Reich.
The
The bombing
bombing offensive
offensive did did not,
not, however,
however, succeed
succeed in in its
its direct
direct mission
mission to to destroy
destroy
aircraft
aircraft production
production.. German
German industry responded to the attack on aircraft factories in
industry responded to the attack on aircraft factories in
such outstanding fashion that fighter production rose dramatically in the coming
such outstanding fashion that fighter production rose dramatically in the coming
months,
months, but the nature
but the nature ofof the
the target
target forced
forced the
the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to come
come upup and
and to
to fight.
fight. As
As
aa result, American fighter
result, American fighter escorts
escorts decimated
decimated the the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's fighter
fighter force
force..

What later historians


What later historians called
called "Big Week," code-named
"Big Week," code-named "Argument,"
"Argument," began
began on
on
February 20 with a multitarget
February 20 with a multitarget attack
attack on
on the
the German
German aircraft
aircraft industry
industry.. Most
Most

237
237
TABLE
TABLE LI
LI
>

GERMAN
GERMAN AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT LOSSES
LOSSES JAN-JUN
JAN-JUN 1944
1944
3
(ALL
(ALL TYPES)
TYPES) D
S

40%
40%
"BIG
"BIG WEEK"
WEEK" ATTACK ON
ATTACK ON NORMANDY
NORMANDY
OIL
OIL

30% 2B .2%
28.2%
27 .8%
27.8%
25 .2°/0
255%

20.5'/0
20J%
20% 22.7%

14.7%

10%

JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUNE
JUNE
TABLE LII
TABLE LII

GERMAN
GERMAN FIGHTER
FIGHTER LOSSES
LOSSES JAN-JUN
JAN-JUN 1944
1944
"BIG
BIG WEEK"
WEEK" ATTACK
ATTACK ON
ON OIL
OIL NORMANDY
NORMANDY
56.4%

50%
50% . ,. ...... ..... ...
.. ... ..
.....
•■••H.f.
,,.♦•*' 50.4%
.
50.4%
48.3%
48.3%

40%
40% ," 43%
43%

33 .8% ,/
33.8% :
30.3/. ..... .. .... ..,.`'
3"5^. ....... •'
30%
30%
a

20% o
z
0
o
m
z
x
rn
JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUNE
JUNE
N tn
W

i3.3 n
x
X
H
TABLE
TABLE LTII
LIII
fe

FIGHTER PILOT
FIGHTER PILOT LOSSES JAN -- MAY
LOSSES -- JAN MAY 1944
1944
I
■<

% OF
OF PILOTS
PILOTS LOST
LOST EACH MONTH (ALL
EACH MONTH (ALL CAUSES)
CAUSES) ~~
i
D
a
NUMBER OF
NUMBER OF PILOTS
PILOTS LOST
LOST EACH
EACH MONTH
MONTH (ALL
(ALL CAUSES(
CAUSES)
TOTAL
TOTAL FIGHTER
FIGHTER PILOT
PILOT LOSSES
LOSSES JAN
JAN - MAY 2262
AVERAGE
AVERAGE FIGHTER
FIGHTER PILOT
PILOT STRENGTH
STRENGTH 2283
30°
0°oo LOSS
LOSS 99%
25% 600

_ 500
20"

400

300

10% .
200

_ 100

JAN
JAN FEB
FEB MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY
TABLE LIV

GERMAN
GERMAN BOMBER LOSSES JAN-JUN
BOMBER LOSSES JAN-JUN 1944
1944

NORMANDY
NORMANDY
40%
40% - "BIG
"BIG WEEK"
WEEK"

34 .2%
34.2%
33 .8%
33.8%

30%
30% -
27 .1%
27.1% "^^
/^ 28.4%
/

20%
20%
20%
20%

15%
o
z
10%
10% -
%
ra

w
1 11 1
1 1
1 1
1 11 m
JAN FEB
FEE MAR
MAR APR
APR MAY
MAY JUNE
JUNE n
a
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

objectives
objectives lay lay in
in the
the Brunswick-Leipzig
Brunswick-Leipzig area Over 1,000
area.. Over 1,000 bombers,
bombers, 16 16 combat
combat
wings
wings of of B-17's
B-17's andand B-24's,
B-24's, sortied from their
sortied from their bases . '29 All
bases.'^' All 1717 fighter
fighter groups
groups in
in
England
England provided
provided an escort of
an escort of 835
835 fighters
fighters (668
(668 P-47's,
P-47's, 94 94 P--38's
P-38's;; and
and 73
73
P-51 IS) .
P-Sl's).'^" "° German
German reaction was generally
reaction was generally weak,
weak, andand the
the attacking
attacking force
force lost
lost only
only
21
21 bombers
bombers.. Operations on the
Operations on the 20th
20th opened
opened aa week
week of
of intense
intense operations
operations byby Eighth
Eighth
and
and Fifteenth
Fifteenth Air Air Forces.
Forces. The
The raids
raids struck
struck the
the German
German aircraft
aircraft industry
industry and
and its
its
supporting
supporting infrastructure
infrastructure repeated
repeated blows
blows.. After
After aa relatively
relatively easy
easy mission
mission on on the
the
21st,
21st, opposition
opposition stiffened
stiffened and
and Eighth
Eighth lost
lost 41
41 bombers
bombers and
and Fifteenth
Fifteenth lost
lost 14
14 on
on the
the
22nd . '3'
22nd.131

The
The final
final two
two raids
raids of
of "Big
"Big Week"
Week" came came on on February
February 24 24 and
and 25th.
25th. Here
Here again,
again,
American bomber formations ran into strong reaction from German fighters . Eighth
American bomber formations ran into strong reaction from German fighters. Eighth
Air
Air Force
Force lost
lost 49 49 bombers
bombers (5 (5 over
over Rostock,
Rostock, 33 33 over
over Gotha,
Gotha, and and 11 11 over
over
Schweinfurt), while Fifteenth Air Force lost 17, for a total of 66 bombers . The
Schweinfurt), while Fifteenth Air Force lost 17, for a total of 66 bombers. The
heavy emphasis that German fighters gave to attacking the bombers resulted in
heavy emphasis that German fighters gave to attacking the bombers resulted in aa
loss
loss of
of only
only 1010 American
American fighters
fighters during
during thethe day
day.. "^ Opposition
'32 Opposition on on the
the following
following day day
was
was nono less
less severe
severe.. From
From England,
England, Eighth
Eighth launched
launched 820 820 bombers
bombers andand 899
899 fighters
fighters
against
against targets
targets located
located inin or
or near
near Stuttgart,
Stuttgart, Augsburg,
Augsburg, Ffrth,Fiirth, and
and Regensburg
Regensburg.. Only Only
17
17 bombers failed to
bombers failed to return;
return; but
but aa second
second attack,
attack, later
later inin the
the day,
day, by by Fifteenth
Fifteenth
received
received aa severe
severe mauling
mauling.. OutOut of of 116
116 bombers,
bombers, supported
supported by by 9696 fighters,
fighters, the the
Germans
Germans shot shot down
down 41 41 four-engine
four-engine aircraft
aircraft.. So
So in in aa two-day
two-day span,
span, American
American air air
forces
forces had
had lost
lost 124
124 bombers,
bombers, twicetwice the
the number
number lostlost in
in the
the Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt raid.
raid. ItIt was
was aa
mark
mark of of how
how greatly
greatly American
American bomber
bomber forces
forces had
had increased
increased over
over the
the past
past months
months
that
that they
they could
could bear
bear such
such attrition
attrition.. Overall,
Overall, during
during "Big"Big Week,"
Week," Eighth
Eighth lost
lost 137137
bombers
bombers and and Fifteenth
Fifteenth lost
lost 89, while the
89, while the two
two air
air forces
forces lost only 28
lost only 28 fighters.
fighters, '33
i"
If
If Eighth
Eighth could
could bear
bear an an attrition
attrition rate
rate that
that was
was close
close to
to 20
20 percent
percent (299(299 bombers
bombers
written
written off)
off) for
for February,"'
February,"" the the Germans
Germans certainly
certainly could
could not
not suffer
suffer thethe losses
losses itit
required
required to to inflict
inflict that
that punishment
punishment.. In In February,
February, Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe fighter
fighter andand pilot
pilot losses
losses
became
became unmanageable
unmanageable.. The The tactics
tactics that
that had
had worked
worked whenwhen there
there was
was time
time to to attack
attack
unescorted bomber formations
unescorted bomber formations were were no no longer
longer effective
effective.. American
American fighters
fighters were
were
nearly
nearly always
always present
present and
and eager
eager to to attack
attack their
their opponent
opponent.. As As aa result,
result, there
there was
was
little
little chance
chance to to use
use twin-engine
twin-engine day day and
and night
night fighters
fighters without
without heavy
heavy losses.
losses. The
The
experiences
experiences of of Zerstorergeschwader
Zerstorergeschwader "Horst "Horst Wessel,"
Wessel," aa Bf Bf 110
110 fighter
fighter squadron,
squadron,
indicates
indicates whatwhat happened
happened to to twin-engine
twin-engine fighters
fighters inin the
the new
new combat
combat environment
environment..
The
The unit
unit worked
worked up up over
over January
January and and early
early February
February to to operational
operational ready
ready status
status.. At
At
12:13,
12:13, on on February
February 20, 20, 13 13 Bf Bf 110's
llO's scrambled
scrambled afterafter approaching
approaching bomber bomber
formations
formations.. Six Six minutes
minutes later,
later, three
three more
more aircraft
aircraft took
took off
off to
to join
join the
the first
first group
group..
When
When they they arrived
arrived atat aa designated contact point,
designated contact point, there
there was nothing left
was nothing left to
to meet.
meet.
American fighters had jumped the 13 Bf 110's from the sun and shot down 11
American fighters had jumped the 13 Bf 110's from the sun and shot down 11..
Meanwhile, two enemy fighters strafed the airfield
Meanwhile, two enemy fighters strafed the airfield and
and damaged
damaged nine
nine more
more aircraft
aircraft. .
Subsequent operations into March followed the same
Subsequent operations into March followed the same pattern.
pattern. On
On the
the 22nd,
22nd, "Horst
"Horst
Wessel"
Wessel" Bf llO's shot
Bf 110's shot down
down two two "Fortresses"
"Fortresses" but but had
had six
six aircraft
aircraft written
written off off and
and
two crews killed . On March 6, from nine aircraft
two crews killed. On March 6, from nine aircraft scrambled,
scrambled, two
two returned
returned with
with
mechanical difficulties,
mechanical difficulties, one received damage
one received damage in in air-to-air
air-to-air combat,
combat, five were shot
five were shot

24
2422
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

down
down (four (four pilots
pilots wounded
wounded and and one
one killed),
killed), and and the
the commander
commander landed landed his his damaged
damaged
aircraft
aircraft at at another
another airfield
airfield.'". "s
For
For the Luftwaffe'% single-engine
the Luftwaffe's single-engine force, force, "Big "Big Week"
Week" usheredushered in in aa period
period during
during
which sustained
which sustained combat combat devastated
devastated its its units
units over
over thethe long haul. "Big
long haul. "Big Week"
Week" was was
only
only the the start
start ofof aa process
process that that lasted
lasted through
through April April andand waswas notnot the
the apogee
apogee but but rather
rather
aa beginning
beginning.. Bf Bf 109109 and and Fw Fw 190 190 losses
losses were were thethe heaviest
heaviest thus thus far
far inin the
the war
war for for
pilots
pilots as as well
well as aircraft.. The
as aircraft The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe wrote wrote offoff over
over 33 33 percent
percent of of its
its single-
single-
engine fighters
engine fighters and and lost
lost 1717.9 percent of
.9 percent of its
its fighters
fighters pilots
pilots during
during February.
February.'^* 136

Attrition
Attrition in in March
March was was even
even heavier
heavier as as Eighth
Eighth expanded
expanded its its operations
operations all all the
the way
way
to Berlin.
to Berlin. On On March
March 4, 4, American
American bombers bombers made made their
their first
first major
major raid raid on on thethe
German capital
German capital and and encountered
encountered only only light light opposition
opposition.. Two Two days days later,
later, they
they
returned to
returned to meet
meet aa more more tenacious opposition, and
tenacious opposition, and thethe bombers
bombers lost lost 6969 ofof their
their
number
number while while 11 11 escorting
escorting fighters
fighters werewere shot shot down.
down. The The third
third major raid on
major raid on Berlin
Berlin
within
within six six days
days occurred
occurred on on thethe 8th
8th;; andand despite
despite excellent
excellent visibility,
visibility, the the attacking
attacking
formations
formations met met relatively
relatively light light opposition.
opposition. Eighth'sEighth's losses
losses remained
remained manageable,
manageable,
37 bombers
37 bombers and and 17 17 escorts
escorts.'^' ."' The
The appearance
appearance of of American
American bombers bombers over over Berlin
Berlin
tried the
tried the imagination
imagination of of even
even Goebbels'
Goebbels' Propaganda
Propaganda Ministry.Ministry. One One newspaper
newspaper
suggested
suggested that: that: "If"If thethe inhabitants
inhabitants of of thethe capital
capital werewere surprised
surprised that,that, despite
despite the the
heavy defenses and heavy
heavy defenses and heavy losses,
losses, isolated
isolated enemy
enemy formations
formations reached
reached the
the capital
capital in
in
formation, it must be
formation, it must be remembered
remembered that
that this
this need
need not
not be
be interpreted
interpreted as
as a
a sign
sign of
of
strength
strength at at all . " The
all." Volkischer Beobachter,
The Volkischer Beobachter, however, however, won won the the prize
prize for for biased
biased
reporting
reporting when claimed that:
when itit claimed that: "If"If occasionally
occasionally they they flyfly inin clear sky without
clear sky without at at the
the
moment being pursued by the dreaded German fighters, only the layman fooled,
moment being pursued by the dreaded German fighters, only the layman is
is fooled,
and
and then
then onlyonly forfor aa few
few moments
moments.. .... . . In
In their
their case,
case, thethe closed
closed drill
drill formations
formations isis not not
aa sign
sign of of strength
strength." .""'''*
The
The attrition
attrition of of German
German fighter fighter pilots
pilots and and aircraft
aircraft reached
reached aa new new high
high point
point in in
March . Luftwaffe units wrote off 56 .4 percent of single-engine fighters available on
March. Luftwaffe units wrote off 56.4 percent of single-engine fighters available on
March
March 1, 1, while
while crew crew losses
losses reached
reached nearly
nearly 22 22 percent
percent of of pilots
pilots present
present on on February
February
29 .' Nevertheless, the Germans did impose severe attrition on Eighth's bombers,
29 39
139 Nevertheless, the Germans did impose severe attrition on Eighth's bombers.
Eighth
Eighth wrote wrote off 349 bombers
off 349 bombers in in March
March.. Not Not until
until May
May did did aa significant
significant decrease
decrease in in
bomber attrition begin, reflecting the continued arrival of new crews and aircraft as
bomber attrition begin, reflecting the continued arrival of new crews and aircraft as
well
well as as the
the final
final collapse
collapse ofthe Luftwaffe's fighter
of the Luftwaffe's fighter force
force (see
(see Table
Table XLIX"°)
XLIX"*)..
The rising German losses in March reflected several factors . The most
The rising German losses in March reflected several factors. The most obvious
obvious
was the tempo of operations . Although bad weather prevented the occurrence of
was the tempo of operations. Although bad weather prevented the occurrence of
another "Big Week," Eighth kept up an unremitting pressure on the defenses. The
another "Big Week," Eighth kept up an unremitting pressure on the defenses. The
bombing
bombing raids raids forced
forced the the Germans
Germans to to fight
fight and
and imposed
imposed aa continuing
continuing battle battle of of
attrition on their fighters . During the month, the Americans were active over
attrition on their fighters. During the month, the Americans were active over
Germany
Germany on on twenty-three
twenty-three days, days, thirteen
thirteen of of which
which involved
involved an an all-out
all-out effort . 141
effort.""
Although
Although the the bomb
bomb damage
damage may may notnot have
have been been as as effective
effective as as during
during "Big"Big Week,"
Week,"
aerial
aerial combat combat results,results, including
including the the achievement
achievement of of air air superiority
superiority over over the the
continent,
continent, were were of of critical
critical importance
importance..
The
The second
second factor
factor working
working againstagainst the the Germans
Germans was was the the growing
growing strength
strength of of the
the
escort
escort forces.
forces. By By March,
March, they they had reached aa point
had reached point where
where American
American fighters,
fighters, having
having
accomplished
accomplished their their primary
primary escort escort mission,
mission, dropped dropped to to low
low altitudes
altitudes andand attacked
attacked

24
2433
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

targets opportunity, particularly


of opportunity,
targets of particularly airfields . '42 For
airfields."*^ For the
the Germans,
Germans, this this was
was aa
dangerous development that strained not only the fighter force but its supporting
dangerous development that strained not only the fighter force but its supporting
infrastructure
infrastructure as
as well
well.. As
As an
an intercepted
intercepted "Ultra"
"Ultra" message
message onon March
March 88 revealed:
revealed:

The
The enemy
enemy hashas recognized
recognized our
our own tactics of
own tactics taking off
of taking and getting
off and getting
away
away from
from the
the airfield
airfield with
with all
all serviceable
serviceable aircraft
aircraft before
before attacks
attacks on
on
our
our ground
ground organization
organization.. In
In the
the west,
west, he
he has
has recently
recently put
put aside
aside aa
part
part of
of the
the escorting
escorting force
force to
to attack
attack these
these aircraft
aircraft and
and has
has achieved
achieved
successes
successes inin this
this connection . 143
connection.'''^

A
A message
message on
on March
March 24
24 indicated how widespread
indicated how the threat
widespread the threat had
had become
become.. Luftflotte
Luftflotte
Reich reported :
Reich reported:

During
During flights into the
flights into the home
home war war zone,
zone, enemy
enemy fighters
fighters have
have
repeatedly
repeatedly carried
carried out attacks on
out attacks on aircraft
aircraft which
which were
were landing
landing oror on
on
the
the airfields
airfields themselves
themselves.. In In doing
doing so,
so, they
they imitate the landing
imitate the landing
procedure
procedure of of German
German fighters
fighters or
or effect
effect surprise
surprise by
by approaching
approaching the the
airfield
airfield inin fast
fast and
and level
level flight
flight.. The
The difficulty in distinguishing
difficulty in distinguishing
friend
friend from
from foefoe often
often makes
makes itit impossible
impossible for
for the
the flak
flak artillery
artillery to
to fire
fire
on
on them . 144
them.'■'^

One
One must
must note note here
here "Ultra's" impact in
"Ultra's" impact in indicating
indicating to to Allied
Allied air
air commanders
commanders the the
effectiveness
effectiveness of of their
their tactics
tactics andand the severe difficulties
the severe difficulties the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was was facing
facing..
Intercepted
Intercepted messages
messages did did not
not always
always reveal what the
reveal what the Allies
Allies wished
wished to to know
know (such
(such asas
bomb
bomb damage),
damage), but operational intercepts
but operational intercepts undoubtedly
undoubtedly helped helped keepkeep the the pressure
pressure
where
where itit hurt
hurt thethe Germans
Germans the the most.
most.
One
One can
can glimpse
glimpse whatwhat thisthis pressure
pressure meant
meant in in the
the war
war diaries
diaries and
and messages
messages of of the
the
fighter
fighter squadrons
squadrons.. The The 2nd2nd Gruppe
Gruppe ofJagdgeschwader
of Jagdgeschwader 11 11 scrambled
scrambled 16 16 aircraft
aircraft onon
March
March 13
13.. Returning
Returning pilots
pilots claimed
claimed two
two "Mustangs"
"Mustangs" as
as certain
certain and
and two
two as
as
probable,
probable, but but one
one German
German aircraft
aircraft crashed
crashed on on return
return (pilot
(pilot killed),
killed), two
two aircraft
aircraft were
were
missing,
missing, aa fourth
fourth waswas lost
lost when
when itsits pilot
pilot bailed out, and
bailed out, and aa fifth
fifth crashed
crashed near near Lfbeck
Liibeck..
On the 6th,
On the 6th, this
this same
same group
group launched
launched 15
15 aircraft
aircraft against
against a
a Berlin
Berlin raid
raid: : one
one pilot
pilot was
was
killed,
killed, one
one missing,
missing, andand one one wounded
wounded when when he he jumped
jumped from from his
his aircraft
aircraft."" . The war
145 The war

diary
diary ofof the
the 3rd3rd Gruppe
Gruppe of of Jagdgeschwader
Jagdgeschwader Udet Udet makes
makes similarily
similarily depressing
depressing
reading
reading.. On On March
March 15, 15, thethe Gruppe launched 20
Gruppe launched aircraft;; 22 pilots
20 aircraft pilots werewere killed
killed
(aircraft
(aircraft destroyed),
destroyed), 22 pilots pilots had
had toto parachute
parachute to to safety,
safety, andand 22 crash
crash landings
landings tooktook
place
place.. On
On thethe next
next day,
day, ninenine aircraft
aircraft scrambled
scrambled;; two two pilots
pilots were
were killed,
killed, fourfour pilots
pilots
were
were wounded
wounded (one (one severely),
severely), and and one
one pilot
pilot parachuted
parachuted to to safety
safety unhurt
unhurt.. On On the
the
next
next day,
day, operations
operations cost cost thethe unit
unit one
one killed
killed andand twotwo more
more pilots
pilots wounded
wounded (one (one
badly)
badly).. Thus,
Thus, in in aa three-day
three-day span,span, aa unit
unit with
with about
about 25 25 pilots
pilots had
had lost
lost 55 killed
killed and
and 66
wounded
wounded (2 severely). iav
(2 severely). '''*
Fighter
Fighter pilotpilot losses
losses were were not not confined
confined to to thethe inexperienced
inexperienced.. Given Given the the
overwhelming odds, the law of averages began to catch up with Germany's leading
overwhelming odds, the law of averages began to catch up with Germany's leading
aces
aces.. In
In March,
March, two two Geschwader
Geschwader commanders
commanders with with 102 102 kills
kills and
and 161161 kills
kills were
were
141 In mid-March, shortages
killed on operations . In mid-March,
killed on operations.'''^ shortages of skilled pilots caused Galland to
of skilled pilots caused Galland to
send
send the
the following
following message
message asking
asking forfor volunteers
volunteers::

244
244
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

The
The strained
strained manpower situation in
manpower situation in units
units operating
operating in
in defense
defense ofof the
the
Reich
Reich demands
demands urgently
urgently thethe further
further bringing
bringing upup ofof experienced
experienced
flying
flying personnel
personnel from
from other
other arms
arms of
of the
the service,
service, in
in particular
particular for
for the
the
maintenance
maintenance of of fighting
fighting power
power toto the
the air
air arm,
arm, tried
tried pilots
pilots of
of the
the
ground
ground attack
attack and
and bomber
bomber units,
units, especially
especially officers
officers suitable
suitable asas
formation
formation leaders,
leaders, will
will now
now also
also have
have toto be
be drawn
drawn onon.. 148
'**

The
The loss
loss of
of aircraft
aircraft was
was asas serious
serious aa problein.
problem . Bombing
Bombing attacks
attacks onon industry
industry hadhad
retarded
retarded production
production at at the
the same
same time
time that
that the
the fighter
fighter force
force waswas suffering
suffering
catastrophic
catastrophic losses
losses inin air-to-air
air-to-air combat
combat and
and through
through the
the strafing
strafing of
of airfields
airfields.. An
An
"Ultra"
"Ultra" message
message atat the
the end
end of
of March
March indicated
indicated the
the severity
severity of
of aircraft
aircraft shortages
shortages..

The
The extraordinarily
extraordinarily difficult
difficult situation
situation inin the
the air
air defense
defense of of the
the
homeland
homeland requires
requires with
with all
all emphasis
emphasis:: (1)
(1) The
The speedy
speedy salvage
salvage ofof all
all
fighter
fighter and
and heavy
heavy fighter
fighter aircraft
aircraft and
and their
their immediate
immediate return
return for
for
repairs
repairs.. (2)
(2) The
The unrestricted employment of
unrestricted employment of salvage
salvage personnel
personnel forfor
salvage
salvage tasks
tasks.. Subordinate
Subordinate units
units are
are expressly
expressly forbidden
forbidden to to employ
employ
them
them for
for any
any other
other purpose
purpose.. (3)'That
(3)" That spare
spare parts
parts be
be acquired
acquired byby
repair
repair and
and salvage
salvage units
units by
by removal
removal from
from aircraft
aircraft worth
worth salvaging
salvaging
only
only in
in case
case ofof absolute
absolute necessity
necessity.. (4)
(4) That
That repair
repair of
of aircraft
aircraft in
in your
your
area
area be
be energetically
energetically seeded
speeded up up in
in order
order to
to increase
increase serviceability
serviceability
and
and to
to relieve
relieve supply
supply.. T'

By
By the end of
the end of March,
March, thethe daylight
daylight "strategic" bombing offensive
"strategic" bombing offensive had
had put
put the
the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe onon the
the ropes
ropes.. It
It had
had retarded,
retarded, although
although only
only for
for aa short
short period,
period, the
the
expansion
expansion of of fighter
fighter production.
production. MoreMore importantly,
importantly, itit had
had caused
caused anan attrition
attrition that
that
one
one can
can only
only describe
describe as as devastating
devastating.. American
American forces
forces were
were toto continue
continue that
that
unrelenting
unrelenting pressure
pressure in in the
the coming
coming months
months.. Thus,
Thus, there
there was
was no
no hope
hope ofof aa recovery
recovery
for
for Germany's
Germany's daylight
daylight fighter
fighter forces,
forces, and
and the
the Allies
Allies were
were close
close to
to winning
winning airair
superiority
superiority over
over all
all of
of Europe
Europe.. Oberst
Oberst Hannes
Hannes Trautloff,
Trautloff, serving
serving as
as inspector
inspector ofof
fighters
fighters and
and asas aa member
member of of the
the "fighter
"fighter staff"
staff" to
to increase
increase aircraft
aircraft production,
production, told
told
aa group
group offactory
of factory workers
workers::

The
The opponent
opponent now
now seeks
seeks to to fix
fix our
our fighter
fighter forces,
forces, the
the fighters,
fighters, the
the
"Destroyers,"
"Destroyers," andand the
the night
night fighters,
fighters, andand toto destroy
destroy the
the factories
factories..
You
You know
know that
that he
he has
has partially
partially succeeded
succeeded.. ThatThat has
has come
come about
about.. . . ..
because
because wewe do
do not
not have
have enough aircraft.. We
enough aircraft We need
need aircraft
aircraft.. ....
. . II
speak
speak also
also your
your language
language because
because the the language
language of of the
the workers
workers andand
the
the language
language ofof the
the front
front is'the
is the same
same.. We
We must
must succeed-and
succeed—and II am am
convinced
convinced wewe will
will succeed
succeed when
when the the new
new measures
measures are
are in
in effect-in
effect—in
producing
producing more
more aircraft
aircraft in
in the
the near future.. 150
near future '*

Unfortunately
Unfortunately for
for Trautloff
Trautloff and
and Germany's
Germany's cities,
cities, there
there was
was no
no method
method that
that could
could
produce
produce enough
enough machines
machines or
or pilots
pilots;; the
the battle
battle for
for air
air superiority
superiority was
was lost
lost because
because
the
the battle
battle of
of production
production had
had been
been lost
lost in
in 1940,
1940, 1941,
1941, and
and 1942-not
1942—not 1944
1944..

WAR
WAR IN
IN THE
THE EAST,
EAST, THE
THE MEDITERRANEAN,
MEDITERRANEAN , AND
AND OVER
OVER BRITAIN
BRITAIN
As
As cited
cited previously,
previously, the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's heavy
heavy commitments
commitments to to the
the defense
defense of
of the
the
Reich
Reich had
had forced it to
forced it to scale
scale back
back commitments
commitments elsewhere
elsewhere.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, German
German

245
245
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

air
air operations
operations at at the
the front did continue,
front did continue, although
although onon aa much
much reduced scale.. Russia
reduced scale Russia
attracted most of the attention because of the deteriorating ground situation, while
attracted most of the attention because of the deteriorating ground situation, while
in Italy the Germans managed to
in Italy the Germans managed to stabilize
stabilize the
the front
front north
north of
of Naples
Naples. . Despite
Despite the
the
Allied landing at Anzio in January 1944, the Germans held the Allies south of Rome
Allied landing at Anzio in January 1944, the Germans held the Allies south of Rome
with
with little
little support
support.. InIn addition
addition toto the
the Mediterranean
Mediterranean and and Russian
Russian theaters,
theaters, the
the
Luftwaffe opened a night offensive against Britain to retaliate for the devastation of
Luftwaffe opened a night offensive against Britain to retaliate for the devastation of
the Reich's cities. The diversion of bomber strength from other threaters was
the Reich's cities. The diversion of bomber strength from other threaters was
considerable,
considerable, the the results
results meager
meager..

The
The new Chief of
new Chief of Staff,
Staff, Korten,
Korten, had supported two
had supported two strategies
strategies upon
upon assuming
assuming
office
office:: the
the defense
defense of of the Reich and
the Reich and aa "strategic"
"strategic" bombing bombing policy
policy on on the
the eastern
eastern
front
front.. We have catalogued
We have catalogued the the course
course of of the
the first
first strategy;
strategy, thethe second
second element
element in in
Korten's
Korten's policy
policy is is worth
worth examining
examining both both for for its
its assumptions
assumptions and and its
its failure
failure.. This
This
reorientation
reorientation in in the
the Luftwaffe's employment began
Luftwaffe's employment began before
before Jeschonnek's
Jeschonnek's death death.. InIn
June
June 1943,
1943, Luffotte
Luftflotte 6, 6, controlling
controlling aircraft
aircraft on on the
the central
central part of the
part of the eastern
eastern front,
front,
proposed
proposed aa bombing
bombing offensive
offensive against
against Russia's armament industries.
Russia's armament industries. ItsIts staff,
staff, while
while
overestimating
overestimating prospects
prospects for for the
the summer,
summer, argued argued that the Wehrmacht
that the Wehrmacht could could not
not
achieve
achieve aa decisive
decisive success
success withwith "Citadel
"Citadel." ." TheThe Russians
Russians withwith their
their immense
immense
production
production would recover and
would recover and gogo over
over to
to the
the offensive
offensive in in winter
winter.. To
To prevent
prevent another
another
winter
winter attack, Luftflotte 66 argued
attack, Luftflotte argued that
that if
if itit possessed
possessed sufficient
sufficient strength,
strength, itit could
could
successfully
successfully attack
attack targets
targets such
such asas the Gorki tank
the Gorki tank production
production center
center.. AnAn effective
effective
"strategic" bombing offensive,
"strategic" bombing offensive, itit argued,
argued, would would injure
injure Russian
Russian morale
morale and and
production
production to to such
such an an extent
extent that
that the
the disasters
disasters of of the
the previous
previous winters
winters wouldwould notnot
recur."'
recur.'" Several
Several days days later,
later, Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek himself himself echoed these points
echoed these points in in aa
conversation
conversation with with aa staff
staff officer
officer.. The
The Chief
Chief of of Staff
Staff suggested that aa systematic
suggested that systematic
attack
attack onon the
the armaments
armaments factories
factories of of the
the Volga
Volga would would weaken
weaken Russia's
Russia's ability
ability toto
launch
launch aa "great
"great breakthrough
breakthrough offensive
offensive."." It
It would,
would, at at least,
least, force
force Russia's
Russia's Allies
Allies to
to
transfer
transfer material
material fromfrom other
other fronts
fronts to
to make
make up up Soviet
Soviet shortages
shortages.. Jeschonnek
Jeschonnek found found
the
the possibility
possibility of of terror
terror attacks
attacks by by 2020 to
to 30 30 aircraft
aircraft on on population
population centers
centers as as aa
particularly
particularly enticing
enticing way way toto injure
injure Russian
Russian morale
morale.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, his his attention
attention forfor
most
most ofof the
the meeting
meeting centered
centered on on the
the ground
ground battle
battle.. '12
"^
The
The growing
growing interest
interest inin "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing reflected
reflected aa variety
variety ofof factors
factors.. The
The
most
most obvious
obvious was
was the
the general
general failure
failure of
of German
German strategy
strategy in in Russia
Russia.. The
The Germans
Germans
now
now had
had aa tiger
tiger by
by the
the tail,
tail, and
and the
the tiger
tiger was
was showing
showing signssigns of of an
an ability
ability to
to eat
eat his
his
attacker
attacker.. Thus,
Thus, there
there was
was every
every reason
reason toto look
look for
for aa new
new strategy.
strategy. A A second
second factor,
factor,
which
which had
had greatly
greatly contributed
contributed to to Soviet
Soviet successes,
successes, was was the
the mobilization
mobilization of of Russia's
Russia's
immense
immense economic
economic andand industrial
industrial resources
resources.. Not
Not only
only on
on the
the ground
ground butbut in
in the
the air,
air,
Soviet
Soviet production
production was
was playing
playing an an important
important role.
role. Aircraft
Aircraft production
production had had grown
grown
from
from 9,780
9,780 inin 1941,
1941, toto 25,436
25,436 in in 1942, and to
1942, and to 34,900
34,900 in in 1943 .'53 In
1943.'" In addition,
addition,
deliveries
deliveries from
from America
America and and Britain
Britain added
added toto the
the total
total number
number of of aircraft
aircraft available
available
to
to the
the Russians
Russians.. Soviet
Soviet aircraft
aircraft had
had played
played an an important
important part part at
at certain
certain critical
critical
moments,
moments, mostmost notably
notably at Moscow in
at Moscow in 1941
1941 and
and in
in the
the fall
fall of
of 1942
1942.. However,
However, not not
until
until 1943
1943 at
at Kursk
Kursk did
did the Soviet air
the Soviet force show
air force show itself
itself able
able toto intervene
intervene in in the
the air
air
and
and ground
ground battle
battle in
in aa sustained
sustained fashion Despite aa concentrated
fashion.. Despite concentrated effort
effort in
in support
support of of

246
246
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

"Citadel," the
"Citadel," the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe had had not not beenbeen able able to to win
win air air superiority
superiority over over the the
battlefield
battlefield..
Korten
Korten did did notnot find
find sentiment
sentiment unanimously
unanimously in in favor
favor of of "strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing.. The The
army
army withwith its its enormous
enormous commitments
commitments in in the
the easteast waswas loath
loath toto lose
lose thethe air
air support
support
that
that the Luftwaffe provided
the Luftwaffe provided its its troops
troops."* .'54 Conversely,
Conversely, Speer Speer added
added his his prestige
prestige to to
those
those urging
urging creation
creation of of aa force
force to to attack
attack Russian
Russian industry.
industry. On On June
June 23,23, he he formed
formed aa
committee
committee to to look
look forfor vulnerable
vulnerable points points in in the
the Soviet
Soviet economy
economy.. Because
Because of of the
the
limited
limited number
number of of bombers
bombers available,
available, the the committee
committee urged urged the the use
use of of precision
precision
bombing
bombing by by small
small groups
groups of of aircraft
aircraft.. Like
Like the the Air
Air Corps
Corps Tactical
Tactical School
School theorists
theorists of of
the
the thirties
thirties at at Maxwell
Maxwell Field, they selected
Field, they selected the the electric
electric industry
industry as as aa choke
choke pointpoint..
According
According to to Speer,
Speer, one one electric
electric plantplant on on thethe upper
upper VolgaVolga supplied
supplied Moscow's
Moscow's
power,
power, whilewhile the the destruction
destruction of of several
several powerplants
powerplants in in the
the Urals
Urals would
would halt halt much
much of of
Russia's
Russia's steel,
steel, tank,
tank, andand munitions
munitions production.
production.'" "I

Armed
Armed with with Speer's
Speer's support,
support, Korten Korten persuaded
persuaded Hitler Hitler andand Goring
Goring that that
"strategic"
"strategic" bombingbombing could could materially
materially aid aid thethe warwar effort
effort.. A A November
November study study set set
forth
forth the
the arguments
arguments.. The The cover
cover letter
letter admitted
admitted that that thethe new
new approach
approach was was aa poorpoor
man's strategy
man's strategy.. It It argued
argued that that the the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe's extensive extensive support
support of of ground
ground
operations had allowed the Russians to build up their armaments
operations had allowed the Russians to build up their armaments industry
industry
undisturbed,
undisturbed, and and thereby
thereby given given the the Soviets
Soviets aa vast vast numerical
numerical superiority
superiority in weapons..
in weapons
Despite an admission that the Red Air Force could defend Russia in depth, the
Despite an admission that the Red Air Force could defend Russia in depth, the paper
paper
optimistically suggested that even with its relatively weak forces, the Luftwaffe
optimistically suggested that even with its relatively weak forces, the Luftwaffe
could
could launch precision bombing
launch precision bombing attacksattacks that that would
would have have greatgreat impact.
impact. There There was was
one premise on which such an offensive rested . The Luftwaffe must withdraw its
one premise on which such an offensive rested. The Luftwaffe must withdraw its
bomber strength in the east from the close support mission and train it for aa
bomber strength in the east from the close support mission and train it for
"strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing offensive
offensive against
against Soviet industry.. The
Soviet industry The study
study itself
itself examined
examined
in
in detail
detail the
the structure
structure of of Soviet
Soviet armament
armament industries
industries and and gave
gave special
special emphasis
emphasis to to
the
the electric
electric industry
industry as as the
the structure's
structure's weak weak link.link.'^*116

These
These arguments
arguments convinced
convinced Goring Goring and, and, for for aa short
short time,
time. Hitler.
Hitler. On On November
November
21,
21, the
the Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall signed signed aa directive
directive to to Luftflotten
Luftflotten 44 and and 66 indicating
indicating his his
intention
intention to to launch
launch aa "strategic"
"strategic" bombing bombing offensive
offensive against against Soviet
Soviet industry
industry.. He He
suggested
suggested that that such
such aa strategy
strategy offered
offered better
better support
support for for the
the ground
ground forces
forces thanthan the the
present
present close
close support
support mission
mission.. Bomber
Bomber units units would
would pull pull back
back to to rear
rear echelon
echelon
airfields
airfields as as soon
soon as as possible
possible and and spend
spend four four to to sixsix weeks
weeks training
training for for the
the deep
deep
penetration,
penetration, precision
precision bombing
bombing missionsmissions."^ . 'S' Korten
Korten thus thus received
received authorization
authorization to to
pull
pull bomber
bomber units units outout ofof the
the line
line andand to to establish
establish aa special special pathfinder
pathfinder unit unit forfor the
the
"strategic"
"strategic" bombing
bombing force force.. TheThe general
general staffstaff scheduled
scheduled early early February
February for for the
the start
start
of
of its
its "strategic"
"strategic" bombingbombing effort effort."*."' Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, the the offensive
offensive onlyonly halfheartedly
halfheartedly
began
began in in April
April.. ThereThere were were two two reasons
reasons for for thethe failure
failure to to meet
meet the the proposed
proposed
schedule:
schedule: First,
First, thethe ground
ground battlebattle in in the
the east
east deteriorated,
deteriorated, and and the
the Germans
Germans found found itit
aa virtual necessity to draw on bomber strength to aid hard-pressed troops . The
virtual necessity to draw on bomber strength to aid hard-pressed troops. The
second factor resulted from the diversion of bomber strength to the "Baby Blitz"
second factor resulted from the diversion of bomber strength to the "Baby Blitz"
retaliation
retaliation attacks
attacks on on London
London..

24
2477
STRATEGY FOR
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

The
The Russian
Russian summer offensive had
summer offensive had rolled
rolled into into high
high geargear after after thethe victory
victory at at
Kursk, and
Kursk, and Soviet
Soviet forces
forces battered
battered German
German infantry infantry back back to to the the Dneper
Dneper.. Hitler's
Hitler's
consistent
consistent refusal
refusal to to authorize
authorize timelytimely withdrawals
withdrawals or or the
the preparation
preparation of of defensive
defensive
positions
positions in in rear
rear areas
areas placed
placed the the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht at at aa severe
severe disadvantage
disadvantage.. The The
tendencies
tendencies that that hadhad marked
marked late late summer
summer battles battles continued
continued into into the the fall
fall.. Pushing
Pushing
across
across the the Dneper
Dneper in in early
early October,
October, Soviet Soviet forcesforces drove
drove on on Krivoi
Krivoi Roy Roy in in the
the
Ukraine
Ukraine and and threatened
threatened to to split
split the
the southern
southern front front in in half
half.. Using
Using forces forces released
released
from
from thethe west,
west, Manstein
Manstein possessed
possessed enoughenough reserves
reserves to to stem
stem this this Russian
Russian thrustthrust."'.'S9
The defense of Krivoi Roy was successful not only because of ground
The defense of Krivoi Roy was successful not only because of ground
reinforcements
reinforcements but but because
because of of substantial
substantial air air support.
support. On On this
this front,
front, the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe
concentrated all twin-engine bombers in the east along with a substantial proportion
concentrated all twin-engine bombers in the east along with a substantial proportion
of
of ground
ground attack units.. By
attack units By flying
flying 1,200
1,200 sorties
sorties per per day
day over
over aa five-day
five-day period,
period, the the
Luftwaffe aided Manstein's forces in halting the Russian offensive . '6°
Luftwaffe aided Manstein's forces in halting the Russian offensive. "*
The
The front's
front's stabilization
stabilization north north of of Krivoi
Krivoi Roy Roy only only brought
brought momentary
momentary relief. relief. InIn
the south, a massive Soviet offensive engulfed Sixth Army, captured the city of
the south, a massive Soviet offensive engulfed Sixth Army, captured the city of
Melitopol
Melitopol (near (near thethe northwest
northwest shore shore of of the
the Sea
Sea of of Azov),
Azov), drovedrove straight
straight across
across to to the
the
northwestern shores of the Black Sea, and isolated the Seventeenth Army in the
northwestern shores of the Black Sea, eind isolated the Seventeenth Army in the
Crimea
Crimea.. Hitler
Hitler refused
refused requests
requests to to withdraw,
withdraw, and and thethe Russians
Russians trapped trapped one one German
German
division and seven Rumanian divisions. At the beginning of November, Soviet
division and seven Rumanian divisions. At the beginning of November, Soviet
forces broke out from their bridgehead on the western bank of the Dneper near
forces broke out from their bridgehead on the western bank of the Dneper near
Kiev . The fighting that developed in this region threatened the entire southern front.
Kiev. The fighting that developed in this region threatened the entire southern front.
Manstein's
Manstein's magic magic couldcould onlyonly patch
patch together
together inadequate
inadequate solutions
solutions to to the
the crises
crises.. All
All
the
the while
while aa terrible
terrible attrition
attrition of of ground
ground forcesforces took took place.
place. First
First Panzer
Panzer Army Army warned
warned
that
that its
its infantry
infantry strength
strength had sunk to
had sunk to desperate
desperate straits;straits; itsits divisions
divisions under under heavy
heavy
attack
attack were
were losing
losing aa battalion
battalion aa day. day. !6l
'*'
The fall
The fall disasters
disasters were were aa prelude
prelude to to what
what would would happen
happen in in thethe winter
winter.. In In the
the
south,
south, Russian
Russian forcesforces keptkept thethe pressure
pressure on on and
and forced
forced the the Germans
Germans back back fromfrom KievKiev
and
and the
the Dneper
Dneper almostalmost to to the
the Bug
Bug River
River in in the
the western
western Ukraine
Ukraine.. They They also also cleared
cleared
the
the Germans
Germans out out ofof Nikopol
Nikopol in in the east central
the east central Ukraine
Ukraine and and finally
finally captured
captured KrivoiKrivoi
Roy.
Roy. Hitler's
Hider's refusal
refusal to to allow
allow any any withdrawals
withdrawals until until thethe last
last moment
moment enabled enabled the the
Russians
Russians to to encircle
encircle four four divisions
divisions near near Cherkassy,
Cherkassy, located located 100 100 milesmiles southeast
southeast of of
Kiev the Luftwaffe
Kiev;; the Luftwaffe supplied
supplied the the pocket
pocket from from the the air.
air. InIn the
the first
first fivefive days
days of of aerial
aerial
supply,
supply, its its squadrons
squadrons lost lost 44
44 aircraft
aircraft to to accidents
accidents and and Russian
Russian fighters
fighters.'" ."'
While
While Army Army GroupGroup South South received
received aa severe severe battering,
battering, the the RedRed Army Army launched
launched aa
general
general offensive
offensive against
against the north. Between
the north. Between mid-January
mid-January and and the the endend of of March,
March, itit
drove
drove the the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht entirely entirely away away from from Leningrad
Leningrad and and the positions that
the positions that the
the
Germans
Gernvans had had held
held for two years
for two years.. By By spring,
spring, the the Russians
Russians had had advanced
advanced to to Lake
Lake
Peipus
Peipus in eastern Estonia
in eastern Estonia and and had
had almost
almost reached
reached the the Baltic
Baltic countries.
countries. The The final
final act
act
in
in the
the catalogue
catalogue of of disasters
disasters befalling
befalling the the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht came came in in thethe winter
winter whenwhen the the
Russians launched
Russians launched an an early spring offensive
early spring offensive against against Army Army Group Group South South.. The The
Soviets
Soviets drovedrove the the Germans
Germans from from their their lastlast holdhold on on thethe Dneper,
Dneper, cleaned cleaned the the
Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht from from its its hold
hold on on the
the western Ukraine, and
western Ukraine, and finally
finally came came to to rest
rest onon the
the
foothills
foothills of of the
the Carpathians
Carpathians and
and the
the Dnester-in
Dnester—in other
other words,
words, on
on the
the frontier
frontier of
of
Rumania
Rumania and
and Hungary . "'
Hungary.'"

248
248
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

These defeats
These defeats made
made the the establishment
establishment of of aa "strategic"
"strategic" bombing bombing force force to to attack
attack
Russia's
Russia's armament
armament industries
industries virtually
virtually impossible.
impossible. Throughout
Throughout the the winter,
winter, the the
Germans
Germans faced faced events
events on on thethe ground
ground that that threatened
threatened destruction
destruction of of not
not merely
merely
divisions
divisions and and corps
corps but but armies
armies and and army army groups.
groups. Only Only the the mostmost desperate
desperate
expedients
expedients allowed
allowed the the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht to to escape
escape complete
complete destruction.
destruction. There There was was no no
choice
choice except
except to to use
use what what was was at at hand,
hand, and and the the bomber
bomber forces forces were were readily
readily
available
available.. The The location
location of of the
the fighting
fighting in in the
the south
south placed
placed the the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe far far from
from
centers
centers of of supply,
supply, and and difficulties
difficulties in in maintaining
maintaining and and supplying
supplying its its forces
forces there-
there—
especially
especially afterafter Army
Army Group Group SouthSouth and and ArmyArmy GroupGroup CenterCenter lost lost contact
contact with with eacheach
other-were
other—were considerable
considerable.. Hitler's Hitler's refusal
refusal to to countenance
countenance withdrawals
withdrawals intensified
intensified
the
the already
already considerable
considerable burdens burdens on on air
air units
units.. His
His demand
demand that that the
the Crimea
Crimea be be held
held
forced
forced thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe to to maintain
maintain aa considerable
considerable airlift airlift by
by Ju Ju 52's
52's and and He He IIll's,
I I's,
including
including some some bomber
bomber units. units. The The use use of of bomber
bomber units units against
against Russian
Russian spearheads
spearheads
was
was at at times
times successful
successful and and givengiven the the desperate
desperate situation
situation on on thethe ground,
ground,
unavoidable
unavoidable.. It It was
was certainly
certainly not not cost-effective
cost-effective.'^ . '6' By
By this
this time,
time, the the Russians
Russians were were
conversant
conversant with with Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe operations,
operations, and and theythey notnot only
only possessed
possessed aircraftaircraft in in large
large
numbers
numbers but but their
their troops
troops were were equipped
equipped with with ample
ample antiaircraft
antiaircraft support support.. Thus,Thus,
German
German air air operations
operations tended tended to to bebe decreasingly
decreasingly effective effective and and more
more costly
costly.. By By
mid-December,
mid-December, Luftflotte Luftflotte 66 reported
reported that that Russian
Russian air air strength
strength was was such such thatthat thethe
enemy
enemy was was launching
launching 3,200 3,200 sorties
sorties aa day day to to support
support groundground operations."'
operations.'" Even Even
more
more depressing
depressing for for German
German ground ground forces was the fact that the Russians had noted
forces was the fact that the Russians had noted
the
the disappearance
disappearance of of German
German fighters
fighters and and hadhad therefore
therefore re-equipped
re-equipped many many fighter
fighter
units
units with
with ground
ground attack
attack aircraft
aircraft.. Those
Those could could now now rangerange over
over the the battle
battle areas
areas withwith
minimal
minimal fear fear ofof Luftwaffe fighters.. '66
Luftwaffe fighters ">*
The
The decrease
decrease in in German
German aircraft aircraft strength
strength in in the
the east
east resulted
resulted in in the
the remaining
remaining
units
units being
being usedused as as fire
fire brigades,
brigades, rushedrushed from from oneone frontline
frontline spot spot to to another
another.. A A loglog
book
book of of an
an HeHe 111111 pilot
pilot on on the
the eastern
eastern front front during
during the the 1943-44
1943-44 period period articulates
articulates
this
this point
point.. In In his
his first
first 2525 missions
missions betweenbetween August August 88 and and September
September 6, 6, 1943,
1943, he he did
did
not
not fly
fly aa single
single mission
mission lasting
lasting more more thanthan 10 10 minutes
minutes over over enemy
enemy territory
territory.. In In his
his
next
next 25
25 missions
missions between
between September
September 77 and and 22nd,
22nd, he he flew
flew only
only two two missions
missions lasting
lasting
more
more than
than 10 10 minutes
minutes over over enemy
enemy territory-one
territory—one of of 1515 minutes
minutes and and one one ofof 22 hours
hours
duration
duration.. In In his
his next
next 50 50 missions,
missions, he he flew
flew onlyonly three
three that
that lasted
lasted more more thanthan 10 10
minutes
minutes overover enemy
enemy territory
territory.. For For hishis second
second 100 100 missions,
missions, 32 32 lasted
lasted longer
longer thanthan 10 10
minutes,
minutes, but but many
many of of these
these werewere weather
weather reconnaissance
reconnaissance flights flights overover the the Black
Black Sea Sea
or
or supply
supply missions
missions intointo the Crimea . The Luftwaffe's specialized antitank forces,
the Crimea.'*' '67 The Luftwaffe's specialized antitank forces,

rushed
rushed fromfrom one one section
section of of the
the front
front to to another,
another, found found itit difficult
difficult to to maintain
maintain their their
operational
operational ready ready rates
rates andand suffered
suffered the the cumulative
cumulative effects effects of of constant
constant commitment
commitment
to
to combat
combat.. One One Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe pilot pilot inin anan antitank
antitank squadron
squadron in in Russia
Russia recalls
recalls thatthat his
his unit
unit
lost
lost as
as many
many aircraft
aircraft as as the
the number
number of of tanks
tanks thatthat itit destroyed-hardly,
destroyed—hardly, he he notes,
notes, aa
cost-effective
cost-effective employment
employment of of aircraft
aircraft.. '68"■*
The
The result
result of of the
the defeats
defeats in in Russia
Russia were were twofold
twofold.. First, First, there
there was was an an
understandable
understandable reluctance
reluctance to to pull
pull bomber
bomber units units out
out of of the
the line
line when
when ground
ground forcesforces
were
were in in trouble
trouble.. Second,
Second, those those forces
forces that that hadhad pulled
pulled back back from
from the the front
front to to begin
begin
special
special training
training programs
programs soon soon found
found themselves
themselves asked asked to to attack
attack supply
supply lines
lines.. ForFor
instance,
instance, in in February
February when when the the Germans
Germans were were in in particularly
particularly bad bad trouble,
trouble, HitlerHitler
used these
used these specialized
specialized squadrons
squadrons to to bomb
bomb railroad
railroad tracks.
tracks. These
These operations
operations cost cost thethe
249
249
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT
STRATEGY FOR DEFEAT

attacking
attacking forces forces heavy
heavy losseslosses withwith no commensurate lessening
no commensurate lessening of of pressures
pressures on on the
the
front . 169 Consequently, the special
front.'*' Consequently, the special units
units did
did not
not complete
complete training
training on
on schedule,
schedule, and
and
itit was
was notnot until
until late
late March
March that the first
that the first attacks
attacks on on Russian
Russian industrial
industrial targets
targets began.
began.
By that time, however, Russian advances in the north had captured the forward
By that time, however, Russian advances in the north had captured the forward
operating
operating fields fields from
from which
which the the Germans
Germans had had hoped
hoped to to launch
launch theirtheir airair offensive
offensive..
Gorki now lay entirely outside the range of German aircraft . Finally, hopes for
Gorki now lay entirely outside the range of German aircraft. Finally, hopes for the
the
"strategic" bombing attacks had rested on the idle hope that the He 177 would
"strategic" bombing attacks had rested on the idle hope that the He 177 would
finally
finally arrive
arrive in in the
the winter
winter of of 1943-44
1943-44 in substantial numbers
in substantial numbers to to augment
augment the the
bomber
bomber squadrons
squadrons.. It It did
did not,not, probably
probably luckilyluckily for for the
the crews,
crews, as as Heinkel
Heinkel still still had
had
not
not solved
solved the the engine
engine problems
problems.. By By the
the time
time thatthat the
the first
first He He 177's
177's (outside
(outside of of the
the
Stalingrad
Stalingrad disaster)
disaster) arrived
arrived on on the
the eastern
eastern frontfront in in the
the summer
summer of of 1944,
1944, lacklack ofof fuel
fuel
precluded
precluded sustained
sustained use use ofof the
the aircraft
aircraft."° . "°
Meanwhile
Meanwhile in in the west. Hitler's
the west, Hitler's decisions
decisions sealed sealed the the fatefate of of thethe "strategic"
"strategic"
bombing
bombing scheme scheme.. For For the the Nazi
Nazi leadership,
leadership, the the terrible
terrible pounding
pounding that that Bomber
Bomber
Command
Command was was inflicting
inflicting on on Germany's
Germany's cities cities hadhad reached
reached intolerable
intolerable levels levels..
Goebbels
Goebbels sprinkledsprinkled his his diary
diary and and speeches
speeches with with thethe hope
hope that that Germany
Germany would would soonsoon
retaliate
retaliate.. In In November
November 1943, 1943, Hitler,
Hitler, believing
believing that that hishis revenge
revenge weaponsweapons were were
ready,
ready, announced
announced to to the
the assembled
assembled Nazi Nazi faithful
faithful in in Munich
Munich that, that, "Our"Our hour hour of of
revenge
revenge is is nigh!
nigh!.. .. .. .. Even
Even if if for
for the
the present
present we we cannot
cannot reach
reach America,
America, thank thank God God
that
that at at least
least oneone country
country is is close
close enough
enough to to tackle ." "' The
tackle."'^' The unfortunate
unfortunate truth truth forfor
Hitler,
Hider, however,
however, was that none
was that none of of the
the retaliatory
retaliatory weaponsweapons were were close
close to to being
being
ready.
ready. Both Both the the V-1
V-1 and and V-2 were encountering
V-2 were encountering difficulties
difficulties in in production,
production, and and final
final
tests
tests indicated
indicated distressing
distressing designdesign problems
problems.. Tests Tests of of the
the V-2 carrying its
V-2 carrying its payload
payload for for
the
the first
first time
time failed
failed completely
completely.. ThroughThrough March March 1944, 1944, of of 5757 rockets
rockets tested,
tested, onlyonly 26 26
got
got off the ground;
off the ground; of of the
the latter,
latter, only
only 44 reached
reached the the target
target area.area. TheThe others
others blewblew up up
on re-entry or
on re-entry or simply
simply disappeared
disappeared.. "^ "z
Troubles
Troubles with with the the rocket
rocket program
program helped helped turn turn the the Germans
Germans to to aa moremore
conventional
conventional means means of of retaliation
retaliation:: the the bomber
bomber.. The The continued
continued emphasisemphasis on on bomber
bomber
production
production and and preference
preference for for that
that aircraft
aircraft type type overover fighters
fighters reflected
reflected aa human human
desire
desire to to strike
strike backback at at Germany's
Germany's tormentors.
tormentors. In In October,
October, Goring Goring passedpassed on on
Hitler's
Hitler's demanddemand that that thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe attackattack one one ofof the
the major
major Italian
Italian towns
towns occupied
occupied by by
the
the British
British (either
(either Brindisium
Brindisium or or Taranto)
Taranto) beforebefore the the establishment
establishment of of night
night fighter
fighter
defenses . The
defenses. The Ffhrer's
Fuhrer's purposepurpose was was not not only
only to to pay
pay backback the the Italians
Italians forfor their
their
betrayal
betrayal but also to
but also to give
give neutrals
neutrals and and especially
especially Germany's
Germany's "rotten" "rotten" allies allies an an
object
object lesson.
lesson.'" I"

In
In late
late November,
November, Goring ordered the
Goring ordered the young
young bomber bomber expert,
expert, Dietrich
Dietrich Peltz,
Peltz, to to
prepare
prepare for for aa retaliation
retaliation offensive
offensive against
against London
London.. He He promised
promised that that units
units detailed
detailed
for
for these
these attacks
attacks would would receive
receive aa full full complement
complement of of crews
crews and and aircraft.
aircraft. In In
conclusion,
conclusion, the the Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall asked asked PeltzPeltz whether
whether he would accept
he would accept Do Do 217's
217's in in
the
the bombing
bombing force; force; Peltz
Peltz replied
replied thatthat he
he would
would welcome
welcome anythinganything that would carry
that would carry aa
bomb
bomb.''''*. 174 That
That was was precisely
precisely what what he he gotgot.. Over
Over December
December and and early January, the
early January, the
Germans accumulated a conglomeration of
Germans accumulated a conglomeration of 550
550 aircraft
aircraft on
on the
the airfields
airfields of
of France
France for
for
the offensive : Ju 88's, Ju 188's, Do
the offensive: Ju 88's, Ju 188's, Do 217's,
217's, Me
Me 410's,
410's, Fw
Fw 200's,
200's, and
and even
even 35
35 brand
brand
new
new He He 177's.
177's. The The widely
widely differing capabilities of
differing capabilities of these aircraft and
these aircraft and thethe limited
limited
navigational and flying skills of the crews lead
navigational and flying skills of the crews lead Peltz
Peltz to
to make
make the
the attack
attack as
as simple
simple as
as

250
250
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

possible.
possible. Specially
Specially trained trained pathfinders,
pathfinders, equipped
equipped with with various
various marking
marking devices,
devices,
would
would locate
locate and and mark
mark the the target
target;; the
the other
other bombers
bombers wouldwould hopefully
hopefully bomb bomb on on these
these
markers
markers.'" . 175
Goring
Goring openedopened the the offensive
offensive on on January
January 21 21 with
with aa typical
typical gesture
gesture.. He He left
left Berlin
Berlin
to
to assume
assume personal
personal command
command of of the
the operation
operation.. He He might
might have have saved
saved himself
himself the the
trouble
trouble as the offensive
as the offensive got got off
off to to aa bad
bad start.
start. The
The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe launched
launched 447 447 bombers
bombers
in
in two
two waves
waves at at the
the British
British capital
capital.. Navigation
Navigation was was poor,
poor, the the pathfinder
pathfinder system system
broke
broke down,
down, and and outout of of 268
268 tonstons of of bombs
bombs dropped
dropped overover England,
England, only only 32 32 tons
tons
landed
landed in in London
London.''* . 176 For
For thethe following
following four four months,
months, the the Germans
Germans continuedcontinued
attacking
attacking with with lessless thanthan spectacular
spectacular results.results . The
The next
next two two attacks
attacks werewere dismal
dismal
failures
failures;; on on February
February 18th, 18th, the
the bombers
bombers managed
managed to to drop
drop 175 175 tons
tons within
within London's
London's
confines
confines.. Thereafter,
Thereafter, the the Germans
Germans managed managed to to get
get 50
50 percent
percent of of bomb
bomb loadsloads within
within
the target area, but the decreasing size of the force gave better accuracy less
the target area, but the decreasing size of the force gave better accuracy less
significance . "' The scale of these attacks was miniscule compared to what Bomber
significance.''' The scale of these attacks was miniscule compared to what Bomber
Command
Command was was doing
doing to to German
German cities cities.. The
The losses
losses suffered,
suffered, however,
however, were were not not
infinitesimal . In the "Baby Blitz" attacks, the Germans lost 329 bombers-a loss
infinitesimal. In the "Baby Blitz" attacks, the Germans lost 329 bombers—a loss
that
that was
was virtually
virtually irreplaceable
irreplaceable.. From From 695 695 operational
operational readyready bombers
bombers in in northern
northern
France at the end of December 1943, bomber strength had sunk to 144 by
France at the end of December 1943, bomber strength had sunk to 144 by MayMay
178
1944. The Germans could not replace these losses because American attacks on
1944 178 jijg Germans could not replace these losses because American attacks on
aircraft production had forced them to concentrate their industrial effort on building
aircraft production had forced them to concentrate their industrial effort on building
fighters
fighters.. WhileWhile itit is is arguable
arguable whether
whether the the bomber
bomber forces
forces could could have have had had aa
significant impact on Russia's armament production, there is no doubt that these
significant impact on Russia's armament production, there is no doubt that these
bombers would have been a useful addition to German strength when D-day
bombers would have been a useful addition to German strength when D-day
occurred.
occurred.
The
The other
other majormajor theater
theater in in which
which the the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht was was locked
locked in in combat
combat was was the the
Mediterranean . Here,
Mediterranean. Here, afterafter aa strong
strong response
response by by German
German fighter
fighter bombers
bombers to to the
the
invasion of
invasion of Italy
Italy and
and aa few few solid
solid shots
shots atat the
the Italians
Italians bailing
bailing out out of of the
the war,
war, the the
Germans
Germans withdrew
withdrew most most of of their
their airair strength.
strength. ThisThis move
move had had fewfew repercussions
repercussions for for
the
the troops
troops on on the
the ground
ground.. The The mountainous
mountainous nature nature of of Italian
Italian geography
geography and and the the
German's
German's skill skill in
in defensive
defensive warfarewarfare allowed
allowed the the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht to to wage
wage aa protracted
protracted
campaign.
campaign. The The Germans
Germans inflicted
inflicted heavy casualties on
heavy casualties on their
their opponents
opponents and and tied
tied up up
considerable
considerable Allied Allied resources
resources.. AlliedAllied efforts
efforts in in using
using airpower
airpower to to strangle
strangle the the lines
lines
of
of communications
communications caused caused some some difficulty,
difficulty, but but the
the restricted
restricted nature
nature of of the
the theater
theater
enabled
enabled the the Germans
Germans to to evade
evade the the full
full impact
impact of of these
these air
air interdiction
interdiction efforts
efforts andand to to
maintain
maintain aa stablestable defensive
defensive system.system. That That very
very stability
stability minimized
minimized the the requirements
requirements
for
for fuel
fuel and
and otherother bulk
bulk itemsitems that
that would
would havehave complicated
complicated supply supply problems
problems..

PRODUCTION
PRODUCTION AND
AND TRAINING
TRAINING
This
This chapter
chapter has
has included
included aa general
general discussion
discussion of
of major
major production
production issues
issues along
along
with
with operational
operational matters
matters.. There
There are,
are, however,
however, several
several aspects
aspects ofof the
the production
production
program
program bestbest left
left to
to this
this last
last section.
section. Milch's
Milch's continued
continued efforts
efforts toto increase
increase
efficiency
efficiency throughout
throughout the
the aircraft
aircraft industry
industry was
was generally
generally successful
successful.. However,
However, for for
the
the first
first time
time in
in the
the war,
war. Allied
Allied bombing
bombing seriously
seriously hurt
hurt aircraft
aircraft and
and particularly
particularly
fighter
fighter production
production.. Milch
Milch had
had byby now
now recognized
recognized the
the desperate
desperate need
need forfor more
more

25
2511
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

fighters
fighters to to meet
meet thethe American
American threat threat.. TheThe choice
choice was was either
either to to meet
meet thethe daylight
daylight
offensive with enough fighters or lose air superiority over the European continent .
offensive with enough fighters or lose air superiority over the European continent.
Neither
Neither Hitler
Hitler andand Goring
Goring nor nor more
more sober
sober military
military men men like
like Korten
Korten were were willing
willing to to
recognize that they faced an either/or situation . Thus, emphasis remained on aa
recognize that they faced an either/or situation. Thus, emphasis remained on
bomber/fighter
bomber/fighter program program until until late
late winter
winter 1944 1944.. By By then,
then, itit was
was tootoo late;
late; while
while the
the
aircraft
aircraft industry
industry underunder Speer's
Speer's direction
direction drove drove up up fighter
fighter production,
production, no no coherent
coherent
program
program existedexisted to to provide
provide the the pilots
pilots or or fuel
fuel that
that they
they would
would require.
require. The The point
point ofof
no
no return
return had had come
come by by the
the early fall of
early fall of 1943
1943;; thereafter,
thereafter, itit waswas tootoo late.
late.
One
One element
element of of German
German aircraft production and
aircraft production and development
development that that hashas
consistently
consistently appearedappeared in in historical
historical discussions
discussions is is the
the development
development of of the
the MeMe 262.
262.
That
That fighter
fighter was was aa design
design and engineering marvel
and engineering marvel for for its time. However,
its time. However, itit is is
doubtful
doubtful whether
whether its its impact
impact on on the
the war
war could
could havehave beenbeen much
much different
different thanthan what
what itit
was
was.. As
As with most new
with most new concepts,
concepts, word word of of the
the aircraft's
aircraft's potential
potential percolated
percolated slowlyslowly
up the
up the chain
chain of of command
command only only after
after its
its initial
initial flights
flights.. Galland
Galland flew flew thethe aircraft
aircraft in in
May
May 1943
1943 and became an
and became an enthusiastic
enthusiastic supporter
supporter of of the
the aircraft
aircraft as as the
the savior
savior of of the
the
fighter
fighter force.119
force."' What What Galland's enthusiasm could
Galland's enthusiasm could not not recognize
recognize was was the
the difficulty
difficulty
involved
involved in transferring aa design
in transferring design model
model into into production,
production, especially
especially since since the
the MeMe 262
262
was
was not
not itsits designer's
designer's highest
highest priority
priority.. Willi
Willi Messerschmitt
Messerschmitt had had involved
involved himself
himself in in
aa running
running battle
battle with
with Milch
Milch from from 19421942 on on and
and was
was particularly
particularly upsetupset at at cancellation
cancellation
of
of the
the MeMe 209209 inin favor
favor of of his
his new jet . tso
new jet. '*" Moreover,
Moreover, there there were
were serious
serious problems
problems with with
the
the engines,
engines, which which is is not
not surprising
surprising considering
considering the the fact
fact that
that they
they represented
represented aa
quantum
quantum leap leap forward
forward in in technology.
technology. Not Not surprisingly,
surprisingly, as as with
with allall new
new weapon
weapon
systems,
systems, the the Germans
Germans found found itit difficult
difficult to to get
get thethe MeMe 262262 into
into series
series production
production
because
because theythey were
were still
still making
making designdesign changes
changes at at the
the same
same timetime they
they were
were working
working
up
up production
production lines lines..
Hitler's
Hitler's interest
interest in in the the jetjet became
became apparent apparent in in September
September 1943 1943 when when
Messerschmitt
Messerschmitt suggested suggested that that itit could
could also also serve
serve as as aa fastfast bomber
bomber to to attack
attack
Britain ."" An
Britain.'*' An aircraft
aircraft demonstration
demonstration at at the
the endend ofof the
the year
year and
and some
some casual
casual remarks
remarks
that
that the
the jet
jet could
could serve
serve as as aa fighter
fighter bomber
bomber put put the Ftihrer completely
the Fuhrer completely on on the
the wrong
wrong
track . "I From
track.'*^ From that that point,
point, he he considered
considered the the MeMe 262 262 asas the
the answer
answer to to Allied
Allied air air
superiority
superiority over over the invasion beaches
the invasion beaches in in the
the coming
coming spring.
spring. In In late
late December,
December, he he
exclaimed
exclaimed::

Every
Every month
month thatthat passes
passes makes
makes itit more
more and and more
more probable
probable that
that we
we
will
will get
get atat least
least one
one squadron
squadron of of jet
jet aircraft
aircraft:: The
The more
more important
important
thing
thing is
is that
that they
they [the
[the enemy]
enemy] get
get some
some bombs
bombs on on top
top of
of them
them just
just as
as
they
they try
try to
to invade
invade.. That
That will
will force
force them
them to to take
take cover
cover .. .. .. and
and in
in
this
this way
way they
they will
will waste
waste hour
hour after
after hour?
hour! ButBut after
after half
half aa day
day our
our
reserves
reserves will
will already
already be
be on
on the
the way . 183
way."^

The
The real explosion did
real explosion did not
not come
come until
until the
the end
qnd of
of May
May when
when Hitler
Hitler discovered
discovered that
that
the Luftwaffe was
the Luftwaffe was manufacturing
manufacturing the
the Me
Me 262
262 as
as aa fighter
fighter that
that could
could not
not carry
carry
bombs
bombs.. He He drastically
drastically intervened
intervened and
and ordered
ordered major
major design
design changes
changes inin the
the
aircraft. It is doubtful, however, whether this decision had much impact on the
114 It is doubtful, however, whether this decision had much impact on the
aircraft.'**
war's
war's final
final outcome
outcome.. The
The engineers
engineers had
had only
only worked
worked the
the flaws
flaws out
out of
of the
the production
production

25 2
252
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

line by
line March with
by March with the the first models appearing
first models appearing in in that
that month
month.. Output
Output for for April
April waswas
16
16 MeMe 262's,
262's, rising rising to to 2828 in in June,
June, and and 59 59 in in July.
July.'*' '85 Even under the best of
Even under the best of
circumstances,
circumstances, it it is
is unlikely
unlikely that that aa massive
massive output
output of of MeMe 262's
262's could
could have
have occurred
occurred
in
in 1944.
1944. By By thethe timetime its its production
production began, began. Allied
Allied escorts
escorts had had already
already savaged
savaged the the
German
German fighter
fighter forces,
forces, and and the
the Germans
Germans had had irrevocably
irrevocably lost lost air
air superiority
superiority over over thethe
continent.
continent. The The losseslosses in in experienced
experienced pilots pilots during
during the the spring
spring make make itit especially
especially
doubtful whether the
doubtful whether the Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe could could havehave manned
manned an an Me
Me 262 262 force
force withwith effective,
effective,
skilled crews.
skilled crews.
American
American bombing bombing attacks attacks on on German
German aircraftaircraft production
production had had begun
begun in in the
the
summer of 1943 . The target selection represented a
summer of 1943. The target selection represented a direct
direct threat
threat to
to the
the Luftwaffe's
Luftwaffe'^
production
production base base and and faced
faced the the Germans
Germans with serious dilemma.
with aa serious dilemma. The The most
most effective
effective
use of resources and manpower to produce aircraft calls for a concentration of
use of resources and manpower to produce aircraft calls for a concentration of
industrial effort to mass produce the items . The
industrial effort to mass produce the items. The Ford
Ford Willow
Willow Run
Run plant
plant and
and the
the
many
many other
other great
great industrial
industrial plantsplants then
then operating
operating in in the
the United
United States
States underline
underline this this
point. Milch, from early 1942, had pushed the German aircraft industry in
point. Milch, from early 1942, had pushed the German aircraft industry in the
the same
same
direction
direction.. TheThe problem
problem was was that
that such
such aa concentration
concentration maximizing
maximizing production
production was was
particularly vulnerable to bombing, especially the type that the Americans were
particularly vulnerable to bombing, especially the type that the Americans were
waging
waging..
The
The threat
threat posedposed by by thethe American
American bombing bombing in in the
the summer
summer of of 1943
1943 caused
caused the the
Germans
Germans to to begin
begin dispersing
dispersing their aircraft industry
their aircraft industry to to less
less vulnerable
vulnerable areasareas.. Efforts,
Efforts,
however,
however, to scatter its
to scatter its industry
industry to to occupied
occupied or or allied
allied countries
countries foundered
foundered on on several
several
difficulties . First, German occupation policies had robbed most foreign firms of
difficulties. First, German occupation policies had robbed most foreign firms of
workers and machines .
workers and machines."* '86 In addition, bureaucratic squabbling within the Third
In addition, bureaucratic squabbling within the Third
Reich
Reich directly dispersal plans
affected dispersal
directly affected plans to to occupied
occupied territories
territories.. At At thethe same
same time time thethe
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe was was desperately
desperately trying trying to to move
move production
production outside Germany, Sauckel
outside Germany, Sauckel
was
was robbing
robbing occupied
occupied territories
territories of the skilled
of the skilled workers
workers such such aa dispersed
dispersed production
production
would
would require.
require.'" "'
The
The dispersal
dispersal effort effort received
received addedadded impetus
impetus from from the the great
great attacks
attacks mademade on on the
the
aircraft
aircraft industry
industry in in the
the winter
winter and and spring
spring of of 19441944.. Critics
Critics of the "strategic"
of the "strategic"
bombing
bombing campaign
campaign have have oftenoften cited
cited the the growth
growth of of German
German fighter
fighter production
production in in
1944
1944 asas evidence
evidence of of the
the campaign's
campaign's failure failure.. In In fact,
fact, attacks
attacks on on German
German industry
industry
were
were effective
effective in in keeping
keeping production
production within within tolerable
tolerable limits limits andand in in helping
helping to to
maintain
maintain AlliedAllied superiority
superiority.. The The mere mere act act of of dispersal
dispersal reduced
reduced production
production
efficiency
efficiency.. German
German industry'sindustry's vaunted
vaunted production
production of of 36,000
36,000 aircraft
aircraft in in 1944
1944 waswas
only
only 8,000
8,000 above
above what what the the Japanese
Japanese produced
produced that that year."'
year."* The The numerical
numerical increase
increase
in 1944 over
in 1944 over 1943,1943, consisting
consisting almost almost entirely
entirely of of fighters
fighters (a (a percentage
percentage rise rise ofof 55
55.9.9
percent),
percent), hides
hides the the fact
fact that
that German
German production
production rose rose onlyonly 23 23.9.9 percent
percent in in terms
terms
of airframe weight."'
of airframe weight.'*' Unhindered
Unhindered by by Allied
Allied bombing,
bombing, German German production
production would would
have
have risen
risen farfar higher
higher and and farfar faster.
faster. The
The target
target ofof 80,000-plus
80,000-plus aircraftaircraft in in production
production
plans
plans for
for 1945
1945 givesgives an an indication
indication of of the
the direction
direction in in which
which Milch
Milch and and his
his planners
planners
were
were pushing
pushing."*' . 190
When
When all all isis saidsaid and and done,
done, however,
however, the the German
German achievement
achievement in in increasing
increasing
fighter
fighter production
production in in 19441944 was was remarkable
remarkable.. "Big "Big Week" Week" had had proven
proven that that thethe
Americans aimed
Americans aimed at at nothing
nothing less less than
than the the destruction
destruction of of Germany's
Germany's aircraft aircraft

25
2533
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

industry.
industry. The The German
German responseresponse was was to to create
create aa special
special group,
group, the the "Fighter
"Fighter Staff," Staff,"
to take control of all aircraft manufacturing in order to maintain and to increase
to take control of all aircraft manufacturing in order to maintain and to increase
production.
production. The The proposal
proposal for for such
such aa group group came came from from Milch,
Milch, and and thethe Field
Field
Marshal's
Marshal's suggestion
suggestion that that Speer's
Speer's assistant,
assistant, Karl-OttoKarl-Otto Sauer, Sauer, head head the the staff,
staff,
shrewdly
shrewdly insuredinsured that that fighter
fighter production
production received received maximummaximum support support from from the the
Armaments
Armaments Ministry. Ministry. Under Under the the battering
battering of of American
American bombers,bombers, the the aircraft
aircraft
industry
industry was was in in dangerous
dangerous shape shape.. Bombing
Bombing attacks attacks had had obliterated
obliterated factories,
factories,
machines,
machines, roofs, roofs, and and walls
walls.. Moreover,
Moreover, morale morale had had sunk
sunk to to such
such low low levels
levels that
that
workers
woikers scurried
scurried for for shelter
shelter at at the
the mere
mere appearance
appearance of of fighters
fighters.'" . '9' Also,
Also, the the attacks
attacks
had
had destroyed
destroyed much much finished
finished production
production still still awaiting
awaiting shipment
shipment to to the
the front.
front. '92"^ The
The
"Fighter
"Fighter Staff"
Staff began began aa desperate
desperate struggle
struggle to to bring
bring order
order in in the
the wake
wake of of American
American
raids.. A
raids A circular
circular from from Speer's
Speer's ministry
ministry warnedwarned that that the
the fighter
fighter defenses
defenses were were the the
only
only means
means to to protect
protect the the armament
armament industryindustry from from Allied
Allied air air attacks
attacks."' . '93 Frontline
Frontline
pilots
pilots called
called desperately
desperately for replacements for
for replacements for those
those aircraft
aircraft thatthat American
American escorts escorts
were
were so so rapidly
rapidly shooting
shooting out out ofof the air . Galland,
the air. Galland, reporting
reporting that that hehe hadhad had
had onlyonly 250250
fighters
fighters thethe dayday before
before to to meet
meet the the American
American onslaught,
onslaught, pleaded pleaded for for "fighters,
"fighters,
fighters,
fighters, nothing
nothing but but fighters"
fighters" from from industrialists
industrialists and and managers
managers."* . '9a The
The "Fighter
"Fighter
Staff"
Staff performed
performed an an extraordinary
extraordinary job job in in restoring
restoring order order andand dispersing
dispersing production
production
to
to less
less vulnerable
vulnerable locations.
locations. Where Where Milch Milch and and Sauer
Sauer ranran into
into bureaucratic
bureaucratic red red tape
tape
and recalcitrance, they
and recalcitrance, hustled offending
they hustled offending individuals
individuals off off toto the
the Berlin
Berlin SS SS offices
offices of of
Ernst
Ernst Kaltenbrunner
Kaltenbrunner.'" . 191 German
German fighterfighter production,
production, even even under
under the the attack,
attack, beganbegan aa
dramatic
dramatic rise.rise."* '96 One
One must,
must, nevertheless,
nevertheless, interject
interject aa word word of of caution,
caution, for for production
production
figures
figures in in the
the Strategic
Strategic BombingBombing Survey Survey included
included aircraft
aircraft thatthat industry
industry repaired
repaired
after
after they
they had received major damage
had received major damage. . Given
Given the
the tempo
tempo of
of Allied
Allied air
air operations,
operations, the
the
Germans
Germans had
had large
large numbers
numbers of
of aircraft
aircraft to
to repair.
repair.
Concurrent
Concurrent with with production
production problemsproblems went went the the difficulty
difficulty of of finding
finding pilotspilots to to fill
fill
cockpits. Up to the summer of 1942, the training program had run on a peacetime
cockpits. Up to the summer of 1942, the training program had run on a peacetime
leisurely
leisurely basis,
basis, with with dancing
dancing classesclasses and and skiingskiing holidays
holidays for for future
future pilots
pilots."^.'97
Thereafter, the training program ran into difficulties . Fuel shortages and demands
Thereafter, the training program ran into difficulties. Fuel shortages and demands
from
from thethe front
front for for more
more pilotspilots ledled toto reductions
reductions in in training
training hours hours.. Air Air transport
transport
commitments
commitments to to Tunisia
Tunisia and and Stalingrad
Stalingrad curtailed
curtailed instrument
instrument and and bomber
bomber training
training
programs
programs.. In In 1943,
1943, more more fuel was available ; and through better management, the
fuel was available; and through better management, the
Germans
Germans doubled
doubled the the number
number of of new
new fighter
fighter pilots
pilots coming
coming out out of of training
training schools
schools..
The
The rise
rise from
from 1,6621,662 new new fighter
fighter pilots
pilots in in 1942
1942 to to 3,276
3,276 in in 1943
1943 was was barely
barely enough,
enough,
however,
however, to to cover
cover wastage
wastage at the front (2,870) .'98 In fact, training schools produced
at the front (2,870)."* In fact, training schools produced
barely
barely enough
enough pilots pilots to to keep
keep up up with
with losses.
losses. Thus, Thus, therethere was was virtually
vktually no no
opportunity to build up a pilot reserve . More dangerous for the future of the fighter
opportunity to build up a pilot reserve. More dangerous for the future of the fighter
force
force waswas the
the fact
fact that
that flying
flying hours
hours in in schools
schools for for German
German pilotspilots werewere less
less than
than half
half
of
of what
what British
British and and American
American pilots pilots received.
received. ProductionProduction shortages
shortages meant meant that that
German pilots
German pilots received
received their their training
training almost
almost entirely
entirely in in obsolete
obsolete aircraft.
aircraft. Ironically,
Ironically,
the
the massive
massive production
production program program of of spring
spring 1944 1944 finally
finally solved
solved that that problem
problem in in late
late
summer
summer.. However,
However, by by that
that time
time there
there was
was no no fuel
fuel left
left for
for training
training..
The
The result
result of of these
these training
training weaknesses
weaknesses and and thethe attrition
attrition taking
taking place place in in early
early
1944
1944 waswas that
that thethe experience
experience and and thethe skill
skill level
level of of German
German fighter fighter pilots
pilots spiraled
spiraled

254
254
ATTRPPION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

downward.
downward. In July 1944,
In July Luftflotte 33 discovered
1944, Luftflotte discovered thatthat with few exceptions,
with few exceptions, only only
Gruppen and Staffelen commanders had more than six months' operational fighter
Gruppen and Staffelen commanders had more than six months' operational fighter
experience.. A
experience A small
small number
number of of other pilots had
other pilots had upup to
to three
three months'
months' experience,
experience,
while
while the bulk of
the bulk of available
available pilots
pilots had
had only
only between
between eight and thirty
eight and thirty days'
days' combat
combat
service .'99 All
service."* All ofof these
these factors
factors by
by 1944
1944 had become mutually
had become mutually reinforcing.
reinforcing. The The
declining
declining skill
skill of
of German
German fighter
fighter pilots
pilots pushed
pushed up up the level of
the level of attrition
attrition taking
taking place,
place,
which
which increased
increased the demand that
the demand that the training establishment
the training establishment turn
turn out
out more
more pilots
pilots..
The
The viciousness
viciousness of the circle
of the circle received
received itsits final
final impetus
impetus andand the Luftwaffe its
the Luftwaffe its death
death
blow
blow when
when the the May
May attacks on German
attacks on German petroleum
petroleum sources
sources robbed
robbed thethe training
training
program ofthe
program of the fuel
fuel needed
needed to produce new
to produce new pilots
pilots..

CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
All
All of
of the
the factors that had
factors that had worked
worked against
against the Luftwaffe in
the Luftwaffe in the
the early
early periods
periods of of the
the
war
war and
and that
that had
had slowly
slowly worn
worn away
away its
its strength
strength came
came together
together toto destroy
destroy itit as
as an
an
effective
effective force
force in
in the
the period
period from
from September
September 1943 through March
1943 through March 1944
1944.. By
By refusing
refusing
to
to recognize
recognize the the full
full nature
nature of of the
the threat,
threat, the
the Germans
Germans placedplaced their
their air force in
air force in aa
hopeless
hopeless situation
situation.. The Luftwaffe did
The Luftwaffe did manage
manage to to make
make aa remarkable
remarkable recovery
recovery in in its
its
ability
ability to
to defend
defend Germany
Germany from from night
night attack,
attack, butbut that
that tactical
tactical victory
victory did
did little
little to
to
change
change thethe war's
war's course
course.. However,
However, despite
despite suchsuch tactical
tactical victories,
victories, the
the steady,
steady,
wearing,
wearing, and and growing
growing pressure
pressure of of the
the daytime
daytime American
American bomberbomber andand fighter
fighter
offensive
offensive destroyed
destroyed thethe German
German fighter
fighter force.
force. There
There were
were no no decisive
decisive moments
moments or or
clear-cut
clear-cut victories
victories.. Rather,
Rather, the American pressure
the American pressure put put the
the German
German fighters
fighters in
in aa meat
meat
grinder
grinder battle
battle ofof attrition
attrition both
both inin terms
terms of of pilots
pilots and
and of of materiel.
materiel. ItIt was
was the the
cumulative
cumulative effect
effect of that intense
of that intense pressure
pressure that that in the final
in the final analysis
analysis enabled
enabled the the
Western
Western Powers
Powers to to gain
gain air
air superiority
superiority over
over Europe
Europe;; thatthat achievement
achievement mustmust be be
counted
counted among
among thethe decisive
decisive victories
victories ofWorld
of World War War II.
II.

255
Notes
Notes

11.. Air Ministry, The


\ix Ministiy, The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofof the
the German
German Air Force, pp.. 239
Air Force, 239..
22.. Below,
Below, AlsAls Hitlers
Hiders Adjulanl,
Adjutant, pp pp.. 350-51
350-51..
33.. Among
Among aa whole
whole host
host ofof evidence,
evidence, one one might
might consult
consult in in particular
particular G6ring's
Goring's remarks
remarks on on October
October 7, 7,
1943
1943:: "Heimatverteidigungsprogramm
"Heimatverteidigungsprogramm 1943, 1943, Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am 77.10.43.
.10 .43 .
Obersalzberg,"
Obersalzberg," AFSHRC: AFSHRC: K K 113 .3i .J-2,
113.31 2, vv..'33..
44.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, TheThe Rise and Fall
Rise and Fall ofof the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 239-40
239-40..
55.. Webster
Webster andand Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,
SAOAG, Vol Vol.. 11,
11, pp pp.. 160-61
160-61..
6.
6. Arthur
Arthur Harris to Winston
Harris to Winston Churchill,
Churchill, 33.11.43.,
.11 .43 ., PROIPREM/3/14/1
PRO/PREM/3/14/1..
77.. PRO
PRO AIR AIR 22/203,
22/203, "War"War Room Room Manual
Manual of of Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand Ops Ops 1939/1945,"
1939/1945," compiledcompiled by by Air
Air
Ministry
Ministry War War Room
Room (Statistical
(Statistical Section)
Section)..
88.. Verrier,
Verrier, The
The Bomber
Bomber Offensive,
Offensive, pp.. 148 148..
9.
9. Zuckermann,
Zuckermmm, From From Apes
Apes to to Warlords,
Warlords, pp pp.. 218-19
218-19..
t0
10.. Interview
Interview with
with Air
Air Marshal
Marshal D D.. C
C.. TT.. Bennett,
Bennett, RAF RAF Staff
Staff College
College Library,
Library, Bracknell
Bracknell..
11
11.. Hansell,
Hansell, The
The Air
Air Plan
Plan that
that Defeated
Defeated Hitler,
Hitler, pp.. 136 136..
12
12.. Webster
Webster andand Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,SAOAG, Vol Vol.. 11,
II, pp.. 264
264..
13
13.. For
For Milch's
Milch's reaction
reaction to to thethe less than distinguished
less than distinguished effort,effort, seesee:: "Der
"Der erste
erste grosse
grosse Einsatz
Einsatz derder
'Wilden
'Wilden Sau', Sau', Auszug
Auszug aus aus der
der G G.. L .-Besprechung am
L.-Besprechung am 20 .8 .43 . im
20.8.43. im RLM,"
RLM," AFSHRC:AFSHRC: K K 113 .312-2, vv..
113.312-2,
33..
14
14.. Irving, The Mare's
Irving, The Mare's Nest,
Nest, pp.. It 3.
113.
15
15.. Webster
Webster andand Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,SAOAG. Vol II, pp.. 203
Vol.. 11, 203..
16
16.. Bill Gunston, Night
Bill Gunston, Night Fighters
Fighters (New (New York,
York, 1976),1976), pp pp.. 103-04
103-04..
17
17.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL 8/93, II Jagdkorps,
RL 8/93, Jagdkorps, "Niederschrift
"Niederschrift fiber fiber die
die Divisionskommand
Divisionskommand eur-besprechung
eur-besprechung am am
29 .12 .43.," pp.. 38
29.l2.i3.," n,; Air Ministry, The Defeat
AkMimsiry,The Defeat of cf the
the German
German Air AirForce,
Force, pp pp.. 278-79
21%-19..
18
18.. See
See particularly
particularly the the clear discussion of
clear discussion of the
the schrage
schrage MusikMusik tactics
tactics in in Martin
Martin Middlebrook's
Middlebrook's
admirable
admirable work, work. The
The Nuremberg
Nuremberg Raid Raid (New
(New York,
York, 1974),
1974), pp. pp. 70--73
70-73..
19
19.. "Heimatverteidigungsprogranun,
"Heimatverteidigungsprogramm, 1943," 1943," Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am 88.10.43.,
.10 .43 .,
Obersalzberg,
Obersalzberg, AFSHRC: AFSHRC: K K 113 .312-2, vv.. 33;percentagelossespresentedon
113.312-2, ; percentage losses presented on the the basis
basis ofof crews
crews present
present at at
the
the beginning
beginning of of each
each month
month in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/725,
III/725, 726,726, Genst
Genst.. GenGen.. QuQu.. 66.Abt.
.Abt . (1),
(I), ""Ubersicht
(Jbersicht
fiber
fiber Soil,Soil, Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste and und Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbiinde,"
VerbSnde," July,July,
August,
August, September
September 19431943..
20.
20. "Heimatverteidigungsprogramm,
"Heimatverteidigungsprogramm, 1943," 1943," Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am 88.10.43,
.10 .43,
Obersalzsberg,
Obersalzsberg, AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K 113 .312-2, vv.. 3,
113.312-2, 3, pp.. 5757..
21
21.. Webster
Webster andand Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,5.40/lG, Vol Vol.. 11,
II, pp.. 163
163..
22
22.. "Besprechung
"Besprechung fiber fiber Tag-find
Tag-und Nachtjagd
Nachtjagd 1943 1943 beim beim R R.. M M.. G6ring
Goring am am 25 25.. and
und 26 .9 .43 .,"
26.9.43.,"
AFSHRC
AFSHRC:: K K 113 .312-2, vv.. 33..
113.312-2,
23
23.. Webster
Webster andand Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,SAOAG, Vol Vol.. 11,
11, pp.. 203-04
203-04..
24
24.. Goebbels,
Goebbels, The The Goebbels
Goebbels Diaries,
Diaries, pp pp.. 532-35
532-35..
25
25.. Hans
Hans Rumpf,
Rumpf, The The Bombing
Bombing of ofGermany
Germany (New (New York,
York, 1961),
1961), pp pp.. 132-35
132-35..
26.. Webster
26 Webster andand Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,SAOAG, Vol Vol.. 11, pp . 204-05
II, pp. 204-05..
27
27.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/91,
8/91,1I Jagdkorps,
Jagdkorps, "Komrnandeurbesprechung
"Konunandeurbesprechung am am 29 .9 .43 . im
29.9.43. im Zeist ."
Zeist."
28 .Ibid .
28.Ibid.
29.
29. Air Air Ministry,
Ministry, TheThe Rise
Rise and Fall of
and Fall of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 278-79
278-79..
30
30.. Middlebrook,
Middlebrook, The The Nuremberg
Nuremberg Raid, Raid, pp pp.. 32-33
32-33..
31
31.. AirAir Ministry,
Ministry, The Rise and
The Rise and FallFall of
of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 200
200..
32
32.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/93,
8/93, 1I Jagdkorps,
Jagdkorps, "Niederschrift
"Niederschrift fiber fiber die
die Divisionkommandeur-Besprechung
Divisionkommandeur-Besprechung am am
25 .1 .44 . um
25,1.44. um 12 .30 Uhr
12.30 Uhr in De Breul ."
inDeBreul."
33
33.. Webster
Webster and
and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,
SAOAG, Vol Vol.. 11,
11, pppp.. 205-06
205-06..
34
34.. PROPRO AIR/20.5815
AIR/20.5815.. See See in in particular
particular the the draft
draft reply
reply for
for CAS
CAS signature
signature to to aa Harris
Harris letter
letter arguing
arguing
about
about the the tactical
tactical difficulties
difficulties which
which mitigated
mitigated against
against an an attack
attack onon Schweinfurt,
Schweinfurt, 24 .1 .44 .
24.1.44.
35
35.. Webster
Webster and
and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,
SAOAG, Vol Vol.. 11,
II, pp.. 207
207;; and
and Middlebrook,
Middlebrook, The The Nuremberg
Nuremberg Raid, Raid, pp.. 86
86..
36
36.. Webster
Webster andand Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG,
SAOAG, Vol Vol.. 11,
II, pp.. 206
206..
37.. Middlebrook,
37 Middlebrook, The The Nuremberg
Nuremberg Raid, Raid, pp pp.. 80-81
80-81.. The The bomb
bomb plotsplots for
for the
the attacks
attacks onon Stuttgart
Stuttgart on on
March
March 15 15 and
and Berlin
Berlin onon March
March 24, 24, onon page
page 81, 81, are
are most
most instructive
instructive on on the
the limitations
limitations under
under which
which
Bomber
Bomber Command Command was was still
still operating
operating..

2566
25
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

38
38.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 207
207;; for
for the
the most
most thorough
thorough description
description of of the
the disaster,
disaster,
see
see Middlebrook's
Middlebrook's excellent excellent The Nuremberg Raid
The Nuremberg Raid..
39
39.. Middlebrook,
Middlebrook, The The Nuremberg
Nuremberg Raid, Raid, pppp.. 88-91
88-91..
40
40.. Interview
Interview with with D D.. CC.. T
T.. Bennett,
Bennett, RAFRAF Staff
Staff College
College Library,
Library, Bracknell
Bracknell..
41
41.. PROPRO AIR AIR 14/3489,
14/3489, Probable
Probable Reconstruction
Reconstruction of of German
German Night Night Fighter
Fighter Reaction,
Reaction, RaidRaid onon
Nuremberg
Nuremberg 30/31 .3 .44 .
30/31.3.44.
42
42.. Middlebrook,
Middlebrook, The The Nuremberg
Nuremberg Raid, Raid, pp.. 140140..
43
43.. PRO
PRO AIR AIR 14/3489,
14/3489, PlotsPlots on on Bombers
Bombers Passed Passed Over Over R/TR/T andand W/T
W/T to to Night
Night Fighters,
Fighters, Raid
Raid on
on
Nuremberg,
Nuremberg, 30/31 .3 .44 .
30/31.3.44.
44
44.. Middlebrook,
Middlebrook, The The Nuremberg
Nuremberg Raid, Raid, pppp.. 161,
161, 277,
277, 330
330..
45
45.. Ibid
Ibid., pp.. 204-07
., pp 204-07..
46
46.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG. Vol Vol.. IV,
IV, pp pp.. 431-32
431-32..
47
47.. PRO
PRO AIR AIR 22/203,
22/203, War War RoomRoom Manual
Manual of of Bomber
Bomber Command
Command Ops, Ops, 1939-1945,
1939-1945, Air Ministry War
Air Ministry War
Room
Room (Statitical
(Statitical Section)
Section)..
48
48.. For
For aa clear picture of
clear picture of what
what itit was
was like
like to to serve
serve asas aa crewmember
crewmember during during thisthis period,
period, seesee Max
Max
Hastings,
Hastings, Bomber
Bomber Command Command (New (New York,
York, 1979),
1979), particularly
particularly Chapters
Chapters VIII VIII and XII..
and XII
49
49.. See
See particularly
particularly Bennett's
Bennett's memorandum
memorandum to to Bomber
Bomber Command,
Command, 33.11.44.,.11 .44 ., quoted
quoted extensively
extensively by by
Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, SAOAG, Vol Vol.. II,
II, pp
pp.. 195-96
195-96;; seesee also
also Middlebrook,
Middlebrook, The The Nuremberg
Nuremberg Raid,Raid, pp..
30
30..
50
50.. Interview
Interview with with D D.. CC.. T
T.. Bennett,
Bennett, RAFRAF StaffStaff College
College Library,
Library, Bracknell
Bracknell.. Bennett
Bennett further
further suggests
suggests
that
that all
all senior
senior commanders
commanders be be required
required to to fly
fly inin wartime
wartime and and that
that for
for every
every AirAir Vice
Vice Marshal
Marshal lost
lost on
on
operations,
operations. Bomber
Bomber Command Command would would have
have saved
saved 200 200 crews
crews..
51
51.. Ibid
Ibid..
52
52.. Webster
Webster and and Frankland,
Frankland, SAOAG, 5A0/1G, Vol Vol.. II,
II, PP.. 193
193..
53
53.. Alfred
Alfred Price,
Price, Pictorial
Pictorial History
History of of the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, 1933-1945
1933-1945 (New (New York,York, 1969),
1969), pppp.. 52-53
52-53..
54
54.. Based
Based on on thethe author's
author's tabulations
tabulations of of figures
figures in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 III/728,
111/728, 729,
729, Genst
Genst.. Gen
Gen.. Qu.
Qu. 66..
Abt
Abt.. (I),
(I), "Ubersicht
"Ubersicht iiber uber Soll,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft,
Einsatzbereitschaft, VerlusteVerluste and und Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden
Verbande
Verbande." ."
55
55.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, The The Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World
World War War II,
II, Vol
Vol.. II,
II, pp.. 688
688..
56
56.. "Statistical
"Statistical Summary
Summary of of Eighth Air Force
Eighth Air Force Operations,
Operations, European
European Theater,
Theater, 17 17 August
August 1942-8
1942-8 MayMay
1945,"
1945," pp.. 14,14, AFSHRC
AFSHRC..
57
57.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, The The Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World War 1I, Vol
WorldWarll, Vol.. II,
II, pp
pp.. 696-97
696-97..
58
58.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp
pp.. 698-99
698-99..
59
59.. "Statistical
"Statistical Summary
Summary of of Eighth
Eighth Air
Air Force
Force Operations,
Operations, European
European Theater,
Theater, 17 17 August
August 1942-8
1942-8 MayMay
1945,"
1945," pp.. 14,14, AFSHRC
AFSHRC..
60
60.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, The Army Air
The Army Air Forces
Forces in in World
World War War 11,11, Vol
Vol.. II,
II, pp
pp.. 703-04,
703-04, 850 850.. For
For the
the most
most
thorough,
thorough, scholarly
scholarly study study of of the
the second
second Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt attack attack from
from both
both sides,
sides, seesee Golucke,
Goliicke, Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt
and
und der
der strategische
strategische Luftkrieg,
Luftkrieg, 1943 1943..
61
61.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp
pp.. 704-05
704-05..
62
62.. Speer,
Speer, Inside
Inside the the Third
Third Reich,
Reich, pp.. 286
286..
63
63.. For
For thethe most
most comprehensive
comprehensive examination
examination of of this
this process,
process, see see Golucke,
Golucke, Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt and und der
der
strategische
strategische Luftkrieg,
Luftkrieg, 1943, 1943, pp pp.. 351-80
351-80..
64
64.. Boylan,
Boylan, "The "The Development
Development of of the
the Long-Range
Long-Range Escort Escort Fighter,"
Fighter," pp.. 129 129..
65
65.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp.. 127
127..
66
66.. For
For an an excellent,
excellent, concise
concise description,
description, see see Boylan,
Boylan, "The "The Development
Development of of the
the Long-Range
Long-Range Escort
Escort
Fighter,"
Fighter," pp pp..146-61
146-61..
67
67.. Emerson,
Emerson, "Operation Pointblank," pp
"Operation Pointblank," pp.. 32-34
32-34..
68
68.. Boylan,
Boylan, "The "The Development
Development of of the
the Long-Range
Long-Range Escort Escort Fighter,"
Fighter," pp pp.. 155-59
155-59..
69
69.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 10/639,
10/639, "Notizen
"Notizen zur zur Traditionsgeschichte
Traditionsgeschichte der der III
III.. Gruppe
Gruppe des des Jagdgeschwaders
Jagdgeschwaders
Udet,
Udet, (Quellen
(Quellen:: Kriegstagebucher
Kriegstagebucher der der III ./e) . "
Ill./e).''
70
70.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of
ofthe
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 289-90
289-90..
71
71.. Golucke,
Goliicke, Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt and und derder strategische Luftkrieg 1943,
strategische Luftkrieg 1943, pp.. 198
198..
72
72.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of
ofthe
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 290-91
290-91..
73
73.. "Heimatverteidigungsprogramm,
"Heimatverteidigungsprogramm, 1943, 1943, Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am 77.10.43.,
.10 .43 .,
Obersalzberg,"
Obersalzberg," pp.. 16, 16, AFSHRC:
AFSHRC: K K 113 .312-2, vv.. 33..
113.312-2,
74
74.. "Ultra,
"Uhra, History
History of of USUS Strategic
Strategic Air Air Force Europe Versus
Force Europe Versus German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," pp.. 106106.. Date
Date of
of the
the
message
message was was October
October 12, 12, and
and itit was
was obviously
obviously the the result
result of
of discussions
discussions on on October
October 77..
75
75.. Based
Based on on thethe figures
figures in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 III/1193,
III/I193, 1194,
1194, 1195,
1195, Genst
Genst.. Gen
Gen.. Qu Qu.. (6
(6.. AN .),
Abt.),
"Flugzeugunfalle
"Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste bei bei den
den fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden
Verbanden." ."

257
257
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

76
76.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/1194,
III/1194, Genst.Genst. Gen Gen.. Qu. Qu. (6 Abt), "Flugzeugunfalle
(6.. Abt), "Flugzeugunfalle and und Verluste
Verluste beibei denden
fliegenden
fliegenden Verbanden
Verbanden." ."
77
77.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 2111/1025,
2111/1025, Genst Genst.. 66.. Abt
Abt., ., "Front-Flugzeug-Verluste
"Front-Flugzeug-Verluste im Oktober 1943
im Oktober 1943."." Part
Part of
of the
the
confusion
confusion undoubtedly
undoubtedly lies lies in exactly how
in exactly how German
German records
records were
were compiled
compiled and and for
for what
what purposes
purposes..
78.. Based
78 Based on on the
the figures
figures of of fighter
fighter pilot
pilot strength
strength andand losses
losses inin the
the tables
tables in
in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 2111/722,
2111/722, 723,723,
724,
724, 725,
725, Genst.
Genst. Gen Gen.. Qu Qu.6. .6 . Abt
Abt.. (I),
(I), "Ubersicht
"Ubersicht iiber uber Sof,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft,
Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste
Verluste
and
und Reserven
Reserven der fliegenden Verbande
der fliegenden Verbande.'' ."
79.. "Ultra,
79 "Ultra, History
History of of US
US Strategic
Strategic Air Force Europe
Air Force Europe Versus
Versus German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," pppp.. 112-13
112-13..
80.
80. "Heimatverteidigungsprogramm
"Heimatverteidigungsprogramm 1943, 1943, Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am 77.10.43.,
.10.43 .,
Obersalzberg,"
Obersalzberg," AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K 113 .312-2, vv.. 33..
113.312-2,
81
81.. Ibid
Ibid.,., Fortsetzung,
Fortsetzung, pp.. 99..
82.
82. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/61,
3/61, "Stenographische
"Stenographische NiederschriftNiederschrift der der Ansprache
Ansprache des des Reichsmarschalls
Reichsmarschalls am am
23 .11 .43 . vor
23.11.43. vor den
den fliegenden
fliegenden Besatzungen
Besatzungen Tagjagd Tagjagd der der 33.. Jagddivision
Jagddivision in in der
der Halle
Halle des
des Flugplatzes
Flugplatzes
Deelen"
Deelen";; see see also
also Goring's
Goring's comments
comments in in the
the war
war diary
diary of of the
the III
III.. Gruppe
Gruppe des des Jagdgeschwaders
Jagdgeschwaders Udet, Udet,
entry
entry 12 .10 .43 .
12.10.43.
83
83.. "Heimatverteidigungsprogramm
"Heimatverteidigungsprogramm 1943, 1943, Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am 77.10.43,
.10 .43,
Fortsetzung," AFSHRC
Fortsetzung," AFSHRC:: K K 113 .312-2, vv.. 3.
113.312-2, 3.
84
84.. David
David Irving,
Irving, Hitler's
Hitler's War War (New(New York,
York, 1977),
1977), pppp.. 574-75
574-75..
85
85.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/61,
3/61, "Stenographische
"Stenographische Niederschrift
Niederschrift der der Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am
28 .11 .44 . in
28.11.44. in Karinhall,"
Karinhall," pp pp.. 94-95
94-95..
86
86.. "Heimatverteidigungsprogramm
"Heimatverteidigungsprogramm 1943, 1943, Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am 77.10.43.,
.10 .43 .,
Obersalzberg, Fortsetzung," AFSHRC:
Obersalzberg, Fortsetzung," AFSHRC: K K 113 .312-2, vv.. 33;; one
113.312-2, one must
must also
also note
note that
that not
not until
until the
the fall
fall of
of
1943
1943 did
did fighter
fighter production
production receivereceive the the same
same priority
priority as
as U-boat
U-boat production
production..
87
87.. BAIMA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/61,
3/61, "Stenographische
"Stenographische Niederschrift
Niederschrift der der Besprechung
Besprechung des des Reichsmarschalls
Reichsmarschalls mit mit GL
GL
and Industrierat
und Industrierat am am 14 .10 .43 . in
14.10.43. in der
der neuen
neuen Reichskanzlei,
Reichskanzlei, Berchtesgaden
Berchtesgaden.'' ."
88
88.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/62,
3/62, "Stenographische
"Stenographische Niederschrift
Niederschrift der der Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am
23 .11 .43 . in
23.11.43. in Karinhall
Karinhall." ."
89
89.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/61,
3/61, "Stenographische
"Stenographische Niederschrift
Niederschrift der der Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am
28 .11 .43 . in
28.11.43. in Karinhall,"
Karinhall," pp.. 88 88..
90
90.. USSBS,
USSBS, ESBGWE,
ESBGWE. Appendix Appendix Table Table 102,102, pp.. 277
277..
91
91.. "Alliierte Luftangriffe im
"Alliierte Luftangriffe im Jahre
Jahre 1943
1943 aufauf Werke
Werke der der deutschen
deutschen Flugzeugindustrie,"
Flugzeugindustrie," AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K
113 .312-2, vV.. 33..
113,312-2,
92
92.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 11/365,
11/365, Der Der Oberbefehlshaber
Oberbefehlshaber der der Luftwaffe, Fuhrungsstab Ic,
Luftwaffe, Ftdhrungsstab Nr.. 32487/43,
Ic, Nr 32487/43,
55.10.43.,
.10 .43 ., "Luftlagebericht
"LuftlageberichtWest, West, StandStand:: 11.. Oktober
Oktober 19431943." ."
93
93.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 11/365,
11/365, Der Der Oberbefehlshaber
Oberbefehlshaber der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Fuhrungsstab
Fuhrungsstab Ic, Ic, Nr
Nr.. 4222/43,
4222/43,
22.11.43,
.11 .43, "Luftlagebericht
"LuftlageberichtWest, West, Stand Stand:: 11.. November
November 1943 1943."."
94
94.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 II/365,
11/365, Der Der Oberbefehlshaber
Oberbefehlshaber der der Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, Fuhrungsstab
Fiihningsstab Ic ., Nr
Ic, Nr 4611/43,
4611/43,
33.12,43.,
.12 .43 ., "Luftlagebericht
"Luftlagebericht West, West, Stand:
Stand: 11.12.1943."
.12 .1943 ."
95
95.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 211/320,
211/320, "USA "USA Fliegertruppe,
Fliegertruppe, die die schweren
schweren amerikanischen
amerikanischen Kampfverbdnde,
Kampfverbande, Stand Stand::
Dezember
Dezember 1943," 1943," Luftwaffenfiihrungsstab,
Luftwaffenfiihrungsstab, Ic/Fremde Ic/Fremde Luftwaffen
Luftwaffen West West..
96
96.. Speer,
Speer, Inside
Inside thethe Third Reich, pp.. 290
Third Reich, 290.. ForFor Goring's
Goring's own own admission
admission after after the
the war
war that
that even
even inin the
the
spring
spring ofof 1944
1944 he he could
could not not believe
believe American
American escortescort fighters
fighters went
went as as far
far as
as Liege,
Liege, see
see "Reichsmarschall
"Reichsmarschall
Herman
Herman G6ring-I,"
Goring—I," Air Air Ministry
Ministry Weekly
Weekly Intelligence
Intelligence Summary,
Summary, issued issued by by Air
Air Ministry
Ministry A .C .A .SS. (1)
A.C.A (1)
(A .I.I .), No . 315,
(A.I.I.),No. 315, 17 .9 .45 .
17.9.45.
97
97.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, TheThe Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World
World WarWar 1I,
II, Vol
Vol.. III,
Ill, pp
pp.. 15-17
15-17..
98
98.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/92,
8/92, "Niederschrift
"Niederschrift dber fiber Divisionkommandeur-Besprechung
Divisionkommandeur-Besprechung am am 44.11.43.,
.11 .43 ., 14.00
14.00
Uhr in De Breul . "
UhrinDeBreul."
99
99.. BAIMA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/92,
8/92, "Besprechung
''Besprechung beim beim Bef.Bef, Mitte
Mitteam am 66.11.43.,
.11 .43 ., 15 .00 Uhr
15,00 Uhr in
in Berlin-Dablem
Beriin-Dahlem,'' ."
100
100.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/92, "Besprechung beim
8/92, "Besprechung beim Bef.Bef. Mitte
Mitte am am 66.11.43.
.11 .43 . 17 .45 Uhr
17.45 Uhr in
in Berlin-Dahlem
Beriin-Dahlem." ."
101.. BA/MA,
101 BA/MA, RL RL 8/92,
8/92, "Besprechung
"Besprechung beim beim Bef.Bef. Mitte
Mitte am am 77.11,43.
.11 .43 . 10 .30 Uhr
10.30 Uhr in in Berlin,
Berlin,
Reichssportfeld
Reichssportfeld." ."
102
102.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/92,
8/92, "Besprechung
"Besprechung am 8 .1 t .43 . 13
am8.11.43. .00 Uhr
13.00 Uhr auf
auf dem Gefechtsstand De Beul ."
demGefechtsstandDeBeul."
103
103.. BAIMA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/92,
8/92, "Besprechung
"Besprechung in in Stade
Stade amam 16 .11 .43 ."
16.11.43."
104
104.. Boylan,
Boylan, "The"The Development
Development of of the
the Long-Range
Long-Range Escort Escort Fighter,"
Fighter," pp.. 107 107..
105
105.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, TheThe Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World War 11, Vol
WorldWarll, Vol.. 11,
II, pp
pp.. 848-52
848-52..
106
106.. Boylan,
Boylan, "The"The Development
Development of of the
the Long-Range
Long-Range Escort Escort Fighter,"
Fighter," pp.. 108 108..
107
107.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 8/93, 8/93, "Niederschrift
"Niederschrift ilber uber die Divisionskommandeur-Besprechung am
die Divisionskommandeur-Besprechung am
29 .12 .1943 ."
29.12.1943."

258
258
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER THE REICH
OVER THE REICH

108
108.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/1025,
III/1025, Genst
Genst.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (III A), Front-Flugzeug-Verluste,
(Ill A), Front-Flugzeug-Verluste, reports reports for
for November
November
and December .
and December.
109
109.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/726,
III/726, 727, 727, 728,
728, GenGen.. Qu Qu.. 66.Abt.
.Abt. (I), "Ubersicht" fiber
(I), "Obersicht" uber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand,
Einsatzbereitschaft,
Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste Verluste and und Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande..
110
110..Ibid
Ibid..
l111.
11 . These
These figures
figures are are based
based on on the
the tables
tables inin BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/722,
III/722, 723,723, 724,
724, 725,
725, 726,
726, 727,
727, 728,
728,
Gen
Gen.. Qu Qu.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (1) ., "Obersicht"
(I)., "Ubersicht" fiber fiber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft,
Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste Verluste and
und Reserven
Reserven der der
fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande..
112
112.. Golucke,
Golucke, Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt andder und der strategische
strategische Luftkrieg
Luftkrieg 1943,
1943, p. p. 217
217..
113
113.. "Statistical
"Statistical Summary
Summary of of Eighth
Eighth AirAir Force
Force Operations,
Operations, European
European Theater,
Theater, 17 17 August
August 1942-8
1942-8 May May
1945," AFSHRC .
1945,"AFSHRC.
114
114..Ibid
Ibid..
115
115.. Futrell,
Futrell, Ideas,
Ideas, Concepts,
Concepts, Doctrine
Doctrine:: A A History
History ofBasic
of Basic Thinking
Thinking in in the
the United
United States
States Air
Air Force,
Force, p.p.
139
139..
116
116.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 211/329,
2 11/329, Luftwaffenfuhrungsstab
Luftwaffenfuhrungsstab Ic Ic NrNr 13/44
13/44 (111
(III A),
A), 22.1.44.,
.1 .44 ., "Luftlage
"Luftlage West
West Nr Nr..
11 vom 31 .12 and
vom31.12 Nacht zum 11.1.44."
undNachtzum .1 .44 ."
117
117.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Gate, TheThe Army
Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World
World WarWar 11,
II, Vol.
Vol. III, pp.. 23-24
Ill, pp 23-24..
118
118.. "Ultra,
"Ultra, History
History of of US
US Strategic
Strategic Air Air Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," pp.. 136136..
119
119.. Based
Based on on loss
loss tables
tables in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 2111/1025,
2 III/1025, Genst
Genst.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (III
(Ill A),
A), Front-Flugzeug-Verluste
Front-Flugzeug-Verluste;;
and
and BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 11/728,
11/728, Gen Gen.. Qu Qu.. 66.Abt.
.Abt . (1),
(I), Obersicht
Ubersicht fiber
uber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft,
Einsatzbereitschaft,
Verluste
Verluste and und Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande..
120
120.. "Ultra,
"Ultra, History
History of of US
US Strategic
Strategic Air Air Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," pp.. 141141..
121
121.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 10/639,
10/639, "Notizen
"Notizen zur zur Traditionsgeschichte
Traditionsgeschichte der der III
III.. Gruppe
Gruppe des des Jagdgeschwaders
Jagdgeschwaders
Udet
Udet (Quellen
(Quellen:: Kriegstagebucher
Kriegstagebucher der der Ill/e)
."
Ill./e).''
122
122.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 2111/1025,
2 III/1025, Genst Genst.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (111
(UI A),
A), Front-Flugzeug-Verluste,
Front-Flugzeug-Verluste, January-June January-June 1944 1944..
123
123..Ibid
Ibid..
124
124.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/728-731,
III/728-731, Gen Gen.. Qu Qu.. 66.. Abt
Abt.. (I),
(I), Obersicht
Ubersicht fiber uber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand,
Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste
Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste and und Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande..
125 BA/MA, RL
125.. BA/MA, RL 22III/1025,
III/1025, GenstGenst.. 6.6 . AN
Abt.. (III
(Ill A),
A), Front-Flugzeug-Verluste,
Front-Flugzeug-Verluste, January-June January-June 1944 1944..
126
126.. BA/MA
BA/MA,, RL RL 8/93,
8/93,11 Jagdkorps,
Jagdkorps, "Niederschrift
"Niederschrift fiber die Divisionskommandeur-Besprechung
iiber die Divisionskommandeur-Besprechung am am
25 .1 .44 . um
25.1.44. um 12 .30 Uhr
12.30 Uhr in in De
De Breul
Breul."."
127
127.. Boylan,
Boy Ian, "The "The Development
Development of of the Long-Range Escort
the Long-Range Escort Fighter,"
Fighter," pp.. 167 167..
128
128.. Ibid,
Ibid, pp.. 168
168..
129
129.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, TheThe Army
Army AirAir Forces
Forces in in World
World WarWar 11,
II, Vol.
Vol. III, p. 33
Ill, p. 33..
130
130.. Boylan,
Boylan, "The "The Development
Development of of the Long-Range Escort
the Long-Range Escort Fighter,"
Fighter," pp.. 168 168..
131
131.. Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol.
Cra\enandCate,TheArmyAirForcesinWorldWarll, Vol. III, pp.. 37-38
Ill, pp 37-38..
132
132.. This
This total
total isis drawn
drawn fromfrom Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, TheArmy
The Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World
World War War 11,
II, Vol.
Vol. III, p. 39
Ill, p. 39;;
and
and Boylan,
Boylan, "The "The Development
Development of of the
the Long-Range
Long-Range Escort Escort Fighter,"
Fighter," pp.. 172 172..
133
133.. Boylan,
Boylan, "The "The Development
Development of of Long-Range
Long-Range Fighter Fighter Escort,"
Escort," pp.. 175 175..
134
134.. Based
Based on on the
the tables
tables in in "Statistical
"Statistical Summary
Summary of of Eighth
Eighth AirAir Force
Force Operations,
Operations, European
European Theater,
Theater,
17 August
17 August 1942-8
1942-8 May May 1945,"
1945," AFSHRC
AFSHRC..
135
135.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 10/257,
10/257, Kriegstagebuch
Kriegstagebuch Nr Nr.. 88 des
des Zerstorergeschwaders
Zerstorergeschwaders "Horst "Horst Wessel"
Wessel" Nr Nr 2626
vom
vom 11.1.—30.9.44.
.1 .-30 .9 .44 .
136.
136. Based
Based on on loss
loss tables
tables in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 III/1025,
111/1025, Genst
Genst.. 66.Abt.
.Abt . (III
(Ill A),
A), Front-Flugzeug-Verluste
Front-Flugzeug-Verluste;;
and
and BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 111/728,
III/728, 729,729, Obersicht
Ubersicht fiberiiber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft,
Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste
Verluste and und
Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande..
137
137.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, TheArmy
The Army Air Air Forces
Forces in in World
World WarWar 11,
II, Vol.
Vol. III, pp.. 51-53
Ill, pp 51-53..
138
138.. Ibid ., pp.. 53
Ibid., 53..
139
139.. Based
Based on loss tables
on loss tables in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 2111/1025,
2 III/1025, Genst
Genst.. 6.6. Abt
Abt.. (111
(Ill A),
A), Front-Flugzeug-Verluste,
Front-Flugzeug-Verluste,
and
and RL RL 22 111/729,
111/729, Ubersicht
Ubersicht fiber iiber Soil,
Soil, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft,
Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste Verluste and und Reserven
Reserven der der
fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande..
140
140.. Figures
Figures basedbased on on aircraft written off
aircraft written off and
and combat
combat strength
strength in in "Statistical
"Statistical Summary
Summary of of Eighth
Eighth AirAir
Force
Force Operations,
Operations, European
European Theater,
Theater, 17 17 August
August 1942-8
1942-8 May May 1945,"
1945," AFSHRC
AFSHRC..
141
141.. Craven
Craven and and Cate,
Cate, TheThe Army
Army AirAir Forces
Forces in in World
World WarWar 11,
II, Vol.
Vol. III, p. 54
Ill, p. 54..
142
142.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 11/329,
11/329, Luftwaffenfuhrungsstab
Luftwaffenfuhningsstab Ic, Ic, Fremde
Fremde Luftwaffen
Luftwaffen West, West, Nr Nr 1193/44,
1193/44,
18 .3 -44 . "Luftlage
18.3.44. "Luftlage West West Nr Nr.. 32
32."."
143
143.. "Ultra,
"Ultra, History
History of of US
US Strategic
Strategic Air Air Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," p. p. 153
153..
144
144.. Ibid ., pp.. 156
Ibid., 156..
145
145.. Ibid ., pp
Ibid., pp.. 153-54
153-54..

25
2599
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

146.. BA/MA,
146 BA/MA, RL RL 10/639,
10/639, Notizen
Notizen zur zur Traditionsgeschichte
Traditionsgeschichte der der III
III.. Gruppe
Gruppe des des Jagdgeschwaders
Jagdgeschwaders
Udet
Udet..
147
\41.. Gol6cke,
Go\iicke, Schweinfurt
Schweinfurt and undderder strategische Luftkrieg 1943,
strategischeLitftkrieg J943, pp.. 218
218..
148
148.. "Ultra,
"Ultra, History
History of of US
US Strategic
Strategic AirAir Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," pp.. 155 155..
149
149.. Ibid
Ibid.,., pp.. 157
157..
150
150.. "Der
"Der Einsatz
Einsatz der der Jager
Jager in in der
der Reichsverteidigung
Reichsverteidigung 1944, 1944, Ansprache
Ansprache des des Oberst
Oberst Trautloff
Trautloff vorvor
Rustungsarbeitem
Rustungsarbeitem bei bei den
den Junkerswerken
Junkerswerken in in Dessau
Dessau am am 15 .3 .44 .," AFSHRC
15.3.44.," AFSHRC:: K K 113 .312-2, vv.. 6,
113.312-2, 6, 1944
1944..
151
151.. BA/MA
BA/MA,, RL 7/51, Der
RL7/51, Chef der Luftflotte 6, Br
DerChefderLuftflotte6, Br.. BB.. Nr.
Nr. 241/43
241/43,, 12 .6 .43 ., Bert.
12.6.43., Betr. Bekampfung
Bekampfung der der
sow
sow.. russ
russ.. Kriegswirtschaft
Kriegswirtschaft..
152
152.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 7/521,
7/521, Besprechungspunkte
Besprechungspunkte Oberst Oberst ii.. G G.. Kless
Kless amam 17 .6 .43 . in
17.6.43. in Robinson
Robinson 44 mit mit
GeneraloberstJeschonnek
Generaloberst Jeschonnek..
153
153.. Olaf Groehler, Geschichte
OlafGroehler, des Luftkrieges 1910
GeschichiedesLuftkrieges 19/0bisbis 1970
1970 (Berlin,
{Berlin, 1973),
1973), pp.. 345345..
154
154.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of
of the
the German
Gennan Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 236
236..
155 . Speer,
155. Inside the
Speer, Inside the Third Reich, pp.. 282
Third Reich, 282..
156
156.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 II/5,
II/5, Luftwaffenfiihrungsstab,
Luftwaffenfuhrungsstab, la la opop NrNr.. 8865/43, .11 .43 ., Anlage
8865/43, 99.11.43., Aniage;: "Kurze
"Kurze
Studie
Studie;: Kampf
Kampf gegen gegen die die russische
russische Rustungsindustrie
Rustungsindustrie." ."
157
157.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 22 II/5,
11/5, Reichsmarschall,
Reichsmarschall, 21 .11 .43 ., An
21.11.43., An LftLft.. Kdo,
Kdo, 4, 4, Chef
Chef dd.. Genst
Genst., ., Lft Kdo, 6,
Lft.. Kdo, 6,
Genst
Genst.. Gen
Gen.. dd.. Kampffl,
Kampffl, Generalmajor
GeneralmajorPeltz. Peltz .
158 . Air
158. Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of
of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 240
240..
159 . Ziemke,
159. Ziemke, Stalingrad
Stalingrad to to Berlin,
Berlin, pp.pp. 174-84
174-84..
160 Air Ministry,
160.. Air Ministry, The The Rise and Fall
Rise and Fall of
ofthe
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 241241..
161
161.. Ziemke,
Ziemke, Stalingrad
Stalingrad to to Berlin,
Berlin, pp.pp. 176-88
176-88..
162
162.. Ibid
Ibid,., pp 229-31 .
pp.. 229-31.
163
163.. Ibid
Ibid.,., Chapters
Chapters XII XII and
and XIII
XIII..
164
164.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of
of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp. pp. 242-43
242-43..
165
165.. "Ultra,
"Ultra, History
History of of US
US Strategic
Strategic AirAir Force
Force Europe
Europe vs vs German
German Air Air Force,"
Force," pp.. 123 123..
166.. Ibid
166 ., pp.. 126
Ibid., 126..
167
167.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 10/544,
10/544, Leistungsbuch,
Leistungsbuch, LeutnantLeutnant ElmarElmar Boersch,
Boersch, 33./K.G.
./K .G . General
General Wever
Wever.. Boersch
Boersch
survived
survived the war with
the war with 311 combat missions
311 combat missions to to his
his credit
credit..
168 . Letter
168. from Oberst
Letter from Oberst Walther Krause in
Walther Krause in possession
possession of of the
the author
author..
169 . Speer,
169. Speer, Inside
Inside thethe Third
Third Reich,
Reich, pppp.. 282-83
282-83..
170 . Air
170. Air Ministry,The
Ministry,The Rise Rise and
and Fall
Fall of
of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp pp.. 242-43
242-43..
171 . Irving,
171. Irving, The The Mare's
Mare's Nest,Nest, pppp.. 177,
177, 181181.. Hitler
Hitler was
was assuring
assuring Goebbels
Goebbels in in September
September that that aa "great
"great
reprisal
reprisal campaign
campaign by by rockets"
rockets" would
would begin
begin in January or
in January or February
February;; Goebbels,
Goebbels, The The Goebbels
Goebbels Diary,
Diary, pp..
467
467..
172 . Ibid
172. ., pp
Ibid., pp.. 220-21
220-21..
173
173.. "Heimatverteidigungsprogramm
"Heimatverteidigungsprogramm 1943, 1943, Besprechung
Besprechung beim beim Reichsmarschall
Reichsmarschall am am 88.10.43.,
.10 .43 .,
Obersalzberg,
Obersalzberg, Fortsetzung,"
Fortsetzung," AFSHRC AFSHRC:: K K 113 .312-2, vv.. 33..
113.312-2,
174
174.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/62,
3/62, "Stenographische
"Stenographische Niederschrift
Niederschrift fiber fiber Besprechung
Besprechung unter unter demdem Vorsitz
Vorsitz desdes
Reich smarschalls am
Reichsmarschalls am 28 .11 .43 . in
28.11.43. in Neuenhazen
Neuenhazen bei bei Berlin
Berlin." ."
175
175.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of
of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 321
321..
176
176.. Groehler,
Groehler, Geschichte
Geschichte des des Luftkrieges,
Luftkrieges, pp.. 396 396..
177
177.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of
ofthe
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 322322..
178
178.. Groehler,
Groehler, Geschichte
Geschichte des des Luftkrieges,
Luftkrieges, pp.. 396 396..
179
179.. Galland,
Galland, The The First
First and
and the
the Last,
Last, pp.. 253
253..
180
180.. See Irving's interesting
Seelrving's interesting discussion,
discussion. The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of of the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp pp.. 217-18
217-18 .
181
181.. Ibid ., pp.. 237
Ibid., 237..
182
182.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The Rise and
The Rise and Fall
Fall of
of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 313
313..
183
183.. Irving,
Irving, TheThe Rise
Rise andand Fall
Fall of
of the
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 266 266..
184
184..Ibid .,pp..281
Ibid., 281..
185
185.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The Rise and
The Rise and Fall
Fall ofthe
of the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 313
313..
186
186.. For
For further
further amplification
amplification of of this
this point,
point, seesee the
the excellent
excellent discussion
discussion of of this
this point
point in in Overy,
Overy, "The
"The
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe and and the
the European
European Economy,
Economy, 1939-1945,"
1939-1945," pp pp.. 66-67
66-67..
187
187.. See
See the
the discussion
discussion of of this
this point
point inin Speer,
Speer, Inside
Inside thethe Third
Third Reich,
Reich, pppp.. 310-1
310-11. 1.
188
188.. Richard
Richard Overy,
Overy, TheAirWar,
TheAirWar, 1939-1945
1939-1945 (London,(London, 1980),1980), pp.. 123
123..
189
189.. USSBS,
\}SSBS,ESBGWE.ESBGWE, AppendixAppendix Tables
Tables 101 101 andand 102
102..
190
190.. Overy,
Overy, The The Air
Air War,
War, 1939-1945,
1939-1945, pp.. 123 123..
191
191.. See
See particularly
particularly the the discussion
discussion of of what
what had had happened
happened to to the
the factories
factories at at Braunschweig
Braunschweig;: BA/MA, BA/MA,
RL 3/1, "Stenographischer
RL3/1, Bericht fiber die Jagerstabs-Besprechung
"StenographischerBerichtuberdie Jagerstabs-Besprechung am am4. 4 . Marz
Marz 1944 im RLM," pp.. 47
1944imRLM," 47..

260
260
ATTRITION
ATTRITION OVER
OVER THE
THE REICH
REICH

192
192.. Irving,
Irving, The
The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall ofofthe
the Luftwaffe,
Luftwaffe, pp.. 270
270..
193
193.. "Sicherung
"Sicherung der der Jager
Jager andund Zerst6rerfabrikation
Zerstorerfabrikation gegengegen Luftangriffe,"
Luftangriffe," 16 .3 .44 ., Imperial
16.3.44., Imperial War War
Museum
Museum FD FD 4352/45
4352/45.. See See also
also Milch's
MUch's speech
speech in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/1,3/1, VI
VI Besprechung
Besprechung in in Allach-
Ailach-
Miinchen,
Munchen, 10 .3 .44 .
10.3.44.
194
194.. BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL3/1,3/1, "Stenografische Niederschrift der Besprechungen wiihrend
"StenografischeNiederschriftderBesprechungen wahrenddes des 'Untemehmens
'Untemehmens
Hubertus'
Hubertus' v. v. F.-11 .3 .44 .," p.
F.-11.3.44.," p . 21
21..
195
195.. See
See particularly
particularly the the interesting
interesting exchange
exchange between
between Milch
Milch and and Sauer
Sauer onon the
the one
one hand
hand and and an
an
offending
offending official
official on
on the
the other
other inin BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/1,
3/1, "Messerschmitt-Regensburg,"
"Messerschmitt-Regensburg," Vorbesprechung
Vorbesprechung im im
Sonderzug,
Sonderzug, 10 .3 .44 .-0 .30 Uhr,
10.3.44.-0.30 Uhr, pp.. 178
178.. Milch
Milch was
was also
also to
to suggest
suggest that
that if
if French
French workers
workers gave
gave trouble
trouble
when
when thethe invasion
invasion came,
came, 50 50 percent
percent should
should bebe shot
shot and
and ifif that
that did
did not
not work
work then
then the
the rest
rest.. Groehler,
Groehler,
Geschichte
Geschichte desdes Luftkrieges
Luftkrieges 1910 1910 bis bis 1970,
1970, pp.. 414
414.. See
See also
also the
the discussion
discussion about
about getting
getting recalcitrant
recalcitrant
workers
workers back
back into
into the
the factories
factories in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/1,
3/1, VV.. "Messerschmitt-Regensburg,"
"Messerschmitt-Regensburg," Vorbesprechung
Vorbesprechung
im
im Sonderzug,
Sonderzug, 10 .3 .44-0:30 Uhr.
10.3.44-0:30 Uhr.
196.
196. USSBS,
USSBS, ESBGWE,
ESBGWE, AppendixAppendix TableTable 102102.. See
See also
also Sauer's
Sauer's discussion
discussion ofof the
the "Fighter
"Fighter Staff's"
Staffs"
success
success by by the
the end
end of of March
March in in BA/MA,
BA/MA, RL RL 3/3,
3/3, "Stenographischer
"Stenographischer Bericht Bericht uber
uber diedie Jagerstabs-
Jagerstabs-
Besprechung
Besprechung am am 25 .3 .44, 10
25.3.44, 10 Uhr
Uhr im im Reichsluftfahrtministerium."
Reichsluftfahrtministerium."
197
197.. Letter
Letter from
from Oberst
Oberst Walter
Walter Krause,
Krause, May
May 25,
25, 1981,
1981, in
in possession
possession of of the
the author
author..
198
198.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of
of the
the German
German Air Air Force,
Force, pp.. 314;
314; and
and BA/MA,
BA/MA RL RL 22 111/722,
III/722
723,
723 724, 725, 726,
724, 725, 726, 727,
727, 728,
728, GenGen.. Qu
Qu.. 66.Abt.
.Abt . (Ij
(I) Ubersicht
Ubersicht fiber
uber Soil,
Soli, Istbestand,
Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft,
Einsatzbereitschaft'
Verluste
Veriuste and
und Reserven
Reserven der der fliegenden
fliegenden Verbande
Verbande..
199
199.. Air
Air Ministry,
Ministry, The The Rise
Rise and
and Fall
Fall of
ofthe
the German
German AirAir Force,
Force, pp pp.. 316-17
316-17..

261
CHAPTER
CHAPTER VII
VII

Defeat
Defeat:: April-September
April-September 1944
1944
The
The airair battles
battles of
of February
February and and March
March had had gone
gone farfar towards
towards establishing
estabhshing air air
supremacy over the continent . The basic issue now was how the Allies could best
supremacy over the continent. The basic issue now was how the Allies could best
utilize
utilize that
that advantage
advantage.. At At this
this point,
point, however,
however, the the air
air commanders
commanders could could no no longer
longer
claim that only their air forces could strike Nazi Germany . Victory in the Atlantic
claim that only their air forces could strike Nazi Germany. Victory in the Atlantic
had
had enabled
enabled Britain
Britain andand the
the United
United States
States toto build
build upup the
the land
land andand naval
naval power
power
required to make an opposed landing on the coast of France a viable possibility .
required to make an opposed landing on the coast of France a viable possibility.
Debate
Debate centered
centered on on how
how thethe air
air forces,
forces, particularly
particularly thethe "strategic"
"strategic" bombers,
bombers, could could
support overall strategy. The results of that debate in effect determined the success
support overall strategy. The results of that debate in effect determined the success
of
of D-day
D-day and and led
led to
to thethe destruction
destruction of of Germany's
Germany's strategic
strategic position
position in in western
western
Europe
Europe..
On
On the
the German
German side,
side, spring
spring boded
boded ill for the
ill for the Third
Third Reich
Reich.. In In Russia,
Russia, its its forces
forces
were
were inin disarray
disarray;; and
and inin the
the Ukraine,
Ukraine, Soviet
Soviet armies
armies were
were reaching
reaching towards
towards Rumania
Rumania
and
and Hungary
Hungary.. Russian
Russian advances
advances posed
posed aa direct
direct threat
threat toto Germany's
Germany's major major source
source of of
crude
crude oil
oil and
and to
to the
the entire
entire Balkan
Balkan region,
region, the
the raw
raw materials
materials of of which
which werewere critical
critical to
to
the
the continued
continued functioning
functioning of of armaments
armaments production.
production. Everywhere
Everywhere in in Europe-from
Europe—from
Russia
Russia to to France,
France, from
from Norway
Norway to to Greece-resistance
Greece—resistance movements movements harried harried thethe
German
German occupier.
occupier. In In France,
France, thethe Germans
Germans facedfaced anan imminent
imminent invasion
invasion withwith little
little
prospect
prospect of of support
support from
from thethe Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe..
Hitler
Hitler understood
understood that that aa successful
successful invasion
invasion of of France
France would
would spell
spell the
the doom
doom of of his
his
regime
regime.. In In aa directive
directive to to the
the Wehrmacht,
Wehrmacht, he he claimed
claimed thatthat Germany
Germany could could lose
lose
territory
territory inin the
the east
east without
without suchsuch losses
losses having
having aa decisive
decisive impact
impact on on the
the war.
war. In In the
the
west,
west, however,
however, the the situation
situation waswas different:
different:

Should
Should thethe enemy
enemy succeed
succeed in breaking our
in breaking our defenses
defenses onon aa wide
wide front
front
here, the
here, the immediate
immediate consequences
consequences would would be be unpredictable
unpredictable..
Everything indicates
Everything indicates that
that the
the enemy
enemy willwill launch
launch an
an offensive
offensive against
against
the
the western
western front
front of
of Europe,
Europe, atat the
the latest
latest in
in the
the spring,
spring, perhaps
perhaps even
even
earlier
earlier.. II can,
can, therefore,
therefore, nono longer
longer take
take responsibility
responsibility for
for [the]
[the]
further
further weakening
weakening of of the
the west
west inin favor
favor of
of other
other theaters
theaters of
of [the]
[the]
war
war.'.t

For
For defense
defense ofof the west, Hitler
the west. Hitler relied
relied on
on two
two ofof his
his foremost
foremost generals-Rundstedt
generals—Rundstedt
and Rommel
and Rommel.. The The former,
former, acclaimed
acclaimed as as aa master
master strategist,
strategist, argued
argued for
for aa mobile
mobile
defense
defense ofof France
France that
that would
would trade
trade territory
territory for
for time
time and
and inflict
inflict heavy
heavy casualties
casualties onon
the
the attacker
attacker.. Rommel,
Rommel, often
often criticized
criticized asas having
having little
little grasp
grasp of
of strategic
strategic issues,
issues,
argued
argued that
that the
the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht must
must defeat
defeat the
the invasion
invasion onon the
the beaches
beaches before
before the
the Allies
Allies
could
could consolidate
consolidate aa foothold.
foothold. He
He warned,
warned, correctly
correctly asas events
events turned
turned out,
out, that
that if
if the
the
Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht couldcould not
not hold
hold the
the coast,
coast, air
air superiority
superiority would
would allow
allow the
the Allies
Allies to
to build
build
up
up their
their forces
forces more
more quickly
quickly than
than aa defender,
defender, harried
harried by by strikes
strikes against
against hishis

263
263
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

transportation
transportation networks.'
networks.^ Hitler
Hitler byby vacillating
vacillating between
between these these two
two clear-cut
clear-cut
strategies and by controlling the mobile reserves himself,
strategies and by controlling the mobile reserves himself, in
in effect,
effect, hamstrung
hamstrung both
both
strategies.
strategies.
In the air,
In the air, American
American fighters
fighters and bombers were
and bombers were close
close toto breaking
breaking Germany's
Germany's
fighter
fighter forces
forces.. Bomber
Bomber Command,
Command, however,
however, had had lost
lost the
the initiative
initiative over
over the
the Reich.
Reich.
The
The night
night fighters
fighters had
had made
made thethe skies
skies over
over central
central Europe
Europe so so dangerous
dangerous that
that the
the
British
British could
could only
only risk
risk their
their bombers
bombers on on deep
deep penetration
penetration raidsraids in
in unusual
unusual
circumstances
circumstances.. However,
However, BomberBomber Command
Command in in western
western Europe
Europe was
was aa most
most
effective force.. Although
effective force Although flying
flying atat night,
night, itit was
was capable
capable of of aa precision that its
precision that its
commander
commander denieddenied it possessed and
it possessed and which
which was,
was, in in some
some respects,
respects, more
more accurate
accurate
than
than the daylight "precision"
the daylight "precision" attacks
attacks of
of American
American bombers
bombers withinwithin the range of
the range of
navigational
navigational aids .3
aids.'

"OVERLORD"
"OVERLORD" AND
AND "STRATEGIC"
"STRATEGIC" BOMBING
BOMBING
On
On January
January 12,
12, Air
Air Marshal
Marshal Arthur
Arthur Harris
Harris fired
fired the
the opening
opening salvo
salvo in
in aa prolonged
prolonged
debate over the role of "strategic" bombers in the coming invasion . "Overlord,"
debate over the role of "strategic" bombers in the coming invasion. "Overlord,"
Harris
Harris announced,
announced, "must"must now
now presumably
presumably be be regarded
regarded as as an
an inescapable
inescapable
commitment." He then pointed out that the "heavy bomber force has
commitment." He then pointed out that the "heavy bomber force has been
been
developed as an independent strategic weapon" whose task was "the destruction of
developed as an independent strategic weapon" whose task was "the destruction of
the enemy's industrial centers ." He claimed that its specialized equipment and
the enemy's industrial centers." He claimed that its specialized equipment and
training
training allowed
allowed itit to
to attack
attack targets
targets with
with efficiency
efficiency andand economy
economy.. After
After describing
describing
the limitations and
the limitations and navigational
navigational problems
problems besetting
besetting hishis force,
force, Harris
Harris laid
laid out
out what
what
his
his force
force could
could not do:
not do:

17
17.. Consequently,
Consequently, anything anything like
like aa planned
planned schedule
schedule of of
bomber
bomber operations
operations designed
designed to to give
give immediate
immediate assistance
assistance ..... . to
to
ground
ground forces
forces engaged
engaged in in effecting
effecting aa landing
landing or or operating
operating in in the
the
field
field would
would be be extremely
extremely unreliable
unreliable and and almost
almost wholly
wholly futile.
futile. .. .. ..
In
In no
no circumstances
circumstances could could itit be be relied
relied upon
upon to to destroy
destroy gun gun
emplacements
emplacements or or cause
cause noticeable
noticeable casualties
casualties to to defenders
defenders in in slit
slit
trenches
trenches.. .. .. .. Nor
Nor isis the
the heavy
heavy bomberbomber force
force suitable
suitable for
for cutting
cutting
railway
railway communications
communications at at definite
definite points
points.. Indeed
Indeed in in -Western
Western
Germany,
Germany, France France and and the the Low Low Countries,
Countries, owing owing to to the the
multiplication
multiplication of of roads
roads andand railways
railways andand the
the impossibility
impossibility of of
maintaining
maintaining the the requisite
requisite continuity
continuity of of action
action inin the
the prevailing
prevailing
weather
weather conditions,
conditions, such such aa policy
policy isis probably
probably impracticable
impracticable withwith
any
any type
type of
of bomber
bomber force
force.. .. .. ..
21
21.. There
There could
could be be no
no greater
greater relief
relief afforded
afforded Germany
Germany
than
than the
the cessation
cessation or
or any
any ponderable
ponderable reduction
reduction of
of the
the bombing
bombing of of
Germany
Germany proper.
proper. The
The entire
entire country
country would
would gogo wild
wild with
with aa sense
sense of
of
relief
relief and
and rebome
rebome hope
hope.. .. .. ..
22
22.. It
It is
is thus
thus clear
clear that
that the
the best
best and
and indeed
indeed the
the only
only
efficient
efficient support
support which which Bomber
Bomber Command
Command can can give
give toto
OVERLORD
OVERLORD is is the
the intensification
intensification ofof attacks
attacks on
on suitable
suitable industrial
industrial
centres
centres inin Germany
Germany as as and
and when
when the
the opportunity
opportunity offers
offers.. If
If we
we
attempt
attempt to
to substitute
substitute forfor this
this process
process attacks
attacks on
on gun
gun emplacements,
emplacements,
beach
beach defenses,
defenses, communications
communications or or [ammunition]
[ammunition] dumps
dumps in in
occupied
occupied territory,
territory, we we shall
shall commit
commit the the irremediable
irremediable error
error of
of
diverting
diverting our
our best
best weapons
weapons fromfixjm the
the military
military function,
function, for
for which
which itit

264
264
DEFEAT
DEFEAT

has
has been
been equipped
equipped and
and trained,
trained, to
to tasks
tasks which
which itit cannot
cannot effectively
effectively
carry
carry out
out.. Though
Though this
this might
might give
give aa specious
specious appearance
appearance ofof
"supporting"
"supporting" the the Army,
Army, in in reality
reality itit would
would be be the
the greatest
greatest
disservice
disservice we
we could
could do
do to
to them .°
them."*

Harris,
Harris, nevernever known
known for for understatement,
understatement, was was attempting
attempting to to minimize
minimize the tiie
commitment
commitment of of his
his command
command to to "Overload
"Overload." ." His
His strongest
strongest argument
argument was was that
that his
his
forces
forces with
with their
their training
training and and doctrine
doctrine couldcould not not effectively
effectively helphelp the
the ground
ground forces
forces..
Harris,
Harris, however,
however, alreadyalready had had evidence
evidence that that heavy
heavy bombers
bombers could could destroy
destroy gun gun
emplacements
emplacements (see (see Chapter
Chapter VI) VI).. In In the
the end,
end, he he did
did throw
throw hishis forces
forces into into thethe
campaign
campaign against against the the French
French transportation
transportation system system.. The The reasons
reasons for for hishis eventual
eventual
acceptance
acceptance of of using
using Bomber
Bomber Command
Command in in support
support of of "Overlord,"
"Overlord," aa course course of of
action
action that
that hehe regarded
regarded with with considerable
considerable distaste,
distaste, were were several.
several. On On one one hand,
hand, his his
command
command had had suffered
suffered terrible
terrible losses during the
losses during the winter,
winter, andand hehe seems
seems to to have
have been
been
more
more amenable
amenable to to AirAir Staff
Staff direction
direction in in the
the spring
spring.. The
The second
second factorfactor pushing
pushing
Hams
Harris towards
towards compliance
compliance was was an an excellent
excellent political
political sense-he
sense—he undoubtedly
undoubtedly
realized
realized that that "Overlord"
"Overlord" represented
represented aa ventureventure that that either
either he he supported
supported or or he
he risked
risked
losing
losing hishis position.
position.
The
The final
final element
element pushing
pushing Bomber
Bomber CommandCommand towards towards support
support for for thethe invasion
invasion
was
was thethe factfact that
that Harris'
Harris' argument
argument that that hishis bombers
bombers could could notnot attack
attack precision
precision
targets
targets in in France
France was was incorrect
incorrect.. The The initial
initial invasion
invasion plan plan hadhad envisioned
envisioned an an
extensive
extensive campaign
campaign againstagainst thethe transportation
transportation system system of of northern
northern France,
France, with with thethe
main
main target
target being
being railroad
railroad marshalling
marshalling yards yards.. The The claims
claims thatthat Bomber
Bomber Command Command
was
was suitable
suitable only only for for "area"
"area" bombing
bombing had had alarmed
alarmed Churchill
Churchill.. If If Harris
Harris werewere
correct,
correct, those
those French
French living
living near
near the
the target
target areas
areas werewere inin great
great danger.
danger. As As aa result,
result,
in
in March,
March, British
British bombers
bombers carried
carried out out test
test raids
raids on on six
six French
French towns.
towns. Using Using OboeOboe
and
and new
new marking
marking techniques,
techniques, the the raids
raids succeeded
succeeded beyond beyond anyone's
anyone's expectations
expectations.' .'
An
An attack
attack on on Vaires
Vaires not not only
only destroyed
destroyed the the railroad
railroad yards
yards butbut occurred
occurred while while troop
troop
trains
trains of of the Waffen SS
the Waffen SS division ' 'Frundsberg'' lay
division "Frundsberg" lay onon sidings
sidings intermingled
intermingled with with
several
several carloads
carloads of of mines
mines.. The
The Germans
Germans collected
collected nearlyneariy 1,200
1,200 identity
identity disksdisks from
from
the
the Waffen
Waffen SS SS dead
dead.* . 6 French
French casualties
casualties were were minimal
minimal..
Establishment
Establishment of of aa command
command system system to to control
control air air assets
assets in in support
support of of the
the
invasion
invasion was was aa tortuous
tortuous process
process.. In In 1943,
1943, AirAir Marshal
Marshal Sir Sir Trefford
Trefford Leigh-Mallory
Leigh-Mallory
received
received appointment
appointment as as Commander,
Commander, Allied Allied Expeditionary
Expeditionary Air Air Force
Force.. However,
However,
neither
neither Spaatz
Spaatz nor nor Harris
Harris wished
wished to to subordinate
subordinate their their "strategic"
"strategic" bombers
bombers to to aa man
man
possessing
possessing experience
experience only only with
with "tactical"
"tactical" aircraftaircraft.. Eisenhower
Eisenhower then then appointed
appointed
Tedder
Tedder as as his
his chief
chief deputy,
deputy, and and Churchill's
Churchill's suggestion
suggestion that that the
the latter
latter command
command all all
air
air assets
assets in in Britain
Britain mightmight have have removed
removed some some ambiguities
ambiguities in in command
command
relationships
relationships.. As As the
the official
official historians
historians note: note: Had Had Churchill's
Churchill's suggestion
suggestion been been
adopted,
adopted, "orders"orders and and not not ambassadors
ambassadors could could have have beenbeen sent
sent to
to thethe strategic
strategic air air
forces
forces."^. "' Churchill's
Churchill's proposal
proposal met met strong
strong resistance
resistance and and anan eventual
eventual compromise
compromise
gave
gave Tedder
Tedder limited
limited control
control over
over the
the bomber
bomber commands.
commands. He He was
was to to form
form thethe air
air
plan
plan inin consultation
consultation with Harris and
with Harris and Spaatz,
Spaatz, while while Leigh-Mallory
Leigh-Mallory under under Tedder's
Tedder's
guidance
guidance would would drawdraw up up the
the "tactical"
"tactical" air air plans
plans for for "Overlord
"Overlord." ." Then
Then Portal
Portal andand
Eisenhower,
Eisenhower, acting acting through
through the the Chiefs
Chiefs of of Staff,
Staff, wouldwould see see that
that the
the heavy
heavy bomber
bomber

265
265
STRATEGY
STRATEGY FOR
FOR DEFEAT
DEFEAT

assets
assets required
required to to support
support the the invasion
invasion would would be be available
available.*' .' The
The command
command
arrangements
arrangements took took aa period
period of of time
time to to settle
settle down
down and,
and, although
although somewhat
somewhat clumsy,
clumsy,
the
the good
good sense
sense of of Allied
Allied commanders
commanders made made them them function.
function.
Two
Two considerable
considerable arguments
arguments occurred
occurred in in the
the months
months beforebefore thethe invasion
invasion.. The The
fast
first was
was Churchill's
Churchill's continuing
continuing worry
worry that that tens
tens of
of thousands
thousands of of Frenchmen
Frenchmen would would
die
die inin attacks
attacks on on the
the transportation
transportation system system.. Such Such casualties
casualties would
would have have serious
serious
implications
implications for for future
future Anglo-French
Anglo-French relations relations.. While
While extensive
extensive arguments
arguments took took
place between
place between Churchill
Churchill and and those
those favoring
favoring aa bombingbombing campaign
campaign against against
transportation targets,
transportation targets. Bomber
Bomber Command's
Command's accurate accurate and and precise
precise destruction
destruction of of
French rail
French rail yards
yards eventually
eventually alleviated
alleviated the the Prime
Prime Minister's
Minister's doubts
doubts.' .'
The
The second
second argument
argument was was between
between advocates
advocates of of the
the transportation
transportation plan plan andand
Spaatz's adherence
Spaatz's adherence to to "Pointblank"
"Pointblank" objectivesobjectives.. The The American
American commander,
commander,
however, interjected
however, interjected aa new new element
element into into thethe "strategic"
"strategic" bombingbombing offensive
offensive by by
pushing
pushing Germany's
Germany's oil oil industry
industry toto the
the toptop ofof his
his priority
priority list.
list. The
The tendency
tendency among
among
some
some historians
historians to to see
see aa clear
clear delineation
delineation betweenbetween the the oil
oil and
and transportation
transportation plans plans
distorts
distorts what
what actually
actually occurred
occurred.. The The plans
plans werewere notnot contradictory,
contradictory, although
although the the
debate
debate at at the
the time
time tended
tended to pose them
to pose them as as such.
such. InIn fact,
fact, events
events proved
proved thethe plans
plans
complementary
complementary.. Spaatz, Spaatz, oneone ofof the
the more
more flexible
flexible andand imaginative
imaginative commanders
commanders in in
the
the war,
war, had
had nono serious
serious qualms
qualms withwith thethe railroad
railroad plan
plan.. He
He noted
noted in in late
late February
February thatthat
he
he would
would havehave no no quarrel
quarrel withwith bombing
bombing railway railway targets
targets if if such
such attacks
attacks were
were to to
stimulate
stimulate "the Luftwaffe to
"the Luftwaffe to fight. "'° He did, however, disagree with Leigh-
fight."'" He did, however, disagree with Leigh-
Mallory's
Mallory's contention
contention that that the
the decisive
decisive air air battle
battle would
would be be won
won over
over the the beaches
beaches..
Rather,
Rather, he he felt
felt that
that Eighth
Eighth AirAir Force's
Force's attacks
attacks on on German
German aircraft
aircraft plants
plants hadhad already
already
helped
helped establish
establish air air supremacy
supremacy and and that
that hishis oil
oil plan
plan would
would continue
continue the the process
process of of
attacking
attacking targets
targets that forced the
that forced the Luftwaffe to fight . His plan had one additional
to fight. His plan had one additional
advantage
advantage.. By By destroying
destroying Germany's
Germany's fuel fuel sources,
sources, the the Allies
Allies would
would eliminate
eliminate
Germany's
Germany's ability ability to to train
train thethe replacement
replacement pilots pilots that
that spiraling
spiraling attrition
attrition rates
rates
demanded.
demanded.
The
The transportation
transportation plan plan owed
owed itsits origins
origins to to the
the close
close work
work between
between Zuckerman
Zuckerman
and
and Leigh-Mallory
Leigh-Mallory.. Zuckerman's
Zuckerman's initial initial conception
conception was was thatthat Allied
Allied air air forces
forces
operating
operating fromfrom England
England wouldwould devote
devote themselves,
themselves, for for extended
extended time time periods,
periods, to to the
the
destruction
destruction of the railroad
of the railroad system
system from
from the the German
German frontier
frontier westward
westward::
An
An essential
essential preliminary
preliminary to to enable
enable Operation
Operation "OVERLORD"
"OVERLORD" to to
take
take place
place is is the
the accomplishment
accomplishment of of certain
certain vital
vital tasks
tasks by by the
the
Strategical
Strategical and
and Tactical
Tactical Air Forces.. Unless
Air Forces Unless these
these are
are completed
completed by by
D-day,
D-day, the
the success
success of of the
the Operation
Operation will
will be
be jeopardized,
jeopardized, not not only
only
because
because ourour naval
naval and and ground
ground forces
forces would
would thenthen have
have toto contend
contend
with
with aa highly
highly unfavorable
unfavorable situation
situation but
but also
also because
because thethe air
air would
would
not
not be
be in
in any
any position
position toto lend
lend full
fiiU support
support to
to the
the actual
actual assault
assauh or or to
to
deal
deal with
with the
the subsequent
subsequent activities
activities of
of the
the enemy
enemy.. Subject
Subject to to aa
satisfactory
satisfactory airair situation,
situation, the
the main
main object
object ofof the
the preliminary
preliminary air air
operations
operations isis to
to paralyze
paralyze the
the railways
railways from
from Western
Western Germany
Germany to to the
the
assault
assault area
area to
to such
such anan extent
extent that
that major
major reinforcement
reinforcement by by rail
rail would
would
be
be virtually
virtually impossible
impossible.'' .tI

Zuckerman's
Zuckerman's plan
plan did
did recognize
recognize that
that Allied
Allied air
air forces
forces would
would have
have to
to maintain
maintain
pressure
pressure on
on the Luftwaffe through
the Luftwaffe through attacks
attacks on
on its
its production
production base.
base.

266
266
DEFEAT
DEFEAT

On
On MarchMarch 5, 5, Spaatz
Spaatz suggested
suggested that that hishis forces
forces attack
attack the the Reich's
Reich's oil supplies and
oil supplies and
refineries
refineries instead instead of of Western
Western Europe'sEurope's transportation
transportation system system.. SuchSuch an an offensive
offensive
would,
would, he he claimed,
claimed, causecause aa 50 50 percent
percent reduction
reduction in in gasoline
gasoline supplies
supplies within
within six six
months
months.'^ ." TheThe upshot
upshot was was aa compromise
compromise.. While While Tedder
Tedder and and Eisenhower
Eisenhower backed backed
Leigh-Mallory's
Leigh-Mallory's emphasis emphasis on on the the transportation
transportation plan, plan, Spaatz
Spaatz placedplaced active active
Luftwaffe units
Luftwaffe units as
as well
well asas the
the German
German aircraftaircraft industry
industry at at the
the top
top of
of Eighth's
Eighth's priority
priority
list
list.. Nevertheless,
Nevertheless, he he agreed
agreed to to use
use hishis heavy
heavy bombers
bombers to to attack
attack thethe transportation
transportation
network
network as as aa "secondary
"secondary objectiveobjective."" ."" Although
Although the the directive
directive to to thethe bomber
bomber
commands
commands said said nothing about oil,
nothing about the Luftwaffe's
oil, the Luftwaffe's designation
designation as as the
the main
main objective
objective
allowed
allowed Spaatz Spaatz sufficient
sufficient latitude
latitude to to go
go after
after the
the synthetic
synthetic fuel fuel industry
industry in in mid-May.
mid-May.
Out
Out of of thethe 80 80 most
most important
important trans

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