SHAUSA
FACTS
1. EPUBLIC v CA
Facts:
The lot subject matter of this land registration case, with
an area of 17,311 square meters, is situated near the
shore of Laguna de Bay, about 20 meters therefrom in
Barrio Pinagbayanan, Pila Laguna. It was purchased by
Benedicto del Rio from Angel Pili on April 19, 1909. When
Benedicto died in 1957, his heirs extrajudicial partitioned
his estate and the subject parcel passed on his son,
Santos del Rio, as the latter’s share in the inheritance.
Sometime before 1966, private oppositors obtained
permission from Santo to construct duck houses on the
land in question. Although there was no definite
commitment as to rentals some of them had made
voluntary payments to Santos. In violation of the original
agreement, private oppositors constructed residential
houses on the land, which prompted Santos to file an
ejectment against the private oppositors. Meanwhile,
during the latter part of 1965, private oppositors had
simultaneously filed their respective sales application
with the Bureau of Lands and was opposed by Santos.
2. Binalay v Manalo
Facts:
A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not
the alluvial process contemplated in Art. 457. The
accumulation of the soil deposits must be slow and hardly
imperceptible in order for the riparian owner to acquire
ownership thereof. Also, the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers (or the
sea coast).
Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by
Judge Taccad from 2 different people (the latter’s
ISSUE
W/N the applicant-private respondent has a registrable
title to the land.
Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion
RULING
Private persons cannot reclaim land from public waters
without prior permission by the government and, even if
reclamation is authorized, acquisition thereof for
ownership is not automatic. The claim of private
oppositors, that they have reclaimed the land from the
waters of Laguna de Bay and that they have possessed
the same for more than 20 years does not improve their
position. In the first place, private persons cannot, by
themselves reclaim land from water bodies belonging to
the public domain without proper permission from the
government authorities. And even if such reclamation
had been authorized, the reclaimed land does not
automatically belong to the party reclaiming the same as
they may still be subject to the terms of the authority
earlier granted. Private oppositors failed to show proper
authority for the alleged reclamation therefore; their
claimed title to the litigated parcel must fall.
No.
The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action
of the heavy rains that cause the highest ordinary level of
waters of the Cagayan River
during the rainy season. The depressed portion is a river
bed and is thus considered property of public
domain.
The SC observed the following:
a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct

daughter and from an earlier purchaser). These lots were
later consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45 hectares.
The lot was beside the Cagayan River, which, due to
flooding, would place a portion of the land underwater
during the rainy season (September to December). On
sunny days, however, the land would be dried up for the
entire dry season (January to August). When a survey of
the land was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of
the land that Manalo bought was then underwater and
was thus left unsurveyed and excluded from Lot 307. The
big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to
north, forks at a certain point to form two braches
(western and eastern) and then unites at the other end,
further north, to form a narrower strip of land. The
eastern branch of the river cuts through Lot 307, and is
flooded during the rainy season. The
unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the bed of the
eastern branch. Note that the fork exists only
during the rainy season while the “island”/elongated strip
of land formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry
and perfect for cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its
ordinary depth. The strip of land in the middle of the fork
totaled 22.7 hectares and was labeled Lot 821- 822. Lot
821 is directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated by the
eastern branch of the river’s fork.
Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of
accretion to the submerged portion of the land to which
it is adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess the
Lot 821, on the other hand, insist that they own it. They
occupy the other edges of the lot along the river bank
(i.e. the fertile portions on which they plant tobacco and
other agricultural
products) and also cultivate the western strip during the
summer.
Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both
dismissed. Later on, he filed a complaint for quieting of
title, possession, and damages against petitioner. The
trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo, saying
that Lot 821 and Lot 307 cannot be considered separate
and distinct from each other. They reasoned that when
the land dries up
SHAUSA
examination depict the depressed portion as a river bed.
The dried up portion had dike-like slopes (around 8m) on
both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot 821 that are
vertical and very
prominent.
b) The eastern bed already existed
even before Manalo bought the land.
It was called “Rio Muerte de Cagayan.”
C) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land
because article 420 of the civil code states that rivers are
property of public dominion. The word “river” includes
the running waters, the bed, and the banks. [The seller
never actually owned that part of the land since it was
public property].
d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the
land he actually bought. It is difficult to suppose that such
a sizable area could have been
brought about by accretion. More importantly, the
requisites of accretion in article 457 were not satisfied.
These are: 1) that the deposition of the soil or sediment
be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of
the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and 3) the
land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of the
rivers (or the sea coast). The accretion should’ve been
attached to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its
ownership. BUT, the claimed accretion lies on the bank of
the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly opposite it
– across the river. Aside from that, the dike-like slopes
which were very steep may only be formed by a sudden
and forceful action like flooding. The steep slopes could
not have been formed by the river in a slow and gradual
manner.
 SHAUSA

for the most part of the year, the two are connected.
[Note: The CA applied the ruling in Gov’t of the Phil
Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, which was actually
inappropriate because the subject matter in this case was
a lake so that the definition of a “bed” was different.]

3. Viajar v CA

Facts:

The spouses Ricardo and Leonor Ladrido were the owners

of Lot 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan situated in
barangay Cawayan, Pototan, Iloilo (154,267 sq. ms., TCT
T-21940 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo). Spouses
Rosendo and Ana Te were also the registered owners of a
parcel of land described in their title as Lot 7340 of the
Cadastral Survey of Pototan. On 6 September 1973,
Rosendo Te, with the conformity of his wife, sold this lot
to Angelica F. Viajar and Celso F. Viajar for P5,000. A
Torrens title was later issued in the latter’s names. Later,
Angelica Viajar had Lot 7340 relocated and found out that
the property was in the possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido.
Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido
refused.

The piece of real property which used to be Lot 7340 of

the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay
Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo; that it consisted of 20,089
sq.ms.; that at the time of the cadastral survey in 1926,
Lot 7511 and Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague
River; that the area of 11,819 sq.ms of what was Lot 7340
has been in the possession of Ladrido; that the area of
14,036 sq.ms., which was formerly the river bed of the
Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been
in the possession of Ladrido; and that the Viajars have
never been in actual physical possession of Lot 7340.

On 15 February 1974, Angelica and Celso Viajar instituted

a civil action for recovery of possession and damages
against Ricardo Y. Ladrido (Civil Case 9660) with the CFI
Iloilo. Summoned to plead, Ladrido filed his answer with a
counterclaim. The Viajars filed their reply to the answer.
 SHAUSA

Subsequently, the complaint was amended to implead

Rosendo Te as another defendant. The Viajars sought the
annulment of the deed of sale and the restitution of the
purchase price with interest in the event the possession
of defendant Ladrido is sustained. Te filed his answer to
the amended complaint and he counterclaimed for
damages.

The Viajars answered the counterclaim. During the

pendency of the case, Celso Viajar sold his rights over Lot
7340 to his mother and co-plaintiff, Angelica F. Viajar. For
this reason, Angelica F. Viajar appears to be the sole
registered owner of the lot.
On 25 May 1978, Ricardo Ladrido died. He was
substituted in the civil action by his wife, Leonor P.
Ladrido, and children, namely: Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio,
Eugenio P. Ladrido and Manuel P. Ladrido, as parties
defendants. After trial on the merits, a second amended
complaint which included damages was admitted. On 10
December 1981, the trial court rendered its decision in
favor of Ladrido, dismissing the complaint of Angelica and
Celso Viajar with costs against them, declaring Leonor P.
Ladrido, Lourdes Ladrido-Ignacio, Eugenio P. Ladrido and
Manuel P. Ladrido as owner of the parcel of land
indicated as Lots A and B in the sketch plan situated in
barangays Cawayan and Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo,
and containing an area of 25,855 sq.ms., and
pronouncing that as
owners of the land, the Ladridos are entitled to the
possession thereof.

Not satisfied with the decision, the Viajars appealed to

the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the court a quo on 29 December 1986 (CA-GR
CV 69942). The Viajars filed a petition for review on
certiorari.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of

merit without pronouncement as to costs.

4. Ballatan v CA
No.
Facts:

Doctrine: In the event that the owner elects to sell to the
builder, planter or sower the land on which the
improvement stands, the price must be fixed at the
prevailing market value at the time of payment.
The parties herein are owners of adjacent lots. Lot 24 is
registered in the name of petitioners Ballatan. Lots 25 &
26 are registered in the name of respondent Go Sr. His
son, Winston Go constructed a house on Lot 25. Adjacent
to Lot 26 is Lot 27, 4 registered in the name of
respondent Li Ching Yao. Petitioner Ballatan constructed
her house on Lot 24. During the construction, she noticed
that the concrete fence and side pathway of respondent’s
house encroached her property. Ballatan informed Go of
this discrepancy and his encroachment on her property.
Surveys were made and it was found out that the lot area
of petitioner Ballatan was less by a few meters and that
of respondent Li Ching Yao, which was three lots away,
increased by two 2 meters. Petitioner Ballatan made a
written demand on respondents Go to remove and
dismantle their improvements on Lot 24. Respondents Go
refused. Hence, Ballatan filed for recovery of possession
of real property. TC decided in favor of petitioners. It
ordered the Go's to vacate the subject portion, demolish
their improvements. CA modified: ordered Go to pay
Ballatan, and respondent Li Ching Yao to pay Go and the
value to be fixed at the time of the taking.
5. Germiniano v CA
The lot in question was originally owned by the mother of
the petitioner. Petitioner sold their unfinished bungalow
to the respondents for P6,000, with a promise to sell the
lot to the latter. The property was later leased to the
respondents for 7 years starting November 1978 for P40
a month as evidenced by their written lease contract. The
respondents built their house and introduced some
improvements in the lot. In 1985 petitioner’s mother
refused receiving monthly rentals. It turned out that the
lot in question was subject to litigation which resulted to
its acquisition by Maria Lee which was sold to Salcedo,
who further sold to Dionisio spouses. The property
Issue: WON the value should be fixed at the time of the
taking
1) Whether or not the respondents were builders in Good
faith?
2) Whether Art 448 or 1678 should be applied?
SHAUSA
All the parties are presumed to have acted in good faith.
Their rights must, therefore, be determined in
accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Civil
Code on property specifically Art. 448. Petitioners, as
owners of Lot 24, may choose to purchase the
improvement made by respondents Go on their land, or
sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying the
improvement is impractical as it may render the Go's
house useless, then petitioners may sell to respondents
Go that portion of Lot 24 on which their improvement
stands.
If the Go's are unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then
they must vacate the land and, until they vacate, they
must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however,
cannot compel respondents Go to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than the portion of their house
constructed thereon. If the value of the land is much
more than the Go's improvement, then respondents Go
must pay reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the
terms of the lease, then they may go to court to fix the
same. In the event that petitioners elect to sell to
respondents Go the subject portion of their lot, the price
must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time
of payment.
1) No, they were not builders in good faith. The
respondents knew that their stay would end after the
lease contract expires. They can’t bank on the promise,
which was not in writing, of the petitioners that the latter
will sell the land to them. According to 1403, an
agreement for the sale of real property or an interest
therein is unenforceable, unless some note or
memorandum thereof be produced. Other than the
alleged promise by petitioner, respondents had no other
evidence to prove their claim.
2) They are mere lessees in good faith; therefore Art 1678
may apply if the lessor chooses to appropriate the

eventually came back to the petitioner when the Dinisio
spouses executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the said
property in favor of the petitioners. As such, the lot was
registered in the latter’s names. (petitioners never lost
possession of the land because Lee and company never
issued a writ of possession against them).
In 1993, petitioners wrote a letter to respondents
demanding them to vacate the premises and when the
latter refused, petitioners filed in court. Respondents
claim that they should be entitled to buy the land
because of the promise of the petitioners to sell them the
land and because they were builders in Good faith. The
courts now are deciding which one to use: Art. 448
regarding builders and land owners in good faith or Art.
1678 regarding lessee in good faith who can be
reimbursed half of the expenses of the improvements if
the LO chooses to appropriate them and that such lessee
have the right to retain in the premises until fully
reimbursed.
6. Sarmiento v Agana
ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latter's mother
had told him the couple could build a RESIDENTIAL
HOUSE whom Ernesto did construct a RESIDENTIAL
HOUSE on the LAND at a cost of P8,000.00 to P10,000.00
who probably assumed that the wife's mother was the
owner of the LAND and that, it would be transferred to
the spouses. Subsequently turned out that the LAND had
been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs. Jose C. Santo, Jr.
who, sold the same to petitioner SARMIENTO.
SARMIENTO filed an Ejectment suit against them. In the
evidentiary hearings before the Municipal Court,
SARMIENTO submitted the deed of sale of the LAND in
her favor, which showed the price to be P15,000.00. On
the other hand, ERNESTO testified that the then cost of
the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE would be from P30,000.00 to
P40,000.00.Sarmiento refuse to pay and give option to
buy the property.
1.Whether or not Ernesto was in good faith.
2.Whether or not Sarmiento could exercise both refusal
to pay the spouses and give option to purchase.
SHAUSA
improvements. But since the petitioners refused to
exercise that option, the private respondents can’t
compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the
house and improvements. Neither can they retain the
premises until reimbursement is made. The private
respondents’ sole right then is to remove the
improvements without causing any more impairment
upon the property leased than is necessary.
1.Yes. We agree that ERNESTO and wife were builders in
good faith in view of the peculiar circumstances under
which they had constructed the RESIDENTIAL HOUSE. As
far as they knew, the LAND was owned by ERNESTO's
mother-in-law who, having stated they could build on the
property, could reasonably be expected to later on give
them the LAND.
In regards to builders in good faith, Article 448 of the
Code provides
ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has
been built, sown or planted in good faith,shall have the
rightto appropriate as his own the works, sowing or
planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in
articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or
planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent.However, the builder or planter
cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is
considerably more than that of the building or trees. In
such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of

7. Manotok realty v Tecson
Doctrine: “Where the improvements have been
destroyed by a fortuitous event without the fault of the
landowner, the basis for the builder’s right to retain the
premises is extinguished; hence there is no other
recourse for him but to vacate the premises and deliver
the same to the landowner.”
Facts: Petitoner Manotok Realty (company for brevity)
filed a complaint against private respondent Madlangawa
for recovery of possession. The court ruled against the
company, declaring Madlangawa as a builder or
possessor in good faith and ordering the company to
WON the destruction of improvement of a builder in
good faith extinguishes his right to retain the premises
until reimbursed.
SHAUSA
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon
the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
2.No. The owner of the building erected in good faith on
a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value of his
building, under article 453 (now Article 546). The owner,
of the land. upon, the other hand, has the option, under
article 361 (now Article 448), either to pay for the
building or to sell his land to the owner of the building.
But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to
pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the
owner of the building to remove it from the land where it
is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when,
after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails
to pay for the same.
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad
compelling defendants-petitioners to remove their
buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-
respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay
for such buildings nor to sell the land, is null and void, for
it amends substantially the judgment sought to be
executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361
(now Article 448) and 453 (now Article 546) of the Civil
Code. (Ignacio vs. Hilario, 76 Phil. 605, 608 [1946]).
Yes. Since the improvements have been gutted by fire,
and therefore, the basis for private respondent's right to
retain the premises has already been extinguished
without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other
recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the
premises and deliver the same to herein petitioner
 SHAUSA

recognize the right of Madlangawa to remain in

company’s lot until after he shall have been reimbursed
by the company. Decision became final and executory.

The petitioner company then filed a motion for the

approval of the company’s exercise of option and for
satisfaction of judgment, praying that the court issue an
order: a) approving the exercise of the company’s option
to appropriate the improvements introduced by
Madlangawa on the property; b) thereafter, Madlangawa
be ordered to deliver possession of the property in
question to the company. Public respondent Judge
Tecson, denied it as well as its motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition for mandamus.

The petitioner company argues that since the judgment

of the trial court has already become final, it is entitled to
the execution of the same and that moreover, since the
house of the private respondent was gutted by fire, the
execution of the decision would now involve the delivery
of possession of the disputed area by the private
respondent to the petitioner.
YES
8. Technogas v CA
WON Technogas is a builder in good faith HELD:
DOCTRINE: Possession acquired in good faith continues to Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and
be enjoyed in the same character in which it was since no proof exists to show that the encroachment over
acquired, until the contrary is proved. Good faith consists a narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondent’s
in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on land was done in bad faith by the builder of the
is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to
The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the have built them in good faith. It is presumed that
title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character
evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the in which it was acquired, until the contrary is proved.
true owner.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the
FACTS: land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any
Technogas Philippines Manufacturing Corp is the defect or flaw in his title. Hence, such good faith, by law,
registered owner of Lot 4531-A of Lot 4531 with all passed on to Pariz’s successor, petitioner in this case.
buildings, walls, and improvements therein, which they The good faith ceases from the moment defects in the
bought from Pariz Industries Inc. The lot that it adjoined, title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous
Lot 4531-B, is owned and registered under the name of evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the
Eduardo Uy. It was later found out that a portion of the true owner.
walled lot encroached on the land owned by Uy.

Technogas offered to by the encroachment but Uy
refused.
They entered into a private agreement to demolish the
wall on the encroached land. Consequently, Uy filed a
complaint for encroachment before the office of the
Municipal Engineer and the Provincial Fiscal. However,
the complaint of did not prosper. This prompted Uy to dig
a canal along the wall, causing it to collapse. Due to the
damage, petitioner filed a complaint against Uy for
malicious mischief.
The RTC ruled in favor of Technogas and ordered Uy to
sell the encroached land and pay for damages to the wall.
The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and ordered
Technogas to pay rent for the encroachment.
9. Lanzar v DOL
DOCTRINE: Properties formed by accretion through the
action of the sea belong to the public domain unless the
government decrees otherwise.
FACTS:
● Petitioner Lanzar filed an application for the
registration of a property in Molo, Iloilo City.
● The Director of Lands filed an opposition to such
W/N the title to property formed by action of the sea as
an accretion may be registered to an applicant on the
basis of adverse possession for over 30 years
SHAUSA
Consequently, the builder, if sued by the aggrieved
landowner for recovery of possession, could have invoked
the provisions of Art. 448 of the Civil Code. The benefit to
the builder under this article is that, instead of being
outrightly ejected from the land, he can compel the
landowner to make a choice between the two options:
(1) to appropriate the building by paying the indemnity
required by law, or (2) sell the land to the builder. The
landowner cannot refuse to exercise either option and
compel instead the owner of the building to remove it
from the land.
In view of the good faith of both petitioner and private
respondent, their rights and obligations are to be
governed by Art. 448. Hence, his options are limited to:
(1) appropriating the encroaching portion of petitioner’s
building after payment of proper indemnity, or (2)
obliging the latter to buy the lot occupied by the
structure. He cannot exercise a remedy of his own liking.
Petitioner, however, must also pay the rent for the
property occupied by its building only up to the date
private respondent serves notice of its option upon
petitioner and the trial court; that is, if such option is for
private respondent to appropriate the encroaching
structure. In such event, petitioner would have a right of
retention which negates the obligation to pay rent. The
rent should however continue if the option chosen is
compulsory sale, but only up to the actual transfer of
ownership.
The land is of public domain.
Article 4 of the Law of Waters provides that:
“Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvium
deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the
public domain. When they are no longer washed by the
waters of the sea, and are not necessary for the purposes
of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government

application on the following grounds:
o the said property is foreshore land
o the City of Iloilo needs the same property as a
road right of way for Molo Blvd.
o the petitioner had not possessed the property in
such manner as to grant him ownership
● The CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the
ground of valid prescription.
● The CA reversed, ruling in favor of the
respondent on the ground that the property was formed
by accretion from the sea making it public domain.
10. Santos v Bernabe
DOCTRINE: Article 381 of the Civil Code states: “If, by the
will of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar
nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if
in the latter case the things cannot be separated without
injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture
proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to
the value of the things mixed or commingled.”
FACTS:
Plaintiff Urbano Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos
of palay and appellant Pablo Tiongson deposited 1,026
cavans and 9 kilos of the same grain in defendant Jose C.
Bernabe's warehouse. It does not appear that the sacks
of palay deposited in Jose C. Bernabe's warehouse bore
any marks or signs nor were they separated one from the
other.
Pablo Tiongson filed with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan a complaint against Jose C. Bernabe, to recover
the cavans and kilos palay he deposited in the
defendant's warehouse. At the same time, the application
of Pablo Tiongson for a writ of attachment was granted,
and the attachable property of Jose C. Bernabe, including
924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos of palay found by the sheriff
in his warehouse, were attached, sold at public auction,
and the proceeds thereof delivered to said defendant
Pablo Tiongson, who obtained judgment in said case.
Whether or not plaintiff acquired right over the mixture
of cavans and kilos of palay. --
SHAUSA
shall declare them to be the property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment
thereof.”
In sum, properties formed by accretion through the
action of the sea belong to the public domain unless the
government decree otherwise. As applied to the case on
hand, it is undisputed that the property was formed by
accretion through the action of the sea and that there
was no such declaration by the government that the said
property is no longer part of public domain. As such, the
petitioner could not have acquired the property by mere
adverse possession for the requisite number of years.
YES.
The sheriff having found only 924 cavans and 31 1/2 kilos
of palay in said warehouse at the time of the attachment
thereof and there being no means of separating form said
924 cavans and 31 1/2 of palay belonging to Urbano
Santos and those belonging to Pablo Tiongson, the
following rule prescribed in article 381 of the Civil Code
for cases of this nature, is applicable:
Art. 381. If, by the will of their owners, two things of
identical or dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture
occurs accidentally, if in the latter case the things cannot
be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a
right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging
to him, according to the value of the things mixed or
commingled.
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been
determined, we will take the proportion only of the 924
cavans of palay which were attached and sold, thereby
giving Urbano Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49
thereof, and Pablo Tiongson, who deposited 1,026
cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of P3 per
cavan.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby
modified, and Pablo Tiongson is hereby ordered to pay
 SHAUSA

Plaintiff, Urbano Santos, intervened in the attachment of the plaintiff Urbano Santos the value of 398.49 cavans of
the palay, but upon Pablo Tiongson's filing the proper palay at at the rate of P3 a cavan, without special
bond, the sheriff proceeded with the attachment, giving pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
rise to the present complaint.