Dizon- Rivera v Dizon
Juico, the SC held that "the intentions and wishes of the testator,
FACTS: In 1961, Agripina Valdez (widow) died and was survived by seven
compulsory heirs: 6 legitimate children and 1 legitimate granddaughter. Marina is
the appellee while the others were the appellants
Valdez left a w ill executed in February 1960 and written in Pampango. The
beneficiaries were the 7 compulsory heirs and six grandchildren
In her will, Valdez distributed and disposed of her properties (assessed at P1.8
million) which included real and personal properties and shares of stocks at
Pampanga Sugar Central Devt Co
During the probate proceedings, Marina (appellee) was name the executor of the
deceased’s estate
In her will, Valdez commanded that her property be divided in accordance with
her testamentary disposition where she devised and bequeathed specific real
properties comprising almost her entire estate among her heirs. Based on the
partition, Marina and Tomas were to receive more than the other heirs
Subsequently, Marina filed her project of partition adjudicating the estate as
follows:
the legitime computed for each compulsory heir was P129,254.96, which was
comprised of cash and/or properties specifically given to them based on the will
Marina and Tomas were adjudicated the properties that they received in the will
less the cash/properties to complete their respective legitime
The other heirs opposed the partition and proposed a counter-partition on the
estate where Marina and Tomas were to receive considerably less
The lower court approved the executor’s project of partition citing that Art 906 and
907 NCC specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the
same shall be completed. The court cited that if the proposition of the oppositors
was upheld, it will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy which is a
violation of Art 791 NCC
ISSUE: WON the last will of the deceased is to be considered controlling in this
case
HELD: Yes. Art 788 and 791 NCC provide that "If a testamentary disposition
admits of different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by which
the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred" and "The words of a will are
to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather
than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes
of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." In
Villanueva v.
when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and
all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise."
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the
matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court
of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only
law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by
his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested
parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Thus,
the oppositors’ proposition for partition cannot be given effect.
ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature
of a partition. In her will, the decedent noted that after commanding that upon her
death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness and funeral
and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the administration of her
property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my
wish and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the
dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real
property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven
compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the
same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated and authorized in
the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a person make a
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be
respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executor’s project of partition as the
oppositors were adjudicated the properties respectively distributed and assigned
to them by the decedent in her will and the differential to complete their legitimes
were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who were
obviously favored by the decedent in her will.
Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the
executrix-appellee's project of partition as approved by the lower court rather than
the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they
would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to
one-half and limit the same, which they would consider as mere devises and
legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the
other half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs.
Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to a distribution by intestacy and
pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.
EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him", from the death of her
ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be
deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law
DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific
properties to specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appears
from the whole context of the will and the dispositions by the testatrix of her whole
estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the
beginning of this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate
through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her testamentary
dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as
mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on account of the
respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth
paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the
third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that in case any of
those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his
forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the
properties I bequeath to said deceased."
COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution
and partition of the entire estate was made by the testatrix, without her having
made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to
determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will
which would call for the application of Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on
collation.
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their
right was merely to demand completion of their legitime under Article 906 of the
Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition,
and they can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the
estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the testatrix principally to the executrix-
appellee.
OTHERS:
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every
expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the
expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition submitted by the
contending parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to the
testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus, where the testatrix
enumerated the specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir and the
testatrix repeatedly used the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a
partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as an attempt on her
part to give such properties as devises to the designated beneficiaries.
Accordingly, the specific properties assigned to each compulsory heir were
deemed to be in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a distribution in
the nature of devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision
of Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is that part of the testator's property which
he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who are,
therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative
prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the will under consideration, the testatrix
disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each
property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that portion of the
estate called "legitime." It is thus imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article
1080 (which is the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.
VDA. DE VILLANUEVA vs. JUICO
FACTS:
Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising
and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Faustina ½ of all his real and
personal properties giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto.
Petitioner filed an action against the administrator contending that upon the
widow’s death, she became vested with the ownership of the properties
bequeathed under clause 7 pursuant to its 8th clause of the will.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death
of Dona Faustina.
HELD:
The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his
wife Doňa Fausta because in his will he provided that Doňa Fausta shall forfeit
the properties if she fails to bear a child and because she died without having
begotten any children with the deceased then it means that Doňa Fausta never
acquired ownership over the property. Upon her death, because she never
acquired ownership over the property, the said properties are not included in
her estate. Those properties actually belong to Villaflor. That was the intention
of the testator. Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to Doňa
Fausta then he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership should
belong to Doňa Fausta without mentioning any condition.
Maria Gervacio Blas v. Rosalina Santos
G.R. No. L-14070 March 29, 1961
FACTS:
Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before
1898. They had three children, only one of whom, Eulalio, left children, namely,
Maria Gervacio Blas, one of the plaintiffs, Marta Gervacio Blas, one of
the defendants, and LazaroGervacio Blas. Lazaro died in 1950, and is survived
by three legitimate children who are plaintiffs herein, namely, Manuel
Gervacio Blas, Leoncio Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio Blas. Marta Cruz
died in 1898, and the following year, Simeon Blascontracted a second marriage
with Maxima Santos. At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation of the
properties required by Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was made. Three of the
properties left are fishponds located in Obando, Bulacan. Maxima Santos does
not appear to have apported properties to her marriage with Simeon Blas.
On December 26, 1936, only over a week before his death on January 9, 1937,
Simeon Blas executed a last will and testament. In the said testament
Simeon Blas gave to Maxima Santos de Blas one half of all her properties.
MAXIMA SANTOS DE BLAS on the other hand made a document giving one
half of all her inheritance to the children of maximo in the first marriage, labelled
as exhibit “A”. The court below held that said Exhibit “A” has not created any
right in favor of plaintiffs which can serve as basis for the complaint; that neither
can it be considered as a valid and enforceable contract for lack of
consideration and because it deals with future inheritance. The court also
declared that Exhibit “A” is not a will because it does not comply with the
requisites for the execution of a will; nor could it be considered as a donation,
etc. Both the court below in its decision and the appellees in their brief, argue
that the heirs of Simeon Blas and his wife Marta Cruz can no longer make any
claim for the unliquidated conjugal properties acquired during said first
marriage, because the same were already included in the mass of properties
constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and in the adjudications
made by virtue of his will, and that the action to recover the same has
prescribed.
ISSUE:
Is exhibit “A” a contract involving future inheritance, hence should be declared
void?
RULING:
No. Exhibit “A” is not a contract on future inheritance. it is an obligation or
promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in
the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated
or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband.
The conjugalproperties were in existence at the time of
the execution of Exhibit “A” on December 26, 1936. As a matter of fact, Maxima
Santos included these properties in her inventory of her husband’s estate of
June 2, 1937. The promise does not refer to any properties that the maker
would inherit upon the death of her husband, because it is her share in
the conjugal assets. That the kind of agreement or promise contained
in Exhibit “A” is not void under Article 1271 of the old Civil Code, has been
decided by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of October 8, 19154,
thus: It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of
a contract under Article 1271 of the Civil Code is “future inheritance.” To us
future inheritance is any property or right not in existence or capable of
determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the
future acquire by succession. The properties subject of the contract Exhibit “A”
are well defined properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which
Simeon Blas declares in his statement as belonging to his wife as her share in
the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife’s actual share in
the conjugal properties may not be considered as future inheritance because
they were actually in existence at the time Exhibit “A” was executed.
Manuel Reyes v. Court of Appeals and Julio Vivares
G.R. No. 12099; October 30, 1997
Facts:
On January 3, 1992, Torcuato Reyes executed his last will and testament. He
bequeathed all his prop to his wife Asuncion (Oning) and his brother Jose. The
will consisted of two pages and was signed by Torcuato Reyes in the presence
of three witnesses: Antonio Veloso, Gloria Borromeo, and Soledad Gaputan.
Private respondent Julio A. Vivares was designated the executor and in his
default or incapacity, his son Roch Alan S. Vivares. PR filed a petition for
probate of the will. The recognized natural children of Torcuato with Estebana
Galolo and Celsa Agape filed an opposition. The court declared that the will
was exec according w/ the forma prescribed by law. However, it ruled that
Asuncion was never married to the deceased (Hence, dispo made in will is
invalid). Julio Vivares filed an appeals before the CA with the allegation that the
oppositos failed to present ay comp. evidence taht Asuncion was legally
married to another person. The CA affirmed the trial court's decision but with
the modification that dispo in favor of Oning was valid.
Ruling:
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon
the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated. Thus, the court merely
inquires on its due execution, whether or not it complies with the formalities
prescribed by law, and the testamentary capacity of the testator. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficacy of the will's
provisions. The intrinsic validity is not considered since the consideration
thereof usually comes only after the will has been proved and allowed. There
are, however, notable circumstances wherein the intrinsic validity was first
determined as when the defect of the will is apparent on its face and the probate
of the will may become a useless ceremony if it is intrinsically invalid. The
intrinsic validity of a will may be passed upon because "practical
considerations" demanded it as when there is preterition of heirs or the
testamentary provisions are of doubtful legality. Parenthetically, the rule on
probate is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the will. The lower court was not asked to rule
upon the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will. As a result, the
declaration of the testator that Asuncion "Oning" Reyes was his wife did not
have to be scrutinized during the probate proceedings. The propriety of the
institution of Oning Reyes as one of the devisees/legatees already involved
inquiry on the will's intrinsic validity and which need not be inquired upon by the
probate court.
Nepomuceno v. CA
139 SCRA 206
FACTS:
Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before
he died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will
that he was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two
legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the
testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were married despite the subsisting first
marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner. On
August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975,
Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper
influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the
Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her
living in concubinage with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator
admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA.
On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court
declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is
null and void.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will
and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.
HELD:
No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the
Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will
and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule
is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule,
however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and
pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to
be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the
court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1)
Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at
the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article
739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage
when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate
the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a
person with whom he had been living in concubinage.
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-7188
August 9, 1954
Facts: Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a document purporting to be
the last will and testament of Father Sancho Abadia, which was executed on
September 6, 1923, filed a petition for its probate. Some cousins and nephews
of the deceased, who would inherit his estate if he left no will, filed opposition.
The trial court ruled in favor of Enriquez, stating that even if the said document
is a holographic will, one which is not permitted by law at the time it was
executed and at the time of the testator’s death, such form of a will is already
allowed at the time of the hearing of the case since the new Civil Code is
already enforced, and that to carry out the intention of the testator which
according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect
in form. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the reckoning period in deciding the validity of the holographic
will of Rev. Sanchio, the time of the hearing of the case shall be considered
and not the time of its execution
Held: No. The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time
of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for
probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was execute, as supported by Art. 795 of the new Civil Code. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after
the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his
estate among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at
the time the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes
a completed act.
When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the
legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should
be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit
by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal requirements
or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should be allowed
to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested rights in
the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the Legislature
cannot validate void wills. Hence, the trial court’s decision was reversed.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK and
TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM
PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL
G.R. No. L-23678
June 6, 1967
Facts: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the state of Texas of the United States. In
his first wife whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his second
wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children. Before he died, he
made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing
his Philippine Properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given
anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have
been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be entitled if Philippine
law were to apply.
Issue: Whether the national law of the deceased should determine the
sucessional rights of the illegitimate children
Held: Yes
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national
law of the decedent, inintestate or testamentary successions, with regard to
four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) theamount of successional rights;
(e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacityto
succeed
The parties admit that the decedent was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A.,
and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law,the
Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR and LUCY CHRISTENSEN vs. HELEN CHRISTENSEN
GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
Facts: This is an appeal from a decision of the CFI of Davao approving among
others, the final account of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse
Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen, respondent
herein, as her legacy, and declaring Maria entitled to the residue of the
property.
Helen filed an opposition alleging that it deprives her of her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward and that the distribution
should be governed by Philippine Law.
The lower court ruled that the deceased was a US citizen (State of California)
at the time of his death. Thus, his successional rights and the intrinsic validity
of the will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with the
testator’s right to dispose his property as he desires.
Issue: Whether or not the successional rights should be governed by the law
of California.
Held: No. There is no question that Edward was a US citizen and was
domiciled in the Philippines at the time of his death. The law that governs the
validity of his testamentary disposition is his national law as provided in Art. 16
of the Civil Code. The term “national law” in Art. 16 does not mean any general
American law but the private law of the State of California. Art 946 of the Civil
Code of California provides that the place where the personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the
laws of his domicile.
The Conflict of Law rule in California referred back (renvoi) the case in the
Philippines. The Philippine Court must apply its own law for its determination.
Hence, Helen is a legally acknowledged forced heir as provided in Arts. 887 (4)
and 849 of the Civil Code of the Philipines.
MICIANO vs. BRIMO
50 PHIL 867
FACTS:
A will of an American testator provided that his estate should be disposed of in
accordance with the Philippine law. The testator further provided that whoever
would oppose his wishes that his estate should be distributed in accordance
with Philippine laws would forfeit their inheritance
ISSUE:
Will there be forfeiture?
HELD:
Even if the testator’s wishes must be given paramount importance, if the wishes
of the testator contravene a specific provision of law, then that provision in a
will should not be given effect. A person’s will is merely an instrument which is
PERMITTED, so his right is not absolute. It should be subject to the provisions
of the Philippine laws.
The estate of a decedent shall be distributed in accordance with his
national law. He cannot provide otherwise.
The SC held that those who opposed would not forfeit their inheritance
because that provision is not legal.
LORENZO LLORENTE, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent
G.R. NO. 124371. November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as “Paula”) were
married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines
Sur. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United
States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua,
Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United
States District Court, Southern District of New York. Paula gave birth to a
boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as “Crisologo Llorente,”
with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the
father’s name was left blank.
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for
the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and
actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior
Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual
allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. On December 4, 1952, the
divorce decree became final. In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the
Philippines. Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia
had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town
as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.
Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary
Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children.
Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for
the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo
moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.
Paula filed with the same court a petition*22+ for letters of administration over
Lorenzo’s estate in her favor.
RTC: considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted
to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore
the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila
is likewise void. CA Affirmed
ISSUE:
Who are entitled to inherit?
RULING:
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.”
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must
be reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from
his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of
the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. “Art.
17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. Will is
valid. SC reversed the decision.
Dorotheo v. CA
GR No. 108581, December 8, 1999
FACTS:
Aniceta Reyes died in 1969 without her estate being settled. Thereafter, her
husband Alejandro also died. In 1977, Lourdes Dorotheo filed a special
proceeding for the probate of Alejandro’s last will and testament. The children
of spouses filed their opposition. The RTC ruled that Lourdes being not the wife
of Alejandro the will is intrinsically void; the oppositors are the only heir entitled
to the estate. Lourdes filed a Motion for Consideration arguing that she is
entitled to some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his
death although they were not legally married to each other. This was denied by
the trial court. The CA dismissed her appeal for her failure to wile the same
within the extended period.
ISSUE:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared intrinsically void
in an order that has become final and executor still be given effect?
RULING:
No. A final and executor decision or order can no longer be disturbed or
reopened no matter how erroneous it may be.
The Supreme Court ruled that the will of Alejandro was extrinsically valid but
the intrinsic provisions thereof are void. Alejandro gave all the property to the
concubine. Such is invalid because one cannot dispose what he does not own.
In this case, the whole property is the conjugal property of Alejandro and
Aniceta. Such has become final and executor. The only instance where a party
interested in probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when
he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake
or inadvertence not imputable to negligence with circumstances do not concur
herein.
JULIANA BAGTAS v. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL.G.R. No. L-6801, March 14, 1912,
TRENT, J.
Perfect soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity. Neither
age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will
affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains.
Facts: The last will and testament executed by Pioquinto Paguio who died a
year and five months from the execution, was propounded by by the
executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of Paguio. Buphagid’s son and several
grandchildren by a former marriage opposed the probate asserting that
Paguio was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and
was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will. According to
them, Paguio suffered from a paralysis of the left side of his body. This resulted
to the impairment of his hearing, lost of the power of speech and uncontrolled
saliva discharge. Despite the paralysis, Paguio retained the use of his right
hand and was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs Paguio was
able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to the other members of his family.
Issue: Whether or not paralysis would establish mental incapacity that
would disqualify the testator from executing a valid will.
Ruling: No. Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility
of body will affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence
remains. The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to
execute a valid will. Perfect soundness of mind is not essential to
testamentary capacity. Even the failure of memory is not sufficient to
create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his immediate
family or property because if such were the legal standard, few indeed
would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements.
The presumption of law is in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and
the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of
testamentary capacity. On the case at hand, it does not appear that
Paguio’s conduct was irrational in any particular and he seems to have
comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in which he was
engaged. Therefore, mental incapacity which renders the will invalid, cannot be
established
BALTAZAR vs. LAXA | G.R. No. 174489 | April 11, 2012 | Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and
testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the
house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which,
Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at
the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages
1, 2 and 4 thereof.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their
children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated
as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as
his own mother.
Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA.
There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996.
In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.
More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo
filed a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will
of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.
On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to
Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s
Will belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence,
Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the
petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being
“mangulyan” or forgetful making her unfit for executing a will and that the
execution of the will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and
influence.
Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in
Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such,
he being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.
RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when
Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason
or strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed
the decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went
up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.

HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful
compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix,
Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and
evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact,
even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be
authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the
same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with
the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily
make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of
the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator
be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly
unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall
be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the
character of the testamentary act.”