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RobinsonA. Grover
125
marketgivespeoplewithcapitalenormousopportunities to makemoney
and/oravoid loss. However,people whoneed to borrowcapitalare now
competingwiththe whole rest of the globe and are oftensubject to
disastrouscapital flight.Moreover,the easy transferof fundsacross
internationalbordersmakes it easy forterrorists to move moneyand
themselvesaroundthe globe. This makesit easier forthemto hide in
countries,to acquireweaponsand explosives,and to meetand
different
plot unobserved.
Thereare manymoreexamplesof thisexplosivegrowth,buttrans-
port,communicationsand finance will do to call attentionto the
problems.The mostobvious of these problemsis the vast increasein
thenumberof people and institutions thatcan effectus forgood or ill.
If myseventeenth centuryEnglishfarmers lived in a littleworldwitha
shortevent-horizon, we live in a huge worldthatincludesmostof the
populationof theearthand has a verylongevent-horizon. And if social
controlshould break down in some serious way, the global state of
naturewould be huge. We would not have a small, nasty,backward
stateofnaturein and aroundMalmesbury. We wouldhavea large,nasty,
technologicalstateof natureeverywhere.
Moreover,theinteractive natureof theworld-wideweb raises a sec-
ond problem.The web greatlyincreases our ability to formloose
interest-basedgroups.The individualsin thesegroupsusuallyreceive
both practicaland psychologicalsupportfromothermembersof the
group.Unfortunately, some of thesegroupshave malevolentpurposes.
Hobbes arguedthatin the state of natureeven the strongestindi-
vidualshave reasonto fearothers:
For as to the strength enoughto kill
of body,the weakesthas strength
the strongest,eitherby secret machinationor by confederacywith
othersthatare in the same dangeras himself(Leviathan,chap. 13).
V. On Beyond Hobbes
If we take the dual threatsof anarchyand autocracyseriously,we
mustfindsome middlegroundthatwill give us a powerfulbutlimited
sovereignty. We need a politicalsystemin whichthe sovereignwill be
effectiveand non-threatening. Much of westernpoliticaltheorysince
Hobbes has been an attemptto articulatejust such a system.A fulldis-
cussionof theattempts to do thiswouldbe a multi-volume summary of
liberalpoliticalphilosophyfromtheseventeenth centuryto thepresent.
Therehave been threemainstrandsin thisremedialdiscourse.The
firstand best knownis to limitthe sovereignby invokinga natural
rightwhich all individualswill accept and which will serve as the
basis forpoliticalcohesion.Anotheris to turnto non-politicalforces,
such as markets,to induce voluntary,self-interested cooperation.A
thirdis to turnto moralvirtuessuch as trustor benevolenceor toler-
ance as thebasis of civil cooperation.All threehave obvious strengths
and weaknesses.
The usual naturalrightstactichas been to imaginea tacitcontractin
whichall inhabitants of an area turnovertheirrightsto some sovereign
in exchangeforsecurityand protection.This is exactlywhatHobbes
himselfdoes, as does Locke, as do manyothers.However,the natural
righttheoristqualifiesthisargument by claimingthatpriorto thecon-
tractthereexistcertainnaturalrights, suchas therightto lifeorproperty,
thatmaynotbe givenup underany circumstances.In particular,they
can notbe alienatedby contract.Therefore,contractsthatinvolvethe
sovereign'sunrestricted takingof a naturalright,such as life or prop-
erty,are invalidor are notcontracts.Hobbes himselfuses thistacticto
optimisticreadingsofiteratedprisoner'sdilemmascenariosleads to the
conclusionthatno strategy winsin all circumstances.
The thirdstrategyto avoid Hobbes's anarchyor autocracyanalysis
is to turnto virtueslike benevolenceor trust.The moralsense theorists
did preciselythatin the eighteenth century.(Remember:Adam Smith
wrotean ethicstreatise,Moral Sense, beforehe wroteThe Wealthof
Nations.)In thenineteenth centuryMill's On Libertypreachestheneed
forrestraintand the tolerationof different opinions.The interesting
point is thathe did not argue forlaws againstthetyranny of themajor-
ity,but ratherforpersonalrestraint by the individualmembersof the
majority.He did not followthe model of the US Constitution, which
seeks to avoid the majority'styranny provisionsfor
by constitutional
theseparationof powersand forchecksand balances. Instead,he calls
for individualsto cultivatethe virtueof tolerance.In contemporary
politicalthoughtwe have FrancisFukuyamawritingTrust,and in gen-
eral, a series of politicalcommentators arguingthatin orderto have a
democraticsociety,especiallyraciallyor culturallydiversedemocratic
polity,we mustfirsthave numerousmechanisms,whichtheyoftencall
"social capital", thatwill producea broad basis of trust.The events
between 1990 and 2000 in Serbia and Bosnia show whatcan happen
whenthereis no trustand no tolerance.These same Balkaneventsshow
us how difficultit is to avoid anarchyor autocracyby appeal to indi-
vidual virtuesalone.
Therefore, it seemsthattheoriginaldilemmaremains.Ournewtech-
nologyis forcingus towarda new versionof Hobbes's stateof nature.
Even if we live in a hightechnologyworld,it is stilla dangerousthing
to be in a stateof nature,because it pushesus towardanarchyor toward
some sortof absoluteautocracy.We can notlive withanarchy.We can
notlive withautocracy.Noneofthestrategies thatseekto avoidthispair
of dismalalternatives can guaranteeeffectiveness overthelongrun.
NOTES