The

Trump Administration’s
Transactional Approach to Security
in the Indo-Pacific Region

Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer

Presentation to
International Political Science Association
25th World Congress of Political Science
Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre
Brisbane, Queensland
July 21-25, 2018
 Overview
1.  Trump’s World View
2.  Trump’s Transactional Foreign Policy
3.  Trump Administration and Southeast
Asia
4.  U.S. National Security Sttrategy and
National Defence Strategy
5.  Conclusion
 1. Donald Trump’s World View
•  Consistently held views since 1987
–  Open Letter to the American People
•  The world take advantage of the stupidity of
America’s Leaders
•  Allies take advantage of the USA
–  Allies should compensate the United States
•  America is a loser
–  Peace through strength
 Donald Trump’s World View
•  Rejection of liberal international order
–  America First!
•  China is a currency manipulator
•  Trade balance is the key - leverage
•  Only Trump can lead
–  “I alone can fix it” – Republican National
Convention, 2016
–  Make America Great Again
 2. Trump’s
Transactional Foreign Policy
•  Decision-making style
–  Chief executive officer, deal maker, deference,
case-by-case basis
•  Three core elements (Matthew Fay):
–  Obsession with power
–  Every policy issue is a transaction with winners
and losers
–  America is always on losing end - weak and foolish
 Trump’s
Transactional Foreign Policy
•  Five key elements (Robert Zoelick):
–  Transactional not institutional
–  Domestic interests will dominate foreign policy
–  Trade prime – protectionist
–  Ambivalent about alliances
–  America is bigger than the president
•  Quid pro quo/zero-sum
 3. Trump Administration
and Southeast Asia
•  Withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership
–  Deal with countries on a one on one basis
•  Trump invites five Southeast Asian heads of
government to The White House
–  President Duterte of the Philippines declines
•  30th US-ASEAN Dialogue (3 May 2017)
•  US-ASEAN Stategic Partnership meeting of
Foreign Ministers (4 May)
 Trump Hosts Visits
by 4 Southeast Asian Prime Ministers
Clockwise
from left:
Vietnam 31
May 2017
Malaysia 13
September
Thailand 2nd
October
Singapore
24th
October
 Shopping Diplomacy
•  Vietnam $8 billion in commercial sales
–  comprehensive partnership
–  Ranks 6th on list of trade surplus with US $32
billion
–  Tariffs of catfish, shrimp, steel and aluminum
•  Malaysia- $10 billion in commercial sales
–  Investment (sovereign wealth and pension fund)
–  US has a trade deficit of $25 billion
 Shopping Diplomacy
•  Thailand $6 billion in commercial sales
–  Military aircraft and missiles
–  Boeing planes, coal
–  investment in shale gas
–  US has a $19 billion trade deficit
•  Singapore
–  US has $9 billion trade surplus
–  largest foreign investor
 President Trump
•  5th ASEAN-US Summit in Manila (13 Nov)
•  Attends APEC CEO Forum in Da Nang
–  Free and open Indo-Pacific Region
–  Bilateral free trade agreements
•  Pays official visit to Vietnam (12 Nov)
•  Attends lunch at East Asia Summit, Manila
–  Leaves early, Secretary Tillerson deputised
 4. U.S. National Security Strategy
•  Indo-Pacific Region (IPR) framework
•  Russia & China designated revisionist powers
–  China a strategic competitor
•  Peace Through Strength
–  Modernization of nuclear arsenal
–  Forward military presence in IPR
•  World Bank funding alternative to BRI
•  Focus on Southeast Asian maritime domain
 U.S. National Defence Strategy
•  Inter-state competition not terrorism now
primary concern
•  China a strategic competitor
–  Military modernization, influence operations,
predatory economics to coerce regional states
•  Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region
•  Alliances and partnerships in a networked
security architecture
 5. Conclusion
•  Major flaw in transactional foreign policy
–  US must have superior hard and soft power and
will power and stamina
–  Otherwise clean slate negotiations gives away US
unique position as hub of global overlapping
alliances, bilateral arrangements, and multilateral
commitments
–  Roberto Menotti
 Trump’s Transactional
Foreign Policy is Bifurcated

John Bolton James Mattis Mike Pompeo

National Security Adviser Secretary of Defense Secretary of State
 Bifurcation of
US National Security Strategy

Trump

Bolton/
Mattis/
Pompeo
 Four Consequences of Trump’s
Transactionalism
1.  Decline in U.S. credibility as a security provider
2.  increased space for China to exercise leadership
in the region
3.  Growing security engagement by Japan,
Australia and India to pick up the strategic slack
to counter China’s rise, and
4.  increased strain on the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations and its centrality in regional
affairs
 The Trump Administration’s
Transactional Approach to Security
in the Indo-Pacific Region

Emeritus Professor Carlyle A. Thayer

Presentation to
International Political Science Association
25th World Congress of Political Science
Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre
Brisbane, Queensland
July 21-25, 2018