1) TANADA V.

TUVERA- DEC 29,1986

TANADA VA TUVERA

Posted by kaye lee on 9:57 AM

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986 [Effectivity and Application of Laws]

FACTS:

Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval.
The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees.
The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential
Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means
complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette.

ISSUE:

Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette.

RULING:

The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.

The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the laws. The clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new Civil Code meant
that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary,
did not have to be made in the official gazette.

2) LARA V. DEL ROSARIO

94 Phil 778 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Publication of Laws

Manuel Lara et al were former taxi drivers of Petronilo Del Rosario, Jr. In September 1950, Del Rosario
sold some of his vehicles which led to Lara et al not being needed anymore. Eventually, their services
were terminated. Because their employer did not give them their one month’s salary in lieu of the
notice required in Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, Lara et al sued Del Rosario.
However, Del Rosario contended that the Code of Commerce was already repealed hence Lara et al
have no legal basis. Del Rosario contends that the New Civil Code took effect in August 1950 or a year
after release for publication.

ISSUE: When did the New Civil Code took effect?

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that Lara et al has no legal basis for their claims since the provision of
the COde of Commerce they are relying on was already repealed by the New Civil Code. Their alleged
dismissal from service without notice took place in September 1950 after the New Civil Code took effect.

The Supreme Court also clarified that, in an obiter dictum, that the new Civil Code of the Philippines
took effect on August 30, 1950. This date is exactly one year after the Official Gazette publishing the
Code was released for circulation, the said release having been made on August 30, 1949.

3) CONSUNJI V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing
work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was
merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock.1

Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages
against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the
widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. RTC rendered a decision in favor
of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision
of the RTC in toto. D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death
benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.

HELD: Yes. The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code.

As a general rule a claimant has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set
by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tort fees or for
higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. But There is an exception
is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he
opted for the first remedy. The choice of the first remedy based on ignorance or a mistake of fact,
nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice.
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent
was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages using the police investigation
report to support her complaint may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the Memorandum
of the Prosecutor’s Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence. This court is
more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about appellant’s negligence only after
she applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall
under the exception

Payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.
In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

4) PEOPLE V. QUE PO LAY

FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and
U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following
the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on
the claim that the said circular had no force or effect because the same was not published in the official
Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said
circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and effect.

HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its
contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

5) DELGADO V. ALONSO

6) CUI V. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

FACTS:

Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College ofLaw
from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded
scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and
took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar,
he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR
until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the
bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of
private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that “the amount in tuition
and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient
students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not
be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided
by Arellano University.

HELD:

The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was
advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students
to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound
policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null
and void.

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal
rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendant’s
counterclaim.

7) FLORESCA V. PHILEX MINING

Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation who, while
working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result
of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Theircomplaint alleges that Philex, in
violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required
precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to
claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. They also filed a separate civil case against Philex for damages.

Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have already claimed benefits
under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philex is correct.

HELD: Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the
WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely,
if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the
WCA.

HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to
ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a remedy.
But, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them
under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this
case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law
sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As
Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

8) PILAPIL V. IBAY SOMERA

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on
January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

9) BILLIS V. BILLIS

10) MICIANO V. BRIMO

Facts:

The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Joseph Brimo, filed a scheme of partition.
However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition.

According to the scheme and its provision, that the deceased requests that all his relatives respect his
wishes, otherwise those who opposed the same shall be cancelled in said disposition in favor of the
oppositor.

The apellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that the deceased was
a Turkish citizen, that his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his nationality.

Issue:WON the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws

WON there shall be cancellation of disposition/s in favor of the appellant-oppositor

Held:

No, although the disposition provides an express provision that it shall be governed by Philippine Laws
and those who opposed the condition of the provisions given shall be cancelled from the disposition, the
fact is that the condition itself is void for being contrary to law. Article 792 of the Civil Code provides:

“Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and
shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise
provide.”

It is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the decedent’s national law, according to Article 10 of
the Civil Code, such national law shall govern his testamentary dispositions.

Therefore, the institution of the legatees are unconditional and are valid, as well as those favorable to
herein appellant-oppositor.
11) REPUBLIC V. BALLOCANAG

FACTS: Danilo Reyes bought the subject land with 162,500 sq.m. at Brgy Banus, Pimanalayan, Oriental
Mindoro from Regina Castillo. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced improvements and planted
Mangoes, Mandarin citrus, and Guyabanos. Also, the title of the land transferred in his name.
Unfortunately, It turned out that the subject land is part of the Timberland of Oriental Mindoro and
therefore, not subject to any disposition or acquisition under any existing law and is not transferable.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of petitioner, filed a complaint for “ Cancellation of
Title and/or Revision” that the issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) is spurious, fictitious, and
irregularly issued on account of the subject title was part of the Timberland of Oriental Mindoro per
Bureau of Forest Department (BFD) Land Classification Map; that the said land are entirely inside the
140 hectares Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty. Augusto D. Marte; that the
subject land cannot be subject of any disposition or acquisition under the law.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that Reyes TCT No. 45238 are null and void and ordered to surrender
the owner’s duplicate copy of the said title and to vacate the premises. Reyes then appealed the RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeal (CA), apparently, Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic should pay Reyes the value of the Improvements he introduced on
the property.

HELD: Yes, Supreme Court resolved to deny Reyes petition for failure to sufficient show that the CA had
committed any reversible error in the questioned the judge. The SC agree with the CA that Reyes was of
the belief that he was the owner of the subject land. He titled the land, planted fruit trees thereon and
invested money from 1970. It is no longer feasible to permit him to remove the trees he planted the
only equitable alternative would be to order the Republic to pay Reyes.

Petition DENIED and DIRECTED the RTC to determines the actual improvements introduced on the
subject land, their current value and the amount of the expenses actually spent by Reyes and DIRECTED
the DENR-BFD to pay private respondent the value of such actual improvements he introduced on the
subject land.

12) HING V. CHOACHUY

Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s) filed a case for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order against the
Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it would
destroy the walls of their building. The court denied the application for lack of evidence. So in order to
get evidences for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two video surveillance cameras
facing the Hing’s property. Their employees even took pictures of the said construction of the fence. The
Hing’s then filed a case against the Choachuy’s for violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the
RTC issued a order granting the application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to remove
the two video surveillance cameras they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of
Appeals and the RTC’s decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the case to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of two video surveillance cameras of Choachuy’s violated the
Hing’s right to privacy.

HELD:

Such act of the Choachuy’s violated the right of privacy of the Hing’s under Article 26(1) prohibiting the
“prying into the privacy of another’s residence.” Although it is a business office and not a residence, the
owner has the right to exclude the public or deny them access.