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SCOTT BASE
ROSS ISLAND, MCMURDO SOUND
ANTARCTICA
Prepared for
Antarctica New Zealand and
Fire and Emergency New Zealand
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CONTENTS
Contents .................................................................................................................................................. 2
Overview ................................................................................................................................................. 3
Fire Ratings – current situation ............................................................................................................... 4
Fire Systems ........................................................................................................................................... 7
Fire fighting equipment ............................................................................................................................ 9
Passive Fire Protection ......................................................................................................................... 10
Incident Room Alarm Silencing ............................................................................................................. 11
Emergency lighting ................................................................................................................................ 12
Inspection procedures ........................................................................................................................... 13
Appendices
F Inspection Schedule
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OVERVIEW
FFP Canterbury has been engaged by Antarctica New Zealand to assist the fire engineering review of
their Antarctic base on Ross Island in McMurdo Sound being undertaken by Fire and Emergency New
Zealand (FENZ). Scott Base is a permanently occupied base housing up to 90 people during peak
periods, and holding a skeleton crew of 10-12 people over the isolation of winter. With the first
buildings constructed from the late 1950s, the base became a series of buildings, which have been
conveniently interconnected by a series of corridors making the use of the base simple to transverse,
without having to be exposed to the weather.
The original base buildings have been added to regularly and the site remains under a constant series
of improvement projects. Although there is an intention to build an entirely new base, there appears to
be no certainty about a potential design, a timeframe to complete this, or the New Zealand
government’s commitment to allocate the necessary funds. As such this report takes into account the
current state of the base as an ongoing operational facility, but notes that the buildings are not likely
to have a lifespan beyond 15 years.
The fire review is aimed at reviewing the multitude of fire designs which have been used over the
years and consider their effectiveness. FFP’s involvement was to document a practical review of the
installed passive fire protection measures and egress routes to allow the FENZ fire engineer to
establish the effectiveness of the current fire resistance ratings, and identify any which may not be
relied on.
In addition to this, FFP was requested to provide a review of the inspection procedures for the
systems with a view to bringing the process closer to that which a commercial building in New
Zealand might be subject to. This would include inspections for the active and passive fire systems,
emergency lighting and egress routes to be undertaken both by base staff, and independently audited
by external qualified personnel.
This report is based on an on-site inspection undertaken throughout the base during late November
2017. A summary of the findings are provided for use by the FENZ fire engineer to allow them to
consider the pathway forward for the protection of the base. Technical notes and field observations
are provided in appendices at the back of the document.
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FIRE RATINGS – CURRENT SITUATION
Each of the buildings have the normal risks which might be associated in any working environment in
the wide range of tasks being undertaken throughout the base – electricity (including generators and
HV supplies), fuel, vehicles, LPG, kitchen processes, and risks associated with people sleeping in the
site.
To avoid fire spread, the various buildings and risk areas have had a 30 minute fire rating included
between the buildings and the adjacent corridor link way and many corridors are also subdivided with
fire rated doors and walls, designed to contain the effects of a fire. In the event egress through the
base is not possible, then external egress points exits in each building allowing occupants to make
their way outside and re-enter the building safely at another point. Egress doors are never locked
from either direction but occupants are not necessarily able to access cold weather clothing before
leaving making internal egress the first option.
The buildings are principally constructed with external fabric of polyisocyanurate (PIR) or expanded
polystyrene (PSP) panels which are manufactured sandwiched between aluminium sheeting. These
panels are simple to use, lightweight and offer extremely good insulation properties, but have a poor
resistance to fire. Within the outer structure, a raised chipboard-type floor allows services to be run
underneath accessed by hatches. The internal fitout is generally from plasterboard on a timber or
steel rondo frame.
Fire rating is typically with the use of a timber wall using 13mm plasterboard (later areas using Gib
Fyreline) on a single layer on each side of the wall. A timber door, generally with Georgian-wire
windows installed is used for access through the fire rating. Most of the doors are certified fire doors
manufactured with a -/30/30 sm rating and include intumescent strips bound either into the leaf or the
frame of the door, and a cold smoke seal. Intumescent strips will expand with heat and seal a door to
its frame to withstand a fire spread.
Doors have automatic closers and in many cases are held in the open position using electro-magnetic
devices which are released on the operation of a smoke detector in the building. Each of the fire
doors has a small opening cut into the base of the door leaf to allow the door to be closed while a fire
hose is run through the door in the event fire fighting is required.
Most fire doors do not form an adequate seal and have clear gaps around the edges and between
leaves which smoke or fire could pass through. Fire and smoke doors have maximum gaps which are
permitted, and most doors on the base exceed these limits. Some doors are also bowed and warped
to the point where they are 10-15mm off the alignment of the frame, reducing their effectiveness
again.
Because of the extremely dry environment in Antarctica, it appears that the natural residual moisture
in the timber has been drawn out of the timber – resulting in the loss of dimensional stability and
causing deformation of the doors due to timber shrinkage. The doors at the top of the stairs to the
HFC link way corridor are less than 2 years old, but have significant gaps around them – but notably
the metal edging is now protruding from the edges of the door, showing that the doors once extended
to the edge of the framing but have now shrunk. It is recommended that any new fire rated doors are
prepared for the ultra-dry environment or adequately sealed to prevent this phenomenon occurring.
Where services pass through walls, there appears to have been some use of fire pillows – typically
the Firepro B235 or the Fyreguard Fyre-pillow – to seal the opening and prevent fire spread. Fire
pillows are a soft and malleable container with an intumescent product which will expand to seal an
opening in a fire, but are generally not considered to be suitable as a permanent solution in fire rated
walls as they are often poorly installed and even more often left incomplete. Fire pillows also do not
provide a smoke seal unless they are tightly packed.
In some cases in Scott Base, entire underfloor fire walls are constructed by nothing other than
stacked pillows across an underfloor space of 1.5 – 2.0m2 unsupported by any wall or framing. Firepro
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identify in their one-page data sheet that their B235 pillow is limited in testing to 0.3m 2 and the
Fyreguard product no longer appears to be manufactured, but would undoubtedly not have been
tested to an area larger than the Firepro product.
As such a fire will cause the fire pillows to start an expansion, but like an unsupported spring in which
tension is placed, it is likely to cause the stack of pillows to bow outwards and fall, causing the entire
fire rating to fail and allowing the fire to spread through the wall.
In addition to this, poor installation practice has found numerous instances of fire pillows being placed
on a cable tray adjacent to an opening or placed next to a penetration. This will have no effect in
sealing the fire wall during combustion as the expanding intumescent product will direct itself into
open space rather than into the wall.
Fire walls have been damaged in numerous areas where plasterboard linings have been breached
and either left open or repaired with inferior products such as chipboard or plywood.
The construction and trade services industries are generally lacking in competency in the
identification, strategy and repair methodologies for the repair of penetrations in fire rated wall
systems, and these are now often left to specialist trades to complete the repairs and openings rather
than letting each trade undertake their own repairs. It would be our recommendation that a single
strategy and methodology is adopted for the sealing of fire rated walls, and all trade staff heading to
Scott Base are trained in the use of the material prior to departure. Recommendations for products
and methodologies are detailed later in this document.
The design requirement for 30-minute fire walls appears to be considering a simple approach as if the
building was in a normal New Zealand environment, modelling on egress to a safe place as written
within the New Zealand Building Code Acceptable Solutions – being “a place outside of and within the
vicinity of a single building unit from which people may safely disperse after escaping the effects of a
fire. It may be a place such as a street, open space, public space or an adjacent building unit.”
Generally this assumes that egress, if it cannot be made inside, will then default to an external route
as outside is safer than inside in a fire. This is not always possible in weather conditions without
risking the health of the evacuee, so it would be recommended that the internal path is better
protected to ensure it is more likely to remain available in a fire. In a new base, two separate internal
paths would be recommended.
The envelopment of the site in PSP and PIR panels creates a risk where a fire can spread within the
envelope and circumvent a fire rated wall. Even where a fire wall exists, the conductivity of the metal
sheeting can cause the fire to spread past the wall, and the combusting or even just melting material
can open the space within the panelling to allow the heat from the fire to bypass the passive fire
protection.
Early PSP panels were heavily used in food processing and cold storage as they were a clean
material and allowed the temperature to be maintained easily. Unfortunately the nature of expanded
plastics - being a mix of aerated fuel - leaves them very vulnerable to fire and once combustion
occurs within the core of the panel, the fire is almost impossible to attack resulting in the loss of the
entire building as the fire creeps invisibly through the core of the building material. This has been the
cause of a number of total loss fires.
Structures constructed from between 10 and 15 years ago incorporate a fire retardant within the PSP
panel, but this will hold combustion until around 400oC, at which point the combustion will self-sustain
and involve the material.
A second issue with expanded foam materials such as PSP and PIR is the toxicity of the gasses
emitted during the combustion process. Primary chemicals produced include large amounts of carbon
monoxide (CO) and hydrogen cyanide (HCN) both of which are toxic in low levels. A fire in a structure
which includes expanded foams will require the use of breathing apparatus even to those outside the
structure to avoid serious health effects.
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A 2011 study of fire toxicity of insulating materials at the University of Central Lancashire's Centre for
Fire and Hazard Science studied PIR and other commonly used materials under more realistic and
wide-ranging conditions representative of a wider range of fire hazard, observing that most fire deaths
resulted from toxic product inhalation. The study evaluated the degree to which toxic products were
released, looking at toxicity, time-release profiles, and lethality of doses released, in a range of
flaming, non-flaming, and poorly ventilated fires, and concluded that PIR generally released a
considerably higher level of toxic products than the other insulating materials studied.1
Because Scott Base is one continuous (and by design, poorly ventilated) structure, the effect of the
toxic fumes from a fire event must be controlled with smoke separations preventing the gasses from
affecting the occupants of the building from being affected by the residual smoke. Given that on
occasions egress outside the complex could place the occupants in more serious danger by exposing
them to some of the harshest weather on the planet, the ‘evacuation within the building’ procedure
then changes the nature of the way the fire design must be viewed, lending this more to be designed
like a hospital than a standard place of work or accommodation.
A third issue is that the external thermal insulation structure is held together almost exclusively with
nylon bolts as suitable for this type of construction in a standard building. In a fire event, the nylon
bolts are likely to fail. Even with fire retardant nylon fittings which have been modified and tested to
achieve a UL94 V-0 rating, the nylon will stop combustion but will be allowed to melt and drip. 2 The
result will be that the structure of the building could fail, with panels literally falling off the steel
skeleton of the base and creating a risk to fire crews.
Additionally nylon bolts have been used to affix other items to the panels – in the Q-Hut corridor link
way, the fire sprinkler main has been suspended from brackets which are not bolted to the steel
structure of the link way, but to steel plates attached by nylon bolts to the PIR panelling. A fire with
any degree of heat to it could cause the entire sprinkler main to lose support and detach from the
ceiling.
The Cosgrove Major Fire report in 2006, reviewed in 2014 appears to identify the fire separations as
we have assumed, and identifies many of the issues we have raised in our inspection – some of
which are marked as resolved under the 2014 comments, but appear not to have been. Particularly
the passive fire protection included fire doors in walls which have limited or in some cases no fire
rating. Unfortunately this report was only uncovered on 23 January 2018 as this report is being
finalised so the findings have not been referred to within the document, but the notes remain highly
relevant as many of the issues raised 12 years ago are still present and in many cases have
deteriorated significantly since.
FENZ will review the current location of fire walls and effectiveness of the design strategy, but the
current situation is that most of the fire walls are only partially useful with many barely offering a
smoke separation as they stand and some offering no protection at all. A revised design should
include sturdy, non-combustible panelling used as external cladding adjacent to fire walls which have
been correctly installed and sealed. These should be allowed to withstand a total loss of one building,
leaving the firecells adjacent to be able to continue to operate.
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FIRE SYSTEMS
The base is protected by automatic fire sprinkler systems fed from two pumps on two water sources.
The primary supply is from 24m3 of water in the HFC building, and the secondary supply is from the
potable water. The primary supply would only allow up to 10 minutes of fire fighting of an OH3
demand maximum capacity, but it is likely to extend this time in an actual fire. Additionally the water
demand is shared with the layflat firefighting hoses at the fire equipment points used by the base fire
crews.
A fire sprinkler system is effective as it will activate early in the development of a fire and work to
control the fire spread. It is limited by obstructions in the discharge of water, and by rapid
development of fire, particularly in stored goods.
Some areas of the base are not sprinkler protected to the requirements of the New Zealand Standard
4541 with some larger underfloor cavities without coverage, and some over-long spacings within
some of the protected concealed spaces. Unprotected spaces should be protected to comply with the
standard, and sprinkler coverage should be added into the areas where storage of goods exceeds the
current capability of the sprinkler systems.
It would be recommended that the following actions are taken with regard to improvement of sprinkler
coverage on the site:
The routine inspection of the diesel engines and valvesets needs to be improved to bring this closer in
line to standard practice with NZS 4541 procedures. We would recommend that the diesel log book
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currently present at the controller is completed weekly, and the data transferred to the Asset system
electronic records. The book should have the carbon copy filed monthly, and annually should have
the engine overhaul detailed recorded in the pages provided.
FFP will provide a schedule for the inspection of the valvesets for the wet and dry pipe systems for
site staff to complete once the overall schedule has been approved in principle.
The base fire alarm is an analogue addressable system dating from 2008. It remains in good
condition and is well supported by the equipment manufacturers. The detection consists of
photoelectronic smoke detection throughout most of the occupied spaces and some under floor
spaces, where sprinkler coverage is not present – in the laundry and Thomson buildings underfloor
spaces.
A series of LCD display mimics are situated at fire crew reporting points around the site to advise the
location and number of devices operated.
The alarm control unit has a modem fitted that when connected will allow FFP staff to remotely
program the panel, view history and configurations and offer support remotely.
Aspirating smoke detection systems exist in the engineering area and vehicle workshop which allow
local isolation of the detectors in times of smoky or dusty work, and provide a filter-protected smoke
detector. One aspirating detector was replaced on the last FFP visit to site after it was identified it had
failed in 2013
This series of fire detection equipment is tested monthly by the use of a fire drill, but does require
some preventative maintenance testing such as battery load testing to be undertaken by site staff.
The system generally has a full survey every 2 years by FFP, but the last survey was undertaken in
2013 and no device testing, cleaning or maintenance has been completed since.
FFP will provide specific items to be checked monthly once the overall inspection routine is approved
in principle.
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FIRE FIGHTING EQUIPMENT
Layflat hoses and fire service waterway equipment is positioned at points around the base from which
firefighting activities can take place. Crews are trained by FENZ prior to deployment and again once
on base. This equipment is checked under the internal Antarctica NZ asset system.
Handheld fire extinguishers are located throughout the site as a mix of ABE dry powder and carbon
dioxide (CO2). These are tested annually with base staff, and require 5-yearly pressure testing. There
is a preference to leasing fire extinguishers to off-set the cost of the 5-yearly service, which is a
service offered by FFP, but as with all leasing arrangements the most economically viable method is
the ownership of the extinguishers. A costed option of leasing will be provided for consideration.
In some older areas, standard 13mm fire hose reels are still present. These provide little benefit given
the other firefighting equipment on site and it is recommended that these are removed from service.
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PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION
As previously outlined, the passive fire protection repair is in a poor state at present. The use of fire
pillows as the primary source of fire retardant is inadequate and we would recommend that all fire
pillows are removed and replaced with suitable fire rated surfaces and penetrations sealed
appropriately with a single new system.
A process is required to outline the repair of fire rated walls in the site. The use of a single system,
using simple materials which can be applied across a wide range of services is strongly
recommended. The current approach taken by the passive fire protection industry is the use of a
mineral fibreboard “batt” which is cut to shape around the services, and then filled with a matching
intumescent (expanding) sealant, sleeves or fire rated seals is a useful and economically viable
method of repairing openings in existing fire walls. The entire surface – and surface of cables arriving
at and leaving the fire wall are then coated with an ablative mix which seals the entire surface. A
single layer of the batt will achieve 60 minute fire rating, a double layer 120 minutes.
Collars should be affixed around PVC or insulated pipes to crush the flexible material and sealed to
prevent smoke transit.
We would recommend the Ryanfire products for this – data sheets and installation methodology
details are attached for reference.
FFP can provide familiarisation with the materials and the training to base staff to undertake the
repairs to the fire rated walls which are required to be retained. It is also recommended that every fire
rated surface is labelled as such in positions where services are likely to be run and that plans are
available showing the location of fire ratings.
It is also recommended that all sub-floor fire walls have two cable transit openings installed within the
fire wall and sealed at the edges. One should be reserved for power services and the other for data to
prevent interference. This will allow future services to be run through the wall without interfering with
the fire rating at all.
All fire walls should be labelled as such in concealed areas where services are likely to be run. FFP
have a self-adhesive label we install at each penetration we protect to prevent other trades from
disturbing this in the future. Identified fire walls are far less likely to be damaged, and tradespeople
who are trained in the correct repairs to fire rated walls are much more likely to use the cable transits
provided, and are able to seal any openings which are created in the running of other services –
maintaining the fire rating of the wall.
Because of the poor state of the fire separations as they are installed, it is recommended that after the
implementation of this report and the improvement works as outlined in the FENZ review, that a re-
inspection and sign-off of the separations is completed. It appears that the follow-up on previous
reports has assumed that passive fire protection works have been completed, but no real confirmation
of this has been put in place. Once complete, it would be anticipated that routine inspections of the
base including fire alarms, emergency lights, egress and fire door operations would include an
inspection of the subfloor fire walls as well.
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INCIDENT ROOM ALARM SILENCING
During the evacuation on base, some distraction occurred with the ongoing background noise from
the evacuation alarm sounding throughout the area where the incident control was being managed.
The installation of a module on the wall and rewiring of the speakers in that area will allow the incident
command area and the neighbouring area for evacuated occupants to have the audible alarms
silenced to prevent distraction. A series of visual indicators should be installed to ensure that the
occupants are aware of the audible alarms still sounding throughout the base.
This will involve the addition of a module and modification of cabling by the Scott Base electrician
under direction from FFP in Christchurch. FFP will need to program the unit which can be completed
with the on-board modem.
We would recommend this is also included in the alternate incident command centre, in the HFC AFT
briefing room.
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EMERGENCY LIGHTING
Although the base is occupied primarily during periods of 24 hour daylight, the site will experience as
much darkness in the year as any other location and emergency lighting is fitted in corridors and
some operation areas to guide egress. A mixture of illuminated exits signage is spread throughout
with some fittings being ‘sustained’ – lit at all times, operating on battery during power failure – and
‘non-maintained’ – not lit in normal states, but illuminated under battery power in mains failure.
The wayfinding light fittings tend to be a Bardic, Phillips or Thorn fitting, none of which in our
experience would score well if measure for the combination of light output, battery life, or fitting
quality. Battery life is a consistent problem with emergency light fittings as NiCad or NiMH batteries
will generally last only 3-5 years before requiring replacement, and are very costly to maintain. In an
average year for this site, it would be expected that 40 battery packs would fail and be sent to landfill.
New battery packs are best made up fresh and installed quickly as rechargeable batteries have a very
poor shelf life.
Fitting life is not much more with the charger regulators regularly failing after 7-9 years, resulting in
the fitting being replaced in its entirety.
The use of a loner-life fitting will save the cost of the battery and fitting in the longer term and leave
less time without the fitting operational when repairs are required. Lithium batteries will generally give
10 year life spans and LED fittings are more compact, require a smaller battery, more reliable and
give a better light output.
We would recommend that any replacement fittings installed be Clevertronics CLIFE LED fitting with a
lithium battery, which can either be installed surface or recessed. These are a more reliable fitting and
have a longer battery life than the fittings currently used.
Spotlight units should be considered for the environment they are installed in, but spotlight fittings
generally do not fail as often.
For Exit fittings, we would recommend the Ecoglo HYU unit which incorporates no battery, but
provides light onto a photoluminescent surface which emits stored light and allows the sign to remain
illuminated on its own in power failure. This will provide a much longer life fitting with no battery or
charger unit, and not have the environmental effects of the requirement to landfill batteries at all.
Outside pathways and stairs should be considered for illumination in an emergency where external
egress is required. Lighting of stairwells and some external areas and guidance lighting toward the
admin porch would assist an evacuation in periods of low light and/or poor visibility. Because of the
nature of the weather conditions, spotlight fittings would be best installed, with the battery and charger
unit installed inside the building and the lights on the exterior surface. In some cases it may be
preferable to illuminate the outside area from under the buildings.
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INSPECTION PROCEDURES
It is recommended that a routine of inspections is set in place to ensure that fire and life safety
systems are checked, records kept and audits undertaken regularly. Under the Building Act 2004, a
system exists where each building must have a schedule of the systems which require inspection, the
standards to which they are measured against, the frequency of the inspection and lists whether the
inspection can be undertaken by the owner or a registered professional contractor. Each year, the
certification provided by the contractor to owner is submitted to the territorial authority with a
certificate declaring all inspection, maintenance and reporting procedures have been adhered with.
This system is known as a building warrant of fitness.
As Scott Base sits outside New Zealand, there is no requirement to comply with the Act and the
necessary inspection procedures, but the system is well-defined and results in excellent outcomes for
compliance and reporting.
FFP requested that the Christchurch City Council consider adopting Scott Base as a building which
would fall under its warrant of fitness administration, but they have responded advising that they
would not wish to take any liability on by adding this site to their network. Because we do not have a
cooperative territorial authority to produce the actual documentation for a warrant of fitness, the
solution is to essentially replicate the process by creating a parallel system based on the same
processes.
We have outlined a proposed inspection programme which would include routine inspections for
many systems including those already undertaken by Scott Base staff and adding an inspection
routine which is closer to the NZ Standards and Building Code routines for those systems. This would
then be audited by qualified FFP staff and, if the systems all meet their standards, have a certificate
issued which identifies that all of the inspection, maintenance and reporting procedures have been
fully complied with, and that the systems are in operational order at the time of the certification.
While this would not be a building warrant of fitness without a territorial authority to administer this, we
would still produce all of the documentation in a parallel format as if it was. This allows a single
certificate to be displayed to identify that the fire safety systems have been inspected and maintained
correctly, providing reassurance to staff and visitors to site.
At present the fire alarm system is checked on a biennial basis by FFP in an inspection on site,
however the last inspection was undertaken in 2013. It is recommended that this becomes a fixed
inspection frame due to the importance of maintenance of this system.
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SCOTT BASE - HATHERTON LAB BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
Note
This is an observation of a
system which is noted for
comment or for our own record,
No action is required.
HA Specified System: View looking down the wall of the fire door
09 to the corridor. Plasterboard linings from
15/3 Fire Separations door to cavity over door. Minimal building
fabric intersections protection.
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SCOTT BASE - HATHERTON LAB BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
HA Specified System: The fire door in the corridor does not close
19 to the latch position, which holds the door
3/3 Automatic Fire Doors closed in a fire event. This requires
adjustment to operate correctly. The door
release button has been installed with a
standard PDL 600 series two position
switch (like a lightswitch) rather than a self-
returning switch. It is recommended this is
changed to match the other fittings
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SCOTT BASE - Q HUT BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
Recommendation
This is an observation of an
improvement which can be
made to a system to increase
efficiency or enhance the way
the system operates.
Note
This is an observation of a
system which is noted for
comment or for our own record,
No action is required.
fire door
No Action required
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SCOTT BASE - Q HUT BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
No Action required
FENZ to review
This is an observation of a
system which is noted for
comment or for our own record,
No action is required.
No Action required.
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SCOTT BASE - Q HUT BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
Note
This is an observation of a
system which is noted for
comment or for our own record,
No action is required.
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SCOTT BASE - LAUNDRY BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
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SCOTT BASE - KITCHEN / DINING / BAR BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
No Action required.
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SCOTT BASE - THOMSON BUILDING BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
No Action required
No Action required.
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SCOTT BASE - THOMSON BUILDING BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
No action required
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SCOTT BASE - RADIO WORKSHOP BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
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SCOTT BASE - ADMIN & POWERHOUSE BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
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SCOTT BASE - LOCKER ROOM & ENGINEERING BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
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SCOTT BASE - LOCKER ROOM & ENGINEERING BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
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SCOTT BASE - HILLARY FIELDS CENTRE BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
HI Container bay
Looking at UFC. bottom wall, is fire rated,
12 15/3 Fire Separations green wall is original external wall of UFC with
window above, not fire rated. both walls open
into the same space - the stairwell and
corridor.
The sliding fire door is defeated by the window
above.
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SCOTT BASE - HILLARY FIELDS CENTRE BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT
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SCOTT BASE - HILLARY FIELDS CENTRE BUILDING INSPECTION REPORT