Analysis
November 3, 2009
Summary: Overtures toward
Tehran, Damascus, Baghdad,
the Kurdish regional govern-
ment, and Turkey’s own Kurds
have contributed to the percep-
tion of a “Turkish moment,”
in which new ground is being
broken on virtually a daily basis.
Turkey’s leadership seems un-
concerned by the potential risks
of dilution and overstretch, and
so far, there has been little to
check Ankara’s momentum.
The new look in Turkish policy
will compel Turkey and its
transatlantic partners to think in
new ways about what is “strate-
gic,” what is “tactical,” and the
implications of an increasingly
ambitious, affinity-based ap-
proach to regional relationships.
This will be the critical backdrop
for Prime Minister Erdoğan’s
planned visit to Washington in
December, where Iran is sure to
be at the top of the agenda.
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The New Turkish Lexicon
by Dr. Ian O. Lesser*
In the current, highly-animated Turkish
debate, the only sure point of agree-
ment is that Turkey is changing, and
changing rapidly. There can be few
countries where the gap between estab-
lished images and the actual extent of
change is so pronounced. Uneasiness
prevails on all sides as observers look
back with nostalgia to more certain
times in Turkish domestic and foreign
policy—or press for an acceleration of
change. A recent visit to participate in
the Istanbul Forum offered a window
into the prevailing discourse and an
opportunity to reflect on Turkey’s new
regional choices and new foreign policy
vocabulary.
Parallel elites
The religious-secular divide no longer
appears to be the real center of gravity
in Turkish politics. To be sure, Islam
is still part of the equation, and more
overt religiosity alongside populist
discourse has been emblematic of the
Justice and Development Party (AKP)
approach. But religious politics has
acquired a recessed quality and has
been overtaken by a more overt com-
petition along class lines. After almost
a decade of AKP-led government in
a country where the state remains
the leading economic arbiter, it is not
surprising that business-government
relations have emerged as the new front
line in Turkish politics. The ongoing
tax case involving the Doğan group,
*
Dr. Ian O. Lesser is a senior transatlantic fellow with the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The views expressed
here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF.
Turkey’s largest media conglomerate,
has become a cause célèbre, complicated
by the lack of any effective parliamentary
opposition to AKP rule and the increas-
ingly personalized character of Turkish
politics.
The early stages of AKP’s rise to power
might reasonably have been described
as a populist, socially conservative revolt
against Turkey’s secular establishment.
Today, the environment is more accu-
rately characterized as a competition
between two parallel elites occupying
adjacent, commanding heights of the
Turkish economy. This is the vision
Cengiz Candar very perceptively
described as “two-Turkey” a few years
ago. Many analysts inside and outside
the country regard this duality as un-
stable and likely to be resolved in favor
of more popular forces. Yet, examples
of societies with sustained parallel elites
(e.g., India, Russia, the United States)
exist on the international scene, and the
increasing globalization of the Turk-
ish economy could well serve as an
ameliorating factor. Significant changes
affecting the role of the state, attitudes
toward religion, civil-military relations,
and other key aspects of the society have
certainly taken place. For the most part,
these have been gradual rather than
revolutionary, even if the net effect has
been substantial over time. As one keen
observer put it when describing the
social and political changes of recent
years, “we have just gotten used to it.”
Analysis
A new foreign policy vocabulary
Something similar might be said of the changes underway in
Turkey’s international policy. Taken as a whole, the transforma-
tion under AKP government has been substantial, and much
of it has been positive from the perspective of transatlantic in-
terests. A decade ago, Turkey had troubled relations with most
of its neighbors, not least Syria, Armenia, and Greece (where
an opening started prior to the advent of AKP rule). Today,
Turkish foreign policy is defined by an explicit policy of “zero
problems” with neighbors and multiple détentes. At the same
time, Ankara has acquired closer ties with Russia, Turkey’s
leading economic partner, Iran, and a host of countries across
Asia, Africa, and Eurasia. Much of this new activism has been
driven by commercial interest. It has also been driven by the
affinities of the AKP leadership and its supporters.
In the wake of the Gaza crisis, Turkish-Israeli relations have
gone from bad to worse, and few would now characterize
the relationship as “strategic” in any meaningful sense. Joint
exercises have been cancelled, defense industrial cooperation
is stalled, and frictions abound at the cultural and political
levels. In truth, a recalibration of Turkish-Israeli relations was
probably inevitable. Public opinion has become an increas-
ingly important factor in Turkish foreign policy, and this
opinion is starkly negative with regard to Israel and deeply
sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
Turkey’s prime minister, has been highly outspoken on this
issue, and his views reflect and reinforce public sentiment. In
geopolitical terms, the close bilateral cooperation of the late
1990s was the product of specific strategic conditions, above
all a shared concern about Syria and Iran. With the tremen-
dous improvement in Turkish relations with Damascus and
Tehran, these conditions no longer exist. So too, Ankara is
less concerned with the perceived benefits of closer ties to
Israel when it comes to relations with Washington. The effect
was never as automatic as many on the Turkish side assumed.
The question now is not whether a strategic relationship be-
tween Turkey and Israel can be re-established, but rather how
far the deterioration is likely to go, and what can be salvaged.
Beyond the shift in Turkey’s relations with key neighbors,
several broader tendencies are observable. These were clearly
on display in remarks by Erdoğan and others at the Istanbul
Forum, where the inaugural theme was “Turkey’s
Neighborhood Policy and the Middle East.” First, Turkey’s
foreign policy discourse is increasingly self-referential, when
2
not openly nationalistic. Turkey’s recent overtures on
multiple fronts, from accords with Armenia to a broad range
of economic and political initiatives involving Russia, Syria,
and Iran, have fueled a sense of Turkish capacity and
centrality. Overtures toward Baghdad, the Kurdish regional
government, and Turkey’s own Kurds have contributed to
the perception of a “Turkish moment,” in which new ground
is being broken on virtually a daily basis. Turkey’s leadership
seems unconcerned by the potential risks of dilution and
overstretch inherent in this continental equivalent of making
the ocean boil; so far, there has been little to check Ankara’s
momentum.
Second, the foreign policy vocabulary of the AKP leadership
reflects a growing attachment to third world and non-aligned
perspectives. The prime minister’s remarks at the Istanbul
Forum included numerous references to the need for a new
global order and anticipated a rebalancing of international
priorities and policies. Non-alignment may strike many
observers as an archaic, Cold War-era notion. But seen
through the lens of the constant pressure to choose between
Turkey’s Western, Eurasian, and Middle Eastern vocations,
the non-aligned option starts to look attractive from the
perspective of a leadership without an automatic preference
for ties with Washington and Brussels. Troubled relations
with Europe and a relationship with the United States that
has yet to fully recover from the stresses of the Bush years
reinforce this inclination. In an otherwise restrained
atmosphere, only two subjects provoked strong reaction
from the largely Turkish audience at the opening of the
Forum—the situation in Gaza and the negative attitude of
key European states toward Turkey’s EU candidacy.
Third, in terms of regional policy, AKP discourse implicitly
favors the idea of a “Middle East for the Middle Easterners.”
This concept fits uneasily with the desire for stronger Ameri-
can leadership in the Middle East peace process but is fully
compatible with the new Turkish activism and desire to serve
as broker or, at least, a facilitator of regional dialogues. Is this
new? It is not that far from the inclinations of the Ecevit and
Ozal leaderships. The crucial difference is that Turkey is now
a much more significant actor in both economic and politi-
cal terms, and Turkey’s Middle Eastern choices are, rightly
or wrongly, seen as linked to the country’s own identity
crisis. The question is not so much whether Turkey’s Middle
Analysis
Eastern engagement is a good thing or a bad thing—it is an
unsurprising response to prevailing economic and strategic
requirements—but whether greater attention to the south
and east will enhance or foreclose options elsewhere.
Is Turkey’s neighborhood policy sustainable?
Over the last few years, Turkey’s foreign policy has been one
of the bright spots in the country’s EU candidacy, with
Ankara within the European (if not always American)
mainstream on most issues. The Turkish position on Iran’s
nuclear program, an issue on which Erdoğan has been
outspoken and inclined to draw comparisons with Israel’s
nuclear posture, holds the potential for a damaging
departure. With Iran’s rejection of the latest fuel cycle deal,
the stage will be set for a sharp debate within the UN
Security Council, in which Turkey may be forced to choose
between the Euroatlantic and Sino-Russian positions. Here,
some of Turkey’s new partners in the Gulf and elsewhere,
concerned about the implications of a nuclear Iran, may
actually lobby for Turkey to adopt a tough line—a harbinger
of difficult and unpredictable pressures to come as Ankara
seeks to balance multiple relationships, to the East as well
as to the West. The new look in Turkish policy will compel
Turkey and its transatlantic partners to think in new ways
about what is “strategic,” what is “tactical,” and the implica-
tions of an increasingly ambitious, affinity-based approach to
regional relationships. This will be the critical backdrop for
Erdoğan’s planned visit to Washington in December, where
Iran is sure to be at the top of the agenda.
Dr. Ian O. Lesser, Senior Transatlantic Fellow, GMF
Dr. Lesser is a GMF senior transatlantic fellow in Washington, DC,
where he focuses on Mediterranean affairs, Turkey, and international
security issues. Prior to joining GMF, he was vice president of the
Pacific Council on International Policy and spent over a decade at the
RAND Corporation. From 1994 to 1995, Dr. Lesser was a member of
the U.S. State Department’s Policy Planning staff.
About GMF
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