1
Sabello v. Department of Education equity dictates that he be given his former rank of
ISABELO T. SABELLO, petitioner,
vs. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS, respondents.
G.R. No. 87687 December 26, 1989
Facts: Isabelo Sabello was the Elementary School Principal
of Talisay. The barangay high school was in deficit at that
time due to the fact that the students could hardly pay for
their monthly tuition fees. Since at that time also, the
President of the Philippines who was earnestly
campaigning was giving aid in the amount of P2,000.00 for
each barrio, the barrio council through proper resolutions
allotted the amount of P840.00 to cover up for the salaries
of the high school teachers, with the honest thought in
mind that the barrio high school was a barrio project and
as such, was entitled to its share of the RICD fund. The only
part that Sabello played was his being authorized by the
said barrio council to withdraw the above amount and
which was subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's
Office in the name of the Talisay Barrio High School. That
was a grave error on the part of Sabello as it involves the
very intricacies in the disbursement of government funds
and of its technicalities.
Thus, Sabello, together with the barrio captain, were
charged of the violation of Republic Act 3019, and both
were convicted to suffer a sentence of one year and
disqualification to hold public office. The Court of Appeals
modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of one-
half of the amount being involved. The herein petitioner,
being financially battered, could no longer hire a lawyer to
proceed to the highest court of the land. Finally, Sabello
was granted an ABSOLUTE PARDON by the President of
the Republic of the Philippines, restoring him to 'full civil
and political rights. Sabello applied for reinstatement to
the government service, only to be reinstated to the wrong
position of a mere classroom teacher and not to his former
position as Elementary School Principal I.
Issue: WON Sabello should be reappointed to the position
he held prior to his conviction.
Held: Yes. The absolute disqualification from office or
ineligibility from public office forms part of the
punishment prescribed under the penal code and that
pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Since the
petitioner in the instance was actually reinstated and there
are no circumstances that would warrant the diminution
of his rank, justice and equity dictates that he be given his
former rank of Principal I.
Main Point:
Given absolute pardon and restored to full civil and
political rights. Since the petitioner in the instance was
actually reinstated and there are no circumstances that
would warrant the diminution of his rank, justice and
Principal I.
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
FACTS: On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying
the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on
that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary
assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of
the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but
also encroached on the power of the executive to grant
reprieve.
The crime of raping his ten-year old either daughter or
step daughter having been committed sometime in April,
1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already
in effect, petitioner was inevitably meted out the supreme
penalty of death.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in
granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the
execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of
judgment has already been rendered that by granting the
TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve
which is an executive function.
HELD: No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision
is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the
power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality.
Main Point: The power to control the execution of its
decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. The powers
of the Executive, the legislative and the Judiciary to save
the life of a death convict do not exclude for the simple
reason that there is no higher right than the right of life. To
contend that only the Executive can protect the right of life
of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of three
branches of our government. (Bernas)
Anti-Graft League of the Philippines v. San Juan (1996)
FACTS:
Marcos issued a decree establishing the Technological
Colleges of Rizal. It directed the Board to provide funds for
the purchase of 4 parcels of land which belonged to Ortigas
&Co. For 12 yrs, the land was idle and construction did not
materialize so the Board authorized the selling of the lot.
This was sold to Valley View Realty. Ortigas filed for
rescission of contract contending that it violated the terms
of the contract by selling such lot to Valley View. The

Board made a Resolution providing for the rescission of
the deed of sale to Valley View. Valley View filed a case
against the Province of Rizal for specific performance but
was dismissed. Thereafter, a compromise agreement was
executed between Province and Ortigas to reconvey the
lots to Ortigas.
ISSUE: W/N this is a case of taxpayer’s suit.
HELD: To constitute a taxpayer’s suit, two requisites:
(1) that public funds are disbursed by a political
subdivision or instrumentality and (2) in doing so, a law is
violated or some irregularity is committed, and that the
petitioner is directly affected by the alleged ultra vires act.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s standing should not even be
made an issue here since standing is a concept in
constitutional law and here no constitutional question is
actually involved. The disbursement of public funds was
only made when the Province bought the lands from
Ortigas. Petitioner never referred to such purchase as an
illegal disbursement of public funds but focused on the
alleged fraudulent reconveyance of said property to
Ortigas because the price paid was lower than the
prevailing market value of neighboring lot.
Main point:
Art 8. Judicial Review. This case(taxpayer's suit) is not
a proper subject for judicial review. The first requisite
for the exercise of judicial is that there must be before
the court an actual case calling for exercise of judicial
power.
(Additional info: The Anti-Graft League of the Philippines is
a non-government organization, constituted to protect the
interest of the Republic and its instrumentalities and
political subdivisions against abuses its public official and
employees, claims the instant petition for certiorari is a
taxpayer’s suit because the Provincial Board of Rizal
allegedly illegally disbursed public funds in transactions
involving the land)
IN RE: ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, A.M. No. 01-12-2003-
SC. July 29, 2002
Facts:
Quoted hereunder is a newspaper article with
contemptuous statements attributed to Atty.Leonard De
Vera concerning the Plunder Law case while the same was
still pending before the Court.
“De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it
would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estrada’s lawyers
to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its
supposed vagueness.”
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
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Atty. Leonard De Vera also argued that he was merely
exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom
of speech when he said that a decision by the Court
declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional
“Would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than
those that led to People Power II.” While Atty.
Leonard De Vera admitted to having uttered the aforecited
statements, respondent denied having made the same to
degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to
bring it into disrepute.
Issue:
WON Atty. Leonard De Vera is liable for indirect contempt
of court for uttering statements aimed at influencing and
threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
Held:
Yes, after a careful consideration of respondent’s
arguments, the Court finds his explanation
unsatisfactory and hereby finds him guilty of indirect
contempt of court for uttering statements aimed at
influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor
of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law. Rule 71,
Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the
courts to hold liable for criminal contempt a person guilty
of conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority
of the court, or of an act obstructing the administration of
justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect.
Main point: (administration of Justice, Rule-Making)
Freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss
judicial proceedings, but such right
does not cover statements aimed at undermining the
Court’s integrity and authority, and interfering with
theadministration of justice. Freedom of speech is not
absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with
therequirements of equally important public interests,
such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts
andorderly functioning of the administration of justice.
Velarde vs. Social Justice Society, GR 159357, April 28,
2004
Facts:The Petition prayed for the resolution whether the
act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in
endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office
or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote
for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit
of the constitutional provisions .They alleged that the
questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts
and a dispositive portion.
ISSUE: What is the standard form of a Decision? Did the
challenge Decision comply with the aforesaid form?

RULING:
The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly
prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing
magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court. In general, the
essential parts of a good decision consist of the following:
(1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues
or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each
issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and,
finally, (5) dispositive portion.
No. Counsel for SJS has utterly failed to convince the Court
that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the
paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there
are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed
Decision. The Petition failed to state directly the ultimate
facts that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral
Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there
were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory
Relief. Neither were there factual findings in the assailed
Decision.
Main point:
Section 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall
be refused due course or denied without stating the legal
basis therefor; At best, Social Justice Society merely asked
the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect,
it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of
which was beyond the court’s constitutional mandate and
jurisdiction. Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in
clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no
findings of facts and final disposition.
Shav
ARTICLE 7, SEC 19: EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
9.17 Rodolfo Llamas, petitioner v. Exec. Sec. Oscar
Orbos and Mariano Ocampo, respondents
Facts: Petitioner, Rodolfo Llmas (Vice-Governor of
Tarlac) filed a complaint against Mariano Ocampo
(Governor of Tarlac), before the Department of Local
Government (DLG), charging him for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. After trial, the Secretary
of the then DLG found Ocampo guilty and penalized with
suspension from office for a period of 90 days thus, Llmas
assumed office. In less than a month, Ocampo returned and
showed an Administrative Order showing that he was
pardoned and can resume office without fully observing
the 90 day suspension. Petitioner contends that executive
clemency could be granted by the President on in criminal
cases and there’s nothing in the statutes or Constitution
that allows the grant of such in administrative cases also,
the word “conviction” refers only to criminal cases.
Issue: WON the President can grant executive clemency
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Ruling: Yes. It is the Court’s considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons
and remit fines and forfeitures for criminal cases with
much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. In the same vein, We do not clearly
see any invalid and convincing reason why the President
can’t grant executive clemency in administrative cases
which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses. It is
not specified in the constitution whether it may be
considered under criminal or administrative cases. If the
law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The
Constitution does not distinguish between which cases
executive clemency may be exercised by the President,
with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases.
*main point underscored
shav
ARTICLE 8, SEC 1: JUDICIAL POWER
10.17 Infotech Foundation v. COMELEC, GR No. 159139
Facts: COMELEC approved Resolution No. 6074 which
awarded Phase II of the Modernization Project of the
Commission to “Mega Pacific Consortium” (MPC,) an entity
that had not participated in the bidding, for the automation
of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004
elections. Despite this grant, the poll body signed the
actual automation Contract with Mega Pacific eSolutions,
Inc., a company that joined the bidding but had not met the
eligibility requirements. The proferred computer
hardware and software even if, at the time of the award,
they had undeniably failed to pass eight critical
requirements designed to safeguard the integrity of
elections
Issue: WON COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion
Ruling: Yes. There is grave abuse of discretion (1) when an
act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence; or (2) when it is executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal
bias. In the present case, the Commission on Elections
approved the assailed Resolution and awarded the subject
Contract not only in clear violation of law and
jurisprudence, but also in reckless disregard of its own
bidding rules and procedure.
*main points underscored
ARTICLE 8, SEC 5: POWERS OF THE SC, JUDICIAL
REVIEW
11.17 Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities (PACU) v. Secretary of Education
Facts: The Philippine Association of Colleges and
Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act
No. 2706 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws
sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the
country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should
first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a
person may be granted the right to own and operate a

private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education
the discretion to ascertain standards that must be followed
by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of
Education can and may ban certain textbooks from being
used in schools. The Government's legal representative
argued that (1) the matter constitutes no justiciable
controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding
the constitutional questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel
to challenge the validity of the said acts; and (3) the Acts
are constitutionally valid.
Issue: WON Act. No. 2706 is unconstitutional
Ruling: No. In the first place, there is no justiciable
controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered
any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education
of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact
control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution
provides for state control of all educational institutions
even as it enumerates certain fundamental objectives of all
education to wit, the development of moral character,
personal discipline, civic conscience and vocational
efficiency, and instruction in the duties of
citizenship. The State control of private education was
intended by the organic law.
Third, the State has the power to ban illegal
textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals.
This is still part of the power of control and regulation by
the State over all schools.
ARTICLE 8, SEC 1: POWERS OF THE SC,
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE; RULE-MAKING
12. 17 In Re Cunanan
Facts: After the SC declared candidates for the bar as
having flunked the examinations, Congress passed R.A. No.
972 or the Bar Flunkers Act in 1952.
Sec. 1 provided the following Bar passing rates: for 1946-
1951: 70%, for 1952: 70%, for 1953: 72%, for 1954: 73%,
for 1955: 74%... provided that the examinee shall have no
grade lower than 50%
The Act lowered the passing marks and declared the
candidates who flunked as having passed it.
Issue: WON R.A. No. 972 is constitutional
Ruling: No. The present amendment would have the effect
of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme
Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of
those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or
more but less than the general passing average fixed for
that year. When a court renders a decision or promulgate a
resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with
a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent
amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not
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affect the final decision, order, or resolution already
promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void
and of no effect
*main point/s underscored
ARTICLE 8, SEC 14: CONTENTS OF DECISION; PETITION
FOR REVIEW; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
13. 17 People v Bravo
Facts: Mario Bravo herein accused-appellant was
convicted of murder for killing his mother-in-law. He
appealed the decision of the RTC contending that such
does not contain "the facts of the case for or against and
only of selected facts in favor of a party." It is argued that
this is unconstitutional. The relevant constitutional
provision is found in Article VIII, Section 14, which says
that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without
expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based."
Issue: WON the trial court violated Art. VIII, Sec. 14 in
rendering its decision
Ruling: No. The Court do not find it has been violated in
the challenged decision. It is for the judge to determine
from the narration of facts, relevant or irrelevant, and the
assertions by the parties, truthful or not, what actually
happened in the case before him. Judge Dizon did this
when he made what the appellant calls a "selective finding
of facts." Of course, it had to be selective. That is how a trial
judge separates the chaff from the grain, extracts the truth
from the mass of conflicting claims, and determines the
basis of the decision he will have to make.
*main point/s underscored
Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio
Factoran
FACTS: Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City.
She was charged for the crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty
and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted
pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister
of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position
since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back
pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the
Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsanto’s
request averring that Monsanto must first seek
appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her
former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the
pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for
the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to
her former post.
HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective.
It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose
upon the government any obligation to make reparation
 5

for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of
done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of
have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of
satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer
petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive be questioned because it has become the law of the case
backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand, Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of
civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to
subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of
reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners
commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not
only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the have a legal standing because they were not parties to the
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, contract
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation. ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
MAIN POINT: The one who is given absolute pardon has no
HELD:
demandable right to reinstatement to an office already
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling
forfeited from him/her due to the punishment imposed of
sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure
their his/her case. He/she only qualifies for a new
from the settled rulings on real parties in interest
appointment.
because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
Garcia v. BOI
LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present
Facts: The Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, a foreign
case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in
corporation, was attracted to situate its petrochemical
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any
plant in Bataan by “initial inducements and other
sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are
circumstances” Subsequently, however, it asked the Board
the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
of Investments to be allowed to move to Batangas on the
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and
ground that it has the right of final choice of plant site. On
directly passed upon and determine in a former suit
that basis, the BOI yielded. The capitulation of the BOI is
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action
challenged as abuse of discretion.
between the same parties involving a different cause of
Issue: whether or not BOI committed grave abuse of
action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least
discretion when it yield to the wishes of the investor,
when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When
national interest notwithstanding.
the second proceeding involves an instrument or
Ruling: Yes. In the light of all the clear advantages manifest
transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the
in the plant’s remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is
one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in
shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near
the second proceeding to make an independent
absolute discretion given by the BOI to investors not only
examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a
to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own
different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the
determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a
least.
concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
The BOI capitulation is adverse to Philippine interest
question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue
contrary to the thrust of the Constitution.
is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST
KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO
MAIN POINT: What appears in the jurisprudence on
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.
“standing” is that it is only a rule that assures concrete
adverseness which can sharpen the presentation of issues
but it also involves considerations of policy related to
FACTS:
judicial self-restraint. (the 1987 PH Constitution reviewer
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment
pg 339)
Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online
lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of
FABIAN VS DESIERTO, AGUSTIN EN BANC
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per
terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998
charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its
own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the FACTS:
expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare President of PROMAT Construction Development

Corporation which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the
District Engineer of the First Metro
Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the
bidding for government construction projects, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of
his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous
relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the
course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for it in problems
concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to
terminate their relationship, private respondent refused
and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.
Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against
private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of
misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension
without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for
reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the
private respondent’s new counsel had been his classmate
and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case
was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who
exonerated private respondent from the administrative
charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that
all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
II. W/N Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive
or procedural in nature.
RULING:
I. No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition
which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc.
vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this
6
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the Court.
II. YES. In the situation under consideration, a transfer by
the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested
with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to
procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to
appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law.
That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by
which the appeal is to be made or decided has been
changed.
MAIN POINT: See page 349 of the book. 
Francisco v. Permiskul
FACTS: An important constitutional question has been
injected in this case which started out as an ordinary
complaint for a sum of money. The petitioner leased his
apartment in Makati to the private respondent for a period
of one year. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private
respondent deposited with the petitioner a certain amount
to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased
premises except when caused by reasonable wear and
tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the
property. He thereafter requested the refund of his
deposit. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the
lessee still owed him for other charges, including the
electricity and water bills and the sum for repainting of the
leased premises to restore them to their original
condition.
As a result, the private respondent sued in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. A summary judgment
was rendered, sustaining the complainant and holding that
the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant
was ordered to pay the plaintiff representing the balance
of the deposit after deducting the water and electricity
charges.
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on
January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum
decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal,
evaluation and study of the records of this
case, this Court hereby adopts by
reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and
finds that there is no cogent reason to
disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is
hereby affirmed in toto. 3

When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his
petition for review was denied, as so too was his motion
for reconsideration. He is now before the SC to fault the
respondent court, principally for sustaining the
memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His
contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the memorandum decision is sufficient
compliance with Section 14, Article VIII
RULING: The memorandum in this case was made
pursuant to what is allowed by Section 40 of BP blg 129.
Because of the above considerations the rule that should
be followed is that, where a Memorandum Decision is
used, the decision adopted by reference must be attached
to the Memorandum for easy reference. Nonetheless, the
Memorandum decision should be sparingly used and used
only where the facts as in the main are accepted by both
parties and in simple litigations only.
“A judicial decision does not have to be a bore.”
However, “The interpretation we make today will not apply
retroactively to the memorandum decision rendered by the
regional trial court in the case at bar, or to the decision of
the respondent court such decision on the strength
of Romero v. Court of Appeals. As earlier observed, there was
substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the direct
availability and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita
incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of
Judge de la Rama. The memorandum decision as then
understood under the Romero decision was a valid act at the
time it was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced
binding legal effect. We also affirm the finding of the
respondent court that the summary judgment without a
formal trial was in accord with the Rule on Summary
Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is not
improper.”
Petition denied.
Jazz
9.25 Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601
January 19, 1999
Facts:
On January 4, 1999, the Supreme Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The
public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance
of the Temporary Restraining Order arguing that the
action of the Supreme Court not only violated the rule on
finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of
the executive to grant reprieve.
Issue:
7
WON the court abused its discretion in granting a
Temporary Restraining Order on the execution of
Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has
already been rendered; that by granting the Temporary
Restraining Order, the Honorable Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function.
Ruling:
No. Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution cannot be interpreted as denying the power
of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions
after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights
and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts.
The suspension of such a death sentence is
undisputedly an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its
effects are the same. In the same vein, it cannot be denied
that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 (Death
Penalty Law) by reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like
that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the
imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary
power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the
power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction.
Main point: Article VII, Section 19; is simply the source of
power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
control the enforcement of their decisions after their
finality.
10.25 Bayan Muna vs. Romulo
641 SCRA 244
Facts:
The International Criminal Court (ICC) under the
Rome Statute was established with "the power to exercise
its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions”. On May 9, 2003, the
Philippines entered into a Non-Surrender Agreement with
United States of America (USA) which aims to protect what
it refers to and defines as "persons" of the RP and US from
frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought
against them in international tribunals.

Issue:
WON there is jurisdictional conflict between the
Philippines, as party to the non-surrender agreement, and
the International Criminal Court.
Ruling:
Contrary to petitioner’s pretense, the Agreement
does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from,
the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one
complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of
complementarity underpins the creation of the
International Criminal Court. As aptly pointed out by
respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court is to "be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the
signatory states]." Furthermore, under the premise of
complementarity, the primary jurisdiction for any case lies
first with the state’s national judicial systems. A state is
given a chance to exercise complementarity by informing
the International Criminal Court of its choice to investigate
and prosecute its own nationals through its own domestic
courts. Thus, the State has the primary jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute its own nationals in its custody
who may have committed the grave international crimes
specified in the Rome Statute.
Main point: Under the premise of complementarity, the
primary jurisdiction for any case lies first with the state’s
national judicial systems.
11.25 Automotive Industry Workers vs. Executive
Secretary
G.R. No. 157509
Facts:
Petitioners, composed of 10 labor unions assailed
the constitutionality of EO 185 for allegedly revert the set-
up prior to RA 6715 in which only Congress can do.
Solicitor General contend that petitioners have no locus
standi to assail the validity of E.O. No. 185, not even in their
capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are
exempt from paying taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform
Act of 1997. Even assuming that their individual members
are taxpayers, respondents maintain that a taxpayer suit
will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not require additional
appropriation for its implementation.
Issue:
WON the 10 labour unions have legal standing to
assail the constitutionality of EO 185?
Ruling:
8
No. For a citizen to have standing, he must
establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. Petitioners have not shown that they
have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal
injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As
labor unions it cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will
prejudice their rights and interests considering that the
scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of
Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse,
revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions.
Main point: As labor unions it cannot be said that E.O. No.
185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering
that the scope of the authority conferred upon the
Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review,
reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
12.25 Maniago vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104392
Facts:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of
shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees
of Texas Instruments, Inc. from Baguio City proper to its
plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one
of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a
passenger jeepney owned by respondent Alfredo Boado.
As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple
physical injuries against petitioner’s driver, Herminio
Andaya was filed in court. A month later, a civil case for
damages was filed by respondent Boado against petitioner
Maniago. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the
proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the
pendency of the criminal case against his driver and
because no reservation of the right to bring the civil case
separately had been made in the criminal case. But the
lower court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that
pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed
independently of the criminal action.
Issue:
WON despite the absence of reservation, private
respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages
against petitioner under Art. 2176 & Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code.
Ruling:
No. The right to bring an action for damages under
the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111
(1), otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, the

provision clearly requires that a reservation must be made
to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of
civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been
instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not
limited to those which arise “from the offense charged.”
On the basis of Rule 111 (1 to 3), a civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when
such action arising from the same act or omission, which is
the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to
bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been
instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has
not been reserved or it was brought before the institution
of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not
bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based
on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
Main point: The right of the injured party to sue separately
for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from
crimes ex delicto or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be
deemed instituted with the criminal action.
13.25 Sesbreno vs. CA
G.R. No. 161390
Facts:
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages thru
breach of contract and attorneys fees against the province
of Cebu with the RTC. The RTC rendered a decision in favor
of the petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s
decision and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court
concluded that petitioner failed to sufficiently establish his
allegation that the respondents induced the camineros to
violate the agreement for attorneys fees and the
compromise agreement, and that he suffered damage due
to respondent’s act of directly paying the camineros the
amounts due them. In response to this, the petitioner
raises the issue that the CA erred in not affirming the trial
court decision due to long delay in deciding CA-G.R. CV No.
43287.
Issue:
WON the CA should have affirmed the trial court’s
decision in view of the delay in resolving the case, and
should have denied the appeal because of the formal
defects in the appellant’s brief.
Ruling:
No. Even when there is delay and no decision or
resolution is made within the prescribed period, there is
no automatic affirmation of the appealed decision. This is
different from the rule under Article X, Section 11 (2) of
the 1973 Constitution which said that, in case of delay, the
decision appealed from was deemed affirmed.
9
Eun
Salvacion Monsanto vs Deputy Exec Sec Fulgencio
Factoran
FACTS: Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City.
She was charged for the crime of Estafa through
Falsification of Public Documents. She was found guilty
and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted
pardon by Marcos. She then wrote a letter to the Minister
of Finance for her to be reinstated to her former position
since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back
pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the
Office of the President and Factoran denied Monsanto’s
request averring that Monsanto must first seek
appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her
former position. Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the
pardon, she should no longer be compelled to answer for
the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to
her former post.
HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective.
It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose
upon the government any obligation to make reparation
for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been
done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to
have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why
petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits. On the other hand,
civil liability arising from crime is governed by the RPC. It
subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any
reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or
commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may
only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and
debtor, compensation and novation.
MAIN POINT: The one who is given absolute pardon has no
demandable right to reinstatement to an office already
forfeited from him/her due to the punishment imposed of
their his/her case. He/she only qualifies for a new
appointment.
Garcia v. BOI
Facts: The Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, a foreign
corporation, was attracted to situate its petrochemical
plant in Bataan by “initial inducements and other
circumstances” Subsequently, however, it asked the Board
of Investments to be allowed to move to Batangas on the
ground that it has the right of final choice of plant site. On
that basis, the BOI yielded. The capitulation of the BOI is
challenged as abuse of discretion.

Issue: whether or not BOI committed grave abuse of
discretion when it yield to the wishes of the investor,
national interest notwithstanding.
Ruling: Yes. In the light of all the clear advantages manifest
in the plant’s remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is
shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near
absolute discretion given by the BOI to investors not only
to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own
first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the
least.
The BOI capitulation is adverse to Philippine interest
contrary to the thrust of the Constitution.
KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO
G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.
FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment
Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online
lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of
4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per
terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to
charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its
own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the
expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for
P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare
ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease
Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of
Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of
the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of
Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer
be questioned because it has become the law of the case
Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of
Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to
determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of
Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners
seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not
have a legal standing because they were not parties to the
contract
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling
sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure
from the settled rulings on real parties in interest
because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present
case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in
Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any
sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are
the same but the cases are not. RULE ON
CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and
directly passed upon and determine in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action
between the same parties involving a different cause of
10
action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least
when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When
the second proceeding involves an instrument or
transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the
one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in
the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a
different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a
concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue
is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST
MAIN POINT: What appears in the jurisprudence on
“standing” is that it is only a rule that assures concrete
adverseness which can sharpen the presentation of issues
but it also involves considerations of policy related to
judicial self-restraint. (the 1987 PH Constitution reviewer
pg 339)
FABIAN VS DESIERTO, AGUSTIN EN BANC
G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
President of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation which was engaged in the construction
business. Private respondent Nestor Agustin was the
District Engineer of the First Metro
Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the
bidding for government construction projects, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of
his official position, inveigled petitioner into an amorous
relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the
course of which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with
public works contracts and interceded for it in problems
concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried to
terminate their relationship, private respondent refused
and resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of
employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.
Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against
private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of
misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension
without pay for 1 year. After private respondent moved for
reconsideration, the Ombudsman discovered that the
private respondent’s new counsel had been his classmate
and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The case
was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who
exonerated private respondent from the administrative
charges. Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) that
all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or

decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
II. W/N Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 is substantive
or procedural in nature.
RULING:
I. No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly
authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section
30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No
countervailing argument has been cogently presented to
justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition
which, as correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc.
vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was intended to give this
Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the Court.
II. YES. In the situation under consideration, a transfer by
the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, of pending cases involving a review of decisions of
the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested
with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to
procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to
appeal of an aggrieved party which is affected by the law.
That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by
which the appeal is to be made or decided has been
changed.
MAIN POINT: See page 349 of the book. 
Francisco v. Permiskul
FACTS: An important constitutional question has been
injected in this case which started out as an ordinary
complaint for a sum of money. The petitioner leased his
apartment in Makati to the private respondent for a period
of one year. Pursuant to the lease contract, the private
respondent deposited with the petitioner a certain amount
to answer for unpaid rentals or any damage to the leased
premises except when caused by reasonable wear and
tear. On May 31, 1985, the private respondent vacated the
property. He thereafter requested the refund of his
deposit. The petitioner rejected this request. He said the
lessee still owed him for other charges, including the
11
electricity and water bills and the sum for repainting of the
leased premises to restore them to their original
condition.
As a result, the private respondent sued in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. A summary judgment
was rendered, sustaining the complainant and holding that
the repainting was not chargeable to him. The defendant
was ordered to pay the plaintiff representing the balance
of the deposit after deducting the water and electricity
charges.
This decision was appealed to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati and was affirmed by Judge Jose C. de la Rama on
January 14, 1987. This was done in a memorandum
decision reading in full as follows:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful and thorough perusal,
evaluation and study of the records of this
case, this Court hereby adopts by
reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and
finds that there is no cogent reason to
disturb the same.
WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is
hereby affirmed in toto. 3
When the defendant went to the Court of Appeals, his
petition for review was denied, as so too was his motion
for reconsideration. He is now before the SC to fault the
respondent court, principally for sustaining the
memorandum decision of the regional trial court. His
contention is that it violates Article VIII, Section 14 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE: W/N the memorandum decision is sufficient
compliance with Section 14, Article VIII
RULING: The memorandum in this case was made
pursuant to what is allowed by Section 40 of BP blg 129.
Because of the above considerations the rule that should
be followed is that, where a Memorandum Decision is
used, the decision adopted by reference must be attached
to the Memorandum for easy reference. Nonetheless, the
Memorandum decision should be sparingly used and used
only where the facts as in the main are accepted by both
parties and in simple litigations only.
“A judicial decision does not have to be a bore.”
However, “The interpretation we make today will not apply
retroactively to the memorandum decision rendered by the
regional trial court in the case at bar, or to the decision of
the respondent court such decision on the strength
of Romero v. Court of Appeals. As earlier observed, there was
substancial compliance with Section 40 because of the direct
availability and actual review of the decision of Judge Balita
incorporated by reference in the memorandum decision of
Judge de la Rama. The memorandum decision as then
understood under the Romero decision was a valid act at the
time it was rendered by Judge de la Rama and produced

binding legal effect. We also affirm the finding of the
respondent court that the summary judgment without a
formal trial was in accord with the Rule on Summary
Procedure and that the award of attorney's fees is not
improper.”
Petition denied.
9.25 Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 132601
January 19, 1999
Facts:
On January 4, 1999, the Supreme Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order staying the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The
public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance
of the Temporary Restraining Order arguing that the
action of the Supreme Court not only violated the rule on
finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of
the executive to grant reprieve.
Issue:
WON the court abused its discretion in granting a
Temporary Restraining Order on the execution of
Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has
already been rendered; that by granting the Temporary
Restraining Order, the Honorable Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function.
Ruling:
No. Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution cannot be interpreted as denying the power
of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions
after their finality. In truth, an accused who has been
convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights
and these rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts.
The suspension of such a death sentence is
undisputedly an exercise of judicial power. It is not a
usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its
effects are the same. In the same vein, it cannot be denied
that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 (Death
Penalty Law) by reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is like
that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the
imagination can the exercise by Congress of its plenary
power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the
power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction.
Main point: Article VII, Section 19; is simply the source of
power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision, however,
12
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
control the enforcement of their decisions after their
finality.
10.25 Bayan Muna vs. Romulo
641 SCRA 244
Facts:
The International Criminal Court (ICC) under the
Rome Statute was established with "the power to exercise
its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions”. On May 9, 2003, the
Philippines entered into a Non-Surrender Agreement with
United States of America (USA) which aims to protect what
it refers to and defines as "persons" of the RP and US from
frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought
against them in international tribunals.
Issue:
WON there is jurisdictional conflict between the
Philippines, as party to the non-surrender agreement, and
the International Criminal Court.
Ruling:
Contrary to petitioner’s pretense, the Agreement
does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from,
the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one
complements the other. As a matter of fact, the principle of
complementarity underpins the creation of the
International Criminal Court. As aptly pointed out by
respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction
of the International Criminal Court is to "be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the
signatory states]." Furthermore, under the premise of
complementarity, the primary jurisdiction for any case lies
first with the state’s national judicial systems. A state is
given a chance to exercise complementarity by informing
the International Criminal Court of its choice to investigate
and prosecute its own nationals through its own domestic
courts. Thus, the State has the primary jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute its own nationals in its custody
who may have committed the grave international crimes
specified in the Rome Statute.
Main point: Under the premise of complementarity, the
primary jurisdiction for any case lies first with the state’s
national judicial systems.

11.25 Automotive Industry Workers vs. Executive
Secretary
G.R. No. 157509
Facts:
Petitioners, composed of 10 labor unions assailed
the constitutionality of EO 185 for allegedly revert the set-
up prior to RA 6715 in which only Congress can do.
Solicitor General contend that petitioners have no locus
standi to assail the validity of E.O. No. 185, not even in their
capacity as taxpayers, considering that labor unions are
exempt from paying taxes, citing Sec. 30 of the Tax Reform
Act of 1997. Even assuming that their individual members
are taxpayers, respondents maintain that a taxpayer suit
will not prosper as E.O. No. 185 does not require additional
appropriation for its implementation.
Issue:
WON the 10 labour unions have legal standing to
assail the constitutionality of EO 185?
Ruling:
No. For a citizen to have standing, he must
establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. Petitioners have not shown that they
have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal
injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185. As
labor unions it cannot be said that E.O. No. 185 will
prejudice their rights and interests considering that the
scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of
Labor does not extend to the power to review, reverse,
revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise
of its quasi-judicial functions.
Main point: As labor unions it cannot be said that E.O. No.
185 will prejudice their rights and interests considering
that the scope of the authority conferred upon the
Secretary of Labor does not extend to the power to review,
reverse, revise or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.
12.25 Maniago vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 104392
Facts:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of
shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees
of Texas Instruments, Inc. from Baguio City proper to its
plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one
of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a
13
passenger jeepney owned by respondent Alfredo Boado.
As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple
physical injuries against petitioner’s driver, Herminio
Andaya was filed in court. A month later, a civil case for
damages was filed by respondent Boado against petitioner
Maniago. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the
proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the
pendency of the criminal case against his driver and
because no reservation of the right to bring the civil case
separately had been made in the criminal case. But the
lower court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that
pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed
independently of the criminal action.
Issue:
WON despite the absence of reservation, private
respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages
against petitioner under Art. 2176 & Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code.
Ruling:
No. The right to bring an action for damages under
the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111
(1), otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, the
provision clearly requires that a reservation must be made
to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of
civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been
instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not
limited to those which arise “from the offense charged.”
On the basis of Rule 111 (1 to 3), a civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when
such action arising from the same act or omission, which is
the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to
bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been
instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has
not been reserved or it was brought before the institution
of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not
bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based
on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
Main point: The right of the injured party to sue separately
for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from
crimes ex delicto or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be
deemed instituted with the criminal action.
13.25 Sesbreno vs. CA
G.R. No. 161390
Facts:
Petitioner filed the complaint for damages thru
breach of contract and attorneys fees against the province
of Cebu with the RTC. The RTC rendered a decision in favor
 14

of the petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s

decision and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court
concluded that petitioner failed to sufficiently establish his
allegation that the respondents induced the camineros to
violate the agreement for attorneys fees and the
compromise agreement, and that he suffered damage due
to respondent’s act of directly paying the camineros the
amounts due them. In response to this, the petitioner
raises the issue that the CA erred in not affirming the trial
court decision due to long delay in deciding CA-G.R. CV No.
43287.

Issue:
WON the CA should have affirmed the trial court’s
decision in view of the delay in resolving the case, and
should have denied the appeal because of the formal
defects in the appellant’s brief.

Ruling:
No. Even when there is delay and no decision or
resolution is made within the prescribed period, there is
no automatic affirmation of the appealed decision. This is
different from the rule under Article X, Section 11 (2) of
the 1973 Constitution which said that, in case of delay, the
decision appealed from was deemed affirmed.