Froilan vs Pan Oriental Shipping

waiver of sovereign immunity

G.R. No. L-6060 September 30, 1954

FERNANDO A. FROILAN, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING CO., defendant-appellant,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellee.

Facts:

Plaintiff, Fernando Froilan filed a complaint against the defendant-appellant, Pan Oriental Shipping Co.,
alleging that he purchased from the Shipping Commission the vessel for P200,000, paying P50,000 down
and agreeing to pay the balance in instalments. To secure the payment of the balance of the purchase
price, he executed a chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping Commission. For various
reasons, among them the non-payment of the installments, the Shipping Commission tool possession of
said vessel and considered the contract of sale cancelled. The Shipping Commission chartered and
delivered said vessel to the defendant-appellant Pan Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines. Plaintiff appealed the action of the Shipping Commission to the President of
the Philippines and, in its meeting the Cabinet restored him to all his rights under his original contract with
the Shipping Commission. Plaintiff had repeatedly demanded from the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. the
possession of the vessel in question but the latter refused to do so.
Plaintiff, prayed that, upon the approval of the bond accompanying his complaint, a writ of replevin be
issued for the seizure of said vessel with all its equipment and appurtenances, and that after hearing, he
be adjudged to have the rightful possession thereof . The lower court issued the writ of replevin prayed for
by Froilan and by virtue thereof the Pan Oriental Shipping Co. was divested of its possession of said
vessel.
Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Plaintiff ‘s rights under the contract of sale, for the reason that
when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of said authority
to the property, Plaintiff having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon. Plaintiff paid
the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the vessel, he
filed an action to recover possession thereof and have him declared the rightful owner of said property.
The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil case praying for the possession of
the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted thereon may be foreclosed.
Issues:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the intervenor with regard to the counterclaim.

Discussions:

When the government enters into a contract, for the State is then deem to have divested itself of the mantle of sovereign immunity
and descended to the level of the ordinary individual. Having done so, it becomes subject to judicial action and processes.

Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the government impliedly allowed itself to be sued when it filed a
complaint in intervention for the purpose of asserting claim for affirmative relief against the plaintiff to the
recovery of the vessel. The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it of the right to sue private
parties in its own courts. The state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of actions open to
private litigants. In short, by taking the initiative in an action against a private party, the state surrenders
its privileged position and comes down to the level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires,
within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims and other defenses he might have against the
state.
 Lim, etc. vs. Brownell, Jr., etc.,
G.R. No. L-8587

FACTS:

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing
plaintiff's action for the recovery of real property for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, City of Manila,
with a total area of 29,151 square meters. The lands were, after the last world war, found by
the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi
Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan, as evidenced by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 64904 to 65140,
On March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the
Enemy Act of the United States, as amended, vesting in himself the ownership over two of the
said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2
On July, 6, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (successor of the Alien
Property Custodian) under the authority of the same statute issued a supplemental vesting
order, vesting in himself title to the remaining Lots Nos. 3 and 4.
On August 3, 1948, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (acting on behalf of the
President of the United States) and the President of the Philippines, executed two formal
agreements, one referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4, whereby the said
Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines upon the
latter's undertaking fully to indemnify the United States for all claims in relation to the property
transferred, which claims are payable by the United States of America or the Philippine Alien
Property Administrator of the United States under the Trading with the Enemy Act, as
amended, and for all such costs and expenses of administration as may by law be charged
against the property or proceeds thereof hereby transferred.
On November 15, 1948, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed a formal notice of claim to
the property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator On the theory that the lots in
question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez. that they were mortgaged by her to the Mercantile
Bank of China; that the mortgage having been foreclosed, the property was sold at public
auction during the war to the Japanese Asaichi Kagawa, who, by means of threat and
intimidation succeeded in preventing Arsenia Enriquez from exercising her right of
redemption; and that Kagawa never acquired any valid title to the property because he was
ineligible under the Constitution to acquire residential land in the Philippines by reason of alien
age.
 On March 7, 1950, the claim was disallowed by the Vested Property Claims Committee
of the Philippine Alien Property Administrator, and copy of the decision disallowing the claim
was received by claimant's counsel on the 15th of that month.
On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate
estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney General of the
United States) for the recovery of the property in question with back rents. The complaint was
later amended to include Asaichi Kagawa as defendant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Intervenor-Appellee (Republic of the Philippines) be sued?

HELD:

No suit or claim for the return of said properties pursuant to Section 9 or 32 (a) of the
Trading with the Enemy Act was filed by Plaintiff within two years from the date of vesting, the
“later” date and the last on which suit could be brought. A condition precedent to a suit for the
return of property vested under Trading with the Enemy Act is that it should be filed not later
than April 30, 1949, or within two years from the date of vesting, whichever is later, but in
computing the two years, the period during which there was pending a suitor claim for the
return of the property of the Act shall be excluded.
The court states that In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from insofar as it
dismisses the complaint with respect to Lots 1 and 2 and the claim for damages against the
Attorney General of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, is affirmed, but
revoked insofar as it dismisses the complaint with respect to Lots 3 and 4, as to which the case
is hereby remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
 United States of America vs. Ruiz
136 SCRA 487

Facts:
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided
in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in
the bidding conducted by the US fro the construction of wharves in said base that was wrongly awarded
to another group. For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.
Issue:
Whether the United States Naval Base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to
be able to invoke state immunity.
Held:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence
and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary
acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign andgovernmental acts. The
restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. A state may be said
to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the
exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of
the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes
 USA v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644
Facts:
These cases have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of State Immunity. In
GR No. 76607, the private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air
Base in connection with the bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the
said base which was won by a certain Dizon. The respondents wanted to cancel the award to
the bid winner because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not included in
the invitation to bid, and subsequently, to conduct a rebidding.
In GR No. 79470, FabianGenove filed a complaint for damages against petitioners Lamachia,
Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation centre at
Camp John Hay Air Station Baguio City. It had been ascertained after investigation, from the
testimony of Belsa, Cartalla and Orascion, that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock
used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. Lamachia, as club manager
suspended him and thereafter referred the case to a board of arbitrators conformably to the
collective bargaining agreement between the centre and its employees. The board unanimously
found him guilty and recommended his dismissal. Genove’s reaction was to file his complaint
against the individual petitioners.
In GR No. 80018, Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Cano O’Donnell, an
extension of Clark Air Base, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by the
individual petitioners who are officers of the US Air Force and special agents of the Air Force
Office of Special Investigators. On the basis of the sworn statements made by them,
information for violation of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed
against Bautista in the RTC of Tarlac. Said officers testified against him at his trial. Bautista was
dismissed from his employment. He then filed a complaint against the individual petitioners
claiming that it was because of their acts that he was removed.
In GR No. 80258, a complaint for damages was filed by the private respondents against the
herein petitioners (except the US), for injuries sustained by the plaintiffs as a result of the acts
of the defendants. There is a conflict of factual allegations here. According to the plaintiffs, the
defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them which bit them in
several parts of their bodies and caused extensive injuries to them. The defendants deny this
and claim that plaintiffs were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they were
struggling and resisting arrest. In a motion to dismiss the complaint, the US and the individually
named defendants argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the US, which had not given
its consent to be sued.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendants were also immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for
acts done by them in the performance of their official duties.
Ruling:
US vs GUINTO (GR No 76607)
The court finds the barbershop subject to the concessions granted by the US government to be
commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The petitioners cannot plead any
immunity from the complaint, the contract in question being decidedly commercial. Thus, the
petition is DISMISSED and the lower court directed to proceed with the hearing and decision of
the case.
US vs RODRIGO (GR No 79470)
The restaurant services offered at the John Hay Station operated for profit as a commercial and
not a government activity. The petitioners cannot invoke the doctrine of self immunity to justify
the dismissal of the damage suit filed by Genove. Not even the US government can claim such
immunity because by entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of
its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. Still, the
court holds that the complaint against petitioners in the lower court be dismissed. There was
nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, the petitioner acted quite
properly in terminating the private respondent’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating
act of polluting the soup stock with urine.
US vs CEBALLOS (GR No 80018)
It was clear that the individually-named petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official
functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the
complainant. For discharging their duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly
impleaded for acts immutable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. The
conclusion of the trial court that the answer filed by the special counsel of Clark Air Base was a
submission of the US government to its jurisdiction is rejected. Express waiver cannot be made
by a mere counsel of the government but must be effected through a duly-enacted statute.
Neither does it come under the implied form of consent. Thus, the petition is granted and the
civil case filed in the lower court dismissed.
US vs ALARCON VERGARA (GR No. 80258)
The contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually happened.
The records were too meagre to indicate that the defendants were really discharging their
official duties or had actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. Only after
the lower court shall have determined in what capacity the petitioners were acting will the
court determine, if still necessary, if the doctrine of state immunity is applicable.
 Republic vs. Villasor

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of

the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the
Sheriff of the City of Manila, the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener
Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction Corporation,
respondents.
November 28, 1973
Fernando, J:
Facts:
The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino
Unchuan and International Construction Corporation was declared final and
executory by Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor.
Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was
issued. And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of
garnishment with several banks, specially on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of
the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the
same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated
and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of
military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the
properties of AFP, hence the notices and garnishments are null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held: No. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates
of the Constitution. It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from
the juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its government is immune
from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of
any formal conception or obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground
that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends.
 Philippine National Bank vs Judge Javier Pabalan

On December 17, 1970, Judge Javier Pabalan issued a writ of execution followed thereafter by a notice of
garnishment on the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration (PVTA) in the sum of P12,724.66
deposited with the Philippine National Bank in La Union. PNB La Union filed an administrative complaint
against Pabalan for grave abuse of discretion, alleging that the latter failed to recognize that the questioned
funds are of public character and therefore may not be garnished, attached, nor may be levied upon. The PNB
La Union Branch invoked the doctrine of non suability, putting a bar on the notice of garnishment.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB may be sued.
HELD: Yes. Funds of public corporations which can sue and be sued are not exempt from garnishment. PVTA
is also a public corporation with the same attributes, a similar outcome is attributed. The government has
entered with them into a commercial business hence it has abandoned its sovereign capacity and has stepped
down to the level of a corporation. Therefore, it is subject to rules governing ordinary corporations and in effect
can be sued. Therefore, the petition of PNB La Union is denied.
 Meritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands
G.R. No. L-11154 March 21, 1916
Facts:
Merrit, riding on a motorcycle at a speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, collided with an
ambulance of the General Hospital which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having
sounded any whistle or horn. Merrit was severely injured. His condition had undergone
depreciation and his efficiency as a contractor was affected. The inquiry at once arises whether
the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom even if the
collision was due to the negligence committed by an agent or employee of the government which
is the chauffeur.

Issue:
Whether or not the Government may be held in this case.

Held:
No. That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and the principle laid down
in a decision, among others, of the 18th of May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of
the state is limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly empowered by a
definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some definite purpose which
gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to a
public official charged with some administrative or technical office who can be held to the
proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently,
the trial court in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment of damages,
caused by an official of the second class referred to, has by erroneous interpretation infringed the
provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30, 1911;
122 Jur. Civ., 146.) It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine
Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the
meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed, without costs in this instance.
Whether the Government intends to make itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth,
which the plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its employees, be legislative
enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds therefore, we are not called upon to determine. This
matter rests solely with the Legislature and not with the courts.
 Kuroda v. Jalandoni
Doctrine:
Rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on
the generally accepted principals of international law. They form part of the law of our nation even if the
Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has
been deliberately general a n d e x t e n s i v e i n i t s s c o p e a n d i s n o t c o n f i n e d t o t h e
r e c o g n i t i o n o f r u l e s a n d principles of international law as contained in treaties to which
our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Facts:
- A Military commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order 68 of the President of
the Philippines, which was issued on July 29, 1947. This is an
acte s t a b l i s h i n g a n a t i o n a l w a r c r i m e s o f f i c e a n d p r e s c r i b i n g r u l e s a n d r e g u l a t i o n gov
erning the trial of accused war criminals.- Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant -General of the
Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The
Philippines from1943-1944, is charged before a military commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the
Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed " t o d i s c h a r g e h i s
d u t i e s a s s u c h c o m m a n d , p e r m i t t i n g t h e m t o c o m m i t b r u t a l atrocities and other high
crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the
laws and customs of war".- Melville Hussey and Robert Port, American lawyers, were appointed
prosecutors in behalf of USA.- Kuroda challenges the legality of the EO No. 68 and the personality as
prosecutors of Hussey and Port.- Kuroda’s arguments were: (1)EO No . is illegal on the ground that
it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional law but also our loc al laws; (2)
Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the
Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a s i g n a t o r y
t o t h e f i r s t a n d s i g n e d t h e s e c o n d o n l y i n 1 9 4 7 a n d , t h e r e f o r e , h e i s charged with
“crime” not based on law, national or international; and (3) Hussey a n d P o r t h a v e n o
p e r s o n a l i t y a s p r o s e c u t o r i n t h i s c a s e b e c a u s e t h e y a r e n o t qualified to practice law in
Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and
thea p p o i n t m e n t o f s a i d a t t o r n e y s a s p r o s e c u t o r s i s violative of our
n a t i o n a l sovereignty.

Issues/Held:
 W O N E O N o . 6 8 i s v a l i d a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ? [ Y e s i t i s a v a l i d because it is based
on the generally accepted principles of international law whichform part of our laws.]
 WON rules and regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of the law of the
nation even if Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them? [Yes,
they form part of our laws.]
 WON the American lawyers could participate in the prosecution of this case? [Yes,
they can.]

Ratio:
(1) The order is valid and constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that- The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law
of t h e p r e s e n t d a y i n c l u d i n g t h e H a g u e C o n v e n t i o n t h e G e n e v a C o n v e n t i o n a n d signi
ficant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the United Nation, all
t h o s e p e r s o n m i l i t a r y o r c i v i l i a n w h o h a v e b e e n g u i l t y o f planning preparing or waging a
war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of t h e
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable
therefore.
. Consequently, in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68, the
President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of ourConstitution. The promulgation of said executive order is an
exercise by the President of his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by
this Court in thecase of Yamashita vs. Styer. Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief isfully
empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war namely the trial andpunishment of war
criminal through the issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.(2) Rules and
regulations of the Hague and Geneva conventions form part of and are wholly based on the
generally accepted principals of international law. In fact,these rules and principles were accepted by the
two belligerent nations, the UnitedStates and Japan, who were signatories to the two
Conventions.
Such rule and p r i n c i p l e s t h e r e f o r e f o r m p a r t o f t h e l a w o f o u r n a t i o n e v e n
i f t h e Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our Constitution has
been deliberately general and extensive in its scope a n d i s n o t c o n f i n e d t o t h e
r e c o g n i t i o n o f r u l e s a n d p r i n c i p l e s o f international law as contained in treaties
to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed
the Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were
equally bound together with the United States and with Japan to the right and
obligation contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries.(3) There is nothing in said executive
order which requires that counsel
appearingb e f o r e s a i d c o m m i s s i o n m u s t b e a t t o r n e y s q u a l i f i e d t o p r a c t i c e l a w
i n t h e Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. Respondent Military Commission is a special
military tribunal governed by a special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court.
Secondly, the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper
thatU n i t e d S t a t e s , w h i c h h a s s u b m i t t e d t h e v i n d i c a t i o n o f c r i m e s a g a
i n s t h e r government and her people to a tribunal of our nation, should be
allowedr e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e t r i a l o f t h o s e v e r y c r i m e s . I f t h e r
e h a s b e e n a n y relinquishment of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the
United

Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tah Keh, 75 Phil 113

FACTS:
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan KehFacts: Petitioner Co Kim Cham had as pending civil Case initiated duringthe time of
the Japanese occupation. After the liberation of ManilaJudge Arsenio Dizon refused to continue hearings on his
case saying that the proclamation of Gen Douglas MacArthur has invalidated and nullified all judicial proceedings
and judgments of the courts of the Philippines and without the enabling law, lower courts have no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines under the
Japanese.
Issues:
 Whether or Not judicial proceedings and decisions during the Japanese Occupation were valid and
remained valid.
 Whether or not the proclamation of General MacArthur declared that all laws, regulations and processes
of any other Government other than that of the commonwealth are null and void, invalidated and all
judgments and judicial acts proceeding from the courts.
 Whether or not of they were invalidated (reference to No.2), the courts can continue hearing the cases
pending before them

Held:1.It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings and non-political
judgements of a de facto government are good and valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto
governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-
known principle of post liminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the
liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of
General Douglas MacArthur.
2.it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas
MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of
the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court
proceedings. "a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."If a belligerent occupant is required to establish courts of justice in the territory
occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing there in their civil
rights, by necessary implication, the military commander of the forces of liberation or the restored
government is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their
litigationduring the period of occupation.
3.the proceedings in cases then pending in said court may continue, without necessity of enacting a law
conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. The laws and courts of the Philippines
did not become the laws and courts of Japan by being continued as requiredby the law of nations.Same
courts may continue exercising the same jurisdictions and cases pending therein before therestoration
of the commonwealth until abolished and replaced by the said government.DECISION: WRIT OF
MANDAMUS IS ISSUED to the judge of the CourtOf First Instance of Manila ordering him to take
cognizance andcontinue to final judgement the proceedings in Case No. 3012.3
Kinds of De Facto Government:

Established through Rebellion

– Governments getspossession and control through the force of the voice of the majority and maintains itself rightful government2.

Established through Occupation

– (PARAMOUNT FORCE)Maintained by the military forces who invade and occupythe territory of the enemy.3.

Established through Insurrection

– Established as anindependent government by the inhabitants of thecountry who rise in insurrection against the parent state.
 ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL 155
Facts:
The Congress of the Philippines enacted the act which nationalizes the retail trade business,
Republic Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business,” prohibiting aliens in
general to engage in retail trade in our country. Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on
behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of RA No.1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is
unconstitutional.
 it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their
liberty and property without due process
 the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
 the Act violates international and treaty obligations
Issue:
Whether Congress in enacting R.A. No. 1180 violated the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of
Human Rights and the Philippine-Chinese Treaty of Amity.
Held:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among residents. It merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike.
The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by alien of the retail
trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s target in the enactment of the
Act.
The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the alien and the national
as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil.
where he temporarily stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the
State, and the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of the country,
the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a
monopolistic control on the nation’s economy endangering the national security in times of
crisis and emergency.
 Gonzales v. Hechanova

FACTS:

During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and
Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the
National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice. Hence, the then Executive
Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of
our local planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed
the executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”,
because Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or
any other government agency.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into by Macapagal

HELD:

The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has been sufficiently
established. Even assuming that said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same
are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with
the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American
constitutional system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.

Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress. He may not
interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He
may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same
through an executive agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts,
suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that
the SC may not be deprived “of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari,
or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in “All
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in
question”. In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with
the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
 In re Garcia, 2 SCRA 984

Facts:
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others,
that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage; that he had taken and
finished in Spain the course of "Bachillerato Superior"; that he was approved, selected and
qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission to the Central University of Madrid
where he studied and finished the law course graduating as "Licenciado en derecho"; and
thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain; and that under the provisions
of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain,
he is entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations.
Issue:
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar.
Held:
The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on Academic Degrees and
Exercise of Profession between the RP and Spain cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said
treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice thair profession in Spain, and
the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a
Filipino citizen desiring to practice profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the
laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals
desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the treaty invoked by the
applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations on the contracting state in
whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the RP and Spain could not have been
intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being
reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.
 Pp. v. Lagman, GR No. 45892, July 13, 1938 Pp. v Soza, GR No. 45893, July 13,
1938

FACTS:
Appellants Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60
of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two
appellants, being Filipinos and having reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and
unlawfully refused to register in the military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said
year, even though they had been required to do so. The two appellants were duly notified to
appear before the Acceptance Board in order to register for military service but still did not
register up to the date of the filing of the information. Appellants argue that they did not
register because de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother and a brother eight years old to
support, and Lagman also has a father to support, has no military learnings, and does not wish
to kill or be killed. The Court of First Instance sentenced them both to one month and one day
of imprisonment, with the costs.
ISSUE:
WON the National Defense Law (Sec 60, Commonwealth Act No. 1) was constitutional by virtue
of Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which states that: SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a
prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law
to render personal military or civil service.
HELD: YES. Decision of CFI affirmed. The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes
compulsory military service, does not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the
contrary, in faithful compliance therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State
cannot be performed except through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will
of the citizens would be to make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no
sufficient men who volunteer to enlist therein. In US cases, it was stated that the right of the
Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the
State; and, that a person may be compelled by force.
To take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down
in its defense. What justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether
actual or whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstances
of the appellants do not excuse them from their duty to present themselves before the
Acceptance Board because they can obtain the proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these
family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of Commonwealth Act No. 1)
Hence, the National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does
not go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. “The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of
this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil service.”
 Aglipay v. Ruiz GR 45459, 13 March 1937 (64 Phil 201).
Facts:
In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of postage
stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rdInternational Eucharistic Congress,
organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine
Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq.,
member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of
the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs of
the postage for printing. The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof remained
unsold. The further sale of the stamps was sought to be prevented by the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether the issuance of the postage stamps was in violation of the Constitution.
Held:
Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to
an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored “the aid
of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to
themselves and their posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty
and democracy,” they thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. Act 4052 contemplates no religious
purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary power to determine
when the issuance of special postage stamps would be “advantageous to the Government.” Of
course, the phrase “advantageous to the Government” does not authorize the violation of the
Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public money or property for the use, benefit
or support of a particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance of the postage stamps
was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic
Church, nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. The purpose
of the issuing of the stamps was to take advantage of an event considered of international
importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people and attract more tourists to the
country. Thus, instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp contained a map of the
Philippines, the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of prohibition, without pronouncement as to
costs.
 Calalang vs. Williams
Facts:

In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public Works, with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules
and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe
transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of
Public Works adopted the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of
animal drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila.
Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Issue:
 Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions
of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or
trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
 Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept
regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people?
Held:
1.No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the
desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the
bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may
interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and
prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over authority because society
will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2. No. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, theadoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of
society, through the maintenance of a propereconomic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of thecommunity, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,or
extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existenceof all governments on the
time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and
diverse units of a society and of theprotection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as acombined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamentaland paramount
objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the
greatest good to the greatest number.”
THE PETITION IS DENIED WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF DAR, G.R. No. 78742
(175 SCRA 343), July 14, 1989
Facts:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter
alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Several petitions are the root of the case:

e. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare
Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend
that President Aquino usurped the legislature’s power.

f. A petition by landowners and sugar planters in Victoria’s Mill Negros Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is
the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.

g. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.

h. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares.

Issue: Whether or Not the aforementioned EO’s, PD, and RA were constitutional.

Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power and eminent
domain. The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized
under Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of
Police Power and Eminent Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to deprive
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject and
the method. Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be
determined is the method employed to achieve it.

Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction
between the police power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under
police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of
such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent
Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the
owner of the property expropriated.
 PT&T vs. NLRC and Grace de Guzman

FACTS: This is a case for illegal dismissal filed by Grace de Guzman against PT&T.
Grace de Guzman is a probationary employee of PT&T. In her job application, she represented
that she was single although she was married. When management found out, she was made to
explain. However, her explanation was found unsatisfactory so she was subsequently dismissed
from work. Grace thus filed a case for illegal dismissal against PT&T with RAB. According to the
Labor Arbiter, Grace, who had already gained the status of regular employee, was illegally
dismissed by PT&T. Moreover, he ruled that Grace was apparently discriminated against on
account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company rules.
On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was upheld. The Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise rebuffed, hence, this special civil action.
Petitioner argued that the dismissal was not because Grace was married but because of her
concealment of the fact that she was married. Such concealment amounted to dishonesty,
which was why she was dismissed from work.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the company policy of not accepting married women for employment was discriminatory
 Whether or not Grace’s act of concealment amounted to dishonesty, leading to loss of confidence
 Whether or not Grace was illegally dismissed

HELD:
There was discrimination. Article 136 of the Labor Code explicitly prohibits discrimination
merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or
considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of
the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws
and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that it dismissed private
respondent from employment on account of her dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that
her ties with the company were dissolved principally because of the company’s policy that
married women are not qualified for employment in PT&T, and not merely because of her
supposed acts of dishonesty.
Concealment did not amount to willful dishonesty. Verily, private respondent’s act of
concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as
willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to
retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by that
very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being
disqualified from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment,
it should not be simulated. It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee
and not on the employer’s caprices. Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for
causes which are improper, illegal, or unjustified.
However, SC nevertheless ruled that Grace did commit an act of dishonesty, which should be
sanctioned and therefore agreed with the NLRC’s decision that the dishonesty warranted
temporary suspension of Grace from work.

Grace attained regular status as an employee. Private respondent, it must be observed, had
gained regular status at the time of her dismissal. When she was served her walking papers on
Jan. 29, 1992, she was about to complete the probationary period of 150 days as she was
contracted as a probationary employee on September 2, 1991. That her dismissal would be
effected just when her probationary period was winding down clearly raises the plausible
conclusion that it was done in order to prevent her from earning security of tenure.

There was illegal dismissal. As an employee who had therefore gained regular status, and as
she had been dismissed without just cause, she is entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent.

On Stipulation against Marriage. In the final reckoning, the danger of PT&T’s policy against
marriage is that it strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable
social institution and, ultimately, of the family as the foundation of the nation.

Petition dismissed.
 Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
 Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
 Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim
that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
 Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
 The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm
and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
 Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It
was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for
any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake
region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:
 Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region?
 Whether the LLDA is a quasi-judicial agency?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a
general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which
is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose
of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government
Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes. Thus
it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

The LLDA has express powers as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution
cases with authority to issue a “cease and desist order” and on matters affecting the
construction of illegal fishpens, fish cages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay.
Sec.149 of RA 7160 has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the LLDA, RA 4850, as
amended. Thus, the LLDA has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for enjoyment of fishery
privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority
to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.