People

v. Gonzales-Flores (April 19, 2001)

FACTS: Gonzales-Flores was found guilty of illegal recruitment as seamen three different people at the same time and collecting money from them
without the necessary license. The complainants filed a complaint after they tried to follow-up their applications and nothing happened for three
months and they found out from the POEA that the accused wasn’t licensed. The evidence consisted of the complainant’s testimonies and
testimonies of other witnesses. Accused now argues that the Court didn’t have enough evidence to convict her.

ISSUE: W/N the Court had enough evidence to convict the accused.

HELD: The SC upholds the conviction. The elements of illegalrecruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in acts ofrecruitment and
placement of workers; (2) the accused has no license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or overseas; and (3) the
accused commits the unlawful acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. All the conditions are present. The evidence shows
that she could do something to get their applications approved. Accused contends that all she did was to refer the complaints but the Labor
Code, recruitment includes “referral” which is defined as the act of passing along or forwarding an applicant for employment after initial interview
of a selected application for employment or a selected employer, placement after initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a
selected employer, placement officer, or bureau. Also she did more than just make referrals, she actively and directly enlisted complainants for
employment aboard, when promising jobs as seamen, and collected money.


People of the Phil. vs Loma Goce, et. al.

Facts: On January 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate nd in large scale, punishable under Articles 38 and 39 of
the labor code as amended by PD 2018, filed against Dan and Loma Goce and Nelly Agustin in the RTC of Manila, alleging that in or about during
the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive in the City of Manila, the accused conspired and represent
themsleves to have the capacity to recruit Filipino workers for employment abroad.

January 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the 3 accused bot none of them was arrested. Hence, on February 1989, the RTC prdered the
case archived but issued a standing warrant os arrest against the accused.

Thereafter, knowing the whereabouts of the accused, Rogelio Salado requested for a copy of the warrant of arrest and eventually Nelly Agustin was
apprehended by the Paranaque Police. Agustin's counsel filed a motion to revive the case and requested to set a hearing for purpose of due
process and for accused to immediately have her day in court. On the arraignment, Agustin pleaded not guilty and the trial went on with four
complainants testified for the prosecution and reciepts of the processing fees they paid.

Agustin for the defense asserted that Goce couple were licensed recruiters but denied her participation in the recruitment and denied knowledge
of the receipts as well.

On November 1993, trial court rendered judgment finding that Agustin as a principal in the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale with sentence
of life imprisonment and pay P100,000.00.

Issues: Agustin appealed witht the follwing arguments: (1) her act of introducing the complainants to the couple does not fall within the meaning
of illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13 in relation to Article 34 of the labor code; (2) there is no proof of conspiracy and (3) there is
no proof that appellant offered/promised overseas employment to the complainants.

Ruling: The testimonial evidence shows that Agustin indeed further committted acts constitutive of illegal recruitment because, the complainants
had a previous interview with Agustin (as employee of the Goce couple) about fees and papers to submit that may constitute as referral. Agustin
collected the payments of the complainants as well as their passports, trainning fees, medical tests and other expenses.On the issue of proof, the
court held that the receipts exhibited by the claimants are clear enough to prove the payments and transaction made.


People vs Laogo


People vs Panis

Facts: Four informations were filed in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent
herein, “without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and
promising employment in Saudi Arabia” to four separate individuals, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one
person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only “whenever two or
more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. ”

Issue: How Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, reading as follows, should be be interpreted:
(b) Recruitment and placement’ refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in
the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays
down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers,
the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words “shall be deemed”
create that presumption.


People vs Hernandez



People vs Jamilosa

FACTS: Sometime in the months of January to February, 1996, representing to have the capacity, authority or license to contract, enlist and deploy
or transport workers for overseas employment, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally recruit, contract and promise to deploy, for a
fee the herein complainants, namely, Imelda D. Bamba, Geraldine M. Lagman and Alma E. Singh, for work or employment in Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. in Nursing Home and Care Center.

Prosecution presented three witnesses, namely Imelda Bamba, Geraldine Lagman and Alma Singh.

According to Bamba, she met the appellant on a bus. She was on her way to SM North Edsa where she was a company nurse. Appellant introduced
himself as a recruiter of workers for employment abroad. Appellant told her he could help her get employed as nurse. Appellant gave his pager
number and instructed her to contact him is she’s interested. Sometime in January 1996, appellant fetched her at her office, went to her house and
gave him the necessary documents and handed to appellant the amount of US$300.00 and the latter showed her a photocopy of her supposed US
visa. However, the appellant did not issue a receipt for the said money. Thereafter, appellant told her to resign from her work because she was
booked with Northwest Airlines and to leave for USA on Feb, 1996. On the scheduled departure, appellant failed to show up. Instead, called and
informed her that he failed to give the passport and US visa because she had to go to province because his wife died. Trying to contact him to the
supposed residence and hotel where he temporarily resided, but to no avail.

Winess Lagman testified that she is a registered nurse. In January 1996, she went to SM North Edsa to visit her cousin Bamba. At that time Bamba
informed her that she was going to meet to appellant. Bamba invited Lagman to go with her. The appellant convinced them of his ability to send
them abroad. On their next meeting, Lagman handed to the latter the necessary documents and an amount of US$300.00 and 2 bottles of black label
without any receipt issued by the appellant. Four days after their meeting, a telephone company called her because her number was appearing in
appellants cell phone documents. The caller is trying to locate him as he was a swindler. She became suspicious and told Bamba about the matter.
One week before her scheduled flight, appellant told her he could not meet them because his mother passed away.

Lastly, Alma Singh, who is also a registered nurse, declared that she first met the appellant at SM North Edsa when Imelda Bamba introduced the
latter to her. Appellant told her that he is an undercover agent of FBI and he could fix her US visa. On their next meeting, she gave all the pertinent
documents. Thereafter, she gave P10,000 to the appellant covering half price of her plane ticket. They paged the appellant through his beeper to set
up another appointment but the appellant avoided them as he had many things to do.

The accused Jamilosa testified on direct examination that he never told Bamba that he could get her a job in USA, the truth being that she wanted to
leave SM as company nurse because she was having a problem thereat. Bamba called him several times, seeking advices from him. He started courting
Bamba and went out dating until latter became his girlfriend. He met Lagman and Singh thru Bamba. As complainants seeking advice on how to apply
for jobs abroad, lest he be charged as a recruiter, he made Bamba, Lagman and Singh sign separate certifications, all to effect that he never recruited
them and no money was involved. Bamba filed an illegal recruitment case against him because they quarreled and separated.

RTC rendered judgment finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment in large scale.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in convicting accused appellant of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale

HELD: “Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, That any person
or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.

Illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of
authority. Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more
persons shall be deemed so engaged.

To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is burdened to prove three (3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the person charged undertook
a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) accused did not have the license or the
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons
that the act of recruitment may be for profit or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction
for illegal recruitment.

New Life v CA G.R. No. 94071 March 31, 1992
J. Regalado

Facts: Julian Sy, owner of New Life, insured his building in 3 different insurance agencies for 350,000, 1,000,000, and 200,000. When his building and
the goods inside burned down, he claimed for insurance indemnities, but these were rejected by the three companies for violation of policy
conditions.

Sy filed for 3 different suits in the trial court, where he won all suits against the insurance companies. The court of appealsreversed the decision of
the trial court.

Issue: Did the petitioner violate conditions 3 and 27 of the three insurance policies, thereby foreiting collection of indemnities?

Held: Yes. Condition 3. The insured shall give notice to the Company of any insurance or insurances already effected, or which may subsequently be
effected, covering any of the property or properties consisting of stocks in trade, goods in process and/or inventories only hereby insured, and unless
such notice be given and the particulars of such insurance or insurances be stated therein or endorsed on this policy pursuant to Section 50 of the
Insurance Code, by or on behalf of the Company before the occurrence of any loss or damage, all benefits under this policy shall be deemed forfeited,
provided however, that this condition shall not apply when the total insurance or insurances in force at the time of loss or damage not more than
P200,000.00.

Sy never disclosed co-insurance in the contracts he entered into with the three corporations. The insured is specifically required to disclose the
insurance that he had contracted with other companies. Sy also contended that the insurance agents knew of the co-insurance. However, the theory
of imputed knowledge, that the knowledge of the agent is presumed to be known by the principal, is not enough.

When the words of the document are readily understandable by an ordinary reader, there is no need for construction anymore.

The conformity of the insured to the terms of the policy is implied with his failure to disagree with the terms of the contract.

Since Sy, was a businessman, it was incumbent upon him to read the contracts.

Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Yap- The obvious purpose of the aforesaid requirement in the policy is to prevent over-insurance and
thus avert the perpetration of fraud. The public, as well as the insurer, is interested in preventing the situation in which a fire would be profitable to
the insured.

“Also, policy condition 15 was used. It stated: 15.. . . if any false declaration be made or used in support thereof, . . . all benefits under this Policy shall
be forfeited . . .”

As for condition number 27, the stipulation read:
27. Action or suit clause. — If a claim be made and rejected and an action or suit be not commenced either in the Insurance Commission or any court
of competent jurisdiction of notice of such rejection, or in case of arbitration taking place as provided herein, within twelve (12) months after due
notice of the award made by the arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, then the claim shall for all purposes be deemed to have been abandoned and
shall not thereafter be recoverable hereunder.

This is regarding Sy’s claim for one of the companies. Recovery was filed in court by petitioners only on January 31, 1984, or after more than one (1)
year had elapsed from petitioners' receipt of the insurers' letter of denial on November 29, 1982. This made it void.


SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION et al.
480 SCRA 146 (2006)

FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace International Management Services (Sunace) under a
12-month contract. Such employment was made with the assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the contract,
Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese employer for another 2 years.

When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and her Taiwanese employer before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-
year extension of her employment contract was with the consent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals
affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. Hence, the filing of this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozo’s employment was made with the knowledge and consent of Sunace

HELD: There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal
directly negotiated with the employee and entered into a new and separate employment contract.

As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information given to Sunace that Montehermozo had taken already her savings from
her foreign employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the extension or Sunace’s consent thereto.

Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed,
by Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Montehermozo’s filing of the
complaint on February 14, 2000.

Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as
obviously, the act of its principal extending [Montehermozo’s] employment contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a misapplication
of the theory of imputed knowledge.

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal, employer, not the other way around. The knowledge
of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said
to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Montehermozo’s claims arising from the 2-year employment
extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights
and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. Furthermore, as Sunace
correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the original
employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and separate employment contract in
Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code states that the agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business entrusted to the agent,
dealing directly with third persons.


ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. AND MARLOW NAVIGATION CO., INC.
GR No. 167614 – March 24, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., under a POEA-
approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7
days paid vacation leave per month.

On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second
Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000 upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April
1998.

Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer. Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was
repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998, serving only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine
(9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Serrano filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the
total amount of US$26,442.73 (based on the computation of $2590/month from June 1998 to February 199, $413.90 for March 1998, and $1640
for March 1999) as well as moral and exemplary damages.

The LA declared the petitioner’s dismissal illegal and awarded him US$8,770, representing his salaray for three (3) months of the unexpired portion
of the aforesaid contract of employment, plus $45 for salary differential and for attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total amount; however, no
compensation for damages as prayed was awarded.

On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision and awarded Serrano $4669.50, representing three (3) months salary at $1400/month, plus 445
salary differential and 10% for attorney’s fees. This decision was based on the provision of RA 8042, which was made into law on July 15, 1995.

Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last clause in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of RA 8042, which reads:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. – x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract,
the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
The NLRC denied the Motion; hence, Serrano filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA), reiterating the constitutional challenge
against the subject clause. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate, but skirted the constitutional issue raised
by herein petitioner Serrano.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a
protected sector.

HELD:
On the first issue.
impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing
acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.

As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995 preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and
respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042, particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the
parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract, they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of
R.A. No. 8042.

But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly
the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they
may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must
yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public welfare.

On the second issue.

The answer is in the affirmative.

Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the law.

Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection
of their rights and welfare.

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary
benefits should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none
should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.

Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its
legislation; however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane
to the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to all members of the class.

There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or rational
basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest; b) the
middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and
that the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest; and c) strict judicial scrutiny in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.

Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject
clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels:

First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;

Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and

Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of
the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with
the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or
more in their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such
limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term
employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of
OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

There being a suspect classification involving a vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the classification to a strict
judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.

What constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale of rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. It is
akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way, such as the public interest in safeguarding health or
maintaining medical standards, or in maintaining access to information on matters of public concern.

In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.

Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there
are mechanisms already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes
administrative disciplinary measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to migrant workers and/or their
Philippine agents. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive suspension. The POEA Rules and Regulations
Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures against erring
foreign employers.

Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary
liability of their foreign principals.

Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal
protection.

The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.