I.
TORTS
A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION
G.R. No. L-3756 June 30, 1952 PONENTE: LABRADOR, J.:
SAGRADA ORDEN DE PREDICADORES DEL SANTISMO ROSARIO DE FILIPINAS vs.NATIONAL COCONUT
CORPORATION Topic: Sources of Obligations
FACTS: This is an action to recover the possession of a piece of real property (land and warehouses) situated in
Pandacan Manila, and the rentals for its occupation and use.
The land belongs to the plaintiff, in whose name the title was registered before the war. During the Japanese
military occupation, the land was acquired by a Japanese corporation Taiwan Tekkosho After liberation, (April 4,
1946), the Alien Property Custodian of the United States of America took possession, control, and custody under
Trading with the Enemy Act for the reason that it belonged to an enemy national.
In 1946 the property was occupied by the Copra Export Management Company under a custodianship agreement
with United States Alien Property Custodian & when it vacated the property it was occupied by the defendant.
The Philippine Government made representations with the Office Alien Property Custodian for the use of property
by the Government .
Plaintiff made claim to the property before the Alien Property Custodian of the United States, but as this was
denied, it brought an action in CFI Manila to annul the sale of property of Taiwan Tekkosho, and recover its
possession. The case did not come for trial because the parties presented a joint petition in which it is claimed by
plaintiff that the sale in favor of the Taiwan Tekkosho was null and void because it was executed under threats,
duress, and intimidation, and it was agreed that the title issued in the name of the Taiwan Tekkosho be cancelled
and the original title of plaintiff re-issued; that the claims, rights, title, and interest of the Alien Property Custodian
be cancelled and held for naught; that the occupant National Coconut Corporation has until February 28, 1949, to
recover its equipment from the property and vacate the premises; that plaintiff, upon entry of judgment, pay to
the Philippine Alien Property Administration the sum of P140,000. The court rendered judgment releasing the
defendant and the intervenor from liability, but reversing to the plaintiff the right to recover from the National
Coconut Corporation reasonable rentals for the use and occupation of the premises.
The present action is to recover the reasonable rentals from August, 1946, the date when the defendant began to
occupy the premises, to the date it vacated it.
The defendant does not contest its liability for the rentals at the rate of P3,000 per month from February 28, 1949
(the date specified in the judgment aforemetioned), but resists the claim therefor prior to this date. It interposes
the defense that it occupied the property in good faith, under no obligation whatsoever to pay rentals for the use
and occupation of the warehouse. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff to recover from the defendant the sum
of P3,000 a month, as reasonable rentals, from August, 1946, to the date the defendant vacates the premises.
The judgment declares that plaintiff has always been the owner, as the sale of Japanese purchaser was void ab
initio; that the Alien Property Administration never acquired any right to the property, but that it held the same
in trust until the determination as to whether or not the owner is an enemy citizen.
ISSUE: Whether the fact of ownership of plaintiff rendered the defendant liable for the use and occupation of the
subject propery.
Held: NO
No. Defendant’s liability does not arise from any of the four sources of obligations, namely, law, contract or quasi-
contract, crime, or negligence. (Article 1089, Spanish Civil Code.)
Defendant-appellant is not guilty of any offense at all, because it entered the premises and occupied it with the
permission of the entity which had the legal control and administration thereof, the Allien Property
Administration. Neither was there any negligence on its part.
There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between the Alien Property Custodian and the Taiwan
Tekkosho, which had secured the possession of the property from the plaintiff-appellee by the use of duress, such
that the Alien Property Custodian or its permittee (defendant-appellant) may be held responsible for the supposed
illegality of the occupation of the property by the said Taiwan Tekkosho. The Allien Property Administration had
the control and administration of the property not as successor to the interests of the enemy holder of the title,
the Taiwan Tekkosho, but by express provision of law (Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States, 40 Stat.,
411; 50 U.S.C.A., 189).
Neither is it a trustee of the former owner, the plaintiff-appellee herein, but a trustee of then Government of the
United States, in its own right, to the exclusion of, and against the claim or title of, the enemy owner.
From August, 1946, when defendant-appellant took possession, to the late of judgment on February 28, 1948,
Allien Property Administration had the absolute control of the property as trustee of the Government of the
United States, with power to dispose of it by sale or otherwise, as though it were the absolute owner. (U.S vs.
Chemical Foundation [C.C.A. Del. 1925], 5 F. [2d], 191; 50 U.S.C.A., 283.) Therefore, even if defendant-appellant
were liable to the Allien Property Administration for rentals, these would not accrue to the benefit of the plaintiff-
appellee, the owner, but to the United States Government.
NAGUIAT v. NLRC G.R. No. 116123 March 13, 1997 Panganiban, J.
TOPIC: Concept Of Tort
FACTS: Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (“CFTI”) held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force Exchange
Services ("AAFES") for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was CFTI's president,
while Antolin T. Naguiat was its vice-president. Like Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated ("Naguiat
Enterprises"), a trading firm, it was a family-owned corporation. Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in
the Philippines, the AAFES was dissolved. Individual respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxicab
drivers. The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers' union"), through its local president, Eduardo Castillo, and
CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits that should be awarded in favor of the drivers. They arrived
at an agreement that the separated drivers will be given P500.00 for every year of service as severance pay. This
was not accepted by the individual respondents.
Instead, after disaffiliating themselves from the drivers' union, individual respondents, through the National
Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM"), a labor organization which they subsequently joined, filed a complaint
for payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-out. In their complaint, herein private respondents
alleged that they were regular employees of Naguiat Enterprises, although their individual applications for
employment were approved by CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been
hired by CFTI, and that the former thence managed, controlled and supervised their employment.
The labor arbiter, finding the individual complainants to be regular workers of CFTI, ordered the latter to pay them
P1,200.00 for every year of service "for humanitarian consideration" and not an award for separation pay, setting
aside the earlier agreement between CFTI and the drivers' union of P500.00 for every year of service. On appeal,
the NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation pay to the respondents where in
discharging such obligations, Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which is headed by Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin
Naguiat, father and son at the same time the President and Vice-President and General Manager, respectively,
should be joined as indispensable party whose liability is joint and several. The motion for reconsideration of the
petitioners was denied by the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not officers of corporations are ipso facto liable jointly and severally with the companies they
represent for the payment of separation pay.
HELD: Concept Of Tort
Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of "corporate tort." Essentially, "tort" consists in the violation
of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty. Article 283
of the Labor Code mandates the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is the
condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently, its
stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or operation of the business should be held personally
liable.
Naguiat Enterprises Not Liable
There was no substantial basis to hold that Naguiat Enterprises is an indirect employer of individual respondents
much less a labor only contractor. Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that Naguiat Enterprises
managed, supervised and controlled their employment. It appears that they were confused on the personalities
of Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual who was the president of CFTI, and Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., as a
separate corporate entity with a separate business. They presumed that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the same
time a stockholder and director of Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., was managing and controlling the taxi
business on behalf of the latter. A closer scrutiny and analysis of the records, however, evince the truth of the
matter: that Sergio F. Naguiat, in supervising the-taxi drivers and determining their employment terms, was rather
carrying out his responsibilities as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat Enterprises as a separate corporation does
not appear to be involved at all in the taxi business. Respondents could not deny that he received his salary from
the office of CFTI inside the base. Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI was in taxi services.
CFTI President Solidarily Liable
A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC is the case in point. A.C. Ransom Corporation was a family corporation,
the stockholders of which were members of the Hernandez family. It held that 'Employer' includes any person
acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly. The term shall not include any labor organization or
any of its officers or agents except when acting as employer.' In the absence of definite proof in that regard, we
believe it should be presumed that the responsible officer is the President of the corporation who can be deemed
the chief operation officer thereof. Thus, in RA 602, criminal responsibility is with the 'Manager or in his default,
the person acting as such.' In Ransom, the President appears to be the Manager."
Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively managed the business. Thus, applying the
ruling in A. C. Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an "employer" as contemplated by the Labor Code, who may
be held jointly and severally liable for the obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees.
Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were "close family corporations"
owned by the Naguiat family. The Court here finds no application to the rule that a corporate officer cannot be
held solidarily liable with a corporation in the absence of evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with malice.
In the present case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily liable for corporate tort because he had actively engaged in
the management and operation of CFTI, a close corporation.
Antolin Naguiat Not Personally Liable
Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI. Although he carried the title of "general manager" as well,
it had not been shown that he had acted in such capacity. Furthermore, no evidence on the extent of his
participation in the management or operation of the business was proffered. In this light, he cannot be held
solidarily liable for the obligations of CFTI and Sergio Naguiat to the private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F. Naguiat, president and co-owner thereof, are ORDERED to
pay, jointly and severally, the individual respondents their separation pay computed at US$120.00 for every year
of service, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment or satisfaction of the judgment;
Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and Antolin T. Naguiat are ABSOLVED from liability in the
payment of separation pay to individual respondents.
B. CONCEPT OF TORTS
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES
G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993 DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: On 27 October 1987, private respondent, a complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married.
Petitioner, an exchange student from Iran, is taking medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in
Dagupan. Petitioner courted and proposed to marry Private Respondent. She accepted his love on the condition
that they would get married. They therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester. Sometime
in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him. She was a virgin before she began living with him. A
week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. During a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live
with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
ISSUE: Is breach of promise to marry actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code?
HELD: Yes. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act,
could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations
of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live
with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory
to their supposed marriage." In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession
of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was
above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. v. First Farmers Milling Co.
L-29041; March 24, 1981 Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS: Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. filed an action for injunction and prohibition with damages against First Farmer
Milling Co, (FFMC) and others, alleging that the defendant FFMC established and operated a sugar central known
as the First Farmer Sugar Central (FFSC) and for the crop years 1964-1966, the defendants transferred their quota
A allotments to FFSC and are actually milling their sugar with the said entity, and constitutes an illegal transfer
with the illegal approval of the Sugar Quota Administration.
Subsequently, a motion to admit amended and supplemental complaint was filed, including PNB and National
Investment and Development Corp (NIDC) as defendants, alleging that they have extended loans to FFMC
amounting to Php16 210 000, to assist in the illegal creation and operation of the said mill and thus, a joint
tortfeasor in the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. In answer to this, PNB and NIDC contends that the granting of
loans in favor of FFMC were extended in the ordinary and usual course of business, and that they have no
participation on the alleged illegal transactions complained of.
ISSUE: w/n PNB and NIDC can be considered as joint tortfeasors
HELD: NO. PNB and NIDC granted loans in the ordinary and usual course of business after the borrowing entity
had established itself as capable of being treated as anew milling district as it could already operate and had its
array of adhering planters. The doing of an act which is in itself perfectly lawful will not render one liable as for a
tort, simply because the unintended effect of such act is to enable or assist another person to do or accomplish a
wrong, assuming that there was such a wrong.
C. QUASI-DELICT
1. CONCEPT AND REQUISITES
PORFIRIO CINCO V. HON. MATEO CANONOY
GR No. L-33171, May 31, 1970 Melencio- Herrera, J.
TOPIC: QUASI DELICT
FACTS: Cinco filed a complaint with the City Court of Mandaue (CCM) for damages against private respondents
Hilot (driver) and Valeriana & Carlos Pepito (operator) on account of a vehicular accident involving the former’s
automobile and the latter’s jeepney. A criminal case was also filed against the driver.
During the pre-trial of the civil case for damages, private respondents moved for its suspension on the ground of
Rule 111, Sec. 3(b), ROC. CCM ordered the suspension and denied petitioner’s MR. It was elevated on certiorari
to the CFI which likewise dismissed the petition prompting petitioner to elevate the case to the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of
the criminal action.
HELD: Yes.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by
the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the
preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article 2177 of the
Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
The civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended
after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based
on quasi-delict.
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-
appellants, vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-24803; May 26, 1977 BARREDO, J.:
FACTS: Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case
No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the
complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the
killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the
said accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake."
ISSUE: Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the
action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the
undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
HELD: The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
whether voluntary or matter. More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from
the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not
so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Therefore, under the proposed
Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not
be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to
a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a
Safeguard Security Agency v Tangco
G.R. No. 165732; December 14, 2006 Austria-Martinez, J:
FACTS: Evangeline Tangco was about to renew her Time Deposit Account with Ecology Bank in Katipunan, Quezon
City. She was a licensed firearm holder with permit to carry outside her residence, so she brought it at the time
she went to the bank. As she was about to deposit the gun to security guard Admer Pajarillo for safekeeping, the
latter shot Evangeline with a service shotgun which caused her death. The family immediately filed a criminal case
of homicide against Pajarillo, and reserved the right to file a civil claim. Pajarillo was convicted. Meanwhile, the
family filed a civil suit against Pajarillo for negligence and Safeguard Security Agency, the employer of Pajarillo, for
failing to exercise due diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of its employees.
The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the family and found them entitled to damages. It found that both
Pajarillo and the Agency were liable jointly and severally. Safeguard Security and Pajarillo appealed to the CA, but
the affirmed with modifications the ruling of the RTC. In this case, the CA declared that the liability of Safeguard
Security was only subsidiary, in light of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code on civil liability of employers.
Petitioner agency went to the Supreme Court to challenge the decision of the CA finding them negligent. The
Supreme Court ruled that the factual antecedents of the case would show that there was negligence, the only
thing left to resolve is whether the CA correctly ruled that the liability of Pajarillo and the Agency were solidary or
only subsidiary.
ISSUES: Should the liability of an employee be based on delict, is a claim for quasi-delict against the employer
barred?
HELD: No. It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause of action
is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.[14] The purpose of an action
or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief
Alleging negligence in the hiring and supervision of employees, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that
the latter are invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the
injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code.
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but
one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
crime.[18] The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission
punishable by law.
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises
a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the selection
of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
INIEGO VS. GULLERMO G. R. No. 166876; March 24, 2006 CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS: A vehicular accident happened when a freight truck allegedly being driven by Pinion hit private
respondent’s jitney which private respondent was driving at the time of the accident. As a result, private
respondent Fokker Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict and damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a
truck involved in a traffic accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego, as owner of the said truck and employer
of Pinion. The complaint prays for actual damages in the amount of P40,000.00, moral damages in the amount
of P300,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P150,000.00. Excluding attorney’s fees in the amount
of P50,000.00, the total amount of damages being claimed is P490,000.00.
Petitioner filed a Motion Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground, among other things, that the RTC has
no jurisdiction over the cause of action as claims for damages arising from a different cause of action (i.e., other
than the fault or negligence of the defendant) should not be included in the computation of the jurisdictional
amount. According to petitioner, the moral and exemplary damages claimed by the respondents in the case at bar
are not direct and proximate consequences of the alleged negligent act. However, the motion was denied.
According to respondent Judge, the cause of action, which is a quasi-delict, is not capable of pecuniary estimation
and not the amount of damage prayed for.7 From this, respondent Judge concluded that since fault or negligence
in quasi-delicts cannot be the subject of pecuniary estimation, the RTC has jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals
affirmed respondent Judge in this respect.8 Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: (1) WON an action based on quasi-delict is not capable of pecuniary estimation.
(2) WON only the exemplary and moral damages shall be included in the computation for damages to determine
jurisdiction.
HELD: (1) NO. Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of
a sum of money for the damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts, and are therefore
capable of pecuniary estimation. In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not
capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now
Regional Trial Courts] would depend on the amount of the claim.
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money
for the damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious acts. The damages claimed in such actions
represent the monetary equivalent of the injury caused to the plaintiff by the defendant, which are thus sought
to be recovered by the plaintiff. This money claim is the principal relief sought, and is not merely incidental thereto
or a consequence thereof. It bears to point out that the complaint filed by private respondent before the RTC
actually bears the caption "for DAMAGES."
(2) YES. The amount of damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the claim for all kinds of
damages that is the basis of determining the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from the
same or from different causes of action. The distinction he made between damages arising directly from injuries
in a quasi-delict and those arising from a refusal to admit liability for a quasi-delict is more apparent than real, as
the damages sought by respondent originate from the same cause of action: the quasi-delict. The fault or
negligence of the employee and the juris tantum presumption of negligence of his employer in his selection and
supervision are the seeds of the damages claimed, without distinction.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the claims for moral and exemplary damages arose from a cause of
action other than the quasi-delict, their inclusion in the computation of damages for jurisdictional purposes is still
proper. All claims for damages should be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court regardless of
whether they arose from a single cause of action or several causes of action. Rule 2, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court allows a party to assert as many causes of action as he may have against the opposing party. Subsection (d)
of said section provides that where the claims in all such joined causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
Hence, RTC has jurisdiction.
JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN, JR., vs INC
G.R. No. 160283; October 14, 2005
TOPIC: CONCEPT AND REQUISITES
FACTS: The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner. It is located in Sta. Rita East, Aringay, La
Union, and bounded on the south by a chapel of the respondent. The gasoline station supposedly needed
additional sewerage and septic tanks for its washrooms. In view of this, the services of Dioscoro “Ely” Yoro (Yoro),
a retired general of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was procured by petitioner, as the former was allegedly
a construction contractor in the locality. Petitioner and Yoro executed a Memorandum of Agreement(MOA) on 28
February 1995. Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner was informed by the members of
the respondent that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging to the latter. The
foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the
respondent. On 18 April 1995, a Complaint against petitioner and a certain Teofilo Oller, petitioner’s engineer,
was filed by the respondent before the RTC, La Union, Branch 31, docketed therein as Civil Case No. A-
1646. Petitioner and Oller filed an Answer with Third-Party Complaint impleading Yoro as third-party defendant.
Yoro filed an Answer to the Third-Party Complaint dated 13 July 1995. An Amended and Supplemental Complaint
dated 30 August 1995 was later filed by the respondent already naming Yoro as a party-defendant, to which the
petitioner and Oller filed an Answer. Yoro filed his own Answer. After four years of hearing the case, the trial court
promulgated its Decision holding that the diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic
tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure. The trial court adjudged the petitioner and
Yoro solidarily liable to the respondent on a 35%-65% basis (the petitioner liable for the 35%), and absolving Oller
from any liability. The petitioner’s appeal to the Court of Appeals, on the other hand, was given due course. On
25 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision denying the appeal.
ISSUE: WON THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE PETITIONER AND YORO HAS THE EFFECT
OF MAKING THE LATTER SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENT.
HELD: NO
Petitioner avers that no liability should attach to him by laying the blame solely on Yoro. He argues that the MOA
executed between him and Yoro is the law between them and must be given weight by the courts. Since nothing
in the MOA goes against the law, morals, good customs and public policy, it must govern to absolve him from any
liability. Petitioner relies heavily in Paragraph 4 of the MOA, which is again reproduced hereunder:
4. Any damage within or outside the property of the FIRST PARTY incurred during the digging shall be borne by
the SECOND PARTY.
 In answer to this, the respondent asserts that the MOA should not absolve petitioner from any liability. This
written contract, according to the respondent, clearly shows that the intention of the parties therein was to search
for hidden treasure. The alleged digging for a septic tank was just a cover-up of their real intention. The aim of
the petitioner and Yoro to intrude and surreptitiously hunt for hidden treasure in the respondent’s premises
should make both parties liable. The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement but the fact
that they have become joint tortfeasors. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or
when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
The requisites of quasi-delict are the following : (a) there must be an act or omission;(b) such act or omission
causes damage to another; (c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and (d) there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties
All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation which caused damage
to the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its premises and it may have affected the foundation
of the chapel. The excavation on respondent’s premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing
contractual relation between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other. For the
damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. The heavy reliance of petitioner
in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited earlier cannot steer him clear of any liability.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise,
countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done for
their benefit. Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had provisions in
their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside petitioner’s property
line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that insures that he be so
declared as liable. Besides, petitioner cannot claim that he did not know that the excavation traversed the
respondent’s property. In fact, he had two (2) of his employees actually observe the diggings, his security guard
and his engineer Teofilo Oller.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, FILCAR TRANSPORT, INC., and FORTUNE
INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 118889. March 23, 1998. BELLOSILLO, J.:
Topic: Quasi-delicts - Concept and Requisites
FACTS: At around 3 o’clock of 21 April 1987, two (2) vehicles, both Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising along EDSA,
figured in a car accident. The car owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven at the outer lane of the highway by
Benjamin Jacildone, while the other car, owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc. (FILCAR), and driven by Peter
Dahl-Jensen as lessee, was at the center lane, left of the other vehicle. Upon approaching the corner of Pioneer
Street, the car owned by FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that time Dahl-
Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver’s license.
Consequently, petitioner FGU Insurance Corporation, insurer of Soriano, paid the latter P25,382.20. By way of
subrogation, it sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune Insurance delict before
the RTC Makati. Summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no longer staying at his given address; in
fact, upon motion of petitioner, he was dropped from the complaint.
Trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to substantiate its claim of subrogation. Respondent CA
affirmed the ruling of the trial court although based on another ground, i.e., only the fault or negligence of Dahl-
Jensen was sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR. In other words, petitioner failed to establish its
cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict.
In this appeal, petitioner insists that respondents are liable on the strength of the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial
Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo that the registered owner of a vehicle is liable for damages suffered by third persons
although the vehicle is leased to another.
ISSUE: For damages suffered by a third party, may an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car
company and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee in driving the rented vehicle?
HELD: NO.
The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of the Civil Code which states: “Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict x x x x”
To sustain a claim based thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and damage incurred by the plaintiff.
We agree with respondent court that petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or
negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established,
not that of FILCAR. It should be noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about by the
circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle that he was driving was at the center lane.
It is plain that the negligence was solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the other
vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any participation therein.
Article 2180 of the same Code which deals also with quasidelict provides:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority
and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of negligence on the part of the
persons made responsible thereunder, derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts
of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Yet, as correctly observed by respondent court, Art. 2180
is hardly applicable because none of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration.
Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen.
As such, there was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any
way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.
We now correlate par. 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides: “In motor vehicle mishap,
the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due
diligence, prevented the misfortune x x x x If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of article 2180
are applicable.” Obviously, this provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver
relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against
respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither
prosper.
Petitioner’s insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporationis rooted in a misapprehension of our ruling therein. In
that case, the negligent and reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused injuries to
several persons and damage to property. Intending to exculpate itself from liability, the corporation raised the
defense that at the time of the collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it was leased to another; and,
that the driver was not its employee but of the lessee. The trial court was not persuaded as it found that the true
nature of the alleged lease contract was nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to relieve itself
of the burdens and responsibilities of an employer.
VERGARA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R NO. L-77679; September 30, 1987 Padilla, J.
TOPIC: QUASI DELICT
FACTS: An action for damages based on quasi delict filed by private respondent Azarcon against the petitioner
arose when a cargo truck belonging to petitioner Vergara rammed the private respondent’s store-residence
causing damages. Petitioner alleged that his driver was driving in a diligent and careful manner, and that the
accident was an act of God because “the steering wheel refused to respond as a result of a blown-out tire”.
The trial court held the petitioner and its insurer solidarily liable to pay the private respondent. On appeal to the
CA, the findings of the trial court were affirmed. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding the petitioner guilty of fault or negligence
RULING: No. The trial court was correct in finding the petitioner guilty of fault or negligence.
It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are present in the case at bar. These
requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person
for whose acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence
and the damages.
Applying to the facts of the case:
Damages: It is undisputed that private respondent suffered damages as a result of an act or omission of petitioner.
Negligence: The findings of said court, affirmed by the respondent court, show that the fact of occurrence of the
"vehicular accident" was sufficiently established by the policy report and the testimony of Patrolman Masiclat.
Connection of cause and effect between negligence and damages: According to the police report, "the cargo truck
was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila and then it crossed to the center line and went to the
left side of the highway; it then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck rammed
the storewarehouse of the plaintiff.
P.S:
A mishap caused by defective brakes cannot be considered as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were
curable and the accident preventable.
The petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of negligence on his part
in the selection and supervision of his driver.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., vs. NOEL CORDERO
G.R. No. 138550 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J
Facts: Petitioner (AMEX) is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards to its customers. Nilda Cordero, wife of
respondent Noel Cordero, applied for and was issued an American Express charge card and an extension card was
issued to the respondent as well.
On Nov. 29, 1991, the respondent went on a holiday trip to Hong Kong. In November 30, 1991, the group went to
the Watsons Chemist Shop. Noel picked up some chocolate candies and handed to the sales clerk his American
Express extension charge card to pay for his purchases. The clerk then verified the card by calling AMEX’s office,
when the respondent was asked to present some IDs for verification he declined, thus his card was confiscated
and was cut into half. This caused embarrassment and humiliation to the respondent.
Nilda then called AMEX’s office and was informed that on Nov. 1, 1991 there was an attempt to use a charge card
with the same number as respondents card. Their office was able to determine that the respondent that time was
in Manila and not in HK, hence his card was placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System which was the reason
why the sales clerk tried to verify the identity of the respondent. If the true identity of the card owner is
established, the card is honored and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.
On March 31, 1992, respondent filed with the RTC of Manila, a complaint for damages against The trial court found
that the inexcusable failure of AMEX to inform Nilo of the November 1, 1991 incident despite sufficient time was
the proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting of plaintiffs extension card which exposed the latter to public
humiliation for which defendant should be held liable
ISSUE: WON the failure of petitioner to inform the respondent of the November 1, 1991 incident was the
proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting of the respondent’s card?
HELD: NO.
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties. But there are exceptions such as when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by
tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
To constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the damage or injury suffered
by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate
cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and
precedent.
The subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioner’s representative
and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the
part of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.
Caravan Travel and Tours International v. Abejar GR 170631 10 Feb 2016
St. Martin Polyclinic v. LWV Construction Corporation GR 217426
2. AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE CRIME
L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, petitioners
vs.
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA, respondents
G.R. No. 158995 September 26, 2006
FACTS: Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the sps. Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by L.G. Foods
Corp. and driven at that time by their employee Ferrer. The child died as a result of the accident. An Information
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before the MTCC in Bacolod.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide. Thus, the MTCC
dismissed the criminal case.
Sps. Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against petitioner as employers of the deceased driver, alleging that
as such employers, they failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
Defendants denied liability and asserted that they exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. Petitioners insisted that their dismissal prayer be resolved and the court required them to file within
10 days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their position. Instead of filing the required memorandum,
they filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the complaint is a claim for subsidiary liability against an employed
under Art. 103, RPC. They contended that there must first be a judgment of conviction against their driver as a
condition sine qua non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the pendency of the criminal action,
the sine qua non condition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of action on the
part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to institute a separate
action for damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is thereby deemed instituted
with the criminal action, which was already dismissed.
The trial court denied their motion for lack of merit and set the case for trial. Their motion for reconsideration was
denied by the same court. They filed a petition for review on certiorari before the CA but it only upheld the lower
court's decision. It held that the case exacts responsibility for fault or negligence under Article 2176, Civil Code,
which is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code.
Therefore, the liability under Article 2180, Civil Code, is direct and immediate, and not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee or prior showing of the latter's insolvency.
ISSUE: WON the spouses' cause of action in their civil case is founded on Article 103 RPC or derived from Article
2180 of the Civil Code
HELD: Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover damages
primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not
engaged in any business or industry.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made when the criminal
case was filed is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any
pronouncement having been made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in
the first place. And for the petitioners to insist for the conviction of their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold
them liable for damages is to ask for the impossible.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 147703; April 14, 2004
NATURE: This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals, which dismissed the herein petitioners appeal of the RTC judgement.
FACTS: On July 1994, the accused Macadangdang was found guilty and was convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property, and was then
sentenced to suffer the penalty. The court held that Rabbit Bus Lines shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the
accused should the latter become insolvent. Over time, the judgement against the accused become final and
executory.
Thereafter, before the execution of judgement of the RTC decision, Macadangdang jumped bail and absconded.
Thus, Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines filed a notice of appeals, which was later denied by the trial court.
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, the court reiterated the liability of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines. The CA held that
the institution of a criminal case implied the institution of the civil action arising from the same offense.
Henceforth, the subsidiary liability of Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, as the employer of the accused, becomes conclusive.
ISSUE: WON an employer may appeal the judgement of conviction of its employee-accused and question the
pronouncement of subsidiary liability
HELD: No. The judgement has already become final and executory, thus, Phil. Rabbit in this case is subsidiarily
liable.
Under Art. 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. These provision are deemed written in the
judgement of conviction.
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or
defeat a final judgement rendered by a competent court. Thus an appeal if made without the consent of the
accused, such as in this case, would result in improperly defeating the ruling of conviction.
The Supreme Court has laid down the requisites before an employer can be held subsidiarily liable:
They are indeed the employers of the convicted employees
That they are engaged in some kind of industry
That the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and
That the execution of judgement against the accused has not been satisfied due to insolvency
MAURICIO MANLICLIC and PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., v. MODESTO CALAUNAN
G.R. No. 150157. January 25, 2007 Chico-Nazario, J:
TOPIC: Quasi-Delict; Vicarious Liability
Facts: The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by petitioner PRBLI and driven by
petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep, owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by
Marcelo Mendoza. The two vehicles, both on the way to Manila, collided in NLEX, where the front right side of
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right
and then fall on a ditch with water resulting to further extensive damage. Respondent suffered minor injuries
while his driver was unhurt. By reason of such collision, a criminal case charging petitioner Manliclic with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries. Subsequently, the respondent filed a
complaint for damages against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI.
Respondent insists it was petitioner Manliclic who should be liable while the latter is resolute in saying it was the
former who caused the smash up. Also, PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee, specifically petitioner Manliclic.
The trial court ruled in favor of respondent Calaunan and found petitioners to be liable and PRBLI exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees. The CA affirmed
the trial court’s decision. Subsequently, petitioners informed the SC that the CA, in the criminal case, acquitted
Manliclic.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners Maniliclic and PBLRI are liable?
Held: Yes.
First, the Court found Manliclic can still be held liable notwithstanding the declaration of the Court of Appeals that
there was an absence of negligence on his part. This is because quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime—a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra- contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce
civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he
is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. The civil liability arising
from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of
reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of. From the foregoing,
the Court found Manliclic to be negligent, affirming the trial court for giving credence to respondent’s testimony.
Second, having ruled that it was petitioner Manliclic’s negligence that caused the smash up, there arises the juris
tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a
good father of a family. Art. 2180, NCC, provides that when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee,
there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either
in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the
employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the
negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. In the selection of prospective
employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In
the supervision of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach thereof.
In this case, the trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection but not in the supervision of its employees. The Court found that has a very good procedure of recruiting
its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. As to supervision, there has been no iota of evidence
introduced by it that there are rules promulgated by the bus company regarding the safe operation of its vehicle
and in the way its driver should manage and operate the vehicles assigned to them. Regular supervision of
employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have been shown and established. This, petitioner failed to do.
The lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of manual containing the rules
and regulations for all the drivers of PRBLI.
Therefore, PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.
3. AS DISTINGHUISHED FROM A BREACH OF CONTRACT
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION and LAMBERT M.
EROLES, respondents
G.R. No. 141910 August 6, 2002
FACTS: G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18 June 1994 thirty (30) units of
Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck, driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., along South Superhighway in Alabang, Metro Manila, to the Central Luzon Appliances
in Dagupan City. While the truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur highway in Barangay
Anupol, Bamban, Tarlac, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep canal, resulting in
damage to the cargoes.
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the
covered cargoes in the sum of P204,450.00. FGU, in turn, being the subrogee of the rights and interests of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to the latter from GPS. Since the
trucking company failed to heed the claim, FGU filed a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage
against GPS and its driver Lambert Eroles with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, of Makati City. In its answer,
respondents asserted that GPS was the exclusive hauler only of Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was
not so engaged in business as a common carrier. Respondents further claimed that the cause of damage was
purely accidental.
CAUSE OF ACTION: BREACH OF CONTRACT / CULPA CONTRACTUAL
DEFENSE: GPS IS NOT A COMMON CARRIER SINCE IT ONLY RENDERS SERVICES, EXCLUSIVELY TO CONCEPION
INDUSTRIES SINCE 1988 AND THE CAUSE OF THE DAMAGE IS PURELY ACCIDENTAL
ISSUE: WON RESPONDENT GPS, EITHER AS A COMMON CARRIER OR A PRIVATE CARRIER, MAY BE PRESUMED TO
HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT WHEN THE GOODS IT UNDERTOOK TO TRANSPORT SAFELY WERE SUBSEQUENTLY
DAMAGED WHILE IN ITS PROTECTIVE CUSTODY AND POSSESSION.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that notwithstanding the petitioner's failure to prove that GPS trucking is a
common carrier and the presumption of negligence attaches, GPS alone may be held liable for damages for breach
of contract. No liability or whatsoever may be attached to Lambert Eroles because the cause of action is Culpa
Contractual. Liability of Eroles wouldn't be same should the petitioners decided to file a Culpa Aquiliana (Cause of
Action) Case since it would no longer require binding contract between parties, it is enough that there has been
an act or omission, damage or injury to another caused by fault or negligence, and no pre-existing contractual
obligation.
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO
SALVA, respondents.
G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000. MENDOZA, J.:
Topic: Quasi-Delict as Distinguished from a Breach of Contract
FACTS: Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the
Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney
was filled to capacity, Sunga was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a wooden stool at the back of the
door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at
the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven
by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga
was injured and her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending
physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of three
months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the
former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a
third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding
that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. On appeal to the Court of Appeals,
the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of
carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil
Code. The appellate court dismissed the thirdp arty complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for
damages to Sunga. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause
of the accident negates his liability and contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva
was a caso fortuito.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 applies in this case, and consequently absolves the
petitioner of any liability against the private respondent?
HELD: No, it does not apply.
The issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether
Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner’s jeepney. On the
other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict,
also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. The
second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the
action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
his destination. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof.

It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence
of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions
involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned,
some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with
regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers. (See Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1756 of the NCC)
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became
the duty of petitioner to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. The driver
of jeepney carry Sunga did not carry the latter “safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances”
The jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders
of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. The fact that Sunga was seated in an
“extension seat” placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore,
not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with a modification that the award of moral damages
is deleted.
JOSEPH SALUDAGA vs FEU and EDILBERTO DE JESUS
G.R. NO. 179337
TOPIC: BREACH OF CONTRACT / CULPA CONTRACTUAL
FACTS: Petitioner Saludaga was a sophomore law student at FEU when he was shot within the school premises by
one of FEU’s security guard Rosete. Petitioner Saludaga was confined due to his wounds.
Meanwhile, Rosete was brought to the police station where he explained that the shooting was accidental. He
was eventually released considering that no formal complaint was filed against him.
Petitioner Saludaga thereafter filed a complaint for damages against respondents on the ground that they
breached their obligation to provide students with a safe and secure environment and an atmosphere conducive
to learning.
FEU and Edilberto De Jesus(as president) then filed a Third-Party Complaint against Galaxy Development and
Management Corporation, the agency contracted by respondent FEU to provide security services within its
premises and Mariano D. Imperial (Galaxy's President) to indemnify them. Respondents aver that the shooting
incident was a fortuitous event because they could not have reasonably foreseen nor avoided the accident caused
by Rosete as he was not their employee; and that they complied with their obligation to ensure a safe learning
environment for their students by having exercised due diligence in selecting the security services of Galaxy
On the other hand, Galaxy and Imperial filed a Fourth-Party Complaint against AFP General Insurance.
The RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner.
Respondents appealed to the CA which reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON FEU is liable for damages for breach of contract
RULING: Yes, FEU is liable for damages for breach of contract.
It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its
compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. In the instant case, the Court finds that, when
petitioner was shot inside the campus by no less the security guard who was hired to maintain peace and secure
the premises, there is a prima facie showing that respondents failed to comply with its obligation to provide a safe
and secure environment to its students.
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the security guards
assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required in the Security Service Agreement. It was not proven
that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test results, 201 files, and other vital documents enumerated in its
contract with Galaxy. Total reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to check the papers
stating the qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution should not
be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the security agency it hired. To
do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to ensure a safe learning environment for its
students.
Thus, the defense of force majeure must also fail. One’s negligence may have concurred with an act of God in
producing damage and injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the
damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be
partly the result of a persons participation whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act the whole
occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides that those who are negligent in the performance of their obligations are
liable for damages. Accordingly, for breach of contract due to negligence in providing a safe learning environment,
respondent FEU is liable to petitioner for damages. It is essential in the award of damages that the claimant must
have satisfactorily proven during the trial the existence of the factual basis of the damages and its causal
connection to defendants acts.
DR. GENEVIEVE L. HUANG v. PHILIPPINE HOTELIERS
GR No. 180440, Dec 05, 2012
Facts: Delia Goldberg (Delia), a registered guest of Dusit Hotel, invited her friend, petitioner Dr. Genevieve L.
Huang, for a swim at the hotel's swimming pool facility. At 7pm, they were informed by the hotel attendant that
the swimming pool area will be closed. They proceed to the shower and dress up. At the time when they get out
of the shower room, the pool area was already pitch black. They carefully walk towards the main door but it was
locked. Petitioner and Delia waited for 10 more minutes near the door hoping someone would come to their
rescue but they waited in vain. Delia became anxious about their situation so petitioner began to walk around to
look for a house phone. Delia followed petitioner. After some time, petitioner saw a phone behind the lifeguard's
counter. While slowly walking towards the phone, a hard and heavy object, which later turned out to be the
folding wooden counter top, fell on petitioner's head that knocked her down almost unconscious. The hotel staff
arrived and assisted the petitioner by placing an ice pack and applying some ointment on her head. Petitioner
demanded the services of the hotel physician.
After resting for a while, the petitioner eel extraordinary dizziness accompanied by an uncomfortable feeling in
her stomach, which lasted until the following day. Petitioner was constrained to stay at home, thus, missing all
her important appointments with her patients. She also began experiencing "on" and "off" severe headaches that
caused her three (3) sleepless nights.
Petitioner, thus, decided to consult a different physicians (both in the Ph and USA)who found that he suffered
very serious brain injury. Petitioner also started to feel losing her memory, which greatly affected and disrupted
the practice of her chosen profession.
The trial court found petitioner's testimony self-serving, thus, devoid of credibility.
Petitioner failed to present any evidence to substantiate her allegation that the lights in the hotel's swimming pool
area were shut off at the time of the incident. She did not even present her friend, Delia, to corroborate her
testimony.
The respondent testified that the normal practice of the hotel management was not to put off the lights until
10:00 p.m. to allow the housekeepers to do the cleaning of the swimming pool area.
As such, petitioner would not have met the accident had she only acted with care and caution.
Emphatically, petitioner cannot fault the hotel for the injury she sustained as she herself did not heed the warning
that the swimming pool area is open only from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. As such, since petitioner's own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of her injury, she cannot recover damages.
The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court.
It cannot be gainsaid that [herein petitioner's] use of the hotel's pool was only upon the invitation of [Delia], the
hotel's registered guest. As such, she cannot claim contractual relationship between her and the hotel. Since the
circumstances of the present case do not evince a contractual relation between [petitioner] and [respondents],
the rules on quasi-delict, thus, govern.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the cause of action of the petitioner can be based on both breach of contract and tort.
Held: Petitioner asserts that the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar any liability for tort since
the act that breaks a contract may also be a tort. Hence, the concept of change of theory of cause of action
pointed to by respondents is irrelevant.
Initially, petitioner was suing respondents PHI and DTPCI mainly on account of their negligence but not on any
breach of contract. Surprisingly, when the case was elevated on appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner had a
change of heart and later claimed that an implied contract existed between her and respondents PHI and DTPCI
and that the latter were liable for breach of their obligation to keep her safe and out of harm. This allegation was
never an issue before the trial court. It was not the cause of action relied upon by the petitioner not until the case
was before the Court of Appeals. Presently, petitioner claims that her cause of action can be based both on quasi-
delict and breach of contract.
Petitioner's belated reliance on breach of contract as her cause of action cannot be sanctioned by this Court. Well-
settled is the rule that a party is not allowed to change the theory of the case or the cause of action on
appeal. Matters, theories or arguments not submitted before the trial court cannot be considered for the first
time on appeal or certiorari. When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to
change his theory on appeal for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would
also be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[73] Hence, a party is bound by the theory
he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate
his theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek to re-litigate the matter anew either in the same forum
or on appeal.
In that regard, this Court finds it significant to take note of the following differences between quasi-delict (culpa
aquilina) and breach of contract (culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and
independent, while in breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the contractual
obligation; there is a pre-existing contract or obligation.[75] In quasi-delict, the defense of "good father of a
family" is a complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers are concerned, while in
breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in the selection and supervision of
employees.[76] In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured party
to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former's complaint will be dismissed, while in breach of
contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that there was breach of the contract and the burden
is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying out of the terms of the contract; the rule
of respondeat superior is followed.
Viewed from the foregoing, petitioner's change of theory or cause of action from quasi-delict to breach of contract
only on appeal would necessarily cause injustice to respondents PHI and DTPCI. First, the latter will have no more
opportunity to present evidence to contradict petitioner's new argument. Second, the burden of proof will be
shifted from petitioner to respondents PHI and DTPCI. Petitioner's change of theory from quasi-delict to breach
of contract must be repudiated.
All told, in the absence of negligence on the part of respondents PHI and DTPCI, as well as their management and
staff, they cannot be made liable to pay for the millions of damages prayed for by the petitioner. Since
respondents PHI and DTPCI are not liable, it necessarily follows that respondent First Lepanto cannot also be made
liable under the contract of insurance.
AIR FRANCE V. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO AND CA
No. L-21438, September 29, 1966 Sanchez, J.
TOPIC: Tort as distinguished from a Breach of Contract
FACTS: Rafael Carrascoso, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes. Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to Carrascoso a 'first class' round
trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in 'first class', but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced him to vacate the 'first class' seat that he was occupying because, in the
words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a 'white man', who, the Manager alleged, had a 'better right'
to the seat.
When asked to vacate his 'first class' seat, Carrascoso, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's
Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G,
Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso
was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified
Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man and plaintiff reluctantly gave his 'first class' seat. in the plane.
The CFI ordered Air France to pay petitioner damages and the difference in the fare between first class and tourist
class. The CA affirmed it but slightly reduce the amount of the refund.
ISSUE: Was there a breach of contract between Air France and Rafael Carrascoso?
HELD: Yes, there was a breach of contract.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation. And
this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling
public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore,
generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carriers employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or discourteous
conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.
The relation of a passenger and carrier is contractual both in origin an nature, nevertheless, the act that breaks
the contract may also be a tort.
The contract of Air France with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as
we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier—
a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
4. SPECIFIC CASES OF LIABILITY
A. POSSESSOR OF ANIMALS
Purita Miranda Vestil and Agustin Vestil, petitioners, vs. IAC David Uy and Teresita Uy, respondents
November 6, 1989 Ponente: Cruz, J.
Topic: Specific Cases of Liability: Possessor of Animals
FACTS: On July 29, 1975, Theness Uy, child of the respondents, was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a
child of the petitioners in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu
City. She was rushed to the hospital and was discharged after 9 days but was re-admitted 1 week later due to
“vomiting of saliva.” The following day, she died. Cause of death, broncho-pneumonia. 7 months later, the Uys
sued for damages, alleging that Vestils were liable as the possessors of “Andoy,” the dog.
Petitioners Contention: Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father
as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs. They further allege that the dog was a tame
animal and that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog. They also argue that even
assuming that they were the possessors of the dog that bit Theness, there was no clear showing that she died as
a result thereof.
ISSUE: WON the Vestils may be held liable for the death of Theness?
HELD: Yes. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in
question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house.
Article 2183. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage
which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage
should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda’s estate, there
is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. She was the only
heir residing in Cebu City. Moreover, there is evidence showing that she and her family used the property as their
second house. Interestingly, her own daughter was playing in the house with Theness when the little girl was
bitten by the dog. The dog itself remained in the house even after the death of Vicente Miranda.
Article 2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should “escape or be lost” and so be
removed from his control. And it does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child
into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause
injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she
was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
As to the cause of death of Theness, the latter developed hydrophobia, a symptom of rabies, as a result of the dog
bites, and second, that asphyxia broncho-pneumonia, which ultimately caused her death, was a complication of
rabies, and lastly, that Theness became afraid of water as established by the testimony of an expert. Moreover,
as held in a different case, death certificate is not conclusive proof of the cause of death but only of the fact of
death.
According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or
on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural
equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must
answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTH DIVISION) AND MS.
LYDIA GERONIMO
G.R. No. 110295, October 18, 1993 DAVIDE, JR., J.:
TOPIC: As Distinguished from a Breach of Contract; Product Liability
FACTS: Lydia Geronimo was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen, an enterprise engaged in the
sale of soft drinks to the students of said school and the public. However, some parents began complaining that
the sodas sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign substances or particles. When she checked her
stocks, she saw for herself the foreign matter complained of. As a result, she brought the said bottles to the
Regional Health Office of the Department of Health for examination, which then confirmed that the samples she
submitted were adulterated*.
As a result, her sales plummeted and eventually she lost her shop. Aggrieved, she filed a complaint for
damages against the petitioner. Petitioners rebuffed and moved to dismiss the complaint. They argue that the
action has already prescribed since the complaint is one for breach of warranty under Article 1561 of the Civil
Code. Private respondent alleges that her complaint was seasonably filed since her cause of action is based on an
injury to her right which can be brought within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code.
Notwithstanding, the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, and denied the reconsideration. She then went straight
to the SC, but the latter remanded to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC and stated that the complaint is one for
quasi-delict.
ISSUES: Whether or not the action for damages by the proprietress against the soft drinks manufacturer should
be treated as one for breach of implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability, as claimed by the
manufacturer, the petitioner herein which must therefore be filed within six months from the delivery of the thing
sold pursuant to Article 1571 of the Civil Code, or one for quasi-delict, as held by the public respondent, which can
be filed within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of the same Code
HELD: Quasi-delict. The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the cause of action is found on quasi-delict and that,
therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations
in the complaint, more particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent
manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption."
While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the
applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the acts
which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Otherwise put, the existence of a contract between the
parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of
damages therefor. The liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations.
NOTE: Adulterated – something rendered to be poorer in quality by the addition of another substance, typically
an inferior one; contaminated.