SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132524. December 29, 1998]

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, petitioner, vs. ISABEL COJUANGCO-

SUNTAY and HON. GREGORIO S. SAMPAGA, Presiding Judge,
*

Branch 78, Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, respondents.

DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:

Which should prevail between the ration decidendi and the fallo of a decision is the primary
issue in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Federico C. Suntay who
opposes respondent Isabels petition for appointment as administratrix of her grandmothers estate
by virtue of her right of representation.
The suit stemmed from the following:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three
children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all
surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. After 4 years, the marriage soured so that in 1962, Isabel Cojuanco-
Suntay filed a criminal case[1] against her husband Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay. In retaliation, Emilio
Aguinaldo filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI)[2] a complaint for legal separation
against his wife, charging her, among others, with infidelity and praying for the custody and care
of their children who were living with their mother.[3] The suit was docketed as civil case number
Q-7180.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision the dispositive portion which reads:

WHEREFORE, the marriage celebrated between Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay on July 9, 1958 is hereby declared null and void and of no effect as between
the parties. It being admitted by the parties and shown by the records that the question of the case
and custody of the three children have been the subject of another case between the same parties
in another branch of this Court in Special Proceeding No. 6428, the same cannot be litigated in
this case.

With regard to counterclaim, in view of the manifestation of counsel that the third
party defendants are willing to pay P50,000.00 for damages and that defendant is
willing to accept the offer instead of her original demand for P130,000.00, the
defendant is awarded the sum of P50,000.00 as her counterclaim and to pay attorneys
fees in the amount of P5,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[4] (Emphasis supplied)

As basis thereof, the CFI said:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans
Memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8,
1967) the patient was already out of the hospital he continued to be under observation
and treatment.

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955;
that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under
expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked
progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9,
1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:

Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for nay of the following causes after (sic)
existing at the time of the marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition
of the plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The
charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the
patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy that in reality, a strong indication of
schizophernia (sic).[5] (emphasis supplied)

On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay. The latter is respondent Isabels paternal grandmother. The decedent died on
June 4, 1990 without leaving a will.[6]
Five years later or on October 26 1995, respondent Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)[7] a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of
Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay which
case was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. In her petition, she alleged among
others, that she is one of the legitimate grandchildren of the decedent and prayed that she be
appointed as administratrix of the estate.[8]
 On December 15, 1995, petitioner filed an Opposition claiming that he is the surviving spouse
of the decedent, that he has been managing the conjugal properties even while the decedent has
been alive and is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate than the petitioner, that
petitioner and her family have been alienated from the decedent and the Oppositor for more than
thirty (30) years and thus, prayed that Letters of Administration be issued instead to him.[9]
On September 22, 1997 or almost two years after filing an opposition, petitioner moved to
dismiss the special proceeding case alleging in the main that respondent Isabel should not be
appointed as administratrix of the decedents estate. In support thereof, petitioner argues that under
Article 992 of the Civil Code an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation
the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, respondent Isabels father
predeceased his mother, the late Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay and thus, opened succession by
representation. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of
Rizal that the marriage of the respondent Isabels parents is null and void, the latter is an illegitimate
child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother the decedent. [10] On
October 16, 1997, the trial court issued the assailed order denying petitioners Motion to
Dismiss.[11] When his motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court in an order dated
January 9, 1998,[12] petitioner, as mentioned above filed this petition.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondent court in denying his motion to
dismiss as well as his motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: (a) a motion to dismiss is
appropriate in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person; (b) the motion
to dismiss was timely filed; (c) the dispositive portion of the decision declaring the marriage of
respondent Isabels parents null and void must be upheld; and (d) said decision had long become
final and had, in fact, been executed.
On the other hand, respondent Isabel asserts that petitioners motion to dismiss was late having
been filed after the opposition was already filed in court, the counterpart of an answer in an
ordinary civil action and that petitioner in his opposition likewise failed to specifically deny
respondent Isabels allegation that she is a legitimate child of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, the
decedents son. She further contends that petitioner proceeds from a miscomprehension of the
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the
body of the decision and its dispositive portion because in an action for annulment of a marriage,
the court either sustains the validity of marriage or nullifies it. It does not, after hearing a marriage
voidable otherwise, the court will fail to decide and lastly, that the status of marriages under Article
85 of the Civil Code before they are annulled is voidable.
The petition must fail.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential
requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or
jurisdiction, and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.[13] There must be a
capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.[14]
A reading of the assailed order, however, shows that the respondent court did not abuse its
discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss, pertinent portions of which are quoted
hereunder. To with:
The arguments of both parties judiciously and objectively assessed and the pertinent
laws applied, the Court finds that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate
considering the peculiar nature of this special proceeding as distinguished from an
ordinary civil action. At the outset, this proceeding was not adversarial in nature and
the petitioner was not called upon to assert a cause of action against a particular
defendant.Furthermore, the State has a vital interest in the maintenance of the
proceedings, not only because of the taxes due it, but also because if no heirs qualify,
the State shall acquire the estate by escheat.

xxx xxx xxx

The court rules, for the purpose of establishing the personality of the petitioner to file
ad maintain this special proceedings, that in the case at bench, the body of the
decision determines the nature of the action which is for annulment, not declaration of
nullity.

The oppositors contention that the fallo of the questioned decision (Annex A Motion)
prevails over the body thereof is not of a final decision is definite, clear and
unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of interpretation or
construction.

Where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the opinion or body of the decision may be
referred to for purposes of construing the judgement (78 SCRA 541 citing Morelos v.
Go Chin Ling; and Heirs of Juan Presto v. Galang).The reason is that the dispositive
portion must find support from the decisions ratio decidendi.

Per decision of the Court of First Instance Branch IX of Quezon City, marked as Annex A of
oppositors motion, the marriage of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay was
annulled on the basis of Art. 85 par. 3 of the Civil Code which refers to marriages which are
considered voidable. Petitioner being conceived and born of a voidable marriage before the
decree of annulment, she is considered legitimate (Art. 89, par. 2, Civil Code of the Phils.).[15]

The trial court correctly ruled that a motion to dismiss at this juncture is inappropriate. The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs the procedure to be observed in actions, civil or criminal
and special proceedings.[16]The Rules do not only apply to election cases, land registration,
cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not therein provided for.
Special proceedings being one of the actions under the coverage of the Rules on Civil
Procedure, a motion to dismiss filed thereunder would fall under Section 1, Rule 16 thereof. Said
rule provides that the motion to dismiss may be filed within the time for but before filing the
answer to the complaint. Clearly, the motion should have been filed on or before the filing of
petitioners opposition.[17] which is the counterpart of an answer in ordinary civil actions.
Not only was petitioners motion to dismiss filed out of time, it was filed almost two years
after respondent Isabel was already through with the presentation of her witnesses and evidence
and petitioner had presented two witnesses. The filing of the motion to dismiss is not only improper
but also dilatory.
The respondent court, far from deviating or straying off course from established jurisprudence
on this matter, as petitioner asserts, had in fact faithfully observed the law and legal precedents in
this case. In fact, the alleged conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion
thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of Rizal is
reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is clear
under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the
Family Code.
Petitioner, however, strongly insists that the dispositive portion of the CFI decision has
categorically declared that the marriage of respondent Isabels parents is null and void and that the
legal effect of such declaration is that the marriage from its inception is void and the children born
out of said marriage is illegitimate. Such argument cannot be sustained. Articles 80, 81, 82 and
83[18] of the New Civil Code classify what marriages are void while Article 85 enumerates the
causes for which a marriage may be annulled.[19]
The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that void marriage is
deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages, with respect to property
relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children born of
such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and
obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89[20] irrespective of whether or not the
parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith.
On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects,
until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically,
the annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but
the law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped
out. The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of
Article 89 which provides that:

Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered
legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural children by legal fiction.[21] (Emphasis
supplied)

Stated otherwise, the annulment of the marriage by the court abolishes the legal character of
the society formed by the putative spouses, but it cannot destroy the juridical consequences which
the marital union produced during its continuance.[22]
Indeed, the terms annul and null and void have different legal connotations and
implications. Annul means to reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect;
to nullify; to abolish; to do away with[23] whereas null and void is something that does not exist
from the beginning. A marriage that is annulled presupposes that it subsists but later ceases to have
legal effect when it is terminated through a court action. But in nullifying a marriage, the court
simply declares a status condition which already exists from the very beginning.
 There is likewise no merit in petitioners argument that it is the dispositive portion of the
decision which must control as to whether or not the marriage of respondent Isabels parents was
void or voidable. Such argument springs from a miscomprehension of the judgment of the Civil
Case No. Q-7180 and the erroneous premise that there is a conflict between the body of the
decision and its dispositive portion.
Parenthetically, it is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a
given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling factor as to
settlement of rights of the parties and the questions presented, notwithstanding statement in the
body of the decision or order which may be somewhat confusing,[24] the same is not without
qualification. The foregoing rule holds true only when the dispositive part of a final decision or
order is definite, clear and unequivocal and can be wholly given effect without need of
interpretation or construction which usually is the case where the order or decision in question is
that of a court not of record which is not constitutionally required to state the facts and the law on
which the judgment is based.[25]
Assuming that a doubt or uncertainty exists between the dispositive portion and the body of
the decision, effort must be made to harmonize the whole body of the decision in order to give
effect to the intention, purpose and judgment of the court. In Republic v. delos Angeles[26] the Court
said:

Additionally, Article 10 of the Civil Code states that [i]n case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail. This mandate of law, obviously cannot be any less binding
upon the courts in relation to its judgments.

x x x The judgment must be read in its entirety, and must be construed as a whole so
as to bring all of its parts into harmony as far as this can be done by fair and
reasonable interpretation and so as to give effect to every word and part if possible,
and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the Court, consistent with the provisions
of the organic law. (49 C.J.S., pp. 863-864 [Emphasis supplied]

Thus, a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of the CFI of Rizal quoted earlier
shows that the marriage is voidable:

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration
classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955;
that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under
expert neuro-psychiatrict (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked
progress, he remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9,
1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a
declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 95 (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

xxx xxx xxx

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition
of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in
this very complaint add emphasis to the finding of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient,
that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia
(sic).[27]

Inevitably, the decision of the CFI of Rizal declared null and void the marriage of respondent
Isabels parents based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code. The legal consequences
as to the rights of the children are therefore governed by the first clause of the second paragraph
of Article 89. A contrary interpretation would be anathema to the rule just above-mentioned. Based
on said provision the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were
conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3,
1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the
legitimate grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of
representation in the estate of their grandmother Cirstina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father,
Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice
to a determination by the courts of whether Letters of Administration may be granted to
her. Neither do the Court adjudged herein the successional rights of the personalities involved over
the decedents estate.
It would not therefore be amiss to reiterate at this point what the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Ruiz Castro, emphasized to all magistrates of all levels of the judicial hierarchy that
extreme degree of care should be exercised in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a
decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The
adjudication of the rights and obligations of thoe parties, and the dispositions made as well as the
directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the
decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally leaving absolutely no room
for dispute, debate or interpretation.[28]
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

*
Should read Isabel Aguinaldo Cojuangco Suntay.
[1]
Allegedly for parricide.
[2]
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch 9, Quezon City.
[3]
Decision dated October 3, 1967 of the CFI of Rizal penned by Judge Lourdes P. San Diego, p. 3; Annex A of
Petition; Rollo, pp. 37-41.
[4]
Ibid., pp. 3-5; Rollo, pp. 39-41.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
Annex I of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 111-119.
[7]
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78.
[8]
Annex I, Petition.
[9]
Annex J, Petition; Rollo, pp. 116-118.
[10]
Motion to Dismiss, Annex A of Petition; Rollo, pp. 31-36.
[11]
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos Bulacan, Branch 78; Annex D of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-
61.
[12]
Order of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78 Annex H of the Petition; Rollo, p. 110.
[13]
Sempio v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 617 (1996).
[14]
Zarate, Jr., v. Olegario, 263 SCRA 1 (1996).
[15]
Annex D, Petition; Rollo, pp. 60-61.
[16]
Rules 1&3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[17]
February 7, 1996.
[18]
Article 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
(1) Those contracted under the ages of sixteen and fourteen years by male and female respectively, even with the
consent of the parents;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages;
(3) Those solemnized without marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;
(4) Bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 83, number 2;
(5) Incestuous marriages mentioned in Article 81;
(6) Those where one or both contracting parties have been found guilty of killing of the spouse of either of them;
(7) Those between stepbrothers and stepsisters and other marriages specified in Article 82. (n)
Article 81. Marriage between the following are incestuous and void from their performance, whether the relationship
between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate;
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree;
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether in the full or half blood;
(3) Between collateral relatives by blood within the fourth degree. (28a)
Article 82. The following marriages shall also be void from the beginning:
(1) Between stepfathers and stepdaughters, and stepmothers and stepsons;
(2) Between adopting father or mother and the adopted, between the latter and the surviving spouse of the former, and
between the former and the surviving spouse of the latter.
(3) Between the legitimate children of the adopter and the adopted. (28a)
Article 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouses of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered
as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the
 absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage contracted shall be valid in any of
the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.(29a)
Article 84. No marriage license shall be issued to a widow till after three hundred days following the death of the
husband, unless in the meantime she has given birth to a child. (n)
[19]
Article 85 of the New Civil Code reads:
A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was between the ages of sixteen and
twenty years, if male, or between the ages of fourteen to eighteen years, if female, and the marriage was
solemnized without the consent of the parent, guardian or person having authority over the party, unless after
attaining the ages of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be, such party freely cohabited with the other and
both lived together as husband and wife;
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in
fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force;
(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other
husband or wife;
(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force or intimidation, unless the violence or threat having
disappeared, such party, afterwards freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may
be;
(5) That the consent of either party was obtained by force or intimidation, unless the violence or threat having
disappeared, such party, afterwards freely cohabited with the other as her husband or his wife, as the case may
be;
(6) That either party was, at the time of marriage, physically incapable of entering into the married state, and such
incapacity continues, and appear to be incurable.
[20]
Article 89. Children conceived or born of marriages which are void from the beginning shall have the same status,
rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are called natural children by legal fiction.
xxx xxx xxx.
[21]
See Tolentino, New Civil Code, Vol. I, pp. 244-245.
[22]
Sy Loc Lieng, et al., v. Sy Quia, et al., 16 Phil. 137 (1910).
[23]
Nuguid v. Nuguid, 123 Phil. 1305 (1966).
[24]
Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Calauag, 11 SCRA 333 (1964).
[25]
Board of Liquidators v. Ricma Trading Corporation, 29 SCRA 397 (1969).
[26]
41 SCRA 422 (1971).
[27]
Decision, Annex A, Petition; Rollo, pp. 37-41.
[28]
Padua v. Robles, 66 SCRA 485 (1975).

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors

BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL, ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL,
JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis
 DECISION

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage after his death?

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their
marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her
death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986,
Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In
lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating
that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus
exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car
accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity
of the second marriage would affect petitioners successional rights. Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are
not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under
Article 47 of the Family Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59,
dismissed the petition after finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure,
insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in

asking for the declaration of the nullity of marriage of their deceased
father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of
this instant suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with
defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.[1]

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null
and void their fathers marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy
Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons who could
initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with this
Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis
of petitioners averment that the allegations in the petition are true and correct." It was
thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under Section 3,
Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court
reconsidered the dismissal and reinstated the petition for review.[4]

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code (FC), the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a
requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the
general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate that
the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as
a basic "autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers
marriage as an "inviolable social institution," and is the foundation of family life which
shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the Family Code considers marriage as "a
special contract of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just an adventure
but a lifetime commitment."[13]

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage
license is dispensed with, one of which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the
marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid
exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the
scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of
every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the marriage
license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace
in the family, avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the
source of gossip arising from the publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to
preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement. Sdaa miso

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was
celebrated without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit
stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry
each other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of
cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting
of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses from securing a marriage
license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein
both parties have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife
during the entire five-year continuous period regardless of whether there is a legal
impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have either
disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and
wife for five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be
computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and wife" where the only missing
factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-
year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the
absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the
day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and
continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is
computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry
each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality
and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the
same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special
relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be strictly observed.
The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be
afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same
missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There
should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required
in order to notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and
that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two
shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:

Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of
any impediment to the marriage to advice the local civil registrar thereof. x
x x."

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the

marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith make an investigation,
examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons
having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local
civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the

local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the
particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a
marriage license. x x x."

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the
concurrence of multiple marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus,
any marriage subsequently contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse shall be
illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where the prior
marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law
in that the contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs
are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions
monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they
have lived with each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the
fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation
contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the
law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a
subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in
fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was
actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any
cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and
wife". Scs daad

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the
exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the
absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to
declare their fathers marriage void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code [20] cannot be applied
even by analogy to petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for
annulment of marriage relied upon by the trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to
file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is inapplicable.
Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit,
not a suit for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not
identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court;
whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or
confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A
voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a
void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed
only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the
parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.[22] That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal
effects except those declared by law concerning the properties of the alleged spouses,
regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43
and 44 as well as Article 51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the
property regime governing voidable marriages is generally conjugal partnership and the
children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema

Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged
marital bond between him and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds
from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond that was dissolved between the
two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never
existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial
decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but
though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of
good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the
nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage,
so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no
marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its
invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be
material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time,
whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon
mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as
non-existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally
attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that
on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab
initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage[27] and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final
judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law makes either the action or
defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. [29] Corollarily, if
the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense,
then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate,
dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same
so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to
any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The
clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article
40 of the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

[1]
The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional Trial
Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants motion to dismiss
is hereby granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).
[2]
Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.
[3]
Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.
[4]
Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.
[5]
Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).

[6]
Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all the requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;

(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

[7]
Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxxxxxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.

xxxxxxxxx
[8]
Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
[9]
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
[10]
Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G. R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999; See also
Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
[11]
Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.
[12]
Article 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life. x x x.
[13]
Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).
[14]
Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also
state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that
he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
[15]
Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
[16]
Rollo, p. 29.
[17]
Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.

Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the
[18]

first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:

(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years."

Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years"
[19]
Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods
[20]

indicated herein:

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his
or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or
person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the
others insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time
before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the
discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time
the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;

For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
[21]
Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement Board, 272 Ill. App. 59 cited in I
Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.
[22]
In re Conzas Estate, 176 Ill. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code,
1990 ed., p. 271.
[23]
Article 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.
[24]
Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986); People v. Mendoza, 95
Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
[25]
35 Am. Jur. 219-220.
[26]
18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.
[27]
Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119;
312 Phil. 939 (1995).
[28]
Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).
[29]
Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated
February 23, 1998.

THIRD DIVISION

LOLITA D. ENRICO, G.R. No. 173614

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
HEIRS OF SPS. EULOGIO B. REYES, JJ.
MEDINACELI AND TRINIDAD
CATLI-MEDINACELI,
REPRESENTED BY VILMA M. Promulgated:
ARTICULO,
Respondents. September 28, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure assails the Order,[1] dated 3 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. II-4057, granting reconsideration
of its Order,[2] dated 11 October 2005, and reinstating respondents Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
On 17 March 2005, respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli (Eulogio)
and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli (Trinidad) filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D.
Enrico. Substantially, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that Eulogio
[3]
and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962, in Lal-lo, Cagayan. They begot seven
children, herein respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel,
Michelle and Joseph Lloyd.[4] On 1 May 2004, Trinidad died.[5] On 26 August 2004,
Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.[6] Six
months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.[7]

In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the

same was entered into without the requisite marriage license. They argued that
Article 34[8] of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been
living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a
marriage license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could
not have lived together under the circumstances required by said
provision. Respondents posited that the marriage of Eulogio to Trinidad was
dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004, which was barely three
months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner. Therefore, petitioner and
Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. To
further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of lack of marriage
ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its performance impossible.

In her Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband
and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted
from the requirement of a marriage license. From their union were born Elvin Enrico
and Marco Enrico, all surnamed Medinaceli, on 28 October 1988 and 30 October
1991, respectively.She further contended that the marriage ceremony was performed
in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by the Municipal Mayor.
As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that
it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action for declaration
of nullity of marriage.

On 11 October 2005, the RTC issued an Order,[9] granting the dismissal of the
Complaint for lack of cause of action. It cited A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,[10] dated 7
March 2003, promulgated by the Supreme Court En Banc as basis. The RTC
elucidated on its position in the following manner:

The Complaint should be dismissed.

1) Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC promulgated by the Supreme Court

which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a)[11] that a
petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife. The language of this rule is plain and simple which
states that such a petition may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. The
rule is clear and unequivocal that only the husband or the wife may file the
petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage. The reading
of this Court is that the right to bring such petition is exclusive and this right
solely belongs to them. Consequently, the heirs of the deceased spouse cannot
substitute their late father in bringing the action to declare the marriage null and
void.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)

The dispositive portion of the Order, thus, reads:

WHEREFORE, [the] Motion to Dismiss raised as an affirmative defense in

the answer is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Complaint filed by the
[respondents] is hereby DISMISSED with costs de officio. [13]

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Following the filing by

petitioner of her Comment to the said motion, the RTC rendered an Order[14] dated 3
May 2006, reversing its Order of 11 October 2005. Hence, the RTC reinstated the
complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog,[15] which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased
spouse have the standing to assail a void marriage even after the death of the latter. It
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife, applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still
living.[16] Where one or both parties are deceased, the RTC held that the heirs may
file a petition to declare the marriage void. The RTC expounded on its stance, thus:

The questioned Order disregarded the case of Nial vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122
(March 14, 2000) in which the Supreme Court, First Division, held that the heirs of
a deceased person may file a petition for the declaration of his marriage after his
death. The Order subject of this motion for reconsideration held that the case of
Nial vs. Bayadog is now superseded by the new Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Marriages (hereinafter referred to as the Rule) because the Supreme
Court has rejected the case of Nial vs. Bayadog by approving the Rule on Nullity
of Void Marriages. The Order further held that it is only the husband or the wife
who is (sic) the only parties allowed to file an action for declaration of nullity of
their marriage and such right is purely personal and is not transmissible upon the
death of the parties.

It is admitted that there seems to be a conflict between the case of Nial vs.
Bayadog and Section 2(a) of the Rule. In view of this, the Court shall try to
reconcile the case of Nial vs. Bayadog and the Rule. To reconcile, the Court will
have to determine [the] basic rights of the parties. The rights of the legitimate heirs
of a person who entered into a void marriage will be prejudiced particularly with
respect to their successional rights. During the lifetime of the parent[,] the heirs
have only an inchoate right over the property of the said parents. Hence, during the
lifetime of the parent, it would be proper that it should solely be the parent who
should be allowed to file a petition to declare his marriage void. However, upon the
death of the parent his heirs have already a vested right over whatever property left
by the parent. Such vested right should not be frustrated by any rules of procedure
such as the Rule. Rules of Procedure cannot repeal rights granted by substantive
law. The heirs, then, have a legal standing in Court.

If the heirs are prohibited from questioning the void marriage entered by
their parent, especially when the marriage is illegal and feloniously entered into, it
will give premium to such union because the guilty parties will seldom, if ever at
all, ask for the annulment of the marriage. Such void marriage will be given a
semblance of validity if the heirs will not be allowed to file the petition after the
death of the parent.

For these reasons, this Court believes that Sec. 2(a) of the Rules on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage is applicable only when both parties
to a (sic) void marriage are still living. Upon the death of anyone of the guilty party
to the void marriage, his heirs may file a petition to declare the the (sic) marriage
void, but the Rule is not applicable as it was not filed b the husband or the wife. It
shall be the ordinary rule of civil procedure which shall be applicable.[17]

Perforce, the decretal portion of the RTC Order of 3 May 2006 states:

In view of the foregoing, the Court grants the motion for reconsideration
dated October 31, 2005 and reinstate this case.[18]
 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
Order; however, on 1 June 2006, the RTC denied the said motion on the ground that
no new matter was raised therein.[19]

Hence, the instant Petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
on the sole question of whether the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC of the Supreme Court applies to
the case at bar.

At the outset, we note that petitioner took an abbreviated route to this Court,
countenancing the hierarchy of courts.

We have earlier emphasized that while the Supreme Court has the concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the RTCs (for writs enforceable within
their respective regions), to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari, the
litigants are well advised against taking a direct recourse to this Court.[20] Instead,
they should initially seek the proper relief from the lower courts. As a court of last
resort, this Court should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the
first instance. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is concurrently within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or the RTC, litigants must observe the principle
of hierarchy of courts.[21]However, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court has the
discretionary power to brush aside procedural lapses if compelling reasons, or the
nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction.[22] Moreover, notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant Petition
for its failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts, this Court will
proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.

Petitioner maintains that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs the instant case. A
contrario, respondents posit that it is Nial which is applicable, whereby the heirs of
the deceased person were granted the right to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage after his death.

We grant the Petition.

 In reinstating respondents Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.

While it is true that Nial in no uncertain terms allowed therein petitioners to

file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their fathers marriage to therein
respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for
the reason that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code. The Court in Nial recognized that the applicable law to
determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the Civil Code, which
was the law in effect at the time of their celebration.[23] What we have before us
belongs to a different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was
entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code. As can be gleaned from the
facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit
in its scope, to wit:

Section 1. Scope. This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of

absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.

The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. (Emphasis supplied.)

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for

doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.[24]

Moreover, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003, following

its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, contrary to the opinion
of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and application. As has been
emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of
the Philippines, and is prospective in its application. The marriage of petitioner to
Eulogio was celebrated on 26 August 2004, and it squarely falls within the ambit of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, which provides:

Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. (n) (Emphasis supplied.)

There is no ambiguity in the Rule. Absolute sententil expositore non

indiget. When the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is
required. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, makes it the sole right of the
husband or the wife to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage.

The Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal Separation and
Provisional Orders explicates on Section 2(a) in the following manner, viz:

1. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file petitions for annulment of

voidable marriages and declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petitions cannot be filed by the compulsory or intestate heirs of the spouses or
by the State. [Section 2; Section 3, paragraph a]

Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment

of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of
the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not
have a legal right to file the petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only
inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence can only
question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse
in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in
the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve
marriage and not to seek its dissolution.[25] (Emphasis supplied.)

Respondents clearly have no cause of action before the court a

quo. Nonetheless, all is not lost for respondents. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or
intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can still protect
their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of
Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, Legal
Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question
the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for declaration of
nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. II-4057 filed

before the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan, Branch 6, is ORDERED
DISMISSED without prejudice to challenging the validity of the marriage of Lolita
D. Enrico to Eulogio B. Medinaceli in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the latter. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Judge Rolando R. Velasco; rollo, pp. 12-13.
[2]
Penned by Judge Virgilio M. Alameda, id. at 15-20.
[3]
Id. at 4.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Id. at 5.
[7]
Id.
[8]
ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties
and found no legal impediments to the marriage.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 15-20.
[10]
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages And Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
[11]
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife.
[12]
Rollo, p. 17.
[13]
Id. at 20.
[14]
Id. at 12-13.
[15]
384 Phil. 661, 672-675 (2000).
[16]
Rollo, p. 13.
[17]
Id. at 12-13.
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id. at 14.
[20]
Pearson v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 356 Phil. 341, 355 (1998).
[21]
Id.
[22]
Tano v. Hon. Gov. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670, 700 (1997); Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation, 400 Phil. 307, 326-327 (2000), citing Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona, 352 Phil. 461, 480 (1998);
[23]
Nial v. Bayadog, supra note 15 at 667, citing Tamano v. Hon. Ortiz, 353 Phil. 775 (1998).
[24]
Modequillo v. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, 31 May 1990, 185 SCRA 766, 772. It must be noted that Article 257 of the
Family Code provides that, This Code shall take effect one year after the completion of its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation, as certified by the Executive Secretary, Office of the President. The Code
was published on 4 August 1987 in the Manila Chronicle, and took effect one year after its publication, or on
3 August 1988, considering that 1988 is a leap year; See Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, 1995 Ed., p. 393, citing Memorandum Circular No. 85 of the Office of the President dated 7
November 1988.
[25]
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000]

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and
EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between private respondent
Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered
private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise
Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church
wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of
a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null
and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated
by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding
in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of
Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He
alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at
the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the
time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been
issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August
4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim
that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their
Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12
and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in
evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil
marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church
marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as
evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of
the facts therein. The fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took
place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is
undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a
church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.[1]
 The Pasig RTC sustained private respondents civil suit and declared his marriage to
herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both
parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court
affirmed the trial courts decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be
validly contracted. Said the appellate court:

We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendants counsel that
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. It
does not say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even without a
judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void, ab initio,
there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter
of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine
for himself for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed
to a second marriage even before a competent court issues a judicial decree
of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the
least, and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed
provisions of the Civil Code on marriage.

xxx

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed

Decision in this wise:

1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M.

Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and
void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount
of P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from
November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.

SO ORDERED. [2]

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition
asserting that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.

BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR

THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A
JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS.
COURT OF APPEALS.
III

IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE

CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE
SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV

IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this
question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the
assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner
to private respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the
marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected
petitioners claim that People v. Mendoza[3] and People v. Aragon[4] are applicable in this
case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases,
decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No.
227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the
provisions of law previously obtaining.[5]
In refusing to consider petitioners appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:

Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory
precedent for this case. Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts
situate it within the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code,
as in the instant case.

xxx

For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a

second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential. . . .[6]

At the outset, we must note that private respondents first and second marriages
contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v.
Bobis[7] and Mercado v. Tan,[8] both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous
marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code, [9] under which a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time
of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the
absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less
than seven years, is generally considered as dead and before any person
believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the
three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil

Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however,
appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,[10] and People v. Aragon,[11] this Court held that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved
the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence
of his first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage
during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for
bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void,
having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a
judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void,
and the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid
marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases,
saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or
not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,[12] and Consuegra v. Consuegra,[13] however, we recognized the
right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their
acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for
judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the
husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to
share in the estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.[14]
 But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),[15] the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as
precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that
his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already
previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling
was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.[16]
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),[17] the Court held that there is a need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In
1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid
marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:[18]
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of
her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though
void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman
at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly,
the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the
law. (Emphasis supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,[19] however, the Court found the second marriage void
without need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family
Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article
40 of the Family Code.[20] Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.

In Terre v. Terre (1992)[21] the Court, applying Gomez,

Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage
during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was
void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have
known that the prevailing case law is that for purposes of determining whether a person
is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential.
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of
Appeals (1993),[22] the Court held:

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86,
99, 147, 148). [23]

However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances
of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)[24] the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of
immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage
was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On
the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We
held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born
before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need
for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence
at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered
into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon.The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he
could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private
respondents second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner
and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,[25] the Family Code has
retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that
impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are
not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate courts finding that despite private
respondents deceit and perfidy in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit
from her silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church
ceremony wherein petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used
three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter
properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondents allegation that he
wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage
license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil
and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil
marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize
the validity and salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that
petitioner had failed to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues
that such failure does not prevent the appellate court
from giving her defense dueconsideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the
State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs
such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the
essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid
license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the
celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the
church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served
not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for
brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could
have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial
court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of
letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls his own deceit and perfidy.
On the matter of petitioners counterclaim for damages and attorneys fees. Although
the appellate court admitted that they found private respondent acted duplicitously and
craftily in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the latter did not
adduce evidence to support her claim.[26]
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in
the present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private
respondent held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate
wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless
complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we
grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages
from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law
absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our
laws do not comprehend an action for damages between husband and wife merely
because of breach of a marital obligation.[27] There are other remedies.[28]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed
partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo
M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount
of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children,
Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or
otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

See also Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582, 593 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353, 365 (1996); Son vs.
[1]

Son, 251 SCRA 556, 564 (1995); re proof of facts cited.

[2]
Rollo, pp. 48-52.
[3]
45 Phil 739 (1954).
[4]
100 SCRA 1033 (1957).
[5]
Rollo, p. 47.
[6]
Rollo, p. 49.
[7]
G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000.
G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000. In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice Vitug opined that the
[8]

necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of remarriage should be held
to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such
judicial declaration of nullity, in his view, should still be deemed essential when the "marriage," for instance,
is between persons of the same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given consent to the
marriage. Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and intended to refer only
to marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37, 38 and 53 thereof.
[9]
E.O. No. 209, which took effect on August 3, 1988.
[10]
45 Phil 739 (1954).
[11]
100 SCRA 1033 (1957).
[12]
33 SCRA 614 (1970).
[13]
37 SCRA 315 (1971).
[14]
See also Lao v. Dee, 45 Phil 739 (1924) and Pisalbon v. Bejec, 74 Phil 88 (1943).
[15]
77 SCRA 338 (1977).
[16]
22 SCRA 525 (1983).
[17]
143 SCRA 499 (1986).
[18]
Id. at 501.
[19]
145 SCRA 229 (1986).
[20]
The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
[21]
211 SCRA 7 (1992).
[22]
226 SCRA 572 (1993).
[23]
Id. at 579.
[24]
268 SCRA 47 (1997)
[25]
286 SCRA 495, 530 (1998).
[26]
Rollo, p. 51.
Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol.1,
[27]

Manila: 1990, p. 223.

[28]
Among them legal separation, or prosecution for adultery and concubinage.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 2349 July 3, 1992

DOROTHY B. TERRE, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JORDAN TERRE, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

In a sworn complaint filed with this Court on 24 December 1981, complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan Terre, a member
of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant, while his prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.

The Court resolved to require respondent to answer the complaint. 1 Respondent successfully evaded five (5) attempts to serve a copy of
the Court's Resolution and of the complaint by moving from one place to another, such that he could not be found nor reached in his alleged
place of employment or residence. 2 On 24 April 1985, that is after three (3) years and a half, with still no answer from the respondent, the
Court noted respondent's success in evading service of the complaint and the Court's Resolution and thereupon resolved to "suspend
respondent Atty. Jordan Terre from the practice of law until after he appears and/or files his answer to the complaint against him" in the
instant
case. 3

On 28 September 1985, respondent finally filed an Answer with a Motion to Set Aside and/or Lift Suspension Order. In his Answer, Atty.
Terre averred that he had contracted marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre on 14 June 1977 upon her representation that she was single;
that he subsequently learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A. Bercenilla sometime in 1968; that when he confronted Dorothy
about her prior marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence; that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings with
Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was then carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that believing in good faith that his
marriage to complainant was null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan. 4

In her Reply, complainant Dorothy denied that Jason Terre was the child of Merlito A. Bercenilla and insisted that Jason was the child of
respondent Jordan Terre, as evidenced by Jason's Birth Certificate and physical resemblance to respondent. Dorothy further explained that
while she had given birth to Jason Terre at the PAFGH registered as a dependent of Merlito Bercenilla, she had done so out of extreme
necessity and to avoid risk of death or injury to the fetus which happened to be in a difficult breech position. According to Dorothy, she had
then already been abandoned by respondent Jordan Terre, leaving her penniless and without means to pay for the medical and hospital bills
arising by reason of her pregnancy.

The Court denied respondent's Motion to Set Aside or Lift the Suspension Order and instead referred; by a Resolution dated 6 January 1986,
the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. 5

Then Solicitor Pio C. Guerrero was appointed investigator by the Office of the Solicitor General. He set the case for hearing on 7 July 1986
with notice to both parties. On 7 July 1986, complainant Dorothy appeared and presented her evidence ex parte, since respondent did not so
appear. 6 The Investigating Solicitor scheduled and held another hearing on 19 August 1986, where he put clarificatory questions to the
complainant; respondent once again did not appear despite notice to do so. Complainant finally offered her evidence and rested her case.
The Solicitor set still another hearing for 2 October 1986, notifying respondent to present his evidence with a warning that should he fail once
more to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent did not appear on 2 October 1986. The Investigating
Solicitor accordingly considered respondent to have waived his right to present evidence and declared the case submitted for resolution. The
parties were given time to submit their respective memoranda. Complainant Dorothy did so on 8 December 1986. Respondent Terre did not
file his memorandum.

On 26 February 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted its "Report and Recommendation" to this Court. The Report summarized
the testimony of the complainant in the following manner:

Complainant Dorothy Terre took the witness stand and testified substantially as follows: she and respondent met for
the first time in 1979 as fourth year high school classmates in Cadiz City High School (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 9); she was
then married to Merlito Bercenilla, while respondent was single (id.); respondent was aware of her marital status (ibid,
p. 14); it was then that respondent started courting her but nothing happened of the courtship (ibid, p. 10); they
[complainant and respondent] moved to Manila were they respectively pursued their education, respondent as a law
student at the Lyceum University (tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 12, 15-16); respondent continued courting her, this time with
more persistence (ibid, p. 11); she decided nothing would come of it since she was married but he [respondent]
explained to her that their marriage was void ab initio since she and her first husband were first cousins (ibid, p. 12);
convinced by his explanation and having secured favorable advice from her mother and
ex-in-laws, she agreed to marry him [respondent] (ibid, 12-13, 16); in their marriage license, despite her [complainant's]
objection, he [respondent] wrote "single" as her status explaining that since her marriage was void ab initio, there was
no need to go to court to declare it as such (ibid, 14-15); they were married before Judge Priscilla Mijares of the City
Court of Manila on June 14, 1977 (Exhibit A; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 16-17); Jason Terre was born of their union on June
25, 1981 (Exhibit B, tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 18); all through their married state up to the time he [respondent] disappeared
in 1981, complainant supported respondent, in addition to the allowance the latter was getting from his parents (ibid,
pp. 19-20); she was unaware of the reason for his disappearance until she found out later that respondent married a
certain Vilma [sic] Malicdem (Exhibit C, tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 21-22); she then filed a case for abandonment of minor
with the City Fiscal of Pasay City (ibid, p. 23) which was subsequently filed before Branch II of the City Court of Pasay
 City as Criminal Case No. 816159 (Exhibit D; tsn, July 7, 1986, p. 24); she likewise filed a case for bigamy against
respondent and Helina Malicdem with the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, where a prima facie case was
found to exist (Exhibit E; tsn, July 7, pp. 25-26); additionally, complainant filed an administrative case against
respondent with the Commission on Audit where he was employed, which case however was considered closed for
being moot and academic when respondent was considered automatically separated from the service for having gone
on absence without official leave (Exhibit F; tsn, July 7, 1986, pp. 28-29). 7

There is no dispute over the fact that complainant Dorothy Terre and respondent Jordan Terre contracted marriage on 14 July 1977 before
Judge Priscilla Mijares. There is further no dispute over the fact that on 3 May 1981, respondent Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem in
Dasol, Pangasinan. When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial
action having been initiated or any judicial declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent with complainant.

Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior marriage with complainant
Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity was necessary.

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place, respondent has not rebutted
complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, that pretended
defense is the same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being
incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract a second marriage
with the respondent. Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the
prevailing case law of this Court which holds that for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage,
a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that
Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his
first marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem must be
regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

That the moral character of respondent Jordan Terre was deeply flawed is shown by other circumstances. As noted, he convinced the
complainant that her prior marriage to Bercenilla was null and void ab initio, that she was still legally single and free to marry him. When
complainant and respondent had contracted their marriage, respondent went through law school while being supported by complainant, with
some assistance from respondent's parents. After respondent had finished his law course and gotten complainant pregnant, respondent
abandoned the complainant without support and without the wherewithal for delivering his own child safely in a hospital.

Thus, we agree with the Solicitor General that respondent Jordan Terre, by his actions, "eloquently displayed, not only his unfitness to
remain as a member of the Bar, but likewise his inadequacy to uphold the purpose and responsibility of his gender" because marriage is a
basic social institution. 9

In Pomperada v. Jochico, 10 the Court, in rejecting a petition to be allowed to take the oath as a member of the Bar and to sign the Roll of
Attorneys, said through Mme. Justice Melencio-Herrera:

It is evident that respondent fails to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession. Whether
the marriage was a joke as respondent claims, or a trick played on her as claimed by complainant, it does not speak
well of respondent's moral values. Respondent had made a mockery of marriage, a basic social institution which public
policy cherishes and protects (Article 216, Civil Code). 11

In Bolivar v. Simbol, 12 the Court found the respondent there guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" because he made a dupe of complainant,
living on her bounty and allowing her to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities while dangling before her the mirage of a
marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand money
from complainant. . . . ." The Court held such acts "indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the Bar." 13

We believe and so hold that the conduct of respondent Jordan Terre in inveigling complainant Dorothy Terre to contract a second marriage
with him; in abandoning complainant Dorothy Terre after she had cared for him and supported him through law school, leaving her without
means for the safe delivery of his own child; in contracting a second marriage with Helina Malicdem while his first marriage with complainant
Dorothy Terre was subsisting, constituted "grossly immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, affording more than
sufficient basis for disbarment of respondent Jordan Terre. He was unworthy of admission to the Bar in the first place. The Court will correct
this error forthwith.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of
this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall
also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
 G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013

YASUO IWASAWA, Petitioner, v. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO,
AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY, Respondents.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the September 4, 2012 Decision2 and October 16, 2012 Order3 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 43, of Manila in Civil Case No. 11-126203. The RTC denied the petition for declaration
of nullity of the marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa with private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan due
to insufficient evidence.

The antecedents follow:

Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime in 2002 in one of his visits to the
Philippines. Private respondent introduced herself as �single� and �has never married before.� Since
then, the two became close to each other. Later that year, petitioner came back to the Philippines and
married private respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding, the couple resided in
Japan.4cralaw virtua law lib rary

In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed. Suspecting that something might have
happened in the Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private respondent confessed to
him that she received news that her previous husband passed away.5 cralaw virt ualaw li bra ry

Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wife�s confession and discovered that indeed, she was married
to one Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20, 1994.6This prompted
petitioner to file a petition7 for the declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void on the
ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family
Code of the Philippines.

During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence
issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO): chanrob les vi rtua 1aw 1ib rary

(1) Certificate of Marriage8

between petitioner and private respondent
marked as Exhibit �A� to prove the fact of marriage between the
parties on November 28, 2002;

(2) Certificate of Marriage9 between private respondent and Raymond

Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibit �B� to prove the fact of
marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994;

(3) Certificate of Death10 of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as

Exhibits �C� and �C-1� to prove the fact of the latter�s death on July
14, 2009; and

(4) Certification11 from the NSO to the effect that there are two entries of
marriage recorded by the office pertaining to private respondent marked
as Exhibit �D� to prove that private respondent in fact contracted two
marriages, the first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June
20, 1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) admitted the authenticity
and due execution of the above documentary exhibits during pre-trial.12 c ralaw virtualaw l ibra ry
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence
to prove private respondent�s prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while petitioner
offered the certificate of marriage of private respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified
about said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioner�s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal
knowledge of private respondent�s prior marriage nor of Arambulo�s death which makes him a complete
stranger to the marriage certificate between private respondent and Arambulo and the latter�s death
certificate. It further ruled that petitioner�s testimony about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable
since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October
16, 2012.

Hence this petition raising the sole legal issue of whether the testimony of the NSO records custodian
certifying the authenticity and due execution of the public documents issued by said office was necessary
before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.

Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are public documents which are considered
self-authenticating and thus it was unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as witness. He cites
Article 410 of the Civil Code which provides that books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facieevidence of the facts stated
therein. Moreover, the trial prosecutor himself also admitted the authenticity of said documents.

The OSG, in its Comment,13 submits that the findings of the RTC are not in accord with law and established
jurisprudence. It contends that both Republic Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Law on Registry of Civil
Status, and the Civil Code elaborated on the character of documents arising from records and entries made
by the civil registrar and categorically declared them as public documents. Being public documents, said
documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness
and consequently, there was no need for the court to require petitioner to present the records custodian or
officer from the NSO to testify on them. The OSG further contends that public documents have probative
value since they are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein as provided in the above-quoted
provision of the Civil Code. Thus, the OSG submits that the public documents presented by petitioner,
considered together, completely establish the facts in issue.

In her letter14 dated March 19, 2013 to this Court, private respondent indicated that she is not against her
husband�s petition to have their marriage declared null and void. She likewise admitted therein that she
contracted marriage with Arambulo on June 20, 1994 and contracted a second marriage with petitioner on
November 28, 2002. She further admitted that it was due to poverty and joblessness that she married
petitioner without telling the latter that she was previously married. Private respondent also confirmed that
it was when she found out that Arambulo passed away on July 14, 2009 that she had the guts to confess to
petitioner about her previous marriage. Thereafter, she and petitioner have separated.

We grant the petition.

There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents. As
provided in the Civil Code:cha nrob les vi rtua 1aw 1ibra ry

ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered
public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution and
genuineness.15 Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the
petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity
and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not
only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they constitute
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain
unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the
contrary.

This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,16 which is void from the
beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in
the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken together concretely establish the
nullity of the marriage of petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous.
The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent married Arambulo on June 20,
1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second marriage this time with
petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on
July 14, 2009 and that it was only on said date that private respondent�s marriage with Arambulo was
deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is
bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second
marriage was contracted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The September 4, 2012 Decision and
October 16, 2012 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 11-126203 are
hereby SET ASIDE. The marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa and private respondent Felisa Custodio
Gangan is declared NULL and VOID.

The Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and the National Statistics Office are hereby ORDERED to make
proper entries into the records of the abovementioned parties in accordance with this Decision.

No pronouncement as to costs. chanrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC
dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.

The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with
petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of
Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4)
and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar
of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions
of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in
the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of
the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which
provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or
the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
"seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the
petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as
husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult
to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when,
on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be
confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction
which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the
improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that
the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a
decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e.
lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in
the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It
only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,]
it should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized
that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition
[for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay
and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the
petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the
"immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead
of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage
between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which
held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered
during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had
already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such
circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting
previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder
of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by
the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x
x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and
should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or
wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment
as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule
39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment
through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody
of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would
mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents
of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of
pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive
litigation on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case
on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil
Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is
the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its
citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal
capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation
under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment
or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a
foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus,
Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment
concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right
of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in
a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In
any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the
personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when
Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on
the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a
"trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can
be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based
on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of
the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
"[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court
recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce.
Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose
laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the
country where it was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The
principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign
spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws
of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse
will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already
have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case
of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as
a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in
Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has
the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their
judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights
and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency
with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment
serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of
the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively,
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated
2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional
Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No.
16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation
of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon
receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of
Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage
Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared
before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao
Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a
receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to
obtain a passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee
of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their
office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a
document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner,
Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the
WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.

SO ORDERED.9

Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the
court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible
mistake.10

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1)
there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it
to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all
the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage
void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration couched
in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the
Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioner’s
counsel, and all concerned government agencies.

SO ORDERED.12

Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s identity was used by an
unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent
to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages
under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.13

Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following
grounds:

I.

RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS
IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.

II.

GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE
ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB
INITIO.14

Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected, because
the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared
and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter’s personal
circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of
marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio.16 Thus, the petition
instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a
Rule 108 proceeding.17

We deny the petition.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a
question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does
not call for the examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue
raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in
effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a
pure question of law.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, to wit:
 SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages;
(c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i)
acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought,
the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order,
fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be
given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest
under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition
thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may make
orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the
judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in
his record.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then
the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since
the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the
true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate
adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court
has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the
evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.21

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest
which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any
person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed,
it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of
the civil register.22

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the
personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged
and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she
claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into
such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO,
it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of
entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise
undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of
the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the
City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where
respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as
well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With
the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in
the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s signature appearing in some of her
government issued identification cards.23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it
was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela
Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute
for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds
for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into
1âw phi 1

and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence
clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a
forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage,
we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not
the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of
such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the
correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court
did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial
Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB,
are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.