Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:

On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the accused-appellant for the
crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time
Republic Act (R.A) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was
inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.

On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of
the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. We find no
substantial arguments on the said motion that can disturb our verdict.

On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of
the Anti-Death Penalty Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).

On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of
accused-appellant. The motion raises the following grounds for the reversal of the death sentence:

[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the pardon by the offended party and her
mother before the filing of the complaint acted as a bar to his criminal prosecution.

[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of the offense in the Complaint and
throughout trial prevented the accused-appellant from preparing an adequate defense.

[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant was the father or stepfather of the
complainant and in affirming the sentence of death against him on this basis.

[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and manifested bias in the conduct of the
trial.

[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and to due
process, due to the incompetence of counsel.

[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se:

a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death penalty is a severe and
excessive penalty in violation of Article III, Sec. 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution.
 b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of
the 1987 Constitution.

In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main issues: (1) mixed factual and legal
matters relating to the trial proceedings and findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former
counsel; and (3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.

It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below
cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our Resolution
in Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals:1

If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first time on appeal proper, with
more reason should such issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court.

It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case against the accused-appellant before the sala of then
presiding judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, the defense attempted to prove that:

a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of the alleged victim's maternal
grandmother;

b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;

c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly penetrated the alleged victim's private part;
and

d) the accused was in Parañaque during the time of the alleged rape.

In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic review, the accused-appellant reiterated as grounds
for exculpation:

a) the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in prompting her grandchild to file the rape case;

b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could not have caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the
victim; and

c) the defense of alibi.

Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the accused-appellant reveals that in their messianic
appeal for a reversal of our judgment of conviction, we are asked to consider for the first time, by way of a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, the following matters:

a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a bar to the criminal prosecution for
rape against the accused-appellant;

b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the offense in the Complaint which deprived
the accused-appellant from adequately defending himself;

c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying circumstance that placed the accused-
appellant within the coverage of the Death Penalty Law;

d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the trial court during the trial of the rape
case.
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration, the only legitimate issue that we can tackle
relates to the Affidavit of Desistance which touches on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have proceeded with the
prosecution of the accused-appellant considering that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any
time, even during appeal.2

It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against the accused-appellant, it appeared that
despite the admission made by the victim herself in open court that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she,
nevertheless, "strongly pointed out that she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused because the latter might do
the same sexual assaults to other women."3 Thus, this is one occasion where an affidavit of desistance must be regarded
with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age, manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges
against the accused-appellant.

We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare,4 that:

As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited by the accused-appellant, an
affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole
consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with
the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the
trial and accepted by the judge. 5

In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly consisted of denial and alibi which cannot
outweigh the positive identification and convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of
desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal
prosecution against the accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over the case.

II

The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his counsel. 6 One of the recognized exceptions
to this rule is gross incompetency in a way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented, in effect, from having
his day in court to defend himself.7

In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-appellant to whom the FLAG lawyers now impute
incompetency had amply exercised the required ordinary diligence or that reasonable decree of care and skill expected of
him relative to his client's defense. As the rape case was being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from the time he was
assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings thereof. Moreover, he had seasonably submitted the Accused-
Appellant's Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration of our June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive discussion in support
of his line of defense. There is no indication of gross incompetency that could have resulted from a failure to present any
argument or any witness to defend his client. Neither has he acted haphazardly in the preparation of his case against the
prosecution evidence. The main reason for his failure to exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is the overwhelming
evidence of the prosecution. The alleged errors committed by the previous counsel as enumerated by the new counsel
could not have overturned the judgment of conviction against the accused-appellant.

III

Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as punishment for violation of law or custom,
religious or secular, is an ancient practice. We do know that our forefathers killed to avenge themselves and heir akin and
that initially, the criminal law was used to compensate for a wrong done to a private party or his family, not to punish in
the name of the state.

The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization throughout the later generations against past
barbarity and the institutionalization of state power under the rule of law. Today every man or woman is both an
individual person with inherent human rights recognized and protected by the state and a citizen with the duty to serve
the common weal and defend and preserve society.

One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to
this, the legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may be committed by
its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in
accordance with these laws.

Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the causes of criminal behavior and the
purposes of criminal punishment, our criminal laws have been perceived as relatively stable and functional since the
enforcement of the Revised Penal Code on January 1, 1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition to the death
penalty provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the death penalty in
specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system
through the old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870.

The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional question of whether or not the death
penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and
unusual punishments. We unchangingly answered this question in the negative in the cases of Harden v. Director of
Prison,8 People v. Limaco,9 People v. Camano, 10 People v. Puda 11 and People v. Marcos. 12 In Harden, we ruled:

The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the
United States Supreme Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life. 13

Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the for a for a protracted debate on the
morality or propriety of the death sentence where the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined
criminal acts. Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limaco that:

. . . there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally
wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as
long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. 14

and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion. 15

Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason, correspondence with the enemy during
times of war, qualified piracy, parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly
weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide, and arson resulting in death. The list of
capital offenses lengthened as the legislature responded to the emergencies of the times. In 1941, Commonwealth Act
(C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the 1950s, at the height of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which carried the death penalty for leaders
of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital offenses were created by more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking
Law, the Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During martial law, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866
was enacted penalizing with death, among others, crimes involving homicide committed with an unlicensed firearm.

In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos regime and led to the nullification of the 1973
Constitution, a Constitutional Commission was convened following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was
catapulted to power by the people.

Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a rejuvenated people, the Constitutional
Commissioners grouped themselves into working committees among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with Jose B.
Laurel, Jr. as Chairman and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as Vice-Chairman.

On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the proposed bill of rights to the rest of the commission.
What is now Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution was first denominated as Section 22 and was originally
worded as follows:

Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment or the death penalty
inflicted. Death penalty already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua.
 Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a consensus among the members of the Bill
of Rights Committee that the death penalty should be abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they
proceeded to deliberate on how the abolition was to be done--whether the abolition should be done by the
Constitution or by the legislature-and the majority voted for a constitutional abolition of the death penalty. Father
Bernas explained:

. . . [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death penalty should be abolished or not,
but rather on whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution — in which case it cannot be
restored by the legislature — or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional abolition
of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family
who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried out. There is no evidence that the death
penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives
might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another man is just too presumptuous for any man.
The fact that the death penalty as an institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us
from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution intended precisely to serve human life.
So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons which were presented in support of the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. 16

The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not survive the debate that it instigated. Commissioner
Napoleon G. Rama first pointed out that "never in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime" and that
"criminality was at its zenith during the last decade". 17 Ultimately, the dissent defined itself to an unwillingness to
absolutely excise the death penalty from our legal system and leave society helpless in the face of a future upsurge of
crimes or other similar emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F. de los Reyes, Jr. suggested, "although we abolish the
death penalty in the Constitution, we should afford some amount of flexibility to future legislation", 18 and his concern
was amplified by the interpellatory remarks of Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now Associate Justice Florenz
Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Commissioner Christian Monsod,
Commissioner Francisco A. Rodrigo, and Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Padilla put it succinctly in the
following exchange with Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani:

BISHOP BACANI. . . . At present, they explicitly make it clear that the church has never condemned the
right of the state to inflict capital punishment.

MR. PADILLA. . . . So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the right even from a moral standpoint
of imposing or prescribing capital punishment.

BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic point of view, that right of the state is
not forbidden.

MR. PADILLA. In fact . . . we have to accept that the state has the delegated authority from the Creator to
impose the death penalty under certain circumstances.

BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do what is needed for the sake of the
common good but the issue at stake is whether or not under the present circumstances that will be for the
common good.

MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.

BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a particular stage in history, but it is not clear
whether or not that delegation is forever under all circumstances.

MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to determine, under certain specified
conditions or circumstances, whether the retention of the death penalty or its abolition would be for the
common good. I do not believe this Commission can a priori, and as was remarked within a few days or
even a month, determine a positive provision in the Constitution that would prohibit even the legislature
to prescribe the death penalty for the most heinous crimes, the most grievous offenses attended by many
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. 19
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered provision. The move to add the phrase, "unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the national assembly provides for the death penalty," came from
Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de los Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed reservations even
as regards the proposed amendment. He said:

. . . [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter in the Constitution or leave it to the
discretion of our legislature. Arguments pro and con have been given. . . . But my stand is, we should
leave this to the discretion of the legislature.

The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will, in effect repeal by our
Constitution a piece of legislation and after repealing this piece of legislation tell the legislature that we
have repealed the law and that the legislature can go ahead and enact it again. I think this is not worthy
of a constitutional body like ours. If we will leave the matter of the death Penalty to the legislature, let us
leave it completely to the discretion of the legislature, but let us not have this half-baked provision. We
have many provisions in the Revised Penal Code imposing the death penalty. We will now revoke or
repeal these pieces of legislation by means of the Constitution, but at the same time say that it is up to the
legislature to impose this again.

. . . The temper and condition of the times change . . . and so we, I think we should leave this matter to the
legislature to enact statutes depending on the changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this completely
to the legislature composed of representatives elected by the people.

I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact that we are not elected by the
people and if we are going to entrust this to the legislature, let us not be half-baked nor halfhearted about
it. Let us entrust it to the legislature 100 percent. 20

Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23) commissioners voting in favor of
the amendment and twelve (12) voting against it, followed by more revisions, hence the present wording of
Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution in the following tenor:

Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death penalty provisions in the Revised Penal Code
and certain special criminal laws and the state of the scale of penalties thereunder, were tremendous.

The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what used to be capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra, 21 we
stated that "in view of the abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty
that may be imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" 22thereby eliminating
death as the original maximum period. The constitutional abolition of the death penalty, it seemed, limited the penalty for
murder to only the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium, which we then, in People
v. Masangkay, 23 People v. Atencio 24 and People v. Intino 25 divided into three new periods, to wit, the lower half of reclusion
temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the three-grade scheme under the Revised Penal Code. In People
v. Munoz, 26 however, we reconsidered these aforecited cases and after extended discussion, we concluded that the
doctrine announced therein did not reflect the intention of the framers. The crux of the issue was whether or not Article
III, Section 19 (1) absolutely abolished the death penalty, for if it did, then, the aforementioned new three-grade penalty
should replace the old one where the death penalty constituted the maximum period. But if no total abolition can be read
from said constitutional provision and the death penalty is only suspended, it cannot as yet be negated by the institution
of a new three-grade penalty premised on the total inexistence of the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled
in Munoz:

The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and
thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium.
These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by
 the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19 (1) merely prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the
remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.

A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty
shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather
awkward, is still plain enough. 27

Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which
the legislature took the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.

The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-
step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the
vote to pass on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments for and against capital punishment, the Members of
the Senate voted on the policy issue of death penalty. The vote was explained, thus:

SUSPENSION OF THE RULES

Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body suspended the Rules of the Senate.

Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Chair directed that a nominal
voting be conducted on the policy issue of death penalty.

INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would vote on this policy question,
Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes would mean a vote in favor of death as a penalty to be
reincorporated in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would be
a vote against the reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties in the Revised Penal Code.

INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ

xxx xxx xxx

The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first decide the question whether or not
death penalty should be reimposed, and thereafter, a seven-man committee would be formed to draft the
compromise bill in accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body decides in favor of the death
penalty, the Chair said that the committee would specify the crimes on which death penalty would be
imposed. It affirmed that a vote of Yes in the nominal voting would mean a vote in favor of death penalty
on at least one crime, and that certain refinements on how the penalty would be imposed would be left to
the discretion of the seven-man committee.

xxx xxx xxx

INQUIRY OF SENATOR TANADA

In reply to Senator Tanada's query, the Chair affirmed that even if a senator would vote "yes" on the basic
policy issue, he could still vote "no" on the imposition of the death penalty on a particular crime.

REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO

 Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic policy issue of whether or not the
death penalty would be included in the scale of penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code.
so that if it is voted down, the Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant to the
Rules, but if approved, a special committee, as agreed upon in the caucus, is going to be appointed and
whatever course it will take will depend upon the mandate given to it by the Body later on.

The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.

REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO

Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a penalty will be reincorporated in
the scale of penalties provided by the Revised Penal Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body
decides in favor of death penalty, the Body would still have to address two issues: 1) Is the crime for
which the death penalty is supposed to be imposed heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2)
And, if so, is there a compelling reason to impose the death penalty for it? The death penalty, he stressed,
cannot be imposed simply because the crime is heinous. 28

With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the
Senate has voted to re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal
Code. A nine-person committee was subsequently created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The
mandate of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main debate in the committee would be the
determination of the crimes to be considered heinous.

On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special Committee on the Death Penalty, delivered his
Sponsorship Speech. He began with an explanation as to why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the death penalty by
amending the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws and includes provisions that do not define or punish
crimes but serve purposes allied to the re-imposition of the death penalty. Senator Tolentino stated:

. . . [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death penalty on heinous crimes and
delegated to the Special Committee the work of drafting a bill, a compromise bill that would be the
subject for future deliberations of this Body, the Committee had to consider that the death penalty was
imposed originally in the Revised Penal Code.

So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the death penalty, unless Congress
should, for compelling reasons reimpose that penalty on heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the
Revised Penal Code that was affected by that provision of the Constitution. The death penalty, as
provided in the Revised Penal Code, would be considered as having been repealed-all provisions on the
death penalty would be considered as having been repealed by the Constitution, until Congress should,
for compelling reasons, reimpose such penalty on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only one article
but many articles of the Revised Penal Code that were actually affected by the Constitution.

And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional provision that our Special Committee
had to consider the Revised Penal Code itself in making this compromise bill or text of the bill. That is
why, in the proposed draft now under consideration which we are sponsoring, the specific provisions of
the Revised Penal Code are actually either reenacted or amended or both. Because by the effect of the
Constitution, some provisions were totally repealed, and they had to be reenacted so that the provisions
could be retained. And some of them had to be amended because the Committee thought that
amendments were proper. 29

In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or not it would have been better if the
Senate were to enact a special law which merely defined and imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes,
Senator Tolentino explicated, thus:

. . . [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind that the death penalty is imposed
in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, when the Constitution abolished the death penalty, it actually was
amending the Revised Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides that where the death
 penalty has already been imposed but not yet carried out, then the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, that
is the penalty in the Revised Penal Code. So we thought that it would be best to just amend the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code, restoring the death penalty for some crimes that may be considered as
heinous. That is why the bill is in this form amending the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole trouble is, when a special bill is
presented and we want to punish in the special bill the case of murder, for instance, we will have to
reproduce the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on murder in order to define the crime for which the
death penalty shall be imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty in the case of kidnapping
which is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will do the same — merely reproduce. Why will we do
that? So we just followed the simpler method of keeping the definition of the crime as the same and
merely adding some aggravating circumstances and reimposing the death penalty in these offenses
originally punished in the Revised Penal Code. 30

From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for discussion until August 16, 1993, the Members of the
Senate debated on its provisions.

The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the
compelling reason for each and every crime for which the supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on the
statement in the preamble of the death penalty bill that the same is warranted in the face of "the alarming upsurge of
[heinous] crimes", Senator Lina demanded for solid statistics showing that in the case of each and every crime in the death
penalty bill, there was a significantly higher incidence of each crime after the suspension of the death penalty on February
2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the majority of the Filipino people, than before such
ratification.31 Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could not satisfy the abolitionists with sufficient statistical data for the
latter to accept the alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a compelling reason justifying the re-imposition of the death
penalty, Senator Lina concluded that there were, in fact, no compelling reasons therefor. In the alternative, Senator Lina
argued that the compelling reason required by the constitution was that "the State has done everything in its command so
that it can be justified to use an inhuman punishment called death penalty". 32 The problem, Senator Lina emphasized,
was that even the re-impositionists admit that there were still numerous reforms in the criminal justice system that may
and must be put in place, and so clearly, the recourse to the enactment of a death penalty bill was not in the nature of a
last resort, hence, unconstitutional in the absence of compelling reasons. As an initial reaction to Senator Lina's
contentions, Senator Tolentino explained that the statement in the preamble is a general one and refers to all the crimes
covered by the bill and not to specific crimes. He added that one crime may not have the same degree of increase in
incidence as the other crimes and that the public demand to impose the death penalty is enough compelling reason. 33

Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Tanada to whom the battle lines were clearly drawn. He put to issue two
things: first, the definition of "heinous crimes" as provided for in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of
compelling reasons for each and every capital crime. His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly showed his objections
to the bill:

Senator Tanada. . . . But what would make crimes heinous, Mr. President? Are crimes heinous by their
nature or elements as they are described in the bill or are crimes heinous because they are punished by
death, as bribery and malversation are proposed to be punished in the bill?

Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but that is not supposed to be the
exclusive criterion. The nature of the offense is the most important element in considering it heinous but
at the same time, we should consider the relation of the offense to society in order to have a complete idea
of the heinous nature of these offenses.

In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by themselves connected with the effect
upon society and the government have made them fall under the classification of heinous crimes. The
compelling reason for imposing the death penalty is when the offenses of malversation and bribery
becomes so grave and so serious as indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling reason
for the death penalty.
 Senator Tanada. With respect to the compelling reasons. Mr. President, does the Gentleman believe that
these compelling reasons, which would call for the reimposition of the death penalty, should be
separately, distinctly and clearly stated for each crime so that it will be very clear to one and all that not
only are these crimes heinous but also one can see the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the
death penalty therefor?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President that matter was actually considered by the Committee. But the decision
of the Committee was to avoid stating the compelling reason for each and every offense that is included
in the substitute measure. That is why in the preamble, general statements were made to show these
compelling reasons. And that we believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would be
sufficient notice as to what were considered compelling reasons by the Congress, in providing the death
penalty for these different offenses.

If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would suppose that with the preamble
already in general terms, the Supreme Court would feel that it was the sense of Congress that this
preamble would be applicable to each and every offense described or punishable in the measure.

So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons for each and every offense.

Senator Tanada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional limitations upon the power of
Congress to enact criminal legislation, especially the provisions on the Bill of Rights, particularly the one
which says that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the compelling reasons be so stated in the bill
so that the bill, when it becomes a law, will clearly define the acts and the omissions punished as crimes?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President I believe that in itself, as substantive law, this is sufficient. The question
of whether there is due process will more or less be a matter of procedure in the compliance with the
requirements of the Constitution with respect to due process itself which is a separate matter from the
substantive law as to the definition and penalty for crimes.

Senator Tanada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that the reimposition of the death
penalty is subject to three conditions and these are:

1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death penalty;

2. There are compelling reasons; and

3. These involve heinous crimes.

Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does the distinguished Gentleman not
feel that Congress is bound to state clearly the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death
penalty for each crime, as well as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous included in the bill?

Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I believe that whether we state the
compelling reasons or not, whether we state why a certain offense is heinous, is not very important. If the
question is raised in the Supreme court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be controlling but what
the Supreme Court will fell as a sufficient compelling reason or as to the heinous nature whether the
crime is heinous or not. The accused can certainly raise the matter of constitutionality but it will not go
into the matter of due process. It will go into the very power of Congress to enact a bill imposing the
death penalty. So that would be entirely separate from the matter of due process. 34

Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty bill violated our international commitment in
support of the worldwide abolition of capital punishment, the Philippines being a signatory to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol. Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified, however, that in the
United Nations, subject matters are submitted to the different committees which vote on them for consideration in the
plenary session. He stressed that unless approved in the plenary session, a declaration would have no binding effect on
signatory countries. In this respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably bound by said covenant and protocol
considering that these agreements have reached only the committee level. 35

After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading. With seventeen (17)
affirmative votes, four (4) negative votes, and one abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third reading on
August 16, 1993.

The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August 16, 1993 was a vindication of, the House of
Representatives. The House had, in the Eight Congress, earlier approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on the
restoration of the death penalty for certain heinous crimes. The House was in effect rebuffed by the Senate when the
Senate killed House Bill No. 295 along with other bills coming from the House. House Bill No. 295 was resurrected during
the Ninth Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which was introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House of
Representatives on October 27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House Bill Nos. 125, 187, 411, 764, 506, 781, 955,
1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632 authored by various Members of the Lower House.

In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal ably essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress
of the power to re-impose the death penalty for compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the nature of this
constitutional pre-requisite to the exercise of such power.

"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:

Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress shall thereafter provide for it. . .

The phrase "unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter
provide for it was introduced as an amendment by then Comm. Christian Monsod.

The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death penalty was not
completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave
Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.

Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision, Comm. Ricardo Romulo said, and I
quote:

"The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some future time, the
people might want to restore death penalty through initiative and referendum.

Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:

We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely possible in
the future that circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today.

xxx xxx xxx

I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the reimposition of the capital
punishment. The violent manner and the viciousness in which crimes are now committed with alarming
regularity, show very clearly a patent disregard of the law and a mockery of public peace and order.

In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the vict ims of heinous crimes — the Hultmans, the
Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses, and many more, and they are all crying for justice. We ought to
listen to them because their lives, their hopes, their dreams, their future have fallen asunder by the cruel
and vicious criminality of a few who put their selfish interest above that of society.

Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent manner in which the same was
committed or by the reason of its inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law,
 public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent viciousness and
atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.

Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.

The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two lovely daughters, will stand in the
people's memory for many long years as the epitome of viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to
civilized society.

The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young business executive, was and still is an
outrage that shocks the moral self of our people.

The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16 year-old high school student who dreamt
of becoming a commercial model someday, at the hands of a crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that
it offends the sensibilities of Christians and non-Christians alike.

The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom Castanos, the lovely and promising
couple from the University of the Philippines, is eternally lodged in the recesses of our minds and still
makes our stomach turn in utter disgust.

xxx xxx xxx

The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken by this body in restoring death
penalty as a positive response to the overwhelming clamor of the people, then, as Professor Esteban
Bautista of the Philippine Law Center said and I quote:

"When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose
upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, there are sown the seeds of
anarchy — of self-help, of vigilante justice and lynch law. The people will take the law
upon their hands and exact vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta."

It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House Bill No. 62.

As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to listen to our constitutents and
heed their plea — a plea for life, liberty and pursuit of their happiness under a regime of justice and
democracy, and without threat that their loves ones will be kidnapped, raped or butchered.

But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on for justice. A law that will exact
retribution for the victims. A law that will deter future animalistic behavior of the criminal who take their
selfish interest over and above that of society. A law that will deal a deathblow upon all heinous crimes.

Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that we hold dear and sacred, let us
retore the death penalty. 36

A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the House of Representatives reveals that, while
both Chambers were not wanting of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome about the
form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of the
Revised penal Code and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact of their very
heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it
the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes
enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly, among the
hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to their cause:

My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not only for the importation,
manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but also far other heinous crimes such as reason; parricide;
murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the Revised Penal Code with or without additionally
 defined circumstances; plunder, as defined in R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532:
carnapping, as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the owner, driver or occupant is killed; hijacking as
defined in . . . RA 6235; and arson resulting in the death of any occupants.

All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to the level of heinous crimes. A
heinous crime is one which by reason of its inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or
perversity, is repugnant and outrageous to the common standards of decency and morality in a just and
civilized society.

For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance to a government, committed by a
person who owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad I Phil. 437). By the "allegiance" is meant the obligation of
fidelity and obedience which individuals owe to the government under which they live or to their
sovereign in return for the protection which they receive (52 Arm Jur 797).

In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against his or her own will in some
unidentified xxx house by a group of scoundrels who are strangers is enough terrify and send shivers of
fear through the spine of any person, even scoundrels themselves.

In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is being punished by death is the
fact that the perpetrator, at the time of the commission of the crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he
commits and sees it merely as a form of self-amusement. When a homicide is committed by reason of the
robbery, the culprits are perceived as willing to take human life in exchange for money or other personal
property.

In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the parents over the personal shock
and suffering of their child but the stigma of the traumatic and degrading incident which has shattered
the victim's life and permanently destroyed her reputation, not to mention the ordeal of having to
undergo the shameful experience of police interrogation and court hearings.

Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the universal hostility of the
perpetrators against their victims who are passengers and complement of the vessel, and because of the
fact that, in the high seas, no one may be expected to be able to come to the rescue of the helpless victims.
For the same reason, Mr. Speaker, the crime of air piracy is punished due to the evil motive of the
hijackers in making unreasonable demands upon the sovereignty of an entire nation or nations, coupled
with the attendant circumstance of subjecting the passengers to terrorism. 37

The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to February 11, 1993. On February 11, 1993, the Members of
the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the death penalty bill on second reading.

On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the House of Representatives cast their vote on House
Bill No. 62 when it was up for consideration on third reading. 38 The results were 123 votes in favor, 26 votes against, and
2 abstentions.

After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23, 1993 and of Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16,
1993, the Bicameral Conference Committee convened to incorporate and consolidate them.

On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous
Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other
Purposes," took effect. 39

Between December 31, 1993, when R.A No. 7659 took effect, and the present time, criminal offenders have been
prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein accused-appellant has been, pursuant to said law, meted out the
supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon his conviction his case was elevated to us on
automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's affirmation of his death sentence and raises for the first
time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is
unconstitutional per se for having been enacted in the absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the death
penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against
punishment of such nature.

We reject accused-appellant's proposition.

Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-appellant's view that Congress enacted R.A No. 7659
without complying with the twin requirements of compelling reasons and heinous crimes.

At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659 as unfurled in the beginning of this
disquisition, necessarily provide the context for the following analysis.

Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power of Congress,
for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."

The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or
describe what is meant by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as
heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly
proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill; and (3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."

In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the definition or description of heinous crimes.
Said clause provides that:

. . . the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful
offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in
a just civilized and ordered society.

Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, 40 traced the etymological root of the
word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning hateful and abominable, which in turn, was from
the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil.

We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of what is to be considered a heinous crime. This
criterion is deliberately undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the manner of
commission of crime, its proximate consequences and effects on the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing
authority sufficient leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases where R.A. No 7659
imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina and Tañada grilled the sponsors of the bill as
regards what they perceived as a mere enumeration of capital crimes without a specification of the elements that make
them heinous. They were oblivious to the fact that there were two types of crimes in the death penalty bill: first, there
were crimes penalized by reclusion perpetua to death; and second, there were crimes penalized by mandatory capital
punishment upon the attendance of certain specified qualifying circumstances.

Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death:

(1) Treason (Sec. 2);

(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);

(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);

(4) Murder (Sec. 6);

(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);

(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the

following four circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more than
three days; (6) it was committed simulating public authority; (c) serious
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were
made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);

(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);

(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or

edifice; (b) a building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or
airplane for public use: (d) a building or factory in the service of public
utilities: (e) a building for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence of a crime: (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or government
museum: and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials located in
an inhabited place; or regardless of what is burned if the arson is
perpetrated by two or more persons(Sec. 10);

(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape is
committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two or
more persons: and (c) the rape is attempted or frustrated and committed
with homicide (Sec. 11);

(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million(Sec. 12);

(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13),

(12) Sale, administration delivery, distribution, and transportation of

prohibited drugs (id.);

(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs (id.);

(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);

(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts

(id.)

(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)

(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 1J):

(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);

(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and

distribution of regulated drugs (id.):

(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs (Sec.
15),
 (21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec. 16);

(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous

drugs confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);

(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate

vicinity of another to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and

(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped

motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).

All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for all of them being not mandatory
death but the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other words, it is premature to demand for a
specification of the heinous elements in each of the foregoing crimes because they are not anyway mandatorily
penalized with death. The elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in these crimes,
would only be relevant when the trial court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually
imposes the death penalty because it has, in appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of
certain circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on his
own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of significance to the commission of the crime or its effects
on the victim or on society, which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or
inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.

On the other hand. under R.A. No 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is imposed in the following crimes:

(1) Qualified bribery

"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from arresting or prosecuting an
offender who has committed a come punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of
any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted

If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death.
(Sec. 4)

(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim
is raped tortured or subjected to dehumanizing acts

"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in
the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention " is raped, or is subject to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed. (Sec. 8)

(3) Destructive arson resulting in death

"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed." (Sec. 10)

(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and qualified rape

"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.

xxx xxx xxx

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be Imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim.

2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.

3. when the rape is committed in full new of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives
within the third degree of consanguinity.

4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

5. when the offender that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.

6. when committal by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency.

7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.
(Sec. 11)

(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs where the victim is
a minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding, the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a
minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of
the death of victim thereof; the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec. 13)

(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the
victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum of the penalty (of
death) shall be imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a
minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.

Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive
or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 13)

(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of regulated drugs where
the victim is a minor or the victim dies

"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a
minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of
the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed." (Sec.
14)

(8) Maintenance of den, dive. or resort for users of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the
victim dies
 'Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum penalty [of death]
herein provided shall be imposed in every case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold
to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.

Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person using the same in such den, dive or
resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)

(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or officers including members of police
agencies and armed forces

"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5 (1 ), 6, 7, 8. R, 9 1 1, 12 and 13 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14 ( 1), 15A (1), 16, and 19 of Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972] shall be imposed, if those found guilty of any of the same offenses are government officials,
employees or officers including members of police agencies and the armed forces. " (Sec. 19)

(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the mandatory death penalty if
convicted are government officials, employees or officers

"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is round guilty of planting any dangerous
drugs punished in Section s 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III
(of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to
implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein provided." (Sec. 19)

(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form

"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offends of his public position, the
penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum [of death] regardless of mitigating circumstances.

The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who
belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.

An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating,

confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime."
(Sec. 23)

It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of heinousness must be squarely applied.

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life
was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal
course of his or her growth as a human being. The right of a person is not only to live but to live a quality life, and this
means that the rest of society is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the sanctity of his
or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or her own spiritual, psychological, material and social
preferences and needs. Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson
resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes;
as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for
more than three days or serious physical injuries were indicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the
victim is a minor, robbery with homicide rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death,
are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts
in the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop
and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the
culture of corruption dishonesty, greed and Syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people,
any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of
government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the
effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses
involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further
destruction and damage to society.

We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly
identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A No 7659 punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to
determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death
Sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out
the death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under
the Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial Court to
validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.

In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to
aggravating circumstances Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime
provided therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither amends nor repeals the aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659 in pari materia with the Revised Penal Code,
death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the
provision of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty; and (2) other circumstances
attend the commission of the crime which indubitably characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659
that justify the imposition of death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we
understand the rationale for the guided discretion granted in the trial court to cognize circumstances that characterize the
commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an infinity of circumstances that may attend the commission of a
crime to the same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is capable of. The legislature cannot and need not foresee
and inscribe in law each and every loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. No. 7659 provides the
test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
Needless to say, we are not unaware of the ever existing danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
meting out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the possibility of executing an innocent man or one criminal but
not heinously criminal, R.A. No. 7659 is replete with both procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure only the
correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.

In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional requirement that the death penalty be re-imposed for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, we note that the main objection to the death penalty bill revolved around
the persistent demand of the abolitionists for a statement of the compelling reason in each and every heinous crime and
statistical proof that such compelling reason actually exists.

We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with
each other. Because the subject crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of the human
standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and consequences so destructive, destabilizing,
debilitating, or aggravating in the context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation, these crimes
must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. There can be no its or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot
afford to wait until we rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and thrashing it to its demission.

The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued and implemented before the death penalty
be re-imposed in case such reforms prove unsuccessful They claimed that the only compelling reason contemplated of by
the constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is left for the government to resort to that could check the chaos
and the destruction that is being caused by unbridled criminality. Three of our colleagues, are of the opinion that the
compelling reason required by the constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant change in the socio-
cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987 such as an unprecedented rise in the
incidence of criminality. Such are, however, interpretations only of the phrase "compelling; reasons" but not of the
conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". The imposition of the requirement that there be a rise
in the incidence of criminality because of the suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is an unfair and misplaced
demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the death penalty first proves itself to be a truly deterrent
factor in criminal behavior. If there was a dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the time that the death
penalty was suspended, that would have proven that the death penalty was indeed a deterrent during the years before its
suspension. Suffice it to say that the constitution in the first place did not require that the death penalty be first proven to
be a deterrent; what it requires is that there be compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.

Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, may re-impose the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death penalty
bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require that the death
penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate criminality in society It is
immaterial and irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of such crimes", for the same
was never intended by said law to be the yardstick to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of
law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to
impose the death penalty for said crimes."

We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that
the death penalty imposed in rape is violative of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.

Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by
the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia. 41 To state, however, that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman,
categorically ruled that the death penalty is a cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.

The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the
death penalty was imposed on the accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered not so
much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on the discrimination against the black accused who is
meted out the death penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine whether or not to
impose the death penalty. In fact, the long road of the American abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case
of Furman was trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against racial discrimination. Thus, the U.S.
Supreme Court stated in Furman:

We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants were sentenced to death
because they were black. Yet our task is not restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these
death penalties. Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled
discretion of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should die .
...

xxx xxx xxx

In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible caste' aspect of law
enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of judges and juries in imposing the death penalty enables
the penalty to be selectively applied feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They are pregnant with
discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not compatible with the idea of equal protection of the
laws that is implicit in the ban on cruel and unusual punishments.

Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court
nullified all discretionary death penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in
the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to
lessen, if not altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts on the part of the
trial judges and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman when most of the states re-enacted their death penalty statutes now bearing the
procedural checks that were required by the U.S. Supreme Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of the new
death penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia, 42 Jurek v.
Texas,43 and Profitt v. Florida 44.

Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of
rape mainly because the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life. In support of his contention, accused-
appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia. 45

In Coker, the U.S Supreme Court ruled as follows:

. . . It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and punishment within the meaning of
Eight Amendment; it is not inherently unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither is it always
disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. It is also established that imposing capital
punishment at least for murder, in accordance with the procedures provided under the Georgia Statutes
saves the sentence from the infirmities which led the Court to invalidate the prior Georgia capital
punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In Gregg [v. Georgia] . . . the Court's judgment was that the death penalty for deliberate murder was
neither the purposeless Imposition of severe punishment nor a punishment grossly disproportionate to
the crime. But the Court reserved the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty when imposed
for other crimes. . . .

That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . [T]he public judgment with respect to rape. as reflected in the statutes providing the punishment for
that crime, has been dramatically different. In reviving death penalty laws to satisfy Furman's mandate,
none of the states that had not previously authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital
felonies. Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital offense, only three provided the death penalty
for rape of an adult woman in their revised statutes-Georgia, North Carolina and Louisiana. In the latter
two States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found guilty, and those laws were invalidated by
Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana and North Carolina respondent to those decisions, again revised
their capital punishment laws, they reenacted the death penalty for murder but not for rape; none of the
seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or replaced their death penalty statutes
since July 2, 1976, including four States (in addition to Louisiana and North Carolina) that had authorized
the death sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted to Furman with mandatory statutes, included
rape among the crimes for which death was an authorized punishment.

xxx xxx xxx

It should be noted that Florida. Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorized the death penalty in some
rape cases, but only where the victim was a child and the rapist an adult. the Tennessee statute has since
been invalidated because the death sentence was mandatory. x x x The upshot is that Georgia is the sole
jurisdiction in the United States at the present time that authorizes a sentence of death when the rape
victim is an adult woman, and only two other jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the victim
is a child.

The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly unanimous among state
legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable
penalty for raping an adult woman.
 . . . [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which
is that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.

We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense
and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the
latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are to be established. Short of
homicide, it is the ultimate violation of self. It is also a violent crime because it normally involves force, or
the threat of force or intimidation, to over come the will and the capacity of the victim to resist. Rape is
very often accompanied by physical injury to the female and can also inflict mental and psychological
damage. Because it undermines the community's sense of security. there is public injury as well.

Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury
to the person and to the public. it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified
taking of human life. Although it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not
include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills; the rapist, if no
more than that does not. Life is over for the victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be
nearly so happy as it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding
conviction that the death penalty, which "is unique in its severity and irrevocability" . . . is an excessive
penalty for the rapist who, as such does not take human life.

The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first, that the public has manifested its rejection of the
death penalty an a proper punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state legislatures to
include rape in their in the aftermath of Furman; and second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous
violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological balance, does not involve the taking of life.

Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the Philippine experience and in the context of
our own culture.

Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the
death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an
ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We have already
demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never
was a defining essence of the death penalty in the context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death
penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that
have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the
masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and
because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their
acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently
prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we
have held in the case of People v. Cristobal: 46

Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does injury to justice and charity.
Rape deeply wounds the respect, Freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a
right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act . . . an
outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the society itself

We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed here, at the heart of the issue of capital
punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-and-death question to which all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life, of
course, over death". But dealing with the fundamental question of death provides a context for struggling with even more
basic questions, for to grapple with the meaning of death is, in an indirect way to ask the meaning of life. Otherwise put,
to ask what the rights are of the dying is to ask what the rights are of the living.

Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is substantially repulsive, if infinitely less
repulsive than the acts which invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a
sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the society all that appears harsh and
suppressive. If we are to preserve the humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of
 character and will to do the unpleasant in order that tranquility and civility may rule comprehensively. It
seems very likely that capital punishment is a . . . necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social
tranquility and ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to indulge in the luxury of
permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the necessity of social survival. 47

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
are hereby DENIED 48 for LACK OF MERIT.

SO ORDERED

Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban
and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

Time has transformed man into a highly intellectual and civilized, as well as, I wish to believe, a humane and
compassionate, being. The ancient edict of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" has since been abandoned by a society
that recognizes the good in every man and gives a transgressor an opportunity to reform. Somehow, however, certain
vestiges of savage retribution still remain; indeed, the taking of a human life continues, at least in some penal systems, to
be an acceptable punishment.

In this country, the issue of whether or not the State should impose the death penalty has recently been resolved with the
ratification, on 02 February 1987, of the Constitution by 76.29% of the electorate. Section 19, Article III, thereof, states:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.

Ours is a rule of law. The Supreme Court is not a political entity; it can merely apply and interpret the law. It cannot. and
it will not, spare itself from this constitutionally-mandated duty. Death penalty cases are not excepted. In the discharge of
its grave responsibility, nevertheless, the Court must act with greatest caution and strictest circumspection for there can
be no stake that can be higher, and no penalty that can be graver, than the extinction by the State of human life.

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty now lies with the sound discretion of the law-making authority,
the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the fundamental law has set forth; viz:

(1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and

(2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime.

It appears to me that the Constitution did not contemplate a simple "reimposition" of the death penalty to
offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or just because of it.

The term "compelling reasons" should be enough to indicate that there must be a marked change in the milieu from that
which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the
enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable
to mandate the death penalty. That milieu must have turned from bad to worse.

Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the "heinous nature" of the crime and make it so
exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law. To venture, in the
case of murder, the crime could become "heinous" within the Constitutional concept when, to exemplify, the victim is
unnecessarily subjected to a painful-and excruciating death, or in the crime of rape when the offended party is callously
humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused.

I submit that, given the circumstances and the law before us, the Constitutional fiat (now being raised for the first time in
the instant Motion for Reconsideration) in the imposition of the death penalty has not been satisfied.

I, therefore, vote for imposing instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua (the next lower penalty than death).

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel,2 the accused
raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act No. 7659, the law reimposing the death
penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original) Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, 3 this
transcendental issue was not brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial
court's sentence of death.4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had nor been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the
1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion
perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it
reduces imposed capital sentence to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the death
penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion
perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction of
an accused for a capital crime remains, death as penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may no longer be
carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas exclaimed,6 "(t)he majority voted
for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera emphasized,7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the
death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty. This
became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of
Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an
exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State and liber- ally in
favor of the people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes but
(2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it
(Congress)9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if
"awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:

(1) by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
 (2) to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."

The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling reasons and of
defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For
clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law, prescribes the death penalty an certain crimes: and courts, by their
decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "Provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by
amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by
amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It
merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general
terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more severe sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or individually for
each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until
February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the
commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution?
More legally put: In reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very
limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes,
it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely
selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a
characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only
too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or
"whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in
a just, civilized and ordered society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a
heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases
therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness can be
determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition.
Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as
blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not. an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can
neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the authoritative source
to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once
the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16 There's nothing really new that Congress
did which it could not have otherwise done had such provision not been included in our fundamental law.

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery, 17 no new crimes were
introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already so punishable by the Revised Penal
Code 18 and by special laws. In short, Sec. 19, Article III of the Constitution did nor have any impact upon the legislative
action. It was effectively ignored by Congress in enacting the capital punishment law.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen.
Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws
which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior to the
charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional
Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not have written
Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death
penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is
evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm.
Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on
"organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say
"murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather
scanty, I believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional
Commission did nor have in mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the
heinousness clause requires that:

1) the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of
perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or

2) even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show
their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or

3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried our evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme
violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21

For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same
manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is
prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to determine
"compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA
7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should
be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done
wholesale but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future,
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the return of the
constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to
questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23
 MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr.
Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.) The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker.
That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to
justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty
is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that that is one
of the compelling reasons. But before we dissect this particular "compelling reason," may
we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA(P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly
elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not
obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling
reason should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in
an organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that
the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks
of the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons
which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he
submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense
committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty
and the people ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present
conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice
demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have committed
heinous crimes.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all
due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact,
I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police show that the crime
volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between 1987,
the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted.

Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the
crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.
 MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987. Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform
us the volume of murder in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12.305 in 1987 to 10.521 in 1988.Correspondingly,

the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent
to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.

MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in
1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN. No. Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty.
Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me, Mr. Speaker that the volume of
robbery cases declined from 22.942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16.926 or a crime rate of
29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say. I understand we are reading now from the
same document.

MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of
22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA(P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I
would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.

MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself".

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons arrested in
regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25

Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related
cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.
 By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photo copy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202
in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are concerned, the
figure continued a downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition "would
pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or
otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of the death
penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and
on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest,
prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his
witnesses — can be argued indefinitely, 28 This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it
would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling
reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it
should — like any other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any exception thereto
meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to
persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at
its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro- life
and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death,
emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of
conception 34 and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property, for people more than the stare, and for life more
than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as
the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech, assembly and even religion. But the most basic
and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and
expression.

This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the
poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal
Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:

(1) Since the reimposition. of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of
1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven
(7) convicts per month, double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From
January to June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts reached 72 an average of 12 convicts per
month, almost double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.

(2) Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900
monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those
earning above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999,
four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those
 earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above
only one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately
two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five percent (5%) earning variable income.
Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.

(3) Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the government-
mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the official poverty line set by
government. Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to
the middle class; only one (1) earns P30,000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on
a percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) con- victs do not know or are unsure of their monthly
income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.

(4) In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers
in animal husbandry; of these, thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent
(35%) are in the transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers
in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport workers (delivery,
dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are
in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish,
cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards,
shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks (janitors,
MERALCO employee and clerk). About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons
belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee
and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.

(5) None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent (44%), or
slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth,
speak and understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo,
Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national and speaks and
understand Niponggo.

(6) Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished
varying levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty
five percent (35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of
them graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did
not study at all.

The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has
militated against the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital
crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation; research and presentation are required. The best example to show the
sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the
proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free Legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.

To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible language.
Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a death
penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense
unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a
very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving
capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged.
To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and written in a
strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate
penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by
law, it seems to me that there will always be a certain class or classes of people in our society who, by reason of their
poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and
subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than- genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are
therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that
perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more
precise, such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent
to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-
poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and
assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be
empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that
everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if
we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this
direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and
disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent,
erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional
firmament .

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its
imposition.

(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitutional right against the death penalty, which is really a species
of the right to life.

(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the Stare and liberally in favor of the accused
because such a statute denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the
underprivileged.

(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.

(5) Congressional power to prescribe death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:

(a) First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which

the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the
elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how
these circumstances define or characterize the crime as "heinous"

(b) Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific
reasons which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling
the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are
Inseparable. They must both be present in view of the specific
constitutional mandate - "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the
offense,

(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each and every
crime, and nor just for all crimes generally and collectively.

"Thou shall not kill" is a fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino
people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong,
acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to
"cases of extreme gravity."39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to
Life),40 "punishment, must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the
offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . .
(which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are
pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the state which man
created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment only for
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only for reasons of "absolute
necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden
of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH, as provided for
under RA 7659," and substitute therefor reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in
its text.

Separate Opinions

SEPARATE OPINION

Time has transformed man into a highly intellectual and civilized, as well as, I wish to believe, a humane and
compassionate, being. The ancient edict of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth" has since been abandoned by a society
that recognizes the good in every man and gives a transgressor an opportunity to reform. Somehow, however, certain
vestiges of savage retribution still remain; indeed, the taking of a human life continues, at least in some penal systems, to
be an acceptable punishment.

In this country, the issue of whether or not the State should impose the death penalty has recently been resolved with the
ratification, on 02 February 1987, of the Constitution by 76.29% of the electorate. Section 19, Article III, thereof, states:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.

Ours is a rule of law. The Supreme Court is not a political entity; it can merely apply and interpret the law. It cannot. and
it will not, spare itself from this constitutionally-mandated duty. Death penalty cases are not excepted. In the discharge of
its grave responsibility, nevertheless, the Court must act with greatest caution and strictest circumspection for there can
be no stake that can be higher, and no penalty that can be graver, than the extinction by the State of human life.

The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty now lies with the sound discretion of the law-making authority,
the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the fundamental law has set forth; viz:

(1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the imposition of the death penalty; and

(2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime.

It appears to me that the Constitution did not contemplate a simple "reimposition" of the death penalty to
offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or just because of it.
The term "compelling reasons" should be enough to indicate that there must be a marked change in the milieu from that
which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the
enactment of the statute prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable
to mandate the death penalty. That milieu must have turned from bad to worse.

Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the "heinous nature" of the crime and make it so
exceptionally offensive as to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law. To venture, in the
case of murder, the crime could become "heinous" within the Constitutional concept when, to exemplify, the victim is
unnecessarily subjected to a painful-and excruciating death, or in the crime of rape when the offended party is callously
humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused.

I submit that, given the circumstances and the law before us, the Constitutional fiat (now being raised for the first time in
the instant Motion for Reconsideration) in the imposition of the death penalty has not been satisfied.

I, therefore, vote for imposing instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua (the next lower penalty than death).

SEPARATE OPINION

Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional

In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel,2 the accused
raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act No. 7659, the law reimposing the death
penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original) Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, 3 this
transcendental issue was not brought up. Hence, it was not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial
court's sentence of death.4

The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty

Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)

The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had nor been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the
1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition5 of the death penalty "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed" to reclusion
perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it
reduces imposed capital sentence to the lesser penalty of imprisonment).

This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the death
penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or reduction to reclusion
perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction of
an accused for a capital crime remains, death as penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may no longer be
carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution. As Comm. Bernas exclaimed, 6 "(t)he majority voted
for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty."

Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera emphasized,7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the non-imposition of the
death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books of the death penalty. This
became the intent of the framers of the Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of the Bill of
Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an
exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State and liber- ally in
favor of the people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.

The Constitution Strictly Limits

Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death

To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing statutes but
(2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose it on condition that it
(Congress)9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution is emphatic (even if
"awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:

(1) by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and

(2) to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."

The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling reasons and of
defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the death penalty. For
clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law, prescribes the death penalty an certain crimes: and courts, by their
decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.

In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "Provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by
amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by
amending certain special laws. 14

But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It
merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was cast in general
terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more severe sanction, either collectively for all the offenses or individually for
each of them.

Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed until
February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital offense; and (2) the
commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by mitigating circumstances.

The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution?
More legally put: In reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of the very
limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I respectfully submit, is YES.

Heinous Crimes

To repeat, while the Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes,
it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely
selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty. It did not give a standard or a
characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only
too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or
"whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in
a just, civilized and ordered society.

In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of what a
heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately justifying its bases
therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of heinousness can be
determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition.
Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as
blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.

Besides, a preamble is really not. an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It
cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can
neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be the authoritative source
to show compliance with the Constitution.

As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once
the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16 There's nothing really new that Congress
did which it could not have otherwise done had such provision not been included in our fundamental law.

In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death prior to the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified bribery, 17 no new crimes were
introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were already so punishable by the Revised Penal
Code 18 and by special laws. In short, Sec. 19, Article III of the Constitution did nor have any impact upon the legislative
action. It was effectively ignored by Congress in enacting the capital punishment law.

During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen.
Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19

So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special laws
which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.

By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death prior to the
charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty. If the Constitutional
Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it would not have written
Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death
penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is
evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter debates on this matter.

The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm.
Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on
"organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did not just say
"murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather
scanty, I believe that the available information shows that, when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional
Commission did nor have in mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the
heinousness clause requires that:

1) the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or level of
perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or

2) even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show
their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or

3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried our evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme
violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21

For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same
manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a heavier penalty is
prescribed.

Compelling Reasons

Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to determine
"compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the preamble of RA
7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It should
be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the characterization of heinousness cannot be done
wholesale but must shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.

The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future,
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the situation (during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons" requiring the return of the
constitutionally-abhorred penalty.

In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to
questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23

MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr.

Speaker? . . .

MR. GARCIA (P.) The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker.
That is one.

MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to
justify or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty
is the alleged worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that that is one
of the compelling reasons. But before we dissect this particular "compelling reason," may
we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA(P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly
elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not
obtained at the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling
reason should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in
an organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that
the penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.

MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks
of the compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons
which would supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he
submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense
committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty
and the people ratified it?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present
conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice
demands that the appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have committed
heinous crimes.

xxx xxx xxx

In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all
due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact,
I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine National Police show that the crime
volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between 1987,
the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993, the year when RA 7659 was enacted.

Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:

MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.

Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the
crime of murder in 1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.

MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.

MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987. Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform
us the volume of murder in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12.305 in 1987 to 10.521 in 1988.Correspondingly,

the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent
to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.

MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in
1987?

MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.

MR. LAGMAN. No. Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.

MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty.
Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?

MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.

MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me, Mr. Speaker that the volume of
robbery cases declined from 22.942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16.926 or a crime rate of
29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?

MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say. I understand we are reading now from the
same document.

MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of
22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the
Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
 MR. GARCIA(P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I
would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.

MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?

MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself".

When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons arrested in
regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25

Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.

In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related
cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.

By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photo copy of this report.

From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202
in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.

But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are concerned, the
figure continued a downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.

In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its reimposition "would
pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no sufficient proof, empirical or
otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of the death
penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and
on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition — that the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest,
prosecution and conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his
witnesses — can be argued indefinitely, 28 This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it
would not lessen the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling
reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.

Other Constitutional Rights

Militate Against RA 7659

It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it
should — like any other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any exception thereto
meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the right pertains to
persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!

So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to enjoy life — life at
its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its other pro- life
and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of torture33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death,
emphasizes the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of
conception 34 and establishes the people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35

This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property, for people more than the stare, and for life more
than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the revival of death penalty as
the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.

Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech, assembly and even religion. But the most basic
and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their enjoyment, utility and
expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates against the
poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by the Free Legal
Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:

(1) Since the reimposition. of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of
1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven
(7) convicts per month, double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed the prior year. From
January to June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts reached 72 an average of 12 convicts per
month, almost double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed in 1995.

(2) Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900
monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those
earning above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999,
four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those
earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above
only one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately
two percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five percent (5%) earning variable income.
Approximately nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.

(3) Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the government-
mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the official poverty line set by
government. Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to
the middle class; only one (1) earns P30,000.00 monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on
a percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) con- victs do not know or are unsure of their monthly
income. Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.

(4) In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers
in animal husbandry; of these, thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent
(35%) are in the transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31) construction workers or workers
in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty seven (27) are transport workers (delivery,
dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are
in clerical, sales and service industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish,
cigarette or rice vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards,
shoemakers, tour guides, computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks (janitors,
MERALCO employee and clerk). About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons
belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee
and executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.

(5) None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent (44%), or
slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth,
speak and understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo,
Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national and speaks and
understand Niponggo.

(6) Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished
varying levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty
five percent (35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of high school, with more than half of
them graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did
not study at all.

The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has
militated against the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot afford the legal services necessary in capital
crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation; research and presentation are required. The best example to show the
sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully omitted in the
proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until the Free Legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible language.
Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net effect of having a death
penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds of the latter, a sense
unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.

Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a
very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs, the law reviving
capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or the underprivileged.
To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and written in a
strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate
penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by
law, it seems to me that there will always be a certain class or classes of people in our society who, by reason of their
poverty, lack of educational attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and
subsisting in less-than-ideal environments, amidst less-than- genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are
therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that
perspective, the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more
precise, such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger deterrent
to the commission of heinous crimes.

However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-
poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater degree of protection and
assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of themselves, they can be
empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates for such a position are, I think, simply that
everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if
we are unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this
direction. Yet we are faced with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and
disadvantaged in the greater majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent,
erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional
firmament .

Epilogue

In sum, I respectfully submit that:

(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its
imposition.

(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitutional right against the death penalty, which is really a species
of the right to life.

(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the Stare and liberally in favor of the accused
because such a statute denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the
underprivileged.

(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.

(5) Congressional power to prescribe death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:

(a) First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which

the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the
elements of the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and how
these circumstances define or characterize the crime as "heinous"

(b) Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific
reasons which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling
the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these requirements are
 Inseparable. They must both be present in view of the specific
constitutional mandate - "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of the
offense,

(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each and every
crime, and nor just for all crimes generally and collectively.

"Thou shall not kill" is a fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino
people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our people belong,
acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to
"cases of extreme gravity."39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to
Life),40 "punishment, must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not go to the extreme of executing the
offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . .
(which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."

Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are
pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the state which man
created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital punishment only for
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly permits it only for reasons of "absolute
necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and practically non-existent.

In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden
of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined "heinous" crimes?

I respectfully submit it has not.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words "DEATH, as provided for
under RA 7659," and substitute therefor reclusion perpetua.

I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in
its text.
 [G.R. No. 117472. June 25, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty is indeed a deterrent as far as the
commission of heinous crimes is concerned and while the attendant details pertaining to the execution of a death sentence
remain as yet another burning issue, we are tasked with providing a clear-cut resolution of whether or not the herein
accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society for the infliction of the primitive and bestial act of
incestuous lust on his own blood.
Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7, 1994, for the crime of Rape, rendered
after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of RAPE as charged in the complaint, aggravated by the fact that the same was committed by the
accused who is the father/stepfather of the complainant, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, as
provided for under RA. No. 7659; to pay the complainant Rodessa Echegaray the sum of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all
the accessory penalties provided by law, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs." [1]

We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:

"C O M P L A I N T

The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:

That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
complainant his daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all against her will and without her consent, to her damage and
prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]

Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered the plea of
"not guilty."
These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in his brief:

"This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.

Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born on September 11, 1983. Rodessa is
the eldest of five siblings. She has three brothers aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively, and a 3-month old baby sister. Her parents
are Rosalie and Leo Echegaray, the latter being the accused-appellant himself. The victim lives with her family in a small
house located at No. 199 Fernandez St., Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9,
1994, TSN).

Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three brothers in their house as her mother
attended a gambling session in another place, she heard her father, the accused-appellant in this case, order her brothers
to go out of the house (pp. 10-11, ibid.). As soon as her brothers left, accused-appellant Leo Echegaray approached
Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the room (p. 12, ibid). Before she could question the appellant, the latter
immediately removed her panty and made her lie on the floor (p. 13, ibid.). Thereafter, appellant likewise removed his
underwear and immediately placed himself on top of Rodessa. Subsequently, appellant forcefully inserted his penis into
Rodessa's organ causing her to suffer intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid.). While appellant was pumping on her, he even
uttered: 'Masarap ba, masarap ba?' and to which Rodessa answered: 'Tama na Papa, masakit' (p. 16, ibid.). Rodessa's plea
proved futile as appellant continued with his act. After satisfying his bestial instinct, appellant threatened to kill her
mother if she would divulge what had happened. Scared that her mother would be killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to
herself the ordeal she suffered. She was very afraid of appellant because the latter, most of the time, was high on drugs
(pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same sexual assault happened up to the fifth time and this usually took place when her mother was
out of the house (p. 19, ibid.). However, after the fifth time, Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion
Rivera, who in turn told Rosalie, Rodessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the Barangay Captain where
Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the precinct where she executed
an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From there, she was accompanied to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for
medical examination (p. 22, ibid.).

Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time when her mother was pregnant. Rodessa
added that at first, her mother was on her side. However, when appellant was detained, her mother kept on telling her:
'Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo, nakakulong' (pp. 39-40, ibid.).

When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of Dra. Ma. Cristina B. Preyna,[3] the complainant
was described as physically on a non-virgin state, as evidenced by the presence of laceration of the hymen of said
complainant (TSN., Aug. 22,1995, pp. 8-9)."[4]

On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:

"x x x the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted that the RAPE charge against the accused
was only the figment of her mother's dirty mind. That her daughter's complaint was forced upon her by her grandma
and the answers in the sworn statement of Rodessa were coached. That the accusation of RAPE was motivated by
Rodessa's grandmother's greed over the lot situated at the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project, Barangay San Antonio, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, which her grandmother's paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to the accused in order to
persuade the latter to admit that Rodessa executed an affidavit of desistance after it turned out that her complaint of
attempted homicide was substituted with the crime of RAPE at the instance of her mother. That when her mother came
to know about the affidavit of desistance, she placed her granddaughter under the custody of the Barangay Captain. That
her mother was never a real mother to her.

She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted homicide as her husband poured alcohol on her body
and attempted to burn her. She identified the certification issued by the NHA and Tag No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the
Certification based on the Masterlist (Exh. 3) indicates that the property is co-owned by accused and Conrado
Alfonso. That Rodessa is her daughter sired by Conrado Alfonso, the latter being the paramour of her mother. That
Conrado Alfonso waived his right and participation over the lot in favor of the accused in consideration of the latter's
accepting the fact that he is the father of Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and to conceal the nauseating sex orgies
from Conrado Alfonso's real Wife.

Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the complainant has a very strong motive in implicating
him to the crime of RAPE since she was interested to become the sole owner of a property awarded to her live-in partner
by the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project. That he could not have committed the imputed crime because he considers Rodessa
as his own daughter. That he is a painter-contractor and on the date of the alleged commission of the crime, he was
painting the house of one Divina Ang of Barangay Vitalis, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Exh 4). The travel time between his
work place to his residence is three (3) hours considering the condition of traffic. That the painting contract is evidenced
by a document denominated 'Contract of Services' duly accomplished (see submarkings of Exh. 4). He asserted that he
has a big sexual organ which when used to a girl 11 years old like Rodessa, the said female organ will be 'mawawarak.'
That it is abnormal to report the imputed commission of the crime to the grandmother of the victim.

Accused further stated that her(sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of drug pushing earlier and he pleaded guilty to
a lesser offense of using drugs. The decretal portion of the judgment of conviction ordering the accused to be confined at
the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center irked the grandmother of Rodessa because it was her wish that accused should be
meted the death penalty.
Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive of Rodessa's grandmother in implicating him in
this heinous crime because of her greed to become the sole owner of that piece of property at the National Housing
Authority-Madrigal Project, situated at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, notwithstanding rigid cross-
examination. He asserted that the imputed offense is far from his mind considering that he treated Rodessa as his own
daughter. He categorically testified that he was in his painting job site on the date and time of the alleged commission of
the crime.

Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she is the laundry woman and part time baby sitter
of the family of accused. That at one time, she saw Rodessa reading sex books and the Bulgar newspaper. That while
hanging washed clothes on the vacant lot she saw Rodessa masturbating by tinkering her private parts. The masturbation
took sometime.

This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the fourth and last witness for the defense. She
stated that she tried hard to correct the flirting tendency of Rodessa and that she scolded her when she saw Rodessa
viewing an X-rated tape. Rodessa according to her was fond of going with friends of ill-repute. That (sic) she
corroborated the testimony of Mrs Punzalan by stating that she herself saw Rodessa masturbating inside the room of her
house."[5]

In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the lower court dismissed the
defense of alibi and lent credence to the straightforward testimony of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill motive to testify
falsely against accused-appellant can be attributed. The lower court likewise regarded as inconsequential the defense of
the accused-appellant that the extraordinary size of his penis could not have insinuated itself into the victim's vagina and
that the accused is not the real father of the said victim.
The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal of the lower court's verdict through
the following assignment of errors:
“1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER MOTIVE OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S
GRANDMOTHER THAT PRECIPITATED THE FILING OF THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE IT ERRED IN
HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY AS CHARGED.
2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE HEALED LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7
O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF ACCUSED TO THE
VAGINA OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED
THE CRIME CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT DENIAL.
3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT ACCUSED WAS IN
PARAÑAQUE ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED CRIME HENCE, IT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR." [6]
Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty, requires a thorough and judicious
examination of the circumstances relating thereto, this Court remains guided by the following principles in evaluating
evidence in cases of this nature: (a) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult
for the accused though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons
are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for the
prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense."[7]
Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to tilt the scales of justice in favor of
the accused-appellant notwithstanding that he cries foul insisting that the rape charge was merely concocted and strongly
motivated by greed over a certain lot situated at the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project, Barangay San Antonio, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution witness Asuncion Rivera, the
maternal grandmother of the victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape so that, in the event that the accused-appellant
shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated in her favor. Indeed, the lot in question is co-owned
by the accused-appellant and Conrado Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the records of the
National Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-appellant would want us to believe that the rape charge was fabricated
by Asuncion Rivera in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the live-in partners would have
the property for their own.[8]
 We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as to instigate her 10-year old
granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father simply on account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot. [9]
It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible where she has no motive to
testify against the accused.[10]
We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old Rodessa which the trial court found
convincing enough and unrebutted by the defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in detail
of her father's monstrous acts had made her cry.[11] Once again, we rule that:

"x x x The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the rape as to the circumstances of the rape
must be given weight for testimony of young and immature rape victims are credible (People v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64
[1993]). No woman especially one of tender age, practically only a girl, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to a public trial, if she were not motivated solely by the
desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished (People v. Guibao, supra)."[12]

The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in his attempt
to bolster his claim that the rape accusation against him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the
accused-appellant was already naked when he dragged her inside the room is inconsistent with her subsequent testimony
that the said accused-appellant was still wearing short pants when she was dragged inside the room. Secondly, Rodessa's
sworn statement before the police investigator which indicated that, while the accused was executing pumping acts, he
uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court wherein she related that when the accused took out his
penis from her vagina, the accused said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion Rivera, recounted
in her sworn statement that it was the accused who went to see her to apprise her of the rape committed on her
granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court, Asuncion Rivera claimed that she was the one who invited the
accused-appellant to see her in her house so as to tell her a secret. [13] These alleged discrepancies merely pertain to minor
details which in no way pose serious doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Whether or not the accused
was naked when he dragged Rodessa inside the room where he sexually assaulted her bears no significant effect on
Rodessa's testimony that she was actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting account of whatever
words were uttered by the accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's private organ against her
will cannot impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A determination of which version earmarks the truth as to how
the victim's grandmother learned about the rape is inconsequential to the judgment of conviction.
As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin:[14]

"This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of a witness do not detract from its essential
credibility as long as it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically believable. Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is
telling the truth and has not been rehearsed as it is not to be expected that he will be able to remember every single detail of an incident
with perfect or total recall."

After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
deserves our utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft of clear and concrete proof of the
accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his penis and that if that be the fact, it could not have merely caused shallow
healed lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock.[15] In his testimony, the accused- appellant stated that he could not have raped
Rodessa because of the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done so.[16] This Court gives
no probative value on the accused-appellant's self-serving statement in the light of our ruling in the case of People v.
Melivo, supra,[17] that:

"The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable of varying degrees of distensibility. The degree
of distensibility of the female reproductive organ is normally limited only by the character and size of the pelvic inlet,
other factors being minor. The female reproductive canal being capable of allowing passage of a regular fetus, there
ought to be no difficulty allowing the entry of objects of much lesser size, including the male reproductive organ, which
even in its largest dimensions, would still be considerably smaller than the full-term fetus.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of the vaginal wall, though not as extensive as appellant might
have expected them to be, indicate traumatic injury to the area within the period when the incidents were supposed to have
occurred." (At pp. 13-14, Italics supplied)

In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. [18] A mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so
to speak, by the accused's penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required
to sustain a conviction.[19] In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal examiner, categorically testified that the healed
lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as narrated by the victim
to have taken place in April, 1994.[20]
Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant erroneously argues that the
Contract of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as evidence in support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be
corroborated because there is no law expressly requiring so. [21] In view of our finding that the prosecution witnesses have
no motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case, uncorroborated by other
witnesses, should be completely disregarded.[22] More importantly, the defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes
even weaker in the face of positive identification of the accused-appellant as perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim,
Rodessa.[23]
The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do some painting Job at the house of one
Divina Ang in Paranaque, Metro Manila, within 25 days from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of the accused-
appellant at the time of the commission of the offense.
The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the complaint, dated July 14,
1994. The gravamen of the said offense, as stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal
knowledge of a woman below twelve years old.[24] Rodessa positively identified his father accused-appellant, succeeded in
consummating his grievous and odious sexual assault on her is free from any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly
inconceivable that it is rehearsed and fabricated upon instructions from Rodessa's maternal grandmother Asuncion Rivera
as asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, more than
two decades ago, are relevant and worth reiterating, thus:

"x x x it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended parties are young and immature girls like the
victim in this case, (Cited cases omitted) there is marked receptivity on its part to lend credence to their version of what
transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state, as parens patria, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to
those, who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its
utmost protection. Moreover, the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The
consternation it causes her family must also be taken into account. It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced
concern in the fundamental law for such institution. There is all the more reason then for the rigorous application of the
penal law with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever warranted. It has been aptly remarked that with the advance
in civilization, the disruption in public peace and order it represents defies explanation, much more so in view of what
currently appears to be a tendency for sexual permissiveness. Where the prospects of relationship based on consent are
hardly minimal, self-restraint should even be more marked."[25]

Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty Law, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code was amended, to wit:

"The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxx xxx xxx

(Italics supplied)

Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty imposed by the trial court by
declaring that he is neither a father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's
mother.[26] On direct examination, he admitted that before the charge of rape was filed against him, he had treated Rodessa
as his real daughter and had provided for her food, clothing, shelter and education. [27] The Court notes that Rodessa uses
the surname of the accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her grandmother's live-in
partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the cross-examination that she, the accused-appellant and her five
children, including Rodessa, had been residing in one house only. [28] At any rate, even if he were not the father, stepfather
or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from the abyss where perpetrators of heinous crimes ought to
be, as mandated by law. Considering that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of Rodessa's mother, [29] he falls
squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under the term "common-law spouse of the parent of
the victim."
The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is reason enough to conclude that
accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the accused
on his young victim has become all the more repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-appellant's
moral ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the accused's selfish and bestial
craving. The law has made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant face the supreme
penalty of death.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima,
Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER,
INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204934

ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas,
Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria
Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco
for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco,
Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V.
Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya
Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander
R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho,
Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura
Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho,
Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M.
Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health,
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN,
Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE
OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos,Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204957

TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 204988

SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his
personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the
school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP.
NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205043

EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205138

PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty.
Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z.
Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C.
Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON.
ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H.
LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY
G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY
LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205491

SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their
Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 205720

PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her
personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA,
CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L.
POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 206355

MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207111

JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q.
VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172

COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND
FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and
DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

x---------------------------------x

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of
Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good." 1

To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people
beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards
the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a problem that concerns not
only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its
very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The
legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to
remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and
substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as
an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to
adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to
interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy
of the Philippine Constitution.

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and
contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates 2 to sticker campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-
political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware
of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented
in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
 (1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong,
in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the
Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);

(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its
president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on
behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);

(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in
their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);

(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation,
Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens
(Serve Life);

(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);

(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of
the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);

(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several
others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);

(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others, 21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
(Echavez);

(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan
F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also
proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);

(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several
others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar
(Pro-Life);

(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita
Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and
members of the Bar (MSF);

(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as
citizens (Juat) ;

(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31in
their capacities as citizens (CFC);

(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and

(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer
(Alcantara); and

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the
following GROUNDS:
 • The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared
policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.35

• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners
posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it
causes cancer and other health problems.36

• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their
beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom. 37

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other
forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health
programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health programs and service,
although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that
skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health
Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural
health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.40

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be
allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41

While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails
to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42

• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the
RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth
program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under
threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment. 43

The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the
majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services. 44

• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates
against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use.
The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to
introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. 45

• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the
penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct
to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them
(the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their
affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
 • The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning
methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners
note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they are still
forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or procedure. 48

• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that
the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to
raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49

It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH
Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters
pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the parents of a child who
has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50

• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners
question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient
and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51

• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution.52

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health
measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the
ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054. 54

Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the
constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions
in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of the Department of Health Dr.
Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive
Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-
Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to
intervene.61

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe
for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially
petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120)
days, or until July 17, 2013.62

On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify
the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral
arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16,
2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court. 63

Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same
time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
 The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to
Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices." Although contraceptive
drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner."65

In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or
anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or
device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall
be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."

On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these measures
included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made
part of a broad educational program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit
family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."

To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No.
79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program,"
provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable methods of
contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of
demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under
that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in
conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which,
among others, mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including
family planning and sex education.71

The RH Law

Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace.
From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in
the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010. 72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not
adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide
for the peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for
health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and
for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to
carry out its mandates.

Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular,
argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to
health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the
status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:

x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No.
5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a
prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the
role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in
the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest
extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning
methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full
range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74

ISSUES

After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to
the following principal issues:

I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

3] Facial Challenge

4] Locus Standi

5] Declaratory Relief

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

4] The Family

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

6] Due Process

7] Equal Protection

8] Involuntary Servitude

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

 DISCUSSION

Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some
procedural impediments.

I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

The Power of Judicial Review

In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and
political wisdom of Congress and respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a
majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that
the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests
the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular,
with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism
Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the
acts of the legislature.79

Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet
to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices
that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80

In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is
often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal
branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is
supreme within its own sphere.81

Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines; 82 (b)
the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines; 83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. 84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government. 85

In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon
the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government,
in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend
of courtesy and caution.86

It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. 87 In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done within its sphere of competence and
authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with
grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the
RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results. 89 The Court must
demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.

In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes
no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or
otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts
of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make
sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the
Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of
proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly
provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]

As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative
and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling
was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC, 92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In
Tanada, the Court wrote:

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no
doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court
(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis
supplied]

In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great
departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between
them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the
judiciary in that balancing operation.95

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any
and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96

Actual Case or Controversy

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH
Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of
the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH
Law is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. 99 The rule is that courts do
not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The
controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There
ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. 100

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to
be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed by either
branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of 102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines, 103 where the constitutionality of
an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued
that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could
possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or
act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the
controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute. 104

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger
of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard
on the matter NOW.

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law
cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure. 105

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has
expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Locus Standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as
applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against
them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. 112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained
or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. 113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 114

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.115

Transcendental Importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."116

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious
constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper
even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to
sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue
of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court
has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR: 119

Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on
the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the
issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other constitutional rights. Mindful
of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among
a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the
unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are
being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to
irreparable consequences.

Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court
has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the
Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where
the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.121

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true
intent - to act as a population control measure.123

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, 124 and that
the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control
measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save
lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the
RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information
on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem,
however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the
law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all
intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law.
It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it
and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth
attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:

It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law
and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so
as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]

In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in
the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right
to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average
person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or
in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act." 129

Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason
to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.

II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners

The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130

According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers
contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus,
sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary to the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.

They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine
devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has
life.131

As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of
contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man. 132

Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify
that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that
abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise or
administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133

Position of the Respondents

For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the
prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes
that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products and supplies shall be made
accessible to the public.134

According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by
enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the
World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference
and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an
abortive.135

For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering
that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he
argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent
the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed. 136

The Court's Position

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137

Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation
of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage.
From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent
fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international
agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in
order to achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other
family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered on the
promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion
of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and
R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm
shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-
abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to
life and guarantee religious freedom.

When Life Begins*

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical
issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it
was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who
have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view
that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum
by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation"
of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143

Plain and Legal Meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary
meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council: 144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people
mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined
by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote;
the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents. 145

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male
spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions. 146

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v.
Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano, 147 it was written:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,
that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]

In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for
human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal
life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child. 149

Intent of the Framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception"
used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."
The records reflect the following:

Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:

"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."

When is the moment of conception?

xxx

Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human
life. x x x.150

xxx

As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the
fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms,
it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these
nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division.
All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.

The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of
the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the
sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells.
Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.

Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and
human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human. 151

Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was
not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:

Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase
"fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the
moment of conception."152

Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:

Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without
specifying "from the moment of conception."

Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he
would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after
fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life begins from the
moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress, too. 153

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was
going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now
states:

The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.

When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we
know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the
ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the
uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum
to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.

Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be
unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.

Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives
are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered
abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall
provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the
Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on
the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of
fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence. 155

From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and
thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and
those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to
protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world.
I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation
of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.

I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also
actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is
that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?

Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet
unshaped.

Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine
device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from
the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral
arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients. 157

Atty. Noche:

Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.

Justice Bersamin:

There is no life.

Atty. Noche:

So, there is no life to be protected.

Justice Bersamin:

To be protected.

Atty. Noche:

Under Section 12, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

So you have no objection to condoms?

Atty. Noche:

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Justice Bersamin:

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Atty. Noche:

Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article
II, Your Honor, yes.

Justice Bersamin:

Alright.

Atty. Noche:

And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor. 158

Medical Meaning

That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health
Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an
ovum and forms a viable zygote."159

It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops." 160

The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics), 161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also
concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages
that ensue.

Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male
and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of
events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion
of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell.
This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being." 162

The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous
process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human
organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes
in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a
genetic unity."

In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill
(Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:

CONCLUSION

The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that
fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from
the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome
would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that,
there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited.
Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.

The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the
factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of human life or of human
embryos.164

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following
the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that
the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive
process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities
confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after implantation
that pregnancy can be medically detected."167

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the
beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. 168 Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by
those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also
to the Constitution.

Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.

If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would
prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based
divisiveness.

It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.

The RH Law and Abortion

The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court
cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn
from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion
decision passed by the Supreme Court.169

A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court
has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates
that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with
provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to
the uterus for implantation.170

Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes
the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:

1] xx x.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

xxx.

(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute
to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health,
the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The elements of reproductive health care include
the following:

xxx.

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

xxx.

2] xx x.

Section 4. x x x.

(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or
not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction,
free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do so; and to attain the highest
standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include
abortion, and access to abortifacients.

3] xx x.

SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance,
executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed,
modified or amended accordingly.

The RH Law and Abortifacients

In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the
RH Law defines an abortifacient as:

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the
word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion
and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device
that either:

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the
FDA.

Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution,
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion
becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as
discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and,
second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).

By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at
implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be given upon
implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized
ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way
until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the
moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the
fertilized ovum prior to implantation.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not
sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized
ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of
beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which
kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is
an abortifacient.

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or
to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully
attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance
when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171

Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the
Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is
made available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso
under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:

Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills,
postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they
redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:

a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:

j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or
health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or
prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved indication as determined
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).

The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that
primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172

This cannot be done.

In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the
insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.

Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It
contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of
the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in
the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known
effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.

For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually
abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174

Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive.
With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against
abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those
contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do
not have the secondary action of acting the same way.

Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be
construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent
with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be
declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that
have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives
which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution."175

To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must
be upheld.
2-The Right to Health

The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the
inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national hospitals. 176Citing various
studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in
women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased
when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is
associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and
an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction. 177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual
health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to
ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180

The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement
of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute
the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women. 181

The Court's Position

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:

HEALTH

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.

Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and
self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express
the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to
implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it was stated:

x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –

... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the
contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule
would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be
subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass
the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and
distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician - be maintained.185

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729.
There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with.
Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and
devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate
safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained
by respondent Lagman:

D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription

108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without
prescription.

109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs
and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions
of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.

110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed
by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute
whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is
by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:

"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of
preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and

"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive
system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.

"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not
more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.

"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

"Approved: June 18, 1966"

111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:

"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever
nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the
consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.

112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the
petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is
completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]

In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:

The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:

SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and
monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local
government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The supply and budget
allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:

(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;

(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and

(c) Cost of family planning supplies.

Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the
overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729,
which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a
heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it
may be held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use. 187

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH
Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the
agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently,
the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the
case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine
devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative only after they have been tested,
evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular
hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence
concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports
this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices,
injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by
Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech

Position of the Petitioners:

1. On Contraception

While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription,
there are those who, because of their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether
abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not
only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive
use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of
God in the transmission of Human life."188

The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes
on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs. 189

2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer

Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions
for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the
conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to another medical practitioner
who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious
objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs. 190

They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited,
because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive
health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a
patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object,
such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH
Law, are also not recognize.191

Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to
another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They
add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and
1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives
with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach
upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required. 192

Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive
health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief
may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury
to the public.193

Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom
because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the
people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development, health, education, information, choice
and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible
parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom. 194

Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and
responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces
individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their religious beliefs. 195 As the
assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the
petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception
against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The Respondents' Positions

The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief. 196 They point out
that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and quality reproductive health
services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of
their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an
assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will. 199

The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively
going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of
the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking
that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the
entire citizenry.201

With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand,
who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who needs access to information and who has
the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's
religion without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others. 202

Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration,
location and impact.203

Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation
providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any information received on account of their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
intervention of the State.204

For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method
acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the
changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general acceptance of the
benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.

The Church and The State

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic,
cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has
allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society together. It has embraced
minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed
fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for
guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and
establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of
law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means
that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest principles of
morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions
contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the
church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one
religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the
State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they
are good for the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the
above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any
other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious
congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit
of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section
29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:

Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

Section 29.

xxx.

No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against
other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups." 206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the
outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:

The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship
of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of
utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he
believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or
purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid,
even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83
S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and
effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless
the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81
S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).

As expounded in Escritor,

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to
promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the establishment
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other
words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to
influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is
comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As
explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211

The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom
of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange,
bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or
doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel.212

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper
regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare."213

Legislative Acts and the

Free Exercise Clause

Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor) 214 where it was stated "that
benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying
the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"

The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion
may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the
exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration
of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether
by the legislature or the courts."217

In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper. 218Underlying the
compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:

Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free
Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it.
Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced
that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The
Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the
law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to
the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The
fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican
Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate
danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression.
On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established
institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by
Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the
"compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.

The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and
present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate
effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent
neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely
conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-
term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive
evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail
over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights
- "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of
the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is
premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in
order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right
with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail
over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to
do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to
the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on
Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to
protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining
supplied.]

The Court's Position

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's
participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith,
practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts." 220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm
where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of
religious freedom.

At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is
replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions
against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the following:

1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section
2, Declaration of Policy]

2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the
foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:

(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]

3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including
effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as those registered and approved by the
FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of
family planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]

4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire
with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in
accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions. [Section 3CDJ

5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their
religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights
instruments. [Section 3(h)]

6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-
based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population
and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized.
[Section 3(i)]

7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family
and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life aspirations, taking into account
psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious
convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical
practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

The Establishment Clause

and Contraceptives

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple
terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.

Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control
program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of
any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that
are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs
in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24
thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person
seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.

In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the
compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an exemption from
obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from
the RH Law deserves no less than strict scrutiny.

In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened.
As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet
under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious
beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.

The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of
a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been
compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written,
"at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 222

Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if
he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in communicating their
beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual
to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. 223 While the RH Law seeks to provide
freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and
prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion. 224

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the
State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods
to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong
view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly,
a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled
to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in
the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.

Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v.
NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the
provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor
ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether
the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty." 227

While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to
assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers

The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should
they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be
struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance
of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.

In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary 228 it was stressed:

Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought
to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10

The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set
consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless,
when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly
chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a
patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.

The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)

The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:

Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head
nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.

This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally
protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be
considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally
apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off
even if one acquires employment in the government.

It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind
must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral
discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent
aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and
petition, and freedom of association.229

The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it
is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between
the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.

Justice Mendoza:

I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete
with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with
qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH
Bill?

Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the
provisions.

Justice Mendoza:

I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled
health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising
midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions
of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?

Congressman Lagman:

I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.

Justice Mendoza:

In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled
health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the
constitutional right to the religious belief?

Congressman Lagman:

Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail. 230

Compelling State Interest

The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were
able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to
render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve
the objectives of the law.

Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the
establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not
to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same
silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:

Justice De Castro:

Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Yes, Justice.

Justice De Castro:

... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to
refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

Ahh, Your Honor, ..

Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?

Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:

In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health
legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by
the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious
objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and
immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. 232

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according
to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from
acting according to one's belief.233

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of
the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to
a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the information, product, method
or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious
freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could
limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any
government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral
by a conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating
the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who
may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person
who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of
constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected.
Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to
the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on
comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:

Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a
comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's
life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses
to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the
right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

 (3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to
the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases,
HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be
provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal
interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and
medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In
addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as
strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate,
timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in
government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of
moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for
the enrichment and strengthening of character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen
maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x." 235 He, however, failed
to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.

The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate
dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the
proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling state interest.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they
could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind
conformity.

Exception: Life Threatening Cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare
service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their
religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency
procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a
medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave
danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we
are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency." 237

In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to
save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:

Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of
the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to
bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is
morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it
is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are
observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor
would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their lives are
equally valuable.238

Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to
even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a
medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering the life he would be able to save.

Family Planning Seminars

Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds
the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares
that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG,
those who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the
information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.

4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by
intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family
rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240

The Court cannot but agree.

The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one
article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.

ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its
solidarity and actively promote its total development.

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.

Section 3. The State shall defend:

The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;

The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and

The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs
that affect them.

In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to
wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision
making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority over their
minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.

The Family and Spousal Consent

Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:

The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...

(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of
lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:

(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing
the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]

The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very
nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately
related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall defend the "right of
the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the
same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them "
is equally recognized.

The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse
who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family, all for the
sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution.241

Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one
of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number
of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and
shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private
right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart
their destiny together as one family.

As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including
the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH
Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray
the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to
decide whether to undergo reproductive health procedure. 242

The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention
would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy
was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right
to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:

We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is
an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not
commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.

Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it
recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246

At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.

The Family and Parental Consent

Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:

SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.

No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided,
That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents
or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.

There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning.
Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is a need to tame population
growth.

It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents.
The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that
their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.

More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:

The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right
of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]

To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of
the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment
of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive
of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the
State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family
and society.

The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor
child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a
state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information

Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with
respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation
between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health
procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned,
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception
in the second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn
child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of
the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the
protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be
allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are
not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to
accept or reject the information received.

Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases

As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and
that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be emphasized that no person
should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.

In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the
requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental
authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above,
and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be
deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.

5 - Academic Freedom

It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the
principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively force educational institutions to
teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the
petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and
breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and
promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251

At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that will be used to educate the
adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions.
Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or
validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents
in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of
the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably, it places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary,"
that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth.
Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also
for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law
itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes
among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision supplements, rather
than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed
in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well
be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes
apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without
merit.254

While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive
health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious
beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

6 - Due Process

The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the
Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be
held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They argue that confusion further
results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."

The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups
from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these
institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering
reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).

Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at
the same time fails to define "incorrect information."

The arguments fail to persuade.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague,
words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the
statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it
must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 256

As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be
made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:

(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited
and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis,
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or
other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3)
public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care
services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with
the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service
provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive
health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the qualifications and exemptions
earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to
render reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of
information and the rendering of medical procedures.

The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services.
For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:

SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:

(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:

(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect
information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to
a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;

From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules;
inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the
truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness that is intentional. 258 Used
together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public
as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health
care service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical
practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the
programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and
safety. The public deserves no less.

7-Egual Protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates
against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use .
They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that
would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the
poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.

They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.

In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection.
Thus:

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process,
as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The
mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation
of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the
distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority in addressing the
health development of the people. Thus:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor
to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall endeavor to
provide free medical care to paupers.

It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility
issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."

Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions
upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples
with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper look into its provisions
shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government
programs to promote basic reproductive health care.

With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education
program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend
public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On
the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.

8-Involuntary Servitude

The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against
involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health
care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health services, actually amounts to
involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced
labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of
giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the powers of the government, the
accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.

The point of the OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal
profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly involves the
very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the
practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public
safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether. 264

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats,
intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion. 265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals
that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service providers to render pro bono
service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private
and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no
compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such
service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate
state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are
exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bona or otherwise.

9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA

The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a
supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL). 266

The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and methods fall under the gamut of
terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."

In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:

SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary
and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
 "(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the
same;

"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;

"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;

"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to
recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;

"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of
appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers,
importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of health
products, as determined by the FDA;

"x x x

"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate
authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;

"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and
non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said
product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any
person;

"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not
registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for
thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;

"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused
death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe,
dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan which is a
requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;

x x x.

As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry
out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to
the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by
permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH
Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization
even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say specific solutions.

10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region

of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to
local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs
the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities, as follows:

SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –

(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and
responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units
shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated
herein.

(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.

While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have
already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and
facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical exception of
cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:

(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other
facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations
Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are
not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit concerned is duly
designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the
national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic
services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of
providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270

In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national
government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law.

Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is
nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the
LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the national government
upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.

The ARMM

The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM.
The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the
organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the
autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no
manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general
welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence,
as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be
restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general
concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law
enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive
issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover,
natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The
jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound
to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather, natural law is
to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable.279

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any
shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and
making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to the poor.

Facts and Fallacies

and the Wisdom of the Law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and
supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in
pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that
man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its
beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such,
everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside
each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the
problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not
the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain
as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries,
which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their
young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent a significant human
capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is
because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed
down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support them? This would be the
situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman. 280

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the
penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.

x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by
the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the law nor to question the policies
adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise
from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in
the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of
interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's
function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted
by the lawmaking body.281

Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the
reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the
assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning
method should be maintained.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual,
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders
the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section
4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby
LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Tingnan ang aking opinyong

Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Concurring Opinion

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

With Separate concurring opinion See: Separate Concurring Opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Concurring and dissenting See Concurring Opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See concurring and dissenting See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Separate dissent

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Imbong vs Ochoa

Substantial: Right to Life; Health; Religion; Free Speech; Privacy; Due Process Clause; Equal Protection Clause

Procedural: Actual Case; Facial Challenge; Locus Standi; Declaratory Relief; One Subject One Title Rule

IMBONG VS OCHOA

G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014

JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
Petitioners,

vs.

HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget
and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, Respondents.

Facts:

Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH
Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

Power of Judicial Review

Actual Case or Controversy

Facial Challenge

Locus Standi

Declaratory Relief

One Subject/One Title Rule

Issue/s:

SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

Right to life

Right to health

Freedom of religion and right to free speech

Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

Freedom of expression and academic freedom

Due process clause

Equal protection clause

Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:

Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

Actual Case or Controversy

Facial Challenge

Locus Standi

Declaratory Relief

One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:

PROCEDURAL

Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of
the case.

Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must
concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is
the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something
has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must
show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of

Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and
peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s
thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can
be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.”

One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the
statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle
that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject
where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject
or scope of the act.”

Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or
repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights
of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of
unconstitutionality may be recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to
retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can
stand independently as law.

Ruling/s:

SUBSTANTIAL

Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that
should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual
Members could express their own views on this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception” according
to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that
conception begins at fertilization.

The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and (b) the
protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the Legislature from
passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and
actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only
drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded
duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by using
the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec.
3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of
contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes adequate
safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under
Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs
and devices will be done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these devices and
materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are
“safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH measures
(a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However, the Court has
the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion. To
allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the
Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state religion.
Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even if the promotion of contraceptive
use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse undergoing the
provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional
safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the
State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands
of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-
making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii)
which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies
the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are not
deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in deciding whether
to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State to provide Age-
and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their
participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a curriculum
on age-appropriate reproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than supplant)
the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in developing the
mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as observed by
the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care service provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of medical
procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family
planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect” and
“knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of
programs and services on reproductive health.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall
prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor
and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law
does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend
to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14 is valid.
There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service providers to render 48
hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is
undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order
to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service
providers to render pro bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render
RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable
controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger
of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard
on the matter now.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some
modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded
its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life,
speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the
Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been
transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time
and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not
otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has,
on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well
being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays
for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the
law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right
to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.

Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason
to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following
provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods
of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43098 March 30, 1981

MARIANO R. BASA, petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Department of
Justice), respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Mariano R. Basa, retired municipal judge of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, seeks the review of the December 12, 1975
decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in WC Case No. C-958, which affirmed the October 14, 1975 order
of the acting chief of Unit, Regional Office No. 5, Department of Labor, at San Pablo City, denying his second claim for
reimbursement of medical expenses incurred in relation with his heart ailment.

On July 26, 1969, petitioner suffered a heart attack that incapacitated him from further performing his function as
municipal judge, and which forced him on October 16, 1969 to retire from the service. Consequently, he filed a claim for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended and was awarded on October 26, 1970 permanent
and total disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses incurred,

On January 26, 1975 or after a period of almost six (6) years his initial heart attack on July 26, 1969, petitioner suffered his
second heart attack which proved more severe, causing loss of his power of speech and the weakening of his body.

On June 26, 1975, he filed with the Workmen's Compensation Unit of the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. 5, at
San Pablo City, a claim for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred in connection with his aforesaid second heart
attack; but the same was denied on October 14, 1975 by the acting chief of unit for lack of merit, reasoning that petitioner
had been awarded benefits under Section 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, for permanent and total
disability, plus reimbursement of medical expenses.

Petitioner duly filed his motion for reconsideration, invoking Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as
amended.

On December 27, 1976, respondent Commission rendered a decision affirming the decision of its acting chief of unit, thus:

It appears that claimant of this case has previously been awarded compensation under Section 15 of the
Act and the instant case was subsequently filed in relation thereto only for the sole purpose of seeking
reimbursement under Section 13.

We cannot sustain claimant's view. The claimant has already been declared totally disabled in the
previous award. That being so, no claim for reimbursement of subsequent and Mother medical expenses
may be entertained or awarded, in accordance with the policy of this Commission.

Hence, this recourse.

The parties are agreed that the sole issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover subsequent and
further medical expenses for the same permanent and total disability which had already been the subject of a maximum
compensation benefits under Section 15 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, and for reimbursement of
medical expenses already then incurred under Section 13 thereof.
I

The issue as framed admits the causal relationship of petitioner's 1969 heart attack to his 1975 heart attack. As a matter of
fact, respondent employer did not allege and there was no evidence presented that petitioner had fully recovered from
his first heart attack in 1969 when his second heart attack occurred in 1975. Moreover, petitioner's attending physician
testified that once the patient has been subjected to this kind of disease, and there is already exclusion in the blood
because of the previous thrombosis, the patient will be in serious condition because the area in the brain will be involved
(TSN, September 26, 1975, pp. 17-18, rec.).

The members of this Tribunal are aware of death induced by a second heart attack even after the lapse of many years
from the first attack.

Consequently, petitioner's second attack, being causally linked with his first heart attack which was already declared
compensable by the Workmen's Compensation, may be the source of a claim for further compensation benefits. In the
recent case of Enriquez versus Workmen's Compensation Commission (93 SCRA 366 [1979]), WE stated that ... the right to
compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a
compensable injury (82 Am Jur 132). Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment,
every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an
independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or misconduct (Larson Workmen's
Compensation law 3-279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequelae that flow from the primary
injury are compensable (ibid.).

II

Petitioner's case therefore comes within the ambit of the 1980 precedents-setting decision of the Supreme Court En
Banc in Biscarra vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (G.R. No. L- 43425, January 22, 1980), where it sustained the right
of an ailing employee under Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, to continuous medical
treatment and therefore reimbursement for subsequent medical expenses incurred even after he is declared permanently
disabled. The Court En Banc, passing upon the same issue and arguments raised in this present case, compassionately
ruled:

The Law applicable is Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended on June 20, 1964,
which provides, in part:

SEC. 13. Services, appliances and supplies. — Immediately after an employee has suffered
an injury or contracted sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the
employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee with such services, appliances and
supplies as the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may require; and that which
will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity.

The word "services" used herein shall include medical, surgical, dental, hospital and
nursing attendance and treatment as well as the proper fitting and training in the use of
appliances and the necessary training for purposes of rehabilitation; "appliances" shall
include crutches, artificial members and other devices of the same kind, and the
replacements or repairs of such artificial members or such devices unless the replacement
or repair is made necessary by the lack of proper care by the employee; and "supplies"
shall include medicines, as well as medical, surgical and dental supplies.' (Underlined
portions are amendments introduced by Section 7 of Republic Act 4119 of June 20, 1964).

As will be seen from this law, it imposes upon the employer the obligation 'to provide the employee with
such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may
require; and that which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity.
'This law does not provide a maximum either as to the amount to be paid or the time within which such
rights may be availed of. To sustain, therefore, the proposition that petitioner's disability being total and
permanent, respondent's liability to furnish him with further medical and hospital expenses is
terminated, would, in effect, qualify Section 13, supra, by adding what is not provided in the law or
subtracting what is therein embodied which is legally impermissible. This would constitute 'judicial fiat'.
This Court, therefore, shall itself to the clear intendment of the law.

Before the 1964 amendment. but as amended by Republic Act 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 13 reads:

Sec. 13. Medical attendance. — Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or
contracted sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer shall
provide the employee with such medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies as
the nature of the injury or sickness may require.

The pecuniary liability of the employer for the necessary, medical, surgical, and hospital
services and supplies shall be limited to the amount ordinarily paid in the community for
such treatment of an injured person of the same standard of living if the treatment had to
be paid for by the injured person himself.'

Under the above-quoted 1952 amendment — prior to the 1964 amendment — WE already ruled that the
employer's liability for medical services subsists during the period if disability or 'lasts as long as the
employee is sick.'

Thus, on October 19, 1961, WE ruled in La Maflorca Pambusco vs. Isip, et al. (L-16495, Oct. 19, 1961 3 SCRA
242, 244):

We are inclined to uphold this contention of respondent. In the first place, in the order of
the Commission dated November 20, 1955 acting favorably on the claim of respondent it
was expressly stated that petitioner should provide him "further medical, surgical and
hospital services and supplies as the nature of his sickness may require until it is cured or
arrested " Said order became final for lack of protest or appeal on the part of petitioner.
Then we have the document signed by respondent entitled "satisfaction of Award or
Decision", dated February 7, 1956, which embodies the so-called compromise agreement
entered into between them, and from this document we find that while respondent
received the sum of P5,302.05 in fun satisfaction of the award, the same is qualified by the
following condition: "except with respect to further hospital or medical treatment,
whenever necessary." Finally, we have the provisions of Section 13 of Act No. 3428, as
amended (Workmen's Compensation Act), which postulate, among others, that "during
the subsequent period of disability, the employer shall provide the employee with such
medical, surgical and hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury or
sickness may require." These provisions justify the subsequent award made by the
Commission.

It is true that under the Workmen's Compensation Act the amount of compensation to
which an injured employee is entitled in case of disability shall not in any case exceed the
total sum of P4,000.00 but this limitation only applies to the compensation for disability,
and not to medical attendance (Sections 12, 14, 16, 18, Act No. 3428, as amended). In fact,
this subject is governed by a different section of law (Section 13, Idem 3 SCRA 242, 244;
emphasis supplied].

Then on September 31, 1963, WE reiterated the aforesaid ruling in Itogon-Suyoc, Inc. vs. Fruto Dulay, et al.
(L-18974, Sept. 31, 1963, 9 SCRA 199, 202-203):

The decision orders petitioner "to provide him (Fruto Dulay) with continuous medical
and hospital service and supplies until his illness is cured or arrested, pursuant to Section
13 of the Act." Petitioner assails this portion of the decision on the ground that Dulay is
no longer in its employ and that its liability for medical care can not extend beyond 208
weeks. There is no merit in the contention. Section 13 does not require employer-
employee relationship as a condition for the employer's liability. As long as the illness
was contracted during the employee's employment, the employer's obligation
 subsists. This obligation lasts for as tong as the employee is sick. The limit of 208 weeks, like the
limit of P4,000.00, refers to the liability of the employer for compensation (Secs. 12, 14, 16, 18,
Act No. 3428, as amended) and has no reference at all to the employer's liability for medical
care (Sec. 13) which lasts during the "period of disability" (See La Mallorea Pambusco vs.
Isip, et al., G.R. No. L-16495, Oct. 19, 1961) [emphasis supplied].

And again, on February 29, 1964, in the case of Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. WCC, et al., (L-19164, Feb. 29,
1964, 10 SCRA 420, 423-425) WE ruled:

It may be observed that the law, in imposing on the employer the obligation to provide
medical attendance to an injured or sick employee, unlike those provisions relating to
compensation for disability (Secs. 14, 16, 17 and 18 of Act No. 3428, as amended) does not
provide maximum either in the amount to be paid or the time period within which such
right may be availed of by the employee. On the contrary the law imposes on the
employer the obligation to "provide the employee with such medical, surgical, and
hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury or sickness may require . The
implication is that such medical expenses as may be necessary until the work-connected injury or
sickness ceases, may be charged against the employer. In the United States, from where our labor
compensation law is derived, the two kinds of benefits for physical injury or sickness are, like in
our law, treated differently. The wage-loss payments based on the concept of disability are
invariably limited in both amount and duration while payments of medical benefits, that is,
hospital and medical expenses occasioned by any work-connected injury, regardless of wage-loss or
disability, vary in the different states of the Union In twelve states such benefits are unlimited as
to duration and amount; in nineteen, the preliminary limits are subject to extension by the
administrative agency for indefinite periods as the case warrants; in eight, there are fixed
limits subject to extension for limited additional periods; and in nine, there are fixed
limits with no provision for extension (Arthur Larson on "The Law of Workmen's
Compensation", Vol. 2 [1952], p. 82). In construing the compensation act's provision requiring
the employer to furnish medical, surgical and hospital services '.reasonably required to care or
relieve e the employee from the facts of the injury ", it was there held that "in the absence of
express statuory authority this court is powerless to place a definite limitation upon the time such
medical, surgical and hospital service shall be rendered in any particular case" (W.J. Newman v.
Industrial Commission, 187 N.E. 137, 353 111. 190, 88 A.L.R., 1188). This was based on the
theory that workmen's acts are a humane law of a remedial nature, and wherever construction is
permissible, their language should be liberally construed in favor of the employee. And, this is
supported by the prevailing rule in compensation cases.

Acts not containing any limitation as to the period during which the employer
may furnish or pay for medical surgical or hospital services have been construed
as imposing liability on the employer as long as such services are required to
cure or relieve the injured employee from the effects of' his injury(Florczak v.
Industrial Commission, 187 N.E. 137, 353 111. 190, 88 A.L.R. 1188).

Thus an employee who contracted tuberculosis while employed at a state tuberculosis

hospital and where the infection was never arrested from the time it was contracted until
his death, was declared entitled to continued treatment the governing statute not having
limited the time of treatment (Carrol v. State, 64 N.Y. 2d 166, 242 Minn. 70) [emphasis
supplied].

xxx xxx xxx

The office of the Solicitor General, however, contends that since the petitioner had been declared to be
totally and permanently disabled, the liability of the employer to furnish medical, surgical and hospital
services ceases, citing 10 Workmen's Compensation Text, Schneider, page 109, that:

Where the evidence discloses that further medical, surgical, and hospital services would
not definitely improve the condition of an injured employee, the liability of an employer
 to furnish reasonable medical and hospital services, as and when needed, ceases Patilsen
vs. Glenn L. Martin - Nebraska Co. 26 N.W. 2d. II, Jan. 31, 1947, citing Wilson vs. Brown-
McDonald Co. 278 N.W. 264, 256, March 4, 1938).

But the foregoing 1947 Nebraska decision was based on the old Nebraska law providing for limited
liability. Thereafter, said law was amended allowing unlimited liability as to time and amount, thus
making Nebraska one of the 12 states providing for such unlimited liability as to time and amount even
for total and permanent disability, together with California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Puerto Rico and Wisconsin (see Samuel B. Horovitz
"Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation law", 1948 ed., p. 294; see also Larson, supra).

From 1948 to 1975, the number of states in the American Union providing for medical benefits which are
unlimited as to duration and amount, has increased from 12 to 43:

61.11 Statutory summary

An integral and important part of the benefit scheme of all compensation acts is the provision of
hospital and medical benefits. These benefits account for about one-third of the total benefits
paid to injured workmen.

In forty-three states such benefits are essentially unlimited as to duration and amount; in one
there is a fixed limit subject to extension for a limited additional amount; in three there
are fixed limits with no provision for extension; and in three, there are limits only as to
silicosis and related diseases.

It is interesting to observe that in the space of about thirty years the number of states providing
full medical coverage has risen from about a dozen to almost four times that number. This appears
to evince agreement with the finding of an authoritative study that "it is impossible fully to relieve
pain and to assure restoration of seriously disabled persons when medical care is arbitrarily
limited Equally important is the convincing evidence that unlimited medical benefits are
economically the soundest benefit; that over the long term, they become the least expensive (Sec.
61.11, Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 1976 ed., emphasis supplied).

Larson continues to state that 'medical benefits ordinarily include not only medical and hospital services,
but necessary incidentals such as transportation, apparatus, and nursing care, which may be compensable
even when supplied at home by a member of claimant's family. Palliative measures are included under the
decisions of most jurisdictions, to relieve pain even after all hope of cure is gone. Rehabilitation is becoming an
increasingly important part of the compensation program under such provisions supplying additional
maintenance and compensation during the rehabilitation period as well as curative and retraining centers
to restore earning power to handicapped workers' (Sec. 61, Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation, 1976 ed., emphasis supplied).

To repeat, the prevailing interpretation of Section 13 is consistent with the law and jurisprudence of the
States of Hawaii, Minnesota and New York (See Table 14, 4, Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation, 574-10-574.11 [1979]), upon whose compensation statutes our own compensation act was
patterned. It was originally adopted by our Philippine Legislature in Spanish from the Statutes of the
Territory of Hawaii (Nava v. Ynchausti Steamship Co. 57 Phil. 751 [19321; Fernando and Quiason, Labor
Standards and Welfare Legislation, 401 [1964]; Pucan and Besinga, Comments and Annotations on the
Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, 5-6 [1971]).

Section 13 of our compensation law mandates the employer to provide the employee medical benefits
immediately after he has suffered an injury and during the subsequent period of disability 'as the nature
of his disability and the process of his recovery may require; and that which will promote his early
restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity', regardless of whether the disability is
permanent or temporary.
In Hawaii; the obligation of the employer to provide the employee medical benefits subsists 'during
resulting period of disability'; in Minnesota, 'during disability as long as necessary to cure and relieve';
and in New York, 'as long as necessary'.

The present jurisprudence in these states sanctions unlimited medical benefits, both in time and in
amount.

In Florida, the pertinent compensation statutes require the employer 'to furnish remedial treatment —for
such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require' but 'all rights for remedial
attention — shall be barred unless a claim therefor is filed or the commission acts on its own initiative
within two years after the date of the last remedial treatment or payment of compensation.' Applying
said provisions in the case of Platzer v. Burger, 144 So. 2d 507 Fla. 1962), where the evidence indicated
that the claimant would need periodic medical treatment consisting of dilation of the urethra, medical
prescriptions, and treatment for prostatitis for the rest of his life, the court ordered medical benefits for
the lifetime of the claimant.

It is true that' throughout the Workmen's Compensation Act, the intention of the legislator to limit
payable compensation to P6,000.00 is redolent But this refers only to compensation for loss of income
proper or income benefit which is fixed or computed on the basis of the average weekly wages of the
claimant; never to medical benefits. For it is likewise pervasive in the law that the legislature has intended
a separate and different treatment for medical benefits as shown by the fact that it provided for separate
provisions for medical benefits. If the intention of the lawmakers were to put a limit to medical benefits
then they would have merged or lumped the two benefits in all the applicable provisions of the law. That
they did not, simply means that they intended a different treatment thereof.

It must be re-emphasized that under the Workmen's Compensation Act, benefits for disability are of two
general types: (1) Indemnity benefits in the form of cash payments which is designed to compensate the
worker for the loss of wages due to disability sustained or for his death; and (2) medical benefits in the
form of medical services, hospitalization, medicine and other matters related to the treatment of the
compensable injury or disease (Fernandez and Quiason, Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation, 597-
598 1964). The first, indemnity or compensation benefits for loss of wages, is limited both as to time and
as to amount; while the second, medical benefits, is unlimited both as to duration and to amount.

xxx xxx xxx

The suggestion that the 'period of disability' used in Section 13 of the Act refers to the number of weeks
fixed in Sections 12, 14, 16 and 18, was already rejected in the aforecited cases. Thus, in the Itogon-Suyoc
case, this Court rules:

The decision orders petitioner: "to provide him (Fruto Dulay) with continuous medical
and hospital services and supplies until his illness is cured or arrested, pursuant to
Section 13 of the Act." Petitioner assails this portion of the decision oil the ground that
Dulay is no longer in its employ and that its liability for medical care cannot extend
beyond 208 weeks 'There is no merit in the contention. Section 13 does not require
employer- employee relationship as a condition for the employer's liability. As long as
the illness was contractes during the employee's employment, the employers obligation
lasts for as long as the employee is sick. The limit of 208 weeks, like the limit of P4,000.00 ,
refers to the liability of the employer for compensation (Sees. 12, 14, 16, 18, Act No. 3428, as
amended) and has no reference at all to the employer's liability, for medical care (Sec. 13) which
lasts during the "period of disability.

Sections 22 and 29 refer to disability compensation or indemnity benefits; not to medical benefits. Section
22 speaks of compensation fixed by law, referring to the amounts fixed in Sections 12, 14, 16 and 18; not to
Section 13 on medical benefits which have no fixed or definite amount. Likewise, Section 29 speaks of 'the
same amount of compensation as that prescribed by this Act', referring to Sections 12, 14, 16 and 18.
It must likewise be noted that the initial text of Section 13 before its amendment by Republic Act 4119 in
1964 imposed a limitation as to the amount of medical benefits, thus: 'The pecuniary liability of the
employer for the necessary medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies shall be limited to the
amount ordinarily, paid in the (community for such treatment of an injured person of the same standard of living if
the treatment of an injured person had to be paid for by the injured himself . That such discriminatory and
degrading limitation was amended out of the Act is clearly indicative of the intention of tile lawmakers to
provide unlimited medical benefits.

xxx xxx xxx

The findings of the 'workmen's Compensation Commission, Chat petitioner is 'totally and permanently
disabled for labor', is no proof that further medical surgical and hospital services would not definitely
improve petitioner's condition, at the very least, relieve him of his pain or other injurious effect of his
ailment. Thus, even assuming that further medical treatment would not return the employee to work or
cure him, further treatment may still relieve him of his pain or its injurious effects. This is the doctrine
laid down in W.J. Newman Co. vs. Industrial Commission (187 N.E.137, June 22, 1933), thus:

[1-37] This is a novel and exceptional case. Index such circumstances caution is required
in the construction of the particular statute so as not to extend it or affect its general
application to the thousands of other cases not presenting such unusual features. In
construing paragraph (a) of Section 8, since the curing of Nee is admittedly impossible,
two principal questions confront us, viz: First, whether the services rendered or to be
rendered are reasonably necessary to relieve the employee from the effects of his injury;
and, secondly, if such services are necessary, whether power is conferred upon this court
to say when such services shall be terminated. Reference to the record clearly shows that
Nee is beyond hope of cure from medical skill. It further shows that the medical, surgical,
and hospital services he had been and is now receiving are not only necessary but also
adequate to relieve him, as far as possible, from the effects of his injury. The findings of
the Industrial Commission on this phase of the question are unquestionably in accord
with the manifest weight of the evidence. We are therefore left solely with the question
whether, by a construction of paragraph (a) of Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation
Act, this court can say, not only in this case but in other cases of exceptional nature
hereafter presented, that the medical, surgical and hospital services rendered by an
employer where no cure is possible, may with justice both to the employer and the
injured employee, be terminated after a reasonable length of time, to be determined
according to the varying circumstances of each particular case. In other words, can it be
said that the last phrase of paragraph (a) should be interpreted to mean that when an
employer has done that which is reasonably required to cure an injured employee from
the effects of his injury and medical advice indicates that a cure is hopeless, the employer
is thereafter relieved from any further liability, under the act, to furnish medical, surgical,
and hospital services. We cannot adopt any such literal or strained construction of
paragraph (a) as plaintiff in error urges in this case, to the effect that the words "cure" and
"relieve" mean virtually the same thing. A workman who is cured is, of course, relieved
from the effects of his injury, but one who is incurable, as in the present case, may still
need skillful attention to relieve him of pain or other injurious effects caused by his
injury. This is only the natural and usual meaning of the words used. It is a construction
in accordance with the general spirit and humane purpose of the act. The Workmen's
Compensation Act is a humane law of a remedial nature, and whenever construction is
permissible its language should be liberally construed. City of Chicago vs. Industrial
Commission, 291 111 23, 125 N.E. 705; Chicago Cleaning Co. vs. Industrial Board, 283
111. 177, 118 N.E. 989. A strained construction not fairly within the provisions of the act
cannot be supported. Berry Co. vs. Industrial Commission, 318 111. 312, 149 N.E. 278.
There was no denial by the employer of liability, and it has been repeatedly held by this
court that the furnishing of medical, surgical, and hospital services must be regarded as
the payment of compensation under the act. Goodman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission,
316 111. 394, 147 N.E. 394, and cases cited.
xxx xxx xxx

[47] By these successive amendments it may be seen that the legislature

deemed inadequate the original limitation of eight weeks' time and $200
in amount as to medicine and hospital services, as the amendment of
1919 enlarged the hospital services from two weeks to extend "during the
period for which compensation may be payable," and also removed any
financial limit, except as to medical or surgical services. The amendment
in 1925 went further by removing all time or money limitation upon
medical and surgical services, and limited medical, surgical, and hospital
services to such as might be "reasonably required to cure or relieve from
the effects of the injury." In the absence of express statutory authority
this court is therefore powerless to place a definite limitation upon the
time such medical, surgical and hospital services shall be rendered in
any particular case. As we have said before, the proof here shows that
medical and hospital services are necessary to relieve Nee from the
effects of bis injury and that such services cannot be rendered in his
home. There is no proof indicating any malingering or feigned sickness
in this case, or any other circumstance which would enable us to say that
fur there services are not reasonably necessary to relieve Nee from the
effects of his injury.

As the Legislature has seen fit to amend paragraph (a) of section 8 and to
successively omit the former limitations therein imposed upon the
furnishing of medical, surgical and hospital services, it would be nothing
short of judicial legislation for this court now, in an exceptional case, to
impose such a limitation The limitations of the section in question cannot
be definitely fixed except by the Legislature, and the only reasonable
interpretation which we are able to place upon it, as said above, is that
the employer's liability continues so long as medical, surgical, and
hospital services are required in order to relieve the injured employee
from the effects of his injury.

Indeed, to follow the modern trend of medical care, the direction is for increased medical liability to be
the "third phase of medicine", from "preventive medicine" and "definitive or curative medicine or
surgery", to the dynamic concept of "medical rehabilitation", one principal objective of which is to reduce
or alleviate the disability to the greatest possible degree (Injury and Death under Workmen's
Compensation Law, Samuel B. Horovitz, p. 297; Medical Handbook on Workmen's Compensation and
Principles of Disability Evaluation, by Guilatco 1967 ed., pp. 264-265).

xxx xxx xxx

In much the same way that euthanasia is not even prescribed as the extreme remedy for what appears to
be a terminal case, WE should not be oblivious to the possibility that medical science may devise
somehow, sometime during the lifetime of the disabled employee, a remedy to banish his pain and to
completely rehabilitate him physically, mentally and socially.

After devoting the best years of their lives to the service of the State, it is only fair and just that the State
should take care of its civil servants until they are relieved completely from the effects of an ailment
incurred by reason of their employment.

Denial of medical benefits to an employee who is disabled permanently, is to accord more rights to an
employee who is suffering only temporary disability or incapacity; because the latter is entitled to
continuous medical, surgical and hospital services and appliances as the nature of his injury or ailment
may require (Section 13, Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended); ...
xxx xxx xxx

It certainly would be anomalous and would do violence to natural reason and logic as well as it would be
an act of inhumanity to favor the temporarily disabled more than the one deemed permanently
incapacitated by illness or injury contracted or sustained during his employment.

An employee, whether temporarily or permanently disabled, is entitled (1) to continuous hospital,

medical and/or surgical services to relieve the painful effects of his disability; (2) to relief from or
alleviation of the humiliating effects of his injury, like plastic surgery after the first operation that may
leave an ugly scar or deformity; (3) to be provided with such facilities, supplies or equipment that will
restore the normal use of his senses, faculties, or limbs, such as improved models of wheelchairs,
crutches, artificial limbs or hearing or visual aids; and (4) to rehabilitation of his morale and spirit by
eliminating the psychological effects of the trauma caused by the ailment or injury so that he can join, and
be accepted by, the mainstream of society and lead a normal life.

After the disability benefits have been paid, the disabled employee may remain to be the main support of
his family. Denial to him of further hospital, medical or surgical services would be aggravating the
economic distress his family is suffering.

Because society does not seem to accept him (like a cured leper his feeling of depression may drive him to
commit suicide or may infect the other members of the family who may, in desperation, commit anti-
social acts, which would engender a more serious tragedy for the family.

Then again, to abandon one who is permanently disabled after the first medical treatment, is virtually to
consign him to the scrap heap or to the garbage dump of human derelicts no longer entitled to the
concern and solicitude of the State. Nothing would be more inhuman, repugnant to the central core of our
democratic welfare state as envisioned by our Constitution and shocking to a compassionate society. As
heretofore emphasized, the Government should be the last to give up hope on the recovery and
rehabilitation of those who are now considered permanently disabled. Laboratories all over the world are
continuously testing and searching for the panacea for all ailments that plague humanity. There is greater
possibility that such a cure may be discovered in our time. The right to life rank second to none in the
hierarchy of human rights. The entire world is witness to the amazing survival of Karen Quinlan for the
last two years (over 4 years now) after the life-giving apparatus was disconnected from her body.

It is likewise possible that from our own flora and fauna may be discovered the remedy for many an
ailment or injury. Many of our plants, fruits and vegetables have been found to cure, prevent or minimize
serious cardiac ailments, hypertension, arthritis, afflictions of the kidney and bladder, as well as deep
wounds. Some of our vegetables are likewise natural disinfectants. Lately, the lowly chichitica and
dioscorea have been found to be a cure for cancer (BT or DE May 13,1978).

God in his infinite wisdom has provided the remedies for human diseases, injuries and afflictions. The
genius of resourceful man will discover these cures somehow, sometime — sooner than expected.

As the Florida Supreme Court pragmatically opined in the 1950 case of Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. vs. Pittman
'Medicine is not an exact science ... Moreover, in this modern era of extensive scientific research, it is not
possible to say with certainty today that any disease is incurable for no one knows but that tomorrow will
herald a new miracle drug'(49 So. 2d 600, 603).

A Filipino eye specialist gave the information that blindness due to glaucoma may in time be a tiling of
the past.

Specialists have provided relief to those afflicted with cardiac and kidney diseases through transplanting
heartily hearts and kidneys for diseased or impaired ones.

Social legislations which constrict the rights of labor, should yield to the social justice guarantee of the
new Constitution which stresses that:
 Sec. 6. The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the
people. Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment
and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits'
(Art. 11, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).

To underscore this obligation of the State, Section 9 of Article I I likewise directs that:

The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed,
and regulate the relations between workers and 'employers. The State shall assure the rights of
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane
conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration' (1973 Constitution,
emphasis supplied).

The conservative view limiting the right of the injured or ailing employee to only one surgical or medical
service prevailing in some States of the American Union should not find adherence in our jurisdiction:
because such States seem to be still dominated by the capitalistic philosophy as they do not provide in
their respective constitutions any guarantee of social justice in favor of their citizens. If, on the other hand,
the humanitarian view which sustains the right of the ailing or injured employee to continuous medical
and surgical services until he has been fully rehabilitated, is espoused by the pro-aggressive states of the
United States of America despite the absence of any social justice guarantee in their respective
constitutions; a fortiori such compassionate approach should be followed in our jurisdiction, where our
Constitution expressly guarantees social Justice 'to ensure the dignity, welfare and security of all the
people' (Sec. 6, Art. 11, 1973 Constitution), while commanding the State to' afford protection to labor' and
'assure the right of workers to ... just and humane conditions of work'(Section 6, Art. 11, 1973
Constitution).

The fear that this humane, liberal and progressive view will swamp the Government with claims for
continuing medical, hospital and surgical services and as a consequence unduly drain the National
Treasury, is no argument against it; because the Republic of the Philippines as a welfare State, in
providing for the social justice guarantee in our Constitution, assumes such risk. This assumption of such
a noble responsibility is, as heretofore stated, only just and equitable since the employees to be benefitted
thereby precisely became permanently injured or sick while invariably devoting the greater portion of
their lives to the service of our country and people. Human beings constitute the most valuable natural
resources of the nation and therefore should merit the highest solicitude and the greatest protection from
the State to relieve them from unbearable agony. They have a right to entertain the hope that during the
few remaining years of their life some dedicated institution or gifted individual may produce a remedy
or cure to relieve them from the painful or crippling or debilitating or humiliating effects of their injury or
ailment, to funy and completely rehabilitate them and develop their 'mental, vocational and social
potentials', so that they will remain useful and productive citizens.

Finally, the New Labor Code itself commands that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation
of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor' (Section
4, Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended). This echoes Article 1702 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
which provides that:

in case of doubt, all labor legislations and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of
safety and decent living for the laborer.'

The school of thought that resists the expansion of the social rights of employees and workers is
essentially capitalistic, conservative, reactionary and selfish. The invocation of the due process clause to
challenge the validity of social and labor legislation as violative of the freedom of contract and an undue
deprivation of property had long been discarded in America since the 1937 case of West Coast Hotel vs.
Parrish (300 U.S. 379) affirming the validity of minimum wage laws. In our country, such a view was
repudiated after the 1924 case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440). Thereafter, other social legislations
followed and survived the constitutional test such as our own minimum wage law, the 8-hour labor law,
and various amendments to the workmen's compensation law, and employer's liability act, law on
 maternity leave with pay, and laws for the protection of women and minors employed in dangerous
industries and occupations. Such statutes were held not to trench upon the Constitution, even in the
states of the American Union whose constitutions do not expressly guarantee social justice specifically in
favor of the working class, as heretofore stated.

Then again, the fear that continued hospitalization and medical treatment of employees who are
permanently disabled would constitute an intolerable burden on the employer, whether government or
private, is more fancied than real. Firstly, no statistics have been cited to show that there are many
permanently disabled and needing continued medical treatment or hospitalization for a long period.
Secondly, the employer can always secure or purchase insurance against such possible liability.

In the instance case, the government is the employer against whom such liability for continued
hospitalization, medical services and medical supplies, is being raised. The government can always
appropriate the necessary funds for the purpose.

The government has been losing revenues, either through graft and corruption or failure to honestly and
fully collect such revenues. These amounts of which the government has been promoted by dishonest
public officers, private contractors or suppliers or which the government failed to collect by reason of the
criminal neglect or dishonesty of its collecting agencies, may aggregate hundreds of millions, if not
billions, of pesos yearly. The financial exposure of the government to provide medical and hospital
services for its unfortunate employees rendered permanently disabled but still suffering pain or
humiliation or degradation by reason of such permanent disability is practically minimal, or not
substantial, compared to the millions of pesos that the country is losing all these years through graft and
corruption. The government has failed not only to prosecute many big-time tax dodgers, grafters and
corruptors but also to recover even a portion of the unpaid revenues or the amounts embezzled or stolen
from its coffers. Until the guilty parties are brought before the courts, the tribunals cannot do anything.

In this case of petitioner who served the government as municipal judge from 1947 to 1969, risking his health and life, and
who prays for a second reimbursement of his medical expenses, ... this Court has the singular opportunity to afford him
relief from his misery and not let him deteriorate until his body is finally and totally decomposed and dissolved into dust.
Any gratuity that he might have received, aside from the first compensation for wage loss and the first refund for
hospitalization and medical treatment, would not even be sufficient to maintain his family for the remaining few years of
his life. With his retirement gratuity and disability compensation already exhausted by now (after eleven years from
1969), he and his family are exposed to complete misery. The government or the court that does not lift a hand to rescue
the ailing employee and his family from such abject penury cannot rightly claim to be an agency of social justice, much
less pretend to be compassionate.

2. And the Court En Banc by way of emphasizing ITS role as a potent social justice arm of the State concluded
optimistically in the aforesaid Biscarra case that —

WE may yet escape the judgment of history that the Supreme Tribunal was once found wanting in 'moral
vision and abdicated ITS role as an active 'implementing instrument of reform.'

3. It appears that petitioner's claim for medical reimbursement as stated in his letter to the Workmen's Compensation Unit
was for the amount of P20,588.85 (p. 242, WCC rec.). However, the receipts submit by his counsel totalled only P19,880.00,
as follows:

1. Exhs.D, D-1 to D-12

(pp- 243-256, WCC rec.)
Payments to St. Luke's

Hospital P11,750.00
(This includes the amounts
in Exhs. B, B-1 to B-152
and Exhs. C, C-1 to C-1 52,
pp. 258-551, WCC rec.).
 2. Exh. O (p. 598, WCC rec.) 330.00

3. Exh. P (p. 597, WCC rec.) 6,500.00

(Professional fee of
Dr. Gatchalian)

4. Exh. Q (p. 596, WCC rec.) 300.00

(Professional fee of Dr. Quizon)

5. Exh. R (p. 595, WCC rec.) 1,000.00

(Professional fee of
Dr. Damian)

_________
TOTAL P19,880.00

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND
THE RESPONDENT DEPARTMENT (NOW MINISTRY) OF JUSTICE IS HEREBY ORDERED TO PAY PETITIONER THE
SUM OF NINETEEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY (P9,880.00) PESOS AS REIMBURSEMENT FOR
MEDICAL EXPENSES.

Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I maintain my dissent and contrary view in Biscarra vs. Republic and WCC (95 SCRA 248, 282) that "an employee who has
been declared to be totally and permanently disabled and who has received the maximum P6,000. — disability
compensation therefor and has been reimbursed the medical expenses attendant to the injury or illness which rendered
him so incapacitated is not entitled under the Act and more particularly under section 13 to any further payment or
reimbursement tor subsequent medical expenses. The Act has never burdened the employer, be it the government itself,
(and this has always been the official construction and implementation of the Act as heretofore stated with the obligation
of making unlimited payments for subsequent, medical services and expenses for as long as the permanently and totally
disabled employee lives. Not even in the case of the State as employer has such a limitless burden been imposed, for the
cost, thereof would be staggering, if not altogether prohibitive, not to mention that no provision for such an open-ended
and endless obligation has ever been provided in the budget for the half-century that the Workmen's Compensation Act
has been in force. The employer's obligation ceases upon payment of the maximum and fixed P6,000. — disability
compensation for total and permanent disability and the medical expenses attendant thereto (which generally have
amounted to about the same sum fixed as maximum compensation);" and that "the remedy for the plight of the
permanently disabled who were not taken care of by the old Workmen's Compensation Act lies not with the Court but
with the lawmakers. This they can give by simple remedial legislation providing the necessary funds and directing that
the medical and rehabilitation services contemplated and provided for under the above-cited Articles 185 and 190 of the
New Labor Code are made applicable and shall be available to the employees and workers who incurred permanent and
total disability under tile Workmen's Compensation Act. "

I reiterate that in our deliberations, the majority decision in Biscarra "was expressly limited to the government as the
employer and that the question of whether the same ruling of now holding the government as employer liable for
indefinite lifelong medical, surgical and hospital expenses of totally and permanently disabled employees would also
apply to the private employers, many of which could possibly be thrown into bankruptcy should this ruling be also
applied to them (considering the prevailing high costs of such medical expenses), was left open and unresolved " (Emphasis
supplied)

Confronted, however, with the majority ruling in Biscarra holding that the government as employer (as in the case at bar)
continues to liable for the indefinite, lifelong medical, surgical and hospital expenses of totally and permanently disabled
employees (notwithstanding their having been paid the corresponding disability compensation and reimbursed the
medical expenses attendant to their disailing injury or illness), we have to apply the prevailing rule, for as long as the
same has not been overturned and set aside. (Cf. Yap vs. Republic, 45 SCRA 36, 40 [1972]). Accordingly I am constrained
to concur in the result.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Petitioner herein was appointed Municipal Judge ill 194-1. He suffered his first heart attack in July, 1969. Here tired from
the service in October, 1969 and was awarded, in October 1970, by the Workmen's Compensation Commission,
permanent and total disability benefits and reimbursement, of medical expenses incurred.

After approximately six years from The date of his retirement, or in 1975, petitioner suffered a second heart attack. He
incurred further medical expenses consisting of hospitalization and physician's fees in the amount of P19,880. Respondent
Commission denied his claim for further reimbursement.

The question is. should petitioner be entitled to reimbursement for the subsequent medical and hospitalization expenses
that he had incurred?

Although under the ruling of the Court En Banc in Biscarra vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (95 SCRA 248 [19801),
petitioner is so entitled, I am constrained, as a matter of principle, to reiterate my dissent in that case to the effect that
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, a totally and permanently disabled claimant is not entitled, up to his death, to
continued hospital, medical and surgical services, nor to further reimbursement of his medical expenses.

Briefly, the reasons I stated were: 1) under section 13 of the said Act, an employee is entitled to such services and expenses
"immediately ...during the subsequent period of disability or, to immediate medical expenses. 2) Under sections 22 and 29
of the Act, "the employer shall be exempt from all liability under this Act as soon as the compensation has been paid
under this section, saving the provisions of section six of this Act." 3) Throughout the said Act, the legislative intent to
limit payable compensation to P6,000.00 is evident (see secs. 12, 14, 16, 18). 4) The administrative interpretation given by
the Workmen's Compensation Commission to Section 13 of the Act, although never conclusive, is usually given great
weight by the Courts as it is the department charged with the implementation of the Workmen's Compensation Act
(Madrigal & Paterno vs. Rafferty & Concepcion, 38 Phil. 415 [1918]; Asturias Sugar Central vs. Commissioner of Customs,
1 SCRA 617 [1961]).

Relative to the assertion that the Philippines is a "welfare state" (p. 26, majority Decision) to which I also took exception in
my previous dissent in Biscarra and which I reiterate herein, I need mention only the statement of President Marcos,
quoted in the local Times Journal of April 27, 1980, reading as follows:

Speaking during a breakfast hosted by the Hawaii Chamber of Commerce and Industry at the Oahu
Country Club in Honolulu, the President further pledged not to adopt the welfare state policy. This could
render industry bankrupt, he said, stressing that his policy is for a proportionate sharing of wealth
between capital and labor.

I, therefore, vote for the affirmance of the ruling of the Workmen's Compensation Commission.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I maintain my dissent and contrary view in Biscarra vs. Republic and WCC (95 SCRA 248, 282) that "an employee who has
been declared to be totally and permanently disabled and who has received the maximum P6,000. — disability
compensation therefor and has been reimbursed the medical expenses attendant to the injury or illness which rendered
him so incapacitated is not entitled under the Act and more particularly under section 13 to any further payment or
reimbursement tor subsequent medical expenses. The Act has never burdened the employer, be it the government itself,
(and this has always been the official construction and implementation of the Act as heretofore stated with the obligation
of making unlimited payments for subsequent, medical services and expenses for as long as the permanently and totally
disabled employee lives. Not even in the case of the State as employer has such a limitless burden been imposed, for the
cost, thereof would be staggering, if not altogether prohibitive, not to mention that no provision for such an open-ended
and endless obligation has ever been provided in the budget for the half-century that the Workmen's Compensation Act
has been in force. The employer's obligation ceases upon payment of the maximum and fixed P6,000. — disability
compensation for total and permanent disability and the medical expenses attendant thereto (which generally have
amounted to about the same sum fixed as maximum compensation);" and that "the remedy for the plight of the
permanently disabled who were not taken care of by the old Workmen's Compensation Act lies not with the Court but
with the lawmakers. This they can give by simple remedial legislation providing the necessary funds and directing that
the medical and rehabilitation services contemplated and provided for under the above-cited Articles 185 and 190 of the
New Labor Code are made applicable and shall be available to the employees and workers who incurred permanent and
total disability under tile Workmen's Compensation Act. "

I reiterate that in our deliberations, the majority decision in Biscarra "was expressly limited to the government as the
employer and that the question of whether the same ruling of now holding the government as employer liable for
indefinite lifelong medical, surgical and hospital expenses of totally and permanently disabled employees would also
apply to the private employers, many of which could possibly be thrown into bankruptcy should this ruling be also
applied to them (considering the prevailing high costs of such medical expenses), was left open and unresolved " (Emphasis
supplied)

Confronted, however, with the majority ruling in Biscarra holding that the government as employer (as in the case at bar)
continues to liable for the indefinite, lifelong medical, surgical and hospital expenses of totally and permanently disabled
employees (notwithstanding their having been paid the corresponding disability compensation and reimbursed the
medical expenses attendant to their disailing injury or illness), we have to apply the prevailing rule, for as long as the
same has not been overturned and set aside. (Cf. Yap vs. Republic, 45 SCRA 36, 40 [1972]). Accordingly I am constrained
to concur in the result.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Petitioner herein was appointed Municipal Judge ill 194-1. He suffered his first heart attack in July, 1969. Here tired from
the service in October, 1969 and was awarded, in October 1970, by the Workmen's Compensation Commission,
permanent and total disability benefits and reimbursement, of medical expenses incurred.

After approximately six years from The date of his retirement, or in 1975, petitioner suffered a second heart attack. He
incurred further medical expenses consisting of hospitalization and physician's fees in the amount of P19,880. Respondent
Commission denied his claim for further reimbursement.

The question is. should petitioner be entitled to reimbursement for the subsequent medical and hospitalization expenses
that he had incurred?

Although under the ruling of the Court En Banc in Biscarra vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (95 SCRA 248 [19801),
petitioner is so entitled, I am constrained, as a matter of principle, to reiterate my dissent in that case to the effect that
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, a totally and permanently disabled claimant is not entitled, up to his death, to
continued hospital, medical and surgical services, nor to further reimbursement of his medical expenses.

Briefly, the reasons I stated were: 1) under section 13 of the said Act, an employee is entitled to such services and expenses
"immediately ...during the subsequent period of disability or, to immediate medical expenses. 2) Under sections 22 and 29
of the Act, "the employer shall be exempt from all liability under this Act as soon as the compensation has been paid
under this section, saving the provisions of section six of this Act." 3) Throughout the said Act, the legislative intent to
limit payable compensation to P6,000.00 is evident (see secs. 12, 14, 16, 18). 4) The administrative interpretation given by
the Workmen's Compensation Commission to Section 13 of the Act, although never conclusive, is usually given great
weight by the Courts as it is the department charged with the implementation of the Workmen's Compensation Act
(Madrigal & Paterno vs. Rafferty & Concepcion, 38 Phil. 415 [1918]; Asturias Sugar Central vs. Commissioner of Customs,
1 SCRA 617 [1961]).

Relative to the assertion that the Philippines is a "welfare state" (p. 26, majority Decision) to which I also took exception in
my previous dissent in Biscarra and which I reiterate herein, I need mention only the statement of President Marcos,
quoted in the local Times Journal of April 27, 1980, reading as follows:

Speaking during a breakfast hosted by the Hawaii Chamber of Commerce and Industry at the Oahu
Country Club in Honolulu, the President further pledged not to adopt the welfare state policy. This could
render industry bankrupt, he said, stressing that his policy is for a proportionate sharing of wealth
between capital and labor.

I, therefore, vote for the affirmance of the ruling of the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
MARIANO R. BASA vs. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R.
No. L-43098 March 30, 1981 FACTS:

Mariano R. Basa, retired municipal judge of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro suffered a heart attack that incapacitated him
from further performing his function as municipal judge, and which forced him on to retire from the service.
Consequently, he filed a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended and was awarded
permanent and total disability benefits and reimbursement of medical expenses incurred. After six years, petitioner
suffered his second heart attack which proved to be more severe. He filed with the Workmen's Compensation Unit a
claim for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred in connection with his aforesaid second heart attack; but the same
was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is entitled to recover subsequent and further medical expenses for the same permanent and
total disability which had already been the subject of a maximum compensation benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner's second attack, being causally linked with his first heart attack which was already declared compensable
by the Workmen's Compensation, may be the source of a claim for further compensation benefits. Where the primary
injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise
arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own
negligence or misconduct. Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequelae that flow from the primary injury are
compensable. It must be re-emphasized that under the Workmen's Compensation Act, benefits for disability are of two
general types: (1) Indemnity benefits in the form of cash payments which is designed to compensate the worker for the
loss of wages due to disability sustained or for his death; and (2) medical benefits in the form of medical services,
hospitalization, medicine and other matters related to the treatment of the compensable injury or disease. The first,
indemnity or compensation benefits for loss of wages, is limited both as to time and as to amount; while the second,
medical benefits, is unlimited both as to duration and to amount.
G.R. No. L-43425 January 22, 1980

JULIO BISCARRA, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Foresty) and the WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Petitioner Julio Biscarra, former assistant district forester of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a Notice of Injury or Sickness and
Claim for Compensation dated April 4, 1972 with Regional Office No. IV of the Department •f Labor for his ailments of
diabetes mellitus, hypertensive cardiovascular disease, arteriosclerosis and chronic pyonephritis. As a result of his
ailments, he stopped working and retired at age 58 on October 31, 1970. This claim for compensation was not
controverted.

On May 19, 1972, the Regional Office issued an award granting the petitioner P6,000.00 as disability compensation after
declaring him from totally and permanently disabled for labor, with a reservation for him to file a claim for reimbursement of
medical expenses.

Petitioner, pursuant to this reservation, filed with the same Regional Office a claim for reimbursement of medical
expenses. The Regional Office, in an Order dated September 15, 1972, awarded him P7,183.14 as reimbursement of
medical expenses.

On January 3, 1975, petitioner filed another petition for reimbursement of medical expenses. The same Regional Office, in
a decision dated September 24, 1975, again granted petitioner P4,965.41 as reimbursement of medical expenses. A copy of
the decision was received by respondent Republic of the Philippines on September 30, 1975.

Aforesaid respondent then filed on February 4, 1976 a petition for relief from judgment dated January 29, 1976 with the
respondent Commission on the ground that ... due to the volume and pressure of work of the undersigned Trial Attorney
in charge of the case, the decision in question was not acted upon immediately or within the period required for filing a
motion for reconsideration, " and argued that claimant, herein petitioner, is not entitled to further reimbursement of
medical expenses after he had been declared totally and permanently disabled for labor.

On March 10, 1976, the respondent Commission, which obviously took cognizance of the case, treating sub silentio the
petition for relief from judgment, as if the case had been seasonably appealed to it, rendered its questioned "Order En
Banc" reversing the "decision appealed," the pertinent portion of which reads:

The decision dated September 24, 1975 should be set aside. Claimant was declared totally and
permanently disabled and no amount of medical treatment could restore him to his former physical
capacity for labor. It would be unfair on respondent's side to be continuously paying the medical
expenses, as it will be an endless obligation. In fact, claimant was already given the maximum amount of
P6,000.00 provided for by the Act, as amended. Hence, claimant is no longer entitled to any further
amount of reimbursement of medical expenses.

From this decision, petitioner filed this petition.

I. The claim (p. 52, rec.) made by counsel for petitioner in his memorandum [pp. 49-53, rec.] filed on August 6, 1976 and
served on same date to the Solicitor General, that the September 24, 1975 decision awarding reimbursement of medical
expenses was already final and executory when the Solicitor General filed on February 4, 1976 his Petition for Relief from
Judgment with the respondent Commission, is not only undisputed as it failed to draw a word from respondent Republic
which filed its memorandum on August 24, 1976; but is also supported by the records.

No appeal was seasonably filed by respondent Republic allegedly because of the "volume and pressure of work of the
Trial Attorney in charge of the case ... instead a Petition for Relief from Judgment predicated mainly on the aforesaid
ground was filed on February 4, 1976 (or after a period of 127 days from receipt of the decision on September 30, 1975) by
respondent Republic with the respondent Commission; clearly beyond the periods provided in Section 3 of Rule 22 of the
Rules and Regulations of the respondent Commission: within 30 days from knowledge of the decision and within 3 months from
entry thereof. Consequently, with the lapse of the 15-day reglementary period and without a Petition for Relief from
Judgment timely filed with and favorably acted upon by respondent Commission, it had no more jurisdiction and
authority to pass upon the merits of the case as by then the same had become final and executory. (Pantoja vs. WCC, L-
43317, Dec. 29, 1978; Bilbao vs. Republic, 80 SCRA 177-180 [1977]; Quintos vs. Republic, 78 SCRA 547 [1977]; Pepito vs.
WWC 78 SCRA 39 [1977]; Soliven vs. WCC, decided jointly with Malijan vs. Republic, 77 SCRA 518 [1977]; Martinez vs.
WWC 73 SCRA 271 [1976]; Ranada vs. WCC, 73 SCRA 263 [1976]; Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. Reyes, 71 SCRA 655
[1976]).

Moreover, the said petition was not based on a valid ground as WE have consistently ruled that volume and pressure of
work do not constitute mistake or excusable negligence as to warrant relief from judgment which is available only in
exceptional cases (Pantoja vs. WCC, supra; Bilbao vs. Republic, supra; Pepito vs. WCC, supra; Martinez vs. WCC, 73 SCRA
271 [1976]; Ranada vs. WCC, supra). WE deem it appropriate to state what was pronounced by this Court, through the
First Division with Justice Teehankee as ponente, in Bilbao vs. WCC, thus:

Respondent Commission itself (in contrast to the case at bar) had correctly denied similar belated
petitions for relief from judgment by the Solicitor General in the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation cases
finding no merit in the contention that volume and pressure of work had prevented the taking of a timely
appeal as such ground is 'not among those provided for by the Rules of the Commission' and ruling that
at any rate 'the Commission has no longer any jurisdiction to review the decision(s), the same being
already final and executory as held by this Court in the said cases, the lapse of the 30-day reglementary
period from knowledge or notice of judgment within which to avail of the statutory last chance to file
a timely petition for relief from judgment for the grounds and reasons stated in the Rule is fatal.

The Court has consistently adhered to this settled doctrine of finality of judgments that (the) basic rule of
finality of judgments is applicable indiscriminately to one and all regardless of whether respondent
employer be a public or private employer, since the rule is grounded on fundamental considerations of
public policy and sound practice that at risk of occasional error, the judgments of courts and award of
quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law,' and '(I)t is of course beyond
question that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period is mandatory and
jurisdictional and that failure to so perfect an appeal renders final and executory the questioned decision
and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The lapse of the appeal period
deprives the courts of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment.

II. Because of the important significance and/or implications of a pronouncement on the transcendental issue posed
whether a totally and permanently disabled claimant, like herein petitioner, is still entitled to continued hospital, medical
and surgical services as well as further reimbursements of his medical expenses — in relation to the social justice clause of
the Constitution, its protection to labor injunction, and the Ideals and objectives of a compassionate society, a basic postulate
of our welfare State, WE shall also grapple with and decisively resolve the said issue.

Petitioner contends that under Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, there is no limit on the
employer's obligation to reimburse the medical expenses incurred by the employee, for as long as the employee's ailment
is not arrested or cured, the employer's obligation subsists. Consequently, despite payment of P7,183.14 as reimbursement
of his medical expenses, petitioner is still entitled to further reimbursement of P4,965.41 representing additional medical
expenses on account of further necessary treatment of his work connected ailment.

Petitioner also contends that the defense invoked by respondent in its petition for relief from judgment was available
before and during the hearing conducted before the Regional Office and should have raised the same in its pleadings or
during the trial. Having failed to plead or raise such defense, respondent is now estopped from raising the defense in its
petit ion for relief from judgment.

The Office of the Solicitor General, upon the other hand, asserts that it is not liable for the reimbursement of further
medical expenses incurred by petitioner, considering that upon payment of his full disability compensation, the
employer's obligation for further medical services is already terminated or ended.
It is further asserted that to grant further medical expenses (to petitioner who was found to be totally or permanently
disabled for labor and for which disability he has been fully compensated) would be stretching the employer's obligation
under Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. For the unlimited reimbursement to petitioner of further medical
expenses, long after his employment had ceased as he had retired precisely because of his disability, would result in an
endless obligation of the employer and would produce an absurd result that the law does not contemplate.

The law applicable is Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended on June 20, 1964, which provides, in
part:

SEC. 13. Services, appliances and supplies. - Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or
contracted sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer or insurance carrier shall
provide the employee with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and the
process of his recovery may require and that which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his
physical capacity.

The word 'services used herein shall include medical, surgical dental, hospital and nursing attendance
and treatment as well as the proper fitting and training in the use of appliances and the necessary
training for purposes of rehabilitation; 'appliances shall include crutches artificial members and other
devices of the same kind, and the replacements or repairs of such artificial members or such devices
unless the replacement or repair is made necessary by the lack of proper care by the employee; and
'supplies' shall include medicines, as well as medical, surgical and dental supplies. (Italics portions are
amendments introduced by Section 7 of Republic Act 4119 of June 20, 1964).

As will be seen from this law, it imposes upon the employer the obligation "to provide the employee with such services,
appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may require; and that which will
promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity." 'This law does not provide a maximum
either as to the amount to be paid or the time within which such rights may be availed of. To sustain, therefore, the
proposition that petitioner's disability being total and permanent, respondent's liability to furnish him with further
medical and hospital expenses is terminated, would, in effect, qualify Section 13, supra, by adding what is not provided in
the law or subtracting what is therein embodied which is legally impermissible. This would constitute "judicial that This
Court, therefore, shall limit itself to the clear intendment of the law.

Before the 1964 amendment, but as amended by Republic Act 772 on June 20, 1952, Section 13 reads:

Sec. 13. Medical attendance. — Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or contracted
sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer shall provide the employee with
such medical, surgical, and hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury or sickness may
require.

The pecuniary liability of the employer for the necessary medical, surgical, and hospital services and
supplies shall be limited to the amount ordinarily paid in the community for such treatment of an injured
person of the same standard of living if the treatment had to be paid for by the injured person himself.

Under the above-quoted 1952 amendment — prior to the 1964 amendment — WE already ruled that the employer's
liability for medical services subsists during the period of disability or "lasts as long as the employee is sick."

Thus, on October 19, 1961, WE ruled in La Mallorca Pambusco vs. Isip, et al. (L-16495, Oct. 19, 1961, 3 SCRA 242, 244):

We are inclined to uphold this contention of respondent. In the first place, in the order of the Commission
dated November 20, 1955 acting favorably on the claim of respondent it was expressly stated that
petitioner should provide him 'further medical, surgical and hospital services and supplies as the nature
of his sickness may require until it is cured or arrested' Said order became final for lack of protest or appeal
on the part of petitioner. Then we have the document signed by respondent entitled 'satisfaction of
Award or Decision', dated February 7, 1956, which embodies the so-called compromise agreement
entered into between them, and from this document we find that while respondent received the sum of
P5,302.05 in full satisfaction of the award, the same is qualified by the following condition: 'except with
 respect to further hospital or medical treatment, whenever necessary.' Finally, we have the provisions of
Section 13 of Act No. 3428, as amended (Workmen's Compensation Act), which postulate, among others,
that 'during the subsequent period of disability, the employer shall provide the employee with such medical,
surgical and hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury or sickness may require.' These
provisions justify the subsequent award made by the Commission.

It is true that under the Workmen's Compensation Act the amount of compensation to which an injured
employee is entitled in case of disability shall not in any case exceed the total sum of P4,000.00, but this
limitation only applies to the compensation for disability, and not to medical attendance (Sections 12, 14,
16, 18, Act No. 3428, as amended). In fact, this subject is governed by a different section of law (Section 13,
Idem). [3 SCRA 242, 244; Emphasis supplied).

Then on September 31, 1963, WE reiterated the aforesaid ruling in Itogon Suyac Inc. vs. Fruto Dulay, et al. (L-18974, Sept. 31,
1963, 9 SCRA 199, 202-203):

The decision orders petitioner 'to provide him (Fruto Dulay) with continuous medical and hospital
services and supplies until his illness is cured or arrested, pursuant to Section 13 of the Act.' Petitioner
assails this portion of the decision on the ground that Dulay is no longer in its employ and that its liability
for medical care can not extend beyond 208 weeks. There is no merit in the contention Section 13 does not
require employer-employee relationship as a condition for the employer's liability. As long as the illness
was contracted during the employee's employment, the employer's obligation subsists. This obligation lasts
for as long as the employee is sick. The limit of 208 weeks, like the limit of P4,000.00, refers to the liability of the
employer for compensation (Secs. 12, 14, 16, 18, Act No. 3428, as amended) and has no reference at all to the
employer's liability for medical care (Sec. 13) which lasts during the 'period of disability (See La Mallorca-
Pambusco vs. Isip et al., G.R. No. L-16495, Oct. 19, 1961) [Emphasis supplied).

And again, on February 29, 1964, in the case of Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. WCC, et al. (L-19164, Feb. 29, 1964 10 SCRA
420, 423-425) WE ruled:

It may be observed that the law, in imposing on the employer the obligation to provide medical
attendance to an injured or sick employee, unlike those provisions relating to compensation for disability
(Secs. 14, 16, 17 and 18 of Act No. 3428, as amended) does not provide maximum either in the amount to
be paid or the time period within which such right may be availed of by the employee. On the contrary
the law imposes on the employer the obligation to 'provide the employee with such medical surgical, and
hospital services and supplies as the nature of the injury or sickness may require.' The implication is that,
such medical expenses as may be necessary within the work-connected injury or sickness ceases, may be charged
against the employer. In the United States, from where our labor compensation law, is derived the two kinds of
benefits for physical injury or sickness are, like in our law, treated differently. The wage-loss payments based on the
concept of disability are invariably limited in both amount arid duration while payments of medical benefits, that is,
hospital and medical expenses occasioned by any work-connected injury regardless of wage-loss or disability, bury
in the different states of the Union. In twelve states such benefits are unlimited as to duration and amount; in
nineteen, the preliminary limits are subject to extension by the administrative agency for indefinite
periods as the case warrants; in eight, there are fixed limits subject to extension for limited additional
periods; and in nine, there are fixed limits with no provision for extension (Arthur Larson on The Law of
Workmen's Compensation.' Vol. 2 [1952], p. 82). In construing the compensation act's provision requiring the
employer to furnish medical surgical and hospital services .reasonably required to cure or relieve the employee from
the effects of the injury', it was there held that its the absence of express statutory authority, this court is powerless
to place a definite limitation upon the time such medical surgical and hospital services shall be rendered in any
particular case, (W., J Newman v. Industrial Commission, 187 N.E. 137, 353 Ill. 190, 88 A.L.R. 1188). This was
based on the theory that workmen's compensation acts are a humane law of a remedial nature, and wherever
construction is permissible, their language should be liberally construed in favor of the employee. And, this is
supported by the prevailing rule in compensation cases.

Acts not containing any limitation as to the period during which the employer may furnish or pay
for medical surgical or hospital services have been construed as imposing liability on the employer
us long us such services are required to cure or relieve the injured employee from the effects of his
injury' (Florczack v. Industrial Commission, 187 N.E. 137, 353 111. 190, 88 A. L. R. 11 88).
 Thus, an employee who contracted tuberculosis while employed at a state tuberculosis hospital would
where the infection was never arrested from the time it was constructed until his death, was declared
entitled to continued treatment, the governing statute not having limited the time of treatment (Carrol v.
State 64 N.W. 2d 166, 242 Minn. 70). [Emphasis supplied].

In several cases WE granted medical benefits to employees who were not entitled to disability compensation because they
continued working despite ailment. Thus, as late as February 27, 1979, in the case of Corales versus ECC and GSIS, WE
reviewed all such cases, to wit:

A fair interpretation of these provisions allows payment and/or reimbursement of medical expenses to
one who suffered workconnected illness or injury or disability, regardless of whether it results to wage-
loss or not. For said section commands the employer or the insurance carrier to provide the employee
with services, appliances and supplies immediately after he has suffered an injury or contracted sickness, and
daring the subsequent period of disability, even if he continues to report to work until he reaches the
compulsory age of retirement.

In the case of Mondejar vs. WCC, et al., WE granted the claimant, a water meter reader of the NWSA for 26
years since 1948, both disability compensation and medical services, including reimbursement for such
expenses therefor, as well as attorney's fees, in spite of the fact that he continued to work until he
voluntarily retired at age 60 because of the economic demands of his family. as he was the only
breadwinner in the family, although he made leaves with the office and went home to Maasin, Iloilo,
where he consulted Dr. Numeriano Jalbuena and was found to be suffering from the same sickness and
on August 12, 1974, he finally retired from the service (77 SCRA 301-304, L-43154, May 31, 1977).

In Evangelista vs. WCC et al., the teacher-claimant, who continued working notwithstanding her ailment,
until her voluntary retirement at age 61, was granted disability compensation, medical services, including
reimbursement of expenses therefor, attorney's fees and administrative costs (77 SCRA, 497-500, L-43572,
June 30, 1977).

In Ibañez vs. WCC, et al., teacher-claimant, despite her ailment, continued to work until her voluntary
retirement at age 64. She was also granted the same benefits, including attorney's fees and administrative
costs (77 SCRA 501-508, L-44123, June 30, 1977).

In Ilingan vs. WCC, et al., the claimant-employee of the Philippine National Railways was likewise granted
similar benefits although he continued and never stopped working until his voluntary retirement at age
63; because he 'may not wait for his body to waste away or his condition to worsen by applying for
retirement at the age of 65, when he is entitled under the law to an earlier retirement' (79 SCRA 345-347,
L-40174, Oct. 11, 1977; see also Dimaano vs. WCC, et al., L-43553, Aug. 31, 1977, 78 SCRA, 507-511). L-
44063, Feb. 27, [979].

WE further stated in the Corales case, supra, that:

WE need not rely on the cases above-cited; because here in the Supreme Court Court, all Associate
Justices and employees are enjoying the medical facilities in the clinic and the services of its doctors
whenever they are afflicted with a disease or ailment, which does not disable them from performing their
official functions.

The claimant in the case at bar sacrificed and endured his pain and suffering by reporting to work
because he needed his salary to the support of himself and his family, and in the process saved the
government money which would have been granted him as disability compensation if he went on sick or
vacation leave with or without pay. It is rather disheartening to observe that the officials and agencies
designated by the law to implement the social justice guarantee in the Constitution and the social
legislation in favor of the working man, lack the heart and the compassion to accord a liberal
interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Law and to resolve all doubts in favor of the employee as
mandated by both the New labor Code the New Civil Code, and the relevant jurisprudence.
 It must also be noted that disability compensation benefits and medical benefits are covered by separate
sections. Section 13 for medical benefits and Section 14 for disability compensation benefits. And while
Section 14 adheres to the wage-loss factor as the basis of award for disability compensation benefits,
implicit from its requirement that no compensation shall be allowed for the first three calendar days of
incapacity resulting from an injury except the benefits provided in the preceding section, Section 13 does
not. It is not therefore difficult to conclude that wage-loss is not necessary for the award of medical
benefits.

Jurisprudence in the United States shows that 'workmen s compensation benefits fall initially into two
categories: benefits to the workman for physical injury, and benefits to dependents ill case of death.
Benefits for physical injury, in turn, are of two kinds: wageloss payments based on the concept of
disability; and payment of hospital and medical expenses occasioned by by any work- connected injury, regardless
of wage-loss or disability Wolf v. City of Altamonte Springs, 148 So. 2nd 13 (Fla. 1962); Shepherd v. Gas Serv.
Co., 186 Kan. 699. 352 P. 2d 48 (1960); Howerton v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 191 Kan. 449,381 P. 2d
365 (1963). (Larsons Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. 11, 10-1, 10-2),

In the abovecited case of Shepherd, respondent contended that since the trial court found that the
claimant suffered no disability, and inasmuch as he remained in respondent's employment at the same
work and wage as before the injury he is not entitled to compensation. The Supreme Court of Kansas
ruled as follows:

[4] We will start with the assumption that the workmen's compensation act is founded
broadly upon considerations of public policy. Its purpose is to provide protection to
workmen within the limits established by the act. To this end this court is committed, in
many decisions unnecessary to review, to a liberal interpretation of the act in favor of the
employee. ...

While the trial court found that claimant suffered no temporary total or permanent partial
disability since he did not miss any work, the court did not mind that claimant did not suffer a
temporary partial disability. It found that claimant met with personal injury by accident and
ordered that respondent furnish medical and hospital treatment in the sum specified for medical
care necessary as a result of claimant's accidental injury to his back. Inherent in the trial
court's finding is a finding that the claimant did suffer a temporary partial disability by reason of
accidental injury and the same could be corrected by medical and hospital attention. It allowed
compensation by way of medical treatment but inasmuch as a claimant was working at the same
wage made no allowance for compensation in weekly payments. ... (pp 50-51).

The Office of the Solicitor General, however, contends that since the petitioner had been declared totally and permanently
disabled, the liability of the employer to furnish medical, surgical and hospital services ceases, citing 10 Workmen's
Compensation Text, Schneider, page 109, that:

Where the evidence discloses that further medical, surgical, and hospital services would not definitely
improve the condition of an injured employee, the liability of the employer to furnish reasonable medical
and hospital services, as and when needed, ceases (Paulsen vs. Glenn L. Martin - Nebraska Co. 26 N.W.
2d. 11, Jan. 31. 1947, citing Wilson vs. Brown-McDonald Co. 278 N.W. 264, 256, March 4, 1938).

But the foregoing 1947 Nebraska decision was based on the old Nebraska law providing for limited liability. Thereafter,
said law was amended allowing unlimited liability as to time and amount, thus making Nebraska one of the 12 states
providing for such unlimited liability as to time and amount even for total and permanent disability, together with
California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Puerto Rico
and Wisconsin (see Samuel B. Horovitz "Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws", 1948 ed., p. 294; see
also Larson, supra).

From 1948 to 1975, the number of states in the American Union providing for medical benefits which are unlimited as to
duration and amount, has increased from 12 to 43:
 61.11 Statutory summary

An integral and important part of the benefit scheme of all compensation acts is the provision of hospital and
medical benefits. These benefits account for about one-third of the total benefits paid to injured workmen.

In forty-three states such benefits are essentially unlimited as to duration and amount, in one there is a fixed limit
subject to extension for a noted additional amount; in three there are fixed limits with no provision for
extension; and in three, there are fixed only as to silicosis and related diseases.

It is interesting to observe that in the space of about thirty years the number of states providing full medical
coverage has risen from about a dozen to almost four times that number. This appears to evince agreement with the
finding of an authoritative study that 'it is impossible fully to relieve pain and to assure restoration of seriously
disabled persons when medical care is arbitrarily limited Equally important is the convincing evidence that
unlimited medical benefits are economically the soundest benefit; that over the long term they become the least
expensive (Sec. 61.11, Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 1976 ed., Emphasis supplied).

Larson continues to state that "medical benefits ordinarily include not only medical and hospital services, but necessary
incidentals such as transportation, apparatus, and nursing care, which may be compensable even when supplied at home
by a member of claimant's family. Palliative measures are included under the decisions of most jurisdictions, to relieve pain even
after all hope of cure is gone. Rehabilitation is becoming an increasingly important part of the compensation program, under such
provisions supplying additional maintenance and compensation during the rehabilitation period as well as curative and
retraining centers to restore earning power to handicapped workers" (Sec. 61, Larson, The Law of Workmen's
Compensation, 1976 ed., Emphasis supplied).

To repeat, the prevailing interpretation of Section 13 is consistent with the law and jurisprudence of the States of Hawaii,
Minnesota and New York (see Table 14, 4 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 574-10-574.11 [1979]), upon
whose compensation statutes our own compensation act was patterned. It was originally adopted by our Philippine
Legislature in Spanish from the Statutes of the Territory of Hawaii (Nava v. Ynchausti Steamship Co. 57 Phil. 751 [1932];
Fernandez and Quiason, Labor Standards and Welfare Legislation, 401 [1964]; Pucan and Besinga, Comments and
Annotations on the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, 5-6 [1971]).

Section 13 of our compensation law mandates the employer to provide the employee medical benefits immediately after
he has suffered an injury and during the subsequent period of disability "as the nature of his disability and the process of
his recovery may require; and that which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical
capacity", regardless of whether the disability is permanent or temporary.

In Hawaii, the obligation of the employer to provide the employee medical benefits subsists "during resulting period of
disability in Minnesota, "during disability as long as necessary to cure and relieve"; and in New York, "as long as
necessary.

The present jurisprudence in these states sanctions unlimited medical benefits, both in time and in amount.

In Florida, the pertinent compensation statutes require the employer "to furnish remedial treatment — for such period as the
nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require" but "all rights for remedial attention — shall be barred unless a
claim therefor is filed or the commission acts on its own initiative within two years after the date of the last remedial
treatment or - payment of compensation. " Applying said provisions in the case of Platzer v. Burger, 144 So. 2d 507 (Fla.
1962), where the evidence indicated that the claimant would need periodic medical treatment consisting of dilation of the
urethra, medical prescriptions, and treatment for prostatitis for the rest of his life, the court ordered medical benefits for the
lifetime of the claimant.

It is true that "throughout the Workmen's Compensation Act, the intention of the legislator to limit payable compensation
to P6,000.00 is redolent. But this refers only to compensate for loss of income proper or income benefit which is fixed
computed on the basis of the average weekly wages of the claimant; never to medical benefits. For it is likewise pervasive
in the law that the legislature has intended a separate and different treatment for medical benefits as shown by the fact
that it provided for separate provisions for medical benefits. If the intention of the lawmakers were to put a limit to
medical benefits then they would have merged or lumped the two benefits in all the applicable provisions of the law. That
they did not, simply means that they intended a different treatment thereof.

It must be re-emphasized that under the Workmen's Compensation Act, benefits for disability are of two general types: (1)
Indemnity benefits in the form of cash payments which is designed to compensate the worker for the loss of wages due to
his disability sustained or for his death; and (2) medical benefits in the form of medical services, hospitalization, medicine
and other matters related to the treatment of the compensable injury or disease (Fernandez and Quiason, Labor Standards
and Welfare Legislation, 597-1598 [1964]). The first, indemnity or compensation benefits for loss of wages, is limited both
as to time and as to amount; while the second, medical benefits, is unlimited both as to duration and to amount.

The pronouncement in Esguerra vs. Munoz Plama. (104 Phil. p. 582, Sept. 24, 1958) that when an injury is compensable, the
entirety of the corresponding indemnity is compensation over which respondent Commission has exclusive jurisdiction, is
purely orbiter dictum and has no bearing on the issue in this case, because what was therein resolved was the issue of
whether the availability of a remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act precludes the claimant from seeking
damages, moral and exemplary, under the new Civil Code from the persons who directly caused his injury. And this
Court ruled that claimant cannot maintain his action for' damages against the respondents, because he has elected to seek
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, and his claim was being processed at the time he filed this
action in the Court of First Instance" (p. 585). The only thing the Court therein stated with respect to compensation in
response to the averment that compensation is not damages, was: "This argument is but a play of words. The term
'compensation' is used in the law (Act 3812 and Republic Act 772) in the sense of indemnity for damages suffered, being
awarded for a personal injury caused or aggravated by or in the course of the employment. Although computed on the
basis of the weekly wage, such 'compensation' is not the wage itself, since 'compensation' is payable even after the death
of the worker. Certainly, the Compensation Acts did not operate to prolong a contract of the employment beyond the
lifetime of the worker, and entitle him to wages even after his death."

At any rate, whatever significance OUR pronouncement in the Esguerra case has oil the issue at hand, is now diluted by
the subsequent cases of Saulog (1958); La Mallorca Pambusco (1961); Itogon Suyoc (1963) and Cebu Portland Cement Co.
(1964) recognizing the inapplicability of the time limitations imposed on disability compensation or indemnity benefits
under Sections 12, 14, 16 and 18 of the Act, to medical benefits.

The suggestion that the "period of disability" used in Section 13 of the Act refers to the number of weeks fixed in Sections
12, 14, 16 and 18, was already rejected in the aforecited cases. 'Thus, in the IItogon Suyoc case, this Court rules:

The decision orders petitioner 'to provide him (Fruto Dulay) with continuous medical and hospital
services and supplies until his illness is cured or arrested, pursuant to Section 13 of the Act. Petitioner
assails this portion of the decision on the ground that Dulay is no longer in its employ and that its liability
for medical care cannot extend beyond 206 weeks. There is no merit in the contention. Section l3 does not
require employer-employee relationship as a condition for the employer's liability As long as the illness
was contracted during the employee's employment, the employer's obligation subsists. Obligation lasts
for as long as the employee is sick. The limit of 208 weeks like the limit of P4,000.00, refers to the liability of for
medical compensation Sec. l2, 14, 16, 18, Act No. 3428, as amended) and has no reference at all to the employers
liability for medical cure (Sec. 13) which lasts during the period of dissability.

Sections 22 and 29 refer to disability compensation or indemnity benefits; not to medical benefits. Section 22 speaks of
compensation fixed by law referring to the amounts fixed in Sections 12, 14, 16 and 18; not to Section 13 on medical benefits
which have no fixed or definite amount. Likewise, Section 29 speaks of "the same amount of compensation as that
prescribed by this Act", referring to Sections 12, 14, 16 and 18.

It must likewise be noted that the initial text of Section 13 before its amendment by Republic Act 4119 in 1964 imposed a
limitation as to the amount of medical benefits, thus: The liability of the employee- not the necessary medical, surgical,
and hospital services and supplies shall be limited to the amount of ordinarily paid in the community for such treatment of an
injured himself." That such discriminatory and degrading limitation was amended out of the Act is clearly indicative of the
intention of the lawmakers to provide unlimited medical benefits.

In the 1975 North Dakota case of Hedden vs. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, the claimant was permanently
totally disabled and was entitled to separate payment for nursing care in a nursing home ( 189 N.W. 2d 634 N.D. 1971).
In the 1964 Louisiana case of Brown vs. Travellers Ins. Company, It was ruled that medical payments are not compensation
and are not subject to time limits applied to compensation and are not subject to time limits applied to compensation
payments ( 247 La., 7, 169 So. 2d 540, 1964).

In the 1967 Maryland case of Andrews vs. Decker, the claimant required medical treatment 12 years after the last payment
of any type under the original award. The Court held that payments for such treatments were not subject to a limitation
period, and the carrier and employer were liable for the expenses (245 Md. 459, 226 A 2d. 241, 1967).

In the 1960 California case of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation vs. Industrial ECC Commission, the employee sustained an injury
in his back but the evidence at that time was insufficient to make a finding on the need for lifetime medical treatment.
Over five years later, the Commission found him entitled to lifetime medical treatments. Since the second award was
predicated on the first award, the second award was affirmed (183 Cal. App. 2d. 361, 6 Cal. Rptr. 409, 1960).

With respect to palliative measures for incurables to prevent pain and discomfort after all hope of cure is gone, a
substantial majority of jurisdictions allows such benefits. Among them are Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington,
Wisconsin (see Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, 1975 ed., Sec. 61.14).

The New Jersey case is Howard v. Harwood's Restaurant Company, The claimant, as the result of a brutal
assault by a co-employee with a monkey wrench, was unconscious for fifty days and confined to a
hospital for a hundred days. She underwent brain and plastic surgery and tracheotomy. Several setbacks
and further hospitalizations followed, after which she entered a nursing home. Her left arm and leg were
paralyzed. She had a traumatic cataract. Periods of convulsion were frequent. Medical specialists testified
that her condition was incurable. All the treatment, medication, and nursing care could, therefore, be said
to be for the purpose of relieving pain. The Court dealt with the argument based on the literal conjunctive
form of statutory phrase 'cure and relieve in the following words;

The effect given the statute by appellant's construction is that in those cases where the
injury arising out of the employment is most serious, i.e., where the workman is totally
and permanently disabled and without hope of cure, the employer's duty to render
medical care and treatment ceases. Thus, in a situation where the injury results in an
incurable cancerous condition the employer is not obligated to defray the cost of medical
treatment which might ease or mitigate the pain and suffering of the employee, and the
employee is left to his own economic resources in acquiring such care as he may be able
to afford. We will not, in the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary, condone
an interpretation of the act so discordant with its benevolent purposes.

Minnesota, interpreting a similar statutory phrase, simply said that 'cure and relieve' should be construed
to mean "cure or relieve", and went on to hold that physiotherapy, massage, and heat treatments might be
ordered for a claimant who had no hope of cure, if it would relieve his stiffness and discomfort.

Horovitz further states that "the trend is in the direction of increasing the medical liability. Where the legislature has not
fettered the courts, the judges have been liberal in construing medical provisions, Even though medical treatment could
not return the employee to work, or "cure" an employee paralyzed for life, and over $10,000.00 had been spent by an
insurer for treatment, further treatment was ordered to "relieve" the injured worker" (citing Newman Co. vs. Industrial
Commission, supra).

The findings of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, that the petitioner is "totally and permanently disabled for
labor," is no proof that further medical, surgical and hospital services would not definitely improve petitioner's condition,
at the very least, relieve him of his pain or other injurious effect of his ailment. Thus, even assuming that further medical
treatment would not return the employee to work or cure him, further treatment may still relieve him of his pain or its
injurious effects. 'This is the doctrine laid down in W.J. Newman Co. vs. Industrial Commission (187 N.E. 137, June 22, 1933),
thus:

[1-37] This is a novel and exceptional case. Under such circumstances caution is required in the
construction of the particular statute so as not to extend it or affect its general application to the
thousands of other cases not presenting such unusual features. In construing paragraph (a) of Section 8,
since the curing of Nee is admittedly impossible, two principal questions confront us, viz: First, whether the
services rendered or to be rendered are reasonably necessary to relieve the employee from the effects of
his injury; and, secondly, if such services are necessary, whether power is conferred upon this court to say
when such services shall be terminated. Reference to the record clearly shows that Nee is beyond hope of
cure from medical skill. It further shows that the medical, surgical, and hospital services he had been and
is now receiving are not only necessary but also adequate to relieve him, as far as possible, from the
effects of his injury. The findings of the Industrial Commission on this phase of the question are
unquestionably in accord with the manifest weight of the evidence. We are therefore left solely with the
question whether, by a construction of paragraph (a) of Section 8 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
this court can say, not only in this case but in other cases of exceptional nature hereafter presented, that
the medical, surgical and hospital services rendered by an employer where no cure is possible, may with
justice both to the employer and the injured employee, be terminated after a reasonable length of time, to
be determined according to the varying circumstances of each particular case. In other words, can it be
said that the last phrase of paragraph (a) should be interpreted to mean that when an employer has done
that which is reasonably required to cure an injured employee from the effects of his injury and medical
advice indicates that a cure is hopeless, the employer is thereafter relieved from any further liability
under the act, to furnish medical, surgical and hospital services. We cannot adopt and such literal or
strained construction of paragraph (a) as plaintiff in error urges in this case, to the effect that the words
cure and 'relieve' means virtually the same thing. A workman who is cured is, of course, relieved from
the effects of his injury, but one who is incurable, as in the prelent case, may still need skillful attention to
relieve him of pain or other injurious effects caused by his injury. 'This is only the natural and usual
meaning of the words used. It is a construction in accordance with the general spirit and humane purpose
of the act. The Workmen's Compensation Act is a humane law of a remedial nature, and whatever
construction is permissible its language should be liberally construed. City of Chicago vs Industrial
Commission, 29 Ill. 23, 125 N.E. 705: Chicago Cleaning Co. vs. Industrial Board, 283 U. 177, 118 N.E. 989. A
strained construction not fairly within provisions the of the act cannot be supported. Berry Co. vs.
Industrial Commission, 318 111. 312, 149 N.E. 278 'There was no denial by the employer of liability, and it
has been repeatedly held by this court that the furnishing of medical surgical, and hospital services must
be regarded as the payment of compensation under the act. Goodman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 316
Ill. 394, 147 N.E. 394, and cases cited.

xxx xxx xxx

[47] By these successive amendments it may be seen that the Legislature deemed inadequate the original
limitation of eight weeks' time and $200 in amount as to medicine and hospital services, as the
amendment of 1919 enlarged the hospital services from two weeks to extend 'during the period for which
compensation may be payable,' and also removed any financial limit except as to medical or surgical
services. The amendment in 1925 went further by removing all time or money station upon medical and
surgical services, and limited medical, surgical and hospital services to such as might be 'reasonably
required to cure or relieve from the effects of the injury.' In the absence of express statutory authority this
court is therefore powerless to place a definite limitation upon the time such medical, surgical and
hospital services shall be rendered in any particular case. As we have said before, the proof here shows
that medical and hospital services are necessary to relieve Nee from the effects of his injury and that such
services cannot be rendered in his home. There is no proof indicating any malingering or feigned sickness
in this case, or any other circumstance which would enable us to say that further services are not
reasonably necessary to relieve Nee from the effects of his injury.

As the Legislature has seen fit to amend paragraph (a) of section 8 and to successively omit the former
limitations therein imposed upon the furnishing of medical, surgical and hospital services, it would be
nothing short of judicial legislation for this court now, in an exceptional cage, to impose such a limitation.
The limitations of the limitation in question cannot be definitely fixed except by the Legislature, and the
only reasonable interpretation which we are able to place upon it, as said above, is that the employer's
liability continues so long as medical surgical and hospital services are required in order to relieve the
injured employee from the effects of his injury
Indeed, to follow the modern trend of medical care, the direction is for increased medical liability to be the "third phase of
medicine from "preventive medicine" and "definitive or curative medicine or surgery, " to the dynamic concept of medical
rehabilitation, " one principal objective of which is to reduce or alleviate the disability to the greatest possible degree
(Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Law, Samuel B. Horovitz p. 297; Medical Handbook on Workmen's
Compensation and Principles of Disability Evaluation, by Guilatco 1967 ed., pp. 264-265).

The New Labor Code on medical services provides:

Art. 185. Medical services. — Immediately after an employee contracts sickness or sustains an injury he
shall be provided by the System during the subsequent period of his disability with such medical services
and appliances as the nature of his sickness or injury and progress of his recovery may require, subject to
the expense limitation prescribed by the Commission (PD 442).

Concerning rehabilitation services, the New Labor Code likewise stipulates:

Art. 190. Rehabilitation services. The System shall, as soon as practicable, establish a continuing program
for the rehabilitation of injured and handicapped employees, who shall be entitled to rehabilitation
services, which shall consist of medical surgical or hospital treatment, including appliances if they have
been handicapped by the injury, to help them become physically independent.

(b) As soon as practicable, the System shall establish centers equipped and staffed to provide a balanced
program of remedial treatment, vocational assessment and preparation designed to meet the individual
needs of each handicapped employee to restore him to suitable employment, including assistance as may
be within its resources to help each rehabilitee to develop his mental, vocational or social potential (PD
442).

Both Sections 185 and 190 (a and b) do not discriminate between those permanently disabled and those temporarily
incapacitated. Hence, obedience must be accorded to the principle that WE should not distinguished where the law
makes no distinction.

It will be noted also that with respect to medical services, the expenses therefor which must be home by the employer is
not definitely quantified or fixed, but is "subject to the expense limitation prescribed by the Commission." But this
qualification appears to collide with the social justice guarantee enjoined by the Constitution. Even on the assumption
that this power of the Employees Compensation Commission to fix a ceiling on the maximum cost of medical services to
be supplied to the disabled employee is constitutional under the social justice guarantee of the Constitution, WE are not
aware of any such limitation established by the Commission.

It will likewise be noted that under the aforequoted Article 190 of the New Labor Code, there is no fixed maximum
amount or cost for rehabilitation services to be furnished by the employer for the disabled employee. On the contrary, the
law assures that the disabled employee shall be entitled to rehabilitation services consisting of medical, surgical or
hospital treatment including appliances to enable the disabled employee to become physically independent. Further, the
same Article 190 directs the System (SS or GSIS) to establish centers equipped and staffed to provide a balanced program
of remedial treatment, vocational assessment and preparation designed to meet the individual needs of each handicapped
employee to restore him to suitable employment, "including assistance as may be within its resources to help each
rehabilitee to develop his mental, vocational or social potential. " Thus, a disabled employee who is still suffering the pair
and inconvenience of permanent disability and therefore needs medical assistance and hospitalization, is not "physically
independent." Furthermore, the obligation of the System does not end with the attainment by the disabled employee of
physical independence or ability to move around on his own power without agony or discomfort, but extends to such
assistance as may "restore him to suitable employment" which may be different from his previous employment, by reason
of which he met the accident or incurred the ailment, as well as to develop his mental, vocational or social potential. That
vocational potential may also be distinct from his previous employment from which he was disabled. And certainly, his
mental, vocational or social potential does not depend on his physical independence.

In much the same way that euthanasia is not even prescribed as the extreme remedy for what appears to be a terminal
case, WE should not be oblivious to the possibility that medical science may devise somehow, sometime during the
lifetime of the disabled employee, a remedy to banish his pain and to completely rehabilitate him physically, mentally
and socially.

After devoting the best years of their lives to the service of the State, it is only fair and just that the State should take care
of its civil servants until they are relieved completely from the effects of an ailment incurred by reason of their
employment.

Denial of medical benefits to an employee who is disabled permanently, is to accord more rights to an employee who is
suffering only temporary disability or incapacity; because the latter is entitled to continuous medical surgical and hospital
services and appliances as the nature of his injury or ailment may require section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
otherwise known as Art No. 3428, as amended); or to be provided "during the subsequent period of his disability with
such medical services and appliances as the nature of his sickness or injury and progress of recovery may require, subject
to the expense station prescribed by the Commission" (Article 184, New Labor Code, which took effect on November 1,
1974), and with [1] "rehabilitation services, which shall consist of medical surgical or hospital treatment, including
appliances if they have been handicapped by the injury, to help them to become physically independent," and [2] "a
balanced program of remedial fitness, location, assessment and progression designed to meet the individual needs of each
handicapped employee to restore him to suitable employment, including assistance as may be within its resources to help
its rehabilitee to develop his mental vocational and social potential (pars. a & b, Art. 189, New Labor Code).

It should be stressed that Articles 184 and 189 aforequoted do not distinguish between temporary and permanent
disability.

It certainly would be anomalous and would do violence to natural reason and logic as well as it would be an act of
inhumanity to favor the temporarily disabled more than the one deemed permanently incapacitated by illness or injury
contracted or sustained during his employment.

An employee, whether temporarily or permanently disabled, is entitled (1) to continuous hospital medical and/or
surgical services to relieve the painful effects of his disability; (2) to relief from, or alleviation of the humiliating effects of
his injury, like plastic surgery after the first operation that may leave an ugly scar or deformity (3) to be provided with
such facilities, supplies or equipment that will restore the normal use of his senses, faculties, or limbs, such as improved
models of wheelchairs, crutches, artificial limbs or hearing or visual aids; and (4) to rehabilitation of his morale and spirit
by eliminating the psychological effects of the trauma caused by the ailment or injury so that he can join, and be accepted
by, the mainstream of society and lead a normal life.

After the disability benefits have been paid, the disabled employee may remain to be the main support of his family.
Denial to him of further hospital, medical or surgical services would be aggravating the economic distress his family is
suffering.

Because society does not seem to accept him (like a cured leper) his feeling of depression may drive him to commit
suicide or may infect the other members of the family who may in desperation, commit anti-social acts, which would
engender a more serious tragedy for the family.

Then again, to abandon one who is permanently disabled after the first medical treatment, is virtually to consign him to
the scrap heap or to the garbage dump of human derelicts, no longer entitled to the concern and solicitude of the State.
Nothing would be more inhuman, repugnant to the central core of our democratic welfare state as envisioned by our
Constitution and shocking to a compassionate society. As heretofore emphasized, the Government should be the last to
give up hope on the recovery and rehabilitation of those who are now considered permanently disabled. Laboratories all
over the world are continuously testing and searching for the panacea for all ailments that plague humanity. There is
greater possibility that such a cure may be discovered in our time. The right to life rank second to none in the hierarchy of
human rights. The entire world is witness to the amazing survival of Karen Quinlan for the last two years after the life-
giving apparatus was disconnected from her body.

It is likewise possible that from our own flora and fauna may be discovered the remedy for many an ailment or injury.
Many of our plants, fruits and vegetables have been found to cure, prevent or minimize serious cardiac ailments,
hypertension, arthritis, afflictions of the kidney and bladder, as well as deep wounds. Some of our vegetation are likewise
natural disinfectants. Lately, the lowly chichirica and dioscorea have been found to be a cure for cancer (BT or DE May 13,
1978).

God in His infinite wisdom, has provided the remedies for human diseases, injuries and afflictions. The genius of
resourceful man will discover these cures somehow, sometime — sooner than expected.

As the Florida Supreme Court pragmatically opined in the 1950 case of Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. vs. Pittman, "Medicine is not
an exact science ... Moreover, in this modern era of extensive scientific research, it is not possible to say with certainty
today that any disease is incurable for no one knows but that tomorrow will herald a new miracle drug" (49 So. 2d 600,
6603).

A Filipino eye specialist gave the information that blindness due to glaucoma may in time be a thing of the past.

Specialists have provided relief to those afflicted with cardiac and kidney diseases through transplanting healthy hearts
and kidneys for diseased or impaired ones. Social legislations which constrict the rights of labor, should yield to the social
justice guarantee of the new Constitution which stresses that:

Sec. 6. The State shall promote social justice to ensure the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people.
Towards this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of
private property, and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits (Art. II, 1973 Constitution,
Emphasis supplied).

To underscore this obligation of the State, Section 9 of Article II likewise directs that:

The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal
work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers.
The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure,
and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (1973
Constitution, Emphasis supplied).

The conservative view limiting the right of the injured or ailing employee to only one surgical or medical service
prevailing in some States of the American Union should not find adherence in our jurisdiction; because such States seem
to be still dominated by the capitalistic philosophy as they do not provide in their respective constitutions any guarantee
of social justice in favor of their citizens. If, on the other hand, the humanitarian view which sustains the right of the ailing
or injured employee to continuous medical and surgical services until he has been fully rehabilitated, is espoused by the
progressive states of the United States of America despite the absence of any social justice guarantee in their respective
constitutions; a fortiori such compassionate approach should be followed in our jurisdiction, where our Constitution
expressly guarantees social justice "to ensure the dignity, welfare and security of all the people" (Sec. 6, Art. II, 1973
Constitution), while commanding the State to "afford protection to labor" and "assure the right of workers to ... just and
humane conditions of work" (Section 6, Art. II, 1973 Constitution).

The fear that this humane, liberal and progressive view will swamp the Government with claims for continuing medical,
hospital and surgical services and as a consequence unduly drain the National Treasury, is no argument against it;
because the Republic of the Philippines as a welfare State, in providing for the social justice guarantee in our Constitution,
assumes such risk. This assumption of such a noble responsibility is, as heretofore stated, only just and equitable since the
employees to be benefitted thereby precisely became permanently injured or sick while invariably devoting the greater
portion of their lives to the service of our country and people. Human beings constitute the most valuable natural
resources of the nation and therefore should merit the highest solicitude and the greatest protection from the State to
relieve them from unbearable agony. They have a right to entertain the hope that during the few remaining years of their
life some dedicated institution or gifted individual may produce a remedy or cure to relieve them from the painful or
crippling or debilitating or humiliating effects of their injury or ailment, to fully and completely rehabilitate them and
develop their "mental, vocational and social potential", so that they will remain useful and productive citizens.

Finally, the New Labor Code itself commands that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor" (Section 4, Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended). This echoes Article 1702 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that:
 In case of doubt, all labor legislations and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of safety and
decent living for the laborer,

The school of thought that resists the expansion of the social rights of employees and workers is essentially capitalistic,
conservative, reactionary and selfish. The invocation of the due process clause to challenge the validity of social and labor
legislation as violative of the freedom of contract and an undue deprivation of property had long been discarded in
America since the 1937 had long been discarded in America since the 1937 case of West Coast Hotel vs. Parrish (300 U.S.
379) affirming the validity of minimum wage laws. In our country, such a view was repudiated after the 1924 case
of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440). Thereafter, other social legislations followed and survived the constitutional test such as
our own minimum wage law, the 8-hour labor law, and various amendments to the workmen's compensation law, and
employer's liability act, law on maternity leave with pay, and laws for the protection of women and minors employed in
dangerous industries and occupations. Such statutes were held not to trench upon the Constitution, even in the states of
the American Union whose constitutions do not expressly guarantee social justice specifically in favor of the working
class, as heretofore stated.

Then again, the fear that continued hospitalization and medical treatment of employees who are permanently disabled
would constitute an intolerable burden on the employer, whether governmental or private, is more fancied than real.
Firstly, no statistics have been cited to show that there are many permanently disabled and needing continued medical
treatment or hospitalization for a long period. Secondly, the employer can always secure or purchase insurance against
such possible liability.

In the instant case, the government is the employer against whom such liability for continued hospitalization, medical
services and medical supplies, is being raised. The government can always appropriate the necessary funds for the
purpose.

The government has been losing revenues, either through graft and corruption or failure to honestly and fully collect such
revenues. These amounts of which the government has been mulcted by dishonest public officers, private contractors or
suppliers or which the government failed to collect by reason of the criminal neglect or dishonesty of its collecting
agencies, may aggregate hundreds of millions, if not billions, of pesos yearly. The financial exposure of the government to
provide medical and hospital services for its unfortunate employees rendered permanently disabled but still suffering
pain or humiliation or degradation by reason of such permanent disability is practically minimal, or not substantial,
compared to the millions of pesos that the country is losing all these years through graft and corruption. The government,
has failed not only to prosecute many big time tax dodgers, grafters and corruptors but also to recover even a portion of
the unpaid revenues or the amounts embezzled or stolen from its coffers. Until the guilty parties are brought before the
courts the tribunals cannot do anything.

But in this particular case of an employee who served the government faithfully and satisfactorily risking his health and
life and who prays for a second refund of medical expenses amounting to only P4,965.41. this Court has the singular
opportunity to afford him relief from his misery and not to let him deteriorate until his body is finally and totally
decomposed and dissolved into dust. Any gratuity that he might have received, aside from the first compensation for
wage loss and the first refund for hospitalization and medical treatment, would not be even sufficient to maintain his
family for the remaining few years of his life. With his retirement gratuity (if qualified) and disability compensation
already exhausted by now, he and his family are exposed to complete misery. The government or the court that does not
lift a hand to rescue the ailing employee and his family from such abject penury cannot rightly claim to be an agency of
social justice, much less pretend to be compassionate.

We may yet escape the judgment of history that this Supreme Tribunal was once found wanting in "moral vision" and
abdicated ITS role as an active implementing "instrument of reform. "

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND
THE RESPONDENT BUREAU OF FORESTRY OR ITS SUCCESSOR, THE BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, IS
HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY CLAIMANT JULIO BISCARRA THE SUM OF FOUR THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE PESOS AND 41/100 (P4,965.41) AS REIMBURSEMENT FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES.

Fernando C.J., Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

We are called upon to set aside at this late stage respondent commission's decision that under the old Workmen's
Compensation Act (repealed and superseded as of December 31, 1974 by the New Labor Code) the Republic of the
Philippines as employer may not be held liable to pay without limit as to time and amount the lifelong medical, surgical and
hospital expenses of an employee after he had been declared totally and permanently disabled for work and had been paid
fully the maximum P6,000. compensation for such disability and had been reimbursed the medical expenses attendant
thereto in the sum of P7,183.14.

Here, petitioner-claimant after having retired at age 58 in 1970 and having been declared totally and permanently
disabled for work upon his uncontroverted claim and having received in 1972 the full compensation and reimbursement
of his medical expenses therefor, submitted anew five (5) years later (at age 63) in January, 1975 another claim for
reimbursement of medical expenses subsequently incurred by him which the referee granted in the amount of P4,965.41.

I hold that respondent commission properly issued its en banc order of March 10, 1976 setting aside the referee's decision
and ruling in consonance with its consistent official interpretation and implementation of the Workmen's Compensation
Act ever since its inception in 1928 1 that "Claimant was declared totally and permanently disabled and no amount of medical
treatment could restore him to his former physical capacity for labor. It would be unfair on respondent's side to be continuously
paying the medical expenses, as it will be an endless obligation In fact, claimant was already given the maximum amount
of P6,000.00 provided for in the Act, as amended. Hence, claimant is no longer entitled to any further amount of
reimbursement of medical expenses. a-1

1. The key provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act on payment of medical expenses and services is found in
section 13 thereof which principally provides that "Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or contracted
sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee with
such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may require; and that
which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity. 2

This key provision is read in conjunction with section 14 on total disability, section 15 on total and permanent disability,
section 16 on partial disability and section 17 on permanent partial disability. It is readily seen from these provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act that the disability of the employee is classified according to theextent thereof into either
total or partial; and according to the duration into either temporary or permanent. Total disability in turn may be either
temporary or permanent. Where it is temporary, since the disability although total is merely temporary, the employee is
given weekly disability payments much less than the maximum granted by the Act for total and permanent disability (as
well as for survivors' death benefits) in the sum of P6,000.00 according to the formula set by the Act during the temporary
period that the employee is unable to earn wages because of his temporary disability. In such cases of total but temporary
disability, section 13 of the Act requires the employer to defray the medical services and expenses that will promote his
"early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity" and get him back on the job. Hence, the employee is
entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses while his curative treatment lasts.

Upon the other hand, where the disability is total and permanent, the employee's total and permanent disability or
incapacity to perform gainful work is so declared. 3 Thus, the employer's liability for the employee's medical services and
expenses in connection with the injury or sickness that caused such permanent and total disability is ended upon
payment of the P6,000. — maximum lump sum compensation therefor and of the medical expenses incurred in
connection therewith. Section 13 of the Act can no longer be invoked for the payment or reimbursement
of subsequent medical expenses of the employee alter his retirement from work as a result of his total and permanent
disability because it is obvious that such expenses are no longer curative and no amount of medical treatment can restore
him to his lost physical capacity for work or labor.

2. It will thus be seen that an employee who has been declared to be totally and permanently disabled and who has
received the maximum P6,000. — disability compensation therefor and has been reimbursed the medical expenses
attendant to the injury or illness which rendered him so incapacitated is not entitled under the Act and more particularly
under section 13 to any further payment or reimbursement for subsequent medical expenses. The Act has never burdened
the employer, be it the government itself, land this has always been the official construction and implementation of the
Act as heretofore stated) with the obligation of making unlimited payments for subsequent medical services and expenses
for as tong as the permanently and totally disabled employee lives. Not even in the case of the State as employer has such
a limitless burden been imposed, for the cost thereof would be staggering, if not altogether prohibitive, not to mention that
no provision for such an open ended and endless obligation has ever been provided in the budget for the half-century
that the Workmen's Compensation Act has been in force. 'the employer's obligation ceases upon payment of the
maximum and fixed P6,000. — disability compensation for total and permanent disability and the medical expenses
attendant thereto (which generally have amounted to about the same sum fixed as maximum compensation).

The situation is akin to that cited in Republic vs. Amil 4 where the claimant-employee was given an award for 15%
permanent disability and discharged as cured from the Orthopedic Hospital for an injury of his left knee, wherein the
Court said that "the claimant was deemed cured in the sense of requiring no further hospitalization or treatment, since the
15% loss of his leg activity was permanent and could not be improved by further medication." In the same manner, in
cases of total and permanent disability the employer is deemed relieved of any liability for subsequent hospitalization or
treatment since further medication could not cure the total and permanent disability nor restore the permanently disabled
employee to his former physical capacity for work.

3. The cases of La Mallorca-Pambusco, Itogon Suyoc Inc. and Cebu Portland Cement Co. 5 cited in the majority decision holding
the employer liable to pay for the medical expenses of the employees' illness until the same was "arrested and cured"
without limitation as to time and amount all precisely deal with a temporary disability. All the employees-claimants in
said three cases had fallen ill with pulmonary tuberculosis (the only illness expressly mentioned by name as compensable
in the Workmen's Compensation Act 6 ) and therefore section 13 of the Act was properly applied and the employers
required to defray the medical expenses until the employees were restored to the maximum level of their physical
capacity for work. Where the disability is temporary or curable (such as pulmonary tuberculosis) and where the treatment
may restore the employee to the maximum level of his physical capacity and put him back on the job, section 13 of the Act
has been applied accordingly.

But where the employee's disability has been declared total and permanent as in the case at bar (with the petitioner found
to have incurred various ailments of diabetes mellitus, hypertensive cardiovascular disease, arterioscleros and chronic
pyonephritis) and he has been paid the maximum P6,000. — disability compensation and reimbursed all medical
expenses before he was declared totally and permanently disabled for work and he has retired from his employment with
the corresponding retirement benefits, respondent commission properly ruled that section 13 was not applicable and
respondent Republic's liability to furnish him with subsequent medical and hospital expenses had terminated because no
amount of medical treatment could restore him to his former physical capacity for work.

Thus, not a single instance of the numerous cases in our jurisprudence has been cited where the Court has reversed such
uniform and consistent ruling of the commission and instead held the respondent employer liable for lifelong medical
expenses in case of total and permanent disability as the majority would now belatedly hold in the case at bar. Such
petitioners for review of the commission's adverse ruling denying further medical expenses and payments to
permanently and totally disabled employees have generally been denied due course, as per the Court's resolution of
February 27, 1978 in Case L-47179, "Umani vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines."

4. It must be borne in mind that under the Workmen's Compensation Act the employer is not the insurer of the
employee's health nor of his medical needs. This is not to say that the State thereby consigns the permanently disabled to
the "scrap heap or to the garbage dump of human derelicts."

It is generally recognized that it is a prime concern of the State to provide for the medical needs and services of the sick
and for the rehabilitation of the disabled and the handicapped. Precisely in pursuance thereof, the State has established
Medicare which provides for the medical needs and services of the citizenry. The New Labor Code has now done away
with the Workmen's Compensation Act whereby the limited responsibility to provide disability compensation and
medical expenses devolved upon the employer, private and public and in its place has adopted the concept of State
insurance of the employees' health and medical needs and provided for an Employees' Compensation Program
administered by the Government Service Insurance System for public employees and by the Social Security System for
private employees, by means of a compulsory coverage in the State Insurance Fund for all employers (with even one
employee) and their employees not over 60 years of age. (The program has preserved for purposes of compensation or
disability benefits the classification of disability into Temporary Total Disability [TTD] and Permanent Total Disability
[PTD] with [PTD] being defined to include among others [TTD] that lasts continuously for more than 120 days and being
entitled to monthly income benefits under the formula set in the Code not to exceed P12,000.00 nor paid longer than 5
years. At the same time, it has sought to constrict the number of "occupational" or work-connected or aggravated illnesses
considered as compensable by providing a limited list thereof.)

Under section 185 which is the counterpart of section 13 of the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it is provided that
"Immediately after an employee contracts sickness or sustains an injury he shall be provided by the System during
the subsequent period of his disability with such medical services and appliances as the nature of his sickness or injury and
progress of his recovery may require, subject to the expense limitation prescribed by the Commission. 7

Two (2) things stand out in this new provision of the New Labor Code compared to the old counterpart provision, to wit:

(a) The phrase in the old provision (section 13 of the old Workmen's Compensation Act) providing that the employer will
provide for the medical services "which win promote [the employee's] early restoration to the maximum level of his
physical capacity" has been eliminated, meaning to say that the classification between the different kinds of disability
(total or partial, temporary or permanent) for purposes of medical services and expenses has been cast aside. Hence, the
former limitation that totally and permanently disabled employees were not entitled to payment of
their subsequent medical expenses since they could no longer be restored to the maximum level of their physical capacity
for work has been eliminated with the result that the totally and Permanently disabled are now entitled to payment of
such subsequent medical expenses; and

(b) Presumably by virtue of the inclusion now in the new program of such totally and permanently disabled employees
and the uncertain expenses that may possibly be incurred for their medical needs, it is now expressly provided that such
medical services and expenses shall be subject to the expense limitation prescribed by the [Employees' Compensation]
Commission.

In conjunction with the foregoing, a new provision, viz, Art. 190 of the New Labor Code now expressly provides for
rehabilitation services of the permanently disabled, as follows:

ART. 190. Rehabilitation services. — (a) The System shall, as soon as practicable, establish a continuing
program for the rehabilitation of injured and handicapped employees, who shall be entitled to
rehabilitation services, which shall consist of medical, surgical or hospital treatment, including appliances
if they have been handicapped by the injury, to help them become physically independent.

(b) As soon as practicable, the System shall establish centers equipped and staffed to provide a balanced
program of remedial treatment, vocational assessment and preparation designed to meet the individual
needs of each handicapped employee to restore him to suitable employment, including assistance as may
be within its resources to help each rehabilitee to develop his mental, vocational or social potential.

This indeed would discharge the Sta. is obligation and concern for the permanently disabled and handicapped — a
burden which could not possibly be borne by the average employer without the risk of insolvency or bankruptcy. 'This
project of providing rehabilitation services is of such magnitude that even now, five years after the issuance of the New
Labor Code, the Minister of Labor has not yet announced any definite plans for the implementation of this provision to
provide free rehabilitation services to the permanently disabled workers and to establish rehabilitation centers.

5. It should be underscored that during our deliberations in the case at bar whereby the established administrative
interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act to the effect that totally and permanently disabled employees cannot
claim for continuing and indeterminable open-ended medical, surgical and hospital expenses would now be retroactively
set aside, the fear of the possibility that the government would now be swamped with claims for such continuing medical
surgical and hospital services that "would unduly drain the national treasury" as taken note of by the majority 8 was
brushed aside with the statement that the State can and should be able to afford it "as a welfare State." I have grave doubts
about this since no funds have ever been appropriated for the purpose during the subsistence for 50 years of the
Workmen's Compensation Act and the bill could run into enormous amounts that would jeopardize the setting up of the
rehabilitation program and services contemplated by the New Labor Code, supra. It should also be made clear that in our
deliberations, this decision was expressly limited to the government as the employer and that the question of whether the
same ruling of now holding the government as employer liable for indefinite lifelong medical, surgical and hospital
expenses of totally and permanently disabled employees would also apply to the private employers, many of which could
possibly be thrown into bankruptcy should this ruling be also applied to them (considering the prevailing high costs of
such medical expenses), was left open and unresolved.

To paraphrase Justice Malcolm in Vergara vs. Pambusco, 9 we in the court have heretofore given repeated evidence of our
desire and resolve to see a spirit of liberality and social justice characterize the construction and implementation of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. We have always endeavored to interpret the Act to promote its purposes. We have even
gone so far by virtue of the Act's presumption of compensability to declare compensable under the Act practically all the
known forms of human illness and disease that have supervened during the course of employment including leprosy and
cancer in all their various forms. But as Justice Malcolm stressed, "we cannot and should not reconstruct the Act to fit
particular cases" or to retroactively disturb and set aside the official administrative interpretation and implementation of
the Act that has received our sanction for decades.

Especially should this be so when the Workmen's Compensation Act has already been repealed and this Court is now on
the verge of clearing its dockets of the hundreds of compensation cases that flooded us because of the precipitate and
hasty denials of claims by the Workmen's Compensation Commission during its last days of existence in order to meet its
deadline for determination of such claims. The remedy for the plight of the permanently disabled who were not taken
care of by the old Workmen's Compensation Act lies not with the Court but with the lawmakers. This they can give by
simple remedial legislation providing the necessary funds and directing that the medical and rehabilitation services
contemplated and provided for under the above-cited Articles 185 and 190 of the New Labor Code are made applicable
and shall be available to the employees and workers who incurred permanent and total disability under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

I vote accordingly for affirmance of the appealed decision.

Aquino, J., dissent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority decision. The views which have induced me to do so can be expounded as
follows:

1. Exercise of the judicial power.(a)The main responsibility of Courts is to interpret and construe the laws, constitutional and
statutory. They should not legislate except interstitially (16 CJS 728); that is, except to fill in the small gaps left in statutes
by the legislative. But what Courts may fill in into those gaps should still be in accordance with the lawmaker's purpose.

(b) Before the effectivity of the Labor Code, employers could be classified into two groups: the first group being
composed of those substantially affected by the Workmen's Compensation Act (the OLD ACF for short), and the second
group being composed of those whose concern with the OLD ACT is minimal. Among those in the second group are
mainly the professionals: lawyers, accountants, advertising agents, etc. It is conceivable that an accountant, or a lawyer,
can say that: (i) The Supreme Court has construed the OLD ACT so liberally in favor of employees that employers who
have actually faced claims for compensation have in the main been held liable, even when illness strictly speaking, were
not really work connected; (ii) Individual employers so held liable were heavily burdened with increased costs of
operation; (iii) The Government has recognized the plight of employers in the first group who have actually been
required to bear the cost of workmen's compensation and, to alleviate their situation, the OLD ACT was repealed, and the
cost of employees, compensation was distributed among an employers, regardless of whether any of their employees
have suffered work connected injuries or illnesses; (iv) Accountants or lawyers have now to pay employees'
compensation where, before the Labor Code, they never had to bear any expense for workmen's compensation; (v)
Employers in the first group have welcomed the Labor Code in the thought that with the payment of premiums for
employees' compensation, they need not worry about workmen's compensation; and (vi) A result of the present system
could be the relaxation of safety measures on the part of employers.

(c) A dissent is a "voice in the wilderness." Nevertheless, and, on principle, I would still like to express my thoughts on the
issue involved in this case, bearing in mind the primordial requirement that Courts should interpret statutes and should
not construe them beyond the legislator's purpose.

2. Simplication of the Problem (a) This case involves the interpretation or meaning to be ascribed to SECTION 13 of

the Workmen's Compensation Act (the OLD ACT, for short), which provides:

SEC. 13. Services, appliances and supplies — Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or
contracted sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer or insurance where
shall provide the employee with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and
the process of his recovery nay require; and that which will promote his early restoration to the
maximum level of his physical capacity.

The word "services" used herein shall include medical, surgical dental hospital and nursing attendance
and treatment as well as the proper fitting and training in the use of appliances and the necessary
training for purposes of rehabilitation; 'appliances' shall include crutches, artificial members and other
devices of the same kind, and the replacements or repairs of such artificial members or such devices
unless the replacement or repair is made necessary by the lack of proper care by the employee; and
'supplies' shall include medicines, as Well as medical surgical and dental supplies.

In case the employer or insurance carrier cannot furnish the aforementioned services, appliances and
supplies promptly, the injured or sick employee may acquire the same at the expense of the employer or
insurance carrier.

If it is shown before the Commission or its authorized representative that the injured or sick employee
voluntarily refused to accept without justifiable cause, the services, appliances and supplies provided by
the employer or insurance carrier or voluntarily obstructed without justifiable cause the giving of such
services, appliances and supplies, such refusal or obstruction shall be construed as a waiver of an or part
of his rights to the same and in this case the employer or insurance carrier shall be liable only for the
disability of any nature that would have ensued if the injured or sick employee had accepted the services,
appliances and supplies tendered by the employer or insurance carrier Provided, however, That the
refusal as well as the kind of disability that would have been the result of the injury or illness if the
injured or sick person had accepted such services, appliances and supplies shall be set forth in an
affidavit made within twenty-four hours after such refusal by the physician or other person called to
render such services or furnish such appliances or supplies. What shall constitute justifiable cause shall
be determined by the representative of the Commission who may, on his own initiative, determine the
necessity, character and sufficiency of any service, appliance and supplies furnished by the employer or
insurance carrier or acquired by the employee himself at the employer's or insurance carrier's expense,
and order a change of such service, appliance and supplies when in his judgment such change is
desirable or necessary.

No claim for such services, appliances or supplies shall be valid and enforceable against the employer or
insurance carrier unless the attending physician or other person concern within twenty days following
the first treatment, attendance, or furnishing of supplies and thereafter within the same period following
every treatment, attendance, or furnishing of supplies, furnish the employer or insurance carrier and the
Commission a report of such injury and treatment on a form prescribed by the Commission.

The liability of an employer or insurance carrier for the aforementioned services, appliances and supplies
shall not be affected by the fact that his employee was disabled through the fault or negligence of a third
party.
(b) The majority has interpreted or construed the foregoing SECTION 13 as requiring the employer to provide the
employee with "services, appliances and supplies" for recurrences of illness as long as he lives (hereinafter called
LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES).

In this case, petitioner was retired on October 31, 1970, because of diabetis mellitus, hypertensive cardiovascular disease,
arteriosclerosis, and chronic pyonephritis. He was paid P6,000.00 for total and permanent disability and, because of his
confinement after retirement, he was awarded P7,183.14 under SECTION 13 on September 15, 1972. On January 3, 1975,
he had again applied for reimbursement for medical expenses incurred after September 15, 1972. The Workmen's
Compensation Commission disallowed the claim for the P4,965.41, stating it would be unfair for the employer to be
continuously paying the medical expenses, as it will be an endless obligation. It is that ruling of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which is being set aside by the majority which holds that the employer is subject to the
payment of LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

(c) On the other hand, I am of opinion that SECTION 13 should be interpreted (and need not be construed) such that the
employer is required to provide the employee, after the injury or illness has been suffered, with "services, appliances and
supplies", or medical expenses, only for the "hospitalization" immediately ... during the subsequent period of
disability (hereinafter called the IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSES). The factors supporting my opinion will hereinafter
be discussed.

3. Agreements on employer's liability. — Sections 22 and 4, as amended, of the OLD ACT provide:

SEC. 22. Payments in a lump sum. — Whenever the Commissioner considers it most advantageous and
convenient, the liability of the employer as regards the compensation may be discharged totally or in part
by payment in a lump sum or sums as may be the case, under the condition that if the sum or sums to be
paid are less than that fixed by the law, the reduction shall not be more than eight per centum: Provided,
however, That any agreement or contract made for this purpose between the parties shall not be valid
unless it be in conformity with the provisions of this section in so far as the amount of compensation is
concerned, and be made in the form of a public document acknowledged before the justice of the peace of
the locality and attested by two witnesses, one of whom shall be the municipal treasurer or the person
acting in his stead if the agreement is entered into outside the City of Manila; subject to the approval of
the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and if in the City of Manila, before the Workmen's
Compensation Commissioner or any of his authorized representative. Before the acknowledgment of the
instrument, the justice of the peace shall fully inform the injured laborer or dependent person or persons
executing the instrument in his stead, of all their rights and privileges under this Act reading and
translating to them into the vernacular dialect they know in case they do not understand English or
Spanish the provisions of this Act establishing the amounts and period of compensation and other
privileges to which they are entitled by reason of the accident, and shall certify in the acknowledgment
clause that an these requisites have been complied with. The expenses of the acknowledgment of the
contract shall be borne by the employer.

SEC. 29. Agreement on compensation. — In case the employer and the injured laborer or the dependents
entitled to compensation arrive at an agreement concerning the compensation provided for by this Act,
such agreement in order to be valid, shall provide, at least, the same amount of compensation as that
prescribed by this Act and must be approved by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, or any of
his authorized representative: Provided, however, That the employer shall be exempt from all liability under
this Act as soon as the compensation has been paid in accordance with this section saving the provisions of
section six of this Act.

The foregoing provisions, to my mind, run counter to the interpretation of SECTION 13 in the Opinion of the majority to
the effect that an injured workman is entitled to LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES up to the end of his natural life.
Following that Opinion of the majority, Sections 22 and 29 would be meaningless because any and all agreements under
those paragraphs, specially the employer's further liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES, would be contrary to
the provisions of SECTION 13 as construed by the Majority. The lawmaker would not have provided for exemption from
further liability of the employer under Section 29 if, after all, the employer has to assume liability to the injured employee
for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.
4. Insurance coverage. — Section 30 of the OLD ACT requires employers, without adequate "financial ability", to secure
insurance against liability under the statute from an insurance company authorized to do business in the Philippines. The
section, in part, reads:

SEC. 30. Security for payment of workmen's compensation. — Employers shall secure the payment of
compensation and other benefits to their employees or laborers and their dependents:

(1) By insuring and keeping insured the full payment of such compensation and other benefits with an
insurance company authorized to do business in the Philippines; or

(2) By furnishing satisfactory proof to the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation of their financial ability to
shoulder such liabilities directly in accordance with paragraph one hereof. An employer securing
payment of such liabilities in accordance with this paragraph shall be known as self insurer.

The section assumes that compensation should be paid by a domestic insurance company, the solvency of which is more
or less assured; rather than the employer who might turn out to be insolvent. The provision seeks to protect the employee.
The exception covers employers who can furnish satisfactory proof of their financial ability to shoulder the payment of
compensation. The important factor to note is that employers who take out insurance from domestic insurance companies
are those who cannot prove their financial ability to shoulder liabilities under the OLD ACT.

An insurance policy, as a practical measure, cannot ordinarily be obtained by an employer to cover himself against liability
For LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES under the SECTION as construed by the majority. If an insurance Company
should agree to a policy covering the employer's undeterminable and unlimited liability under SECTION 13 for
LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES; the premium will be prohibitive, and would not be within the means of the employer
to pay because his application for the insurance policy presupposes that he is not possessed with "financial ability to
shoulder" the liabilities for compensation. That result could not have been the intention of the legislator in requiring
employers to secure insurance coverage. SECTION 13 should not be construed to produce inequitable situations, which
would be the result under the ruling in the majority Opinion.

Under the present Labor Code, employees' compensation has to come from a state insurance fund to which employers
pay insurance premiums. Even the insurance coverage under the present Labor Code cannot support unlimited and
undeterminable liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES which the majority would like insurance companies under
the OLD ACT to bear in respect of unlimited and undeterminable liability under SECTION 13, Thus, Article 185 of the
Labor Code provides:

Art. 185. Medical services. — Immediately after an employee contracts sickness or sustains an injury, he
shall be provided by the System during the subsequent period of his disability with such medical services
and appliances as the nature of his sickness or injury and progress of his recovery may require, subject to
the expense limitation prescribed by the Commission.

The foregoing paragraph is rather similar to the first paragraph of SECTION 13. It will be seen that the Labor Code,
although it knows the enormity of the state insurance fund, will not allow LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES. If the
liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES under the OLD ACT is assessed from the point of view of a single
employer, or of a single domestic insurance company, whose resources would be fractions compared to the state
insurance fund, then it should not be difficult to conclude that it could not have been the legislator's intention in
SECTION 13 to have an individual employer liable for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES, taking account of his very
limited means vis-a-vis the state insurance fund.

5. SECTION 13 and Article 185 of the Labor Code. — It can be presumed that, in regards to the Labor Code, the lawmaker
knew of the construction made by this Court of SECTION 13. The lawmaker must have considered that construction
unwarranted and impractical and, in transposing SECTION 13 as Article 185 of the Labor Code, he added the clause to
the Article "subject to the expense limitation prescribed by the Commission". As I have said before, it is entirely
conceivable that the Government has realized that the OLD ACT has been construed by this Court beyond the
intendment of the legislative, and that was the motivation for the repeal of the OLD ACT and its replacement by the
provisions on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund incorporated into the Labor Code.
6. The general purpose of the OLD ACT. — Throughout the OLD ACT the intention of the legislator to limit payable
compensation to P6,000.00 is redolent. The following are the relevant provisions:

SEC. 12. Sundry provisions regarding death benefits. — in computing death benefits, the average weekly
wages of the deceased employee shall not be reckoned at more than fifty pesos nor less than fourteen
pesos; but the total weekly compensation shall not in any case exceed the average weekly wages
computed in accordance with Section nineteen of this Act, nor shall the compensation paid in any case exceed
in its aggregate the sum of six thousand pesos.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 14.

In the case of an employee whose average weekly wages are less than fourteen pesos per week, the
weekly compensation shall be the entire amount of such average weekly wages; but if the disability is
permanent, the compensation shall be fourteen pesos in such case. In the event that the total disability
begins after a period of partial usability, the amount of compensation due for the latter and for any other
disability shall not exceed the maximum amount of six thousand pesos.

SEC. 16. Partial disability. — In case the injury or sickness causes partial disability for labor, the
employer, during such disability and except as hereinafter provided, shall pay to the injured or sick
employee for a period of not to exceed two hundred and eight weeks, beginning with the first day of
disability, a weekly compensation equal to fifty per centum of the difference between his average weekly
wages before the accident and the weekly wages which he could probably earn thereafter; but not more
than eighteen pesos per week. The weekly payments shall not in any case continue after the disability has
ceased, and in case partial disability sets in after a period of total disability, such period of total disability,
shall be deducted from the total period of two hundred and eight weeks and the amount of the
compensation paid shall not in any case be in excess of the total sum of six thousand pesos. No award for
disability shall be made before a lapse of two weeks counted from the date of the injury.

SEC. 18.

In case of an injury producing a serious disfigurement of the face or head, the Commission may, at the
request of an interested party, determine and award such compensation as may seem fair and proper in
view of the nature of the disfigurement, but which shall not exceed six thousand pesos.

The total compensation prescribed in this and the next preceding section and the total
compensation prescribed in Sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act, shalt together, not exceed the sum of
six thousand pesos: Provided, however, That after the payment has been made for the period specified by
the Act in each case, the Workmen's Compensation Commission may from time to time cause the examination
of the condition of the disabled laborer, with a view to extending, if necessary, the period of
compensation which shall not however, exceed the said amount of six thousand pesos.

It has to be conceded that medical expenses under SECTION 13 can be in addition to the P6,000.00 limit But the medical
expenses should be considered only as a supplement and they should not be much more than a small fraction of the
P6,000.00 limit. That is how the purpose of the legislator has to be assessed. It cannot be that the amount of expenses
under SECTION 13 can exceed P6,000.00, which could easily be the case with LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES. The
supplement should not exceed the main or principal.

7. Time frame of SECTION 13. The first paragraph of SECTION 13 reads:

SEC. 13. Services, appliances and supplies. — Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or
contracted sickness and

During the subsequent period of disability.

The employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of
his disability and the process of his recovery may require; and

That which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity.

(a) The word "immediately". The relevant clause in connection with the word is: "Immediately after an employee has
suffered an injury or contracted sickness ... the employer of insurance carrier shall provide the employee with such
services." It is rather clear to me that, if the services have to be provided immediately after the injury or illness and have to
be paid, SECTION 13 has only provided for immediate medical expenses, and not for LIFELONG MEDICAL
EXPENSES. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius.

(b) The "period of disability". The phrase "period of disability" is also used in Section 20 of the OLD ACT as follows:

SEC. 20. Voluntary payments. — Payments made by the employer or his insurer to the injured laborer
during the period of his disability or to his dependents, which under the provisions hereof were not due or
payable when they were made, shall, upon being duly established, by agreement between the parties
concerned, a certified copy of which shall be sent to the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, or
subject to the decision of the Commissioner, be deducted from the sum to be paid as compensation:
Provided, That in case of disability, the deduction shall be made by reducing the period of time during
which the compensation is to be paid, and not by reducing the weekly payment to be made in accordance
with sections fourteen, fifteen, sixteen and seventeen of this Act.

It should be rather clear that the "period of disability" used above refers to the weeks envisaged in Sections 14, 16 and 17
during which weekly compensations are payable. The said clause "Period of disability" cannot refer to a period after
the weekly compensations have been completed. The general rule is that words and clauses used several times in a statute
should have the same meaning. Hence, the clause "period of disability" in SECTION 13 cannot be up to the end of the
natural life of an injured employee, or after the termination of the weeks when weekly compensations have to be paid.

Moreover, "period of disability", as used in the OLD ACT, inclusive of its use in SECTION 13, must be coupled with
employment. If a person is no longer employed, he cannot have a "Period of disability". Under the majority Opinion
upholding the employer's liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES, the employer's payments will no longer be
during "Period of disability". It should be clear, therefore, that SECTION 13, according to the legislative purpose, is not to
make medical expenses payable after an employment has terminated. If that is so, then LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES
should be held as not within the legislative purpose in SECTION 13.

(c) Singularity of "period". In the term "period of disability", the word "period" is in the singular. This is further proof that
the legislative intendment was that medical expenses will be paid for a single "period". Hence, several "periods" of
disability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES cannot be deemed within the intendment of the legislator in SECTION
13.

(d) The word "subsequent". Under the majority Opinion, SECTION 13 is being construed as applicable to all subsequent
periods of disability; That is, if an employee is hospitalized immediately after contracting compensable illness, say in
1972, and is again hospitalized in 1975, as happened in this case, the 1975 hospitalization is still a subsequent period of
disability. A similar question as to what is "subsequent" was resolved in McIntosh v. S.A. Heally Construction Company,
236 N.Y.S. 2d 189. In that case, it was held, without reference to cause, that a second disablement was not a "subsequent"
disability to the first, for purposes of entitling an employer to reimbursement from a special disability fund. Similarly,
under SECTION 13, a second hospitalization should not be deemed to be a "subsequent period of disability".

8. Administrative Interpretation. — In this case, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has ruled that when an injured
employee has been totally and permanently disabled, it would be unfair for the employer to be continuously paying his
medical expenses as it will be an endless obligation. That ruling of the Commission is against the position taken by the
majority in regards to the meaning of SECTION 13 and is being set aside. The Commission has actually interpreted
SECTION 13 as not providing for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

In rejecting the Opinion of the Commission, the majority has not given due consideration to the doctrine enunciated in the
following cases:
 This contemporaneous construction is highly persuasive:

The practice and interpretive regulations by officers, administrative agencies, departmental heads and
other officials charged with the duty of administering and enforcing a statute will carry great weight in
determining the operation of a statute. (2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 516).

In the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who are
called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very
great respect. (Edwards Lessee vs. Darby 12 Wheat. 206,210).

Commenting on the above rule, Erwin N. Criswold of the Harvard Law School, wrote:

Another reason why contemporaneousness is an important factor is its bearing on the need for certainty
and predictability in our tax laws. This is where the motion of the Court's function in the scheme of
judicial tax administration becomes important. A statute is enacted. A regulation is issued. It will in the
normal course of events, be five or six years, and very likely more, before the construction of the statute,
in the light of the regulation, will come before the Supreme Court. In the meantime, people will go on
living, and transactions will be conducted under the statute. perhaps all the transactions that are ever to
be conducted under the statute. Thus, it seems that a strong argument can be made in favor of giving
very heavy weight to a contemporaneous regulation, so that taxpayers may rely upon it and have some
certainty that it will be followed by the courts. (A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 Harvard Law
Review, p. 398, 406). (Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil., 580).

Opinions and rulings of officials of the Government called upon to execute or implement administrative
laws command much respect and weight (Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173; Grapilon v. Mun. Council of
Carigara L-12347, May 30, 1961; Tan v. Municipality, 7 SCRA 887, 892).

Great weight should be given to the construction placed upon a revenue law, whose meaning is doubtful,
by the department charged with its execution. (Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38
Phil., 415).

Giving weight to administrative interpretation of statutes is salutary, and is being implemented by recent grants, for
instances, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to the Bureau of Mines, and to the National Housing
Administration to resolve controversies in regards to matters within their jurisdictions. The administrative agencies, more
than the Courts, can better resolve questions as to matters which are their concern. In a sense, the Commission is the
"expert" in the field of workmen's compensation and, because it is not palpably wrong, its opinion should be upheld.

9. Article 298, Labor Code. — That SECTION 13 of the OLD ACT was not meant to provide for LIFELONG MEDICAL
EXPENSES is also shown in the following Article 298 of the Labor Code:

ART. 298. Continuation of insurance policies and indemnity bonds. — All workmen's compensation
insurance policies and indemnity bonds for self-insured employers existing upon the effectivity of this
Code shall remain in force and effect until the expiration dates of such policies or the lapse of the period
as such bonds, as the case may be, but in no case beyond December 31, 1974. Claims may be filed against
the insurance carriers and/or self-insured employers for causes of action which accrued during the
existence of said policies or authority to self-insured.

It should be plain that the Labor Code assumes that insurance policies and indemnity bonds of self-insured employers
were not intended to cover LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES; otherwise, the Labor Code would not have provided for
the termination of such policies and indemnity bonds after December 31, 1974.

If a workmen's compensation insurance policy should be analyzed, it will most likely be held that neither employer nor
insurer had intended to insure the employer against LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES; and that fact can be established
through the actuarial studies made for the determination of the premium. As previously stated, the premium for a policy
covering LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES would be prohibitive. it can be presumed that, in regards to the Labor Code,
the lawmaker knew the extent of coverage of insurance policies under the OLD ACT, and that the policies did not cover
LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES. The invalidation of the policies by December 31, 1974 would show that the Labor
Code has not envisaged that, under the OLD ACT, SECTION 13 provides for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

10. Developing and developed haves and have-nots. The majority Opinion is replete with citations from the United. States of
America, a highly developed and have country. The citations show that many States in that country, apparently the
majority, provide for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES in their Workmen's Compensation Acts. However, there are still
some States, even in that well developed have country, which adhere to IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSE. So, if we
have to follow foreign patterns, the Philippines can still have the option of joining the minority of the American States in
living with IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSE.

Our country is only a developing one, and it is definitely a have not. The query is whether we should keep up with the
Joneses and through Court action establish the LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES plan; or, within our still developing
economy, abide with the minority of American States with the IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSE plan.

To me there is only one choice. As a developing have not nation, we should not emulate the highly developed have States
across the Pacific who provide for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

11. The Welfare State. (a) I cannot quite agree with the majority Opinion that ours is a welfare state. Whether we are a
welfare state or not could be a constitutional question which need not be resolved in this case at all.

(b) Welfare programs are, indeed, a major function in virtually every government. However, the serious burden on the
treasury, such as that of the British, which has one of the more comprehensive of all social security programs, is already
felt. (The Dynamics of Modern Government, Meehan Roche & Stedman, p. 349; 354-355). While in the United States, the
welfare system has posed a "real problem" in that marginally employed people see their jobs as 'no better than welfare'
and that 'continuing on welfare' is deemed by them as 'a very reasonable substitution for working' (see U.S. News &
World Report, January 22, 1979, p. 22). I doubt it very much whether we are desirous of duplicating this situation in the
Philippines.

The foregoing are the reasons for my dissent notwithstanding the relatively minimal amount involved.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

We are called upon to set aside at this late stage respondent commission's decision that under the old Workmen's
Compensation Act (repealed and superseded as of December 31, 1974 by the New Labor Code) the Republic of the
Philippines as employer may not be held liable to pay without limit as to time and amount the lifelong medical, surgical and
hospital expenses of an employee after he had been declared totally and permanently disabled for work and had been paid
fully the maximum P6,000. compensation for such disability and had been reimbursed the medical expenses attendant
thereto in the sum of P7,183.14.

Here, petitioner-claimant after having retired at age 58 in 1970 and having been declared totally and permanently
disabled for work upon his uncontroverted claim and having received in 1972 the full compensation and reimbursement
of his medical expenses therefor, submitted anew five (5) years later (at age 63) in January, 1975 another claim for
reimbursement of medical expenses subsequently incurred by him which the referee granted in the amount of P4,965.41.

I hold that respondent commission properly issued its en banc order of March 10, 1976 setting aside the referee's decision
and ruling in consonance with its consistent official interpretation and implementation of the Workmen's Compensation
Act ever since its inception in 1928 1 that "Claimant was declared totally and permanently disabled and no amount of medical
treatment could restore him to his former physical capacity for labor. It would be unfair on respondent's side to be continuously
paying the medical expenses, as it will be an endless obligation In fact, claimant was already given the maximum amount
of P6,000.00 provided for in the Act, as amended. Hence, claimant is no longer entitled to any further amount of
reimbursement of medical expenses. a-1

1. The key provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act on payment of medical expenses and services is found in
section 13 thereof which principally provides that "Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or contracted
sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee with
such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may require; and that
which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity. 2

This key provision is read in conjunction with section 14 on total disability, section 15 on total and permanent disability,
section 16 on partial disability and section 17 on permanent partial disability. It is readily seen from these provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act that the disability of the employee is classified according to theextent thereof into either
total or partial; and according to the duration into either temporary or permanent. Total disability in turn may be either
temporary or permanent. Where it is temporary, since the disability although total is merely temporary, the employee is
given weekly disability payments much less than the maximum granted by the Act for total and permanent disability (as
well as for survivors' death benefits) in the sum of P6,000.00 according to the formula set by the Act during the temporary
period that the employee is unable to earn wages because of his temporary disability. In such cases of total but temporary
disability, section 13 of the Act requires the employer to defray the medical services and expenses that will promote his
"early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity" and get him back on the job. Hence, the employee is
entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses while his curative treatment lasts.

Upon the other hand, where the disability is total and permanent, the employee's total and permanent disability or
incapacity to perform gainful work is so declared. 3 Thus, the employer's liability for the employee's medical services and
expenses in connection with the injury or sickness that caused such permanent and total disability is ended upon
payment of the P6,000. — maximum lump sum compensation therefor and of the medical expenses incurred in
connection therewith. Section 13 of the Act can no longer be invoked for the payment or reimbursement
of subsequent medical expenses of the employee alter his retirement from work as a result of his total and permanent
disability because it is obvious that such expenses are no longer curative and no amount of medical treatment can restore
him to his lost physical capacity for work or labor.

2. It will thus be seen that an employee who has been declared to be totally and permanently disabled and who has
received the maximum P6,000. — disability compensation therefor and has been reimbursed the medical expenses
attendant to the injury or illness which rendered him so incapacitated is not entitled under the Act and more particularly
under section 13 to any further payment or reimbursement for subsequent medical expenses. The Act has never burdened
the employer, be it the government itself, land this has always been the official construction and implementation of the
Act as heretofore stated) with the obligation of making unlimited payments for subsequent medical services and expenses
for as tong as the permanently and totally disabled employee lives. Not even in the case of the State as employer has such
a limitless burden been imposed, for the cost thereof would be staggering, if not altogether prohibitive, not to mention that
no provision for such an open ended and endless obligation has ever been provided in the budget for the half-century
that the Workmen's Compensation Act has been in force. 'the employer's obligation ceases upon payment of the
maximum and fixed P6,000. — disability compensation for total and permanent disability and the medical expenses
attendant thereto (which generally have amounted to about the same sum fixed as maximum compensation).

The situation is akin to that cited in Republic vs. Amil 4 where the claimant-employee was given an award for 15%
permanent disability and discharged as cured from the Orthopedic Hospital for an injury of his left knee, wherein the
Court said that "the claimant was deemed cured in the sense of requiring no further hospitalization or treatment, since the
15% loss of his leg activity was permanent and could not be improved by further medication." In the same manner, in
cases of total and permanent disability the employer is deemed relieved of any liability for subsequent hospitalization or
treatment since further medication could not cure the total and permanent disability nor restore the permanently disabled
employee to his former physical capacity for work.

3. The cases of La Mallorca-Pambusco, Itogon Suyoc Inc. and Cebu Portland Cement Co. 5 cited in the majority decision holding
the employer liable to pay for the medical expenses of the employees' illness until the same was "arrested and cured"
without limitation as to time and amount all precisely deal with a temporary disability. All the employees-claimants in
said three cases had fallen ill with pulmonary tuberculosis (the only illness expressly mentioned by name as compensable
in the Workmen's Compensation Act 6 ) and therefore section 13 of the Act was properly applied and the employers
required to defray the medical expenses until the employees were restored to the maximum level of their physical
capacity for work. Where the disability is temporary or curable (such as pulmonary tuberculosis) and where the treatment
may restore the employee to the maximum level of his physical capacity and put him back on the job, section 13 of the Act
has been applied accordingly.

But where the employee's disability has been declared total and permanent as in the case at bar (with the petitioner found
to have incurred various ailments of diabetes mellitus, hypertensive cardiovascular disease, arterioscleros and chronic
pyonephritis) and he has been paid the maximum P6,000. — disability compensation and reimbursed all medical
expenses before he was declared totally and permanently disabled for work and he has retired from his employment with
the corresponding retirement benefits, respondent commission properly ruled that section 13 was not applicable and
respondent Republic's liability to furnish him with subsequent medical and hospital expenses had terminated because no
amount of medical treatment could restore him to his former physical capacity for work.

Thus, not a single instance of the numerous cases in our jurisprudence has been cited where the Court has reversed such
uniform and consistent ruling of the commission and instead held the respondent employer liable for lifelong medical
expenses in case of total and permanent disability as the majority would now belatedly hold in the case at bar. Such
petitioners for review of the commission's adverse ruling denying further medical expenses and payments to
permanently and totally disabled employees have generally been denied due course, as per the Court's resolution of
February 27, 1978 in Case L-47179, "Umani vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines."

4. It must be borne in mind that under the Workmen's Compensation Act the employer is not the insurer of the
employee's health nor of his medical needs. This is not to say that the State thereby consigns the permanently disabled to
the "scrap heap or to the garbage dump of human derelicts. "

It is generally recognized that it is a prime concern of the State to provide for the medical needs and services of the sick
and for the rehabilitation of the disabled and the handicapped. Precisely in pursuance thereof, the State has established
Medicare which provides for the medical needs and services of the citizenry. The New Labor Code has now done away
with the Workmen's Compensation Act whereby the limited responsibility to provide disability compensation and
medical expenses devolved upon the employer, private and public and in its place has adopted the concept of State
insurance of the employees' health and medical needs and provided for an Employees' Compensation Program
administered by the Government Service Insurance System for public employees and by the Social Security System for
private employees, by means of a compulsory coverage in the State Insurance Fund for all employers (with even one
employee) and their employees not over 60 years of age. (The program has preserved for purposes of compensation or
disability benefits the classification of disability into Temporary Total Disability [TTD] and Permanent Total Disability
[PTD] with [PTD] being defined to include among others [TTD] that lasts continuously for more than 120 days and being
entitled to monthly income benefits under the formula set in the Code not to exceed P12,000.00 nor paid longer than 5
years. At the same time, it has sought to constrict the number of "occupational" or work-connected or aggravated illnesses
considered as compensable by providing a limited list thereof.)

Under section 185 which is the counterpart of section 13 of the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it is provided that
"Immediately after an employee contracts sickness or sustains an injury he shall be provided by the System during
the subsequent period of his disability with such medical services and appliances as the nature of his sickness or injury and
progress of his recovery may require, subject to the expense limitation prescribed by the Commission. 7

Two (2) things stand out in this new provision of the New Labor Code compared to the old counterpart provision, to wit:

(a) The phrase in the old provision (section 13 of the old Workmen's Compensation Act) providing that the employer will
provide for the medical services "which win promote [the employee's] early restoration to the maximum level of his
physical capacity" has been eliminated, meaning to say that the classification between the different kinds of disability
(total or partial, temporary or permanent) for purposes of medical services and expenses has been cast aside. Hence, the
former limitation that totally and permanently disabled employees were not entitled to payment of
their subsequent medical expenses since they could no longer be restored to the maximum level of their physical capacity
for work has been eliminated with the result that the totally and Permanently disabled are now entitled to payment of
such subsequent medical expenses; and
(b) Presumably by virtue of the inclusion now in the new program of such totally and permanently disabled employees
and the uncertain expenses that may possibly be incurred for their medical needs, it is now expressly provided that such
medical services and expenses shall be subject to the expense limitation prescribed by the [Employees' Compensation]
Commission.

In conjunction with the foregoing, a new provision, viz, Art. 190 of the New Labor Code now expressly provides for
rehabilitation services of the permanently disabled, as follows:

ART. 190. Rehabilitation services. — (a) The System shall, as soon as practicable, establish a continuing
program for the rehabilitation of injured and handicapped employees, who shall be entitled to
rehabilitation services, which shall consist of medical, surgical or hospital treatment, including appliances
if they have been handicapped by the injury, to help them become physically independent.

(b) As soon as practicable, the System shall establish centers equipped and staffed to provide a balanced
program of remedial treatment, vocational assessment and preparation designed to meet the individual
needs of each handicapped employee to restore him to suitable employment, including assistance as may
be within its resources to help each rehabilitee to develop his mental, vocational or social potential.

This indeed would discharge the Sta. is obligation and concern for the permanently disabled and handicapped - a burden
which could not possibly be borne by the average employer without the risk of insolvency or bankruptcy. 'This project of
providing rehabilitation services is of such magnitude that even now, five years after the issuance of the New Labor Code,
the Minister of Labor has not yet announced any definite plans for the implementation of this provision to provide free
rehabilitation services to the permanently disabled workers and to establish rehabilitation centers.

5. It should be underscored that during our deliberations in the case at bar whereby the established administrative
interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act to the effect that totally and permanently disabled employees cannot
claim for continuing and indeterminable open-ended medical, surgical and hospital expenses would now be retroactively
set aside, the fear of the possibility that the government would now be swamped with claims for such continuing medical
surgical and hospital services that "would unduly drain the national treasury" as taken note of by the majority 8 was
brushed aside with the statement that the State can and should be able to afford it "as a welfare State." I have grave doubts
about this since no funds have ever been appropriated for the purpose during the subsistence for 50 years of the
Workmen's Compensation Act and the bill could run into enormous amounts that would jeopardize the setting up of the
rehabilitation program and services contemplated by the New Labor Code, supra. It should also be made clear that in our
deliberations, this decision was expressly limited to the government as the employer and that the question of whether the
same ruling of now holding the government as employer liable for indefinite lifelong medical, surgical and hospital
expenses of totally and permanently disabled employees would also apply to the private employers, many of which could
possibly be thrown into bankruptcy should this ruling be also applied to them (considering the prevailing high costs of
such medical expenses), was left open and unresolved.

To paraphrase Justice Malcolm in Vergara vs. Pambusco, 9 we in the court have heretofore given repeated evidence of our
desire and resolve to see a spirit of liberality and social justice characterize the construction and implementation of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. We have always endeavored to interpret the Act to promote its purposes. We have even
gone so far by virtue of the Act's presumption of compensability to declare compensable under the Act practically all the
known forms of human illness and disease that have supervened during the course of employment including leprosy and
cancer in all their various forms. But as Justice Malcolm stressed, "we cannot and should not reconstruct the Act to fit
particular cases" or to retroactively disturb and set aside the official administrative interpretation and implementation of
the Act that has received our sanction for decades.

Especially should this be so when the Workmen's Compensation Act has already been repealed and this Court is now on
the verge of clearing its dockets of the hundreds of compensation cases that flooded us because of the precipitate and
hasty denials of claims by the Workmen's Compensation Commission during its last days of existence in order to meet its
deadline for determination of such claims. The remedy for the plight of the permanently disabled who were not taken
care of by the old Workmen's Compensation Act lies not with the Court but with the lawmakers. This they can give by
simple remedial legislation providing the necessary funds and directing that the medical and rehabilitation services
contemplated and provided for under the above-cited Articles 185 and 190 of the New Labor Code are made applicable
and shall be available to the employees and workers who incurred permanent and total disability under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
I vote accordingly for affirmance of the appealed decision.

Aquino, J., dissent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority decision. The views which have induced me to do so can be expounded as
follows:

1. Exercise of the judicial power.

(a) The main responsibility of Courts is to interpret and construe the laws, constitutional and statutory. They should not
legislate except interstitially (16 CJS 728); that is, except to fill in the small gaps left in statutes by the legislative. But what
Courts may fill in into those gaps should still be in accordance with the lawmaker's purpose.

(b) Before the effectivity of the Labor Code, employers could be classified into two groups: the first group being
composed of those substantially affected by the Workmen's Compensation Act (the OLD ACF for short), and the second
group being composed of those whose concern with the OLD ACT is minimal. Among those in the second group are
mainly the professionals: lawyers, accountants, advertising agents, etc. It is conceivable that an accountant, or a lawyer,
can say that: (i) The Supreme Court has construed the OLD ACT so liberally in favor of employees that employers who
have actually faced claims for compensation have in the main been held liable, even when illness strictly speaking, were
not really work connected; (ii) Individual employers so held liable were heavily burdened with increased costs of
operation; (iii) The Government has recognized the plight of employers in the first group who have actually been
required to bear the cost of workmen's compensation and, to alleviate their situation, the OLD ACT was repealed, and the
cost of employees, compensation was distributed among an employers, regardless of whether any of their employees
have suffered work connected injuries or illnesses; (iv) Accountants or lawyers have now to pay employees'
compensation where, before the Labor Code, they never had to bear any expense for workmen's compensation; (v)
Employers in the first group have welcomed the Labor Code in the thought that with the payment of premiums for
employees' compensation, they need not worry about workmen's compensation; and (vi) A result of the present system
could be the relaxation of safety measures on the part of employers.

(c) A dissent is a "voice in the wilderness." Nevertheless, and, on principle, I would still like to express my thoughts on the
issue involved in this case, bearing in mind the primordial requirement that Courts should interpret statutes and should
not construe them beyond the legislator's purpose.

2. Simplication of the Problem (a) This case involves the interpretation or meaning to be ascribed to SECTION 13 of

the Workmen's Compensation Act (the OLD ACT, for short), which provides:

SEC. 13. Services, appliances and supplies — Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or
contracted sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer or insurance where
shall provide the employee with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and
the process of his recovery nay require; and that which will promote his early restoration to the
maximum level of his physical capacity.

The word "services" used herein shall include medical, surgical dental hospital and nursing attendance
and treatment as well as the proper fitting and training in the use of appliances and the necessary
training for purposes of rehabilitation; 'appliances' shall include crutches, artificial members and other
devices of the same kind, and the replacements or repairs of such artificial members or such devices
unless the replacement or repair is made necessary by the lack of proper care by the employee; and
'supplies' shall include medicines, as Well as medical surgical and dental supplies.
 In case the employer or insurance carrier cannot furnish the aforementioned services, appliances and
supplies promptly, the injured or sick employee may acquire the same at the expense of the employer or
insurance carrier.

If it is shown before the Commission or its authorized representative that the injured or sick employee
voluntarily refused to accept without justifiable cause, the services, appliances and supplies provided by
the employer or insurance carrier or voluntarily obstructed without justifiable cause the giving of such
services, appliances and supplies, such refusal or obstruction shall be construed as a waiver of an or part
of his rights to the same and in this case the employer or insurance carrier shall be liable only for the
disability of any nature that would have ensued if the injured or sick employee had accepted the services,
appliances and supplies tendered by the employer or insurance carrier Provided, however, That the
refusal as well as the kind of disability that would have been the result of the injury or illness if the
injured or sick person had accepted such services, appliances and supplies shall be set forth in an
affidavit made within twenty-four hours after such refusal by the physician or other person called to
render such services or furnish such appliances or supplies. What shall constitute justifiable cause shall
be determined by the representative of the Commission who may, on his own initiative, determine the
necessity, character and sufficiency of any service, appliance and supplies furnished by the employer or
insurance carrier or acquired by the employee himself at the employer's or insurance carrier's expense,
and order a change of such service, appliance and supplies when in his judgment such change is
desirable or necessary.

No claim for such services, appliances or supplies shall be valid and enforceable against the employer or
insurance carrier unless the attending physician or other person concern within twenty days following
the first treatment, attendance, or furnishing of supplies and thereafter within the same period following
every treatment, attendance, or furnishing of supplies, furnish the employer or insurance carrier and the
Commission a report of such injury and treatment on a form prescribed by the Commission.

The liability of an employer or insurance carrier for the aforementioned services, appliances and supplies
shall not be affected by the fact that his employee was disabled through the fault or negligence of a third
party.

(b) The majority has interpreted or construed the foregoing SECTION 13 as requiring the employer to provide the
employee with "services, appliances and supplies" for recurrences of illness as long as he lives (hereinafter called
LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES).

In this case, petitioner was retired on October 31, 1970, because of diabetis mellitus, hypertensive cardiovascular disease,
arteriosclerosis, and chronic pyonephritis. He was paid P6,000.00 for total and permanent disability and, because of his
confinement after retirement, he was awarded P7,183.14 under SECTION 13 on September 15, 1972. On January 3, 1975,
he had again applied for reimbursement for medical expenses incurred after September 15, 1972. The Workmen's
Compensation Commission disallowed the claim for the P4,965.41, stating it would be unfair for the employer to be
continuously paying the medical expenses, as it will be an endless obligation. It is that ruling of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which is being set aside by the majority which holds that the employer is subject to the
payment of LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

(c) On the other hand, I am of opinion that SECTION 13 should be interpreted (and need not be construed) such that the
employer is required to provide the employee, after the injury or illness has been suffered, with "services, appliances and
supplies", or medical expenses, only for the "hospitalization" immediately ... during the subsequent period of
disability (hereinafter called the IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSES). The factors supporting my opinion will hereinafter
be discussed.

3. Agreements on employer's liability. — Sections 22 and 4, as amended, of the OLD ACT provide:

SEC. 22. Payments in a lump sum. — Whenever the Commissioner considers it most advantageous and
convenient, the liability of the employer as regards the compensation may be discharged totally or in part
by payment in a lump sum or sums as may be the case, under the condition that if the sum or sums to be
paid are less than that fixed by the law, the reduction shall not be more than eight per centum: Provided,
 however, That any agreement or contract made for this purpose between the parties shall not be valid
unless it be in conformity with the provisions of this section in so far as the amount of compensation is
concerned, and be made in the form of a public document acknowledged before the justice of the peace of
the locality and attested by two witnesses, one of whom shall be the municipal treasurer or the person
acting in his stead if the agreement is entered into outside the City of Manila; subject to the approval of
the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and if in the City of Manila, before the Workmen's
Compensation Commissioner or any of his authorized representative. Before the acknowledgment of the
instrument, the justice of the peace shall fully inform the injured laborer or dependent person or persons
executing the instrument in his stead, of all their rights and privileges under this Act reading and
translating to them into the vernacular dialect they know in case they do not understand English or
Spanish the provisions of this Act establishing the amounts and period of compensation and other
privileges to which they are entitled by reason of the accident, and shall certify in the acknowledgment
clause that an these requisites have been complied with. The expenses of the acknowledgment of the
contract shall be borne by the employer.

SEC. 29. Agreement on compensation. — In case the employer and the injured laborer or the dependents
entitled to compensation arrive at an agreement concerning the compensation provided for by this Act,
such agreement in order to be valid, shall provide, at least, the same amount of compensation as that
prescribed by this Act and must be approved by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, or any of
his authorized representative: Provided, however, That the employer shall be exempt from all liability under
this Act as soon as the compensation has been paid in accordance with this section saving the provisions of
section six of this Act.

The foregoing provisions, to my mind, run counter to the interpretation of SECTION 13 in the Opinion of the majority to
the effect that an injured workman is entitled to LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES up to the end of his natural life.
Following that Opinion of the majority, Sections 22 and 29 would be meaningless because any and all agreements under
those paragraphs, specially the employer's further liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES, would be contrary to
the provisions of SECTION 13 as construed by the Majority. The lawmaker would not have provided for exemption from
further liability of the employer under Section 29 if, after all, the employer has to assume liability to the injured employee
for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

4. Insurance coverage. — Section 30 of the OLD ACT requires employers, without adequate "financial ability", to secure
insurance against liability under the statute from an insurance company authorized to do business in the Philippines. The
section, in part, reads:

SEC. 30. Security for payment of workmen's compensation. — Employers shall secure the payment of
compensation and other benefits to their employees or laborers and their dependents:

(1) By insuring and keeping insured the full payment of such compensation and other benefits with an
insurance company authorized to do business in the Philippines; or

(2) By furnishing satisfactory proof to the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation of their financial ability to
shoulder such liabilities directly in accordance with paragraph one hereof. An employer securing
payment of such liabilities in accordance with this paragraph shall be known as self insurer.

The section assumes that compensation should be paid by a domestic insurance company, the solvency of which is more
or less assured; rather than the employer who might turn out to be insolvent. The provision seeks to protect the employee.
The exception covers employers who can furnish satisfactory proof of their financial ability to shoulder the payment of
compensation. The important factor to note is that employers who take out insurance from domestic insurance companies
are those who cannot prove their financial ability to shoulder liabilities under the OLD ACT.

An insurance policy, as a practical measure, cannot ordinarily be obtained by an employer to cover himself against liability
For LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES under the SECTION as construed by the majority. If an insurance Company
should agree to a policy covering the employer's undeterminable and unlimited liability under SECTION 13 for
LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES; the premium will be prohibitive, and would not be within the means of the employer
to pay because his application for the insurance policy presupposes that he is not possessed with "financial ability to
shoulder" the liabilities for compensation. That result could not have been the intention of the legislator in requiring
employers to secure insurance coverage. SECTION 13 should not be construed to produce inequitable situations, which
would be the result under the ruling in the majority Opinion.

Under the present Labor Code, employees' compensation has to come from a state insurance fund to which employers
pay insurance premiums. Even the insurance coverage under the present Labor Code cannot support unlimited and
undeterminable liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES which the majority would like insurance companies under
the OLD ACT to bear in respect of unlimited and undeterminable liability under SECTION 13, Thus, Article 185 of the
Labor Code provides:

Art. 185. Medical services. — Immediately after an employee contracts sickness or sustains an injury, he
shall be provided by the System during the subsequent period of his disability with such medical services
and appliances as the nature of his sickness or injury and progress of his recovery may require, subject to
the expense limitation prescribed by the Commission.

The foregoing paragraph is rather similar to the first paragraph of SECTION 13. It will be seen that the Labor Code,
although it knows the enormity of the state insurance fund, will not allow LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES. If the
liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES under the OLD ACT is assessed from the point of view of a single
employer, or of a single domestic insurance company, whose resources would be fractions compared to the state
insurance fund, then it should not be difficult to conclude that it could not have been the legislator's intention in
SECTION 13 to have an individual employer liable for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES, taking account of his very
limited means vis-a-vis the state insurance fund.

5. SECTION 13 and Article 185 of the Labor Code.- It can be presumed that, in regards to the Labor Code, the lawmaker
knew of the construction made by this Court of SECTION 13. The lawmaker must have considered that construction
unwarranted and impractical and, in transposing SECTION 13 as Article 185 of the Labor Code, he added the clause to
the Article "subject to the expense limitation prescribed by the Commission". As I have said before, it is entirely
conceivable that the Government has realized that the OLD ACT has been construed by this Court beyond the
intendment of the legislative, and that was the motivation for the repeal of the OLD ACT and its replacement by the
provisions on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund incorporated into the Labor Code.

6. The general purpose of the OLD ACT. — Throughout the OLD ACT the intention of the legislator to limit payable
compensation to P6,000.00 is redolent. The following are the relevant provisions:

SEC. 12. Sundry provisions regarding death benefits. — in computing death benefits, the average weekly
wages of the deceased employee shall not be reckoned at more than fifty pesos nor less than fourteen
pesos; but the total weekly compensation shall not in any case exceed the average weekly wages
computed in accordance with Section nineteen of this Act, nor shall the compensation paid in any case exceed
in its aggregate the sum of six thousand pesos.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 14.

In the case of an employee whose average weekly wages are less than fourteen pesos per week, the
weekly compensation shall be the entire amount of such average weekly wages; but if the disability is
permanent, the compensation shall be fourteen pesos in such case. In the event that the total disability
begins after a period of partial usability, the amount of compensation due for the latter and for any other
disability shall not exceed the maximum amount of six thousand pesos.

SEC. 16. Partial disability. — In case the injury or sickness causes partial disability for labor, the
employer, during such disability and except as hereinafter provided, shall pay to the injured or sick
employee for a period of not to exceed two hundred and eight weeks, beginning with the first day of
disability, a weekly compensation equal to fifty per centum of the difference between his average weekly
wages before the accident and the weekly wages which he could probably earn thereafter; but not more
than eighteen pesos per week. The weekly payments shall not in any case continue after the disability has
 ceased, and in case partial disability sets in after a period of total disability, such period of total disability,
shall be deducted from the total period of two hundred and eight weeks and the amount of the
compensation paid shall not in any case be in excess of the total sum of six thousand pesos. No award for
disability shall be made before a lapse of two weeks counted from the date of the injury.

SEC. 18.

In case of an injury producing a serious disfigurement of the face or head, the Commission may, at the
request of an interested party, determine and award such compensation as may seem fair and proper in
view of the nature of the disfigurement, but which shall not exceed six thousand pesos.

The total compensation prescribed in this and the next preceding section and the total
compensation prescribed in Sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act, shalt together, not exceed the sum of
six thousand pesos: Provided, however, That after the payment has been made for the period specified by
the Act in each case, the Workmen's Compensation Commission may from time to time cause the examination
of the condition of the disabled laborer, with a view to extending, if necessary, the period of
compensation which shall not however, exceed the said amount of six thousand pesos.

It has to be conceded that medical expenses under SECTION 13 can be in addition to the P6,000.00 limit But the medical
expenses should be considered only as a supplement and they should not be much more than a small fraction of the
P6,000.00 limit. That is how the purpose of the legislator has to be assessed. It cannot be that the amount of expenses
under SECTION 13 can exceed P6,000.00, which could easily be the case with LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES. The
supplement should not exceed the main or principal.

7. Time frame of SECTION 13. The first paragraph of SECTION 13 reads:

SEC. 13. Services, appliances and supplies. — Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or
contracted sickness and

During the subsequent period of disability.

The employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of
his disability and the process of his recovery may require; and

That which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity.

(a) The word "immediately". The relevant clause in connection with the word is: "Immediately after an employee has
suffered an injury or contracted sickness ... the employer of insurance carrier shall provide the employee with such
services." It is rather clear to me that, if the services have to be provided immediately after the injury or illness and have to
be paid, SECTION 13 has only provided for immediate medical expenses, and not for LIFELONG MEDICAL
EXPENSES. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius.

(b) The "period of disability". The phrase "period of disability" is also used in Section 20 of the OLD ACT as follows:

SEC. 20. Voluntary payments. — Payments made by the employer or his insurer to the injured laborer
during the period of his disability or to his dependents, which under the provisions hereof were not due or
payable when they were made, shall, upon being duly established, by agreement between the parties
concerned, a certified copy of which shall be sent to the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, or
subject to the decision of the Commissioner, be deducted from the sum to be paid as compensation:
Provided, That in case of disability, the deduction shall be made by reducing the period of time during
which the compensation is to be paid, and not by reducing the weekly payment to be made in accordance
with sections fourteen, fifteen, sixteen and seventeen of this Act.

It should be rather clear that the "period of disability" used above refers to the weeks envisaged in Sections 14, 16 and 17
during which weekly compensations are payable. The said clause "Period of disability" cannot refer to a period after
the weekly compensations have been completed. The general rule is that words and clauses used several times in a statute
should have the same meaning. Hence, the clause "period of disability" in SECTION 13 cannot be up to the end of the
natural life of an injured employee, or after the termination of the weeks when weekly compensations have to be paid.

Moreover, "period of disability", as used in the OLD ACT, inclusive of its use in SECTION 13, must be coupled with
employment. If a person is no longer employed, he cannot have a "Period of disability". Under the majority Opinion
upholding the employer's liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES, the employer's payments will no longer be
during "Period of disability". It should be clear, therefore, that SECTION 13, according to the legislative purpose, is not to
make medical expenses payable after an employment has terminated. If that is so, then LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES
should be held as not within the legislative purpose in SECTION 13.

(c) Singularity of "period". In the term "period of disability", the word "period" is in the singular. This is further proof that
the legislative intendment was that medical expenses will be paid for a single "period". Hence, several "periods" of
disability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES cannot be deemed within the intendment of the legislator in SECTION
13.

(d) The word "subsequent". Under the majority Opinion, SECTION 13 is being construed as applicable to all subsequent
periods of disability; That is, if an employee is hospitalized immediately after contracting compensable illness, say in
1972, and is again hospitalized in 1975, as happened in this case, the 1975 hospitalization is still a subsequent period of
disability. A similar question as to what is "subsequent" was resolved in McIntosh v. S.A. Heally Construction Company,
236 N.Y.S. 2d 189. In that case, it was held, without reference to cause, that a second disablement was not a "subsequent"
disability to the first, for purposes of entitling an employer to reimbursement from a special disability fund. Similarly,
under SECTION 13, a second hospitalization should not be deemed to be a "subsequent period of disability".

8. Administrative Interpretation. - In this case, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has ruled that when an injured
employee has been totally and permanently disabled, it would be unfair for the employer to be continuously paying his
medical expenses as it will be an endless obligation. That ruling of the Commission is against the position taken by the
majority in regards to the meaning of SECTION 13 and is being set aside. The Commission has actually interpreted
SECTION 13 as not providing for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

In rejecting the Opinion of the Commission, the majority has not given due consideration to the doctrine enunciated in the
following cases:

This contemporaneous construction is highly persuasive:

The practice and interpretive regulations by officers, administrative agencies, departmental heads and
other officials charged with the duty of administering and enforcing a statute will carry great weight in
determining the operation of a statute. (2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 516).

In the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who are
called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very
great respect.' (Edwards Lessee vs. Darby 12 Wheat. 206,210).

Commenting on the above rule, Erwin N. Criswold of the Harvard Law School, wrote:

Another reason why contemporaneousness is an important factor is its bearing on the need for certainty
and predictability in our tax laws. This is where the motion of the Court's function in the scheme of
judicial tax administration becomes important. A statute is enacted. A regulation is issued. It will in the
normal course of events, be five or six years, and very likely more, before the construction of the statute,
in the light of the regulation, will come before the Supreme Court. In the meantime, people will go on
living, and transactions will be conducted under the statute. perhaps all the transactions that are ever to
be conducted under the statute. Thus, it seems that a strong argument can be made in favor of giving
very heavy weight to a contemporaneous regulation, so that taxpayers may rely upon it and have some
certainty that it will be followed by the courts. (A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 Harvard Law
Review, p. 398, 406). (Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil., 580).
 Opinions and rulings of officials of the Government called upon to execute or implement administrative
laws command much respect and weight" (Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173; Grapilon v. Mun. Council of
Carigara L-12347, May 30, 1961; Tan v. Municipality, 7 SCRA 887, 892).

Great weight should be given to the construction placed upon a revenue law, whose meaning is doubtful,
by the department charged with its execution. (Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38
Phil., 415).

Giving weight to administrative interpretation of statutes is salutary, and is being implemented by recent grants, for
instances, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to the Bureau of Mines, and to the National Housing
Administration to resolve controversies in regards to matters within their jurisdictions. The administrative agencies, more
than the Courts, can better resolve questions as to matters which are their concern. In a sense, the Commission is the
"expert" in the field of workmen's compensation and, because it is not palpably wrong, its opinion should be upheld.

9. Article 298, Labor Code. — That SECTION 13 of the OLD ACT was not meant to provide for LIFELONG MEDICAL
EXPENSES is also shown in the following Article 298 of the Labor Code:

ART. 298. Continuation of insurance policies and indemnity bonds. — All workmen's compensation
insurance policies and indemnity bonds for self-insured employers existing upon the effectivity of this
Code shall remain in force and effect until the expiration dates of such policies or the lapse of the period
as such bonds, as the case may be, but in no case beyond December 31, 1974. Claims may be filed against
the insurance carriers and/or self-insured employers for causes of action which accrued during the
existence of said policies or authority to self-insured.

It should be plain that the Labor Code assumes that insurance policies and indemnity bonds of self-insured employers
were not intended to cover LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES; otherwise, the Labor Code would not have provided for
the termination of such policies and indemnity bonds after December 31, 1974.

If a workmen's compensation insurance policy should be analyzed, it will most likely be held that neither employer nor
insurer had intended to insure the employer against LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES; and that fact can be established
through the actuarial studies made for the determination of the premium. As previously stated, the premium for a policy
covering LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES would be prohibitive. it can be presumed that, in regards to the Labor Code,
the lawmaker knew the extent of coverage of insurance policies under the OLD ACT, and that the policies did not cover
LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES. The invalidation of the policies by December 31, 1974 would show that the Labor
Code has not envisaged that, under the OLD ACT, SECTION 13 provides for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

10. Developing and developed haves and have-nots. The majority Opinion is replete with citations from the United. States of
America, a highly developed and have country. The citations show that many States in that country, apparently the
majority, provide for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES in their Workmen's Compensation Acts. However, there are still
some States, even in that well developed have country, which adhere to IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSE. So, if we
have to follow foreign patterns, the Philippines can still have the option of joining the minority of the American States in
living with IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSE.

Our country is only a developing one, and it is definitely a have not. The query is whether we should keep up with the
Joneses and through Court action establish the LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES plan; or, within our still developing
economy, abide with the minority of American States with the IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSE plan.

To me there is only one choice. As a developing have not nation, we should not emulate the highly developed have States
across the Pacific who provide for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

11. The Welfare State. (a) I cannot quite agree with the majority Opinion that ours is a welfare state. Whether we are a
welfare state or not could be a constitutional question which need not be resolved in this case at all.

(b) Welfare programs are, indeed, a major function in virtually every government. However, the serious burden on the
treasury, such as that of the British, which has one of the more comprehensive of all social security programs, is already
felt. (The Dynamics of Modern Government, Meehan Roche & Stedman, p. 349; 354-355). While in the United States, the
welfare system has posed a "real problem" in that marginally employed people see their jobs as 'no better than welfare'
and that 'continuing on welfare' is deemed by them as 'a very reasonable substitution for working' (see U.S. News &
World Report, January 22, 1979, p. 22). I doubt it very much whether we are desirous of duplicating this situation in the
Philippines.

The foregoing are the reasons for my dissent notwithstanding the relatively minimal amount involved.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

We are called upon to set aside at this late stage respondent commission's decision that under the old Workmen's
Compensation Act (repealed and superseded as of December 31, 1974 by the New Labor Code) the Republic of the
Philippines as employer may not be held liable to pay without limit as to time and amount the lifelong medical, surgical and
hospital expenses of an employee after he had been declared totally and permanently disabled for work and had been paid
fully the maximum P6,000. compensation for such disability and had been reimbursed the medical expenses attendant
thereto in the sum of P7,183.14.

Here, petitioner-claimant after having retired at age 58 in 1970 and having been declared totally and permanently
disabled for work upon his uncontroverted claim and having received in 1972 the full compensation and reimbursement
of his medical expenses therefor, submitted anew five (5) years later (at age 63) in January, 1975 another claim for
reimbursement of medical expenses subsequently incurred by him which the referee granted in the amount of P4,965.41.

I hold that respondent commission properly issued its en banc order of March 10, 1976 setting aside the referee's decision
and ruling in consonance with its consistent official interpretation and implementation of the Workmen's Compensation
Act ever since its inception in 1928 1 that "Claimant was declared totally and permanently disabled and no amount of medical
treatment could restore him to his former physical capacity for labor. It would be unfair on respondent's side to be continuously
paying the medical expenses, as it will be an endless obligation In fact, claimant was already given the maximum amount
of P6,000.00 provided for in the Act, as amended. Hence, claimant is no longer entitled to any further amount of
reimbursement of medical expenses. a-1

1. The key provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act on payment of medical expenses and services is found in
section 13 thereof which principally provides that "Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or contracted
sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee with
such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and the process of his recovery may require; and that
which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity. 2

This key provision is read in conjunction with section 14 on total disability, section 15 on total and permanent disability,
section 16 on partial disability and section 17 on permanent partial disability. It is readily seen from these provisions of
the Workmen's Compensation Act that the disability of the employee is classified according to theextent thereof into either
total or partial; and according to the duration into either temporary or permanent. Total disability in turn may be either
temporary or permanent. Where it is temporary, since the disability although total is merely temporary, the employee is
given weekly disability payments much less than the maximum granted by the Act for total and permanent disability (as
well as for survivors' death benefits) in the sum of P6,000.00 according to the formula set by the Act during the temporary
period that the employee is unable to earn wages because of his temporary disability. In such cases of total but temporary
disability, section 13 of the Act requires the employer to defray the medical services and expenses that will promote his
"early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity" and get him back on the job. Hence, the employee is
entitled to reimbursement of medical expenses while his curative treatment lasts.

Upon the other hand, where the disability is total and permanent, the employee's total and permanent disability or
incapacity to perform gainful work is so declared. 3 Thus, the employer's liability for the employee's medical services and
expenses in connection with the injury or sickness that caused such permanent and total disability is ended upon
payment of the P6,000. — maximum lump sum compensation therefor and of the medical expenses incurred in
connection therewith. Section 13 of the Act can no longer be invoked for the payment or reimbursement
of subsequent medical expenses of the employee alter his retirement from work as a result of his total and permanent
disability because it is obvious that such expenses are no longer curative and no amount of medical treatment can restore
him to his lost physical capacity for work or labor.

2. It will thus be seen that an employee who has been declared to be totally and permanently disabled and who has
received the maximum P6,000. — disability compensation therefor and has been reimbursed the medical expenses
attendant to the injury or illness which rendered him so incapacitated is not entitled under the Act and more particularly
under section 13 to any further payment or reimbursement for subsequent medical expenses. The Act has never burdened
the employer, be it the government itself, land this has always been the official construction and implementation of the
Act as heretofore stated) with the obligation of making unlimited payments for subsequent medical services and expenses
for as tong as the permanently and totally disabled employee lives. Not even in the case of the State as employer has such
a limitless burden been imposed, for the cost thereof would be staggering, if not altogether prohibitive, not to mention that
no provision for such an open ended and endless obligation has ever been provided in the budget for the half-century
that the Workmen's Compensation Act has been in force. 'the employer's obligation ceases upon payment of the
maximum and fixed P6,000. — disability compensation for total and permanent disability and the medical expenses
attendant thereto (which generally have amounted to about the same sum fixed as maximum compensation).

The situation is akin to that cited in Republic vs. Amil 4 where the claimant-employee was given an award for 15%
permanent disability and discharged as cured from the Orthopedic Hospital for an injury of his left knee, wherein the
Court said that "the claimant was deemed cured in the sense of requiring no further hospitalization or treatment, since the
15% loss of his leg activity was permanent and could not be improved by further medication." In the same manner, in
cases of total and permanent disability the employer is deemed relieved of any liability for subsequent hospitalization or
treatment since further medication could not cure the total and permanent disability nor restore the permanently disabled
employee to his former physical capacity for work.

3. The cases of La Mallorca-Pambusco, Itogon Suyoc Inc. and Cebu Portland Cement Co. 5 cited in the majority decision holding
the employer liable to pay for the medical expenses of the employees' illness until the same was "arrested and cured"
without limitation as to time and amount all precisely deal with a temporary disability. All the employees-claimants in
said three cases had fallen ill with pulmonary tuberculosis (the only illness expressly mentioned by name as compensable
in the Workmen's Compensation Act 6 ) and therefore section 13 of the Act was properly applied and the employers
required to defray the medical expenses until the employees were restored to the maximum level of their physical
capacity for work. Where the disability is temporary or curable (such as pulmonary tuberculosis) and where the treatment
may restore the employee to the maximum level of his physical capacity and put him back on the job, section 13 of the Act
has been applied accordingly.

But where the employee's disability has been declared total and permanent as in the case at bar (with the petitioner found
to have incurred various ailments of diabetes mellitus, hypertensive cardiovascular disease, arterioscleros and chronic
pyonephritis) and he has been paid the maximum P6,000. — disability compensation and reimbursed all medical
expenses before he was declared totally and permanently disabled for work and he has retired from his employment with
the corresponding retirement benefits, respondent commission properly ruled that section 13 was not applicable and
respondent Republic's liability to furnish him with subsequent medical and hospital expenses had terminated because no
amount of medical treatment could restore him to his former physical capacity for work.

Thus, not a single instance of the numerous cases in our jurisprudence has been cited where the Court has reversed such
uniform and consistent ruling of the commission and instead held the respondent employer liable for lifelong medical
expenses in case of total and permanent disability as the majority would now belatedly hold in the case at bar. Such
petitioners for review of the commission's adverse ruling denying further medical expenses and payments to
permanently and totally disabled employees have generally been denied due course, as per the Court's resolution of
February 27, 1978 in Case L-47179, "Umani vs. Shell Co. of the Philippines."

4. It must be borne in mind that under the Workmen's Compensation Act the employer is not the insurer of the
employee's health nor of his medical needs. This is not to say that the State thereby consigns the permanently disabled to
the "scrap heap or to the garbage dump of human derelicts."
It is generally recognized that it is a prime concern of the State to provide for the medical needs and services of the sick
and for the rehabilitation of the disabled and the handicapped. Precisely in pursuance thereof, the State has established
Medicare which provides for the medical needs and services of the citizenry. The New Labor Code has now done away
with the Workmen's Compensation Act whereby the limited responsibility to provide disability compensation and
medical expenses devolved upon the employer, private and public and in its place has adopted the concept of State
insurance of the employees' health and medical needs and provided for an Employees' Compensation Program
administered by the Government Service Insurance System for public employees and by the Social Security System for
private employees, by means of a compulsory coverage in the State Insurance Fund for all employers (with even one
employee) and their employees not over 60 years of age. (The program has preserved for purposes of compensation or
disability benefits the classification of disability into Temporary Total Disability [TTD] and Permanent Total Disability
[PTD] with [PTD] being defined to include among others [TTD] that lasts continuously for more than 120 days and being
entitled to monthly income benefits under the formula set in the Code not to exceed P12,000.00 nor paid longer than 5
years. At the same time, it has sought to constrict the number of "occupational" or work-connected or aggravated illnesses
considered as compensable by providing a limited list thereof.)

Under section 185 which is the counterpart of section 13 of the old Workmen's Compensation Act, it is provided that
"Immediately after an employee contracts sickness or sustains an injury he shall be provided by the System during
the subsequent period of his disability with such medical services and appliances as the nature of his sickness or injury and
progress of his recovery may require, subject to the expense limitation prescribed by the Commission. 7

Two (2) things stand out in this new provision of the New Labor Code compared to the old counterpart provision, to wit:

(a) The phrase in the old provision (section 13 of the old Workmen's Compensation Act) providing that the employer will
provide for the medical services "which win promote [the employee's] early restoration to the maximum level of his
physical capacity" has been eliminated, meaning to say that the classification between the different kinds of disability
(total or partial, temporary or permanent) for purposes of medical services and expenses has been cast aside. Hence, the
former limitation that totally and permanently disabled employees were not entitled to payment of
their subsequent medical expenses since they could no longer be restored to the maximum level of their physical capacity
for work has been eliminated with the result that the totally and Permanently disabled are now entitled to payment of
such subsequent medical expenses; and

(b) Presumably by virtue of the inclusion now in the new program of such totally and permanently disabled employees
and the uncertain expenses that may possibly be incurred for their medical needs, it is now expressly provided that such
medical services and expenses shall be subject to the expense limitation prescribed by the [Employees' Compensation]
Commission.

In conjunction with the foregoing, a new provision, viz, Art. 190 of the New Labor Code now expressly provides for
rehabilitation services of the permanently disabled, as follows:

ART. 190. Rehabilitation services. — (a) The System shall, as soon as practicable, establish a continuing
program for the rehabilitation of injured and handicapped employees, who shall be entitled to
rehabilitation services, which shall consist of medical, surgical or hospital treatment, including appliances
if they have been handicapped by the injury, to help them become physically independent.

(b) As soon as practicable, the System shall establish centers equipped and staffed to provide a balanced
program of remedial treatment, vocational assessment and preparation designed to meet the individual
needs of each handicapped employee to restore him to suitable employment, including assistance as may
be within its resources to help each rehabilitee to develop his mental, vocational or social potential. "

This indeed would discharge the Sta. is obligation and concern for the permanently disabled and handicapped — a
burden which could not possibly be borne by the average employer without the risk of insolvency or bankruptcy. 'This
project of providing rehabilitation services is of such magnitude that even now, five years after the issuance of the New
Labor Code, the Minister of Labor has not yet announced any definite plans for the implementation of this provision to
provide free rehabilitation services to the permanently disabled workers and to establish rehabilitation centers.
5. It should be underscored that during our deliberations in the case at bar whereby the established administrative
interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act to the effect that totally and permanently disabled employees cannot
claim for continuing and indeterminable open-ended medical, surgical and hospital expenses would now be retroactively
set aside, the fear of the possibility that the government would now be swamped with claims for such continuing medical
surgical and hospital services that "would unduly drain the national treasury" as taken note of by the majority 8 was
brushed aside with the statement that the State can and should be able to afford it "as a welfare State." I have grave doubts
about this since no funds have ever been appropriated for the purpose during the subsistence for 50 years of the
Workmen's Compensation Act and the bill could run into enormous amounts that would jeopardize the setting up of the
rehabilitation program and services contemplated by the New Labor Code, supra. It should also be made clear that in our
deliberations, this decision was expressly limited to the government as the employer and that the question of whether the
same ruling of now holding the government as employer liable for indefinite lifelong medical, surgical and hospital
expenses of totally and permanently disabled employees would also apply to the private employers, many of which could
possibly be thrown into bankruptcy should this ruling be also applied to them (considering the prevailing high costs of
such medical expenses), was left open and unresolved.

To paraphrase Justice Malcolm in Vergara vs. Pambusco, 9 we in the court have heretofore given repeated evidence of our
desire and resolve to see a spirit of liberality and social justice characterize the construction and implementation of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. We have always endeavored to interpret the Act to promote its purposes. We have even
gone so far by virtue of the Act's presumption of compensability to declare compensable under the Act practically all the
known forms of human illness and disease that have supervened during the course of employment including leprosy and
cancer in all their various forms. But as Justice Malcolm stressed, "we cannot and should not reconstruct the Act to fit
particular cases" or to retroactively disturb and set aside the official administrative interpretation and implementation of
the Act that has received our sanction for decades.

Especially should this be so when the Workmen's Compensation Act has already been repealed and this Court is now on
the verge of clearing its dockets of the hundreds of compensation cases that flooded us because of the precipitate and
hasty denials of claims by the Workmen's Compensation Commission during its last days of existence in order to meet its
deadline for determination of such claims. The remedy for the plight of the permanently disabled who were not taken
care of by the old Workmen's Compensation Act lies not with the Court but with the lawmakers. This they can give by
simple remedial legislation providing the necessary funds and directing that the medical and rehabilitation services
contemplated and provided for under the above-cited Articles 185 and 190 of the New Labor Code are made applicable
and shall be available to the employees and workers who incurred permanent and total disability under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.

I vote accordingly for affirmance of the appealed decision.

Aquino, J., dissent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority decision. The views which have induced me to do so can be expounded as
follows:

1. Exercise of the judicial power.(a)The main responsibility of Courts is to interpret and construe the laws, constitutional and
statutory. They should not legislate except interstitially (16 CJS 728); that is, except to fill in the small gaps left in statutes
by the legislative. But what Courts may fill in into those gaps should still be in accordance with the lawmaker's purpose.

(b) Before the effectivity of the Labor Code, employers could be classified into two groups: the first group being
composed of those substantially affected by the Workmen's Compensation Act (the OLD ACF for short), and the second
group being composed of those whose concern with the OLD ACT is minimal. Among those in the second group are
mainly the professionals: lawyers, accountants, advertising agents, etc. It is conceivable that an accountant, or a lawyer,
can say that: (i) The Supreme Court has construed the OLD ACT so liberally in favor of employees that employers who
have actually faced claims for compensation have in the main been held liable, even when illness strictly speaking, were
not really work connected; (ii) Individual employers so held liable were heavily burdened with increased costs of
operation; (iii) The Government has recognized the plight of employers in the first group who have actually been
required to bear the cost of workmen's compensation and, to alleviate their situation, the OLD ACT was repealed, and the
cost of employees, compensation was distributed among an employers, regardless of whether any of their employees
have suffered work connected injuries or illnesses; (iv) Accountants or lawyers have now to pay employees'
compensation where, before the Labor Code, they never had to bear any expense for workmen's compensation; (v)
Employers in the first group have welcomed the Labor Code in the thought that with the payment of premiums for
employees' compensation, they need not worry about workmen's compensation; and (vi) A result of the present system
could be the relaxation of safety measures on the part of employers.

(c) A dissent is a "voice in the wilderness." Nevertheless, and, on principle, I would still like to express my thoughts on the
issue involved in this case, bearing in mind the primordial requirement that Courts should interpret statutes and should
not construe them beyond the legislator's purpose.

2. Simplication of the Problem (a) This case involves the interpretation or meaning to be ascribed to SECTION 13 of

the Workmen's Compensation Act (the OLD ACT, for short), which provides:

SEC. 13. Services, appliances and supplies — Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or
contracted sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer or insurance where
shall provide the employee with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his disability and
the process of his recovery nay require; and that which will promote his early restoration to the
maximum level of his physical capacity.

The word "services" used herein shall include medical, surgical dental hospital and nursing attendance
and treatment as well as the proper fitting and training in the use of appliances and the necessary
training for purposes of rehabilitation; 'appliances' shall include crutches, artificial members and other
devices of the same kind, and the replacements or repairs of such artificial members or such devices
unless the replacement or repair is made necessary by the lack of proper care by the employee; and
'supplies' shall include medicines, as Well as medical surgical and dental supplies.

In case the employer or insurance carrier cannot furnish the aforementioned services, appliances and
supplies promptly, the injured or sick employee may acquire the same at the expense of the employer or
insurance carrier.

If it is shown before the Commission or its authorized representative that the injured or sick employee
voluntarily refused to accept without justifiable cause, the services, appliances and supplies provided by
the employer or insurance carrier or voluntarily obstructed without justifiable cause the giving of such
services, appliances and supplies, such refusal or obstruction shall be construed as a waiver of an or part
of his rights to the same and in this case the employer or insurance carrier shall be liable only for the
disability of any nature that would have ensued if the injured or sick employee had accepted the services,
appliances and supplies tendered by the employer or insurance carrier Provided, however, That the
refusal as well as the kind of disability that would have been the result of the injury or illness if the
injured or sick person had accepted such services, appliances and supplies shall be set forth in an
affidavit made within twenty-four hours after such refusal by the physician or other person called to
render such services or furnish such appliances or supplies. What shall constitute justifiable cause shall
be determined by the representative of the Commission who may, on his own initiative, determine the
necessity, character and sufficiency of any service, appliance and supplies furnished by the employer or
insurance carrier or acquired by the employee himself at the employer's or insurance carrier's expense,
and order a change of such service, appliance and supplies when in his judgment such change is
desirable or necessary.

No claim for such services, appliances or supplies shall be valid and enforceable against the employer or
insurance carrier unless the attending physician or other person concern within twenty days following
the first treatment, attendance, or furnishing of supplies and thereafter within the same period following
every treatment, attendance, or furnishing of supplies, furnish the employer or insurance carrier and the
Commission a report of such injury and treatment on a form prescribed by the Commission.
 The liability of an employer or insurance carrier for the aforementioned services, appliances and supplies
shall not be affected by the fact that his employee was disabled through the fault or negligence of a third
party.

(b) The majority has interpreted or construed the foregoing SECTION 13 as requiring the employer to provide the
employee with "services, appliances and supplies" for recurrences of illness as long as he lives (hereinafter called
LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES).

In this case, petitioner was retired on October 31, 1970, because of diabetis mellitus, hypertensive cardiovascular disease,
arteriosclerosis, and chronic pyonephritis. He was paid P6,000.00 for total and permanent disability and, because of his
confinement after retirement, he was awarded P7,183.14 under SECTION 13 on September 15, 1972. On January 3, 1975,
he had again applied for reimbursement for medical expenses incurred after September 15, 1972. The Workmen's
Compensation Commission disallowed the claim for the P4,965.41, stating it would be unfair for the employer to be
continuously paying the medical expenses, as it will be an endless obligation. It is that ruling of the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which is being set aside by the majority which holds that the employer is subject to the
payment of LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

(c) On the other hand, I am of opinion that SECTION 13 should be interpreted (and need not be construed) such that the
employer is required to provide the employee, after the injury or illness has been suffered, with "services, appliances and
supplies", or medical expenses, only for the "hospitalization" immediately ... during the subsequent period of
disability (hereinafter called the IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSES). The factors supporting my opinion will hereinafter
be discussed.

3. Agreements on employer's liability. — Sections 22 and 4, as amended, of the OLD ACT provide:

SEC. 22. Payments in a lump sum. — Whenever the Commissioner considers it most advantageous and
convenient, the liability of the employer as regards the compensation may be discharged totally or in part
by payment in a lump sum or sums as may be the case, under the condition that if the sum or sums to be
paid are less than that fixed by the law, the reduction shall not be more than eight per centum: Provided,
however, That any agreement or contract made for this purpose between the parties shall not be valid
unless it be in conformity with the provisions of this section in so far as the amount of compensation is
concerned, and be made in the form of a public document acknowledged before the justice of the peace of
the locality and attested by two witnesses, one of whom shall be the municipal treasurer or the person
acting in his stead if the agreement is entered into outside the City of Manila; subject to the approval of
the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and if in the City of Manila, before the Workmen's
Compensation Commissioner or any of his authorized representative. Before the acknowledgment of the
instrument, the justice of the peace shall fully inform the injured laborer or dependent person or persons
executing the instrument in his stead, of all their rights and privileges under this Act reading and
translating to them into the vernacular dialect they know in case they do not understand English or
Spanish the provisions of this Act establishing the amounts and period of compensation and other
privileges to which they are entitled by reason of the accident, and shall certify in the acknowledgment
clause that an these requisites have been complied with. The expenses of the acknowledgment of the
contract shall be borne by the employer.

SEC. 29. Agreement on compensation. — In case the employer and the injured laborer or the dependents
entitled to compensation arrive at an agreement concerning the compensation provided for by this Act,
such agreement in order to be valid, shall provide, at least, the same amount of compensation as that
prescribed by this Act and must be approved by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, or any of
his authorized representative: Provided, however, That the employer shall be exempt from all liability under
this Act as soon as the compensation has been paid in accordance with this section saving the provisions of
section six of this Act.

The foregoing provisions, to my mind, run counter to the interpretation of SECTION 13 in the Opinion of the majority to
the effect that an injured workman is entitled to LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES up to the end of his natural life.
Following that Opinion of the majority, Sections 22 and 29 would be meaningless because any and all agreements under
those paragraphs, specially the employer's further liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES, would be contrary to
the provisions of SECTION 13 as construed by the Majority. The lawmaker would not have provided for exemption from
further liability of the employer under Section 29 if, after all, the employer has to assume liability to the injured employee
for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

4. Insurance coverage. — Section 30 of the OLD ACT requires employers, without adequate "financial ability", to secure
insurance against liability under the statute from an insurance company authorized to do business in the Philippines. The
section, in part, reads:

SEC. 30. Security for payment of workmen's compensation. — Employers shall secure the payment of
compensation and other benefits to their employees or laborers and their dependents:

(1) By insuring and keeping insured the full payment of such compensation and other benefits with an
insurance company authorized to do business in the Philippines; or

(2) By furnishing satisfactory proof to the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation of their financial ability to
shoulder such liabilities directly in accordance with paragraph one hereof. An employer securing
payment of such liabilities in accordance with this paragraph shall be known as self insurer.

The section assumes that compensation should be paid by a domestic insurance company, the solvency of which is more
or less assured; rather than the employer who might turn out to be insolvent. The provision seeks to protect the employee.
The exception covers employers who can furnish satisfactory proof of their financial ability to shoulder the payment of
compensation. The important factor to note is that employers who take out insurance from domestic insurance companies
are those who cannot prove their financial ability to shoulder liabilities under the OLD ACT.

An insurance policy, as a practical measure, cannot ordinarily be obtained by an employer to cover himself against liability
For LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES under the SECTION as construed by the majority. If an insurance Company
should agree to a policy covering the employer's undeterminable and unlimited liability under SECTION 13 for
LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES; the premium will be prohibitive, and would not be within the means of the employer
to pay because his application for the insurance policy presupposes that he is not possessed with "financial ability to
shoulder" the liabilities for compensation. That result could not have been the intention of the legislator in requiring
employers to secure insurance coverage. SECTION 13 should not be construed to produce inequitable situations, which
would be the result under the ruling in the majority Opinion.

Under the present Labor Code, employees' compensation has to come from a state insurance fund to which employers
pay insurance premiums. Even the insurance coverage under the present Labor Code cannot support unlimited and
undeterminable liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES which the majority would like insurance companies under
the OLD ACT to bear in respect of unlimited and undeterminable liability under SECTION 13, Thus, Article 185 of the
Labor Code provides:

Art. 185. Medical services. — Immediately after an employee contracts sickness or sustains an injury, he
shall be provided by the System during the subsequent period of his disability with such medical services
and appliances as the nature of his sickness or injury and progress of his recovery may require, subject to
the expense limitation prescribed by the Commission.

The foregoing paragraph is rather similar to the first paragraph of SECTION 13. It will be seen that the Labor Code,
although it knows the enormity of the state insurance fund, will not allow LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES. If the
liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES under the OLD ACT is assessed from the point of view of a single
employer, or of a single domestic insurance company, whose resources would be fractions compared to the state
insurance fund, then it should not be difficult to conclude that it could not have been the legislator's intention in
SECTION 13 to have an individual employer liable for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES, taking account of his very
limited means vis-a-vis the state insurance fund.

5. SECTION 13 and Article 185 of the Labor Code. — It can be presumed that, in regards to the Labor Code, the lawmaker
knew of the construction made by this Court of SECTION 13. The lawmaker must have considered that construction
unwarranted and impractical and, in transposing SECTION 13 as Article 185 of the Labor Code, he added the clause to
the Article "subject to the expense limitation prescribed by the Commission". As I have said before, it is entirely
conceivable that the Government has realized that the OLD ACT has been construed by this Court beyond the
intendment of the legislative, and that was the motivation for the repeal of the OLD ACT and its replacement by the
provisions on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund incorporated into the Labor Code.

6. The general purpose of the OLD ACT. — Throughout the OLD ACT the intention of the legislator to limit payable
compensation to P6,000.00 is redolent. The following are the relevant provisions:

SEC. 12. Sundry provisions regarding death benefits. — in computing death benefits, the average weekly
wages of the deceased employee shall not be reckoned at more than fifty pesos nor less than fourteen
pesos; but the total weekly compensation shall not in any case exceed the average weekly wages
computed in accordance with Section nineteen of this Act, nor shall the compensation paid in any case exceed
in its aggregate the sum of six thousand pesos.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 14.

In the case of an employee whose average weekly wages are less than fourteen pesos per week, the
weekly compensation shall be the entire amount of such average weekly wages; but if the disability is
permanent, the compensation shall be fourteen pesos in such case. In the event that the total disability
begins after a period of partial usability, the amount of compensation due for the latter and for any other
disability shall not exceed the maximum amount of six thousand pesos.

SEC. 16. Partial disability. — In case the injury or sickness causes partial disability for labor, the
employer, during such disability and except as hereinafter provided, shall pay to the injured or sick
employee for a period of not to exceed two hundred and eight weeks, beginning with the first day of
disability, a weekly compensation equal to fifty per centum of the difference between his average weekly
wages before the accident and the weekly wages which he could probably earn thereafter; but not more
than eighteen pesos per week. The weekly payments shall not in any case continue after the disability has
ceased, and in case partial disability sets in after a period of total disability, such period of total disability,
shall be deducted from the total period of two hundred and eight weeks and the amount of the
compensation paid shall not in any case be in excess of the total sum of six thousand pesos. No award for
disability shall be made before a lapse of two weeks counted from the date of the injury.

SEC. 18.

In case of an injury producing a serious disfigurement of the face or head, the Commission may, at the
request of an interested party, determine and award such compensation as may seem fair and proper in
view of the nature of the disfigurement, but which shall not exceed six thousand pesos.

The total compensation prescribed in this and the next preceding section and the total
compensation prescribed in Sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act, shalt together, not exceed the sum of
six thousand pesos: Provided, however, That after the payment has been made for the period specified by
the Act in each case, the Workmen's Compensation Commission may from time to time cause the examination
of the condition of the disabled laborer, with a view to extending, if necessary, the period of
compensation which shall not however, exceed the said amount of six thousand pesos.

It has to be conceded that medical expenses under SECTION 13 can be in addition to the P6,000.00 limit But the medical
expenses should be considered only as a supplement and they should not be much more than a small fraction of the
P6,000.00 limit. That is how the purpose of the legislator has to be assessed. It cannot be that the amount of expenses
under SECTION 13 can exceed P6,000.00, which could easily be the case with LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES. The
supplement should not exceed the main or principal.

7. Time frame of SECTION 13. The first paragraph of SECTION 13 reads:

SEC. 13. Services, appliances and supplies. — Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or
contracted sickness and
 During the subsequent period of disability.

The employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of
his disability and the process of his recovery may require; and

That which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity.

(a) The word "immediately". The relevant clause in connection with the word is: "Immediately after an employee has
suffered an injury or contracted sickness ... the employer of insurance carrier shall provide the employee with such
services." It is rather clear to me that, if the services have to be provided immediately after the injury or illness and have to
be paid, SECTION 13 has only provided for immediate medical expenses, and not for LIFELONG MEDICAL
EXPENSES. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius.

(b) The "period of disability". The phrase "period of disability" is also used in Section 20 of the OLD ACT as follows:

SEC. 20. Voluntary payments. — Payments made by the employer or his insurer to the injured laborer
during the period of his disability or to his dependents, which under the provisions hereof were not due or
payable when they were made, shall, upon being duly established, by agreement between the parties
concerned, a certified copy of which shall be sent to the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, or
subject to the decision of the Commissioner, be deducted from the sum to be paid as compensation:
Provided, That in case of disability, the deduction shall be made by reducing the period of time during
which the compensation is to be paid, and not by reducing the weekly payment to be made in accordance
with sections fourteen, fifteen, sixteen and seventeen of this Act.

It should be rather clear that the "period of disability" used above refers to the weeks envisaged in Sections 14, 16 and 17
during which weekly compensations are payable. The said clause "Period of disability" cannot refer to a period after
the weekly compensations have been completed. The general rule is that words and clauses used several times in a statute
should have the same meaning. Hence, the clause "period of disability" in SECTION 13 cannot be up to the end of the
natural life of an injured employee, or after the termination of the weeks when weekly compensations have to be paid.

Moreover, "period of disability", as used in the OLD ACT, inclusive of its use in SECTION 13, must be coupled with
employment. If a person is no longer employed, he cannot have a "Period of disability". Under the majority Opinion
upholding the employer's liability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES, the employer's payments will no longer be
during "Period of disability". It should be clear, therefore, that SECTION 13, according to the legislative purpose, is not to
make medical expenses payable after an employment has terminated. If that is so, then LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES
should be held as not within the legislative purpose in SECTION 13.

(c) Singularity of "period". In the term "period of disability", the word "period" is in the singular. This is further proof that
the legislative intendment was that medical expenses will be paid for a single "period". Hence, several "periods" of
disability for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES cannot be deemed within the intendment of the legislator in SECTION
13.

(d) The word "subsequent". Under the majority Opinion, SECTION 13 is being construed as applicable to all subsequent
periods of disability; That is, if an employee is hospitalized immediately after contracting compensable illness, say in
1972, and is again hospitalized in 1975, as happened in this case, the 1975 hospitalization is still a subsequent period of
disability. A similar question as to what is "subsequent" was resolved in McIntosh v. S.A. Heally Construction Company,
236 N.Y.S. 2d 189. In that case, it was held, without reference to cause, that a second disablement was not a "subsequent"
disability to the first, for purposes of entitling an employer to reimbursement from a special disability fund. Similarly,
under SECTION 13, a second hospitalization should not be deemed to be a "subsequent period of disability".

8. Administrative Interpretation. — In this case, the Workmen's Compensation Commission has ruled that when an injured
employee has been totally and permanently disabled, it would be unfair for the employer to be continuously paying his
medical expenses as it will be an endless obligation. That ruling of the Commission is against the position taken by the
majority in regards to the meaning of SECTION 13 and is being set aside. The Commission has actually interpreted
SECTION 13 as not providing for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.
In rejecting the Opinion of the Commission, the majority has not given due consideration to the doctrine enunciated in the
following cases:

This contemporaneous construction is highly persuasive:

The practice and interpretive regulations by officers, administrative agencies, departmental heads and
other officials charged with the duty of administering and enforcing a statute will carry great weight in
determining the operation of a statute. (2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 516).

In the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who are
called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very
great respect. (Edwards Lessee vs. Darby 12 Wheat. 206,210).

Commenting on the above rule, Erwin N. Criswold of the Harvard Law School, wrote:

Another reason why contemporaneousness is an important factor is its bearing on the need for certainty
and predictability in our tax laws. This is where the motion of the Court's function in the scheme of
judicial tax administration becomes important. A statute is enacted. A regulation is issued. It will in the
normal course of events, be five or six years, and very likely more, before the construction of the statute,
in the light of the regulation, will come before the Supreme Court. In the meantime, people will go on
living, and transactions will be conducted under the statute. perhaps all the transactions that are ever to
be conducted under the statute. Thus, it seems that a strong argument can be made in favor of giving
very heavy weight to a contemporaneous regulation, so that taxpayers may rely upon it and have some
certainty that it will be followed by the courts. (A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 Harvard Law
Review, p. 398, 406). (Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil., 580).

Opinions and rulings of officials of the Government called upon to execute or implement administrative
laws command much respect and weight" (Regalado v. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173; Grapilon v. Mun. Council of
Carigara L-12347, May 30, 1961; Tan v. Municipality, 7 SCRA 887, 892).

Great weight should be given to the construction placed upon a revenue law, whose meaning is doubtful,
by the department charged with its execution. (Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38
Phil., 415).

Giving weight to administrative interpretation of statutes is salutary, and is being implemented by recent grants, for
instances, to the Securities and Exchange Commission, to the Bureau of Mines, and to the National Housing
Administration to resolve controversies in regards to matters within their jurisdictions. The administrative agencies, more
than the Courts, can better resolve questions as to matters which are their concern. In a sense, the Commission is the
"expert" in the field of workmen's compensation and, because it is not palpably wrong, its opinion should be upheld.

9. Article 298, Labor Code. — That SECTION 13 of the OLD ACT was not meant to provide for LIFELONG MEDICAL
EXPENSES is also shown in the following Article 298 of the Labor Code:

ART. 298. Continuation of insurance policies and indemnity bonds. — All workmen's compensation
insurance policies and indemnity bonds for self-insured employers existing upon the effectivity of this
Code shall remain in force and effect until the expiration dates of such policies or the lapse of the period
as such bonds, as the case may be, but in no case beyond December 31, 1974. Claims may be filed against
the insurance carriers and/or self-insured employers for causes of action which accrued during the
existence of said policies or authority to self-insured.

It should be plain that the Labor Code assumes that insurance policies and indemnity bonds of self-insured employers
were not intended to cover LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES; otherwise, the Labor Code would not have provided for
the termination of such policies and indemnity bonds after December 31, 1974.

If a workmen's compensation insurance policy should be analyzed, it will most likely be held that neither employer nor
insurer had intended to insure the employer against LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES; and that fact can be established
through the actuarial studies made for the determination of the premium. As previously stated, the premium for a policy
covering LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES would be prohibitive. it can be presumed that, in regards to the Labor Code,
the lawmaker knew the extent of coverage of insurance policies under the OLD ACT, and that the policies did not cover
LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES. The invalidation of the policies by December 31, 1974 would show that the Labor
Code has not envisaged that, under the OLD ACT, SECTION 13 provides for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

10. Developing and developed haves and have-nots. The majority Opinion is replete with citations from the United. States of
America, a highly developed and have country. The citations show that many States in that country, apparently the
majority, provide for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES in their Workmen's Compensation Acts. However, there are still
some States, even in that well developed have country, which adhere to IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSE. So, if we
have to follow foreign patterns, the Philippines can still have the option of joining the minority of the American States in
living with IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSE.

Our country is only a developing one, and it is definitely a have not. The query is whether we should keep up with the
Joneses and through Court action establish the LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES plan; or, within our still developing
economy, abide with the minority of American States with the IMMEDIATE MEDICAL EXPENSE plan.

To me there is only one choice. As a developing have not nation, we should not emulate the highly developed have States
across the Pacific who provide for LIFELONG MEDICAL EXPENSES.

11. The Welfare State. (a) I cannot quite agree with the majority Opinion that ours is a welfare state. Whether we are a
welfare state or not could be a constitutional question which need not be resolved in this case at all.

(b) Welfare programs are, indeed, a major function in virtually every government. However, the serious burden on the
treasury, such as that of the British, which has one of the more comprehensive of all social security programs, is already
felt. (The Dynamics of Modern Government, Meehan Roche & Stedman, p. 349; 354-355). While in the United States, the
welfare system has posed a "real problem" in that marginally employed people see their jobs as 'no better than welfare'
and that 'continuing on welfare' is deemed by them as 'a very reasonable substitution for working' (see U.S. News &
World Report, January 22, 1979, p. 22). I doubt it very much whether we are desirous of duplicating this situation in the
Philippines.

The foregoing are the reasons for my dissent notwithstanding the relatively minimal amount involved.
JULIO BISCARRA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Bureau of Foresty) and the WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION G.R. No. L-43425 January 22, 1980 FACTS:

Petitioner Julio Biscarra, former assistant district forester of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a Notice of Injury or Sickness and
Claim for Compensation for his ailments in which, as a result, he stopped working and retired at age 58. The Regional
Office of Department of Labor issued an award granting the petitioner P6,000.00 as disability compensation after
declaring him from

totally and permanently disabled for labor

, with a reservation for him to file a claim for reimbursement of medical expenses. Petitioner, pursuant to this reservation,
filed a claim for reimbursement of medical expenses. The Regional Office, awarded him P7,183.14 as reimbursement of
medical expenses. Petitioner filed another petition for reimbursement of medical expenses. The same Regional Office,
again granted petitioner P4,965.41 as reimbursement of medical expenses. Respondent then filed a petition for relief from
judgment with the respondent Commission. It argued that claimant, herein petitioner, is not entitled to further
reimbursement of medical expenses after he had been declared totally and permanently disabled for labor. Petitioner
contends that under Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, there is no limit on the employer's
obligation to reimburse the medical expenses incurred by the employee, for as long as the employee's ailment is not
arrested or cured, the employer's obligation subsists. The Office of the Solicitor General, upon the other hand, asserts that
it is not liable for the reimbursement of further medical expenses incurred by petitioner, considering that upon payment
of his full disability compensation, the employer's obligation for further medical services is already terminated or ended.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a totally and permanently disabled claimant, like herein petitioner, is still entitled to continued hospital,
medical and surgical services as well as further reimbursements of his medical expenses

RULING:

Yes. The law applicable is Section 13 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended on June 20, 1964, which provides,
in part: SEC. 13. Services, appliances and supplies. - Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or contracted
sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee
with such services, appliances and supplies as the nature of his

disability and the process of his recovery may require and that which will promote his early restoration to the maximum
level of his physical capacity. This law does not provide a maximum either as to the amount to be paid or the time within
which such rights may be availed of. To sustain, therefore, the proposition that petitioner's disability being total and
permanent, respondent's liability to furnish him with further medical and hospital expenses is terminated, would, in
effect, qualify Section 13, supra, by adding what is not provided in the law or subtracting what is therein embodied which
is legally impermissible. This would constitute "judicial fiat

”.

This Court, therefore, shall limit itself to the clear intendment of the law
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 211465, December 03, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SHIRLEY A. CASIO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

�Chicks mo dong?�1

With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of many of our cities, the fate of many desperate women is
sealed and their futures vanquished. This case resulted in the rescue of two minors from this pernicious practice.
Hopefully, there will be more rescues. Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime. It is committed even though the minor
knew about or consented to the act of trafficking.

This case involves Republic Act No. 9208,2 otherwise known as the �Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.�3

Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a).
The information against accused, dated May 5, 2008, states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 o�clock A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire
and/or recruit AAA, a minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as
their procurer for different customers, for money, profit or any other consideration, in Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a),
Qualified by Sec. 6, Par. ( a), of R.A. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM),5 a non-governmental organization, coordinated with the police in
order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City.6

Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso
composed the team of police operatives.7 PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour
guides looking for girls to entertain their guests.8 IJM provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the
police blotter.9
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These rooms were adjacent to each other. Room 24 was
designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team.10

PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City�s red light district.
Accused noticed them and called their attention by saying �Chicks mo dong?� (Do you like girls, guys?).11

During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their conversation with accused went as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accused: Chicks mo dong? (Do you like girls, guys?)

PO1 Luardo: Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests naghulat sa motel. (Are they new? They must be
young because we have guests waiting at the motel.)

Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I�ll get them.)12

At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found a prospective subject.13

After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private complainants in this case.14

Accused:

Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)

PO1 Veloso:

Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in sex?)15

Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in sex. PO1 Luardo inquired how much their services would cost.
Accused replied, �Tag kinientos� (P500.00).16

PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them to Queensland Motel. Upon proceeding to Room 24,
PO1 Veloso handed the marked money to accused.17

As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a missed call. This was their pre-arranged signal. The rest of
the team proceeded to Room 24, arrested accused, and informed her of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated
the marked money from accused.18 Meanwhile, AAA and BBB �were brought to Room 25 and placed in the custody of
the representatives from the IJM and the DSWD.�19

During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991. This statement was supported by a copy of her
certificate of live birth.20

AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in Mandaue City. In March 2008 she stopped working as a
house helper and transferred to Cebu City. She stayed with her cousin, but she subsequently moved to a boarding house.
It was there where she met her friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew that Gee Ann worked in a disco club. When Gee Ann found
out that AAA was no longer a virgin, she offered AAA work. AAA agreed because she needed the money in order to help
her father. AAA recalled that she had sex with her first customer. She was paid P200.00 and given an additional P500.00
as tip. For the first few weeks, Gee Ann provided customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann brought her to Barangay
Kamagayan, telling her that there were more customers in that area.21

AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA would usually see her pimping girls to customers in
Barangay Kamagayan.22 AAA further testified that on May 2, 2008, accused solicited her services for a customer. That
was the first time that she was pimped by accused.23 Accused brought her, BBB, and a certain Jocelyn to Queensland
Motel.24

AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed in the taxi, while she and BBB went to Room 24. It was in Room 24 where the customer
paid Shirley. The police rushed in and told AAA and BBB to go to the other room. AAA was then met by the Department
of Social Welfare and Development personnel who informed her that she was rescued and not arrested.25

AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display herself, along with other girls, between 7 p.m. to 8 p.m.
She received P400.00 for every customer who selected her.26

The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial. PSI Ylanan, SPO1 Mendaros, and SPO1 Altubar testified
that after PO1 Veloso had made the missed call to PSI Ylanan, they �rushed to Room 24 and arrested the accused.�27
SPO1 Altubar retrieved the marked money worth P1,000.00 from accused�s right hand �and upon instruction from
PCINSP Ylanan recorded the same at the �police blotter prior operation�. . . .�28

The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM �in conducting the operation against the accused.�29

Version of the accused

In defense, accused testified that she worked as a laundrywoman. On the evening of May 2, 2008, she went out to buy
supper. While walking, she was stopped by two men on board a blue car. The two men asked her if she knew someone
named Bingbing. She replied that she only knew Gingging but not Bingbing. The men informed her that they were
actually looking for Gingging, gave her a piece of paper with a number written on it, and told her to tell Gingging to
bring companions. When accused arrived home, she contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come because
allegedly, she would be given money by the two males.30

Ruling of the trial court

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and held31
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . . as defined under paragraph (a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208 for
the purpose of letting her engage in prostitution as defined under paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of �sexual
intercourse� need not have been consummated for the mere �transaction� i.e. the �solicitation� for sex and the
handing over of the �bust money� of Php1,000.00 already consummated the said act.

....
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of trafficking in persons
under paragraph (a), Section 4 as qualified under paragraph (a), Section 6 of R.A. 9208 and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00).

Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.

SO ORDERED[.]32

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the fine and awarded moral damages. The
dispositive portion of the decision33 reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 10
August 2010 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CBU-83122 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay each of the private complainants Php150,000 as moral
damages.

SO ORDERED.34

Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the Court of Appeals noted and gave due course in its
resolution36 dated January 6, 2014.

The case records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01490 were received by this court on March 17, 2014.37

In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to notify the parties that they may file their respective
supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. This court also required the Superintendent of the Correctional
Institution for Women to confirm the confinement of accused.39

Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor General41 filed their respective manifestations, stating that they
would no longer file supplemental briefs considering that all issues had been discussed in the appellant�s brief and
appellee�s brief filed before the Court of Appeals. Through a letter42 dated June 17, 2014, Superintendent IV Rachel D.
Ruelo confirmed accused�s confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women since October 27, 2010.

The sole issue raised by accused is whether the prosecution was able to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

However, based on the arguments raised in accused�s brief, the sole issue may be dissected into the following:

(1)
Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid, considering that there was no prior surveillance
and the police did not know the subject of the operation;43

(2)

Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused�s guilt beyond reasonable doubt even though there was no evidence
presented to show that accused has a history of engaging in human trafficking;44 and

(3)

Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering that AAA admitted that she works as a
prostitute.45

Arguments of accused

Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was instigated into committing the crime.46 The police
did not conduct prior surveillance and did not even know who their subject was.47 Neither did the police know the
identities of the alleged victims.

Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should be acquitted because the prosecution did not present
evidence that would prove she had a history of engaging in human trafficking or any other offense. She denied being a
pimp and asserted that she was a laundrywoman.48 In addition, AAA admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it
was her decision to display herself to solicit customers.49

Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee

The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, argued that the trial court did
not err in convicting accused because witnesses positively identified her as the person who solicited customers and
received money for AAA and BBB.50 Entrapment operations are valid and have been recognized by courts.51 Likewise,
her arrest in flagrante delicto is valid.52 Hence, the trial court was correct in stating that accused had �fully
consummated the act of trafficking of persons. . .�53

We affirm accused Shirley A. Casio�s conviction.

I.

Background of Republic Act No. 9208

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN CTOC) was �adopted and opened for
signature, ratification and accession�54 on November 15, 2000. The UN CTOC is supplemented by three protocols: (1)
the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; (2) the Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.55
On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations �Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children� (Trafficking Protocol).56 This was ratified by the Philippine Senate on
September 30, 2001.57 The Trafficking Protocol�s entry into force was on December 25, 2003.58

In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Article 3

Use of terms

For the purposes of this Protocol:

(a) �Trafficking in persons� shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power
or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;

(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article
shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;

(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be
considered �trafficking in persons� even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of this
article;

(d) �Child� shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.

Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the �Anti-Trafficking Act will serve as the enabling law of
the country�s commitment to [the] protocol.�59

Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship speech and described trafficking in persons as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its hideousness, is tantamount to modern-day slavery at
work. It is a manifestation of one of the most flagrant forms of violence against human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt
of this insidious form of violence. It is exploitation, coercion, deception, abduction, rape, physical, mental and other forms
of abuse, prostitution, forced labor, and indentured servitude.

....
As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women; the 1995 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the United Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant
Workers and their Families; and the United Nations� Resolution on Trafficking in Women and Girls, among others.

Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United Nations� Convention Against Organized Crime, including
the Trafficking Protocol in October last year.

At first glance, it appears that we are very responsive to the problem. So it seems.

Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up with a law that shall squarely address human
trafficking.60

During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then numbered as Senate Bill No. 2444, Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta
asked if there was a necessity for an anti-trafficking law when other laws exist that cover trafficking.61

Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking issue are the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 8042 or
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, R[epublic] A[ct] No. 6955 or the Mail-Order Bride Act, and Republic Act
No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act. These laws address issues such as illegal recruitment, prostitution, falsification of
public documents and the mail-order bride scheme. These laws do not respond to the issue of recruiting, harboring or
transporting persons resulting in prostitution, forced labor, slavery and slavery-like practices. They only address to one or
some elements of trafficking independent of their results or consequence.62 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address the issue of human trafficking. Republic Act No. 9208
was passed on May 12, 2003, and approved on May 26, 2003.

II.

Elements of trafficking in persons

The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1)

The act of �recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim�s
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders.�

(2)

The means used which include �threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another; and

(3)
The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes �exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of
sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.�63

On January 28, 2013, Republic Act No. 1036464 was approved, otherwise known as the �Expanded Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2012.� Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 was amended by Republic Act No. 10364 as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:

�SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. � As used in this Act:

�(a) Trafficking in Persons � refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim�s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which
includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

�The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or
when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as
�trafficking in persons� even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph. (Emphasis
supplied)

Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to include the following
acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1)

The act of �recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt
of persons with or without the victim�s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;�

(2)

The means used include �by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person�

(3)

The purpose of trafficking includes �the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs� (Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their services were peddled to the police
who acted as decoys.65 AAA was a child at the time that accused peddled her services.66 AAA also stated that she agreed
to work as a prostitute because she needed money.67 Accused took advantage of AAA�s vulnerability as a child and as
one who need money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.68

III.

Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.
Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even before May 2, 2008. She concludes that AAA was
predisposed to having sex with �customers� for money.69 For liability under our law, this argument is irrelevant. As
defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives
consent.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. � As used in this Act:

Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be
considered as �trafficking in persons� even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.70 (Emphasis supplied)

The victim�s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by
perpetrators of human trafficking.71 Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor�s consent is
not given out of his or her own free will.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts of trafficking in persons. Accused was charged under
Section 4(a), which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. � It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or judicial, to commit any of the
following acts.

a.� To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the
pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;72

Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of trafficking in persons is qualified.

SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. � The following are considered as qualified trafficking:

When the trafficked person is a child;

When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the �Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995� and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercise authority over the trafficked person
or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;

When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military or law enforcement
agencies;

When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and

When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers
mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73

Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines �child� as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. � As used in this Act:

. . . .�

b.

Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care
of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.74

Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of trafficking in persons, accused performed
all the elements in the commission of the offense when she peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The offense was also qualified because the trafficked persons were
minors.

Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for the customers waiting at Queensland Motel. AAA also
testified that she was only 17 years old when accused peddled her. Her certificate of live birth was presented as evidence
to show that she was born on January 27, 1991.

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed the offense of trafficking in persons,
qualified by the fact that one of the victims was a child. As held by the trial court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[T]he act of �sexual intercourse� need not have been consummated for the mere �transaction� i.e. that �solicitation�
for sex and the handing over of the �bust money� of Php.1,000.00 already consummated the said act.75

IV.

Validity of the entrapment operation

In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and the subjective test to determine whether there was a valid
entrapment operation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the �subjective� or �origin of intent� test laid down in
Sorrells v. United States to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's
predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government
agents. All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in
committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. The predisposition
test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct and reflects an
attempt to draw a line between a �trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.� If the accused
was found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense
will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement.

Some states, however, have adopted the �objective� test. . . . Here, the court considers the nature of the police activity
involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents, on
police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter
unlawful police conduct. The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce
a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense; for purposes of this test, it
is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the
simple opportunity to act unlawfully. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)77

Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply the objective test in determining the whether there was an
entrapment operation or an instigation.78 However, the use of the objective test should not preclude courts from also
applying the subjective test. She pointed out that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Applying the �subjective � test it is worth invoking that accused-appellant procures income from being a laundry
woman. The prosecution had not shown any proof evidencing accused-appellant�s history in human trafficking or
engagement in any offense. She is not even familiar to the team who had has [sic] been apprehending human traffickers
for quite some time.79 (Citations omitted)

Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a prior surveillance before the entrapment operation.

Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between entrapment and instigation. In Chang v. People,80 this
court explained that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the
actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in
the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the
criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the
commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.81

Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly instigated by the police to commit the offense. She denied
being a pimp and claimed that she earned her living as a laundrywoman. On this argument, we agree with the finding of
the Court of Appeals:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction with PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso by calling their
attention on whether they wanted girls for that evening, and when the officers responded, it was the accused-appellant
who told them to wait while she would fetch the girls for their perusal.82

This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she initiated the transaction. As testified by PO1
Veloso and PO1 Luardo, accused called out their attention by saying �Chicks mo dong?� If accused had no
predisposition to commit the offense, then she most likely would not have asked PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they
wanted girls.
The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The police merely proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in
Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who asked them whether they wanted girls. There was no illicit inducement on the
part of the police for the accused to commit the crime.

When accused was arrested, she was informed of her constitutional rights.83 The marked money retrieved from her was
recorded in the police blotter prior to the entrapment operation and was presented in court as evidence.84

On accused�s alibi that she was merely out to buy her supper that night, the Court of Appeals noted that accused never
presented Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi was unsubstantiated and cannot be given credence.85

With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for an entrapment operation�s
validity.86 In People v. Padua87 this court underscored the value of flexibility in police
operations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which
has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. However the police carry out its entrapment
operations, for as long as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the
wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior
surveillance.88 (Citations omitted)

This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The urgency of rescuing the victims may
at times require immediate but deliberate action on the part of the law enforcers.

V.

Imposition of fine and award of damages

The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of P2,000,000.00. Section 10 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. � The following penalties and sanctions are hereby established for the offenses
enumerated in this Act:

. . . .�

c.

Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00);

However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages from P150,000.0089 to P500,000.00. We also award
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00. These amounts are in accordance with the ruling in People v. Lalli90
where this court held that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as
a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

....

The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape,
or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without one�s consent and to be sexually
violated four to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita
experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in
Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise justified.91

Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of poverty and its accompanying desperation that compels
our women to endure indignities. It reflects the weaknesses of that society even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive
in such hopelessness. We should continue to strive for the best of our world, where our choices of human intimacies are
real choices, and not the last resort taken just to survive. Human intimacies enhance our best and closest relationships. It
serves as a foundation for two human beings to face life�s joys and challenges while continually growing together with
many shared experiences. The quality of our human relationships defines the world that we create also for others.
Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, we affirm the text and spirit of our laws.
Minors should spend their adolescence moulding their character in environments free of the vilest motives and the worse
of other human beings. The evidence and the law compel us to affirm the conviction of accused in this case.

But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we also express the hope that our people and our
government unite against everything inhuman. We contribute to a commitment to finally stamp out slavery and human
trafficking.

There are more AAA�s and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to be rescued. They, too, need to be shown that in spite of
what their lives have been, there is still much good in our world.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 2013, finding
accused Shirley A. Casio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic
Act No. 9208, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P2,000,000.00, with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law)
in accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.92

The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:

Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants:

(1) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and

(2) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr.,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE VS CASIO (G.R. NO. 211465 DECEMBER 3, 2014)

People of the Philippines vs Casio

G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014

Facts: On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), a nongovernmental organization, coordinated with the police
in order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino
Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso composed the team of police operatives,
Luardo and Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides looking for girls to entertain their guests. IJM
provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the police blotter. The team went to Queensland Motel and
rented adjacent Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24 was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police
team. PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light
district where the accused noticed them and called their attention. Negotiation occured and upon the signal, the accused
was arrested and the two minors were taken into custody by the DSWD officials.

Issue: Whether or not accused is liable for trafficking of persons.

Held: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to include the
following acts:

(1) The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or
receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;”

(2) The means used include “by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person”

(3) The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs”

The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their services were peddled to the police
who acted as decoys. AAA was a child at the time that accused peddled her services.66 to work as a prostitute because
she needed money. AAA also stated that she agreed Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one
who need money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.

Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.

“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or
when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as
‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.”
Accused is further guilty of qualified trafficking. SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons.— The following are considered
as qualified trafficking:

When the trafficked person is a child;

When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995” and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large
scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;

When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercise authority over the trafficked person
or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;

When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military or law enforcement
agencies;

When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and

When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane, suffers
mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunod eficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS).