Van Dorn vs. Romillo Jr.

139 SCRA 139

Facts:
Alice Reyes, a Filipina, married Richard Upton, an American, in Hongkong in 1972. They established residence in the
Philippines and had two children. In 1982, the wife sued for divorce in Nevada, U.S.A., on the ground of incompatibility. She later
married Theodore Van Dorn in Nevada in 1983. Upton sued her before RTC, Branch LXV in Pasay City asking that she be ordered
to render an accounting of her business, which Upton alleged to be conjugal property. He also prayed that he be declared with a
right to manage the conjugal property. The defendant wife moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the cause of action
was barred by a previous judgment in the divorce proceedings wherein he had acknowledged that the couple had no “community
property”.

Issue:
Whether or not absolute divorce decree granted by U.S. court, between Filipina wife and American husband held
binding upon the latter.

Ruling:
The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada Divorce of the parties. There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any states of the U.S. The decree is binding on Upton as an American citizen. Hence, he cannot sue petitioner,
as her husband, in any state of the United States. It is true that owing to the nationality principle under article 15 of the civil code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Upton from the marriage from
the standards of American law. Thus, pursuant to his national law, he is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case as petitioner husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is also estopped by his
own representation before the Nevada court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. He should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v.

REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian

citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in
Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was
issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12,
1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent
was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on
the ground of bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her. On his Answer, Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly
dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from
a family court in Sydney, Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”

The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on
the ground that the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there
was no more marital union to nullify or annul.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.

2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.

RULING:

1st issue:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of
respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Furthermore, the divorce decree
between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

2nd issue:

Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have
been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to
his national law. Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which
erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity
to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence. The Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her
marriage to respondent null and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to
marry.

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and
EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014, J. Lucas P. Bersamin
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law.
Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted
as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be
enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage. Atty. Luna’s
subsequent marriage to Soledad was void for being bigamous, on the ground that the marriage between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo
in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna. Given the subsistence of the
first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties
out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties
in lit is legally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently,
the sole ownership of the 25/100pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the law
books pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

PILAPIL v IBAY-SOMERA174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and the respondent to the case, and Erich
Geiling, a German national, were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After
about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany
in January 1983 while Pilapil filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before
RTC of Manila in January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local
Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was granted to petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent, petitioner
had an affair with a certain William Chia and Jesus Chua sometime in 1982 and 1983 respectively. The
respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against
petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but
before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987,
respondent judge denied the motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused.
Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent’s adultery charges against the petitioner is still valid given the
fact that both had been divorced prior to the filing of charges.

HELD:

The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the
complaint should only be the offended spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce
in his country in 1983, is admitted. According to Article 15 of the Civil Code, with relation to the status
of Filipino citizens both here and abroad, since the legal separation of the petitioner and respondent has
been finalized through the courts in Germany and the RTC in Manila, the marriage of the couple
were already finished, thus giving no merit to the charges the respondent filed against the petitioner.
Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner holds no legal merit to commence the adultery
case as the offended spouse at the time he filed suit in 1986. The temporary restraining order issued in
this case was made permanent.

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