II.
JURISDICTION Act of 1995, the subject matter of PEZA’s petition for
1. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU V. PEZA
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari the
City of Lapu-Lapu and the Province of Bataan separately filed
against the Philippine Economic Zone Authority(PEZA).
In G.R. No. 184203, the City of Lapu-Lapu (the City) assails
the Court of Appeals’ decision2 dated January 11, 2008 and
resolution3 dated August 6, 2008, dismissing the City’s appeal
for being the wrong mode of appeal. The City appealed the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City’s decision
finding the PEZA exempt from payment of real property taxes.
In G.R. No. 187583, the Province of Bataan (the Province)
assails the Court of Appeals’ decision4dated August 27, 2008
and resolution5 dated April 16, 2009, granting the PEZA’s
petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 115, Pasay City gravely abused
its discretion in finding the PEZA liable for real property taxes
to the Province of Bataan.
Facts common to both cases:
President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 66 in 1972, declaring as government policy the
establishment of export processing zones in strategic
locations in the Philippines. To carry such policy, the Export
Processing Zone Authority was created. The said decree
declared that EPZA will be a non-profit entity, and was also
declared to be exempt from taxes.
Facts of G.R. No. 184203
On March 25, 1998, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office
of the Treasurer, demanded from the PEZA PHP
32,912,350.08 in real property taxes for the period from 1992
to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan
Economic Zone. The City pointed out that no provision in the
Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 specifically exempted the
PEZA from payment of real property taxes, unlike Section 21
of Presidential Decree No. 66 that explicitly provided for
EPZA’s exemption. Since no legal provision explicitly
exempted the PEZA from payment of real property taxes, the
City argued that it can tax the PEZA.
On September 11, 2002, the PEZA filed a petition for
declaratory relief25 with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from
payment of real property taxes. Pursuant to Rule 63, Section
3 of Rules of Court, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
comment31 on the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief. It
agreed that the PEZA is exempt from payment of real property
taxes, citing Sections 24 and 51 of the Special Economic Zone
Act of 1995. Characterizing the PEZA as an agency of the
National Government, the trial court ruled that the City had no
authority to tax the PEZA under Sections 133(o) and 234(a) of
the Local Government Code of 1991. In the resolution32 dated
June 14, 2006, the trial court granted the PEZA’s petition for
declaratory relief and declared it exempt from payment of real
property taxes.
ISSUE: WON the RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide on
the petition of declaratory relief by PEZA against the city of
Lapu-Lapu
RULING: The Regional Trial Court of Pasay had no
jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide
the PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief against the City of
Lapu-Lapu
. any other jurisdictional defense in any action commenced by
We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for
declaratory relief against the City. The City had already
issued demand letters and real property tax assessment
against the PEZA, in violation of the PEZA’s alleged tax-
exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic Zone
declaratory relief, had already been breached. The trial court,
therefore, had no jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory
relief.
A special civil action for declaratory relief is filed for a judicial
determination of any question of construction or validity arising
from, and for a declaration of rights and duties, under any of
the following subject matters: a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation. However, a
declaratory judgment may issue only if there has been “no
breach of the documents in question.” If the contract or statute
subject matter of the action has already been breached, the
appropriate ordinary civil action must be filed. If adequate
relief is available through another form of action or
proceeding, the other action must be preferred over an action
for declaratory relief. In the present case, the Regional Trial
Court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action,
specifically, over the remedy sought.
In sum, a petition for declaratory relief must satisfy six
requisites:c[F]irst, the subject matter of the controversy must
be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second, the terms
of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction; third, there must have been no
breach of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an
actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one
between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue
must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth, adequate
relief is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.
We rule that the PEZA erred in availing itself of a petition for
declaratory relief against the City. The City had already
issued demand letters and real property tax assessment
against the PEZA, in violation of the PEZA’s alleged tax-
exempt status under its charter. The Special Economic Zone
Act of 1995, the subject matter of PEZA’s petition for
declaratory relief, had already been breached. The trial court,
therefore, had no jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory
relief.
In the present case, the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, specially,
over the remedy. The trial court should have dismissed the
PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief for lack of jurisdiction.
2. BERNABE VS. NAVIDA
FACTS:
Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed
in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve foreign
countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of
plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained
from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a
chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on
farms in 23 foreign countries. The cases were eventually
transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The
defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal
of all the actions under the doctrineof forum non conveniens.
In a Memorandum Order, the Federal District Court
conditionally granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss
provided the defendants:
(1) participated in expedited discovery in the United States
(2) either waived or accepted service of process and waived
a plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country
in which his injury occurred.
(3) waived any limitations-based defense that has matured
since the commencement of these actions in the courts of
Texas;
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(4) stipulated that any discovery conducted during the
pendency of these actions may be used in any foreign
proceeding to the same extent as if it had been conducted
5) submitted an agreement binding them to satisfy any final
judgment rendered in favor of plaintiffs by a foreign court.
In the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally
affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action
commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his home country
or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return
to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume
jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never been
dismissed for. Case 1 (125078) and 2 (125598): 336 plaintiffs
from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC
of General Santos City. Named as defendants therein were:
Shell Oil Co. (SHELL); Dow Chemical Co. (DOW); Occidental
Chemical Corp. (OCCIDENTAL); Dole Food Co., Inc., Dole
Fresh Fruit Co., Standard Fruit Co., Standard Fruit and
Steamship Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DOLE);
Chiquita Brands, Inc. and Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
(CHIQUITA); Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A. and Del Monte
Tropical Fruit Co. (hereinafter collectively referred to as DEL
MONTE); Dead Sea Bromine Co., Ltd.; Ameribrom, Inc.;
Bromine Compounds, Ltd.; and Amvac Chemical Corp. (The
aforementioned defendants are hereinafter collectively
referred to as defendant companies.)
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of
the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which
they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP.
They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this
chemical during the early 1970’s up to the early 1980’s when
they used the same in the banana plantations where they
worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural
area where such chemical was used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed
that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or
negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they
produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of
commerce DBCP-containing products. According to NAVIDA,
et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products,
which the defendant companies knew, or ought to have
known, were highly injurious to the former’s health and well-
being.
Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of
General Santos City issued an Order dismissing the
complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case because the substance of the
cause of action as stated in the complaint against the
defendant foreign companies cites activity on their part which
took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the
territorial domain of the Philippines. These acts of defendants
cited in the complaint included the manufacture of pesticides,
their packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or
other disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream
of commerce. The subject matter stated in the complaint and
which is uniquely particular to the present case, consisted of
activity or course of conduct engaged in by foreign defendants
outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the
jurisdiction of Philippine Courts, including the present
Regional Trial Court.
Second, the RTC of General Santos City adjudged that
NAVIDA, et al., were coerced into submitting their case to the
Philippine courts, merely to comply with the U.S. District
Court’s Order and in order to keep open to the plaintiffs the
opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.
Third, the trial court ascribed little significance to the voluntary
appearance of the defendant companies. Defendants have
appointed their agents authorized to accept service of
summons/processes in the Philippines pursuant to the
agreement in the U.S. court that defendants will voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of this court. While it is true that this
court acquires jurisdiction over persons of the defendants
through their voluntary appearance, it appears that such
voluntary appearance of the defendants in this case is
conditional. Thus in the “Defendants’ Amended Agreement
Regarding Conditions of Dismissal for Forum Non
Conveniens” filed with the U.S. District Court, defendants
declared that “(t)he authority of each designated
representative to accept service of process will become
effective upon final dismissal of these actions by the Court”.
The decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case is
not yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and
defendants appealed therefrom. Consequently, since the
authority of the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is
conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with
the U.S. courts, the acquisition of jurisdiction by this court over
the persons of the defendants is also conditional.
Fourth, the RTC of General Santos City ruled that the act of
NAVIDA, et al., of filing the case in the Philippine courts
violated the rules on forum shopping and litis pendencia. This
court frowns upon the fact that the parties herein are both
vigorously pursuing their appeal of the decision of the U.S.
District court dismissing the case filed thereat. To allow the
parties to litigate in this court when they are actively pursuing
the same cases in another forum, violates the rule on ‘forum
shopping’ so abhorred in this jurisdiction. Moreover, the filing
of the case in the U.S. courts divested this court of its own
jurisdiction. This court takes note that the U.S. District Court
did not decline jurisdiction over the cause of action. The case
was dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, which
is really a matter of venue. By taking cognizance of the case,
the U.S. District Court has, in essence, concurrent jurisdiction
with this court over the subject matter of this case. It is settled
that initial acquisition of jurisdiction divests another of its own
jurisdiction.
Case 3 (126654), 4 (127856), 5(128398)
Another joint complaint for damages against SHELL, DOW,
OCCIDENTAL, DOLE, DEL MONTE, and CHIQUITA was
filed before Branch 16 of the RTC of Davao City by 155
plaintiffs from Davao City. They alleged that as workers in the
banana plantation and/or as residents near the said
plantation, they were made to use and/or were exposed to
nematocides, which contained the chemical DBCP. According
to ABELLA, et al., such exposure resulted in “serious and
permanent injuries to their health, including, but not limited to,
sterility and severe injuries to their reproductive capacities.”
The RTC of Davao City, however, junked Civil Cases. The
Court however is constrained to dismiss the case at bar not
solely on the basis of the above but because it shares the
opinion of legal experts given in the interview made by the
Inquirer in its Special report “Pesticide Cause Mass Sterility,”
Former Justice Secretary Demetrio Demetria in a May 1995
opinion said: The Philippines should be an inconvenient forum
to file this kind of damage suit against foreign companies since
the causes of action alleged in the petition do not exist under
Philippine laws. There has been no decided case in Philippine
Jurisprudence awarding to those adversely affected by DBCP.
This means there is no available evidence which will prove
and disprove the relation between sterility and DBCP.
Eventually, the cases reached the SC!
Present case:
The main contention of the petitioners states that the allegedly
tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant companies
occurred within Philippine territory. Said fact allegedly
constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume
jurisdiction over the case.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant
companies constitute a quasi-delict, which falls under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. DOLE also argues that if indeed there
is no positive law defining the alleged acts of defendant
companies as actionable wrong, Article 9 of the Civil Code
dictates that a judge may not refuse to render a decision on
the ground of insufficiency of the law. The court may still
2
resolve the case, applying the customs of the place and, in the
absence thereof, the general principles of law.
CHIQUITA (another petitioner) argues that the courts a quo
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the cases filed
before them. CHIQUITA avers that the pertinent matter is the
place of the alleged exposure to DBCP, not the place of
manufacture, packaging, distribution, sale, etc., of the said
chemical. This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti
commisi theory in determining the situs of a tort, which states
that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was
committed will govern the action. CHIQUITA and the other
defendant companies also submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the RTC by making voluntary appearances and
seeking for affirmative reliefs during the course of the
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTCs have jurisdiction over the subject
matter in these cases.
HELD: Yes.
1. The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter
of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all
or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law,
on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody
other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the
RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, states:
The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever kind” in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to
or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in
cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of
action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such
claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.
It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause of
action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is
approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants.
The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed
in General Santos City and Davao City.
2. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the defendants. What
determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the
action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
complaint. The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the
defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict which is the
basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of approximately P2.7
million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviously falls within
the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.
3. It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when
they dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated
by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and
had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of
the Philippines, i.e., “the manufacture of the pesticides, their
packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other
disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of
commerce,” and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where
territoriality, or the situs of the act complained of, would be
determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In
personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages,
the Rules of Court allow the action to be commenced and tried
in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or
defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove
the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available
only in the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all
residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or
in Davao City. Second, the specific areas where they were
allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the
territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et
al., and ABELLA, et al., initially filed their claims for damages.
Third, the testimonial and documentary evidence from
important witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family
members and other members of the community, would be
easier to gather in the Philippines.
Re: Jurisdiction over the person
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City
validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the
defendant companies. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally
and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the defendant companies
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by
making several voluntary appearances, by praying for various
affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the
course of the proceedings below.
In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the
Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant in civil cases is acquired either by his
voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its
authority or by service of summons. Furthermore, the active
participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an
invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide
by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party from later
on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction v Exercise of Jurisdiction
It may also be pertinently stressed that “jurisdiction” is different
from the “exercise of jurisdiction.” Jurisdiction refers to the
authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision
rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction
over the persons of the defendants and the subject matter, as
in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions
arising therefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any
error that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not
affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the
court of the jurisdiction over the case.
Re: Bad faith in filing cases to procure a dismissal and to allow
petitioners to return to the forum of their choice.
This Court finds such argument much too speculative to
deserve any merit.
It must be remembered that this Court does not rule on
allegations that are unsupported by evidence on record. This
Court does not rule on allegations which are manifestly
conjectural, as these may not exist at all. This Court deals with
facts, not fancies; on realities, not appearances.
* We REMAND the records of this case to the respective
Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and appropriate
3
proceedings in line with the ruling herein that said courts have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended
complaints.
DOCTRINE:
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT-MATTER
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations
in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some
of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on a
particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by anybody other
than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.
At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the
RTC in civil cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:
“SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.—Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxxx (8) In all
other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where
the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).”
Corollary thereto, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No.
0994,
states: “2. The exclusion of the term “damages of whatever
kind” in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section
19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by
R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are
merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the
main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the
court.” It is clear that the claim for damages is the main cause
of action and that the total amount sought in the complaints is
approximately P2.7 million for each of the plaintiff claimants.
The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction over the cases filed
in General Santos City and Davao City, as both claims by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., fall within the purview of
the definition of the jurisdiction of the RTC under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
Moreover, the allegations in both Amended JointComplaints
narrate that the defendants were at fault or were negligent in
that they manufactured, produced, sold, and/or used DBCP
and/or otherwise, put the same into the stream of commerce,
without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health
and/or health and/or without instructions on its proper use and
application.
As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints,
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., point to the acts and/or
omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing,
producing, selling, using, and/or otherwise putting into the
stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP,
without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health
and/or without instructions on its proper use and application.
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the cause
of action of plaintiff claimants — a quasidelict,
which under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code is defined as an act,
or omission which causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence.
JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY ALLEGATIONS OF THE
COMPLAINT
Jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the action
is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective
of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all
or some of the claims asserted therein. The jurisdiction of the
court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in
the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the
question of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the
defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is
the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the
allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the
character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the
defendant companies constitute a quasidelict
which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA,
et al., and ABELLA, et al., with individual claims of
approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which
obviously falls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction
of the RTCs.
Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., allegedly suffered resulted from their
exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana
plantations located in the Philippines or while they were
residing within the agricultural areas also located in the
Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint
Complaints
all point to their cause of action, which undeniably occurred in
the Philippines.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they
dismissed the cases on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on
the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated by
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and
had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of
the Philippines, i.e., “the manufacture of the pesticides, their
packaging in containers, their distribution through sale or other
disposition, resulting in their becoming part of the stream of
commerce,” and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.
The cases are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the
situs of the act complained of, would be determinative of
jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases.
In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of
damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to be
commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of
the plaintiffs or defendants resides, or in the case of a
nonresident
defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
CONVENIENT FORUM
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove
the claims of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., are available
only in the Philippines:
1. Plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either
in General Santos City or in Davao City
2. The specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to
the chemical DBCP are within the territorial jurisdiction of the
courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
initially filed their claims for damages
3. The testimonial and documentary evidence from important
witnesses, such as doctors, coworkers,
family members and other members of the community, would
be easier to gather in the Philippines
Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the
alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,
against the defendant companies for damages occurred in the
Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the RTC of General
Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction
over the subject matter in the instant civil cases, they are,
indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases
.
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City
validly acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the
defendant companies. All parties voluntarily, unconditionally
and knowingly appeared and submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the courts a quo. All the defendant companies
designated and authorized representatives to receive
4
summons and to represent them in the proceedings before the
courts a quo. All the defendant companies submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making
several voluntary appearances, by praying for various
affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the
course of the proceedings below.
Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that “[t]he defendant’s voluntary appearance in the
action shall be equivalent to service of summons.
Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is
acquired either by his voluntary appearance in court and his
submission to its authority or by service of summons.
Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the
proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court’s
jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the
case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court
or body’s jurisdiction.
JURISDICTION V. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is different from the exercise of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is authority to decide a case, not the orders or the
decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has
jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants and the subject
matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all
questions arising therefrom is but an exercise of such
jurisdiction.
Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not
affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the
court of the jurisdiction over the case.
Anent the insinuation by DOLE that the plaintiff claimants filed
their cases in bad faith merely to procure a dismissal of the
same and to allow them to return to the forum of their choice,
this Court finds such argument much too speculative to
deserve any merit.
3. LANDBANK OF THE PHIL VS CORAZON VILLEGAS
FACTS:
These consolidated cases[1] are about the jurisdiction of a
Regional Trial Court (RTC), acting as a Special Agrarian
Court, over just compensation cases involving agricultural
lands located outside its regular territorial jurisdiction but
within the province where it is designated as agrarian court
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
The Facts and the Case
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) filed
cases for determination of just compensation against
respondent Corazon M. Villegas in Civil Case 2007-14174 and
respondent heirs of Catalino V. Noel and Procula P. Sy in
Civil Case 2007-14193 before the RTC of Dumaguete City,
Branch 32, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court for the province
of Negros Oriental. Respondent Villegas property was
in Hibaiyo, Guihulngan City, Negros Oriental, while
respondent heirs land was
in Nangca, Bayawan City, NegrosOriental. These lands
happened to be outside the regular territorial jurisdiction of
RTC Branch 32 of Dumaguete City.
On September 13, 2007 RTC, Branch 32 dismissed Civil Case
2007-14174 for lack of jurisdiction.[2] It ruled that, although it
had been designated Special Agrarian Court for Negros
Oriental, the designation did not expand its territorial
jurisdiction to hear agrarian cases under the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan City where
respondent Villegas property can be found.
On November 16, 2007 RTC, Branch 32 also dismissed Civil
Case 2007-14193 for lack of jurisdiction. It pointed out that
RTC, Branch 63 of Bayawan City had jurisdiction over the
case since respondent heirs property was within the latter
courts territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioner Land Bank moved for the reconsideration of the
dismissal of the two cases but RTC, Branch 32 denied both
motions.[3] Aggrieved, Land Bank directly filed this petitions
for certiorari[4] before this Court, raising a purely question of
law.
ISSUE: The sole question presented in these cases is
whether or not an RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court, has
jurisdiction over just compensation cases involving
agricultural lands located outside its regular jurisdiction but
within the province where it is designated as an agrarian court
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998.
HELD: The RTC, Branch 32 based its order on Deputy Court
Administrator (DCA) Zenaida Elepaos opinion that
single sala courts have jurisdiction over agrarian cases
involving lands located within its territorial jurisdiction. An RTC
branch acting as a special agrarian court, she claimed, did not
have expanded territorial jurisdiction. DCA Elepao said:
x x x [B]eing a single sala court, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 64, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, has jurisdiction
over all cases, including agrarian cases, cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court emanating from the geographical
areas within its territorial jurisdiction.
Further, the jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Courts
over agrarian cases is co-extensive with its territorial
jurisdiction. Administrative Order No. 80 dated July 18,
1989, as amended by Administrative Order No. 80A-90
dated February 23, 1990, did not expand the territorial
jurisdiction of the courts designated as Special Agrarian
Courts.[5]
Respondent Villegas[6] adopts DCA Elepaos view. Villegas
points out that the designation of RTC, Branch 32 as a Special
Agrarian Court did not expand its territorial
jurisdiction. Although it has been designated Special Agrarian
Court for the Province of Negros Oriental, its jurisdiction as an
RTC did not cover the whole province.
Respondent Villegas adds that, in hearing just compensation
cases, RTC, Branch 64 in Guihulngan City should be no
different from the situation of other single sala courts that
concurrently hear drugs and family-related cases even as the
Supreme Court has designated family and drugs courts
in Dumaguete City within the same
province. Further, Guihulngan City is more than 100
kilometers from Dumaguete City where RTC, Branch 32
sits. For practical considerations, RTC, Branch 64
of Guihulngan City should hear and decide the case.
For their part, on June 19, 2009 respondent heirs of Noel
informed[7] the Court that petitioner Land Bank had already
paid them for their land. Consequently, they have no further
interest in the outcome of the case. It is not clear, however, if
the trial court had already approved a settlement.
Jurisdiction is the courts authority to hear and determine a
case. The courts jurisdiction over the nature and subject
matter of an action is conferred by law.[8] In this case, the law
that confers jurisdiction on Special Agrarian Courts
designated by the Supreme Court in every province is
Republic Act (R.A.) 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988. Sections 56 and 57 are the relevant
provisions:
SEC. 56. Special Agrarian Court. - The Supreme Court
shall designate at least one (1) branch of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) within each province to act as a Special
Agrarian Court.
5
The Supreme Court may designate more branches to
constitute such additional Special Agrarian Courts as
may be necessary to cope with the number of agrarian
cases in each province. In the designation, the Supreme
Court shall give preference to the Regional Trial Courts
which have been assigned to handle agrarian cases or
whose presiding judges were former judges of the
defunct Court of Agrarian Relations.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) judges assigned
to said courts shall exercise said special jurisdiction in
addition to the regular jurisdiction of their respective
courts.
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts unless
modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate
cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30)
days from submission of the case for decision.
The law is clear. A branch of an RTC designated as a Special
Agrarian Court for a province has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation in that province. In Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[9] the Supreme Court ruled that Special Agrarian
Courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over two
categories of cases: (1) all petitions for the determination of
just compensation to landowners, and (2) the prosecution of
all criminal offenses under R.A. 6657.
By special jurisdiction, Special Agrarian Courts exercise
power in addition to or over and above the ordinary jurisdiction
of the RTC, such as taking cognizance of suits involving
agricultural lands located outside their regular territorial
jurisdiction, so long as they are within the province where they
sit as Special Agrarian Courts.
R.A. 6657 requires the designation by the Supreme Court
before an RTC Branch can function as a Special Agrarian
Court. The Supreme Court has not designated the
single salacourts of RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan City and
RTC, Branch 63 of Bayawan City as Special Agrarian
Courts. Consequently, they cannot hear just compensation
cases just because the lands subject of such cases happen to
be within their territorial jurisdiction.
Since RTC, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City is the
designated Special Agrarian Court for the province of Negros
Oriental, it has jurisdiction over all cases for determination of
just compensation involving agricultural lands within that
province, regardless of whether or not those properties are
outside its regular territorial jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions, SETS
ASIDE the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32
of Dumaguete City dated September 13, 2007 and October
30, 2007 in Civil Case 2007-14174, entitled Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Corazon Villegas, and its orders dated
November 16, 2007 and December 14, 2007 in Civil Case
2007-14193, entitled Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs
of Catalino V. Noel and Procula P. Sy, which orders
dismissed the cases before it for lack of jurisdiction. Further,
the Court DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 32
of Dumaguete City to immediately hear and decide the two
cases unless a compromise agreement has in the meantime
been approved in the latter case.
DOCTRINE:
The law is clear. A branch of an RTC designated as a Special
Agrarian Court for a province has the original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation in that province.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 758 (1996) the
Supreme Court ruled that Special Agrarian Courts have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of
cases:
(1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners; and
(2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. 6657.
By “special” jurisdiction, Special Agrarian Courts exercise
power in addition to or over and above the ordinary jurisdiction
of the RTC, such as taking cognizance of suits involving
agricultural lands located outside their regular territorial
jurisdiction, so long as they are within the province where they
sit as Special Agrarian Courts.
R.A. 6657 requires the designation by the Supreme Court
before an RTC Branch can function as a Special Agrarian
Court. The Supreme Court has not designated the single sala
courts of RTC, Branch 64 of Guihulngan City and RTC,
Branch
63 of Bayawan City as Special Agrarian Courts.
Consequently, they cannot hear just compensation cases just
because the lands subject of such cases happen to be within
their territorial jurisdiction.
Since RTC, Branch 32 of Dumaguete City is the designated
Special Agrarian Court for the province of Negros Oriental, it
has jurisdiction over all cases for determination of just
compensation involving agricultural lands within that province,
regardless of whether or not those properties are outside its
regular territorial jurisdiction.
4. HERRERA V BERNARDO
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 73674.
The antecedents are as follows:
Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, represented by
Emelita Bernardo, filed a complaint before the Commission on
the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against Alfredo
Herrera (Alfredo) for interference, disturbance, unlawful claim,
harassment and trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land
situated at Barangay Dalig, Cardona, Rizal, with an area of
7,993 square meters. The complaint was docketed as
COSLAP Case No. 99-221.
Respondents claimed that said parcel of land was originally
owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Crisanto Bernardo,
and was later on acquired by Crisanto S. Bernardo. The parcel
of land was later on covered by Tax Declaration No. CD-006-
0828 under the name of the respondents.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the portion of the
subject property consisting of about 700 square meters was
bought by Diosdado Herrera, Alfredo's father, from a certain
Domingo Villaran. Upon the death of Diosdado Herrera,
Alfredo inherited the 700-square-meter lot.
The COSLAP, in a Resolution[3] dated December 6, 1999,
ruled that respondents have a rightful claim over the subject
property. Consequently, a motion for reconsideration and/or
reopening of the proceedings was filed by Alfredo. The
COSLAP, in an Order[4] dated August 21, 2002, denied the
motion and reiterated its Order dated December 6, 1999.
Aggrieved, petitioner Celia S. Vda. de Herrera, as the
surviving spouse of Alfredo, filed a petition for certiorari with
6
the CA.[5] The CA, Twelfth Division, in its Decision dated April
28, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of
the COSLAP. The CA ruled that the COSLAP has exclusive
jurisdiction over the present case and, even assuming that the
COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the land dispute of the
parties herein, petitioner is already estopped from raising the
issue of jurisdiction because Alfredo failed to raise the issue
of lack of jurisdiction before the COSLAP and he actively
participated in the proceedings before the said
body. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated October 17, 2005.
Hence, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
with the following issues:
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT COSLAP HAD JURISDICTION
TO DECIDE THE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF A
TORRENS TITLE IN THE NAME OF THE
PETITIONER'S HUSBAND IN 2002 RENDERED
THE INSTANT CONTROVERSY ON THE ISSUE
OF OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY MOOT AND ACADEMIC.[6]
HELD:
Petitioner averred that the COSLAP has no adjudicatory
powers to settle and decide the question of ownership over
the subject land. Further, the present case cannot be
classified as explosive in nature as the parties never resorted
to violence in resolving the controversy. Petitioner submits
that it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over
controversies relative to ownership of the subject property.
Respondents, on the other hand, alleged that the COSLAP
has jurisdiction over the present case. Further, respondents
argued that petitioner is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of laches due to
Alfredo's active participation in the actual proceedings before
the COSLAP. Respondents said that Alfredo's filing of the
Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reopening of the
proceedings before the COSLAP is indicative of his conformity
with the questioned resolution of the COSLAP.
The main issue for our resolution is whether the COSLAP has
jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership between the
parties.
The petition is meritorious.
The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 561, issued on September 21, 1979 by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an administrative body established
as a means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious
settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners
and members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest.
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 specifically enumerates the
instances when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory
functions:
Section 3. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency
having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute
referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission
may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and
resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and
explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large
number of the parties involved, the presence or
emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar
critical situations requiring immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease
agreement holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation
grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or
applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of
lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and
magnitude.[7]
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of
limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are
specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. [8] Under
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in
acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a)
refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction
for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the
matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of
the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking
into account the large number of parties involved, the
presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar
critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving
whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the
same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to
consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the
parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the
need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent
injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The
law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land
dispute or problem.[9]
In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of respondents' complaint. The present case
does not fall under any of the cases enumerated under
Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561. The dispute
between the parties is not critical and explosive in nature, nor
does it involve a large number of parties, nor is there a
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest. It can also
hardly be characterized as involving a critical situation that
requires immediate action.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a
quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature
and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by
the material allegations therein and the character of the relief
prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or
complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.[10]
Respondents' cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to
their claim of ownership over the subject property, which is an
action involving title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein,[11] the jurisdiction of which is vested with the
Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts depending
on the assessed value of the subject property.[12]
The case of Banaga v. Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems,[13] applied by the CA and invoked by the
respondents, is inapplicable to the present
case. Banagainvolved parties with conflicting free patent
applications over a parcel of public land and pending with the
Bureau of Lands. Because of the Bureau of Land's inaction
within a considerable period of time on the claims and protests
of the parties and to conduct an investigation, the COSLAP
assumed jurisdiction and resolved the conflicting claims of the
parties. The Court held that since the dispute involved a parcel
of public land on a free patent issue, the COSLAP had
jurisdiction over that case. In the present case, there is no
showing that the parties have conflicting free patent
applications over the subject parcel of land that would justify
the exercise of the COSLAP's jurisdiction.
Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the
proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null
and void.[14] A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body
7
without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of any right
or create any obligation.[15] All acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal
effect.[16] Having no legal effect, the situation is the same as it
would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the
parties in the position they were before the proceedings.[17]
Respondents allegation that petitioner is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of
laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from
raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.[18] The fact that a person attempts to
invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him
from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject
matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by
mere consent of the parties.[19]
In Regalado v. Go,[20] the Court held that laches should be
clearly present for the Sibonghanoy[21] doctrine to apply, thus:
Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the
landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy on the
matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than
the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue
of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu
is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies,
laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of
jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant
the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had
abandoned or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised
for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety
almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the
jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was
only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction.[22]
The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present
in the case at bar that would justify the application of estoppel
by laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she appealed the case to the
CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed
for laches to attach. Therefore, petitioner is not estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Additionally, no
laches will even attach because the judgment is null and void
for want of jurisdiction.[23]
Anent the issuance of OCT No. M-10991 in favor of
petitioners husband Alfredo Herrerra in 2002, respondents
alleged that there was fraud, misrepresentation and bad faith
in the issuance thereof. Thus, respondents are now
questioning the legality of OCT No. M-10991, an issue which
this Court cannot pass upon in this present petition. It is a rule
that the validity of a Torrens title cannot be assailed
collaterally.[24] Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529
provides that:
Certificate not Subject to Collateral Attack. − A certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be
altered, modified, or canceled, except in a direct proceeding
in accordance with law.
The issue of the validity of the Title was brought only during
the proceedings before this Court as said title was issued in
the name of petitioner's husband only during the pendency of
the appeal before the CA. The issue on the validity of
title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be
raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose[25] and
the present appeal before us, is simply not the direct
proceeding contemplated by law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated April 28, 2005
and October 17, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 73674
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision and Order of
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems, dated
December 6, 1999 and August 21, 2002, respectively, in
COSLAP Case No. 99-221, are declared NULL and VOID for
having been issued without jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE:
The Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 561, issued on September 21, 1979 by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an administrative body established
as a means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious
settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners
and members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest.
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561 specifically enumerates the
instances when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory
functions:
Section 3. Powers and Functions. — The Commission shall
have the following powers and functions:
2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency
having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute
referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission
may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve
land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in
nature considering, for instance, the large number of the
parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension
or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action:
(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease
agreement holders or timber concessionaires;
(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation
grantees;
(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or
applicants;
(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of
lands of the public domain; and
(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and
magnitude
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of
limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are
specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Under Section
3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on
a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit:
(a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate
jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or
(b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those
enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case
is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large
number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of
social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
immediate action.
In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to
refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the
COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the
land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the
questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent
action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or
destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on
the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.
8
In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of respondents’ complaint. The present case
does not fall under any of the cases enumerated under
Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561. The dispute
between the parties is not critical and explosive in nature, nor
does it involve a large number of parties, nor is there a
presence or emergence of social tension or unrest. It can also
hardly be characterized as involving a critical situation that
requires immediate action.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a
quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature
and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by
the material allegations therein and the character of the relief
prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or
complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.
Respondents’ cause of action before the COSLAP pertains to
their claim of ownership over the subject property, which is an
action involving title to or possession of real property, or any
interest therein, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the
Regional Trial Courts or the Municipal Trial Courts depending
on the assessed value of the subject property.
Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the
proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null
and void. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without
jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of any right or
create any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Having no legal
effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was
no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position they
were before the
proceedings.
QUESTION OF JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED AT ANY
TIME
Respondents’ allegation that petitioner is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of
laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from
raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.
The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter
challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such
jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the
parties.
In Regalado v. Go, the Court held that laches should be clearly
present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to apply, thus:
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction was raised
for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety
almost 15 years after the questioned ruling had been
rendered. At several stages of the proceedings, in the court a
quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, the Surety invoked the
jurisdiction of the said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for final adjudication on the merits. It was
only when the adverse decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction.
The factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present
in the case at bar that would justify the application of estoppel
by laches against the petitioner. Here, petitioner assailed the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP when she appealed the case to the
CA and at that time, no considerable period had yet elapsed
for laches to attach. Therefore, petitioner is not estopped from
assailing the jurisdiction of the COSLAP. Additionally, no
laches will even attach because the judgment is null and void
for want of jurisdiction.
5. DACASIN VS. DACASIN
FACTS:
On April 1994, petitioner and respondent got married here in
the Philippines. The following year respondent got pregnant
and gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Stephanie. In
June of 1999 respondent sought and obtained from the Illinois
Court a divorce decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the
Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and
respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie
and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement
purposes.
On 28th of January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed
in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of
Stephanie. Two years after, petitioner sued respondent in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner claimed that
respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint due to lack
of jurisdiction, since Illinois Court hold the jurisdiction in
enforcing the divorce decree.
ISSUE:
 Whether the Trial Court have the jurisdiction over the
case
 Whether the agreement or contract is valid
HELD:
 Case was dismissed dated March 1, 2005.
Court’s Rationale:
o It is precluded from taking cognizance over
suit considering the Illinois Court’s retention
of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree,
including its order awarding sole custody of
Stephanie to respondent
o The divorce decree is binding on petitioner
following the “nationality rule” prevailing in
this jurisdiction
 Agreement is void
o The agreement is void for contravening
Article 2035 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code
prohibiting compromise agreements on
jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Petitioner sought reconsideration his new argument is that the
divorce decree obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the
divorce is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
the case. In its order on June 23, 2005, the trial court denied
reconsideration because petitioner is under the laws of his
nationality, which is American. Hence, the petitioner filed
alternative theories for the validity of the agreement:
> The agreement noted the valid divorce decree, modifying
the terms of child custody from the sole to joint
> The agreement is independent of the divorce decree
obtained by respondents
ISSUE
 Whether the trial court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of petitioner’s suit
 Whether the trial curt can enforce the
Agreement on joint custody
HELD
Agreement is still void but the court calls for the remand of
the case to settle Stephanie’s custody. (Article 213 of the
Family Code lost its coverage over Stephanie. Stephanie was
already almost 15 during this time thus, she is entitled to
choose to whom she want to be)
Instead of dismissing the case, court chose to
remand the case in order to settle Stephanie’s custody. Court
decided to REVERSE the orders dated March 1, 2005 and
June 23, 2005. The case is REMANDED for further
proceedings consistent with its ruling.
DOCTRINE:
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time
Herald filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on
9
Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to
enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this
species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, Herald went to the
right court.
What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction for the
purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of
its Judgment for Dissolution.” Herald’s suit seeks the
enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the divorce
decree but of the post-divorce agreement on child custody.
Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s
“retained jurisdiction.”
While the trial court had jurisdiction, the agreement cannot be
enforced because it is void for being contrary to law (daughter
was below 7 years old and, by law, she must stay with the
mother). Also, the agreement was repudiated by the mother
when she refused to allow joint custody.
6. FAR EAST BANK vs. SHEMBERT
Facts: Far East Bank & Trust Company (FEBTC), petitioner,
is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing
under Philippine laws. It is now managed and operated by the
Bank of the Philippine Islands with main office in Makati City.
Shemberg Marketing Corporation, Mackie Industries
Corporation, Benson Industries Incorporated, Kamaro
Enterprises Corporation, Polysaccharide Corporation, Prime
Crafts Incorporated, Cebu United Polymer Corporation,
Shemberg Natures Craft Inc., respondents herein, are all duly
registered domestic corporations based in Pakna-an,
Mandaue City. The individual respondents, all surnamed
Dacay, are directors and corporate officers of the said
corporations.
Respondents are the registered owners of several realties
located in Mandaue City. Prior to 1998, respondents entered
into several credit transactions with petitioner secured by
several real estate mortgages. In their respective mortgage
contracts, duly annotated on respondents’ titles, the parties
stipulated that upon failure or refusal of the mortgagor to pay
the obligations when due, the entire principal, interest,
penalties and other charges shall be immediately demandable
and payable without need of notice or demand; and the
mortgagee shall have the absolute discretion to foreclose the
mortgage extrajudicially pursuant to Act No. 3135, as
amended.
On February 28, 2001, respondents filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City, a Complaint4 for
Declaratory Relief, Injunction, Damages, Annulment of
Promissory Notes, Documents, and Contracts against
petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-4045. The
complaint alleges that prior to 1998, respondents obtained
credit accommodations from petitioner. However, it tuned out
that petitioner’s employees filled the blanks with “false and
inaccurate entries.” Respondents deny and dispute the
genuineness and due execution of the documents.
On March 9, 2001, the trial court issued an Order granting
respondents’ prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO). Petitioner filed its Answer with
Affirmative Defenses, Counterclaim, and Vigorous Opposition
to the Order directing the issuance of a TRO and/or
preliminary mandatory injunction. Likewise, petitioner filed
a Motion to Dismiss Based On Affirmative Defenses
alleging that: (1) the venue is improperly laid; (2) the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case for non-
payment of proper docket fees.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioner then
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
declaring that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Whether the trial court has jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. MAN-4045.
Ruling: On the first issue, petitioner contends that in real
actions, the assessed value of the property or if there is none,
the estimated value thereof, must be alleged in the complaint,
and shall serve as the basis for computing the fees. Nowhere
in the complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-4045 did respondents
allege the assessed values of their realties. Hence, there is no
adequate basis for computing the proper filing fees. It
necessarily follows that the fees paid are deficient. The trial
court, therefore, did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Respondents counter that a perusal of the complaint in Civil
Case No. MAN-4045 shows that the suit primarily involves
cancellation of mortgages, an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Consequently, petitioner’s contention that there is
a deficiency in the payment of docket fees is without merit.
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed fees.9 The importance of filing fees
cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court
expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of
supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of
personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the
handling of each case.10 Hence, the non-payment or
insufficient payment of docket fees can entail tremendous
losses to the government in general and to the judiciary in
particular.
Is an action for cancellation of mortgage incapable of
pecuniary estimation?
Under Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 180, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, Regional Trial Courts
have sole, exclusive, and original jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide “all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.”
In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill,11 this Court laid the test for
determining whether the subject matter of an action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus: Ascertain the nature
of the principal action or remedy sought. If the action is
primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation. Whether the
trial court has jurisdiction would depend upon the amount of
the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is only incidental or a consequence of the principal relief
sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Here, the primary reliefs prayed for by respondents in
Civil Case No. MAN-4045 is the cancellation of the real
estate and chattel mortgages for want of consideration. In
Bumayog v. Tumas,12 this Court ruled that where the issue
involves the validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable
of pecuniary estimation. In the more recent case of Russell v.
Vestil,13 this Court, citing Bumayog,14 held that an action
questioning the validity of a mortgage is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Petitioner has not shown adequate
reasons for this Court to revisit Bumayog and Russell. Hence,
petitioner’s contention can not be sustained. Since
respondents paid the docket fees, as computed by the
clerk of court, consequently, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. MAN4045.
DOCTRINE:
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed fees. The importance of filing fees
cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court
10
expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of
supplies, use of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of
personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the
handling of each case. Hence, the non-payment or insufficient
payment of docket fees can entail tremendous losses to the
government in general and to the judiciary in particular.
Is an action for cancellation of mortgage incapable of
pecuniary estimation?
Under Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 180, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, Regional Trial Courts
have sole, exclusive, and original jurisdiction to hear, try, and
decide “all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.”
In Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, this Court laid the test for
determining whether the subject matter of an action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus:
(a) Ascertain the nature of the principal action or remedy
sought.
(b) If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation.
Whether the trial court has jurisdiction would depend upon the
amount of the claim.
(c) However, where the basic issue is something other than
the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is only incidental or a consequence of the principal relief
sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Here, the primary reliefs prayed for by respondents in Civil
Case No. MAN-4045 is the cancellation of the real estate and
chattel mortgages for want of consideration. In Bumayog v.
Tumas, this Court ruled that where the issue involves the
validity of a mortgage, the action is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation. In the more recent case of Russell v. Vestil, this
Court, citing Bumayog, held that an action questioning the
validity of a mortgage is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Petitioner has not shown adequate reasons for this
Court to revisit Bumayog and Russell. Hence, petitioner’s
contention cannot be sustained. Since respondents paid the
docket fees, as computed by the clerk of court, consequently,
the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Civil Case No.
MAN4045.
7. ARRIOLA VS. ARRIOLA
Facts:
John Arriola (respondent) filed a case with the
RTC for judicial partition of the properties of decedent
Fidel Arriola against herein petitioners Vilma and
Ronald Arriola. John is a son of the decedent with the
1st wife; Vilma is the 2nd wife, Ronald her kid with the
deceased.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering partition
of the subject lot into 1/3 share to each party. This
decision became final in March 4, 2004. However,
since the parties failed to agree on how to partition the
lot, John sought its sale through public auction, which
the court ordered. After the date for the public auction
had been scheduled, it had to be reset because the
petitioners Vilma and Roland refused to include in the
auction sale the house standing on the land. Thus,
John filed with the RTC an Urgent Manifestation and
Motion for Contempt of Court praying that petitioners
be held in contempt.
RTC denied the motion, ruling that the noninclusion
of the house was justified since the decision
of the court earlier shows that nothing was mentioned
about the house. Even John’s initiatory complaint
never mentioned the house. The court said it could not
grant a relief not alleged and prayed for in the
complaint. MR with the RTC also denied.
In a petition for certiorari with CA, the court
granted the petition, reversing and setting aside the
RTC ruling. It ordered the sale of the lot, including the
house standing thereon. Petitioners filed MR with CA,
but it was denied, hence the present case.
Issue: Did the lower court err in taking jurisdiction
over the contempt proceeding? – Yes, it was wrong for it to
do so for failure to comply with req’ts
Held:
The contempt proceeding initiated by the John
Arriola is one for indirect contempt. Under Rule 71, it is
to be initiated by the court motu propio or by a
verified petition, with supporting particulars and
certified true copies of docs/papers involved and with
full compliance with the req’ts for filing initiatory
pleadings for civil actions. The law is clear. The filing of
a verified petition that has complied with the req’ts for
the filing of initiatory pleading is mandatory and for
failure to do so, the court should dismiss it outright.
Here, John Arriola merely filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for Contempt. It was not
verified, and it failed to conform with the req’ts for
initiatory pleadings such as submission of certification
against non-forum shopping and payment of docket
fees. The RTC clearly erred in taking jurisdiction over
the contempt proceeding. Even if the contempt
proceedings stemmed from the main case over which
the court already acquired jurisdiction, the rules direct
that the petition for contempt be treated independently
of the principal action. Consequently, the necessary
prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such
as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a
certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment
of the necessary docket fees, must still be faithfully
observed. (Before, it was actually allowed that
contempt proceedings be initiated by mere motion and
without compliance with the reqt’s for initiatory
pleadings, but since the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, such practice was no longer countenanced).
[Substantive part: even if the motion complied with
the req’ts of the Rules of Court, it should still fail on
substantive grounds since it turned out that the house
is a family home and despite the death of one or both
spouses, it shall continue for a period of 10y or for as
long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs
cannot partition it unless there is a compelling reason.
No such reason here.]
CA ruling is modified. The house is declared
part of the lot, but it is exempted from partition by
public auction until the period provided for in the law.
DOCTRINE:
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
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respondents instituted the complaint on March 10, 1999,
which was well within a year after the demand to vacate was
made around September of 1998 or later.
FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION V. LACK OF
CAUSE OF ACTION
Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action
are really different from each other. On the one hand, failure
to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the
pleading, and is a ground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the
Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause action refers
to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of
action alleged in the pleading.
Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial
law, has explained the distinction:
Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to
prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for
dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to
demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10
has been eliminated in this section. The procedure would
consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of
action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to
file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted.
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence
of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(1) The legal right of the plaintiff;
(2) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(3) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said
legal right.
If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence
of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action. Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of
action that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but
the fact that the complaint states no cause of action.
Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest
stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of
cause of action may be raised at any time after the questions
of fact have been resolved on the basis of the stipulations,
admissions, or evidence presented.

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