Germany’s Changing Geostrategic

Designs and Rise of Euro-deterrent

Shees Ul Hassan

Outline
I. Abstract
II. Introduction
i. Brief History
a. German Unification (1871)
1. Always a key player
2. Greatest in size
b. Role of Germany in WWI and WWII
c. The Re-unified Germany 1990
ii. Cold War Ends
a. East & West Germany united in to a whole
b. Followed liberal values since 1990
c. Mearsheimer’s prediction in 1990’s paper
III. The End of Cold War and Rise of Germany
i. Three major schools of thought emerged
a. Realist: shifts in political structures
b. Rationalist: The embededness in affairs determined policies
c. Constructivist
ii. Germany’s Foreign Policy in 1990s
a. Built on two contradictory Principles
1. Extending democracy eastwards
2. Good relations with Russia
b. Russia-Nato Act
c. Institutionalization of CSCE
IV. Presidential Elections of The US (2017)
i.

Abstract:
Germany, since its unification at the end of cold war in 1990, has been a key player in modern
Europe. After the formation of European Union in 1993, Germany has played a central role in
deciding the direction of European foreign policy. European Union in general and newly
founded Unified Germany in particular has adopted a liberal domestic and foreign policy. A
strong dissent against Nuclear Weapons combined with its sincerest support for nuclear non-
proliferation regime, Germany has been a model state in terms of civilian power. In the
backdrop of Trump’s election as the President of the United States, his dissenting remarks
about NATO and his growing inclination towards Russia, the pro-nonproliferation Germany is
undergoing a paradigm shift. Article under consideration sheds light on various aspects related
to this change in German nuclear policy. It also discusses the repercussions that Germany and
EU, as a whole might face and the challenges that lies ahead in the pursuit of the Euro-
deterrent.

Key Words: Offensive Realism, Euro-deterrent, NPT, Geostrategic environment, German

hegemony

Introduction:
Germany, right from its unification in 1871, has always led an aggressive foreign policy. Wilhelm
I of Prussia was chosen, in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles, to be the first
strongman of the new German state that comprised of all the German speaking populations.
This was the beginning of what latter became the cradle for aggressive German Nationalism.
Germany joined WWI to expand its territory and power though the common perception is that
it did so to aid its ally Austria-Hungary against triple entente. This lust of territorial
aggrandizement has also been demonstrated by Nazi Germany in WWII. Putting in a nutshell,
Germany has always been an aggressive state. The post WWII settlements, the division of spoils
of war, among the allies left Germany crippled. The Cold War acted as buffer time for Germany
to reflect upon its past, especially the Germany under the control of the USSR.

At the end of Cold War both parts of Germany were united to form, once again, The Greater
German State. The Germany opted for the liberal path this time. But, there was a group of
scholars who foresaw the inevitability of German aggression. Professor John Mearsheimer was
the most vocal proponent of this thought. In his paper “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe
after the Cold War”, Mearsheimer put forward certain predictions relating to the post-Cold War
future of Europe. He predicted that in order to achieve Balance of Power vis-à-vis Russia,
Germany will resort to Nuclear Weapons. In addition, he also proposed the disintegration of
NATO and dismemberment of European Union.1 This was quite a farfetched idea at the time
but in today’s world, rapidly changing scenarios has made these propositions equally plausible
possibilities.

The End of Cold War and The subsequent Rise of Germany

1
Mearsheimer, J. (1990). Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. International
Security, 15(1), 5-56. doi:10.2307/2538981
During the Cold War, a distinct German foreign policy style existed in the midst of East-West
conflict. A controversy ensued with the end of Cold War, after the unification of Germany, as to
whether Germany would follow the foreign policy course of ‘Bonn Republic’ or it would reorient
itself along the lines of major power player of the time – France and Great Britain.2 Three major
schools of thought emerged which argued that German foreign policy in the 1990s would
follow:

i. Realist: Posited that shifts in international power structures would lead Germany to
the path of power politics, to seek maximum autonomy outside transatlantic
institutions or maximum influence in the European Union.3
ii. Rationalist: The degree of international embeddedness in multilateral
organizations like EU, NATO and Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) would lead Germany to follow the course prescribed by the norms
and rules of these institutions.4
iii. Constructivist: The Germany would conceive a foreign policy depending on its own
self-conception (Identity) or role conception (ego) to formulate a social constructed
foreign policy culture that would be stable and more robust.

German foreign policy was built on two, somewhat conflicting, principles: Germany was
determined to extend democracy eastwards to the newly liberated States from former Soviet
Union along with keeping the good relations with Russia, which explains initial hesitation in the
enlargement of NATO. Germany played a leading role in cracking NATO-Russia Act and the
institutionalization of Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.5 Henning Tewes
contends the conception that propagates German’s pro-enlargement policy being driven from
norms and values of EU and NATO. He says that if Germany had any such intentions it would
have pursued it right from the first day of its foundation without hesitation. But Germany
struggled due to the tensions inherent in its civilian power role – deepening integration and
widening integration.6

The strength of the constructivist civilian power analysis of German foreign policy was
demonstrated by Oliver Meier by putting forward the case of Germany’s non-proliferation

2
Gunther Hellmann, ‘The Sirens of Power and German Foreign Policy: Who Is Listening?’, German Politics, 6/2
(1997), pp.29–57
3
Arnulf Baring (ed.), Germany’s New Position in Europe:Problems and Perspectives (Oxford: Berg 1994);
4
Banchoff, The German Problem Transformed; Peter Katzenstein, ‘United Germany in an Integrating
Europe’, in Katzenstein (ed.)
5
Sebastian Harnisch (2001) Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy, German Politics, 10:1,
35-60, DOI: 10.1080/09644000412331307384
6
Tewes makes this point even more vigorously in his superb Ph.D. dissertation: Henning Tewes, ‘Germany as a
Civilian Power. The Western Integration of East Central Europe, 1989–1997’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of
Birmingham, 1998), pp.222–5
policy in the 1990s. He rejected the expectations of neo-realists about Germany going for
nuclear weapons, in order to reconstruct the Balance of Power in the region. Meier argues that
Germany would prefer the non-nuclear path even if the nuclear umbrella from the US falters.
Hence, he refutes the institutionalist argument that Germany would remain true to non-
proliferation regime as long as it enjoys the US nuclear protection.7

In sum, three conclusions can be drawn from the brief discussion above. First, Germany has
remained true to its ‘civilian power’ role. Second, the cases where Germany apparently diverge
from its proposed roles, the divergence can be explained through role-theoretical approach.
Third, “alter- and ego-expectations as constituting parts of the role concept were not simply
down-loaded or up-loaded by policy makers.”8

Presidential Elections of the United States (2017)

European Union (EU), especially Germany, was facing a hard time sorting its issues in the
backdrop of declining situation in Middle East and Africa. There were problems – slow
economy, terrorism, refugee crisis etc. but nothing hurt the EU interests more than the election
of Donald Trump as the President of the United States.9 Trump during his campaign showed
indifference to the idea of possible breakup of EU and voice praise for the nationalist political
movements such as Brexit. Also throughout his campaign he pledged things that were against
the dominant liberal world order such as closing borders, racial and religion based
discrimination, indifference towards multilateral regimes such as Paris Climate accords. He also
declared NATO “obsolete”: the system that has kept the whole EU safe throughout the Cold
War.

The worst move made by Donald Trump was the inclination that he showed towards Russia,
despite the fact that Russia has been involved in forced annexations such as Crimea and
violation of human rights etc. The latest leaks that showed Russian meddling in the 2017
elections in favor of Trump, has sparked new concerns in the courts of European Union about
uncertain future of Trump’s Presidency. Trump adopted nationalistic, closed borders and anti-

7
Oliver Meier, ‘Eine vergleichende Untersuchung der deutschen und der japanischen Nichtverbreitungspolitik’
(unpublished manuscript, niversity of Trier, 1997), and ‘A Civilian Power Caught Between the Lines – Germany
and Nuclear Non-Proliferation’, in Harnisch and Maull (eds.), Germany – Still a Civilian Power?
8
Sebastian Harnisch (2001) Change and continuity in post-unification German foreign policy, German Politics, 10:1,
35-60, DOI: 10.1080/09644000412331307384
9
Kühn, U., & Volpe, T. (2018, January 1). Keine Atombombe, Bitte. Retrieved January 1, 2018, from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-06-13/keine-atombombe-bitte
globalization policies that were against the liberal values. The conflicting stances of Trump vis-à-
vis European Union made EU look inwards for security and stability.

Euro-Deterrent – The Silver Lining

European lawmakers are concerned over the unprecedented tilt of the US towards Russia. They
worry that Trump’s America and Putin’s Russia could collude to strike a “grand bargain” that
would exclude European interests, a potential first step to dictate EU’s future.10 The fear is
greater because of the Russian actions of the recent past. Russia attacked Crimea in 2014 that
resulted in Crimean annexation to Russia. A part of Germany still harbors the painful memories
of former Soviet occupation. And the irony is that being the biggest nation of EU it has to face
Russia on negotiation table whenever such a crisis raises it head.

In the wake of Russian annexation of Crimea, Germany’s pragmatic relations with Russia rapidly
deteriorated. EU imposed sanctions on Russia and sent German forces to reassure nervous
Baltic NATO allies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is another silver lining in the
relations of Europe and The US. Trump accusing European members of not paying enough has
sparked severe discontent in EU.

The European Union has started mulling over acquiring the nuclear weapons of its own. The
discussion of so called “Eurodeterrent” has become mainstream especially in Germany: a
country who has always been a vocal contender against nuclear proliferation.11

The Options
i. British-French Nuclear Umbrella
The idea of a British French is not a new one. Short after Suez Canal crisis, in 1957,
relations between the United States and France took a harsh turn. US was wary of
the fact that Britain and France did not take the US into confidence before launching
an attack to secure Suez Canal for themselves. It was the height of Cold War, and
any such action without taking the bloc leader into confidence was considered as a
dissenting act. This was the reason that British and French armies were forced to
leave the canal as such upon the US pressure. These differences plot the seed of
non-confidence in the French power circles. The French government began to doubt
the credibility of US assurances of protecting EU in case of a foreign attack and that
it would extend nuclear umbrella over the whole Europe. France suggested to Italy

10
Fisher, M. (2017, March 06). Fearing U.S. Withdrawal, Europe Considers Its Own Nuclear Deterrent, the New
York Times, P. A8
11
Fisher, M. (2017, March 06). Fearing U.S. Withdrawal, Europe Considers Its Own Nuclear Deterrent, The New
York Times, P. A8
 and West Germany that the three countries should go for the development of
Nuclear weapons together. These secret negotiations were cancelled as soon as next
French president assumed the charge of office and began indigenous nuclear
program for the development of Nuclear Weapons. France also offered the
extension of its nuclear umbrella to the Unified Germany, in 1990, in order to
decrease the US influence on European matters. These efforts failed because the
French were not willing to relinquish their control over the weapons, deployed in
the foreign territory as well, which was synonymous to give up French autonomy in
foreign policy.12
This debate has come to fore, once again, in the back drop of changing geostrategic
conditions of the region. Germany has determined that it has a slight window of
opportunity to finance the British-French nuclear program and in return, demanding
the nuclear umbrella to be extended over the whole European Union while
remaining fully committed to its international obligations under the treaties it has
signed related to nuclear proliferation. German Parliament has already made a
thorough assessment of the possibility of materializing the plan. “Britain and France,
it finds, could legally base nuclear warheads on German soil”. Germany could be
granted partial control of the weapons on its soil using a “dual key” system. This
arrangement currently applies to American warheads based there.13
The complications that may arise are of two types. First is that the large parts of the
French Nuclear Force is stationed on nuclear submarines and UK is almost solely
dependent on sea-based-system14 and they will require a large amount of financial
aid to mainstream their weapons to fit for the job they are being required of. The
second problem is the reluctance of France to share control of nuclear weapons with
any other country.

ii. German Nuclear Deterrent

In the midst of complications regarding British-French nuclear deterrent Germany
found its rationale to become a nuclear power. There are certain challenges that
encircle this whole idea of Nuclear Germany. First and foremost, the popular opinion
in German public is anti-nuclear proliferation. The second one is the international
obligations under the treaties signed by Germany such as Nuclear Non-proliferation

12
Kühn, U., & Volpe, T. (2018, January 1). Keine Atombombe, Bitte. Retrieved January 1, 2018, from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-06-13/keine-atombombe-bitte
13 rd
Berlin1, page 1, 3 para
14
Dausend, Peter / Thumann, Michael, "Nuclear power Europe", in: TIME v. 02/16/2017, p 2,
www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2017-02/trump-nato-atomwaffen-
 Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Ban Treaty (NBT), and The Two plus Four Treaty. These all
prohibits a non-nuclear weapon State (like Germany) to indigenously acquire nuclear
weapons.

Germany has recently pondered upon and a published a review15 on the wider implications of
these treaties. Review named “International obligations of Germany in dealing with the Nuclear
Weapons”16 concludes that Germany has a window of opportunity and is allowed to pursue its
ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons by a sharing agreement.

A brief Critique of International Obligations on Germany

The main focus in this report was given to the point that if Germany is allowed to finance a
nuclear program of another nuclear weapon State and in return demand a secondary
partnership. This problem did not arise in case of NATO because the nuclear weapons deployed
under the NATO agreement was indigenously developed by the US without any foreign funding.
Following are some critical points that were put forward by The Scientific Services of the
German Bundestag that was commissioned by German Parliament to assess various intricacies
related to Germany’s international obligations regarding Nuclear Weapon Proliferation.

i. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Non-Proliferation Treaty allows the member states to procure nuclear material
(to procure Art. IV NPT) for peaceful purposes from Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)
and in return the nuclear powers undertake not to pass the knowledge and
technology needed to build nuclear weapons. The NPT’s notion of preventing
nuclear proliferation does not extend to “nuclear sharing”. This refers to two key
arguments:
1. The nuclear weapon state and the state where the nukes are being deployed can
reach a mutual understanding regarding SOPs of their use (so called “secondary
participation”).17
2. The proliferation of nuclear weapons prohibited under NPT to a non-nuclear
weapon State or the acquisition of sole power of disposal of the weapons
deployed on its soil, by a non-nuclear weapon state, does not come under the
‘nuclear sharing’
The consulting, planning and exercises of members of defense alliance in the field of
nuclear defenses is compliant with the provisions of NPT
ii. Convention on Cluster Munition 2008

15
Fisher, M. (2017, July 7). European Nuclear Weapons Program Would Be Legal, German Review Finds. The New
York Times, P. A10.
16
http://www.bundestag.de/blob/513080/c9a903735d5ea334181c2f946d2cf8a2/wd-2-013-17-pdf-data.pdf
17
Shaker, Mohammed I, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Origin and Implementation 1959-1979. Volume 1.
 The NPT do not have any provision like in the case of “Convention on Cluster
Munitions”18 that prohibits co-financing or any kind of financial help offered by the
non-nuclear weapons states to accrue some kind of favor from the NWS. As
Germany is not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, it has no obligation
to stay true to the convention’s provisions. In sum Germany (a non-weapon state)
can finance a NWS like France or Britain and in return ask for their support as a
share bargain.

Rise of a Nuclear Germany

The rise of a strong Germany with nuclear weapons will benefit European Union a lot; it shall
help in deterring un-necessary meddling of the US in German and European internal affairs; it
shall reduce EU dependence on the US for the protection of its sovereignty. Despite all the
benefits this uplift in Germany’s power will provide to European countries, they are still
haunted from the shadow of the past. Every time Germany takes the lead, its neighbors recall
history and grow nervous about German hegemony over Europe.19

The unified Germany is territorially bigger than any other State in the Europe. Its economic and
military power has always sparked fear in its neighbors. Right from the first unification in 1871,
Germany was never stronger enough to control Europe alone and was surrounded by hostile
coalitions to counter its power. This led Germany to develop affinity for authoritarian rule and
attempts to impose that rule to the whole Europe.20 After the unification in 1990, the
institutional bonds of NATO and EU has kept German question to repeat it. It was an age of
‘liberalism’. This all change for Europe in 2009. The great depression and the subsequent EU
debt crisis led many nations to demand for German leadership.21 But when Germany tried to
help they accuse it of harboring hegemonic aspirations. The Germany is trying since to maintain
its role of being not too much bossy.

Rise of Right wing parties

18
The Convention on Cluster Munitions (so-called. "Convention on Cluster Munitions") is entered into force on 1
August 2010. International treaty banning the use, development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention
and transfer of cluster munitions. Gem. Art. 1 this Agreement comparable to each State Party agrees, " never
under any circumstances (...) to support anyone, encourage or induce, any activity that are a Contracting
prohibited under this Convention. "Text available at: http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/343708/publicationFile/4116/081203-
19
Kühn, U., & Volpe, T. (2018, January 1). Keine Atombombe, Bitte. Retrieved January 1, 2018, from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-06-13/keine-atombombe-bitte
20
Kühn, U., & Volpe, T. (2018, January 1). Keine Atombombe, Bitte. Retrieved January 1, 2018, from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-06-13/keine-atombombe-bitte
21
Kühn, U., & Volpe, T. (2018, January 1). Keine Atombombe, Bitte. Retrieved January 1, 2018, from
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/germany/2017-06-13/keine-atombombe-bitte
The Germany has been known for its liberal values that it has adopted after the post-Cold War
unification. There were always concerns of Germany going nuclear on its own but basing their
analysis on the tilt of popular opinion towards pro non-proliferation liberal norms, experts
always denied this possibility despite the fact that Germany has been termed as a latent
nuclear power.

This attitude is also in a shift. The result of German Elections held in September 2017 is a proof
of this claim. The far right parties have never secured enough votes to influence the policy
making since the demise of Hitler’s Nazi Party. Elections of 2017, for the first time in seven
decades, demonstrated the rise of a nationalist party. The Alternative for Germany (AFD), a
party of far right, secured 13% of the votes that shows a popular shift away from the dominant
liberal center-left. This shift in popular opinion is remarkable and may prove to be the turning
point in the nuclear policy of Germany as AFD has been campaigning for nuclear deterrent for a
very long time but never got enough representation to show its power, this time it does.

Conclusion