CrimPro Rule 112 Cases

1. Quisay vs. People, Jan. 13, 2016

G.R. No. 216920 | January 13, 2016 | J. Perlas-Bernabe
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati issued a Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause against the
petitioner for the violation of RA 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act). Later on, a Pabatid Sakdal or Information was filed before the RTC charging the petitioner of the said crime.

Pasiya / Resolution – penned by Assistant City Prosecutor De La Cruz and approved by Senior Assistant City
Prosecutor Hirang; Pabatid Sakdal / Information – penned by ACP De La Cruz, but without approval from any higher
authority. However, there was a Certification claiming that ACP De La Cruz has prior written authority or approval
from the City Prosecutor in filing the said Information.

The petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of authority of the person
who filed the same before the RTC. She claims that it is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured. OCP-Makati
countered that SACP-Hirang was authorized to approve the Pasiya pursuant OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32 and
the prior approval from the City Prosecutor with regards to the information was shown in the Certification.

RTC – denied the motion to quash for lack of merit. It found that the Certification attached in the Information
sufficiently complies with Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the ROC which requires prior written authority or approval by the CP.
CA – affirmed the denial of the motion to quash holding that OCP-Makati complied with Sec. 9 of RA 10071
(Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and OCP-Makati Office Order No. 32. It also opined that the said Certification
should enjoy the presumption of regularity in absence of a contrary proof.

ISSUE:
WON RTC and CA gravely abused their discretion in dismissing petitioner’s motion to quash?

HELD:
YES. Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a complaint or
information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or
information may be filed before the courts. xxx Thus, as a general rule, complaints or information filed before the
courts without the prior written authority or approval of the foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective
and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the same Rules. xxx In this relation, People v.
Garfin, firmly instructs that the filing of an Information by an officer without the requisite authority to file the same
constitutes a jurisdictional infirmity which cannot be cured by silence, waiver, acquiescence, or even by express
consent. Hence, such ground may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged, was validly
made as it bore the approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as
evidenced by his signature therein.

Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the RTC, as there was no
showing that it was approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP- Makati’s division chiefs or
review prosecutors. All it contained was a Certification from ACP De La Cruz which stated, among others, that
“DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na ang paghahain ng sakda lna ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot
o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig”– which translates to “and that the filing of the Information is with the
prior authority and approval of the City Prosecutor.xxx despite such certifications, the Informations were defective as
it was shown that the officers filing the same in court either lacked the authority to do so or failed to show that they
obtained prior WRITTEN authority from any of those authorized officers enumerated in Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. xxx Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the
criminal case against petitioner.

DISPOSITIVE: Petition GRANTED. CA and RTC ruling REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Information against petitioner is
QUASHED. Criminal case against the same is DISMISSED.

2. ABS-CBN Corp. vs. Gozon, et al, March 11, 2013

ABS-CBN CORPORATION v. FELIPE GOZON et al. (G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015)
ABS-CBN Corp., petitioner vs. GMA Pres. and CEO Atty. Felipe Gozon, GMA Vice President and COO Gilberto Duavit
Jr., Marissa L. Flores, Jessica A. Soho, GMA Head of News Operations Grace Dela Peña-Reyes, GMA News Program
Manager John Oliver Manalastas, et. al., respondents. G.R. No. 195956, 1 March 2015 Ponente: Justice Marvic F.
Leonen
FACTS:
On August 13, 2004, petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal complaint against respondent GMA for (alleged) act of
copyright infringement under Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code (RA 8293, as amended),
because the respondent aired footage of the arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq
without the petitioner's consent. ABS-CBN stated that it has an agreement with Reuter's that the petition will
contribute news and content that it owns and makes to Reuters in exchange of the latter's news and video material,
and Reuters will ensure that ABS-CBN's materials cannot be aired in the country.

The respondent was a subscriber of Reuter's and CNN live feeds. After it received the live feed of Angelo Dela Cruz's
arrival and homecoming from Reuter's, it immediately aired the video from that news feed. The respondent alleged
that its news staff was not aware that there was (a news embargo) agreement between ABSCBN and Reuters.
Respondent alleged that it was not also aware that it aired petitioner's footage.

Assistant City Prosecutor Dindo Venturanza issued resolution on 3 December 2004 which found probable cause to
indict Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas. The respondents appealed the Prosccutor's resolution before DOJ. DOJ
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez ruled in favor of respondents in his resolution dated 1 August 2005 and held that good
faith may be raised as a defense in the case.

Meanwhile, DOJ Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued a resolution on 29 June 2010 which reversed Sec.
Gonzalez's resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela Peña-Reyes, Manalastas, as well as to indict Gozon,
Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho for violation of the Intellectual Property Code (due to copyright infringement).

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision on 9 November 2010, which granted the Petition for Certiorari to reverse
and set aside DOJ Sec. Alberto Agra's resolution and a prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction.

The appellate court stated that the petitioner has copyright of its news coverage, but respondents’ act of airing five
(5) seconds of the homecoming footage without notice of the “No Access Philippines” restriction of the live Reuter's
video feed, was undeniably attended by good faith and thus, serves to exculpate from criminal liability under the
Intellectual Property Code.

ISSUES:
W/N there is probable cause to find respondents to be held liable criminally for the case of copyright infringement
under the Intellectual Property Law (RA 8293, as amended)?

HELD:
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED ABS-CBN’s petition and ordered RTC Q.C. Branch 93 to continue with the
criminal proceedings against Grace Dela PeñaReyes and John Oliver Manalastas due to copyright infringement.

The other respondents, Atty. Felipe Gozon, Gilberto Duavit Jr., Marissa L. Flores, and Jessica A. Soho were held not
liable for the (criminal) act of copyright infringement. The Court held that their mere membership in GMA7's Board of
Directors does not mean that they have knowledge, approval, or participation in the criminal act of copyright
infringement., as there is a need for their direct/active participation in such act. Also, there was lack of proof that
they actively participated or exercised moral ascendancy over Manalastas and Dela Cruz-Pena.

Contrary to GMA’s contention, the Supreme Court deemed GMA's mere act of rebroadcast of ABS-CBN’s news
footage (arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz at NAIA from Iraq last 22 July 2004) for 2 mins and 40
secs.without the latter's authority creates probable cause to find GMA's news personnel Manalastas and Dela Peña-
Reyes criminally liable for violating provisions of Intellectual Property Code (Section 216217 of RA 8293, as
amended) that imposes strict liability for copyright infringement, since they have not been diligent in their functions
to prevent that footage from being aired on television. They knew that there would be consequences in carrying
ABS-CBN’s footage in their broadcast – which is why they allegedly cut the feed from Reuters upon seeing ABS-CBN’s
logo and reporter.

The difference of an act mala in se and mala prohibita was stated in the present case. Acts mala in se requires
presence of criminal intent and the person's knowledge of the nature of his/her act, while in acts mala prohibita,
presence of criminal intent and the person's knowledge is not necessary. The Court also stated that Philippine laws
on copyright infringement does not require criminal intent (mens rea) and does not support good faith as a defense.
Thus, the act of infringement and not the intent is the one that causes the damage.

It held that ABS-CBN's video footage is copyrightable because it is under “audiovisual works and cinematographic
works and works produced by a process analogous to cinematography or any process for making audiovisual
recordings.” It also stated that news or the event itself is not copyrightable. The Court differentiated idea and
expression – idea meant as “a form, the look or appearance of a thing” while expression is its reality or the “external,
perceptible world of articulate sounds and visible written symbols that others can understand.” Thus, the Supreme
Court stated that “only the expression of an idea is protected by copyright, not the idea itself”, citing the US
Supreme Court's decision in Baker vs Selden (101 U.S. 99). In the present case, expression applies to the event
captured and presented in a specific medium via cinematography or processes analogous to it.
The Court also gave the four-fold test under the Fair Use Doctrine (stated in section 185 of RA 8293 or the Intellectual
Property Code, as amended) to determine fair use: a. The purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; b. The nature of the copyrighted work;
c. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and d. The
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.

Fair use, which is an exception to copyright owner’s monopoly of the work's usage, was defined by the Supreme
Court as privilege to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the copyright owner's consent or
by copying the material's theme or idea rather than its expression. It also said that determination of whether the
Angelo dela Cruz footage is subject to fair use is better left to the trial court where the proceedings are currently
pending. /archie.manansala Archibald Jose T. Manansala CEU School of Law, A.Y. 20152016

3. De Los Santos-Dio vs. CA, June 26, 2013

Facts:
Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio), the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd. (HS Equities) and authorized
representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd. (Westdale), was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of the Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the authorized representative of Active
Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV China), the majority shareholder of SBMEI. Dio, on behalf of HS Equities,
decided to invest in SBMEI’s Ocean Adventure Marine Park (Ocean Adventure), a theme park to be constructed at
the Subic Bay Freeport Zone which, when operational, would showcase live performances of false-killer whales and
sea lions. In this relation, Dio claimed that Desmond led her to believe that SBMEI had a capital of US$5,500,000.00,
inclusive of the value of the marine mammals to be used in Ocean Adventure, and also guaranteed substantial
returns on investment. Desmond even presented a Business Plan. While no Certificate of Stock was issued either to HS
Equities or to Dio, HS Equities was expressly granted minority protection rights in a subsequent Subscription and
Shareholders Agreement stating that there shall be “a nominee of the Subscriber to be elected as Treasurer/Chief
Financial Officer, who may not be removed by the Board of Directors without the affirmative vote of the Subscriber.”
Dio was appointed as its Treasurer. The parties later executed two (2) Investor’s Convertible Promissory Notes. Dio, this
time on behalf of Westdale, invested in a separate business venture, called the Miracle Beach, which involved the
development of a resort owned by Desmond adjoining Ocean Adventure. They agreed that the said investment
would be used to settle SBMEI’s loan obligation to First Metro Investment Corporation and for the construction of 48
lodging units/cabanas. However, when the corresponding subscription agreement was presented to Dio by SBMEI
for approval, it contained a clause stating that the “funds in the Subscription Bank Account” were also to be used
for the funding of Ocean Adventure’s Negative Cash Flow This was in conflict with the exclusive purpose and intent
of Westdale’s investment in Miracle Beach and as such, Dio refused to sign the subscription agreement.

Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmond’s representations, SBMEI actually had no capacity
to deliver on its guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses which prompted her to call for an
audit investigation. Consequently, Dio discovered that, without her knowledge and consent, Desmond made
certain disbursements from Westdale’s special account, meant only for Miracle Beach expenditures (special
account), and diverted therein for the operating expenses of Ocean Adventure.21 When Desmond refused to
execute an undertaking to return the diverted funds, Dio, in her capacity as Treasurer of SBMEI, suspended the
release of the remaining funds in the aforesaid special account. Eventually, after Dio was ousted as Director and
Treasurer of SBMEI, she filed 2 criminal complaints, for Estafa (a) through false pretenses and (b) with unfaithfulness or
abuse of confidence through misappropriation or conversion both against Desmond before the Olongapo City
Prosecutor’s Office. After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution finding probable
cause against Desmond. The RTC ruled in favour of Desmond and declared that no probable cause exists for the
crimes charged against him since the elements of estafa were not all present. The CA upheld the RTC’s authority to
dismiss a criminal case if in the process of determining probable cause for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the
evidence on record insufficient to establish probable cause.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it dismissed the
subject information for lack of probable cause.

Ruling: Yes. Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.

The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to
determine whether probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court. The second is one
made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. In this respect,
the judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause,
the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

In other words, once the information is filed with the court and the judge proceeds with his primordial task of
evaluating the evidence on record, he may either: (a) issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b)
immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the
prosecutor to submit additional evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause.

Applying these principles, the Court finds that the RTC’s immediate dismissal, as affirmed by the CA, was improper as
the standard of clear lack of probable cause was not observed.

4. Mendoza vs. People, April 21, 2014

FACTS:
Juno Cars hired Mendoza as Trade-In/Used Car Supervisor. Upon partial audit, it was discovered that five cars had
been sold and released by Alfredo without permission and without remitting the payment to Juno Cars. Juno Cars
filed a criminal complaint against Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa. Mendoza contends that Juno Cars failed
to prove ownership over the five (5) cars or its right to possess them with the purported unremitted payments, hence,
it could not have suffered damage.

Prosecutor Rey Delgado issued a resolution finding probable cause and filed the two (2) informations before the RTC
against Mendoza for qualified theft and estafa. Mendoza moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied. He
filed before the RTC a motion for determination of probable cause. After conducting an independent assessment of
the evidence on record, Judge Rizalina Capco – Umali dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the trial court may dismiss an information filed by the prosecutor onthe basis of its own independent
finding of lack of probable cause.
(2) What is the difference between executive determination of probable cause from judicial determination of
probable cause?
(3) What are the three (3) options given to the trial court upon the filing of the criminal information under Section 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court?

HELD: (1) YES. Once the information has been filed in court, the judge shall then “personally evaluate the resolution
of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant of
arrest.
Under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court mandates the judge to “immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.”

(2) The executive determination of probable cause is one made during the preliminary investigation. It is a function
that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be
held for trial.

Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be
filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor is a matter that
the trial court itself does not and may not be competent to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence
submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the
judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

The difference is clear. The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough
evidence to support an information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand,
determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.

(3) Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three (3) options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (b) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause.

5. Leviste v. Almeda, GR No. 182677, August 3, 2010

Facts: On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with homicide for the
death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private complainants-heirs of de las
Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to
re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC
thereafter issued the Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus, allowing the prosecution to conduct a
reinvestigation. Later, the trial court issued the other order that admitted the Amended Information for murder and
directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate court.
Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not guilty" for him. Prior to this,
the petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court granted
on the ground that the evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is not strong. The trial court went on to try the
petitioner under the Amended Information. Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial
court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial
court. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial
amendment, which would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.

Held: Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to whether a defendant
is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available
after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to
the information in the one form as in the other.

An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment
had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. here is no substantial distinction between a
preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same
objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that
petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were
made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to
present countervailing evidence on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to
merely observe the proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the
reinvestigation.

6. Arroyo vs. DOJ, Sept. 18, 2012

NATURE:
These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in G.R. No. 199118 and
Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012
Decision3 dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against respondents Commission on Elections
(Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec
Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team),
et al.

FACTS:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint Committee
and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases In its Initial
Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections
in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. It recommended that
Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage and manipulating the election results.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the
Joint Panel.

On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:
1. Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of
Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National
Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is
hereby declared VALID.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not
exercise concurrent jurisdiction

HELD:
1. The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed
Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be
approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. 45 With more reason, therefore, that
we the the court cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s
independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution

2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the
amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power
between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent
initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by
said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The
subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a
settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.

FALLO: petition is denied

7. People vs. Judge Yadao, Nov. 13, 2012

FACTS:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police’s Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat, then headed by Police Chief
Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal
Investigation Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and
those who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers
involved. On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder
against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan. On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered
the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the
recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.
The case was reopened in March 27, 2001 but the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson’s petition on the ground
of double jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to try the case. It was re-raffled
to branch 81 presided by Judge Yadao. Yadao in 2003 junked the murder case against Lacson and other police
officials for lack of probable cause. On March 3, 2004 the prosecution filed the present special civil action of
certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the criminal actions on the
ground of lack of probable cause
HELD: The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the motions for
determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and allowed
the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The general rule of course is that the judge is not required,
when determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge
only needs to personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence. But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in
their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable
cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and related documents
that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records. The SC held that the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.
The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered
the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Section
6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information:
(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if
it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in
case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option under the above is for it to “immediately dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.” That is the situation here: the evidence on record
clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.
In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated
from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadao’s policy of allowing only one public prosecutor and one private
prosecutor to address the court during the hearing for determination of probable cause but permitting counsels
representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is prosecuted under the direction and control of the
public prosecutor. The burden of establishing probable cause against all the accused is upon him, not upon the
private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients’ damages claim. Besides, the public and the private
prosecutors take a common position on the issue of probable cause. On the other hand, each of the accused is
entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him.

8. Sierra vs. Lopez, Aug. 29, 2008

9. Baviera vs. Paglinawan, Feb. 8, 2007

Facts: SCB acted as a stock broker, soliciting from local residents foreign securities called GTPMF. These securities
were not registered with the SEC and were then remitted outwardly to SCB-Hong Kong and SCB-Singapore. The
Investment Capital Association of the Philippines (ICAP) filed with the SEC a complaint alleging that SCB violated the
Revised Securities Act, particularly the provision prohibiting the selling of securities without prior registration with the
SEC; and that its actions are potentially damaging to the local mutual fund industry. Notwithstanding the BSP
directive, SCB continued to offer and sell GTPMF securities in this country. Petitioner learned that the SCB had been
prohibited by the BSP to sell GPTMF securities. Petitioner filed with the DOJ a complaint for violation of Section 8.1 of
the Securities Regulation Code against private respondents but was denied holding that it should have been filed
with the SEC.

Issue: Whether the SEC has jurisdiction over the case

Held: Yes. A criminal charge for violation of the Securities Regulation Code is a specialized dispute. Hence, it must
first be referred to an administrative agency of special competence, i.e., the SEC. Under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts will not determine a controversy involving a question within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the specialized
knowledge and expertise of said administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The
Securities Regulation Code is a special law. Its enforcement is particularly vested in the SEC. Hence, all complaints
for any violation of the Code and its implementing rules and regulations should be filed with the SEC. Where the
complaint is criminal in nature, the SEC shall indorse the complaint to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and
prosecution.

10. Borlongan vs. Pena, May 5, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation and expenses,
damages, and attorney’s fees, against Urban Bank and the petitioners. Respondent allegedly entered into agency
with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and
squatter from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel.
Attached to the motion were the following documents: 1) a letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman
Ponce and Julie Abad on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the subject property;
2) an unsigned letter dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon
Bejasa from Marilyn G. Ong; 3) a letter dated December 9, 1994 addressed to TeodoroBorlongan and signed by
Marilyn G. Ong; and 4) a Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III. Said documents were
presented in an attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by
the petitioners.

In view of the introduction of the above-mentioned documents, respondent Peña filed his Complaint-Affidavit with
the Office of the City Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed that said documents were falsified because the alleged
signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and
employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they
were falsified.

In a Resolution dated September 23, 1998, the City Prosecutor concluded that the petitioners were probably guilty
of four (4) counts of the crime of Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the principal of
the respondent. Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Bago City.

On October 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For
Reinvestigation. Petitioners insisted that they were denied due process because they claimed that they were not
afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavit. They then argued that since no such counter-affidavit and
supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit
and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules.
In an Order dated November 13, 1998, the court denied the omnibus motion primarily on the ground that
preliminary investigation was not available in the instant case --- which fell within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. The
court, likewise, upheld the validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the Rules.
Besides, the court added, petitioners could no longer question the validity of the warrant since they already posted
bail.

Petitioners subsequently instituted a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and TRO, before the CA ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the MTCC in issuing and not recalling the warrants of arrest, reiterating the arguments in
their omnibus motion.

On June 20, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioners now raise before us the following issues:
Respondents contend that the foregoing issues had become moot and academic when the petitioners posted bail
and were arraigned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the posting of bail amounts to a waiver of questioning the validity of the warrant of arrest

RULING: NO. The earlier ruling of this Court that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of the right to question the
validity of the arrest has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Furthermore, the principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of his arrest after
arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his
objections thereto.

Records reveal that petitioners filed the omnibus motion to quash the information and warrant of arrest, and for
reinvestigation, on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation
that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest. From these circumstances, we cannot
reasonably infer a valid waiver on the part of the petitioners, as to preclude them from raising the issue of the
validity of the arrest before the CA and eventually before this Court.

ISSUE: whether or not a criminal prosecution can be restrained.

RULING. YES. As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin
or restrain criminal prosecution. However, the following exceptions to the rule have been recognized: 1) when the
injunction is necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2) when it is
necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3) when there is a
prejudicial question which is sub judice; 4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; 5)
where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6) when double jeopardy is clearly
apparent; 7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8) where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; 9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and 10) when
there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
Considering that the issues for resolution involve the validity of the information and warrant of arrest, and
considering further that no waiver of rights may be attributed to the petitioners as earlier discussed, we issued a TRO
on August 2, 2000 to give the Court the opportunity to resolve the case before the criminal prosecution is allowed
to continue.

Petitioners insist that they were denied due process because they were not afforded the right to submit counter-
affidavits which would have aided the court in determining the existence of probable cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the submission of counter-affidavit is necessary before the judge can determine probable
cause in issuing a warrant of arrest.

RULING. NO. Petitioners were charged with the offense defined and penalized by the second paragraph of Article
17235 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty imposable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prisioncorreccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
Clearly, the case is cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court and preliminary investigation is not mandatory.
Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the complaint- affidavit of the respondent and did not require
the petitioners to submit their counter-affidavits. The prosecutor should not be faulted for taking this course of
action, because it is sanctioned by the Rules. To reiterate, upon the filing of the complaint and affidavit with
respect to cases cognizable by the MTCC, the prosecutor shall take the appropriate action based on the affidavits
and other supporting documents submitted by the complainant.
The prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission of counter- affidavits. Probable cause may then be
determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the complainant, without infringing
on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.
On the other hand, for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge must personally determine the existence of
probable cause. Again, the petitioners insist that the trial judge erred in issuing the warrant of arrest without
affording them their right to submit their counter- affidavits.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis
thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not
satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
In determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest in the case at bench, we find nothing
wrong with the procedure adopted by the trial judge --- he relied on the resolution of the prosecutor, as well as the
supporting documents submitted by the respondent. There is no provision of law or procedural rule which makes
the submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge can determine whether or not there exists
probable cause to issue the warrant.

In light of the foregoing, it appears that the proper procedure was followed by the prosecutor in determining
probable cause for the filing of the informations, and by the trial court judge in determining probable cause for the
issuance of the warrants of arrest. To reiterate, preliminary investigation was not mandatory, and the submission of
counter-affidavit was not necessary.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is probable cause in the instant case

RULING. NO. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.On the other hand, we have defined probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe
that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
To accord respect to the discretion granted to the prosecutor and for reasons of practicality, this Court, as a rule,
does not interfere with the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause. It is only in exceptional cases when this
Court may set aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge on the existence of probable cause, that
is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of
justice. The facts obtaining in the present case warrant the application of the exception.
Contrary to the findings of the MTCC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, we find the complaint-affidavit and
attachments insufficient to support the existence of probable cause. Specifically, the respondent failed to
sufficiently establish prima facie that the alleged documents were falsified. In support of his claim of falsity of the
documents, the private respondent stated in his complaint-affidavit that Herman Ponce, Julie Abad and Marilyn
Ong, the alleged signatories of the questioned letters, did not actually affix their signatures; and that they were not
actually officers or stockholders of ISCI. He further claimed that Enrique Montilla’s signature appearing in another
memorandum addressed to respondent was forged. These are mere assertions, insufficient to warrant the filing of
the complaint or the issuance of the warrant of arrest.
It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his witnesses, shall allege facts within their
(affiants) personal knowledge. The allegation of the respondent that the signatures of Ponce, Abad, Ong and
Montilla were falsified does not qualify as personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that
he was present at the time of the execution of the documents.Neither did he claim that he was familiar with the
signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare assertion that the signatories were mere dummies of ISCI and
they were not in fact officers, stockholders or representatives of the corporation. At the very least, the affidavit was
based on respondent’s "personal belief" and not "personal knowledge."

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 20, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No.
49666 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order dated August 2, 2000 is hereby made
permanent. Accordingly, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, City of Bago, is ORDERED to DISMISS Criminal Case Nos.
6683-86.
SO ORDERED.